4.  The applicant was born in 1931 and lives in Warszawa. 5.  The applicant’s testators owned a piece of real property in Warsaw. By virtue of the 1945 Decree on the Ownership and Use of Land in Warsaw (Dekret o własności i użytkowaniu gruntów na obszarze m. st. Warszawy) all land in Warsaw was nationalised. The applicant’s testators filed an application for the grant of a right of perpetual use of the real property. On 6 July 1972 the Board of the Warsaw National Council (Prezydium Rady Narodowej) refused the application. On 12 February 1973 the competent Minister upheld that decision. Simultaneously, the applicant’s testators lodged a claim for compensation. On 22 November 1972 the Board of the Warsaw National Council dismissed the claim as according to the 1957 Law on exclusion of detached houses and apartments in housing cooperatives’ buildings from public management (Ustawa o wyłączeniu spod publicznej gospodarki lokalami domów jednorodzinnych oraz lokali w domach spółdzielni mieszkaniowych), the real property in question was not a detached house. Consequently, the 1965 Cabinet Resolution allowing for nationalised detached houses to be compensated was not applicable. The applicant’s testators appealed unsuccessfully against this decision. 6.  On 24 February 1997 the applicant instituted administrative proceedings against the State Treasury for compensation for nationalised family real property. 7.  It appears that on several occasions between 1997 and 2000 the applicant lodged complaints, alleging inactivity on the part of the first‑instance authority. 8.  On 25 February 2000 the Mayor of Warsaw District informed the applicant that the administrative proceedings were in their final stage and in the near future a decision would be issued ordering valuation of the real property. Consequently, the assessment of the amount of compensation would then be possible. 9.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a complaint about inactivity on the part of the Mayor of the Warsaw District with the Supreme Administrative Court. 10.  On 17 November 2000 the Supreme Administrative Court admitted that the proceedings in question had been lengthy and ordered the Mayor to deal with the case within two months of the judgment being served on the parties. The court stated that the relevant organ had not only failed to issue any decision as to the merits during the proceedings in question but had also failed to justify its delay. 11.  On 9 February 2001 the Warszawa District Governor discontinued the relevant proceedings. He stated that the legal regime governing compensation for the expropriation of detached houses had not changed since 1957. Therefore, if a valid decision had been taken in 1972, a re‑examination of the case between the same parties and about the same claim was inadmissible. The applicant appealed against this decision. 12.  On 18 March 2002 the Mazowiecki Governor dismissed the applicant’s appeal concluding in line with the contested District Governor’s decision. 13.  On 27 November 2003 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s cassation appeal. 14.  On 21 December 2004 the applicant instituted administrative proceedings in order to have a plot of land on which the real property was situated restored to her. 15.  It results from the case file that the relevant proceedings are still pending before the Minister of Infrastructure.


4.  The applicant, a Ukrainian national, was born in 1952 and lives in the city of Zaporizhzhya, Ukraine. 5.  In 1999 the applicant, a private entrepreneur, concluded a labour contract with the Shevchenkivskiy District State Administration in Zaporizhzhya. 6.  As the State Administration failed to pay the applicant under the contract, in 2002 she instituted proceedings against it in the Commercial Court of Zaporizhzhya Region, seeking recovery of remuneration and compensation for delay in payment. 7.  On 15 January 2003 the court awarded the applicant UAH 16,094.52[1] (Рішення Господарського суду Запоріжської області). This judgment was not appealed against and became final. 8.  On 28 March 2003 the Shevchenkivskiy District Bailiffs' Service (Відділ Державної виконавчої служби Шевченківського районого управління юстиції м. Запоріжжя) initiated enforcement proceedings. On 3 November 2004 the Bailiffs' Service returned the writ of execution to the applicant on the ground that no funds allowing enforcement of the judgment had been found. 9.  On 28 May 2003 and 30 December 2004 the applicant received UAH 6,000[2] and UAH 5,000[3], respectively. 10.  By letters of 5 November and 6 December 2004 the Zaporizhzhya Regional Department of Justice informed the applicant that there were no funds in the debtor's bank accounts and that it was not possible to dispose of the debtor's property because the debtor was a governmental institution. 11.  On 25 August 2005 the Commercial Court of Zaporizhzhya Region repeatedly ordered the Bailiffs' Service to enforce the judgment in the applicant's favour of 15 January 2003. On 20 August 2005 the Bailiffs' Service refused to institute the enforcement proceedings for lack of jurisdiction. 12.  The judgment in the applicant's favour remains partly unenforced.


8.  The applicant was born in 1919 and lives in Monistrol-d’Allier. 9.  On 3 November 1960 the applicant and his wife purchased by notarial deed a dwelling house built on land in the municipality of Arradon, in the département of Morbihan. The house had been built on a dyke that overlapped with land on the seashore falling within the category of maritime public property. 10.  It can be seen from the various documents relating to the house that, by a decision of 5 December 1889, the prefect of Morbihan had authorised Mr A., in consideration of payment of a charge, to “retain on maritime public property in the cove of Kérion, in the municipality of Arradon, a dyke ... on which stands a dwelling house”. The house had allegedly been built prior to that decision despite a decision of the prefect of 31 May 1856 refusing an application for a building permit. The decision of 1889 specified that “the existence of this dyke and dwelling house on maritime public property was recorded in 1886 ... and the permittee undertakes to pay the charge from 1 January 1887”. It also pointed out that the dyke, irregularly shaped and of a surface area of 359.40 sq. m, on which stood the dwelling house measuring 7.60 m by 6.60 m, “cannot interfere in any way with navigation rights or maritime coastal traffic on condition that steps are built at each end of the dyke in order to facilitate public access” and that the authorities “reserved the right to modify or withdraw the authorisation without the permittee thereby acquiring any right to claim compensation or damages in that regard. He must, if required, restore the site to its original state”. 11.  Prior to that, on 2 December 1889, the Directorate-General for Registration and Property had written to the prefect in the following terms:
“... Having regard to Mr A.’s genuine lack of means, as a former seaman who has reached an advanced age and cannot possibly pay the normal charge, and considering, furthermore, that it would be a drastic measure to order the demolition of the little house that he has built on land reclaimed from the sea and uses as a dwelling house, I have decided to impose the minimum charge thus reflecting the precariousness of the occupancy and preventing the rights of the State from becoming time-barred.
In the circumstances I consider ... that there is now no further obstacle to disposing of this case by issuing a concession order, but on Mr A.’s death, his heirs should be served with notice either to purchase the usurped land or to pay the charge at the rate applicable for private occupancy of maritime public property.” 12.  Following the death of Mr A., his two daughters requested authorisation from the authorities to keep the house on the same terms as their parents. Authorisation was granted them by a decision of 9 July 1897 conferring a right of temporary occupancy of the public property in question. The house was subsequently transferred in 1909 and sold in 1957, with the title deeds specifying each time that the small house built on maritime land was included in the sale. The deed of 1957 reads as follows:
“Title and entry into possession: the purchasers shall hereby acquire title to the land and the little house of Kérion from today’s date. The property is sold free of tenants or occupants.” 13.  The relevant passages of the deed of sale of 1960 read as follows:
“Title – Entry into possession:
The purchasers hereby acquire title to the property conveyed to them under this deed, and shall enter into actual possession thereof from today’s date ...
From the date of their entry into possession they shall pay all taxes and charges payable now or in the future on the house hereby sold together with the land. ...
... The present sale is concluded in consideration of the principal price of three thousand new francs ...” 14.  Following this purchase, and in order to acquire legal access to the house, the applicant and his wife were granted rights of temporary occupancy of maritime public property that were regularly renewed in 1961 (year during which the applicant was permitted to extend the dyke and a public right of way was granted along the seaward edge of the dyke), 1975, 1986 and 1991. The authorisation of temporary occupancy of 1986 specified that the applicant sought “the renewal of the prefectoral decision of 17 August 1961 authorising the construction of a dyke with a dwelling house on it ...”. The last agreement granting them the right to occupy public property expired on 31 December 1992. The decisions specified that “the requested dyke will not in any way interfere with navigation rights, on condition that it is levelled off above the highest water mark, or with maritime coastal traffic provided that public access is guaranteed at all times” and that “in accordance with Article A 26 of the Code of State Property [see paragraph 40 below], the authorities reserve the right to modify or withdraw the authorisation should they deem it necessary, on any ground whatsoever, without the permittee thereby acquiring any right to claim damages or compensation in that regard. The permittee must, if required, restore the site to its original state by demolishing the constructions built on the public property, including those existing on the date on which the decision was signed. Should he fail to comply with that obligation, the authorities shall do so of their own motion and at his expense”. 15.  By a letter of 14 March 1993, the applicant and his wife requested the prefect of Morbihan to renew authorisation of their occupancy. 16.  The prefect of Morbihan replied on 6 September 1993 informing the applicant that the entry into force of Law no. 86-2 of 3 January 1986 on the development, protection and enhancement of coastal areas (“the Coastal Areas Act”), and in particular section 25 thereof, no longer allowed him to renew authorisation on the previous terms and conditions. Section 25 provided that decisions regarding the use of maritime public property had to take account of the vocation of the zones in question, which ruled out any private use including dwelling houses. However, in order to take account of the length of occupancy and the applicant’s sentimental attachment to the house in question, he proposed to enter into an agreement with the applicant that would authorise limited and strictly personal use and prohibit him from transferring or selling the land and house and from carrying out any work on the property other than maintenance and would include an option for the State, on the expiry of the authorisation, to have the property restored to its original condition or to reuse the buildings. 17.  By a letter dated 19 November 1993, the applicant and his wife rejected the prefect’s offer and requested a concession to build a dyke that would be valid as a transfer of ownership under Article L. 64 of the Code of State Property (see paragraph 43 below). 18.  On 9 March 1994 the prefect of Morbihan gave a decision, based on section 25 of the Coastal Areas Act, in which he considered that there was no public interest justifying the concession requested. He did, however, renew his offer to grant the applicant and his wife a right of temporary occupancy subject to conditions. 19.  On 5 May 1994 the applicant and his wife applied to the Rennes Administrative Court for the prefect’s decision of 9 March 1994 to be set aside. In support of their application, they submitted that the refusal to grant them a concession to build a dyke was unlawful. 20.  By a letter of 4 July 1994, the prefect of Morbihan served notice on the applicant and his wife to regularise their status as unauthorised occupants of public property. That notice was renewed on 10 April 1995. 21.  On 6 September 1995 the Public Works Department of the département of Morbihan drew up an official report recording the administrative offence of unlawful interference with the highway and noting the unlawful occupancy of the land by the applicant, contrary to the provisions of Article L. 28 of the Code of State Property (see paragraph 40 below). 22.  On 20 December 1995 the prefect of Morbihan lodged an application with the Rennes Administrative Court citing the applicant and his wife as defendants in respect of an offence of unlawful interference with the highway as they continued to unlawfully occupy public property. He sought an order against them to pay a fine and restore the foreshore to its original state prior to construction of the house and to restore the dyke on which it stood, within three months. 23.  On 19 February 1996 the Revenue Department served notice on the applicant to pay the sums due for the years 1995 and 1996 for unauthorised occupancy of public property, namely, a total of 56,754 French francs (FRF). 24.  By two separate judgments delivered on 20 March 1997, the Rennes Administrative Court ruled on the application lodged by the applicants on 5 May 1994 (case no. 941506) and the application lodged by the prefect of Morbihan on 20 December 1995 (case no. 953517).
The application for the prefect’s decision rejecting their request for a permit to build a dyke to be set aside (case no. 941506) was dismissed on the following grounds:
“... In support of their argument that the stretch of land on which the dwelling house stands belongs to the category of maritime private property the applicants have exhibited in the proceedings a decision authorising the temporary occupancy of maritime public property dating back to 1889. However, this decision merely takes note that the land in question has been drained and does not certify the lawfulness thereof. Accordingly, it does not call into question the classification of the land as public property.
In accordance with Article L. 64 of the Code of State Property, ‘the State may concede, on conditions it shall determine ... the right to build a dyke’. While section 27 of the above-mentioned Act of 3 January 1986 [Coastal Areas Act] has reduced the scope of application of that Article, it does nonetheless specify that ‘land draining carried out prior to the present Act shall continue to be governed by the previous legislation’. Accordingly, the only provisions applicable to the present case are Article L. 64 of the above-mentioned Code and the Maritime Public Property Act of 28 November 1963, which provides that ... ‘subject to any contrary provisions of deeds of concession, land artificially removed from the action of the tide shall be incorporated into the category of maritime public property’. In rejecting the request on the basis of the principles and guidelines laid down in the inter-ministerial circular of 3 January 1973 setting out the policy to be followed for the use of maritime public property, the prefect – when examining the applicant’s particular situation involving an application for a concession – did not err as to the scope of the circular in question, which neither repeals nor amends the above-mentioned legislative provisions but is limited to applying them.
The above-mentioned circular, which instructs the authorities responsible for deciding whether or not to grant concessions to build dykes not to transfer title to the plots of land thus created and to accept only installations designed for collective use, to the exclusion of private dwellings, was issued in respect of an area in which the relevant authorities have discretionary power. In referring to the principles laid down in the circular, the prefect does not appear to have interpreted the legislative provisions inaccurately; nor did he fail to consider the specificity of the applicant’s proposal before concluding that there was no special factor justifying an exemption from the instructions analysed above.”
The application lodged by the prefect of Morbihan (case no. 953517) was granted. The court stated that “the land on which Mr and Mrs Depalle’s dwelling house stands is indeed public property”. With regard to the offence of unlawful interference with the highway, the court found as follows:
“... The rules governing public property
... The purpose of prosecuting someone for the administrative offence of interference with the highway is to preserve the integrity of public property. As can be seen from the judgment delivered by the court today in case no. 941506, the land on which Mr and Mrs Depalle’s dwelling house was built is indeed public property.
The administrative courts base their determination of the substance of artificial public property on the judicial interpretation of any private deeds that may be produced whose examination raises a serious difficulty. In the present case the dyke and the house are not publicly owned property, given the exclusively private use made of them and the fact that they do not belong to a public authority, as confirmed by the deed of sale dated 8 October 1960. Accordingly, as it is not seriously disputed that the property in question has been appropriated for private use, it is not necessary to adjourn the application. ...
Whether there has been unlawful interference with the highway
While Mr and Mrs Depalle have full title to the dwelling house occupied by them and claim, accordingly, that they are therefore not the unlawful occupants of public property, the fact remains that the erection of a permanent structure on public property could not be legally undertaken without either a concession to build a dyke or another type of concession. The investigation into the facts and, in particular, the absence of any documents evidencing that a concession was granted show that the dwelling house in question was illegally built on maritime public property. Accordingly, and despite the production by the owners of undisputed title deeds, the prefect is justified in requesting an order against Mr Depalle to pay a fine and restore the foreshore to its original state prior to the construction of the house.
Penalty for the offence
 ... Mr Depalle is hereby ordered to pay a fine of FRF 500.
State property proceedings
Mr Depalle is hereby ordered to restore the property to the state it was in prior to the construction of the buildings within three months of service of this judgment. On expiry of that time-limit Mr Depalle shall pay a fine of FRF 100 per day’s delay in the event of failure to comply with the present judgment and the authorities shall be authorised to enforce it at the cost and risk of the offender ...” 25.  On 2 July 1997 the applicant and his wife lodged an appeal against the judgment delivered in case no. 953517. On 7 July 1997 they appealed against the judgment delivered in case no. 941506.
In support of their appeal against the judgment delivered in case no. 941506, the applicant and his wife submitted that the land in question was not public property belonging to the State. They maintained that the land was private property belonging to the State with the twofold effect that the usual rules governing acquisition by adverse possession under private law were applicable to their situation and that the administrative courts did not have jurisdiction to decide the dispute. 26.  By a judgment of 8 December 1999, the Nantes Administrative Court decided to join the two sets of proceedings on the ground that they were connected and to dismiss the applicant and his wife’s appeals on the following grounds:
“With regard to the application ... concerning the offence of unlawful interference with the highway:
Regarding the State property proceedings
Firstly, it is not disputed that the land on which the dyke on which the house occupied by Mr and Mrs Depalle was built was entirely covered by water, independently of any exceptional meteorological circumstances, prior to the draining works undertaken in order to build the dyke. It has not been established, or even alleged by the applicants moreover, that the undrained portion of this land had ever been removed from the action of the tide. The investigation shows, moreover, that the dyke is the result of land draining carried out prior to the entry into force of the above-mentioned Act of 28 November 1963 [the Maritime Public Property Act] ... and that, notwithstanding the various authorisations of temporary occupancy granted by the authorities, as this was not done in the manner prescribed for concessions for the construction of a dyke it has not had the effect of bringing this part of the land thus removed from the action of the tide outside the category of maritime public property. In accordance with the principles of inalienability and imprescriptibility of public property, the submissions by Mr and Mrs Depalle to the effect that the house was built legally and its occupancy accepted by the authorities for a very long time and tolerated even after expiry of the last authorisation to occupy it do not alter the fact that the property falls within the category of maritime public property.
Secondly, as has been said, the last decision in favour of Mr and Mrs Depalle authorising temporary occupancy of the maritime public property expired on 31 December 1992. In the absence, since that date, of a lawful title of occupancy, the prefect of Morbihan is justified in requesting an order against the occupants to restore the site – if they have not already done so – to its original state prior to construction of the house on maritime public property. In disputing that obligation, the applicants cannot properly rely on the long period of occupancy of the premises or on the fact that the authorities have tolerated the continuation of that occupancy since 31 December 1992 and proposed draft occupancy agreements in order to regularise the situation, which, moreover, they have not taken up. ...
Fifthly, [the obligation to restore the site to its original state] does not constitute a measure prohibited by the requirement of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that no one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest. ...
The application regarding the refusal to grant a concession to build a dyke
... Secondly, as section 27 of the above-mentioned Act of 3 January 1986 [the Coastal Areas Act] provides that draining works carried out prior to enactment of that Act shall continue to be governed by the previous legislation, the provisions codified under Article L. 64 of the Code of State Property according to which ‘the State may concede, on conditions it shall determine ... the right to build a dyke ...’ are applicable.
The prefect of Morbihan based his decision not to grant Mr and Mrs Depalle the requested concession to build a dyke on the guidelines set out in the circular of 3 January 1973 issued by the Minister for Economic Affairs and the Minister for Regional Development on the use of public property other than commercial or fishing ports. He did not discern any general-interest ground in favour of granting the applicants’ request.
By instructing the authorities responsible for granting concessions to build a dyke not to allow any plot of land whatsoever falling into the category of public property to be reclassified as private property with a view to transferring full title thereto, the ministers signatory to the circular of 3 January 1973 did not adopt any legal rules amending or supplementing the above-mentioned provisions of Article L. 64 of the Code of State Property but confined themselves to applying them. Accordingly, as stated above, the plot of land in question is State-owned public property. There is no evidence in the case that the prefect, before reaching his decision, either failed to examine the particular circumstances of Mr and Mrs Depalle’s request or made a manifest error of assessment in concluding that there was no special feature or general-interest consideration in the case justifying an exemption from the above-mentioned rules.” 27.  On 21 February 2000 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against the judgment of 8 December 1999. The Government Commissioner pointed out, in the same submissions as those made in a similar case, that the value in today’s terms of the purchase price of the house was 1,067,143 euros (EUR). He continued as follows:
“... However, the acquisition of rights in rem is not permitted under the Law of 25 July 1994 on State-owned Natural Public Property ... nor were these acquired before that Law was passed ... The appellants have not acquired any property rights over their houses; nor have they acquired rights in rem over public property as a result of the successive sales. Given the precarious situation of the buildings, the market value could not be established without taking account of that essential fact and it is to be hoped that the applicants were duly informed of the position when the purchase deeds were drawn up ... Lastly, and despite the fact that we are not especially enthusiastic about the outcome of this case, we have no alternative but to dismiss the appellants’ pleadings. ... They probably committed a tactical error in refusing the prefect’s reiterated offer. Even if they were not exactly delighted by the prospect, it was at least preferable to a straightforward demolition order which will have to be judicially enforced at their expense. All hope is perhaps not lost of renewing contact with the authorities with a view to finding what might be a less drastic solution.
There may be a case for suing the State in tort for allowing occupants of public property to nurture for almost a century the hope that they would not be ruthlessly compelled to demolish their property. It should be pointed out that the prospects of success of such an action are fairly slim, however, given the legitimate protection enjoyed by public property. In any event, it is clear that if the public authority were to be found liable, the offenders would bear a considerable portion of liability too.” 28.  By a judgment delivered on 6 March 2002, the Conseil d’Etat dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It held that he could not rely on any right in rem over the land in question or over the buildings that had been erected on it and that the obligation to restore the land to its original state without any prior compensation was therefore not a measure prohibited by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It also held that the applicant could not rely on the fact that the authorities had tolerated the occupancy of the property in support of his submission that he should be allowed to restore the site to the state it had been in at the time of acquisition of the house. 29.  Following a fire in 2005 the applicant applied for a building permit for identical refurbishment of the house. By a decision of 5 September 2005, he was issued with a building permit following a favourable opinion given by an architect from the Architectes des bâtiments de France under the Coastal Areas Act. The permit was subsequently revoked, however, at the request of the prefect lodged with the mayor of Arradon, on the ground that it was illegal because it had been issued in contravention of the rules of inalienability and imprescriptibility of public property. 30.  In 2007 and 2008 the Revenue Department sent the applicant a reminder to pay the charges for the years 2006 and 2007 in the sum of EUR 5,518 and EUR 5,794 respectively, plus property tax. 31.  The applicant produced a valuation of his house drawn up by an estate agent’s office in November 2008 which states as follows:
“... a dwelling house ... situated on a plot of land measuring 850 sq. m. ... Having regard to the geographical situation of the property, the condition of the building, the surface area, its location on maritime public property and the local property market, and subject to the owners’ ability to produce a concession agreement in respect of maritime public property, this property is worth between EUR 1,150,000 and 1,200,000.”


4.  The applicant was born in 1971. He is currently serving a prison sentence at the Berdychiv Town Correctional Colony (Prison) No. 70, Zhytomyr Region (“the Berdychiv Colony”). 5.  On 4 November 1998 the Deputy Prosecutor of Chernivtsi initiated criminal investigations into the murder of Mrs S. 6.  On 30 July 1999 the applicant’s wife was arrested on suspicion of the murder of Mrs S. On 2 August 1999 she was released. 7.  On 4 August 1999 the prosecutors placed Mr V. on the list of persons suspected of the crime. The investigations were suspended. 8.  On 2 September 1999 the applicant was arrested following the issue of a warrant by the Head of the Investigation Unit of the Chernivtsi Town Prosecutor’s Office on suspicion of the murder of Mrs S., and the criminal investigations resumed. The applicant chose Mr Shelepa to defend him in the proceedings. 9.  On 4 September 1999 the Chernivtsi Town Prosecutor remanded the applicant in custody in view of the pending criminal investigations against him. The applicant remained in detention throughout the proceedings. 10.  On 7 September 1999 the applicant and Mr V. were charged with aggravated murder. 11.  On 18 October 1999 the Chernivtsi Town Prosecutor extended the maximum period of the applicant’s pre-trial detention to three months. 12.  On 23 November 1999 the investigations were completed and the applicant, together with his lawyer, was given access to the case file. 13.  On 20 December 1999 the applicant and his lawyer completed their study of the case file. 14.  On 28 January 2000 the prosecutors referred the case together with the indictment, containing charges of aggravated murder and theft, to the Chernivtsi Regional Court (“the Chernivsti Court”). The latter received the case file on 4 February 2000. 15.  On 25 February 2000 the court remitted the case for additional investigation as it was incomplete. It also ordered the applicant to remain in detention. On 6 March 2000 the prosecutors received the case file. 16.  On 9 March 2000 the prosecutors resumed the pre-trial investigations. 17.  On 13 March 2000 the Chernivtsi Regional Prosecutor extended the maximum period of the applicant’s detention to five months on the ground that it was not possible to complete the investigation. 18.  On 15 May 2000 the investigations were completed and the applicant, together with his lawyer, was given access to the case file. On 5 June 2000 the latter finished consulting the file. 19.  On 22 June 2000 the prosecutors referred the case to the Chernivtsi Court. 20.  On 30 June 2000 the court received the case file and on 19 September 2000 it remitted the case for additional investigation. The court refused to change the applicant’s preventive measure. 21.  On 26 September 2000 the prosecutors received the case file. 22.  On 10 October 2000 the Chernivtsi Regional Prosecutor extended the maximum period of the applicant’s detention to six months. 23.  On 25 October 2000 the Deputy Prosecutor General of Ukraine extended the maximum period of the applicant’s detention to nine months. 24.  On 28 November 2000 the investigations were completed and the applicant, together with his lawyer, was given access to the case file. On the same day they completed their study of the case file. 25.  On 22 December 2000 the case was referred to the Chernivtsi Court. 26.  On 12 January 2001 the Deputy Prosecutor of the Chernivtsi Region withdrew the case from the court and resumed the investigations. 27.  On 18 January 2001 the applicant was informed that the investigations were complete and that he was charged with concealment of crime. 28.  On 26 January 2001 the applicant and his lawyer were given access to the case file. On the same day they completed consulting the case file. 29.  On 1 February 2001 the case was referred to the Chernivtsi Court. 30.  On 5 February 2001 the court received the case file. 31.  On 14 March 2001 the court remitted the case for additional investigation. The applicant was ordered to remain in detention. 32.  On 19 March 2001 the prosecutors received the case file. 33.  On 29 March 2001 the applicant was informed that the investigations were complete, and was given a copy of the indictment, in which he was charged with aggravated murder and robbery. Between 29 March and 2 April 2001 the applicant and his lawyer consulted the case file. 34.  On 6 April 2001 the case was referred to the Chernivtsi Court. On 9 April 2001 the court received the case file. 35.  On 17 April 2001 the prosecutors withdrew the case and resumed the investigations. On the same day they issued an indictment, containing the same charges and based on the same facts as the indictment of 29 March 2001. 36.  On 16 May 2001 the applicant was informed that the investigations were complete and he was given a copy of the indictment of 17 April 2001. On the same day the applicant was provided with another lawyer, Mr B., whom the prosecutors gave access to the case file. 37.  According to the applicant, he had agreed to have another lawyer, as the prosecutors told him that Mr Shelepa had not been able to participate in the proceedings due to his illness. From mid-April to 5 May 2001 Mr Shelepa was having medical treatment in a hospital in Kyiv. The latter was not informed that the investigations were complete on 16 May 2001. 38.  On the same day the applicant and his new lawyer finished consulting the case file and on 18 May 2001 the case was referred to the Chernivtsi Court, the latter having received it on 24 May 2001. 39.  On 29 May 2001 Mr Shelepa was again admitted to participate in the proceedings. 40.  In the course of the investigations, in particular on 11 June and 28 November 2000, and 30 March 2001 the applicant’s lawyer made three requests to the prosecutors that the proceedings against the applicant be discontinued for absence of elements of a crime in his actions. The requests were dismissed as unfounded by the prosecutors’ decisions of 13 June and 30 November 2000 and 3 April 2001. 41.  In the course of the trial, the applicant and his lawyer argued that some of the evidence submitted by the prosecutors had been collected after the expiry of the statutory terms of the investigation and the applicant’s detention and therefore should not be admitted by the court. 42.  On 26 June 2001 the court found the applicant and Mr V. guilty of aggravated murder and sentenced the applicant to twelve years’ imprisonment. It rejected the applicant’s and his lawyer’s argument concerning the admissibility of evidence, holding in particular that the maximum statutory terms of the investigation and pre-trial detention envisaged by the Code of Criminal Procedure had not expired in the case, and that those terms had ceased to run during the periods when the applicant and his lawyer were studying the case file, when it had been referred to the court, and when the lawyer’s petitions had been considered by the prosecutors. The court, relying on Articles 120 and 156 of the same Code, also noted that the terms of the investigation and detention had actually been extended up to twelve months, as the case had been remitted for additional investigation on three occasions. 43.  In his appeal in cassation, the applicant complained about the wrongful assessment of the facts and a violation of his procedural rights in the course of the investigation and trial. 44.  On 25 September 2001 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s appeal in cassation as unsubstantiated.


5.  The applicant, Mr Andrei Deak, is a Romanian national who was born in 1956 and lives in Bucharest. 6.  The applicant married C.D. (hereinafter referred to as “the mother”), also a Romanian national, in January 1998. In July 1998 their son C.A. (hereinafter referred to as “the child”) was born. 7.  In November 2000 they divorced and according to the divorce agreement between them, endorsed by a final court judgment, the mother was to have custody of the child, while the applicant obtained a right of access of 82 days per year and was to pay a monthly allowance. 8.  In September 2002 the mother travelled to England to commence studying for a Master degree in Business and Administration and left the child in Romania with her parents. 9.  In November 2002 the mother married a British national. She later returned to Romania and on 23 December 2002, without informing the applicant, took the child with her to London. 10.  The applicant found out about the child’s removal from Romania to the United Kingdom in January 2003. 11.  On 6 February 2003 he instituted proceedings in London before the High Court of Justice, Family Division (“the High Court”), under the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“the Hague Convention”). The child and the mother were located by the British authorities; however, their place of residence was not disclosed to the applicant. 12.  A directions hearing was held on 27 February 2003 before the High Court at which the parties were requested to file observations on the question whether the removal of the child from Romania was wrongful under Romanian law within the meaning of Article 3 of the Hague Convention. The judge in charge of the case also directed that the matter be set down for final hearing on 11 April 2003. 13.  On 11 April 2003 the parties received permission to file further evidence. 14.  By the time of the next hearing, on 9 May 2003, the High Court was presented by the applicant with documentary evidence emanating from the Ministry of Justice, the Romanian President’s Office, the Child Protection Authority and the Ombudsman, according to which the child’s removal was wrongful under Romanian law. However, the court was not convinced and, in accordance with Article 15 of the Hague Convention, requested a Romanian court decision on the matter. 15.  On 11 June 2003 the applicant instituted civil proceedings before the Bucharest Third District Court (“District Court”) seeking a ruling that the child’s removal from Romania had been illegal. 16.  On 16 July 2003 the applicant introduced a new application before the same court seeking a ruling that the child’s removal was contrary to Article 3 of the Hague Convention because he also had custody rights over the child. 17.  On 1 September 2003 the District Court held the first hearing in respect of the applicant’s first action; however, as a result of the mother’s request for an adjournment, the proceedings were adjourned until 8 December 2003. 18.  On 29 September 2003 the Romanian Ministry of Justice wrote to the High Court in London, informing it that the Romanian courts had exclusive competence in issuing decisions in accordance with Article 15 of the Hague Convention. 19.  On 30 September 2003 the District Court in Bucharest held the first hearing in respect of the second action and adjourned the case on the grounds that the applicant had failed to sign the application and that the mother had failed to sign her request for an adjournment. 20.  On 2 October 2003 the High Court in London resumed its examination of the case. The judge in charge of the case indicated that since his decision of May 2003 a number of documents from Romania had become available which seemed to indicate that the child’s removal from Romania by his mother was wrongful, and that, had these documents been available earlier, he would not have sought a declaration under Article 15 of the Hague Convention. Nevertheless, in view of the fact that the proceedings in Romania had commenced, and in view of the letter from the Romanian Ministry of Justice of 29 September 2003 it was decided to adjourn the proceedings to a date after 8 December 2003 (the date on which the District Court in Bucharest was to hear the case). The judge expressed concern about the time that had elapsed in the proceedings and indicated that if the 8 December hearing in Romania was not conclusive he would discharge the order he had made in May and proceed to adjudication. 21.  On 31 October 2003 the mother submitted her observations concerning the applicant’s actions in the Romanian proceedings and introduced a counter-action seeking, inter alia, a ruling that the applicant did not have a right of custody over the child and that he did not have the right to decide on the child’s place of domicile. 22.  On 8 December 2003 the District Court in Bucharest adjourned the hearing at the applicant’s request so that he could examine the mother’s observations and the counter-action lodged by her. On the same date the two actions lodged by the applicant and the mother’s counter-action were joined. 23.  On 19 December 2003 the judge at the High Court in London, having learned that the final determination of the case before the Romanian court had yet again been put back, made an order that the final hearing in London should take place “as a matter of urgency” in January 2004. 24.  On 5 January 2004 the District Court in Bucharest adopted a final ruling in the case and declared inadmissible the applicant’s actions without entering into the merits of the case. It decided not to examine the mother’s counter-action. Both parties appealed against the judgment. 25.  On 14 January 2004 the proceedings in London were adjourned at the request of the parties to 1 March 2004 to allow time for receipt of the written reasons from the Romanian court. 26.  On 20 January 2004 the District Court in Bucharest delivered its judgment and on 3 and 5 February the parties appealed against it. 27.  On 6 February 2004 the case file was transmitted by the District Court to the Bucharest Court of Appeal and the latter fixed 6 April as the date of the hearing in the case. 28.  On 23 February 2004 the applicant requested the Bucharest Court of Appeal to speed up the proceedings in view of the proceedings pending in London. His request was granted and the date of the hearing was set for 16 March 2004. 29.  On 1 March 2004 the applicant applied for an adjournment in the High Court proceedings in London pending determination of the case by the Bucharest Court of Appeal. His request was granted and the judge in charge of the case ordered that the final hearing should take place as soon as possible after receipt of an authorised translation of the decision of the Bucharest Court of Appeal. 30.  On 15 March 2004 the mother filed her observations with the Bucharest Court of Appeal. 31.  On 16 March 2004 the applicant’s representative requested an adjournment from the Bucharest Court of Appeal in order to study the mother’s observations. 32.  On 11 May 2004 the Bucharest Court of Appeal held a hearing in the case and heard submissions from the parties. The pronouncement of the judgment was adjourned to 25 May 2004. 33.  On 25 May 2004 the Fourth Section of the Bucharest Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of the first-instance court in part. It examined the applicant’s action on the merits and dismissed it as ill-founded, finding that the applicant did not have custody rights over the child and that the child’s removal from Romania was legal under domestic law and not wrongful within the meaning of Article 3 of the Hague Convention. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was communicated to the parties on 19 July 2004. 34.  On 3 August 2004 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Court of Cassation (Înalta Curte de Casaţie şi Justiţie) against the judgment of the Bucharest Court of Appeal. 35.  On 16 August 2004 the case file was sent by the Bucharest Court of Appeal to the Court of Cassation of Romania. 36.  On three occasions between November 2004 and March 2005 the applicant lodged requests with the Court of Cassation asking it for a speedier examination of his case on grounds of the urgency of the matter. 37.  It appears that during that period the Romanian Code of Civil Procedure was undergoing changes and that it was not clear which court was competent under the new rules to examine the applicant’s appeal on points of law. On 16 March 2005 the Court of Cassation declined jurisdiction in favour of the Bucharest Court of Appeal and on 28 March the case file was sent back to that court. 38.  The Bucharest Court of Appeal scheduled the first hearing in the case for 16 June 2005. 39.  On 13 May 2005 the applicant requested that the proceedings be speeded up in view of an upcoming hearing in the London proceedings. On 19 May the applicant’s request was upheld and the hearing was rescheduled for 26 May 2005. 40.  On 26 May 2005 the Third Section of the Bucharest Court of Appeal held a hearing; however, it decided to adjourn the proceedings to 9 June 2005. 41.  On 9 June 2005 the Court of Appeal resumed the examination of the case and dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law. It found, inter alia, that, under Romanian family law, after divorce the parents of a child do not have equal rights in respect of their child. In particular, the parent who has custody of the child does not need the consent of the other parent in respect of measures concerning the child except for matters relating to adoption and/or losing or re-obtaining Romanian nationality. The parent who does not enjoy custody cannot veto a decision of the other parent concerning the child’s domicile. Accordingly, the removal of the child from Romania by the mother was lawful under Romanian law. 42.  In July 2005, after the Romanian proceedings had ended and the final Romanian judgment had become available in English, the High Court in London resumed its proceedings and listed the case for a final hearing on 3 and 4 August 2005. 43.  On 1 August 2005 the judge in charge of the case at the High Court in London acceded to the applicant’s application for an expert opinion on the law of Romania. The expert was to file his report by 16 September 2005. 44.  Both parties agreed to instruct Dr Mihai to draft a report on Romanian family law and on 14 September 2005 the High Court confirmed the joint instructions to the expert and the time for lodging of the expert report was extended to 7 October 2005 with the final hearing listed for 14 October 2005. 45.  On 28 September 2005 the High Court in London extended the time-limit for the expert report to 11 October and relisted the case for 31 October 2005. 46.  The expert’s report was ready on 11 October 2005; however, the parties wished to put more questions to him. Therefore, on 31 October 2005, on an application from the applicant, the court adjourned the proceedings to 8 December 2005 and made further procedural directions in relation to any further questions to be put to the expert. 47.  On 8 December 2005 the final hearing was listed before the High Court in London for 28 February and 1 March 2006. 48.  On 28 February and 1 March 2006 the High Court held the final hearings in the case and gave judgment on 28 March 2006. The court found in favour of the applicant, choosing to rely on the expert opinion and to disregard the decisions of the Romanian courts. It found that the applicant had custody rights within the meaning of Article 5 of the Hague Convention and that therefore the child’s removal from Romania had been wrongful under Article 3 of the same Convention. The court also rejected an objection based on Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention raised by the mother and issued an order for the return of the child to Romania. 49.  On 7 April 2006 the mother sought leave to appeal. This was granted on 10 April 2006 and the case was fixed for hearing in the Court of Appeal on 25 May 2006. 50.  On 25 May 2006 the Court of Appeal heard and dismissed the mother’s appeal while varying the order for the peremptory return of the child until the end of the school term. 51.  The mother appealed to the House of Lords. Her appeal was heard between 9 and 11 October 2006 and on 16 November 2006 the House of Lords gave judgment allowing the appeal. The House of Lords reversed the judgment of the High Court, finding that the applicant did not have custody rights within the meaning of Article 5 of the Hague Convention and that therefore the child’s removal from Romania was not wrongful under Article 3 of the same Convention. The House of Lords criticised the decision of the High Court to seek a further expert opinion after having obtained a final decision on the matter from the Romanian courts and expressed regret about the length of the proceedings. 52.  Lord Hope of Craighead observed, inter alia, that:
“Article 15 of the Convention contemplates that the court may need to be provided with a determination from the authorities of the state of the child’s habitual residence that the removal was wrongful. So a judge is not to be criticised if he decides to use this procedure because he cannot responsibly resolve the issue on the information provided by the applicant. Nevertheless if he decides on this course delay will be inevitable. Great care must therefore be taken, in the child’s best interests, to keep this to the absolute minimum. The misfortunes that have beset this case show that, once the court has received the response, it should strive to treat the information which it receives as determinative.
In this case the response that was received from Romania was sufficient to show that the child’s removal was not wrongful within the meaning of article 3. On 9 June 2005 the final Court of Appeal of Bucharest, upholding the court of first appeal, stated in the clearest terms that, under the law as it then stood in Romania, termination of marriage through divorce brings joint custody to an end, that cases where the agreement of the parties is required about a measure which the parent with custody proposes are limited, and that none of the rights that the father had been granted on divorce gave him a right of veto or to decide the child’s place of residence. It is wholly understandable that the father should feel aggrieved by what has happened in this case. The effect on his ability to exercise his rights of access is plain to see. But the phrase “rights of custody” has been given a particular definition by the Convention. It is only if there has been a breach of rights of custody as so defined that the removal can be described as wrongful for its purposes. The information provided by the Romanian court shows that, as the law stood at the time of the child’s removal, the father had no such rights.” 53.  Baroness Hale of Richmond commented, inter alia, that:
“...the Bucharest Court of Appeal concluded that the removal of the child in December 2002 had not been wrongful... How then should the courts of the requested state respond to such a determination? Most certainly not as they did in this case. Having received a determination, binding between the parties, in the final court of the requesting state, the English High Court proceeded in effect to allow the father to challenge that ruling by adducing fresh expert evidence. The fact that the expert was jointly instructed does not cure the vice.” 54.  Lord Carswell stated that:
“It was quite wrong to permit the father to adduce further expert evidence from Dr Mihai which challenged not only the conclusion but the statement of the content of the father’s rights set out in the judgment of the Romanian court. The English court should have considered the terms of the judgment itself, without any subsequently obtained expert evidence. If it had done so it could only have come to the same conclusion as the Romanian court, even without applying any presumption in its favour.” 55.  Lord Brown commented as follows:
“This is an extraordinary case. It is, we are told, unique in the length of time which elapsed before the judge’s order for the child’s summary return to Romania (over three years after the commencement of Hague Convention proceedings); and unique too in being the only case in which a United Kingdom court has rejected a foreign court’s article 15 determination that the child’s removal was not in the event wrongful within the meaning of article 3...
In circumstances like these it seems to me almost inconceivable that the court requesting the article 15 determination would then not simply accept it. Certainly there would need to be some compelling reason to reject it such as a flagrant breach of the rules of natural justice in the foreign judicial process or a manifest misdirection as to the autonomous meaning of the Convention term “rights of custody”. There is nothing of that sort here. On the contrary, the judge - neither Johnson J (who had requested the determination) nor Hogg J (who later ordered the child’s return to Romania) - on 1 August 2005, acting merely on the father’s request, ordered that an expert in Romanian law be jointly instructed by both parties to cover exactly the same ground as the Romanian Appeal Courts had themselves just covered...” 56.  Throughout the entire proceedings in the United Kingdom the applicant was allowed to meet his child on a number of occasions in special contact centres for periods not exceeding two hours. According to him, however, over the last four years he has only been able to spend about thirty hours with his son. 57.  It does not appear that the applicant ever applied to the United Kingdom courts in order to obtain a judgment from them giving him access to the child. However, on an unspecified date in 2007 he applied to the High Court in London for the recognition of the Romanian judgment of November 2000 (see paragraph 7 above). The Court is not aware of the outcome of those proceedings. 58.  The relevant provisions of the Romanian Family Code read as follows:
Article 43 3.  The divorced parent, who was not entrusted with the child, keeps the right to have personal ties with the child, as well as to observe his or her bringing up, education, studies and professional instruction. 59.  The relevant provisions of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction provide:
Article 3
“The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where –
a)  it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and
b)  at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention.
The rights of custody mentioned in sub-paragraph a above, may arise in particular by operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law of that State.”
Article 5
“For the purposes of this Convention –
a)  ’rights of custody’ shall include rights relating to the care of the person of the child and, in particular, the right to determine the child’s place of residence;
b)  ’rights of access’ shall include the right to take a child for a limited period of time to a place other than the child’s habitual residence.”
Article 7
“Central Authorities shall co-operate with each other and promote co-operation amongst the competent authorities in their respective States to secure the prompt return of children and to achieve the other objects of this Convention.
In particular, either directly or through any intermediary, they shall take all appropriate measures -
a)  to discover the whereabouts of a child who has been wrongfully removed or retained;
b)  to prevent further harm to the child or prejudice to interested parties by taking or causing to be taken provisional measures;
c)  to secure the voluntary return of the child or to bring about an amicable resolution of the issues;
d)  to exchange, where desirable, information relating to the social background of the child;
e)  to provide information of a general character as to the law of their State in connection with the application of the Convention;
f)  to initiate or facilitate the institution of judicial or administrative proceedings with a view to obtaining the return of the child and, in a proper case, to make arrangements for organizing or securing the effective exercise of rights of access;
g)  where the circumstances so require, to provide or facilitate the provision of legal aid and advice, including the participation of legal counsel and advisers;
h)  to provide such administrative arrangements as may be necessary and appropriate to secure the safe return of the child;
i)  to keep other each other informed with respect to the operation of this Convention and, as far as possible, to eliminate any obstacles to its application.”
Article 8
“Any person, institution or other body claiming that a child has been removed or retained in breach of custody rights may apply either to the Central Authority of the child’s habitual residence or to the Central Authority of any other Contracting State for assistance in securing the return of the child...”
Article 10
“The Central Authority of the State where the child is shall take or cause to be taken all appropriate measures in order to obtain the voluntary return of the child.”
Article 11
“The judicial or administrative authorities of Contracting States shall act expeditiously in proceedings for the return of children.
If the judicial or administrative authority concerned has not reached a decision within six weeks from the date of commencement of the proceedings, the applicant or the Central Authority of the requested State, on its own initiative or if asked by the Central Authority of the requesting State, shall have the right to request a statement of the reasons for the delay. If a reply is received by the Central Authority of the requested State, that Authority shall transmit the reply to the Central Authority of the requesting State, or to the applicant, as the case may be.”
Article 13
“Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if the person, institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that –
a)  the person, institution or other body having the care of the person of the child was not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal of retention; or
b)  there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.
The judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views.
In considering the circumstances referred to in this Article, the judicial and administrative authorities shall take into account the information relating to the social background of the child provided by the Central Authority or other competent authority of the child’s habitual residence.”
Article 15
“The judicial or administrative authorities of a Contracting State may, prior to the making of an order for the return of the child, request that the applicant obtain from the authorities of the State of the habitual residence of the child a decision or other determination that the removal or retention was wrongful within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention, where such a decision or determination may be obtained in that State. The Central Authorities of the Contracting States shall so far as practicable assist applicants to obtain such a decision or determination.”
Article 21
“An application to make arrangements for organizing or securing the effective exercise of rights of access may be presented to the Central Authorities of the Contracting States in the same way as an application for the return of a child.
The Central Authorities are bound by the obligations of co-operation which are set forth in Article 7 to promote the peaceful enjoyment of access rights and the fulfilment of any conditions to which the exercise of those rights may be subject. The Central Authorities shall take steps to remove, as far as possible, all obstacles to the exercise of such rights.
The Central Authorities, either directly or through intermediaries, may initiate or assist in the institution of proceedings with a view to organizing or protecting these rights and securing respect for the conditions to which the exercise of these rights may be subject.”


5.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Warsaw. He is currently detained in Warsaw Remand Centre. 6.  On 21 December 2004 the applicant was held in custody. It does not result from the case-file whether the applicant remains detained in this set of proceedings. 7.  On 5 April 2006 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of murder, attempted robbery and drug trafficking committed in an organised criminal group. 8.  On the same date the Białystok District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) remanded him in custody, relying on a reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offences in question. The court indicated that the evidence which had been gathered in the case, in particular the testimonies of witnesses and other suspects, showed that there was a sufficient probability that the applicant had committed the offences with which he had been charged. It attached importance to the risk that he would attempt to induce witnesses to give false testimony or, by other means, would obstruct the proceedings. The latter risk was considered of the utmost importance in the light of the fact that the case involved a large number of alleged accomplices. 9.  An appeal by the applicant against the detention order, likewise his further appeals against decisions extending his detention and all of his subsequent, numerous applications for release and appeals against refusals to release him, were unsuccessful. 10.  In the course of the investigation, the applicant’s pre-trial detention was extended on several occasions, namely, on 27 June 2006 (to 5 October 2006), 29 September 2006 (to 5 December 2006), 28 November 2006 (to 5 March 2007), 2 March 2007 (to 5 May 2007), 27 April 2007 (to 5 August 2007), 30 July 2007 (to 5 November 2007) and 30 October 2007 (to 5 February 2008). In their decisions, the courts stressed the fact that the applicant had been acting in an organised criminal group. They underlined the unique nature of the proceedings involving organised crime, in which the authorities had to determine the degree of alleged responsibility of each of the suspects. The courts attached importance to the seriousness of the charges and the likelihood of a severe sentence being imposed on the applicant. 11.  On 30 January 2008 the Białystok District Court refused to extend the applicant’s detention. It stated that the applicant had been held in pre‑trial detention since April 2006 and that this period should have been sufficient for the authorities to collect evidence in the applicant’s case. In addition, it considered that the decision about the extension of the applicant’s pre-trial detention beyond the period of three months should be taken by the Białystok Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy). 12.  The Prosecutor lodged an interlocutory appeal against this decision. 13.  On 13 February 2008 the Białystok Regional Court amended the contested decision and extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention to 5 May 2008. The court argued that as the applicant was remanded in custody in the first set of criminal proceedings, his detention in the second set of proceedings was merely administrative. It further stated that the applicant was charged with serious offences committed in an organised criminal group and that there was a high risk that, if released, he would attempt to induce witnesses to give false testimony or, by other means, would obstruct the proceedings. Finally, the court observed that the Prosecutor could not have completed the investigation as evidence in proceedings involving organised crime often emerged gradually. 14.  On 29 April 2008 the Białystok District Court extended the applicant’s detention to 5 June 2008. 15.  On an unspecified date the Prosecutor requested the Białystok District Court to extend the applicant’s detention to 5 September 2008. 16.  On 4 June 2008 the Białystok District Court extended the applicant’s detention to 31 July 2008. The court observed that the applicant’s pre-trial detention had been extended for over two years almost automatically and it did not seem that the investigation was reaching its final stage. It concluded that the extension of the applicant’s detention for a shorter period than was requested by the Prosecutor should prompt the authorities to accelerate the acts of investigation regarding the applicant. 17.  The applicant lodged an interlocutory appeal against this decision claiming that he had been detained for over 26 months and that this period should have been sufficient for completing the investigation. 18.  On 9 July 2008 the Białystok Regional Court quashed the contested decision. It stated that the decision about the extension of the applicant’s pre-trial detention beyond the period of one year should be taken by the Białystok Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny). 19.  On 17 July 2008 the Białystok Court of Appeal extended the applicant’s detention until 31 August 2008. The court underlined the complexity of the case and the severity of the penalty to which the applicant was liable. Having regard to the organised character of the alleged criminal activities, it also held that the applicant’s detention was necessary in order to prevent the applicant from interfering with the proceedings. 20.  The Prosecutor lodged an interlocutory appeal against this decision claiming that the period of one month would not be sufficient for collecting evidence in the applicant’s case. 21.  On 7 August 2008 the Białystok Court of Appeal modified the contested decision and extended the applicant’s detention until 30 September 2008. The court observed that the applicant’s pre-trial detention was indeed lengthy but necessary in the particular circumstances of the case. 22.  On 17 September 2008 a bill of indictment was lodged with the Białystok Regional Court. The applicant was charged with murder, attempted robbery and drug trafficking committed in an organised criminal group. 23.  On 23 September 2008 the Białystok Regional Court extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention to 30 December 2008. 24.  In October 2008 the case was referred to the Warszawa-Praga Regional Court. 25.  On several occasions the Warszawa-Praga Regional Court applied to the Warsaw Court of Appeal, asking for the applicant’s detention to be extended. The Warszawa Court of Appeal allowed all those requests extending the applicant’s pre-trial detention on 22 December 2008 (to 30 June 2009), 25 June 2009 (to 31 December 2009), 10 December 2009 (to 31 May 2010), 27 May 2010 (to 15 October 2010), 7 October 2010 (to 31 January 2011), 18 January 2011 (to 31 May 2011) and 24 May 2011 (to 30 September 2011). 26.  The criminal proceedings against the applicant are still pending. The applicant remains detained. 27.  The applicant submitted that during the entire period of his detention he was held in overcrowded cells in conditions which did not comply with the basic standards of hygiene.