6.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Derry. He was the brother of Colm McCartney.
A  The attack at Altnamachkin and the initial investigation 7.  On the night of 24 August 1975, Colm McCartney, the applicant's brother and Sean Farmer were driving home from the All-Ireland Gaelic football semi-finals in Croke Park, Dublin. Both men were found shot dead on the Cortamlet Road, Altnamachin, in South Armagh. Colm McCartney had been shot four times, Sean Farmer six times. According to the later inquest, the time of death was about 11.35 pm. The car was found burnt out half a mile from the murder scene. 8.  Prior to their deaths, at about 10.45 pm a police patrol in an unmarked car had been stopped at what was believed to be a bogus checkpoint (“VCP”) manned by armed men in military style uniforms on the A25 several hundred yards from where the bodies were found. A short conversation took place between the three RUC officers and a person holding a torch dressed in full military combat uniform. The officers noticed a second person also dressed in military uniform lying in a ditch apparently giving cover with a rifle. The scene at the checkpoint roused suspicions, inter alia, due to the lack of other vehicles, the accent of the person who stopped them and the length of hair of the man in the ditch. After being allowed through the checkpoint, the officers requested clarification by radio as to the presence of any army checkpoints in the vicinity. They were informed that none were operating. The police patrol drove to a police station, where, requesting army support, they decided to investigate further. 9.  At about 11.30 pm a local resident who had been walking his dog noticed a vehicle stopped on Cortamlet Road. He saw the interior light of the car come on and a door on the passenger side open. Three or four gunshots were heard. The witness saw a light from a lamp lying on the road. He then heard the sound of someone running along the road and a man's voice shouting "Stop, stop," several times. This was followed by a flash and a bang. He heard a wild scream and everything went quiet. Fearing for his safety, the witness hid behind a tree. He heard further shooting, five to ten shots. After some minutes, he heard a car engine being started and the car, brownish with a black vinyl roof, drove past him without its lights on. He went to a neighbour who returned with him to the scene where they found two bodies. They contacted the police. 10.  At first light, a Detective Constable visited the scene and inspected the bodies which were some 50 metres apart. He arranged for the scene to be examined, photographed and mapped. The bodies were identified. 11.  The police visited the McCartney and Farmer families that day. On the same day, Colm McCartney's car was found gutted by fire half a mile from the scene. It was subsequently established by ballistics examinations that three firearms had been used and that the weapons had been used in other incidents. 12.  The police believed that the murders had been carried out by an extreme loyalist paramilitary organisation, reacting to a murder of a local Protestant. They had little doubt that the men who stopped the police patrol had been directly connected with the murders if not in fact the actual murderers. 13.  A report was submitted by the police to the Director of Public Prosecutions on 17 February 1976. 14.  An inquest occurred on 23 July 1976. It appears that the local resident who witnessed the shooting did not appear at the inquest, nor was his statement made available due to the decision of a police officer to protect his identity. 15.  The applicant claimed that there were concerns about the thoroughness of the original investigation. He stated that the occupants of the two cars who had come upon the two bodies were not asked to give a statement to the police or at the inquest. Because of the method used (a VCP manned by persons in uniform), there were allegations of security force collusion made at the time of the shooting. 16.  The investigation did not close and became active again in 1978, when a Catholic priest Father Hugh Murphy was abducted by loyalist paramilitaries intending to use him as a hostage vis-à-vis the IRA. The police arrested a reserve police constable, William McCaughey, who, in the course of questioning, revealed his part in the abduction of the priest and in a variety of other loyalist paramilitary incidents. McCaughey also named a police officer as being involved in a range of incidents. He specifically referred to a well-known paramilitary as being involved in the Altnamachin murders. While this paramilitary had been arrested and interviewed by the police on a number of occasions, the Government stated that there was no record that he had been specifically interviewed about the Altnamachin murders. The police officer was arrested and questioned, inter alia, about his role in the murders of McCartney and Farmer. He made no admissions. He was charged with other serious offences, resigned from the police and was subsequently convicted and sentenced. 17.  McCaughey's revelations gave rise to investigations in eleven specific cases, some of which were linked in terms of the identities of those involved, the modus operandi or by virtue of the ballistics examinations of weapons used. Nine suspects were arrested in total, including five police officers and all were eventually charged with offences. 18.  One of those implicated was a police officer John Weir who was named as having been involved in the murder of a shopkeeper called Strathearn in Ahoghill in April 1977: he was convicted for that murder in June 1980 and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Government stated that both McCaughey and Weir refused to name the two loyalist paramilitaries also involved with them in the murder unless they received immunity from prosecution. The police and prosecuting authority took the decision prior to the trial not to enter into any process of bargaining with Weir and McCaughey. While both were approached by the police after their convictions to see if at that stage they would give evidence against the loyalist paramilitaries, each again refused to do so unless there was something in it for themselves. The Government stated that during the period in which Weir was detained he was interviewed on a large number of occasions. At no time did he implicate himself or others in any offence other than the Strathearn murder. 19.  On 1 February 1993, John Weir was released from prison on licence. In January 1999, he made a statement to a journalist alleging RUC and Ulster Defence Regiment (“UDR”) collusion with loyalist paramilitaries from the Portadown area in the mid-1970s. This statement was published in the Sunday Times newspaper in March 1999. It was obtained by the Patrick Finucane Centre, a human rights non-governmental organisation in Derry (“the Centre”). 20.  John Weir's statement made detailed allegations about security force collusion with loyalist paramilitaries in a series of incidents. He alleged inter alia that RUC Reserve Constable Laurence McClure had told him that McClure and Robert McConnell, a member of the UDR, along with members of the Ulster Volunteer Force (“UVF”), a proscribed loyalist paramilitary organisation, had been involved in the murder of Colm McCartney and Sean Farmer. 21.  The statement also made links between the attack on Donnelly's Bar and other attacks allegedly carried out by members of the security forces, both RUC and UDR, and loyalist paramilitaries. This group used the farmhouse in Glennane owned by James Mitchell, a RUC reservist, as a base from which to carry out attacks on Catholics and nationalists. Other attacks allegedly included the murder of John and Brian Reavey and wounding of Anthony Reavey in their home on 4 January 1976 (see application no. 34640/04); the attack on Donnelly's Bar in which Trevor Brecknell, Michael Donnelly and Patrick Donnelly were killed (see application no. 32457/04); the murder of Joseph, Barry and Declan O'Dowd and wounding of Barney O'Dowd (see application no. 34622/04); and the attack on the Rock Bar in which Michael McGrath was seriously injured (see application no. 34651/04). Weir also linked these attacks to the Dublin and Monaghan bombings in which 33 people were killed in the Republic of Ireland. 22.  On or about 10 June 1999, RTE, an Irish television channel, broadcast a television programme that contained allegations of security force involvement in a number of deaths, including that of Trevor Brecknell. Weir made allegations on that programme that members of the RUC and UDR were directly involved in the attack on Donnelly's Bar. A BBC Spotlight programme produced a similar documentary. 23.  These allegations attracted considerable attention on both sides of the Irish border and became the subject of police investigation in both jurisdictions. The Government stated that the police investigation in Northern Ireland was focussed on determining whether Weir's allegations should be assessed as sufficiently credible to require a full investigation. They obtained from the journalist an edited transcript of the interview with Weir. While his whereabouts were unknown to the RUC, Weir met with senior Irish police officers at the Irish Embassy on 15 April 1999. A copy of his statement was provided by the Garda to the RUC, along with a further statement made by Weir to another journalist dated 3 February 1999. The police analysed the available materials and sought to identify the personalities to be interviewed. It became apparent that some had died and that others, living abroad, could not be traced. A series of seven interviews were conducted, under cautions, between July and December 2001, of those individuals central to Weir's account who could be traced. No charges were preferred. The interviews followed the format of Weir's allegations being put to the interviewee for his or her response. The predominant response was denial of any involvement and claims that Weir had been untruthful. No admissions were made by any interviewee. Interviews were also conducted with less central personalities and with police officers involved in interviewing Weir in 1978. The latter stated that Weir had not mentioned the matters now being alleged. Amongst those interviewed by the police in the course of the preliminary investigation of Weir's allegations, was one person questioned about the Altnamachin murders. He denied any involvement and made no admissions. 24.  Meetings were held regularly with RUC counterparts in the Republic of Ireland. The RUC co-operated also with the judicial inquiry established in the Republic of Ireland into the Dublin and Monaghan bombings (see the description of the inquiry in the Brecknell case referred to above). Amongst matters about which the RUC team provided information to the inquiry was ballistics information which linked some of the weapons used to more than one incident. In February 2000 a substantial report was compiled by the RUC for the Garda dealing with Weir's allegations. It profiled Weir and dealt inter alia with a description of the 1978 investigation into McCaughey, Weir and others. It concluded that the investigation would continue but that his credibility was in doubt. According to the Government, despite inquiries being conducted, Weir's whereabouts could not be traced. This report was not disclosed as the investigation was continuing. An internal RUC report dated 27 February 2001 concluded that it would be necessary to interview Weir before any view could be finalised in respect of the credibility of his allegations: such interview was not possible as his whereabouts were not known. The report noted the absence of any previous mention of the allegations before 1999 and that much of what he said was hearsay and speculation. Inquiries made of the British Embassy in Nigeria (where he had a known address) and the criminal intelligence service and others failed to locate Weir. Contact was made with the Garda and the secretariat of the Inquiry into the Dublin and Monaghan bombings without positive result. 25.  The Serious Crime Review Team (“SCRT”) was established in March 2004, with responsibilities including the review of all historical murders by way of case assessment for evidential and investigative opportunities. A preliminary case assessment was carried out by a detective chief inspector, who audited all known information and documentation. It was noted that the dossier provided by the Centre included statements from civilian witnesses who had allegedly come across the bodies following the murders. The SCRT attempted without success to obtain access to these materials. In light of the preliminary assessment, the case was referred to the Historical Enquiry Team (“HET”). On 28 April 2006, a senior investigating officer reported on the further review; a number of potential lines of inquiry were identified and recommendations made, including that the HET should extensively interview Weir. This recommendation has been approved. The HET director of Investigations, Detective Chief Superintendent James of the London Metropolitan Police Force, took over personal supervision of the investigation which has progressed through the first three of five stages of the HET process (collection of all relevant material; assessment of the investigations to date; review of evidence, with intelligence and open and non-police sources, together with a meeting with the families of the victims of the attack). As a number of investigative opportunities were identified and to be followed up, the case was to continue to be processed by HET, which had been put in touch with Weir by the Centre. The Government submitted that if any evidence of police involvement in the murders was found, the Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland would then become involved. The Government have provided recent information that Weir finally agreed to meet with the HET in Dublin; he refused, however, to make a written statement or to give evidence in court. 26.  There has been contact between the police and family members, their solicitors or the Centre. In particular, there were meetings on 21 January 2000 with Chief Superintendent McCann; on 19 December 2001 with Detective Inspector Aiken and in November 2002 with Detective Inspector Williamson and in June and August 2004 with the Chief Constable; members of HET met with families or their representatives on 30 March and 25 May 2006, and there has also been extensive correspondence with the families or their representatives.


6.  The applicant was born in 1933 and lives in Novosibirsk. 7.  Since 1988, the applicant had been receiving an old-age pension. From February 1998, her pension was to be calculated under the Law on Calculating and Upgrading State Pensions. The law introduced a new method for calculating pensions. This method, “a pensioner's individual multiplier” was meant to link the pensioner's pension to his or her previous earnings. 8.  The authority in charge of the applicant's pension, the Pension Fund Agency of the Zayeltsovskiy District of Novosibirsk, fixed the applicant's multiplier at 0.525. The applicant considered that the agency had misread the law, and that her multiplier should be higher. On an unspecified date in 1999 she challenged the agency's decision in a court. Thus, in her view the net underpayments from February 1998 until December 1999 amounted to 1,627.5 Russian Roubles, without taking into account the raise of the local cost of living index. 9.  The case came before the Zayeltsovskiy District Court of Novosibirsk. On 21 October 1999 the court held for the applicant. It found that the agency had misread the law: as from 1 February 1998 the multiplier should have been 0.7. Consequently, the agency was ordered to recalculate the applicant's pension accordingly and pay it. 10.  The agency appealed against the judgment, but on 14 December 1999 the Novosibirsk Regional Court dismissed the appeal, and the judgment came into force. On the same day the court issued a writ of execution where it invited the local branch of the Pension Fund to recalculate the applicant's old age pension, applying the multiplier 0.7, and pay it to the applicant. The enforcement proceedings against the Agency were initiated. The agency recalculated the pension in accordance with the judgment of 14 December 1999 and requested the federal Pension Fund to allocate respective amounts. 11.  On 29 December 1999 the Ministry of Labour and Social Development had passed an Instruction on the Application of Limitations Established by the Law on Calculating and Upgrading State Pensions (hereinafter – “Instruction”). The Instruction clarified how to apply the law. 12.  Some time thereafter a group of individuals challenged the Instruction before the Supreme Court. On 10 April 2000 the enforcement of the judgment in the applicant's favour was suspended in connection with the proceedings before the Supreme Court. On 24 April 2000 the Supreme Court dismissed the complaint. It found that contrary to what the plaintiffs suggested the Ministry of Labour had not trespassed its authority when it issued the Instruction, and that the Ministry's interpretation of the Pensions Law had been correct. On 25 May 2000 the Cassation Section of the Supreme Court upheld this judgment on appeal. 13.  On 21 August 2000, the agency asked the District Court to re-open the case due to discovery of new circumstances. They argued that the interpretation of the law on pensions given by the Instruction was different from that of the Zayeltsovskiy District Court. Further, they referred to the decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation which confirmed the lawfulness of the Instruction. The agency argued that it had not known about those facts until after the litigation, and that the case should therefore be reconsidered. 14.  On 16 January 2001, the district court granted the agency's request and reopened the judgment under Article 333 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under this Article, a court might reopen a judgment, if a party discovered significant circumstances that were not and could not have been known to this party during the litigation. 15.  Having reconsidered the case, on 12 February 2001 the district court dismissed the applicant's claims in full. On 22 March 2001, the regional court upheld the judgment on appeal.


5.  The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Žilina. 6.  On 26 November 2004 the Považská Bystrica District Court remanded the applicant in custody in connection with criminal proceedings in which he was accused of several offences. 7.  On 20 May 2005 a public prosecutor indicted the applicant before the Považská Bystrica District Court. 8.  On 10 August 2005 the applicant requested that he be released from detention. He argued that his detention under the decision of 26 November 2004 had expired on 25 May 2005 and that no decision had been taken to extend it. 9.  The District Court dismissed the applicant’s request on 23 August 2005. On 12 September 2005 the Trenčín Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint against that decision. 10.  On 14 November 2005 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint alleging a breach of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. 11.  On 15 November 2005 the District Court convicted the applicant of two offences and sentenced him to two years’ imprisonment. The judgment became final on the same day. 12.  On 6 December 2006 the Constitutional Court found that the Regional Court, by its decision of 12 September 2005, had breached the applicant’s rights under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. In particular, his detention had been unlawful between 26 May 2005 and 15 November 2005, as the District Court had not delivered a decision extending the applicant’s detention. 13.  The Constitutional Court quashed the Regional Court’s decision, awarded the equivalent of 1,970 euros (at that time) in compensation to the applicant and ordered the Regional Court to reimburse the costs of the applicant’s legal representation in the constitutional proceedings.


5.  The applicant was born in 1979 and is serving a sentence of imprisonment in the Ivanovo Region. 6.  On 28 October 2000 victims B. and M. were killed in the latter's house. On 31 October 2000 the applicant was questioned in the Oktyabrskiy district prosecutor's office of Ivanovo in relation to the murders. Having been apprised of the privilege against self-incrimination, the applicant stated that he had spent most of the relevant day with his girlfriend Y. and his friend Ov., as well as several other persons (I., K. and V.), except for some time in the afternoon when Ov. and the applicant went to M.'s place but the latter was absent. The applicant added a note to the interview record alleging that he had been threatened with death or violence if he refused to make certain admissions. The record was also signed by a lawyer, Mr O. Immediately thereafter, the applicant signed a suspect arrest record, in which he indicated that he would like to be represented by O. 7.  On the same evening, the investigator twice heard Y., who stated at the second interview around midnight that the applicant had told her that he had killed victim M. The investigator also interviewed Ov., who confirmed in substance the applicant's account of the events but added that the applicant had told him that he had killed victims M. and B. with an axe; Ov. had also heard the applicant discuss an alibi with Y. 8.  On 1 November 2000 the applicant was brought for further interrogation. He was assisted by counsel and refused to testify. According to the applicant, a police officer or several officers exerted pressure on him and hit him on the head with a folder in order to force him to make self-incriminating statements. On the same day Y. gave a more detailed statement in addition to her second statement made on 31 October 2000. 9.  On 2 November 2000 the applicant refused the services of O., allegedly under pressure from unnamed officers. As follows from his written statement, he declined the services of counsel O. due to “contradicting positions on the case” and sought the appointment of a Ms Z. instead. The investigator appointed Z. as counsel and she assisted the applicant during the interview on the same day. The Government referred to the interview record from which it would follow that the applicant had made admissions on that date; that he had felt well and had been willing to give an oral testimony in the presence of counsel Z.; that he had been provided with an opportunity to have a consultation with counsel before the interview; and that he had had no complaints against any police officers. Ov. was also interviewed and provided a more detailed account of the events. 10.  On 3 November 2000 the applicant was examined by a medical expert. The applicant had scratches on his left elbow, bruises and scratches on his right arm and legs, several cuts and scratches on his hands, scratches below the ribs, and a scratch on his head. According to the expert, the above injuries had been sustained four to nine days before the date of the examination. 11.  On 10 November 2000 the applicant expressed a wish to be represented by O. again. However, on 7 December 2000 the applicant retained the services of another counsel, Mr S., who assisted him in the subsequent pre-trial and trial proceedings. 12.  On 20 December 2000 O. (instead of counsel S.) requested the investigator to order an expert report to verify if the applicant had been emotionally disturbed when, according to his version, he had seen victim B. kill victim M. in the latter's house. However, the investigator rephrased the question to the expert as whether the applicant had been emotionally disturbed when the victims had been murdered. 13.  Ov. and Y. were interviewed again in 2001. The investigator also interviewed K., who stated that on 28 October 2000 he had been together with the applicant until his departure in the evening; that Ov. told him that the applicant had killed M. and B. 14.  On an unspecified date, the applicant was charged with murder, robbery and destruction of property.  The case was referred to the Ivanovo Regional Court for trial by a jury. 15.  The trial judge considered that it was appropriate to accept in evidence the applicant's interview record of 2 November 2000 since the applicant's allegation of duress was unfounded. The applicant argued that he had seen victim B. kill victim M.; he admitted the arson of the house but pleaded legitimate self-defence in respect of causing injuries to victim B. during a violent fight. 16.  It also appears that a number of expert reports were presented to the jury. It transpires from the available material that one of the reports concluded that certain traces of blood at the crime scene and on the clothes of the applicant “could belong” to the applicant and victim B. who had the same blood group. 17.  The jury heard a number of witnesses, including witnesses K., V., I., who had seen the applicant in Ov.'s flat on the day of the murders or on the next day. The trial judge allowed the reading out of their pre-trial depositions. 18.  The jury also heard Ov. and the applicant was given an opportunity to put questions to him. At the court hearing Ov. alleged that he had previously made statements against the applicant under pressure from the police. The judge examined the allegation of ill-treatment and rejected it as unfounded. The judge thus allowed the reading out of his pre-trial depositions to the jury (see also paragraph 20 below). 19.  The trial judge twice summoned Y. However, the subpoenas could not be served on her and were returned to the court because she did not live at the address which she had provided to the domestic authorities during the investigation. There was no information about her whereabouts; her next of kin were not aware of her new place of residence. Having excluded Y.'s statement made on 31 October 2000, the trial judge, however, allowed the reading out of her subsequent statements (see also paragraph 21 below). 20.  In her summing-up to the jury on 16 October 2001, the trial judge reiterated the charges against the applicant and the evidence referred to by the parties and declared admissible. The judge explained to the jury that she had not been presented with any evidence indicating that Ov.'s testimony had been obtained under duress or otherwise in breach of law. Considering that the defence counsel had presented a distorted summary of the victims' injuries in his final speech, the judge reiterated the conclusions of the admissible expert reports. She also indicated to the jury that it was not their remit to decide on the putative self-defence issue. 21.  After several hours of deliberations, the jury returned a guilty verdict on the charges of murder, robbery and destruction of property. On 17 October 2001 the trial judge held the final hearing concerning civil claims, the sentence and other matters to be determined by the trial judge. Y. appeared before the trial judge on that day and explained that she had not received any court summons, which had been sent to her mother's home address. Her mother was unaware of her new place of residence. Having learnt about the trial the day before, she decided to come to the courthouse (see also paragraph 19 above). The trial judge allowed Y. to give her opinion concerning the applicant's personality in so far as this matter could be relevant to the sentence. On the same day, the applicant was sentenced to eighteen years' imprisonment and the confiscation of his property was ordered. 22.  The applicant submitted objections to the trial verbatim record, considering inter alia that Y. had in fact explained to the trial judge that the investigator had wrongly noted her new home address as her work address. The trial judge, however, rejected those objections as untrue. 23.  The applicant and his counsel submitted appeals to the Supreme Court of Russia. They argued that there had been various defects in the pre-trial investigation, in particular as regards the right to legal assistance; they contested the quality of the evidence, including the expert opinions, and the trial judge's summing-up to the jury. The applicant's counsel S. asked to be notified of the date for the appeal hearing and the applicant asked to be brought to that hearing. 24.  On 8 January 2002 the applicant requested the Regional Court to give him access to the case file in order to prepare his defence on appeal. On 1 February 2002 the Regional Court dismissed his request because Russian law did not vest in the accused a right to have access to the file in appeal proceedings. The applicant unsuccessfully renewed his request in February 2002. 25.  On 22 February 2002 the judge rejected a request by the applicant to have the trial verbatim record amended. Having examined the trial transcript, on 18 March 2002 the applicant's counsel submitted a statement of appeal. A handwritten inscription by the trial judge contained the instruction that “all participants in the proceedings be made aware of that document”. 26.  On 19 April 2002 the Supreme Court granted leave to the applicant to participate in the appeal hearing and ordered that he be brought to Moscow from the Ivanovo Region. As can be seen from a telegram dated 28 May 2002, the applicant's counsel had been informed that the appeal hearing was listed for 4 June 2002 at 10 am. According to the Government, the applicant was also informed accordingly on the same date. 27.  The applicant asserted that in April 2002 he had requested the Supreme Court to grant him access to the documents relating to the appeal proceedings, including the statement of appeal lodged by his lawyer and the written observations prepared by the prosecutor. He received no reply to this request. 28.  On an unspecified date, the prosecutor lodged his observations in reply to the applicant's appeal. A copy of those observations was not made available to the applicant or his counsel. 29.  On 31 May 2002 Moscow remand centre received a letter from the Supreme Court requiring them to make arrangements for the applicant's participation in the appeal hearing on 4 June 2002 at 10 am and for the applicant to be notified of the date of the hearing. 30.  On 4 June 2002 the Supreme Court heard the applicant by way of a video link and upheld the trial judgment. During the appeal hearing the applicant was not represented by a lawyer. The prosecutor was present at the hearing. 31.  The court refused to examine the applicant's arguments directed against the findings of fact made at first instance by the jury since this aspect of the case could not be challenged on appeal. It noted that the applicant had been informed of the special procedure for appeal against the verdict of a jury (see also paragraph 48 below). The appeal court examined the remaining arguments and dismissed them. Lastly, the court noted that the applicant had been given access to the case file before the trial in July-August 2001 and after the trial in December 2001-February 2002. The applicable legislation did not require photocopying of the file. 32.  In 2005 the Regional Court reconsidered the trial and appeal judgments in the light of the amended (more favourable) legislation and lifted the order for the confiscation of the applicant's property. 33.  The applicant complained to the district prosecutor that on 1 November 2000 an officer had hit him on the head with a folder; that he had been subjected to threats on 2 November 2000 and that he had been compelled to decline O.'s services. The prosecutor heard the investigator in charge of the case against the applicant and the officer who had allegedly beat him. On 6 December 2000 the district prosecutor refused to initiate criminal proceedings, noting the applicant's contradictory statements concerning the alleged threats or beating. The inquiry file was then lost. In the resumed proceedings, the district investigator heard the applicant and the investigator in charge of the case against the applicant. On 27 August 2001 the district investigator issued a new decision not to institute criminal proceedings. He referred to the medical report of 3 November 2000, which had revealed injuries sustained, according to the expert, four to nine days before the date of the examination (see paragraph 10 above). The investigator concluded that those injuries had been sustained before the applicant's arrest. He also noted that the applicant had made no health complaints during his detention in the temporary detention centre from 31 October to 3 November 2000. 34.  The applicant was informed of his right to appeal against the above refusals to a prosecutor or to seek judicial review. Instead, the applicant brought court proceedings accusing the town prosecutor of inaction in relation to the alleged threats on 31 October 2000. On 29 March 2002 the Leninskiy District Court of Ivanovo discontinued the proceedings because the town prosecutor had never been asked to deal with the applicant's complaint. The court also held that the prosecutor's office had carried out inquiries but found no evidence of the alleged ill-treatment. Moreover, the District Court referred to the fact that the Regional Court had dealt with this issue at the applicant's trial and also found no evidence of the alleged ill-treatment. On 30 April 2002 the Regional Court upheld the decision of 29 March 2002, considering that only formal decisions were amenable to judicial review. In separate proceedings, the applicant complained about unlawful actions against him on 31 October 2000. On 15 May 2002 the Regional Court took the final decision to discontinue the case because there was no formal decision amenable to review. On 18 April 2003 the applicant again complained to a court about the alleged ill-treatment by the police and the inaction of the regional prosecutor's office. On 19 June 2003 the Regional Court took the final decision to discontinue the case. 35.  From 31 October to 3 November 2000 the applicant was kept in a temporary detention centre in Ivanovo. It appears that from 3 November 2000 to 14 May 2002 he was detained in Ivanovo remand centre no. 1. The applicant was kept in Moscow remand centre no. 77/3 from 14 May to 2 August 2002 in relation to the appeal proceedings in his criminal case. 36.  The applicant submitted that on 4 June 2002 he had spent six hours in a small cell in the remand centre with fifteen other persons. The cell had been overheated and had no ventilation. While the temperature outside on 4 June 2002 had exceeded 30ºC, the temperature in the cell had reached over 50ºC. He had not been given water for six hours and had not been allowed to use the toilet. 37.  The applicant subsequently submitted that the cell measured 18.6 square metres and that he had been detained with up to twenty other persons. 38.  According to the Government, on 4 June 2002 the applicant had been placed in an “assembly cell” measuring 18.6 square metres. This cell had no windows, ventilation, sanitary installations or water supply. However, the prison staff allowed the detainees to go to the toilet outside the cell and provided them with drinking water. Air access was ensured by an opening in the cell door. 39.  Later on the same day, the applicant had been transferred to cell no. 521 measuring 32.7 square metres for the purpose of participating in the appeal hearing before the Supreme Court by way of a video link. The cell was equipped with a ventilation system, water supply and a sink. Toilet facilities were separated from the main area. Drinking water had been made available to the applicant and the lights had been left on. During the summer period the window panes were removed and detainees were provided with fans. The outside temperature had not exceeded 21.4ºC on that day. The applicant had been provided with bedding and tableware in the remand centre. Detainees were provided with three hot meals a day. 40.  The applicant and certain other detainees complained about the conditions of detention in the Moscow remand centre. 41.  According to a letter from the Moscow Prosecutor's Office of 9 March 2004, the conditions of detention in cell no. 521 were acceptable; the outside temperature in Moscow on 4 June 2002 did not exceed +18º C, as indicated by the Moscow Weather Centre. 42.  According to letters from the Moscow Prosecutor's Office of 5 and 7 July 2004, the conditions in a cell measuring 18.6 square metres “did not meet the sanitary requirements” at the material time. After an inquiry the supervising prosecutor concluded on 5 July 2004 that up to late 2002 detainees awaiting an appeal hearing had been placed in the above cell with no window, ventilation, sanitary installations or water supply. Since late 2002 detainees awaiting appeal hearings had been placed in “assembly cell” no. 521. Although the applicant had not provided sufficient details, on the basis of information from the prison staff the prosecutor determined that the applicant had also been kept in cell no. 521 on 4 June 2002. The prosecutor also indicated that the document confirming that the applicant had received the letter from the Supreme Court concerning the appeal hearing did not bear his signature. He concluded that the remand centre staff had nonetheless ensured the applicant's right to participate in the appeal hearing. 43.  According to the applicant, on 23 January 2003 he handed over a letter to be dispatched by the prison administration to the Registry of the Court. In November 2003 the latter acknowledged receipt of his letter dated 14 September 2003 and informed him that no letter dated 23 January 2003 had been received. 44.  On 13 July 2004 the Registry of the Court, by registered mail, requested the applicant to provide by 24 August 2004 certain documents and information concerning his application pending before the Court. According to the acknowledgement-of-receipt card, on 5 August 2004 the letter was received by an unspecified person in the detention facility. According to the Government, on 5 and 15 August 2004 the applicant was called to the office in charge of correspondence in the facility in order to receive the letter, but refused to accept it. 45.  On 22 September 2004 the applicant's sister informed the Court by fax that the applicant had only received the letter on 21 September 2004 in an unsealed envelope. 46.  Following the applicant's complaint about the issue, on 3 November 2004 the Penitentiary Department of the Ivanovo Region replied that the delay in the delivery of the letter did not constitute a hindrance of the applicant's correspondence with the European Court; although the prison officer had been negligent, there had been no intention to delay the letter.


5.  The applicant was born in 1946 and is now serving a prison sentence in Kazan UE-148/19 correctional colony. 6. On 16 December 2001 he was arrested. On 28 December 2001 the prosecutor’s office of the Novosheshminskiy District of the Republic of Tatarstan authorised his detention on charges of inflicting severe injuries which had caused the death of the victim. 7. By a judgment of 5 March 2002, the Novosheshminskiy District Court of the Republic of Tatarstan convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to ten years and six months’ imprisonment in a correctional colony with a special regime. On 14 May 2002 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan upheld the judgment on appeal.
 8. During the relevant periods the applicant was detained in the following detention facilities. From 16 December 2001 to 9 January 2002 he was held in the temporary detention facility at Novosheshminskiy police station (изолятор временного содержания Новошешминского РОВД). He was then transferred to Bugulma IZ-16/03 remand centre (следственный изолятор ИЗ-16/3 Главного управления Федеральной службы исполнения наказаний по Республике Татарстан) where he was held from 9 January to 20 August 2002, except for a short period from 28 to 29 January 2002, which he spent in the temporary detention facility at Novosheshminskiy police station. From 20 August 2002 to 26 August 2003 he was held in Chistopol UE-148/T prison (тюрьма УЭ-148/Т г. Чистополя Республики Татарстан).
 9. The parties’ descriptions of the conditions of the applicant’s pre-trial and post-trial detention significantly differ on a number of counts. 22. The applicant was held in Bugulma IZ-16/3 detention facility from 9 January to 20 August 2002, except for a short period from 28 to 29 January 2002. 23. According to his submissions, at the material time the cells where he was detained measured 5 x 1.5 metres on average, had six beds and accommodated between twelve and fifteen inmates, who had to take turns to sleep and were not provided with personal bedding. The lights were permanently on. The windows had no glass and were sealed with metal shutters. It was very hot in the summer and freezing in the winter. The toilet was placed very close to the dining table, with no privacy. Despite regular complaints about insects, the administration took no action to fumigate the cells. A shower was available twice a month. No outside exercise was offered to the applicant. The detainees’ food consisted mainly of vegetables and soya products. The medical assistance was inadequate. 2. The Government’s account
 24. Relying on a certificate dated 27 December 2006 issued by the facility management, the Government submitted that the applicant had been held in five cells:
- cell no. 212, measuring 21 sq. m and accommodating five inmates including the applicant;
- cell no. 311, measuring 12 sq. m with six sleeping places;
- cell no. 312, measuring 12 sq. m with six sleeping places;
- cell no. 317, measuring 21 sq. m with fourteen sleeping places;
- cell no. 407, measuring 21 sq. m, with fourteen sleeping places.
 25. In cell no. 212 the applicant was detained from 8 to 20 August 2002. Due to the destruction of the facility’s records on the expiry of the statutory storage time-limit, it was not possible to establish the exact periods during which the applicant was detained in the other four cells and the exact number of inmates detained with him.
 26. All cells were equipped with a sink and a lavatory separated from the living area by a partition of not less than one metre in height. Showers were available once a week with a simultaneous change of bedding. The inmates were provided with washbowls for their hygiene needs. The water was supplied centrally and could be heated with electric heaters.
 27. The cells were ventilated through casement windows and in addition were equipped with ventilation shafts. The cells were aired daily, while the inmates were having their exercise. The average temperature and level of humidity met sanitary and hygiene requirements.
 28. The windows were not covered with metal shutters, as a result there was enough natural light to allow reading and writing. The cells were also equipped with lamps which could be turned on when necessary. The lamps were covered with a protective fitting. During the night, the artificial lighting was dimmed.
 29. The cells were fumigated regularly, with the assistance of a special sanitary service when necessary, and the detainees never complained about insects or rats.
 30. The food met official nutritional standards. The quality of the food was controlled by the facility’s medical unit. In addition, the applicant could receive parcels and could buy food and other things from the facility’s shop.
 31. During his detention the applicant was provided with an individual sleeping place, bedding, cutlery and utensils. He had an hour’s daily exercise. His state of health was monitored regularly and he was provided with medical assistance when necessary. He never complained about the conditions of his detention while in Bugulma IZ-16/3.


4.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Simferopol. 5.  On 16 March 2005 the prosecutors started criminal investigations against her on suspicion of fraud. 6.  On 5 October 2005 she was arrested and placed in a cell in the Simferopol Kyivskyy District Police Station. According to the applicant, the conditions of her detention were degrading. In particular, she was not provided with medical aid, food, or a place to sleep. 7.  The applicant alleges that during her first questioning, on 6 October 2005, she was not assisted by a lawyer. 8.  On 7 October 2005 the Kyivskyy District Court of Simferopol ordered the applicant’s release subject to an undertaking not to abscond. 9.  On 23 July 2007 the Tsentralnyy District Court of Simferopol (“the Tsentralnyy Court”) convicted the applicant of several counts of fraud and sentenced her to five years’ imprisonment with confiscation of all her property. The court also ordered the applicant’s placement in custody pending the entry into force of its judgment. 10.  On the same day the applicant was placed in the Simferopol Temporary Investigative Isolation Unit no. 15 (“the SIZO”). 11.  The applicant maintains that the findings of the first-instance court concerning her responsibility for the crimes of which she had been convicted on 23 July 2007 were subsequently relied upon by the same court in a judgment of 30 November 2007 concerning a similar case against another person. She provided no further details of the latter case. 12.  On 20 December 2007 the Crimea Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) quashed the judgment of 23 July 2007 and remitted the case to the Tsentralnyy Court for fresh consideration. At the same time, it ordered the applicant to remain detained, without providing reasons or a time-limit for her continued detention. 13.  In the course of the new consideration of the case by the Tsentralnyy Court, the charges against the applicant were changed to one count of fraud. 14.  On 6 February 2008 the court rejected the applicant’s request for release stating in particular that there were no grounds for the release, whereas a quashing of the judgment was not a reason for changing a detention order as such. 15.  On 20 August 2008 the court changed the applicant’s preventive measure in view of the new charges against her and her state of health. It ordered the applicant’s release subject to an undertaking not to abscond. 16.  In a judgment of 27 August 2008 it convicted the applicant of fraud and sentenced her to thirteen months’ imprisonment. The court further held that the applicant was not required to serve her sentence, as she had been detained for the same period of time in the course of the proceedings. By the same judgment, the court ordered the destruction of certain items in evidence, which, according to the applicant, included some of her personal belongings seized in the course of the investigations. 17.  The applicant did not appeal against that judgment. 18.  She unsuccessfully lodged a number of complaints with the prosecutors, courts, and the Council of Judges, accusing the investigators and judges of falsification of the case materials and of various procedural violations. She also raised allegations that some of the witnesses against her had made false statements, but to no avail.


4.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Yugorsk, a town in the Tyumen region. 5.  On 29 May 2002 the applicant brought a court action against his former employer seeking compensation for damage to health related to professional hardship. 6.  On 29 November 2004 Yugorskiy District Court (Khanty-Mansiyskiy Region) dismissed his claim as manifestly ill-founded. 7.  On 14 December 2004 the applicant lodged an appeal against the judgment of 29 November 2004. 8.  According to the Government, on 30 December 2004 the District Court sent a letter to the applicant informing him that the appeal hearing had been scheduled for 8 February 2005. 9.  On 8 February 2005 the Khanty-Mansiyskiy Regional Court held a hearing which the applicant did not attend. The adverse party’s representative attended the hearing and made submissions. The Regional Court upheld the judgment of 29 November 2004. 10.  On an unspecified date the applicant applied for a supervisory review of the appeal decision of 8 February 2005. 11.  By a decision of 14 March 2005 a judge of the Regional Court refused to examine his application on the grounds that the enclosed copy of the appeal decision of 8 February 2005 had not been certified by the relevant court.


6.  The applicants were born in 1974 and 1977 respectively and live in Kielce. 7.  The first applicant (Ms D. Welke), had a school friend, Ms M.B., who was resident in the Netherlands. 8.  In January 2003 the Central Investigation Bureau (“CIB”; Centralne Biuro Śledcze) of the Police was informed by the German authorities about a parcel containing cocaine, which had been dispatched in Brazil and addressed to Ms E.B. in Kielce, Poland. On 3 February 2003 the Chief Police Commissioner (Komendant Główny Policji) authorised the covert surveillance of the parcel on the basis of section 19b § 1 of the Police Act. On 4 February 2003 the parcel was intercepted by officers of the CIB. They opened the parcel and found that it contained, in particular, fourteen plastic bags containing a white powder substance hidden by twos in seven cases. The police experts tested the substance and established that it was cocaine. The officers replaced the drugs with a similar-looking substance. 9.  On 5 February 2003 the Chief Police Commissioner ordered the covert operation (kontrola operacyjna w postaci podsłuchu pomieszczeń). It appears that the police placed a secret recording device in the parcel. 10.  On 6 February 2003 the parcel was delivered to Ms E.B. She was a friend of Ms M.B.’s late mother. On the same day Ms E.B. informed the first applicant that she had received a parcel from Brazil addressed to M.B. The first applicant telephoned her friend who confirmed that she was expecting a parcel and asked the first applicant if she could keep it for her. The first applicant agreed. 11.  On the same day the first applicant went to collect the parcel. She and Ms E.B. partly opened it and found tee-shirts and cardboard cases containing chain necklaces. They did not find anything else in the parcel. 12.  Subsequently Ms Welke took the parcel home, where she met her boyfriend Mr Białek (the second applicant). The applicants opened the parcel and examined its contents. Later on, they both left the flat to call Ms M.B. from a phone box. The first applicant put all contents of the parcel in a plastic bag together with parts of the original parcel indicating the addresses of the sender and the recipient. Then the first applicant hid the plastic bag in her room. 13.  On 6 February 2003 at around 8 p.m. the police arrested the applicants as they were leaving the flat. The officers then searched the flat. The first applicant, at the request of the officers, surrendered the plastic bag with all its contents. Examination of the contents revealed that in each of the seven cases containing chain necklaces were hidden two transparent plastic bags containing a white powder substance. The applicants were charged with drug-trafficking offences. 14.  On 8 February 2003 the Kielce Regional Prosecutor from the Organised Crime Department opened a criminal investigation into the alleged transfer of cocaine from Brazil to Poland. He relied on classified material provided by the Chief Police Commissioner and the information gathered by the CIB officers. 15.  On 8 February 2003 the Kielce District Court remanded the applicants in custody on reasonable suspicion that they had committed the drug-trafficking offences. It had regard to the evidence obtained so far in the case, in particular the witnesses’ statements, the classified evidence, the expert reports and the results of the search. The court noted that the applicants’ statements contradicted the other evidence in the case. On 23 June 2003 the Kielce Regional Court decided to end the applicants’ detention and to release them on bail. The bail was paid on the following day and the applicants were released. The court imposed non-custodial preventive measures on them. 16.  A significant part of the evidence gathered in the case was classified as confidential (poufne). On 9 April 2003 both applicants consulted the classified evidence and other evidence. They did not lodge any motions in respect of the evidence and did not make any comments on the investigation. 17.  On 18 April 2003 the prosecution filed a bill of indictment against the applicants with the Kielce Regional Court. They were charged with trafficking in 971 grams of cocaine. The prosecutor established the facts of the case on the basis of classified evidence, expert reports in chemistry and dactyloscopy, the results of the search of the flat and statements made by Ms E.B. and her friend Ms I.B., and partly on the basis of statements made by the applicants. 18.  Part of the case file and the written reasons for the bill were classified as it contained information covered by professional secrecy (tajemnica służbowa). The prosecutor asked the court for the defendants and their counsel to be allowed to consult the reasons for the bill of indictment, in accordance with the rules laid down in the Protection of Classified Information Act. Furthermore, invoking Article 360 § 1 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CCP”), the prosecutor requested that the entire hearing be conducted in camera on account of the important State interests involved. 19.  The first applicant had two defence lawyers and the second applicant had one. On 12 and 26 May 2003 respectively the applicants and their counsel consulted the bill of indictment in the secret registry of the Kielce Regional Court. 20.  On 27 May 2003 the President of the 3rd Criminal Division of the Regional Court authorised the applicants, their counsel and the prosecutor to consult the record of the opening of the parcel, the transcript of the secret recordings and photographic evidence. On 28 May 2003 counsel for the first and second applicants consulted those materials in the secret registry. They were informed that they would be criminally liable in the event of their failure to respect the confidentiality of the information. 21.  The first hearing was set for 27 May 2003. At that hearing the court allowed the prosecutor’s request to conduct the trial in camera, having regard to the important State interests involved as provided for in Article 360 § 1 (3) of the CCP. The applicants’ counsel did not object to the prosecutor’s request. The court directed the persons present in the courtroom (the applicants, their counsel and three police officers) that they were under an obligation to keep confidential all information disclosed during the hearing. The applicants and their counsel could consult the case file in the secret registry of the court. 22.  The Kielce Regional Court held six hearings on the following dates: 27 May, 12 and 23 June, 22 July, 10 September and 8 October 2003. The Regional Court’s bench was composed of one professional judge and two lay judges. 23.  At the first hearing, held on 27 May 2003, the applicants pleaded not guilty. They refused to testify, but answered some questions from the court and their counsel. The trial court heard as witnesses Ms E.B., Ms I.B. and two other persons, friends of the applicants, who had been arrested with them. 24.  On 11 June 2003 the trial court received a copy of the decision of the Warsaw Regional Court of 12 February 2003 authorising the Chief Police Commissioner of 5 February 2003 to order the secret recordings. 25.  On 12 June 2003 the court provided the applicants with the transcript of secret recordings, on which they refused to comment. At the hearing held on 22 July 2003 the trial court heard the secret recordings made by the CIB. According to the applicants, the recordings were of very poor quality. The conversation between the first applicant and Ms E.B. was completely incomprehensible, and only vague extracts of the conversation between the applicants could be heard, interrupted by noises and rattling. 26.  At the hearings held on 10 September and 8 October 2003 the court heard CIB officers involved in the investigation, including those who had opened the parcel on 4 February 2003. The court authorised them to testify in respect of the facts covered by the duty of professional secrecy. 27.  At the hearing held on 10 September 2003 the first applicant requested the trial court to reverse its earlier decision to conduct the proceedings in camera. She submitted that as a consequence of that decision her defence rights had been limited because she had not been allowed to make notes from the file. Her counsel did not take a stand on the request, stating that it was the first applicant’s personal view. The prosecutor objected to the request, claiming that the grounds for the decision to exclude the public remained relevant. He also argued that the first applicant’s defence rights were duly respected as she could personally consult the classified part of the case file. The Regional Court dismissed the request to reverse the earlier decision to conduct the proceedings in camera as the grounds originally invoked for that decision remained fully valid. 28.  On 15 October 2003 the Kielce Regional Court gave judgment. It found the applicants guilty of having participated in the transit of cocaine through Poland in concert with other persons, and sentenced them to one year and six months’ imprisonment and a fine of PLN 1,500. It further ordered them to make a payment of 500 PLN to a local association fighting drug addiction and to reimburse the State’s costs incurred in the proceedings. The written reasons for the judgment were classified as confidential and deposited in the secret registry of the court. The applicants’ counsel were informed accordingly and notified of their right to consult the written reasons. They filed an appeal without consulting the written reasons for the judgment. 29.  When establishing the facts, the Regional Court excluded the evidence obtained by means of the secret recordings ordered by the Chief Police Commissioner on 5 February 2003. The Regional Court observed that the Police Commissioner’s order had not been endorsed by a court within five days as required by section 19 § 3 of the Police Act. Accordingly, the evidence obtained on the basis of that order was unlawful and could not be used in the criminal proceedings against the applicants. On the other hand, the Regional Court confirmed that the secret surveillance of the parcel and the replacement of the cocaine with an unspecified powder substance had been effected in accordance with the Police Act and the relevant Ordinance of the Minister of the Interior. 30.  On the basis of the available evidence, in particular, various statements made by the applicants during the investigation and during the trial, the Regional Court found that at the time when the parcel had been at their disposal the applicants had known that it contained drugs. The court found that the applicants had acted intentionally with a view to transferring the drugs through Poland to the Netherlands. Thus, their guilt had been sufficiently established. 31.  In their appeal, the applicants alleged breaches of several provisions of criminal procedure committed by the prosecution and the court, arbitrary assessment of evidence and disregard for the in dubio pro reo principle. They argued that the excluded evidence should have been omitted as the “fruit of the poisonous tree”, whereas the court had actually based the conviction on that evidence. Further, they submitted that the applicants’ right to defend themselves had been impaired because access to the classified evidence had been very difficult, and neither the applicants nor their lawyers had been allowed to make copies or notes of the written reasons for the judgment. 32.  On 5 February 2004 the Kraków Court of Appeal held a hearing at which the prosecutor requested the court to conduct the proceedings in camera. The applicants’ counsel left the issue to the court’s discretion. The Court of Appeal decided pursuant to Article 360 § 1 (3) of the CCP to allow the prosecutor’s request since the examination of the appeal would not be possible without consideration of the classified evidence. The Court of Appeal further decided to supplement the evidentiary material. It noted that the trial court had not determined the exact circumstances of the removal of the cocaine from the parcel and its replacement by a similar substance and decided, to this end, to hear four police officers who had been involved in the covert interception of the parcel. 33.  On 10 March 2004 the Kraków Court of Appeal held a hearing in camera. It heard evidence from three police officers and established that the cocaine had been removed from the parcel and replaced with a similar substance by the police. 34.  The prosecutor requested the Court of Appeal to hear the secret recordings and argued that the Regional Court had erred in excluding that evidence. The Court of Appeal rejected that request, noting that it could not examine the relevant decision of the Regional Court since the first-instance judgment had not been appealed against by the prosecutor (reformatio in peius). 35.  On the same date, after deliberations, the Court of Appeal amended the judgment of the Regional Court by changing the legal classification of the offence to one of “attempted” transit of drugs (usiłowanie nieudolne) as the police had secretly removed the drug from the parcel and replaced it with a similar substance. It accordingly reduced the applicants’ sentence to one year’s imprisonment. The judge rapporteur presented orally the main reasons for the judgment. The written reasons for the judgment were classified as confidential and could only be consulted in the secret registry of the court. 36.  The Court of Appeal confirmed that the applicants had taken part in the transit of cocaine through Poland. The first applicant had collected the parcel from the addressee and kept it in order to hand it over to a person indicated by Ms M.B.. She had also informed Ms M.B. of the collection of the parcel. The second applicant had assisted the first applicant in the process. 37.  The Court of Appeal held, inter alia, as follows:
“The applicants’ counsel are wrong to plead that the accused had no intention to take part in the transit of the drugs through Poland. This was sufficiently established by the [admitted] evidence, and in particular by the statements of the accused themselves. (...)
The applicants’ counsel are wrong to claim that the accused’s right to defend themselves was restricted on account of the fact that part of the evidence was classified, or that the judgment was the result of the fact that the judges had retained in their mind the content of excluded evidence. Both those situations are a simple consequence of the application of the relevant regulations, namely the regulation regarding classified information and the [regulation on] judicial review of the legality of evidence. ... 3.  The assertion that there was no equality of arms because part of the evidence was classified is incorrect. Such evidence was not withheld from the counsel, as they were able to consult it in the same manner as the prosecutor, and the restrictions on disclosure of classified material were equally applicable to both parties. 4.  (...) The consultation of classified evidence meant accepting certain conditions, including the prohibition on taking notes on the contents of such evidence; nonetheless those restrictions were not of such a nature that they could be considered to limit the rights of the defence. Counsel could memorise the content of the evidence they consulted, then use it, while respecting the requirements of confidentiality, either when pleading at the closed hearings or with due diligence in their written submissions. (...) Those were then not limitations on the rights of the defence, but rather certain impediments in conducting the defence, in any case impediments of a minor degree. In the Court of Appeal’s view, those limitations were necessary since part of the evidence was classified. If they [those limitations] were not applied, the interests protected by the regulation on classified information would be affected. [Those limitations] are present in every case concerning classified information, and thus alleging shortcomings in this respect does not concern just this particular case but relates generally to the principle of the determination of criminal charges based on evidence covered by the regulation on classified information. That would then be a claim of unconstitutionality in respect of the determination of such cases due to the limitation by that regulation of the constitutionally protected rights of the defence (Article 42 § 2 of the Constitution), which is far-reaching, unjustified and – for the Court of Appeal – unconvincing. If those arguments (or rather groundless assertions) of the author of such allegations were to be shared, then the determination of cases involving classified material would be ruled out. (...).” 38.  The Court of Appeal rejected the applicants’ claim that the trial court had based the conviction on the excluded evidence. In this respect it noted, inter alia:
“The allegation that the Regional Court’s ruling was influenced by the content of the excluded evidence, i.e. the evidence obtained secretly by the police and the explanations of the accused related to that evidence, is incorrect. Firstly, it is not uncommon in criminal proceedings that some evidence is removed from the scope of evidentiary material constituting the basis for a ruling. (...) Ensuring that judges did not know the evidence that was excluded would mean extinguishing those procedural acts in which such evidence was examined, removing the records of such information from the files and restarting every trial before a different panel of the court. That would not be reasonable and it is not provided for by law. (...) In other words, the Court of Appeal examines whether the evidence the Regional Court took as the basis for its ruling was sufficient for it to give the ruling or whether there was insufficient evidentiary basis for it. The Court of Appeal considers that there was sufficient evidence to give the judgment, and thus the judgment [of the Regional Court] has adequate evidentiary basis (with one reservation in respect of the presence of the drug in the parcel). The allegation that the judges [of the Regional Court] were influenced by the content of excluded evidence had no significance for the content of the judgment.” 39.  The applicants lodged cassation appeals. The second applicant’s lawyer submitted, inter alia, that the Court of Appeal had not referred to the arguments raised in the appeals, that in its assessment of evidence the court had infringed the principles of impartiality, presumption of innocence and in dubio pro reo. They repeated their arguments, submitted to the Court of Appeal, that the unlawfully obtained evidence, although eventually excluded by the first-instance court, had been presented during the trial as admissible evidence, which must have unfairly prejudiced the outcome of the proceedings. The defence also argued that since the evidence obtained by means of the secret recordings had been excluded at first instance, there had been no reason to hold the appeal proceedings in private. 40.  On 20 October 2004 the Supreme Court, sitting in camera in a single judge formation, dismissed the applicants’ cassation appeals, finding both of them manifestly ill-founded.


11.  The applicant was born in October 1971 and lives in Wiltshire. 12.  The facts, as found by Mr Justice Wall (“Wall J”), who heard the parties’ oral evidence (see paragraph 20 below), are as follows. 13.  On 12 July 2000 the applicant and her partner, J. (born in November 1976), commenced treatment at the Bath Assisted Conception Clinic (“the clinic”). The applicant had been referred for treatment at the clinic five years earlier, when she was married, but had not pursued it because of the breakdown of her marriage. 14.  On 10 October 2001 the applicant and J. were informed, during an appointment at the clinic, that preliminary tests had revealed that the applicant had serious pre-cancerous tumours in both ovaries, and that her ovaries would have to be removed. They were told that because the tumours were growing slowly it would be possible first to extract some eggs for in vitro fertilisation (“IVF”), but that this would have to be done quickly. 15.  The consultation of 10 October 2001 lasted approximately an hour in total. A nurse explained that the applicant and J. would each have to sign a form consenting to the IVF treatment and that, in accordance with the provisions of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (“the 1990 Act”), it would be possible for either to withdraw his or her consent at any time before the embryos were implanted in the applicant’s uterus (see paragraph 37 below). The applicant asked the nurse whether it would be possible to freeze her unfertilised eggs, but was informed that this procedure, which had a much lower chance of success, was not performed at the clinic. At that point J. reassured the applicant that they were not going to split up, that she did not need to consider the freezing of her eggs, that she should not be negative and that he wanted to be the father of her child. 16.  Thereafter, the couple entered into the necessary consents, by signing the forms required by the 1990 Act (see paragraph 37 below).
Immediately beneath the title to the form appeared the following words:
“NB – do not sign this form unless you have received information about these matters and have been offered counselling. You may vary the terms of this consent at any time except in relation to sperm or embryos which have already been used. Please insert numbers or tick boxes as appropriate.” 17.  On 12 November 2001 the couple attended the clinic and eleven eggs were harvested and fertilised. Six embryos were created and consigned to storage. On 26 November the applicant underwent an operation to remove her ovaries. She was told that she should wait two years before attempting to implant any of the embryos in her uterus. 18.  In May 2002 the relationship broke down. The future of the embryos was discussed between the parties. On 4 July 2002 J. wrote to the clinic to notify it of the separation and to state that the embryos should be destroyed. 19.  The clinic notified the applicant of J.’s withdrawal of consent to further use of the embryos and informed her that it was now under a legal obligation to destroy them, pursuant to paragraph 8(2) of Schedule 3 to the 1990 Act (see paragraph 37 below). The applicant commenced proceedings in the High Court, seeking an injunction requiring J. to restore his consent to the use and storage of the embryos and a declaration, inter alia, that he had not varied and could not vary his consent of 10 October 2001. Additionally she sought a declaration of incompatibility under the Human Rights Act 1998 to the effect that section 12 of, and Schedule 3 to, the 1990 Act breached her rights under Articles 8, 12 and 14 of the Convention. She also pleaded that the embryos were entitled to protection under Articles 2 and 8. Interim orders were made requiring the clinic to preserve the embryos until the end of the proceedings. 20.  The trial judge, Wall J, heard the case over five days and took evidence from, among others, the applicant and J. On 1 October 2003, in a 65-page judgment (Evans v. Amicus Healthcare Ltd and Others [2003] EWHC 2161 (Fam)), he dismissed the applicant’s claims. 21.  He concluded that under the terms of the 1990 Act, and as a matter of public policy, it had not been open to J. to give an unequivocal consent to the use of the embryos irrespective of any change of circumstance, and that, as a matter of fact, J. had only ever consented to his treatment “together” with the applicant, and not to her continuing treatment on her own in the event that their relationship ended. Wall J thus rejected the applicant’s submission that J. was estopped from withdrawing his consent, finding that both the applicant and J. had embarked on the treatment on the basis that their relationship would continue. On 10 October 2001 J. had been doing his best to reassure the applicant that he loved her and wanted to be the father of her children; giving a truthful expression of his feelings at that moment, but not committing himself for all time. Wall J observed that in the field of personal relationships, endearments and reassurances of this kind were commonplace, but they did not – and could not – have any permanent, legal effect. In undergoing IVF with J., the applicant had taken the only realistic course of action open to her. Wall J continued:
“However, even if I am wrong about that, and even if an estoppel is capable of existing in the face of the Act, I do not, for the reasons I have given, think it would be unconscionable to allow [J.] to withdraw his consent. It is a right which the Statute gives him within the clear scheme operated by Parliament. It was the basis upon which he gave his consent on 10 October 2001. It is perfectly reasonable for him, in the changed circumstances which appertain, not to want to father a child by Ms Evans.” 22.  As to the applicant’s Convention claims, Wall J held in summary that an embryo was not a person with rights protected under the Convention, and that the applicant’s right to respect for family life was not engaged. He accepted that the relevant provisions of the 1990 Act interfered with the private life of both parties, but held that it was proportionate in its effect, the foundation for the legislation being a treatment regime based on the twin pillars of consent and the interests of the unborn child. He considered it entirely appropriate that the Act required couples embarking on IVF treatment to be in agreement about the treatment, and permitted either party to withdraw from it at any time before the embryo was transferred into the woman. 23.  Wall J emphasised that the provisions of Schedule 3 to the Act (see paragraph 37 below) applied equally to all patients undergoing IVF treatment, irrespective of their sex, and concluded with an illustration of how the requirement for joint consent could similarly affect an infertile man.
“If a man has testicular cancer and his sperm, preserved prior to radical surgery which renders him permanently infertile, is used to create embryos with his partner; and if the couple have separated before the embryos are transferred into the woman, nobody would suggest that she could not withdraw her consent to treatment and refuse to have the embryos transferred into her. The statutory provisions, like Convention rights, apply to men and women equally.” 24.  The applicant’s appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed in a judgment delivered on 25 June 2004 (Evans v. Amicus Healthcare Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 727).
The court held that the clear policy of the 1990 Act was to ensure the continuing consent of both parties from the commencement of treatment to the point of implantation of the embryo, and that “the court should be extremely slow to recognise or to create a principle of waiver that would conflict with the parliamentary scheme”. Like Wall J, the Court of Appeal found that J. had only ever consented to undergoing “treatment together” with the applicant, and had never consented to the applicant using the jointly created embryos alone. Once the relationship had broken down, and J. had indicated that he did not wish the embryos to be preserved or used by the applicant, they were no longer being treated “together”. The court rejected the applicant’s argument that J. had concealed his ambivalence, thereby inducing her to go forward with him into couple treatment, holding this to be an unjustified challenge to the finding of the trial judge who had had the obvious advantage of appraising the oral evidence of the applicant, J., and the other witnesses (see paragraph 20 above). The Court of Appeal was also informed by J.’s counsel that J.’s clear position in withdrawing his consent was one of fundamental rather than purely financial objection. 25.  While there was an interference with the private lives of the parties, Lords Justices Thorpe and Sedley found it to be justified and proportionate, for the following reasons.
“The less drastic means contended for here is a rule of law making the withdrawal of [J.’s] consent non-conclusive. This would enable [the applicant] to seek a continuance of treatment because of her inability to conceive by any other means. But unless it also gave weight to [J.’s] firm wish not to be father of a child borne by [the applicant], such a rule would diminish the respect owed to his private life in proportion as it enhanced the respect accorded to hers. Further, in order to give it weight the legislation would have to require the [Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority] or the clinic or both to make a judgment based on a mixture of ethics, social policy and human sympathy. It would also require a balance to be struck between two entirely incommensurable things. ...
... The need, as perceived by Parliament, is for bilateral consent to implantation, not simply to the taking and storage of genetic material, and that need cannot be met if one half of the consent is no longer effective. To dilute this requirement in the interests of proportionality, in order to meet [the applicant’s] otherwise intractable biological handicap, by making the withdrawal of the man’s consent relevant but inconclusive, would create new and even more intractable difficulties of arbitrariness and inconsistency. The sympathy and concern which anyone must feel for [the applicant] is not enough to render the legislative scheme ... disproportionate.” 26.  Lady Justice Arden stated, by way of introduction:
“The 1990 Act inevitably uses clinical language, such as gametes and embryos. But it is clear that the 1990 Act is concerned with the very emotional issue of infertility and the genetic material of two individuals which, if implanted, can lead to the birth of a child. ... Infertility can cause the woman or man affected great personal distress. In the case of a woman, the ability to give birth to a child gives many women a supreme sense of fulfilment and purpose in life. It goes to their sense of identity and to their dignity.”
She continued:
“Like Thorpe and Sedley LJJ, I consider that the imposition of an invariable and ongoing requirement for consent in the 1990 Act in the present type of situation satisfies Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. ... As this is a sensitive area of ethical judgment, the balance to be struck between the parties must primarily be a matter for Parliament ... Parliament has taken the view that no one should have the power to override the need for a genetic parent’s consent. The wisdom of not having such a power is, in my judgment, illustrated by the facts of this case. The personal circumstances of the parties are different from what they were at the outset of treatment, and it would be difficult for a court to judge whether the effect of [J.’s] withdrawal of his consent on [the applicant] is greater than the effect that the invalidation of that withdrawal of consent would have on [J.]. The court has no point of reference by which to make that sort of evaluation. The fact is that each person has a right to be protected against interference with their private life. That is an aspect of the principle of self-determination or personal autonomy. It cannot be said that the interference with [J.’s] right is justified on the ground that interference is necessary to protect [the applicant’s] right, because her right is likewise qualified in the same way by his right. They must have equivalent rights, even though the exact extent of their rights under Article 8 has not been identified.
... The interference with [the applicant’s] private life is also justified under Article 8 § 2 because, if [the applicant’s] argument succeeded, it would amount to interference with the genetic father’s right to decide not to become a parent. Motherhood could surely not be forced on [the applicant] and likewise fatherhood cannot be forced on [J.], especially as in the present case it will probably involve financial responsibility in law for the child as well.” 27.  On the issue of discrimination, Lords Justices Thorpe and Sedley considered that the true comparison was between women seeking IVF treatment whose partners had withdrawn consent and those whose partners had not done so; Lady Justice Arden considered that the real comparators were fertile and infertile women, since the genetic father had the possibility of withdrawing consent to IVF at a later stage than in ordinary sexual intercourse. The three judges were nevertheless in agreement that, whatever comparators were chosen, the difference in treatment was justified and proportionate under Article 14 of the Convention for the same reasons which underlay the finding of no violation of Article 8. The Court of Appeal further refused leave to appeal against Wall J’s finding that the embryos were not entitled to protection under Article 2, since under domestic law a foetus prior to the moment of birth, much less so an embryo, had no independent rights or interests. 28.  On 29 November 2004 the House of Lords refused the applicant leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s judgment.


5.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Izmir. 6.  On an unspecified date, police officers at the Istanbul airport arrested two persons in possession of passports containing fake visas. In their statements to the police, these two persons submitted that they had paid 3,000 German marks to the applicant and A.G. in order to have their passports stamped. Consequently, on 29 January 1996 police officers carried out a search at the applicant’s home in the presence of one of his siblings. The police officers seized four passports belonging to the applicant, his sibling and two other persons 7.  On 6 March 1996 the applicant surrendered to the police. He was then placed in custody. 8.  On 7 March 1996 the applicant was brought before a single judge at the Izmir Magistrates’ Court who ordered his detention on remand. 9.  On 14 March 1996 the Izmir Principle Public Prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Izmir Assize Court charging the applicant with the offence of forging passport, in particular arranging for false visa stamps for travelling abroad. 10.  On 9 May 1996 the Izmir Assize Court heard the applicant and released him on bail. 11.  On 30 December 1998, following the qualification of the offence as committed by a criminal organisation, the Izmir Assize Court issued a decision of lack of jurisdiction ratione materiae and sent the case-file to Izmir State Security Court. 12.  On 11 February 1999 the Izmir State Security Court issued a decision of lack of jurisdiction ratione materiae and referred the case to the Court of Cassation for determination of the competent court. 13.  On 25 March 1999 the Court of Cassation overturned the Izmir Assize Court’s decision of lack of jurisdiction ratione materiae and held that the offence in question was within the latter’s jurisdiction. The case-file was therefore sent to the Izmir Assize Court. 14.  Between 22 March 2001 and 3 December 2003 the Izmir Assize Court held eight hearings. All hearings prior to the seventh one, which was held on 5 June 2003, were postponed on the ground that the address of one of the co‑accused, namely A.G., could not be found. During this period, the Izmir Assize Court sent five letters to the Izmir Public Prosecutor’s Office and requested the latter to find out A.G.’s address. 15.  On 3 December 2003 the Izmir Assize Court terminated the criminal proceedings against the applicant holding that the prosecution was time‑barred.


5.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Amsterdam. 6.  The applicant was suspected of membership of a crime ring organised around one H., a person widely known to have amassed criminal convictions for serious crimes; of complicity in extortion; and of possession of an illegal firearm. 7.  On 30 January 2006 the applicant was arrested. On 2 February 2006 he was taken into initial detention on remand (bewaring) for fourteen days by order of an investigating judge of the Haarlem Regional Court (rechtbank). The order included the following grounds:
“(post alia)
Considering in addition that it appears that there is a serious reason of public safety requiring the immediate deprivation of liberty;
Considering in this connection:
that there is a suspicion of a [criminal] act which, according to the law, carries a maximum sentence of imprisonment of twelve years or more and that act has caused serious upset to the legal order (een feit waarop naar de wettelijke omschrijving een gevangenisstraf van twaalf jaren of meer is gesteld en de rechtsorde ernstig door dat feit is geschokt);
that there is a serious likelihood (dat er ernstig rekening mee moet worden gehouden) that the suspect will commit a crime (misdrijf) by which the health or safety of persons will be endangered, since the framework of the suspicion encompasses the display of aggressive and unrestrained behaviour by the suspect;
that detention on remand is necessary in reason for discovering the truth otherwise than through statements of the suspect; ...” 8.  On 14 February 2006 the applicant was taken into extended detention on remand (gevangenhouding) for thirty days by order of the Haarlem Regional Court following a hearing in camera. This decision stated the following grounds:
“considering that the Regional Court finds, after examining the case, that the suspicion, indications and grounds which have led to the order for the suspect’s initial detention on remand still obtain;
considering that the existence of these grounds is borne out by the conduct, facts and circumstances stated in the order for the suspect’s initial detention on remand, given on 2 February 2006, which the Regional Court adopts as its own; ...” 9.  The Regional Court renewed its order for a further term of thirty days on 11 April 2006. The applicant appealed against this decision; his appeal was dismissed by the Amsterdam Court of Appeal (gerechtshof) on 17 May 2006. 10.  The order for the applicant’s extended detention on remand was renewed periodically by the Regional Court until its suspension. 11.  On 7 May 2007 the Haarlem Regional Court ordered the suspension (schorsing) of the applicant’s detention on remand with effect from noon the following day. The reason stated was the following:
“The Regional Court is of the view that the serious reasons and grounds stated in the order for extended detention on remand (bevel tot gevangenhouding) still exist and that Article 67a § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Wetboek van Strafvordering) is not yet applicable.
Even so, the Regional Court considers it appropriate, in view of the circumstance that it has today ordered the suspension of the trial until a date next September, to decide as follows as to the execution of the detention on remand.
The suspension of the trial is directly linked with the state of health of a co-suspect and the Regional Court’s decision in principle (uitgangspunt) to pursue the proceedings against all suspects simultaneously.
That being so, and also in light of the length of the detention on remand until today, the Regional Court is led to suspend the detention on remand until the day on which the trial of the suspect will be pursued.”
The co-suspect referred to was H., who needed time to recover from heart surgery which he had undergone in detention before his trial could resume. 12.  The suspension of the applicant’s detention on remand was made subject to the following conditions:
“1.  that the suspect not seek to evade the execution of the detention on remand order if its suspension should be terminated; 2.  that the suspect, should he be sentenced to a custodial sentence other than [in lieu of a fine or a community service order] for the criminal act for which the detention on remand was ordered, not seek to evade its execution; 8.  that the suspect shall report in person twice a week (zich tweemaal per week dient te melden) at times and places indicated to him by the public prosecution service (openbaar ministerie).” 13.  On 20 August 2007 the applicant submitted a request for his detention on remand to be lifted altogether (opheffing van het bevel tot voorlopige hechtenis). 14.  On 22 August 2007 the Haarlem Regional Court gave a decision in the following terms:
“This court’s decision of 7 May 2007 suspended the suspect’s pre-trial detention in connection with the special circumstances mentioned in that decision, which did not concern the suspect himself, which entailed the interruption of the trial for a considerable time.
The Regional Court has allowed the interest of the suspect in awaiting the resumption of his trial in freedom to prevail over the prosecution interest in keeping the suspect in detention on remand on the grounds stated in the order for extended detention on remand only because of that special situation and only for as long as that situation might continue. As the suspect’s trial will resume before long and the said special situation will from then on no longer exist, there will, from then on, be no reason to allow the suspension of the suspect’s detention on remand to continue.
The Regional Court takes the view that the serious reasons and grounds, with the exception of the ground related to the investigations, still exist and considers that Article 67a § 3 [of the Code of Criminal Procedure] is not yet applicable. The mere fact stated by the suspect’s counsel that since the suspect’s liberation there has been no large-scale public protest and that the suspect has complied unreservedly (onverkort) with the suspension conditions do not mean that there is no longer any ‘serious upset to the legal order’ within the meaning of Article 67a § 2 under 1 or the danger of an offence within the meaning of Article 67a § 2 under 2.
Considering also the nature of the first-mentioned ground – briefly, an offence carrying a twelve-year sentence that has caused serious upset to the legal order –, the Regional Court does not consider the arguments submitted sufficient reason to suspend the detention on remand, as is requested in the alternative as a less intrusive way of using this means of coercion (minder bezwarende wijze van toepassing van dit dwangmiddel). ...”
No appeal was possible against this decision. 15.  The trial resumed on 25 September 2007. The applicant, through his counsel, made a request at the hearing for the detention on remand order to be lifted, or in the alternative, for the suspension to be continued. He argued that his release had not caused any public outcry. 16.  According to the official record (proces-verbaal) of the hearing, the Regional Court gave a refusal, stated by its president in the following terms:
“The Regional Court refers to its decision of 7 May last. At the time, the medical situation of the co-suspect H., the Regional Court’s desire to consider the cases together, and the fairly long duration of the detention on remand led to the decision to suspend the detention on remand until such time as the trial would resume.
As soon as these reasons cease to apply the Regional Court must consider the situation afresh.
This does not mean that the Regional Court will look back to see how well things have gone and what ripples your release has caused (hoeveel rumoer er over uw vrijlating is ontstaan), but that it will consider whether the serious reasons and grounds still exist. It takes the view that such is the case.
As regards the alternative request, the Regional Court takes the view that the prosecution interest would not be served in sufficient measure if you could, within the framework of a suspension of your detention on remand, await the outcome of your criminal case in freedom. Your personal interest in awaiting the determination of your case in freedom does not outweigh the prosecution interest. Your detention on remand should therefore continue, given also that there is no question at the present time of applying Article 67a § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The president stresses that the Regional Court will continue to consider ex officio whether it is necessary for the detention on remand to continue, and whether there may be grounds to order a variant as regards the modalities of its execution.
The Regional Court dismisses both the principal and the alternative requests.” 17.  The applicant was taken back into detention on remand on 27 September 2007. 18.  On 15 November 2007 the applicant’s counsel submitted a further request for the lifting or, in the alternative, the suspension of the detention on remand order. This too was refused. 19.  On 4 December 2007 the Regional Court lifted the applicant’s detention on remand. The decision was in the following terms:
“That the Regional Court, sitting in camera, has come to take the view that serious reasons and grounds referred to in the order for extended detention on remand still exist, but that at this point Article 67a § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure leads the Regional Court to take the appertaining decision.” 20.  On 21 December 2007 the Regional Court convicted the applicant and sentenced him to eighteen months’ imprisonment. 21.  The applicant appealed. On 3 July 2009 the Amsterdam Court of Appeal quashed the first-instance judgment on technical grounds. Convicting the applicant afresh, it sentenced him to eighteen months’ imprisonment, six months of which was suspended. 22.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law (cassatie) with the Supreme Court, which dismissed the appeal on 12 October 2010.