5.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Bucharest. 6.  On 8 December 1995 S.M., a powerful businessman, lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant, who, between March and October 1995, had asked for 20,000 US dollars (USD) for his sick wife, and instead had used the money to buy a Mercedes and a BMW car. The applicant claimed that he was working for the Protection and Guard Service (Serviciul de Protecţie şi Pază), a state body with attributions in the field of national security, but later on the investigation showed that on 5 April 1995 he had been released from duty.
Similar complaints of fraud were made by other alleged victims of the applicant. 7.  The applicant was arrested on 11 January 1996 and brought to the Bucharest District Police Detention Centre. The next day the prosecutor ordered his pre-trial detention in the same police facility.
In a statement made on 12 February 1996 the applicant informed the prosecutor that he had psychiatric problems that made him unfit for detention and therefore asked to undergo psychiatric tests (see paragraph 23 below). 8.  On 4 April 1996 the Bucharest District Court rejected a request by the prosecutor for an extension of the applicant’s detention. On 8 April 1996 the applicant was released from custody. 9.  On 12 June 1996 the prosecutor ordered the applicant to be remanded in custody. On 14 June 1996 he was arrested again and placed in police detention. 10.  On 24 July 1996 the Bucharest County Court quashed the District Court’s decision of 4 April and extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention. 11.  He was released again on 18 December 1997. 12.  The parties’ submissions concerning the conditions of detention differ significantly. 13.  According to the applicant, during the first four weeks of his detention he was beaten by masked police officers and by inmates, on the orders of the investigators. 14.  He was woken up in the night and interrogated, under threat of death. He was forced to bend over with his hands handcuffed behind his knees. The investigators would then hang him with his head downwards from a truncheon passed between his hands and legs. He was beaten on his feet with his shoes on until he lost consciousness. 15.  He was subject to the same treatment every two to four days. 16.  He used to be taken to the first-floor offices and beaten over the back and head with 1.5 metre-long metal-reinforced wooden truncheons, while the investigators verbally abused him. 17.  On an unspecified date an inmate called “Nelu” raped the applicant, with the help of other inmates and encouraged by the investigator. He also broke the applicant’s teeth with his fist when the applicant refused to open his mouth. 18.  His inmates urinated on his food and forced him to eat it. 19.  The applicant told his wife about the ill-treatment and she informed his lawyer, who managed to have the applicant moved to a different cell but the applicant was again subjected to ill-treatment by his new inmates. He was forced to squat and do push-ups all night long under the supervision of an inmate. If he refused to obey, the next day he would be beaten. He was not allowed to use the toilets but was beaten when he urinated in the cell. 20.  According to the applicant, the treatment inflicted by the investigators was far worse than that he suffered at the hands of his inmates. Once he was punched in his liver by the police until he almost lost consciousness. 21.  The Government denied that any ill-treatment had been inflicted on the applicant. 22.  They presented a detailed report of the applicant’s detention and medical treatment, based on the prison records and medical files. According to that report, from 30 January to 9 February 1996 the applicant had shared a dormitory with twelve other detainees, including M.I. 23.  From 9 to 28 February he was kept in Jilava Prison Hospital. On 22 February 1996 the psychiatric doctors from the Mina Minovici Forensic Medicine Institute examined the applicant and diagnosed him with a personality disorder. He was prescribed antidepressants. The diagnosis was confirmed by the same Institute on 8 August 1996, on the prosecutor’s request. 24.  From 28 February to 1 April 1996 he was held in the Bucharest Police Detention Centre again and placed in a dormitory with ten other inmates: M.I., B.Y., T.G., C.M., G.M., V.G., L.N., P.N., V.C. and R.S.M. 25.  On 1 April he was sent to Jilava Prison Hospital where he remained until 8 April. He was diagnosed with depression, anxiety and hemiplegia of the left side of his body. 26.  From 14 June to 7 September 1996 he was held in the police facilities again and shared a cell with four other inmates. He spent the rest of his pre-trial detention in Jilava Prison Hospital, where he was treated for depression and a personality disorder. 27.  No detainee named “Nelu” was identified by the prison authorities. 28.  No complaints by the applicant concerning the conditions of detention were registered with the authorities during his detention. 29.  On 16 February 1996 the applicant’s wife lodged a criminal complaint with the Military Prosecutor’s Office attached to the Bucharest County Court, claiming that her husband was being subjected to ill‑treatment in detention. She claimed that she had noticed marks of violence on her husband’s face on 14 February 1996 when she had visited him in the prison hospital. He had told her that he had been beaten. 30.  On 15 March 1996 the applicant gave testimony before the prosecutor. The relevant parts of his statement are as follows:
“I was arrested... and put in a cell with seven other detainees for the first two-three weeks. During that time the prisoner responsible for maintaining order in the cell, a certain “Nelu”, tried to sexually abuse me. During the same period I was taken for questioning and kicked in my stomach and face; I received blows to my cheeks and was kneed... by three to four persons wearing civilian clothes and masks ... This treatment is still going on...
I should also mention that in ... 1995 I was treated for spasmophilia; in May 1995 I suffered from depression and received treatment for it ... and I was treated for anxiety.” 31.  On 21 March 1996 the prosecutor took depositions from M.I. and S.C., two inmates who stated that they had shared a cell with the applicant, the first from 30 January to 1 April 1996 and the second from 7 March 1996 to an unspecified date. They both stated that the applicant had not complained of ill-treatment by investigators and had not been subjected to any violence in the cell. 32.  On 4 April 1996 the Mina Minovici Forensic Medicine Institute, which had examined the applicant upon the prosecutor’s request, rendered its report, describing the applicant’s condition as follows:
“1)   pale yellow ecchymoses of 6/7 cm on the right arm, at 1/3 distance from the palm, with receding contour, hard upon palpation (old haematoma, ...);
2)   pale yellow zone with hyper-pigmented centre, uneven contour, ... isolated on the left arm, at approximately 1/3 distance on the front side (plaque of 5/4 cm);
3)  semicircular ecchymose of 7/5 cm on the right inguinal zone (with pale yellow centre), bluish with greeny yellow margins and visible contour;
4)  complains of pain in the right hypochondrium.
Palpation: liver, approximately 5 cm under the rib cage, very sensitive. Specialist examination recommended (ultrasound scan).
Conclusion: “Georgescu Florin presents injuries caused by hitting with hard objects which could have taken place 15 to 30 days before the medical examination. He would have needed 6 to 7 days’ medical treatment for his injuries.” 33.  On 19 April 1996 the military prosecutor took the following decision: 34.  On 24 April 1996 the military prosecutor sent the following letter to the applicant’s wife:
“The investigation showed that the facts complained about had taken place because of the conflicts between [the applicant] and his inmates, caused by [the applicant’s] mental illness. They had not been caused by the wardens.” 35.  Neither the applicant nor his wife received a decision by the prosecutor. 36.  On 26 August 2003, on the applicant’s request, the Bucharest Military Prosecutor’s Office informed the applicant that on 19 April 1996 the prosecutor had decided not to prosecute, as the facts complained about were not prohibited by the criminal law. 37.  On 27 December 1995 the applicant gave the Bucharest Police documents required for the investigation into the allegations against him.
On 28 December 1995 his deposition was taken by the police in connection with the facts under examination. The next day the police decided to open a criminal investigation in respect of the applicant. 38.  On 10 January 1996 the Prosecutor’s Office attached to the Bucharest County Court opened criminal proceedings against the applicant on various charges of forgery and abuse of official position. 39.  The applicant’s testimony was heard again either by the police or by the prosecutor on 11, 12 and 30 January, 19 March, 11 June, 9 July and 15 August 1996.
From January to June 1996 several witnesses and alleged victims gave testimony in the case.
The applicant’s wife’s deposition was heard by the investigators on 27 December 1995, 5 and 31 January, 19 March and 11 June 1996. 40.  On 11 January, 16 March and 6 June 1996 searches were conducted at the applicant’s home. A Mercedes and a BMW car found in his garage were confiscated and valued by an expert at USD 18,654. On 2 April 1996, with the applicant’s wife’s agreement, the two cars were given to S.M. in compensation for the damage he had sustained. 41.  On 13 September 1996 the prosecutor opened a separate file for the offences allegedly committed between 28 March and 3 April 1995 and referred the case to the Bucharest Military Prosecutor’s Office, as the applicant had been a military officer during that time. 42.  On 16 September the same prosecutor indicted the applicant for an act of fraud allegedly committed on 6 June 1996. On 6 October 2000 the applicant was convicted by the Bucharest District Court. This application to the Court does not concern the proceedings referred to in this paragraph. 43.  Several witnesses gave testimony before the military prosecutor. On 7 December 1999 the Military Prosecutor’s Office decided not to prosecute the applicant for the offences committed before 3 April 1995 and referred the case back to the Prosecutor’s Office attached to the Bucharest County Court in respect of the offences allegedly committed between 26 June and 15 October 1995. It also noted that the applicant had tried to abscond during the investigation. On his request, the applicant was informed of this decision on 8 August 2003 but did not receive a copy of it. 44.  The prosecutor attached to the Bucharest County Court opened the investigation but could not hear the applicant’s testimony before 27 June 2001, as the latter had allegedly absconded. 45.  On 9 September 2002 the prosecutor at the Bucharest County Court also decided not to prosecute the applicant and made reference to the military prosecutor’s decision of 7 December 1999 concerning the same facts. However, on 23 September 2002 the Prosecutor’s Office attached to the Bucharest Court of Appeal annulled the decision and ordered the reopening of criminal proceedings against the applicant. 46.  The case was referred back to the prosecutor attached to the Bucharest County Court on 26 September 2002 and from there to the police for further investigation on 6 November 2002. 47.  On 10 February 2003 the applicant gave testimony. 48.  On 10 March 2003 the police returned the file to the prosecutor attached to the Bucharest County Court with a proposal to indict the applicant. However, on 4 July 2003 the prosecutor closed the investigation as the case had become time-barred. 49.  On 5 November 2003 the Prosecutor’s Office attached to the Bucharest County Court informed the applicant of its decision. 50.  The applicant asked the Bucharest District Court to release a copy of the transcripts made during the hearing of 4 April 1996. This information was requested by the Court. 51.  In a letter of 4 September 2003 the president of the District Court informed the applicant that it was impossible to obtain the document as the file was situated in the old archives which were being reorganised. 52.  In 1995 the Romanian Intelligence Service requested the Prosecutor’s Office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice to start a criminal investigation in respect of the applicant for having allegedly blackmailed senior civil servants and businessmen between February and July 2005, pretending to be an employee of the Intelligence Service. 53.  On 11 October 2005 the High Court Prosecutor’s Office relinquished competence in favour of the Bucharest County Court Prosecutor’s Office. On 24 October 2005 the latter searched the applicant’s home and confiscated several documents, including the following:
-  a letter of 11 August 2003 from the Court concerning the present application;
-  the medical expert report of 4 April 1996;
-  the criminal complaint of 16 February 1996;
-  the military prosecutor’s letter of 24 April 1996;
-  copies of a letter addressed by the applicant to the Court and of a letter addressed to the Anti-Corruption National Prosecutor’s Office. 54.  All these documents were returned to the applicant on 1 and 21 February 2006. 55.  The applicant claimed that the investigators and the secret services had tried to intimidate him in order to make him withdraw his application to the Court. 56.  The criminal proceedings against the applicant are still pending before the Bucharest District Court. 57.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an action for compensation for illegal detention under Articles 504 and 505 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He considered that the prosecutor’s decision to terminate the proceedings on the ground that they were time-barred had infringed his right of access to a court and had caused him additional damage in so far as it had not ordered the restitution of the two confiscated cars. 58.  In a decision of 27 April 2004 the Bucharest County Court dismissed the action on the grounds that the applicant’s detention did not fall within any of the categories provided for in Article 504 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that he had not proved ownership of the two cars.


5.  The applicant, Ms I. S., was born in 1962 and lives in Bielefeld. 6.  The applicant married in 1986 and had two children. In 1991 and 1992 she suffered miscarriages and a stillbirth, which caused her a long lasting psychological trauma. 7.  In summer 1999 she became pregnant with twins after an extramarital affair. The natural father insisted on an abortion, as did the husband of the applicant. Both men threatened to leave her. 8.  In November 1999 the husband of the applicant moved out and threatened to stop paying maintenance for his two sons and to the applicant. He put further pressure on her by threatening to break off all contact with his sons if she sued for maintenance. Instead, he offered to move back in with the applicant if she gave away the “illegitimate” children. The applicant’s sister and her mother refused to support her. The applicant felt extremely guilty for having destroyed the family situation for her two sons, yet she was determined not to have an abortion. 9.  On 19 April 2000 the twin sisters, S. and M., were born prematurely. The applicant and the newborn children had to remain in hospital, where until 7 May 2000 the applicant cared for the children.
The applicant did not specify the identity of the natural father of the twins. 10.  The applicant made initial contact with the Bielefeld Youth Office during her pregnancy. She allegedly initially thought about having the twins placed in foster care, due to her difficult family and financial situation. The Bielefeld Youth Office – according to the applicant – instead suggested adoption as the applicant herself or her husband would have to pay for the foster care. 11.  From January until October 2000 the applicant received psychological treatment on the advice of her gynaecologist. According to her psychoanalyst the applicant was depressed, had suicidal tendencies, and suffered from anxiety, panic attacks and extreme feelings of guilt as well as a sleeping disorder. The applicant felt overwhelmed by the situation and the decisions to be taken. The potential adoption was a topic of discussion during the treatment. 12.  As the applicant could not take the newborn children home she consented to having them placed in provisional care with a view to later adoption. In this way she hoped to avoid too many changes of the children’s primary carers. She was allegedly told that if placed in foster care the newborns would first be given to an emergency foster family for six months before being handed over to a long-term foster family. 13.  From 8 May 2000 onwards a staff member from the Bielefeld Youth Office advised the applicant to stop visiting the children if she really intended to give them up for adoption. 14.  On 19 May 2000 the children were handed over to the couple who later became their adoptive parents. 15.  In summer 2000 the applicant personally met the future adoptive parents of the twin sisters. The applicant was allegedly so upset that she burst into tears and had to cut the visit short. 16.  On 1 September 2000 it was legally acknowledged that the husband of the applicant was not the father of the twin sisters by judgment of the Bielefeld District Court (no. 34 F 1306/00). The applicant began to work full time in order to support herself and her two sons. 17.  On 9 November 2000 the applicant formally consented to the adoption of the children in a deed before the civil law notary, D.R., in Bielefeld. The declaration reads as follows:
“I hereby give consent for my children, S. and M., born 19.04.2000 in Bielefeld, to be adopted by the married couple identified under no. [...] on the list of the Bielefeld City Youth Office.
I declare this for the use of the competent family court. I am aware that this declaration cannot be revoked.
I have been instructed by the civil law notary as to the legal consequences of the adoption, in particular the fact that all kinship of the children and their children to me and my relatives will cease as will all duties and rights that follow from kinship.
Although I do not know the names of the future parents of my children I trust that the Bielefeld City Youth Office has made a proper choice regarding the parents and respected the interests of the children.
In case the family court wishes to inform me about the beginning or the end of care, the beginning or the end of guardianship regarding my children or about the granting of adoption, I hereby empower the Bielefeld City Youth Office to receive that information for me.” 18.  As the identity of the natural father of the children remained unknown, he could not consent to or object to the adoption. 19.  After the declaration of consent had been made, the applicant, the prospective adoptive parents and the twin infants met again in person. On 25 November 2000 an oral agreement was reached between the prospective adoptive parents and the applicant at a meeting at Stormarn District Social Services in the presence of a staff member. It was considered that the adoptive parents would send a short report together with photographs of the children to the applicant once a year through the Bielefeld Youth Office. Whether this agreement laid down any rules regarding regular meetings between the children and the applicant is disputed. A personal meeting in summer 2001 was considered, but did not take place. 20.  On 1 February 2001 the future adoptive parents declared in a deed before a civil law notary that they wished to adopt the twin sisters S. and M. 21.  In March 2001 the District Administrator (Landrat) of Stormarn District, Department of Social Services and Adoption gave an expert opinion on the development of the children in the care of the prospective adoptive parents. 22.  On 21 June 2001 the guardianship division of the Reinbek District Court (proceedings no. 2 XVI 1/01) held a hearing with the prospective adoptive parents in the presence of the twins. The record of the hearing reads:
“It was debated how the children have been getting on in the family. Particular attention was paid to addressing anxieties resulting from the fact that the natural mother is obviously having enormous difficulties coping on a psychological level with the fact that she has given away her children. There are signs, given that a half-open adoption was agreed on, which lead to the conclusion that the mother seeks contact with the twins. However, the arrangement involving the staff of the Youth Office and the natural mother remains valid, namely, that photographs of the children are to be sent annually to the natural mother. The children will also be told early on that they were adopted.” 23.  On the same day the Reinbek District Court concluded the adoption of S. and M. and declared them the legitimate children of the adoptive parents. The family and the given names of the children were changed accordingly. 24.  On 11 April 2002 the applicant commenced proceedings before the Bielefeld District Court in order to declare her consent to the adoption void. The court transferred the case to the competent Reinbek District Court (no. 2 XVI 6/02). The applicant argued that the adoption was void because the father of the child had not consented to the adoption. She further argued that at the time of giving her consent she had been either in a temporary or in a pathological state of mental disturbance, which had prevented the free exercise of her will. She had not been aware of what she had been doing. She argued – referring to medical evidence – that she had been suffering from an “aggravated reactive form of depression with acute risk of suicide” since 1992, when she had been traumatised by the stillbirth. 25.  The guardian ad litem of the children argued that a revocation of the adoption would be against the best interests of the children, as since their birth they had been almost continuously in the care of the adoptive parents who had established a very good parental relationship with them. 26.  In reaction to the arguments of the guardian ad litem the applicant partly withdrew her application with regard to custody rights and made clear that her aim was no longer to integrate the children into her own family. She acknowledged that the children were well cared for and fully settled in the adoptive family. She underlined that her aim was to regain kinship in order to have a right to contact with the children. In her view her vulnerable situation at the time of the birth had been exploited by the Bielefeld Youth Office; she now felt that she had been unduly influenced to put the children up for adoption. 27.  The Reinbek District Court procured a psychiatric opinion on whether the applicant had been temporarily legally incapable of acting at the time of consenting to the adoption. The expert contacted the applicant, her psychoanalyst at the time and her long-term gynaecologist. According to the psychiatric expert the applicant had been in a situation of extreme conflict from the time she had become aware of her pregnancy. This had aggravated the depression she was already suffering from due to the accidental stillbirth in 1992. He put the applicant’s decision to put the twin sisters up for adoption down to her desire to “get her husband back”. He diagnosed a certain weakness in the applicant’s personality and a dependency on male authority. However, he could not diagnose any past or present psychotic illnesses and therefore concluded that although she had been suffering from a deep inner conflict at the time of consenting to the adoption, the applicant had been legally capable of making a decision on her own. 28.  On 4 June 2003 the court heard the applicant, who explained how, in her view, the Bielefeld Youth Office had unduly used her wish to see her children in the summer of 2000 in order to pressurise her into signing the adoption declaration. 29.  In a decision of 10 June 2003 the Reinbek District Court dismissed the applicant’s claim. It acknowledged the situation of extreme conflict the applicant had been in at the time of consenting to the adoption and the psychological implications of that. It stated that solutions other than putting the children up for adoption might have been available to resolve the applicant’s personal crisis. In line with the expert opinion, however, the court held that the applicant had still been capable of making decisions. Furthermore, the court stated that the applicant had no legal standing to rely on the lack of consent of the children’s father to the adoption. 30.  Since the applicant did not appeal against the decision, it became final. 31.  On 14 November 2002 the applicant filed proceedings (no. 1 F 32/02) for contact with the children and the right to receive information about them at the Reinbek District Court. She argued that she had been promised meetings with the children every six months and letters and photos of them. A meeting with the children in June 2001 had been scheduled according to the agreement, but did not take place because the responsible member of Bielefeld Youth Office was on extended leave. No other member of the Youth Office had replaced the absent staff member. In September 2001 the applicant received photos of the children. When she mentioned that she was thinking about revoking her consent to the adoption, staff of the Bielefeld Youth Office threatened to stop her contact with the children. A letter that the applicant wrote to the adoptive parents and handed over to the Bielefeld Youth Office was returned with the remark that the applicant should seek psychological treatment. The applicant based her claim for contact on Article 1666 and additionally on Article 1685 § 2 of the Civil Code (see “Relevant domestic law” below). Her claim for the right to receive information about the children was based on Article 1686 of the Civil Code. 32.  On 2 July 2003 the adoptive parents were heard. They opposed the claim of the applicant and asked for it to be dismissed. They referred to the legal basis of adoption under the Civil Code, which only provided for anonymous adoption. According to the hearing record the adoptive parents declared that they still intended to inform the children about the adoption before they started primary school. They had planned to see the mother of the children together with the children in spring 2001. This meeting had been set up for the sole benefit of the applicant, as the children would not have benefited from it. They had had the intention of sending letters to the applicant with information about the children. Now, in view of the court proceedings, they felt insecure and preferred to wait for the court decisions. 33.  In a decision of 21 July 2003 the Reinbek District Court dismissed the applicant’s request for contact with the children. According to the court Article 1684 of the Civil Code was not applicable to the applicant’s case as she had lost her legal status as a parent as a result of the adoption. An analogous application of the Article was, according to a decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of 9 April 2003 (no. 1 BvR 1493/96), not possible. Article 1685 of the Civil Code was applicable, but would not grant contact rights to the applicant as she did not fulfil the legal requirements. The applicant could not be considered as a person who had cared for the children for an extended period of time. In fact, she had only cared for them for two weeks. Even if the criteria of the Federal Constitutional Court in the above-mentioned decision – whether there was a social and family relationship – were applied, the applicant could not be granted contact, as she had not created a significant social and family relationship with the children. The time of pregnancy and the two weeks after the birth did not suffice. The Civil Code grants to the adoptive parents the sole right to establish, grant or deny contact with the children even in respect of the natural mother. Furthermore, the court argued that the children, who were only three years old, might be overwhelmed by the fact that they had two mothers. 34.  On 28 July 2003 the court also dismissed the applicant’s claim in regard to the right to receive information about the children. Article 1686 of the Civil Code was not applicable, as the applicant was not a parent any more. Insofar as Article 1686 might be construed more widely, it would not apply to the applicant as her case did not fall under the scope of Article 1685 of the Civil Code. 35.  On 11 August 2003 the applicant filed an appeal with the Schleswig Court of Appeal. She mainly complained that the Reinbek District Court had neither decided on Article 1666 of the Civil Code as a potential basis of her claim nor on whether a contractual agreement existed; furthermore, her petition for an expert opinion on the children’s best interests had been ignored. She further argued that the criteria of a “long duration”, when applied to parent-child relationships, had to be interpreted from the perspective of the child, whose concept of time differed from that of adults. The natural mother was always a “relevant person” in the sense of Article 1685 of the Civil Code, and this evaluation did not change even after the natural mother ceased to have legal responsibilities. Regarding the right to information, she argued that although she had consented to the adoption, she remained the natural mother and the constitutional protection of the family applied to her. Even the Federal Constitutional Court had acknowledged that during pregnancy a psycho-social relationship between mother and the foetus was established (judgment of 29 January 2003 – 1 BvL 20/99 and 1 BvR 933/01). Lastly, she complained about the length of the proceedings. 36.  On 22 October 2003 the applicant was granted legal aid. 37.  On 30 January 2004 the Schleswig Court of Appeal (10 UF 199/03 and 10 UF 222/03) dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decisions of the Reinbek District Court of 21 and 28 July 2003. Two hearings, one on 15 December 2003 and the other on 30 January 2004, had taken place. Regarding the length of the proceedings before the district court, the Schleswig Court of Appeal found that that court had dealt adequately with the complex case within seven and a half months. Concerning the contact rights of the applicant, the court found that only Article 1685 Civil Code was applicable. Although the applicant was the children’s natural mother, she did not belong to the circle of people who had lived in “domestic community” with the child for a long period of time. According to the court, only foster parents are covered by this terminology. Furthermore, in order to determine “a long period of time” one had to establish whether a child had come to accept that his or her “relevant surroundings” (Bezugswelt) were with the individual in question. In the present case, the time of pregnancy was irrelevant, as an unborn child does not have a concept of its surroundings. Article 1685 Civil Code was in line with the constitutional protection of the family. The natural mother ceased to have contact or custody rights at the moment of adoption. The legal provisions regarding adoption were aimed at the undisturbed development of the child, and they served the best interests of the adopted child, who had to be fully integrated into the adoptive family; the biological family became irrelevant in accordance with the law. Even if the criteria of the judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court of 9 April 2003 regarding the natural father of a child born out of wedlock were applied, the natural mother would have to have lived with the children for a considerable time, which was not the case here. As the applicant knew, the right to contact on the basis of a contractual agreement could not be enforced by the family courts, as they were not empowered to regulate such matters. Article 1666 of the Civil Code did not give grounds for a different solution. 38.  Having considered the claim for the right to receive information about the children under Article 1686 of the Civil Code, the court found that the applicant had ceased to be a parent at the moment of adoption. As the legal basis was unambiguous and the circle of people who had a right to such information was strictly limited to the parents, the court found no room for a different interpretation. 39.  On 8 March 2004 the applicant raised a constitutional complaint regarding the denial of her rights to receive information about and have contact with the twin sisters after their adoption. 40.  In a decision of 13 December 2007, served on the applicant’s representative on 19 December 2007, a panel of three constitutional judges refused to admit the constitutional complaint. 41.  The applicant also commenced proceedings in June 2003 concerning the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the twin sisters, in order for the children to be able to raise a constitutional complaint against the adoption decision of the guardianship division of the Reinbek District Court of 21 June 2001 (no. 2 XVI 1/01). These proceedings are the issue of another complaint before this Court (application no. 30296/08). 42.  The applicant divorced her husband and is now remarried. She had a child with her new husband in 2003. 43.  By letter of 16 December 2011 this Court informed the applicant that on 3 December 2011 the Law on a remedy against lengthy court proceedings and criminal investigations (Federal Law Gazette Part I, 2011, page 2302 et seq.) had come into force in the Federal Republic of Germany.


4.  The applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Dublin. 5.  In July 1995 the applicant priest became aware of allegations of sexual abuse against him about alleged events in the 1980s. These allegations were made in a letter from the complainant’s solicitor to the applicant’s religious order. In September 1995 a formal police complaint was made. In June 1996 the applicant was interviewed by the police. 6.  In June 1997 the applicant was charged before the District Court on three counts of indecent assault. In October 1997 the case was transferred to a Circuit Criminal Court where he was charged with a further six counts of indecent assault. A hearing date was fixed (for March 1998). 7.  In February 1998 the applicant sought disclosure of records from a psychiatrist who had treated the complainant. The trial was then adjourned: the applicant claimed that was due to a conflict of interest on the part of the trial judge and the Government claimed that it was partly because the psychiatrist’s records were not available at such short notice. 8.  The applicant began judicial review proceedings in the High Court seeking the prohibition of the criminal proceedings on grounds of delay and seeking disclosure of the psychiatrist’s records. In March 1999 the High Court rejected the application concerning delay and no order for discovery of the psychiatric records was made because the prosecution undertook to procure them. Since the relevant psychiatrist was unwilling to disclose the medical records, in July 1999 the High Court directed the psychiatrist to make discovery, which was done in October 1999. The applicant then applied for discovery of medical records in the possession of North Eastern Health Board. In February 2000 the High Court directed the Circuit Criminal Court to order discovery against the Health Board. In March 2000 the Circuit Criminal Court so ordered and in September 2000 the Health Board made discovery. 9.  In October 2000 the trial began but the jury was discharged and the trial was transferred to another Circuit Criminal Court (the “trial court”). 10.  The applicant sought to trace the authors of entries in the medical records and maintained that there had not been full disclosure of all relevant medical records. The trial was listed for June 2001. However, since witness tracing was incomplete, the trial was adjourned and further discovery orders were made. In early November 2001 statements from the authors of the entries in the medical records were disclosed to the applicant. In March 2002 the prosecution stated to the trial court that another file had been submitted with those statements, that it needed time to furnish it to the applicant but that it would only proceed with the counts of indecent assault with which the applicant had been charged in June 1997. The trial was fixed for October 2002. 11.  In June 2002 the applicant applied to the High Court for leave to apply for judicial review for an order prohibiting his trial because of the delay caused by the failure to make full disclosure. In February 2003 the High Court ruled in his favour. In April 2003 the prosecution appealed to the Supreme Court. In December 2004 the written judgment of the High Court was delivered and in April 2005 the prosecution amended its appeal. In February 2007 the Supreme Court heard the appeal. By judgment of March 2007 (a majority of three to two) it allowed the appeal. Fennelly J, giving judgment for the majority, found that the prosecution was not to blame for the delay. In determining whether an order for prohibition should be made, the correct approach was to balance the right of the accused to be protected from stress and anxiety caused by an unnecessary and inordinate delay against the public interest in the prosecution and conviction of those charged with criminal offences. There was no evidence that the applicant had suffered excessive pre-trial anxiety. 12.  In May 2007 the prosecution requested the trial court not to fix a trial date as a police officer was ill and would be ill for a further six months. The court fixed a trial date for March 2008. In January 2008 the applicant applied to stay his prosecution pending judgment in the present application having regard to a stay on prosecution obtained in the Barry case (see Barry v. Ireland, no. 18273/04, 15 December 2005). The trial court adjourned to February 2008 to receive information on whether the Barry prosecution had indeed been stayed. In February 2008 the trial date (foreseen for March 2008) was vacated since a police witness had had a car accident. At end March 2008 the case was adjourned to May 2008: prosecution submissions on the applicant’s request for a stay on the prosecution were outstanding. In May 2008 the prosecution made those submissions (objecting to a stay) and applied for a hearing date but after the court recess of 2009 (since a police witness would be incapacitated for some time). The trial court fixed a trial date for early July 2009. 13.  Before the trial date, in June 2009, the prosecution drew the applicant’s attention to a reference, in material already disclosed to him, to the complainant having been referred for hypnosis: the prosecution was making further inquiries. By letter of June 2009 the prosecution confirmed that the complainant had not in fact received such treatment. Once the applicant’s further requests for confirmation that the complainant had not been so treated had been responded to, a trial date was fixed for January 2010. 14.  The trial took place over 4 days in January 2010, at the end of which hearing the trial judge directed the jury to return a verdict of not-guilty given, inter alia, the unavailability of three medical witnesses (one of whom had died). The criminal prosecution thereby ended.


6.  On 29 May 1998 the first applicant married V.D. On 7 January 2003 their son, the second applicant, was born. 7.  In 2006 V.D. initiated divorce proceedings, of which allegedly the first applicant, who was then living in Greece, was not aware. In a judgment of 21 July 2006, which became final on 11 October 2006, the Sofia District Court granted the divorce between the first applicant and V.D. and granted the latter residence rights in respect of the second applicant. The first applicant was granted contact rights for two hours twice a month in V.D.’s presence. 8.  After the divorce, V.D. and the child lived with the third applicant, V.D.’s mother. On 9 February 2006 V.D.’s partner Y.S. moved in with them. On an unspecified date at the end of 2006 or the beginning of 2007 V.D. and Y.S. had a son. 9.  In the summer of 2007 V.D., Y.S. and the children moved out of the third applicant’s home. 10.  In the application to the Court the third applicant stated that during a visit to her house on 24 August 2007 the child told her that his anus hurt. He shared with her that in the evenings Y.S. would come to his bed, put his finger in his anus, and touch his anus, penis and nipples, which were painful. When he told his mother she confronted Y.S., but he replied that it had been just a game. After that Y.S. threatened the child that if he told anyone else, he would beat and punish him. 11.  On the evening of 26 August 2007 the child again complained to his grandmother, the third applicant, that his anus hurt and asked her to take him to a doctor. 12.  The same evening the third applicant, in a telephone conversation, informed the second applicant’s doctor about the situation. Apparently, the second applicant himself told the doctor that his anus hurt because his “dad” [Y.S.] had put his finger there. 13.  On the following morning the second applicant was examined by a surgeon, who established that there were injuries to his anus. 14.  Meanwhile, having been informed about the situation by the third applicant, the first applicant arrived in Bulgaria on 30 August 2007. 15.  On an unspecified date, the third applicant found a CD with family photos on two of which the child was naked on the toilet. During the criminal investigation (see paragraphs 16-33 below) the third applicant submitted that she found the CD in her apartment where the photos had been taken. She also alleged that Y.S. had taken the photos. During her questioning in that connection V.D. stated that she herself had taken the photos with the family camera. 16.  On 27 August 2007, following the third applicant’s complaint, criminal proceedings were opened at first against an unknown perpetrator and later against Y.S. for sexual assault (блудство). On 28 August Y.S. was remanded in custody, but on 31 August 2007 was released on bail. 17.  On 27 August 2007 a forensic medical examination of the child was carried out upon a prosecutor’s order. The doctor found injuries to the child’s anus and concluded that these injuries might have resulted from penetration with a finger. An additional medical expert opinion stated that the injuries could also have been inflicted by penetration with a finger or by constipation. 18.  In an opinion of 29 August 2007, requested by the child’s mother, V.D., a doctor concluded that there were no injuries to the child’s anus. 19.  On 31 August 2007 the police department informed social services about the alleged abuse and recommended that action be taken under the Child Protection Act. 20.  In the period between 27 August 2007 and March 2008 at least eleven expert opinions and assessments were sought and a number of witnesses were questioned. Polygraph tests were conducted on Y.S. and the third applicant. The results of these tests were inconclusive. 21.  In a forensic psychiatric expert opinion of 30 August 2007 two experts concluded that the second applicant’s statements were unreliable and that he was easily influenced by the adults in the family. 22.  In a psychological opinion of 4 September 2007 an expert held that the second applicant’s story about the alleged abuse by Y.S. was tenable. 23.  In another expert opinion, carried out at the request of Lozenets District Social Assistance Office (“the Lozenets SAO”), of 4 October 2007, a doctor concluded that there were no signs of abuse on the second applicant and advised that no further psychological consultations and medical tests in respect of this issue be carried out, as they could have a negative impact on him. 24.  Between 13 November 2007 and February 2008 a forensic psychiatric expert assessment of Y.S.’s personality, a complex psychiatric and sexological expert assessment of Y.S., a psychological and psychiatric expert assessment of the grandmother, a forensic medical expert opinion of the child and an expert opinion on the CD with the photographs (see paragraph 15 above) were obtained. In the latter expert opinion, the expert noted that the CD contained family photos on two of which the child was sitting on the toilet naked. The expert concluded that the photographs had no pornographic content. 25.  In an expert opinion of 4 February 2008 five experts concluded that the second applicant’s testimony was unreliable and that he could not be credited as a witness because he lived in a world of fantasy and was easily influenced by other people. 26.  In an order of 28 February 2008 a prosecutor from the Sofia district public prosecutor’s office, after making an assessment of the conclusions of the expert opinions and the witness statements, discontinued the proceedings for lack of sufficient evidence that an offence had been committed. 27.  On appeal by the first and third applicants, on 18 March 2008 the Sofia District Court quashed the prosecutor’s order and remitted the case to the prosecution for further investigation. The District Court held, inter alia, that the order lacked sufficient reasoning, that the evidence was inconclusive and that the expert opinions did not exclude the possibility of abuse. It also declared the third applicant’s appeal inadmissible, because as the grandmother, she did not have standing to appeal against the discontinuation order. 28.  On an appeal by the prosecutor’s office, in a decision of 1 July 2008 the Sofia City Court upheld the lower court’s decision. The court found that the evidence in the case was inconclusive, as the parties involved had given conflicting statements and some of the expert reports had reached contradictory conclusions. The court pointed out the importance of the testimony of the second applicant’s doctor, who had confirmed the telephone conversation of 26 August 2007, the words used by the child to describe what had happened, and certain contradictions in V.D.’s statements. It also mentioned the apparent conflict between the adults in the family. The City Court noted that the presence of two irreconcilable versions of the events required a careful assessment of the statements and thorough analysis of the situation. It further gave detailed instructions as to the necessary additional actions to be taken, which included further questioning and expert opinions. 29.  In accordance with the Sofia City Court’s instructions on 26 August 2008 a prosecutor from the Sofia district public prosecutors’ office ordered additional investigative actions to be carried out, which included questioning the child’s doctor (see paragraph 12 above) and the surgeon who issued the certificate of 27 August 2007 (see paragraph 13 above), and commissioning of expert opinions on the credibility of the child’s story, the grandmother’s attitude towards the child and the nature of the child’s injuries. He also ordered the investigator to report the case to the prosecutor every thirty days. 30.  After the remittal of the case at least six more expert opinions were carried out and a large number of witnesses were questioned, thus the total number of the expert opinions and assessments in the preliminary investigation reached at least eighteen and the number of the witnesses questioned was approaching forty. 31.  In an expert opinion of an unspecified date a forensic doctor, a paediatrician and a surgeon specialising in paediatrics, who had examined the second applicant on 24 September 2008, concluded that there were injuries to his anus which could have been inflicted in the way described by him and that it was unlikely that those injuries had been caused by constipation. 32.  In a psychological expert opinion of 15 October 2008 two psychologists and a psychiatrist concluded that the grandmother did not have an “unnatural attachment” or an obsession with the child, but that the latter’s story about the alleged abuse could have been influenced by the grandmother. 33.  In an expert opinion of 12 November 2008 two child psychiatrists and three child psychologists concluded that the second applicant had reproduced previously heard phrases and was susceptible to influence and inculcation. The experts did not find any indication of sexual abuse. 34.  In an order of 20 January 2009 a prosecutor from the Sofia district public prosecutor’s office ordered two expert opinions to be sought on the CD with the child’s photographs, and the grandmother to be questioned in that connection. 35.  In an expert opinion of an unspecified date three experts concluded that the injuries on the second applicant’s anus could have been inflicted by the insertion of hard objects, such as a thermometer or a fingernail when inserting the thermometer. 36.  Between January and April 2009 a complex psychiatric and sexological expert assessment of Y.S. and the two expert opinions on the CD with the photographs were obtained (see paragraph 34 above). In the latter two opinions the experts concluded that the photographs had been taken in March and April 2006 with a SAMSUNG camera, that the CD had not been tampered with and that the inscription on the CD had not been done by V.D. 37.  During the proceedings at least forty witnesses were questioned. Among the witnesses were relatives, friends and acquaintances of the third applicant and V.D., as well as doctors, experts and social workers. The third applicant, V.D. and Y.S. were questioned several times. V.D. and Y.S. denied the allegations of abuse, the mother stating that the child had never complained to her about such abuse. The third applicant’s mother and brother testified that initially the relations between her, V.D. and Y.S. had been good but then conflicts arose and after the couple and the children moved out of the third applicant’s apartment, she wanted to keep the child with her and did everything possible to separate him from his mother and Y.S. Other witnesses, friends of the third applicant, stated that they had heard about the alleged abuse from the grandmother and that at some point V.D. had started preventing the third applicant from seeing the child. Y.S.’s former partner testified that she had never seen any signs of physical or sexual abuse in him and that he had never shown any unhealthy interest in her underage daughter, who used to live with them. The social workers testified that there was no indication of sexual abuse in respect of the second applicant. 38.  On 27 April 2009 and 8, 11 and 15 September 2009 one of the father’s representatives, Mrs T.Ch., was presented with the materials and findings of the preliminary investigation. She made comments and requests for further investigative actions, which were dismissed on 5 October 2009 as manifestly ill-founded and unnecessary. 39.  In an order of 5 October 2009 a prosecutor from the Sofia district prosecutor’s office discontinued the proceedings for lack of sufficient evidence of an offence. The prosecutor relied, inter alia, on the statements of the social workers who had been involved in the second applicant’s case and who considered that there had been no indication of sexual abuse in respect of the second applicant, as well as on the statements of the witnesses and the conclusions of the expert opinions obtained in the course of the proceedings. He noted in particular that V.D. repeatedly denied the allegations of abuse, the social workers saw no indications of abuse, the photographs on which the child was naked in the bathroom had no pornographic content and none of the individuals questioned had actually witnessed any abuse, most of them having heard about the allegations of abuse from the grandmother. 40.  On 24 November 2009 one of the father’s representatives, Mrs B.B., appealed. She contested the interpretation of the evidence and the findings of the prosecutor and pointed out that the findings of the investigation had not been presented to her. 41.  In a decision of 4 May 2010 the Sofia District Court, after examining the expert opinions and the evidence gathered, concluded that there was not sufficient evidence that an offence had been committed, and upheld the discontinuation, endorsing the prosecutor’s reasoning. The court relied, inter alia, on the conclusions of the psychological expert opinion of 25 January 2009, which stated that the child was easily influenced by others and that his behaviour did not indicate sexual abuse. It also noted that all instructions for further investigative actions given by the courts and the prosecutors had been complied with. 42.  Meanwhile, on 18 January 2010 the other representative of the father, Mrs T. Ch., had also appealed against the discontinuation order of 5 October 2009. Apparently, however, her appeal had not been forwarded to the Sofia District Court, which in its decision of 4 May 2010 had examined only the appeal by Mrs B.B. Following complaints by Mrs T.Ch., in a decision of 10 January 2011 the Sofia District Court quashed the discontinuation of the proceedings and ordered Mrs T.Ch.’s appeal to be heard. 43.  The parties have not informed the Court about the outcome of the proceedings. 44.  On 4 September 2007 the first applicant initiated proceedings under the Protection Against Domestic Violence Act (“the PADVA”) requesting that the Sofia District Court impose an injunction and remove Y.S. from the family home. 45.  In a decision of 5 September 2007 the Sofia District Court discontinued the proceedings, finding that Y.S. could not be the respondent in these proceedings because, as simply a cohabitant of one of the parents, he was not among the persons explicitly listed in section 3 of the PADVA in respect of whom such proceedings could be conducted. 46.  On 28 September 2007 the third applicant initiated proceedings under the PADVA and requested an “order for immediate protection” to be issued and the second applicant’s mother, V.D., to be obliged to take actions to protect the child from the alleged abuse, including removing him from his current home. In an order of 28 September 2007 the Sofia District Court discontinued the proceedings, finding that:
“the circumstances described in the claim do not disclose domestic violence under... the PADVA.” 47.  On 29 August 2007 the third applicant requested the Lozenets SAO to issue an order to remove the child from his current home. On 31 August 2007 officials from the Lozenets SAO met the father and the grandmother. On the same day the director of the Lozenets SAO issued an order placing the second applicant with his father. 48.  V.D. appealed against this order. In an order of 13 September 2007, served on the first applicant on 23 June 2008, the director of the Sofia Regional Social Assistance Office (“the RSAO”) quashed the order, finding breaches of the required form and procedure. She found, inter alia, that the order lacked sufficient reasoning and that the social services had failed to prepare an assessment of the effect which the removal would have on the second applicant. In conclusion, the director held that the order was not in the best interest of the child and remitted the case to the Lozenets SAO for further work. 49.  On 4 July 2008 the first applicant appealed before the Sofia Administrative Court through the RSAO. He alleged that the RSAO had never forwarded his appeal to the court. It appears that he did not file it directly with the Administrative Court either. 50.  On 24 January 2008 the third applicant requested the Sofia district public prosecutor’s office to initiate court proceedings for removal of the second applicant from his current home under section 26 (2) of the Child Protection Act. 51.  Her request was refused, by an order of 30 January 2008. On appeal, on 29 February 2008 the Sofia city public prosecutor’s office upheld the refusal. The Sofia appellate public prosecutor’s office did the same, in a final order of 30 July 2008. The prosecutors took into account the findings of the criminal proceedings against Y.S., which had not proved beyond reasonable doubt that abuse had taken place, and the opinion of the social services of 30 July 2008, that removal of the child from his current home would have a negative effect on his psychological and emotional development. 52.  On 17 March 2008 the first applicant initiated proceedings under section 26 of the Child Protection Act, requesting the Sofia District Court to place the child with the grandmother. Later in the proceedings he amended his request to include his parents and the child’s aunt among the families where the child could be placed. 53.  In a decision of 7 July 2008, after holding a hearing, the District Court discontinued the proceedings, as the first applicant had failed to pay the additional court fee, noting that the fee had been paid under the wrong case number. The first applicant’s lawyers appealed against the discontinuation, claiming that the wrong case number had been indicated in the summons sent to him in May 2008. 54.  On 14 July 2008 the first applicant’s lawyer requested the correction of a mistake in the transcript of the hearing of 7 July 2008, which was granted on 27 November 2008 after a hearing had been held. Thereafter the appeal procedure against the discontinuation of the proceedings continued. 55.  In a decision of 24 March 2009 the Sofia City Court quashed the decision for discontinuation of the proceedings and remitted the case to the District Court for examination on the merits. The City Court held that under Article 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure it was for the court to scrutinise the carrying out of all necessary procedural actions, therefore, in the present case, instead of discontinuing the proceedings the District Court should have informed the first applicant that the court fee had been paid under the wrong case number, and ordered him to pay it under the correct number. 56.  On 13 April 2009 the first applicant paid the court fee under the correct case number and the proceedings continued. 57.  Hearings were held on 8 July, 10 August and 28 September 2009. 58.  In a judgment of 26 November 2009 the Sofia District Court dismissed the action, holding that removing the child from his current home was a measure of last resort, which should be taken only after all other means of protecting him within his family environment had failed. In the case at hand these means had not been exhausted. 59.  On an appeal by the first applicant of 8 February 2010, the Sofia City Court examined the expert opinion of 27 August 2007 and the medical certificate of 29 August 2007 (see paragraphs 17 and 18 above) and commissioned a forensic psychiatric and psychological expert opinion on the effects which abuse could have on the second applicant. It admitted to the case file materials from the criminal proceedings against Y.S., the proceedings for deprivation of parental rights (see paragraphs 82-85 below), the social services reports and conclusions given in these proceedings, and a number of other items of written evidence. It also heard as witnesses all relatives who had agreed to receive the child at their home, social workers and other specialists. On 2 and 7 July, 26 September and 23 October 2009, and 2 March and 24 April 2011 social services prepared reports on the material conditions at the child’s current place of residence and on the conditions in the residences of the individuals who were ready to receive him in their homes. In these reports and at a court hearing of 7 March 2011 the social workers concluded that the material conditions in the second applicant’s current home were good, that he was receiving adequate and sufficient care and attention, and that his placement with other relatives would have a negative effect on his sense of security and emotional stability. 60.  In a final judgment of 17 May 2011, relying on the evidence gathered and the conclusions of the social services, the Sofia City Court upheld the previous court’s judgment and refused to remove the second applicant from his current residence. The court held, inter alia, that it had not been proved that sexual abuse had taken place and that not all means of working with the second applicant and providing protection within his current family had been exhausted. It further noted that in similar situations the authorities should act in the best interest of the child and not in the interest of its parents or other relatives. 61.  At the end of August 2007 the Lozenets SAO was notified of possible abuse and started working on the case (see paragraphs 19 and 47 above). 62.  On 11 September 2007 the grandmother lodged a complaint with the State Child Protection Agency, which had a governing and controlling function in the field of child protection, notifying them of the allegation of abuse and requesting assistance with the interim removal of the second applicant from his current home. 63.  On 15 September 2007 the latter forwarded the grandmother’s request to the Lozenets SAO, instructing it to undertake certain measures in order to establish whether there was a risk to the second applicant if he remained in his current home, and also for information on the scheduled actions and the progress of the case. 64.  Meanwhile, on 5 and 27 September 2007 social workers visited the child’s home and met him and his mother, V.D. 65.  On 27 November 2007 a social report was drafted, recommending that the second applicant and his mother have family counselling and psychological help. 66.  Between 20 December 2007 and 20 February 2008 the child and V.D. received regular family counselling and psychological assistance. 67.  On 18 January 2008 the director of the State Child Protection Agency sent a letter to the director of the State Social Assistance Agency (“the SSAA”) in connection with the grandmother’s complaint of 11 September 2007. She pointed out that the report from the Lozenets SAO did not contain an assessment of the risk of abuse and that there was not sufficient information to confirm that the second applicant was not at risk in his current home. She recommended the assignment to the case of one more social worker from another Social Assistance Office, in order to guarantee objectivity of the work in the case. 68.  In that connection, on 21 and 22 February 2008 the State Child Protection Agency carried out an inspection and gave instructions for the future handling of the case. 69.  On 1 July 2008 the child and his mother were referred to an association for counselling and psychological help. During the counselling period at least two reports on the second applicant’s and his mother’s psychological state of health were carried out. Their conclusions showed no signs of sexual or physical abuse. The second applicant also started attending sessions with a speech therapist. 70.  The child and his mother continued to be involved in a number of special programmes for counselling and psychological advice in connection with the allegations of abuse and the conflict between the members of the child’s extended family. 71.  Between May and October 2009 social services prepared several reports and opinions, including those requested by the domestic courts, examining the various proceedings under the Family Code and the Child Protection Act initiated by the applicants. They also held a number of meetings, which included meetings with the child and his mother, V.D., with the child’s teacher, and with his doctor. On several occasions social workers paid impromptu visits to the second applicant’s home, monitoring his development and the relations between him, his younger brother, V.D. and Y.S. 72.  The conclusions of numerous reports prepared by the social authorities were that the environment in the child’s home was “peaceful and harmonious”, his development was normal, all his needs were being adequately met, the material conditions in which he lived were good, and V.D. and Y.S. were open to receiving help from the social authorities. Removing the child from his present home would negatively affect his emotional stability and his sense of security. 73.  During their work with the second applicant psychologists prepared at least six reports assessing the risk of abuse in respect of this applicant. The conclusions were that there was no evidence that such a risk existed. 74.  It appears that at the end of 2010 a proposal was made to discontinue the active work with the second applicant and his family as the child had overcome the stressful situation and did not need further social assistance. It is not clear whether or when the active social work was discontinued. 75.  On 21 May 2008 the first applicant complained to the Sofia RSAO that the work of the Lozenets SAO was slow and inefficient, and requested that an order be issued for the removal of the child from his current home. 76.  In a letter of 10 June 2008 the director of the Sofia RSAO replied that two departments, the Lozenets SAO and the Slatina SAO, were working together on the second applicant’s case; that the child protection authorities had to act in the best interest of the child, and that their efforts were concentrated on re-establishing relations between the members of the family. The director pointed out that the Sofia RSAO could remove the child from his current home only after the relevant authorities had sufficient proof that abuse had taken place. She further expressed a concern about the second applicant’s psychological and emotional state, with regard to the fact that he was involved in and influenced by the conflict between the members of his family. 77.  It appears that in June 2008 the first and second applicants met in the presence of social workers. 78.  On 21 August 2008 the first applicant requested the Slatina SAO to give him certain information on the case, and sought assistance with the re‑establishment of personal contact between him and the second applicant and between the latter and his relatives on his mother’s side. 79.  On 21 November 2008 the Lozenets SAO organised a meeting between the first applicant, the latter’s mother, the third applicant, V.D.’s lawyer and a number of social workers. During the meeting it was established that the first applicant had not seen the second applicant since June 2008 and that V.D. did not allow such contact. 80.  At the end of February 2009 the first applicant reiterated his request to the State Agency for Child Protection for assistance with scheduled contact with the second applicant. 81.  The parties have not submitted information as to the steps taken in that connection after this date. From the materials in the Court’s possession, however, it appears that meetings between the first and second applicants have taken place. Thus, for example, in November 2008 and the spring of 2009 they met at the second applicant’s home. 82.  On 28 March 2008 the third applicant initiated proceedings under Article 70 (2) of the Family Code, claiming that V.D. had denied her contact with the second applicant and requesting the Sofia District Court to take measures which would allow her contact with him. In a judgment of 15 June 2009 the Sofia District Court granted the third applicant contact rights once a month for four hours. The court noted the strained relationship between the third applicant and V.D. and the fact that the third applicant had not been in contact with the child for about two years. It is not clear whether this judgment was appealed against. 83.  The parties have not submitted information as to whether contact has been re-established between the child and his grandmother since that judgment and prior to the latter’s death. 84.  On 11 September 2007 V.D. initiated proceedings to deprive the first applicant of parental rights. In a judgment of 8 June 2008 the Sofia District Court dismissed the claim as manifestly ill-founded. On appeal, on 28 April 2009 this judgment was upheld by the Sofia City Court, which held that the exercising of parental rights by both parents was of major importance for the second applicant’s development. It is not clear whether the parties appealed further. 85.  Meanwhile, on an unspecified date the first applicant initiated proceedings to deprive V.D. of parental rights and for full parental rights in respect of the second applicant. In a judgment of 17 March 2011 the Sofia District Court dismissed the first applicant’s action. It is not clear whether this judgment was appealed against.


4.  The applicant was born in 1948 and resides in the town of Zhovti Vody, the Dnipropetrovsk Region. 5.  On 7 May 1999 and 30 August 2001 the Zhovti Vody City Court (hereafter “the City Court”) awarded the applicant a total of UAH 3,124[1] against the State-owned Electrongaz Company (hereafter “the Company”) in salary arrears. Both judgments became final and were sent to the Zhovti Vody City Bailiffs’ Office (hereafter “the Bailiffs”) for compulsory enforcement. 6.  In a letter of 27 February 2003, the Bailiffs informed the applicant that the enforcement of the judgments in her favour was impeded by the entry into force of the Law on the Introduction of a Moratorium on the Forced Sale of Property 2001, which barred the attachment and sale of the Company’s assets. 7.  On 7 March 2003 the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Commercial Court (hereafter “the Commercial Court”) instituted bankruptcy proceedings against the Company and issued an injunction barring any debt recovery. On 10 October 2003 the Commercial Court approved a rehabilitation proposal and appointed a trustee to rehabilitate the Company’s business. 8.  On 21 October 2004 the Bailiffs terminated the enforcement proceedings in the applicant’s favour as both awards were fully paid to her.


8.  The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Rocca Priora (Rome). 9.  He is the owner of an apartment in Rome, which he had let to C.C. 10.  In a registered letter of 17 April 1984, the applicant informed the tenant that he intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 May 1986 and asked her to vacate the premises by that date. 11.  In a writ served on the tenant on 18 January 1985, the applicant reiterated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Rome Magistrate. 12.  By a decision of 11 March 1985, which was made enforceable on 2 April 1985, the Rome Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 28 February 1987. 13.  On 3 April 1987, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises. 14.  On 27 April 1987 he served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 5 June 1987. 15.  Between 5 June 1987 and 31 January 1989, the bailiff made eight attempts to recover possession. 16.  On 11 May 1989, the applicant had made a statutory declaration that he urgently required the premises as accommodation for himself. On 20 October 1993, he reiterated the declaration. 17.  Between 6 September 1989 and 22 February 1996, the bailiff made forty two attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession. 18.  On 24 March 1996, the tenant vacated the premises.


4.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in the village of Novodonetskoye, Donetsk region. 5. On 31 May 2002 the Dobropillya Court awarded the applicant against the State-owned coal-mine “Pioner” UAH 26,051[1] in compensation for work-related damage to his health. On 29 August 2002 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal reduced the award to UAH 24,438[2]. 6.  On 7 October 2002 the Dobropillya Office of the Bailiffs' Service instituted the enforcement proceedings. 7.  Between June 2003 and June 2004 the applicant was paid the judgment debt owed to him. 8.  The judgment of 29 August 2002 was enforced in full on 7 June 2004.


5.  The applicant, Mr Boutros Yaacoub El Khoury was born in 1977. At the time of lodging his applications he was detained in Berlin’s Moabit prison. 6.  On 2 August 2005 the Berlin Tiergarten District Court issued an arrest warrant against the applicant on suspicion of two counts of drug trafficking. The arrest warrant specified that the strong suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences resulted from statements made by one of his co‑suspects, the separately prosecuted A.K. The District Court further found that there was a risk that the applicant, who did not have a permanent residence in Germany and in the past had been travelling between Brazil and Europe, would abscond. A partly suspended prison sentence had previously been imposed on him in Germany. Moreover, two additional arrest warrants were pending against him in Germany, one relating to a further offence of drug trafficking and the other, dated 1 July 2004, concerning forgery of identification papers. 7.  On 16 August 2006 the applicant was detained in Portugal pending his extradition to Germany (Auslieferungshaft) as a consequence of the arrest warrants dated 1 July 2004 and 2 August 2005. On 8 September 2006 he was extradited to Germany where he was remanded in custody in Berlin Moabit prison. His detention on remand (Untersuchungshaft) was subject to reinforced security conditions. He was kept separate from other prisoners in an isolated cell (isolierter Einzelhaftraum) and was excluded from most group prison events. Contacts with visitors were limited and subject to close supervision. 8.  On 18 September 2006 the Berlin Prosecutor’s Office charged the applicant with having used a forged passport when entering German territory on one occasion in 2003. By a further bill of indictment dated 20 October 2006, he was charged with two counts of drug trafficking, committed jointly with several co-accused, among them G., U. and A.K. He was further accused of having incited G. to import drugs illicitly. 9.  In their description of the facts underlying the drugs-related offences allegedly committed by the applicant, the prosecution authorities mainly relied on statements made by A.K. in the course of separate criminal proceedings jointly conducted against A.K. and U. before the Berlin Regional Court on suspicion of organised drug trafficking. The bill of indictment further specified that the applicant was suffering from a congenital heart defect and as a consequence was not to be subjected to long-lasting situations of physical and mental stress. 10.  On 13 December 2006 the Berlin Regional Court admitted both indictments and opened the trial against the applicant. The trial started on 20 February 2007. The applicant was represented by counsel throughout the proceedings. 11.  By a judgment of the Berlin Regional Court dated 28 February 2007 in the proceedings separately conducted against A.K., the latter was convicted of several counts of drug trafficking and illicit importation of drugs and sentenced to a cumulative prison sentence of five years and three months. A.K. appealed against the judgment on points of law. 12.  On 20 September 2007 and 30 October 2007 the applicant applied for the arrest warrants dated 1 July 2004 and 2 August 2005 to be set aside. By decisions of 20 September 2007 and 19 November 2007 respectively the Regional Court rejected the applicant’s motions. 13.  By a decision of 17 December 2007 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal. The Court of Appeal confirmed that the risk of absconding prevailed because a final expulsion order against the applicant was in force and he had used various aliases. It stressed that the applicant’s continued detention on remand was still proportionate. The trial court had complied with its obligation to conduct the proceedings expeditiously. Any circumstances that had limited the court’s ability to accelerate the proceedings had their origin outside the latter’s sphere of responsibility. Since the first trial day on 20 February 2007, hearings had been held on 37 days. Delays in the proceedings were the result of comprehensive applications for the taking of evidence by the defence in August and September 2007, in particular of a voluminous motion regarding the applicant’s alibi submitted on 2 August 2007. Moreover, the applicant had been unavailable to attend trial on a number of days due to his participation in separately conducted court proceedings. The Court of Appeal further noted that the fact that one of the judges sitting in the applicant’s case had been seconded to another court since 15 October 2007 had reduced the frequency with which hearings could be held. 14.  On 3 March 2008 the applicant again requested that the arrest warrants be set aside. 15.  By a decision of 7 March 2008 the Regional Court ordered that the applicant’s detention on remand be continued. In the Regional Court’s view any possible delays in the proceedings were the result of the defence’s continuing voluminous applications for the taking of evidence. 16.  Following the applicant’s appeal against this decision on 29 April 2008 the Berlin Court of Appeal lifted the arrest warrant dated 1 July 2004 but rejected the remainder of the applicant’s appeal. The Court of Appeal held that the risk of absconding was still high with regard to the fact that the applicant’s companion had been sentenced to four years in prison, the execution of which had been suspended on the condition that she reported to the police and did not leave the country (Haftverschonung). 17.  The Court of Appeal further held that while the sentence to be expected for the offence of forgery underlying the arrest warrant of 1 July 2004 did not justify its further execution, the applicant’s continued detention on remand on the basis of the arrest warrant dated 2 August 2005 was, for the time being, still proportionate. The Court of Appeal noted in this context that in the period since 20 February 2007 hearings had been held in the instant case on 56 days with an average duration of three hours, amounting to an average of less than one hearing day per week. Gaps in the hearing schedule from 23 April to 7 May 2007, in the period from 12 July until 3 September 2007 and from 22 December 2007 to 6 January 2008, were due to the judges’ absence on leave, while in May 2007 counsel for the defence had been on leave. The Court of Appeal further took into account that on several occasions the Regional Court had dispensed with the reading out of whole documents (so-called “self-reading procedure” – Selbstleseverfahren) to speed up the proceedings. 18.  On 29 May 2008 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the Court of Appeal’s decision of 29 April 2008 and applied for his immediate release. 19.  On 2 June 2008, following a plea bargain between the prosecution and the defence, the proceedings against G. were severed from the applicant’s trial. 20.  On 4 June 2008 the applicant, whose heart condition had deteriorated in the course of his detention and who had previously been treated in the prison hospital, underwent heart surgery. 21.  By a decision of 11 June 2008 (file no. 2 BvR 1062/08) the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant’s constitutional complaint of 29 May 2008, without providing reasons. It further held that, as a consequence, there was no need to decide on the applicant’s request for interim measures. 22.  In the proceedings against A.K., the Federal Court of Justice on 10 July 2008 dismissed A.K.’s appeal on points of law against his conviction by judgment of the Berlin Regional Court dated 28 February 2007. 23.  On 4 August 2008 the applicant submitted a further request to set aside the arrest warrant dated 2 August 2005. He argued that the continued execution of the arrest warrant was disproportionate. 24.  By a decision of 15 August 2008 the Berlin Regional Court held that the applicant’s detention was still proportionate. 25.  On 6 October 2008 the Berlin Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal, in which the applicant’s counsel had stated that the applicant’s ability to stand trial was not reduced due to his prior heart surgery. The Court of Appeal found that the strong suspicion of the applicant having engaged in drug trafficking, as well as the risk of his absconding, persisted. With reference to the findings in its decision of 29 April 2008, the Court of Appeal further held that the conduct of the proceedings since May 2008 did not change its assessment that his continuing detention on remand was still proportionate. The low frequency with which hearings had been scheduled and the interruption of the trial from 6 to 21 May 2008 and 17 July to 6 August 2008 had not been imputable to the domestic courts. 26.  On 2 November 2008 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the Berlin Court of Appeal’s decision alleging, inter alia, that the domestic authorities’ failure to conduct the proceedings expeditiously despite his continued detention on remand violated his rights under Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention. By a decision of 26 November 2008 (file no. 2 BvR 2241/08) the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant’s constitutional complaint without providing reasons. 27.  By decisions of the Berlin Court of Appeal of 9 March 2009 and the Berlin Regional Court of 20 April 2009 the reinforced security conditions accompanying the applicant’s detention on remand were set aside for the most part. 28.  On 20 April 2009 the Berlin Regional Court, following a further request by the applicant to lift the arrest warrant, again ordered that the applicant’s detention on remand be continued. The applicant appealed against the decision. 29.  On 22 May 2009 the Berlin Court of Appeal, referring to the reasoning in its previous decisions, rejected the applicant’s appeal. The Court of Appeal found that the conduct of the proceedings since its last decision of 6 October 2008 had again been determined by continual applications for the taking of evidence filed by the defence as well as requests for the suspension of the proceedings and motions for bias against the court. All such requests had been dealt with by the Regional Court in due course and any resulting delays in the proceedings, like the time lapse between hearings from 13 December 2008 to 4 January 2009 and 5 May 2009 to 1 June 2009, did not fall within the trial court’s sphere of responsibility. 30.  By a decision of 27 July 2009 (file no. 2 BvR 1320/09) the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant’s related constitutional complaint of 18 June 2009. 31.  On 16 September 2009 the Berlin Regional Court pronounced its judgment in the applicant’s trial after having held hearings on a total of 101 days, with an average duration of not more than three hours each, in which it had heard at least twenty witnesses and one expert. 32.  By its judgment of 16 September 2009 the Berlin Regional Court convicted the applicant of two counts of drug trafficking as well as falsification of documents and imposed a cumulative prison sentence (Gesamtfreiheitsstrafe) of six years. In the determination of the applicant’s sentence, the Regional Court had regard to the particular strain to which the applicant had been subject as a result of the long duration of the proceedings as well as of his detention on remand. It emphasised that the latter had lasted around three years, calculated from the date of the applicant’s extradition from Portugal until the pronouncement of the judgment and had been particularly burdensome due to, inter alia, the reinforced security conditions imposed on the applicant and his heart operation in 2008. 33.  As regards the offence of falsification of documents, the Regional Court established that on 2 November 2003 the applicant had entered German territory using a forged Greek passport. 34.  Concerning the drugs-related offences the Regional Court observed that, during the period at issue, the applicant had engaged in large-scale drug trafficking in cooperation with G. and U. In the afternoon of 7 February 2004, the applicant, according to a plan previously agreed with U., had taken over 3 kg of a cocaine mixture as well as 100 kg of hashish from G. in Berlin with a view to reselling the drugs for a profit. The Regional Court also found it established that on an unspecified date in the period between 25 February and 10 March 2004 the applicant had acquired between 95 and 100 g of a cocaine mixture from A.K. for the purpose of reselling it to a customer for a profit. 35.  While the applicant confessed to having used a forged passport on the occasion of his entry into Germany on 2 November 2003, he denied any involvement in drug trafficking. The Regional Court based its finding of facts in this regard on the witness statements made by A.K., whom it considered to be the central witness against the applicant and the only direct witness of the facts underlying the actual crimes. A.K. had secretly observed how G. had handed the drugs over to the applicant on 7 February 2004. On the occasion of a meeting between A.K. and the applicant several weeks after the incident, the applicant had confessed to A.K. that G. had imported the drugs on the applicant’s behalf according to a plan previously set up with U. 36.  Within the period from 6 March 2007 to 15 January 2009, A.K. testified on several occasions as a witness at the applicant’s trial. He answered questions from the trial court and the prosecution throughout the proceedings. At the beginning of the proceedings he furthermore offered to consider answering questions formulated by counsel and put to him by the Regional Court, but refused to answer direct questions from the applicant or the defence, relying on his right to remain silent in order not to incriminate himself by virtue of Article 55 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 49 below). Following his last hearing on 15 January 2009, the witness travelled to Lebanon and subsequent attempts by the Regional Court to summon him to appear at trial were to no avail. By a decision of 31 July 2009 the court held that it would be impossible to have the witness examined in the foreseeable future since the latter was prevented from leaving Lebanon pursuant to a decision by a Lebanese religious court, the authenticity of which had been confirmed by the Lebanese Foreign Ministry and the German Embassy in Beirut. Pointing to the court’s obligation to conduct the proceedings expeditiously in view of the applicant’s continuing detention on remand, and having regard to the fact that the witness had repeatedly been heard at trial, the Regional Court was of the opinion that his absence did not justify a further delay in the proceedings. 37.  The court also heard representatives of the police and public prosecution authorities who had been involved in A.K.’s examination at the pre-trial stage as well as the acting judges and public prosecutors in the criminal proceedings conducted in respect of A.K. and in respect of further separately prosecuted co-accused. In addition, at a request by the defence, all available protocols of statements made by A.K. at the various stages of the proceedings were read out at trial with the consent of all parties. 38.  The Regional Court specified in its judgment that A.K’s testimony had only been marginally supplemented and confirmed by the remaining available evidence which had provided information with respect to the motivation underlying the offence, the time when it had been committed and the quality of the drugs at issue. The court emphasised that in view of the decisive nature of A.K.’s statements for the applicant’s conviction and the fact that he had refused to answer any questions from the defence, it had assessed particularly carefully and critically whether the witness had been reliable. This had also been necessary taking into account that A.K. was living in Lebanon, had testified at the applicant’s trial with a view to obtaining a reduction of the expected sentence in his own proceedings on charges of drug trafficking and had repeatedly been found guilty of drug trafficking. 39.  The court nevertheless concluded that A.K. had been a credible witness. His witness statements made at trial had been coherent and consistent with submissions previously made before the investigative authorities at the pre-trial stage. His decision to contribute to the clarification of the facts underlying the charges against the applicant as well as other accused persons involved in organised drug trafficking had been motivated by his wish to cut his link to the drug-dealer scene and start a new life. In the Regional Court’s opinion there was no evidence that he had wrongly incriminated the applicant. 40.  The Regional Court further found that the applicant’s right under Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention to examine or have examined witnesses against him had been respected in the instant case. A.K.’s refusal to answer questions from the defence did not require the court to exclude his statements as evidence in the trial nor did such behaviour put the witness’s credibility into question. Even following termination of the criminal proceedings against A.K. by final decision of the Federal Court of Justice dated 10 July 2008, the witness could still rely on his right not to testify, by virtue of Article 55 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, since there remained a risk that he would incriminate himself with respect to offences that were closely linked to the one of which he had been convicted. Several investigations previously conducted against A.K. in this respect had been discontinued by the prosecution authorities and could be resumed in the future. The court emphasised in this connection that it had done everything in its power to enable an examination of A.K. by the defence. Despite A.K.’s refusal to answer questions from the defence or the applicant, in the beginning he had offered to consider answering the applicant’s questions put to him in writing. The applicant’s counsel declined this offer. As a consequence the court had granted the applicant’s counsel’s request to examine A.K., which he accordingly did. Any attempts in this respect had, however, been to no avail. Therefore the court itself had questioned A.K. on subjects that had appeared to be of importance for the defence and he had answered all questions. Subsequently, upon the court’s proposal the applicant had submitted further subjects of interest in a list. On these matters the court then put questions to A.K. in a later hearing. In addition, in the last part of the trial, A.K. had answered a number of questions that had been proposed by the defence and had been put to him by the court with identical wording. At his counsel’s recommendation he had then decided to refrain from participating in any such indirect questioning. 41.  In his appeal on points of law of 15 April 2010 against the Regional Court’s judgment the applicant complained, inter alia, that neither he nor his counsel had had an opportunity to examine A.K., the main witness against him, at any stage of the proceedings. Furthermore, A.K.’s testimony had not been corroborated by further significant evidence as regards the actual commission of the crime by the applicant. The applicant also argued that, after A.K.’s conviction in the criminal proceedings conducted against him had become final on 10 July 2008, the latter could no longer rely on a right to remain silent by virtue of Article 55 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the applicant’s proceedings. The Regional Court had nevertheless not compelled him to answer questions by the defence at that stage of the proceedings and had consequently not done everything in its power to enable an examination of the witness by the defence, in breach of Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention. 42.  By written submissions to the Federal Court of Justice dated 31 August 2010, the Federal Public Prosecutor moved that the applicant’s appeal on points of law be dismissed. He argued that, notwithstanding the fact that the applicant had not had an opportunity to examine A.K. at any stage of the proceedings, these had as a whole been fair. 43.  In his reply to the Federal Prosecutor’s submissions, the applicant also claimed that his trial had been unreasonably long. He argued that during 135 weeks or 31 months of trial, hearings had been held on 101 days, which amounted to an average of 0.75 days per week or 3.25 days per month and had on average lasted less than three hours each. 44.  By a decision of 6 December 2010 the Federal Court of Justice dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law as manifestly ill-founded. 45.  By written submissions dated 20 October 2010 to the Federal Court of Justice the applicant complained of a violation of his right to be heard. 46.  On 17 January 2011 the Federal Court of Justice rejected the applicant’s complaint. 47.  On 13 January 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court. He complained of a violation of his right to a fair trial because he had not been able to question witness A.K. at any stage of the proceedings and of the length of his detention on remand and the length of the proceedings. 48.  By a decision of 18 January 2012 (file no. 2 BvR 447/11) the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant’s constitutional complaint without providing reasons.