4.  The applicant was born in 1936 and lives in Lviv. 5.  In 1981 the applicant was convicted of speculating in gold and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. In 1992 his conviction was annulled as unlawful. Subsequently the applicant instituted civil proceedings, seeking various kinds of compensation for his unlawful conviction and punishment. 6.  On 24 February 1998 the Khust Court (Хустський районний суд Закарпатської області) awarded the applicant 3,350.55 hryvnyas (UAH)[1] against the Ministry of Finance (“the Ministry”; Міністерство фінансів України) in compensation for his loss of income while in detention. 7.  This judgment became final and on 3 June 1998 the bailiffs instituted enforcement proceedings. They submitted the enforcement writ to the Ministry of Finance, which redirected it to the State Treasury (Державне Казначейство України). 8.  On 18 November 2003 the enforcement writ was returned to the applicant unenforced. 9.  On 13 May 1999 the Khust Court awarded the applicant UAH 7,281.70[2] against the Khust State Treasury Department (“the Khust Treasury”; Відділ Державного казначейства в Хустському районі Закарпатської області) in compensation for the gold confiscated from him following his conviction. This decision became final. 10.  On 12 November 2002 the Khust Treasury informed the applicant that it could not make the payment without the command of the bailiffs. In connection with this, the Khust Treasury had transferred the applicant's request for enforcement and a copy of the judgment to the bailiffs and had requested the Khust Court to transfer the enforcement writ thereto. 11.  On 5 March 2003 the Khust Court informed the applicant that it had never issued the enforcement writ as the applicant personally had never requested the court to do so. 12.  The judgment of 13 May 1999 remains unenforced. 13.  On 2 April 2002 the Lychakivsky District Court of Lviv awarded the applicant UAH 2,000[3] against the State Treasury in moral damages for a delay in the enforcement of the judgment of 24 February 1998. 14.  This decision became final in October 2002 and on 9 December 2002 the enforcement proceedings were instituted. On several occasions the Treasury informed the applicant that the judgment award could not be paid on account of the lack of budgetary allocations. 15.  On 26 January 2004 the Lviv Regional Court of Appeal (“the Regional Court”; Апеляційний суд Львівської області) gave the applicant, who sought to obtain a higher amount of compensation, leave to appeal against the judgment of 2 April 2002 out of time. 16.  On 15 March 2004 the Regional Court, following the applicant's appeal, reviewed the facts of the case in their entirety and quashed the judgment of 2 April 2002. The court rejected the applicant's claims against the Treasury as lacking statutory basis under domestic law. On 25 September 2006 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant's request for leave to appeal in cassation. 17.  The applicant made several unsuccessful attempts to institute civil proceedings against various authorities, seeking compensation for the delays in the enforcement of the judgments in his favour.


6.  The applicants are Finnish citizens. Their dates of birth and places of residence are set out in the Annex. 7.  On 25 November 1995 a group of young people organised a sit-in in the premises of a department store in Helsinki, Oy Stockmann Ab (presently Oyj Stockmann Abp; henceforth “Stockmann”), criticising it for selling fur coats and thereby participating in cruelty to animals. Around the same time various pamphlets and posters had appeared in Helsinki, criticising the fur trade in general and Stockmann in particular. The group had to be forcibly removed from the store. 8.  In March 1996 Stockmann requested a pre-trial investigation into “the distribution to the public of printed matters purporting to be produced on the company’s behalf but which had not been commissioned by [it]”. Should the police find that a criminal offence had been committed, Stockmann requested that the matter be brought to the attention of the public prosecutor. The request was registered as a matter of suspected public defamation. 9.  In the ensuing pre-trial investigation 36 persons, including the applicants, were heard as suspects in respect of the offence of public defamation. 10.  On 11 April 1996 the police conducted a search at the home of Mr Miettinen, relying on chapter 4, section 1, and chapter 5, section 1 of the Coercive Measures Act (pakkokeinolaki, tvångsmedelslagen 450/1987). According to the minutes, the search was carried out for the purpose of an investigation into malicious damage (vahingonteko, skadegörelse) of which his room mates – A.L. (not an applicant) and Ms Karjalainen – had been suspected. The police seized pamphlets critical of Stockmann’s sale of fur products as well as letters related to Mr Miettinen’s participation in an association of anti-fur activists. 11.  On 13 June 1996 the police searched the homes of Ms Mikola and Ms Soini. According to the minutes, the searches were carried out “for other investigation purposes”. The police seized pamphlets and documents related to Ms Mikola’s participation in the same association of anti-fur activists. At the home of Ms Soini the police seized similar pamphlets, diaries from the years 1994-1995 and a telephone note book. 12.  On 20 June 1996 the police returned to Ms Mikola some of the seized material, retaining eight pamphlets stating, inter alia: “Stockmann supports trading in carcasses” (Stocka [Stockmann] tukee raatokauppaa). 13.  On 26 June 1996 the police returned two of Ms Soini’s diaries, keeping a third one until 9 September 1996. 14.  On 18 October 1996 the District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätten) of Helsinki maintained the seizures of Ms Mikola’s and Ms Soini’s materials until 31 December 1996. The seizures were later extended until 31 January 1997. 15.  On 20 November 1996 the pre-trial investigation ended with a signed report. On 10 January 1997 applicants Sami and Sanna Seppilä, Soini, Uosukainen, Karjalainen, Särkisilta, Kaihovaara, Pelkonen, Riska, Karlstedt, Salonen, Miettinen and Mikola were charged with a violation of Stockmann’s domiciliary peace (kotirauhan rikkominen, hemfridsbrott) and a violation of the Police Act, both committed on 25 November 1995. All except applicants Sami Seppilä, Uosukainen, Karlstedt and Miettinen had been minors at the time of the offence. 16.  At the same time, applicants Soini, Therman and Mustonen were charged with having defamed Stockmann in public while being minors. Applicants Uosukainen and Karjalainen were charged with the same offence but were no longer minors when committing the offence, namely between the summer of 1995 and the summer of 1996. In the alternative, all except Karjalainen were charged with common nuisance. 17.  Mr Purmonen was charged with incitement to one or the other of those offences. 18.  In addition, applicants Sami Seppilä, Soini, Särkisilta and Salonen were charged with some further offences. 19.  On 2 April 1997 Ms Soini requested that the seizure of her possessions be lifted. The District Court having maintained the seizures, she appealed to the Court of Appeal (hovioikeus, hovrätten) of Helsinki. 20.  On 15 May 1997 the police lifted the seizure and returned the remaining material to Ms Soini and Ms Mikola. On 17 July 1997 the Court of Appeal found that since the police had already returned the material seized from Ms Soini it was not necessary to examine her appeal. 21.  Meanwhile, on 18 June 1997 applicants Sanna Seppilä, Soini, Uosukainen, Särkisilta, Kaihovaara, Pelkonen, Riska, Karlstedt, Salonen, Miettinen and Mikola were convicted of violation of Stockmann’s domiciliary peace and sentenced to forty, fifty or sixty days’ conditional imprisonment respectively. Mr Sami Seppilä was likewise convicted – except on one count not relevant to this case – and given a longer conditional prison sentence coupled with a fine. 22.  Applicants Purmonen, Therman and Mustonen were acquitted of all charges. 23.  On 22 June 1999 the Court of Appeal reversed the District Court’s judgment by acquitting all twelve convicted applicants in so far as they had been found guilty of violating domiciliary peace. The court considered that Stockmann’s shop premises, being accessible to the public, could not be considered a domicile for the purposes of the relevant provision of the Penal Code. While upholding these applicants’ convictions of one or several other offences the court reduced their sentences to fines.


5.  The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Moscow. 6.  In the early morning of 22 February 2001 the applicant entered the grounds of a furniture depot, where he was spotted by security guards. The guards called the police, and, soon after, the applicant was arrested. He claimed that he had been beaten by the police officers and the guards when he was being arrested. After searching the premises, the police discovered a handgun, allegedly belonging to the applicant. The applicant was taken to Vidnovo police station (Moscow Region) for questioning. 7.  The applicant alleges that in the course of the questioning police officers M. and E. tortured him: they put a gas mask over his head and blocked air access, so that he started suffocating. They also hit him with a rubber stick. The applicant agreed to confess to theft and, moreover, to give them money so that they would stop. At about 4 a.m. the applicant went to his flat, accompanied by two police officers, where, at gunpoint, he handed over 5,000 US dollars. Then the police officers returned to the police station with him and he was locked in a cell. However, the policemen promised him that if he confessed to the alleged crimes the town prosecutor would soon release him on bail. The applicant wrote a statement in which he confessed to attempted theft and illegal possession of a handgun. 8.  The Government produced an extract from the police station record of arrests. Entry no. 296 concerned the applicant; it read as follows: “22.02.2001/[the applicant] made no complaints [about his condition]/no visible injuries [on him]”. 9.  In the afternoon the police instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant on suspicion of theft and illegal possession of a firearm (criminal case no. 39697). In connection with these proceedings the town prosecutor authorised the applicant's pre-trial detention. 10.  On 23 February 2001 the applicant met with his lawyer. Through him the applicant transmitted to the town prosecutor a written statement in which he described the circumstances of his arrest, the ill-treatment and extortion of money. According to the applicant, his complaint of ill‑treatment was handed to the investigator in charge of his case on that date; however, the case file does not contain any proof of that. 11.  On 5 March 2001 the applicant lodged a formal complaint with the town prosecutor about the ill-treatment and extortion, seeking the criminal prosecution of the police officers involved. He also requested to be released on the grounds that he might easily be subjected to further pressure and physical violence by those police officers while in the pre-trial detention facility. 12.  The applicant claimed that, as a result, officers M. and E. had been dismissed from service. The Government confirmed that M. had been dismissed for underperformance and E. had been transferred to another unit. However, neither of these disciplinary measures was related to the events at issue. 13.  On 21 May 2001, after a preliminary inquiry into the applicant's allegations of ill-treatment, the town prosecutor decided not to proceed with the investigation. The materials of the inquiry were added to the file in the applicant's case. 14.  On 25 May 2001 the Vidnovo town prosecutor issued a bill of indictment in the applicant's case and transmitted it with the case-file to the Vidnovo Town Court for examination on the merits. 15.  In July 2001 the applicant's lawyer lodged similar complaints of ill‑treatment with the Regional Prosecutor and the Prosecutor General, seeking further investigation into the alleged ill-treatment and extortion. It is unclear whether those complaints were ever examined on the merits. The applicant's complaint in similar terms lodged with the Internal Security Department of the Ministry of the Interior was forwarded to the Moscow Regional Court “for further inquiries”. On 5 September 2001 this complaint was forwarded to the Vidnovo Town Court, where it was “added to the case file”. 16.  After the applicant's conviction on 10 September 2001, his lawyer lodged a new complaint with the prosecutor of the Vidnovo district, seeking the institution of criminal proceedings against officers M. and E. As can be seen from the applicant's submissions, he received no reply to this complaint. 17.  On 19 March 2002 the applicant lodged a civil-law complaint about the inaction of the prosecutor of the Vidnovo district before the Vidnovo Town Court, under the provisions of the Judicial Appeals Act (see the “Relevant domestic law” part below). 18.  On 29 March 2002 the court returned his complaint unexamined. The Town Court indicated that the complaint had been lodged under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, whereas it should have been lodged in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Town Court referred to the position of the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, expressed in its Ruling of 21 December 1993 in which the Supreme Court held that decisions of the prosecuting authorities should be challenged by way of a criminal-law complaint. 19.  The applicant appealed, claiming that the Town Court's refusal to examine his complaint was unlawful and breached his constitutional right of access to court. However, on 22 May 2002 the Moscow Regional Court upheld the decision of the Vidnovo Town Court of 29 March 2002. The Court of Appeal confirmed that the decision of the prosecutor not to proceed with the case should have been challenged under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 20.  During the pre-trial investigation of criminal case no. 39697 and the trial of his case before the Vidnovo Town Court the applicant remained in the remand prison. On several occasions he requested the investigator in charge of his case and the town prosecutor to release him. In particular, on 22 March 2001 he lodged an application with the Vidnovo town prosecutor. However, it was refused on the ground that the applicant might abscond or interfere with the course of justice. 21.  On 17 April 2001[1] the applicant lodged another application for release with the court. In his application he described the alleged ill‑treatment and extortion of money by the police officers. He also referred to various defects in the investigation proceedings and to his poor health and personal circumstances. 22.  On 11 May 2001 the Kashira Town Court of the Moscow Region rejected his application, putting forward the following arguments:
“[The applicant] has committed several intentional crimes, including serious ones. This fact is not disputed either by [the applicant] or by his defence counsel. There is no information that the state of his health is incompatible with detention pending investigation. Given this fact and taking into account the fact that Mr Medvedev committed the impugned crime in another district, the Court holds that the investigative authorities have rightly applied detention pending investigation as a preventive measure.”
The applicant was informed in that ruling that he had seven days to lodge an appeal with the Moscow Regional Court. 23.  The applicant's lawyer appealed. The applicant indicated that his appeal had been lodged on 14 May 2001; the Government did not dispute that assertion. On 13 June 2001 the appeal was dismissed by the Moscow Regional Court. It appears that neither the applicant nor his lawyer was present at the appeal court hearing. The ruling of the appeal court was very short and dealt with the applicant's arguments summarily. 24.  The applicant indicated that he had received a copy of the appeal court's decision in February 2002[2]. The Government did not dispute that; they claimed, however, that the case file concerning the application for release before the Kashira Town Court had been destroyed after the expiry of the time-limits established by domestic legislation for the storage of documents in the court's archives. The applicant indicated that under the applicable rules on document management in the Russian courts the case file concerning his application for release should have been kept in the Moscow Regional Court until 2007, so these documents should have been in the possession of the authorities. 25.  On 22 May 2001 the prosecution forwarded the applicant's case, together with the bill of indictment, to the Vidnovo Town Court of the Moscow Region. In the course of the trial the applicant raised the issue of ill-treatment and extortion of money by the police officers before the court as an argument in support of his innocence. 26.  On 10 September 2001 the Vidnovo Town Court delivered its judgment. As to the alleged ill-treatment, the court rejected this argument, referring to the inquiry conducted by the Vidnovo town prosecutor at the applicant's request. The court further noted that the security guards at the furniture depot, who had been present at the time of the applicant's arrest, had testified that the applicant had confessed to the alleged theft immediately. So there had been no need to put further pressure on him in order to extort a confession. 27.  The court found the applicant guilty of attempted theft but acquitted him of illegal possession of firearms. He was sentenced to eight months' imprisonment. 28.  The judgment of 10 September 2001 was subject to appeal to the Moscow Regional Court. However, the applicant did not appeal, allegedly out of fear of reprisals by the police officers implicated in the ill-treatment. Therefore, the conviction became final on 17 September 2001. A supervisory-review appeal by the applicant was rejected by the Moscow Regional Court on 13 December 2001. 29.  On 24 October 2001 the applicant was released from prison.


5.  The applicant was born in 1970 and lives in Liverpool. 6.  On 6 October 2005 the applicant was charged with two offences of conspiracy to supply Class A drugs. 7.  On 7 October 2005 the applicant was produced at Liverpool City Magistrates' Court. Following a contested bail application she was granted bail by the Deputy District Judge. 8.  The prosecution gave notice that it wished to appeal against the grant of bail and the applicant remained in detention. The appeal hearing was to take place at Liverpool Crown Court on 11 October 2005 and the applicant's solicitors arranged with the Prison Service for her to be present at the court building. 9.  The prosecution's appeal came before Judge Globe on 11 October 2005. At the start of the hearing, counsel for the applicant requested that the judge exercise his discretion to allow the applicant to be present while the appeal was heard. It was contended on the applicant's behalf that she had been led to believe that she would be released following the grant of bail at the magistrates' court and that she had not properly understood the implications of the prosecution's appeal. Counsel for the applicant asserted that if she were present she would see that her case was being dealt with fairly and he further clarified that the basis for his application was “common humanity” and “not technical”. Judge Globe declined the request, reasoning that the applicant could be given a full report of what had happened from her counsel. Moreover, her attendance would be undesirable as one of the applicant's co-accused had not been present at the hearing of the appeal against the grant of bail to him, and it would therefore be unfair to treat the applicant more favourably. 10.  When the applicant later arrived in the court building, her counsel again requested that she be allowed to attend the hearing in person. He emphasised that this was a re-hearing and rather unusual as it was the prosecution which had sought to appeal the Deputy District Judge's ruling on bail. As the applicant was already present in the building, her production would cause little inconvenience. Judge Globe again refused, this time explaining that if he allowed the applicant to be present it would set a precedent for any defendant in custody wishing to attend an appeal against bail in the future. 11.  The applicant's counsel submitted to the judge:
“You have considerable experience of looking at people and taking into account their demeanour. This woman is, on the defence case, a respectable woman of good background and a vulnerable person. I would like you to see her, frankly, because you will be able to tell and see that she does not fall into a category of so many of those who appear before you ... I was able to address the learned District Judge on precisely those terms. I believe that it had some impact on his decision to grant bail because he was able to see her and make an assessment of that person. She is here and you could make that assessment if she was brought up before you.” 12.  In refusing the applicant permission to attend, Judge Globe stated:
“I am not going to alter my view in relation to [the applicant] being present during the hearing. I will listen to your submissions. If there is anything during your submissions that causes me to hear evidence from her or to have to do something different to what I am doing at the moment in relation to the hearing of the matter, I will reconsider it at that stage.” 13.  At a later stage of the hearing, Judge Globe remarked:
“... [W]hat beyond what you have been able to describe to me are you suggesting that I should gain from bringing her up from the cells into the dock at the moment? What do you want me to do if I were to ask her to come up into the dock, just look at her? Does that add anything to anything that you are suggesting? I have a very clear picture of the sort of person who is going to walk into the dock. No doubt she is going to be very worried. It must be a very intimidating experience for anybody of no previous convictions who has recently been taken into custody, to be brought into a court as large as this. I can imagine full well what is going to happen when she walks in. But given the fact that I can imagine that, and I have seen it happen many times, what else am I going to notice?” 14.  The applicant's counsel replied that he had withdrawn his application for her to attend. Judge Globe invited him to make any last submissions about what might be gained by seeing the applicant in person. Counsel answered with:
 “...looking at the demeanour of the person, that is all. There is something to do with that assessment which is better if one looks at the person and sees them looking across the court looking back at you. But you have in detail, as you have pointed out, a thorough description of her and if that suffices I am not going to seek to persuade you to go further.” 15.  Judge Globe proceeded with the hearing in the applicant's absence. He decided to allow the prosecution appeal and refuse bail, on the grounds that the applicant's brother, one of the co-accused, was at liberty, possibly overseas, and that there was a risk that she would abscond and join him or provide him with information about the prosecution case which would obstruct the course of justice. 16.  The applicant applied for permission to apply for judicial review of the decision not to allow her to attend the hearing on the ground that her rights under the Convention had been breached. 17.  On 9 November 2005 Mr Justice Sullivan refused the application for permission to apply for judicial review. He first observed that the applicant was challenging Judge Globe's decision not to allow her to attend the prosecution appeal, and that she did not contend that the ultimate decision to refuse her bail was unreasonable. Mr Justice Sullivan further noted that though Rule 19.17 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Rules (see paragraph 22 below) was not referred to during the hearing before Judge Globe, it was Convention compliant because a person was entitled to be present if, in an exceptional case, the interests of justice so required. The applicant's grounds for applying for permission to seek judicial review did not explain why hers was an exceptional case or why the interests of justice required her attendance whilst she was legally represented. 18.  Mr Justice Sullivan took into account Judge Globe's clear indication that he would be prepared to reconsider his view and allow the applicant to be present if there was anything that would require him to hear evidence from her in person. However, counsel representing the applicant had not been able to identify what would be gained by producing the applicant. 19.  On 7 December 2005 Mr Justice Gibbs refused the applicant's renewed application for permission to bring judicial review proceedings. The applicant's counsel attended and argued that the decision to refuse her admission to the hearing of the prosecution's appeal had breached her rights under Article 5 § 3, or alternatively, Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. It was asserted that the production of the applicant before the Deputy District Judge did not fulfil the requirements of Article 5 § 3 because the judge was not a judge authorised by law to exercise judicial power, as his decision was subject to immediate appeal and was never put into effect. 20.  In giving judgment, Mr Justice Gibbs took into account a transcript of the proceedings before Judge Globe. Although Rule 19.17 (4) had not been expressly cited to Judge Globe, the latter's approach to the application made to him had been entirely consistent with that rule. The general principle underlying Rule 19.17 (4) was that an applicant should not generally be entitled to be present at the hearing of a prosecution appeal. The first exception to that proposition had not been fulfilled as the applicant was not acting in person. Therefore the judge would have to take the view that the case was of an exceptional nature and/or that the interests of justice required the applicant to be present. Judge Globe, in considering the matter, undoubtedly had the interests of justice in mind. He had referred to the position of the co-defendant and had made an enquiry as to whether there was any particular reason to believe that injustice would occur, having regard to the fact that an explanation could be given to the applicant immediately afterwards as to the judge's decision and his reasons for it. Judge Globe had also, notably, left open the possibility of altering his decision if, for example, it became apparent that oral evidence might be required from the applicant in support of her application. 21.  Mr Justice Gibbs found that the Deputy District Judge was authorised to exercise judicial power as required by Article 5 § 3 of the Convention and clearly had exercised it, even though his decision was subject to immediate appeal and was not put into effect pending appeal. As concerned the applicant's complaints under Article 5 § 4, the legal framework covering applications for bail, including appeals, did in Mr Justice Gibbs view enable her to take proceedings whereby the lawfulness of her detention could be decided speedily by a court as required by that article. There was, in his judgment, nothing even arguably to be found in the wording of Article 5 § 4 which entitled an applicant to be present at such proceedings in all instances. Where prosecution appeals against refusal of bail were concerned, Rule 19.17 (4) provided a Convention compatible procedure to ensure that no injustice was caused to an applicant in cases in which he or she was not permitted to be present.


4.  The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Komsomolske. 5.  On 16 February 2001 the applicant and six other persons, all members of the collective enterprise Z., lodged a claim with the Zmiyiv Town Court (“the Zmiyiv Court”) against this enterprise and its director seeking the annulment of decisions on the Z.’s re-organisation. The applicant had worked in this enterprise for about thirty years. 6.  On 2 November 2001 the Zmiyiv Court decided to leave the claim without examination. 7.  On 11 January 2002 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal quashed that ruling and remitted the case to the first-instance court for an examination on merits. 8.  Meanwhile the enterprise Z. was liquidated, and the liquidator became a party to the proceedings. 9.  As a result, on 22 October 2004 the Zmiyiv Court restarted its examination of the case. 10.  On 7 February 2007 it found against the claimants. 11.  In the course of the proceedings the Zmiyiv Court adjourned hearings on twelve occasions in allowing requests of the claimants, who needed additional time for amending their claims, or given their failure to appear. There were also thirteen adjournments requested by the defendant enterprise or caused by the absence of its representative. On one or two occasions hearings were adjourned because the judge was busy or following procedural measures ordered by the court. 12.  On 14 March 2007 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal found that the case fell under the jurisdiction of commercial courts and sent it for examination to the Kharkiv Commercial Court of Appeal, which on 5 July 2007 upheld the judgment of the Zmiyiv Court. 13.  On 26 December 2007 the Higher Commercial Court found that the dispute was to be examined by the courts of general jurisdiction, quashed the ruling of 5 July 2007 and remitted the case back to the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal. 14.  On 1 April 2008 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal discontinued the proceedings in part concerning the claims against the enterprise Z., as it had been liquidated by that time, and rejected the remainder of the claims as unsubstantiated. 15.  On 17 October 2008 the Supreme Court upheld that ruling. 16.  On 18 December 2002 the applicant, as well as the other claimants (see paragraph 5 above), lodged an additional claim against the enterprise Z. for recovery of a share. 17.  The claimants supplemented and specified their initial claims on a number of occasions. 18.  On 13 December 2005 the Zmiyiv Court stayed the examination of the case pending the outcome in the first set of proceedings. 19.  On 8 February 2006 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal quashed the above ruling, and the first-instance court resumed the proceedings. 20.  On 9 June 2006 the Zmiyiv Court allowed the applicant’s request for an expert assessment of the value of a share in the enterprise Z., which it entrusted to the Kharkiv Research Institute for Forensic Expert Examinations. 21.  In January 2007 the aforementioned expert institution informed the court that it did not have the required expertise capacities. The proceedings were then resumed, without the evaluation in question having been undertaken. 22.  On 19 February 2007 the Zmiyiv Court found against the claimants. 23.  On 30 July 2007 by the Kharkiv Commercial Court of Appeal upheld that judgment. 24.  On 26 December 2007 the Higher Commercial Court found that the case was to be examined by courts of general jurisdiction, quashed the ruling of 30 July 2007 and sent the case for examination to the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal. 25.  On 28 May 2008 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal discontinued the proceedings in the part concerning the claims against the enterprise Z. due to its liquidation and upheld the judgment of 19 February 2007 in the remaining part. 26.  On 12 December 2008 the Supreme Court upheld that ruling.


5.  The applicant was formerly a member of the Bulgarian Communist Party (“BCP”), in which he held the position of Secretary of the Central Committee of the BCP (1976-1986) and was a Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the BCP (1977-1988). He was also a Member of the National Assembly (1974-1990), the Minister for Industry and a Member of the Council of Ministers (1984-1986) and the Bulgarian Ambassador to Norway (1989-1990). 6.  The applicant contended that following the democratic changes of 1989 the authorities started to systematically intimidate and harass both him and his family. In particular, despite continuing to have immunity as a Member of the National Assembly, his family residence had been searched, an inventory of all their possessions had been made and several restrictions had been placed on their real property. Fearing further intimidation, reprisals and possible unjustified prosecution by the authorities the applicant left the country on 14 April 1990. Thereafter he resided in Vienna, Austria. 7.  Preliminary investigation No. 3/92 was opened on 9 July 1992 by the Chief Prosecutor's Office against all the members of the Bureau of the Council of Ministers and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the BCP for the period between 1981 and 1989. A total of twenty-two persons were charged, on an unspecified date, that during the said period they had participated in the adoption of decisions to provide financial assistance or extend loans, totalling 243,537,000 old Bulgarian levs (BGL), to (a) foreign countries, in respect of the Government, and (b) foreign political parties, in respect of the BCP. The decisions in question had been adopted by the Bureau of the Council of Ministers, the Secretariat or the Politburo of the Central Committee of the BCP. These persons, including the applicant, were charged under Article 203, in conjunction with Articles 201, 202 and 282, of the Criminal Code for having misappropriated, in concert, the aforementioned funds. It was contented that, in breach of their official duties, they had facilitated the misappropriation with the aim of obtaining an advantage for a third party, thereby causing considerable economic damage to the country's economy. In view of the very large sums involved, the offence was qualified as being very serious. 8.  In respect of the applicant, the initial charges against him were also under the above quoted provisions of the Criminal Code. It was contended that between 1981 and 1986 in his capacity of an official, Political Secretary of the BCP, and in concert with another ten officials, members of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the BCP, he had misappropriated public funds and property (BGL 8,171,347; 200,000 convertible Bulgarian levs; 2,175,500 United States dollars; 8,000 tonnes of wheat; the value of organising a summit; sixty airplane tickets; 20,000 tonnes of oil; properties given to Ethiopia; training of fifty officials from Mozambique, thirty officers and thirty cadets from Ghana; and, training, accommodation and employment for thirty Turkish nationals), which had been entrusted to him for safekeeping and management and which represented a very serious offence and for a very large amount. In addition, it was claimed that in order to facilitate the aforesaid offence the applicant had perpetrated another offence – that in his capacity as an official, Secretary of the Central Committee of the BCP, he had violated his obligations as such and had exceeded his authority with the aim of obtaining advantage for himself and for a third party and had caused severe damages, which was qualified as being a very serious offence. 9.  The criminal proceedings continued in the absence of the applicant due to the fact that he was residing in Austria at the time. On an unspecified date, he retained a lawyer to represent him before the investigating authorities. 10.  On 23 July 1992 the Chief Prosecutor's Office ordered that the applicant be detained on remand, but the order was not enforced due his absence from the country. On an unspecified date the applicant was placed on the list of persons being sought by the police. 11.  In a decision of 7 January 1993 the charges against the applicant were amended and the order for his detention was maintained. 12.  On 1 October 1993 the Chief Prosecutor's Office sent a letter to the Chief Prosecutor's Office of Austria requesting it to detain and extradite the applicant to Bulgaria. The applicant was detained by the Austrian authorities on 9 December 1993. 13.  On 8 December 1993 the applicant requested political asylum in Austria. 14.  He was released by the Austrian authorities on 15 December 1993. 15.  On 6 January 1994 the Chief Prosecutor's Office sent an official request to the Republic of Austria seeking the applicant's extradition to Bulgaria. 16.  In a decision of 5 May 1994 the Vienna Court of Appeal refused the extradition request. It found that the actions of the applicant were in conformity with the Bulgarian Constitution and the laws at the time in question and that the payments from the State budget to third countries and organisations were approved by decisions of the Council of Ministers and acts on the State budget. Moreover, the applicant's actions were deemed not to contravene the principles of international law and human rights. In addition, the Vienna Court of Appeal found that the applicant had been acting in conformity with his rights and obligations as an official who could decide on the allocation of State funds, which he did not undertake on his own, but as a member of a collective body, for which he was not individually culpable. 17.  The criminal proceedings against the applicant continued. He contended that no further investigative procedures were conducted thereafter and that on at least four occasions the criminal proceedings had been stayed for undetermined periods of time. The last such occasion had been on 28 May 1995 when the Chief Prosecutor's Office stayed the proceedings because two of the defendants had become members of the National Assembly and had obtained immunity from prosecution. 18.  On 3 June 1999 the applicant's lawyer filed a request with the Chief Prosecutor's Office demanding that the criminal proceedings be terminated. She referred to the findings of the Court in the case of Lukanov v. Bulgaria (judgment of 20 March 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑II, pp. 529-547) which had examined the same criminal proceedings and had found them to be deficient because the actions of the defendant had not constituted an offence under domestic legislation. In addition, the applicant's lawyer referred to the Government's undertaking before the Council of Europe to avoid similar such violations in the future (Resolution DH (98) 203 adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 10 July 1998 at the 637th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies). 19.  On 15 June 1999 the criminal proceedings against the applicant were reopened by the Supreme Cassation Prosecutor's Office and the case was remitted for further investigation to the Specialised Investigation Division. 20.  On 24 August 1999 the applicant's lawyer filed a second request with the Chief Prosecutor's Office demanding that it rule on her previous request of 3 June 1999. 21.  On 17 September 1999 the Sofia City Prosecutor's Office rejected the request of 3 June 1999 as it considered that it could not rule on its merits before the criminal proceedings had been completed. 22.  In a decision of the Sofia City Prosecutor's Office of 28 January 2000 the criminal proceedings against the defendants in case No. 3/92 were terminated and, inter alia, the order for the applicant's detention was rescinded. It found that the actions of the defendants, including the applicant, did not constitute an offence under domestic criminal legislation at the time of the events. In particular, the funds in question had always been included as expenditures in the State budget, the decisions were adopted without exceeding the powers granted thereto under the existing legislation and the provisions of such aid was in harmony with the State's international obligations. Reference was made to the decision of 5 May 1994 of the Vienna Court of Appeal to refuse the applicant's extradition and the Lukanov judgment (cited above) where the Court had found in respect of the same proceedings that:
“...no evidence has been adduced to show that [the] decisions [for grating aid] were unlawful, that is to say contrary to Bulgaria's Constitution or legislation, or more specifically that the decisions were taken in excess of [their] powers...” (ibid. § 43). 23.  On 27 March 2000 the Sofia Court of Appeals confirmed the decision of the Sofia City Prosecutor's Office to terminate the criminal proceedings against, inter alia, the applicant and the said decision became final.


5.  The applicant was born in 1974. He is currently serving a prison sentence. 6.  On 9 November 2004 the Opole Regional Court convicted the applicant of manslaughter and sentenced him to fifteen years’ imprisonment. The prosecution appealed. 7.  On 8 December 2004 J.G., the lawyer assigned to represent the applicant under the legal‑aid scheme, also submitted an appeal against the first-instance judgment, arguing that the sentence was too severe. In the same pleadings J.G. also requested the court to dispense him from his obligation to represent the applicant and to appoint another lawyer to the case. 8.  In a letter of the same date he informed the applicant that, in his view, the appeal offered no reasonable prospects of success. He also stated that under no circumstances would he represent him for the purposes of cassation proceedings. 9.  On 16 December 2004 the Wroclaw Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals. In the proceedings before the appellate court the applicant was represented by another legal‑aid lawyer, D.K. 10.  On 4 March 2005 the court allowed the applicant’s request for the grant of legal aid and assigned J.G. to represent him for the purposes of cassation proceedings. 11.  On 15 March 2005 the second-instance judgment with the written statement of reasons was served on both the applicant and his lawyer. 12.  By a letter of 16 March 2005 the lawyer requested the court to be exempted from the obligation to represent the applicant. He submitted that he had already informed the applicant that he would prepare an appeal against the first‑instance judgment on the ground that in the circumstances of the case the sentence was disproportionate. He had also informed him that, in his view, this appeal offered no reasonable prospects of success. In the light of the judgment of the Court of Appeal his opinion proved justified. He also stated that he had warned the applicant that under no circumstances would he represent him for the purposes of cassation proceedings. In his view, there were no grounds on which to accept that any grounds for a cassation appeal obtained in the case. This was so because in the appeal against the first-instance judgment he had relied only on the disproportionate nature of the sentence, which could not be argued before the Supreme Court. 13.  The Wrocław Court of Appeal informed the applicant of this refusal by a letter dated 22 March 2005. It was further stated that in these circumstances the only course of action left to the applicant was to request the Ombudsman to lodge a cassation appeal on his behalf. This letter was served on the applicant on 29 March 2005.


4.  The applicant, who is living in Vienna, is a practising lawyer by profession. 5.  The applicant represented a commercial manager in administrative criminal proceedings before the Eisenstadt Municipal Office for alleged violations of the Frozen Food Labelling Decree (Tiefkühlkostkennzeichnungsverordnung – “the FFLD”). Referring to charges brought by the Vienna Food Inspection Agency (Lebensmitteluntersuchungsanstalt) concerning two samples of turkey meat, the applicant on 13 March 1996 filed observations, stating that:
“Since the samples taken are not labelled as frozen food (contrary to the attempt to play tricks on my client (Schummelversuch) in the expert opinion underlying the criminal charge), they are not covered by Section 1 § 1 (1) of the FFLD.” 6.  On 11 June 1996 the Vienna Municipal Office requested the Vienna Bar Association to institute proceedings against the applicant, claiming that his serious and unfounded allegations had tarnished the Vienna Food Inspection Agency’s reputation and were incompatible with a lawyer’s professional duties. 7.  Subsequently, on 26 June 1996, the Vienna Bar Association opened disciplinary proceedings against the applicant. 8.  On 3 July 1997 he filed observations, submitting that the Vienna Food Inspection Agency had repeatedly applied an extensive interpretation of the provisions in issue. By suggesting that the authority had attempted to play tricks on his client, he had merely sought to express his doubts as to the authority’s legal opinion “with a nod and a wink”, even though there may have been sufficient grounds for instituting proceedings for abuse of authority. 9.  By decision of 24 March 1999 the Disciplinary Council (Disziplinarrat) of the Vienna Bar Association discontinued the proceedings. It found that, while the applicant’s allegations may have infringed the profession’s honour and reputation, his statements disclosed only a minor degree of culpability, as they had apparently been made in the context of a heated exchange between him and the authority concerned. 10.  On 7 September 1999 the Bar Association prosecutor (Kammeranwalt) appealed. He asserted that the expression “attempt to play tricks on my client”, used by the applicant, insinuated that the authority had been acting fraudulently. 11.  Subsequently, on 16 September 1999, the applicant filed observations in which he repeated his defence, namely that his remarks were not meant to be taken literally. He had resorted to innuendo, alluding to an allegedly unlawful practice on the part of the Vienna Food Inspection Agency. He alleged in particular that the latter used its position to pursue its aims in the field of food inspection policy. 12.  On 14 February 2000 the Appeals Board (Oberste Berufungs- und Disziplinarkommission) granted the prosecutor’s appeal. It quashed the decision of 24 March 1999 and remitted the case to the Disciplinary Council. 13.  Having held an oral hearing, at which the applicant was present, the Disciplinary Council on 6 September 2000 convicted the applicant under Section 9 of the Lawyers Act (Rechtsanwaltsordnung) and, relying on Section 16 of the Disciplinary Act (Disziplinarstatut), issued a written reprimand. Moreover, it ordered the applicant to pay the costs of the proceedings. 14.  The Disciplinary Council held that the applicant had used a defamatory and disparaging expression. Pursuant to Section 9 of the Lawyers Act a lawyer, when defending the interests of his client, was entitled to address the perceived incorrectness of any official document in an appropriate manner. The applicant’s statement had transgressed the limits of acceptable conduct. In the submissions at issue he had failed to indicate any facts or circumstances which would have justified the use of the expression “attempt to play tricks on my client”. The applicant would have been free to institute proceedings for abuse of authority (Amtsmißbrauch), had there been grounds for such a suspicion. In conclusion, the Disciplinary Council found that the applicant had infringed the profession’s honour and reputation. 15.  On 15 December 2000 the applicant lodged an appeal against the decision and on 17 January 2001 the Bar Association prosecutor submitted his observations in reply. 16.  Following another oral hearing, the Appeals Board dismissed the applicant’s appeal on 7 May 2001. It confirmed that the applicant had transgressed the limits laid down in Section 9 of the Lawyers Act. The impugned statement had been defamatory and had disparaged the staff of the Vienna Food Inspection Agency. Since that statement had been made in writing, it had been well-considered. Therefore, it could not be said that the applicant had acted with a minor degree of culpability. 17.  On 2 August 2001 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof). He complained, inter alia, that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention, submitting that the Food Inspection Agency’s charges against his client had been objectively wrong. By using the impugned expression, he had merely sought to emphasise his argument. 18.  By decision of 21 June 2004 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint. It found that the interference complained of had served the aim of maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary and that the disciplinary authorities had duly balanced the applicant’s rights under the Convention against the profession’s interest in safeguarding its standards of professional duties. Hence, they had given ample reasons why there had been no violation of the applicant’s right to freedom of expression. The decision was served on the applicant on 23 July 2004.


9.  The applicant was born in 1956 in Algeria, where he currently lives. 10.  The applicant arrived in France with his parents in 1960. He has six brothers and sisters, all of whom were born in France and have French nationality. 11.  On 13 April 1982 he was convicted of burglary and handling stolen goods by the Lyons Criminal Court. He was given an eight-month suspended prison sentence and was ordered to pay a fine of 1,200 French francs (FRF). 12.  On 24 April 1984 he was sentenced by the Lyons tribunal de grande instance to six months' imprisonment for burglary. The court also activated the suspended sentence he had been given previously. On 28 June 1984 the Lyons Court of Appeal upheld the activation of the suspended sentence, which was the only point on which the applicant had appealed. 13.  On 6 December 1988 the Lyons tribunal de grande instance sentenced the applicant to fourteen months' imprisonment and ordered his permanent exclusion from French territory for offences under the legislation on dangerous drugs. 14.  On 15 April 1989 the applicant married a French national. The marriage was dissolved on 28 January 1993. He has one daughter, who was born in 1983. 15.  On 27 April 1989 the Lyons Court of Appeal raised the sentence to four years' imprisonment and upheld the permanent exclusion order for offences under the legislation on dangerous drugs. It noted in particular that the applicant had been arrested on his arrival at the home of a drug-addicted prostitute and had been in possession of a small bag containing 100 grams of heroin, which the police laboratory described as being “of good quality”. The court moreover considered that the applicant could not have been unaware that he had been acting as intermediary between a supplier and his principal client and accordingly that he had possessed, transported and dealt in heroin. It concluded that his role in such deals had been confirmed by the discovery at his home of precision scales and lactose.
The Court of Appeal further found that, at the material time, the applicant had been on day release from prison and that he had preferred to act as intermediary between a drug supplier and his clients rather than doing a job that he had abandoned for the past month. It held that “the conduct of this foreign national, who present[ed] a risk to public safety and health, [was] incompatible with his continued presence in France”. 16.  On 7 June 1990 the Court of Cassation declared that his right to appeal on points of law was forfeit. 17.  On 22 October 1992 the Lyons Criminal Court tried fifteen individuals on drugs offences.
It noted that during a search of the applicant's home investigators had found four small transparent plastic bags containing traces of white powder, a book of matches on which a number of accounts were noted, twenty syringes and a spoon with a blackened underside, two forged identity cards and a forged driving licence. On the basis of various statements, including that of the applicant's wife, and the results of telephone tapping and shadowing, the court concluded that the applicant had played a key role as a supplier in the drug trafficking.
The court ordered the applicant to serve prison sentences of six years for the drugs offence, three months for forgery of administrative documents and two months for residing in France in breach of an exclusion order. 18.  In 1994 the applicant was diagnosed as suffering from active chronic hepatitis. 19.  In a judgment of 6 June 1996, the Lyons Court of Appeal dismissed an application by the applicant for the lifting of the exclusion order. It noted that the applicant had had five convictions between 13 April 1982 and 22 October 1992, with prison sentences ranging from two months to six years, and that the offences of which he had been convicted on 27 April 1989 concerned heroin deliveries, including one of 100 grams of very high-quality heroin, and had been committed while he was on day release from prison. The court also found that the authenticity of the applicant's marriage to a French national had not been confirmed by the slightest evidence, and that the order for his removal did not constitute a disproportionate interference with his rights under Article 8 of the Convention. 20.  On 8 December 1997 the Minister of the Interior issued a deportation order in respect of the applicant. An appeal by the applicant to the Lyons Administrative Court was dismissed on 16 December 1998. 21.  On 9 August 1999 the applicant was released from prison and taken into administrative detention pending his removal from France. 22.  On 11 August 1999 the prefect ordered the applicant's removal to Algeria. 23.  On 13 August 1999 the applicant lodged an application with the Administrative Court seeking the annulment and stay of execution of that order, together with a request for its immediate suspension. 24.  On 16 August 1999 the Administrative Court dismissed the request for immediate suspension, finding that
“it is not apparent from the evidence, and in particular from the medical certificate produced by [the applicant], that his state of health entails a short-term imperative need for the treatment of hepatitis C with two associated drugs that are not currently available in Algeria; accordingly, [the applicant] is not justified in seeking the suspension of execution of the decision taken by the prefect of the département of Isère ordering his removal to that country”. 25.  On 16 August 1999 the applicant applied for asylum, which was denied on 18 August 1999 by the OFPRA (French authority for the protection of refugees and stateless persons) on the ground that “his application, which was not lodged in a timely manner, [did] not contain any established or individual elements to substantiate the merits of his fears of persecution by the current Algerian authorities”. 26.  A doctor serving as a public-health inspector for the health and social services department for the département of Rhône sent two letters to the prefect of the Rhône-Alpes region on 13 and 18 August 1999. In the first of those letters the doctor stated, inter alia:
“I observe that Mr Aoulmi has not produced any medical documents subsequent to January 1998, that he has not asked to see a doctor since his arrival at the detention centre and that he is not currently undergoing any treatment. I am thus entitled to consider that his current state of health is of no immediate cause for concern.
The medical certificate mentions that Mr Aoulmi's state of health may justify treatment involving a combination of interferon and ribavirin; ...
I have contacted the laboratory ... which produces ribavirin. According to the information I received, ribavirin is not yet available on the Algerian market. The drug may be imported with the authorisation of the Algerian Ministry of Health further to a request by the central pharmacy of Algiers Hospital. A procedure has been initiated with a view to exporting the molecule to Algeria. ...” 27.  In his second letter the doctor indicated:
“I refer to the second medical certificate that you sent to me, for my opinion, concerning the state of health of Mr Rachid Aoulmi, issued by Lyon-Sud Hospital on 13 July 1999.
Supplementing the previous certificate that you brought to my attention, this second certificate confirms that Mr Rachid Aoulmi's medical condition may be treated with a combination of interferon and ribavirin. The indications on the certificate concerning the availability of ribavirin in Algeria do not correspond to those given to me verbally by the laboratory ...
I should point out that ribavirin is available in France under temporary authorisation (ATU – autorisation temporaire d'utilisation) for use in hospital pharmacies alone and that the marketing authorisation (AMM – autorisation de mise sur le marché) is to be issued shortly.” 28.  On 19 August 1999 the applicant was put on a boat for Algeria. 29.  On 13 December 2000 the Lyons Administrative Court set aside the prefect's removal order of 11 August 1999, holding as follows:
“It is apparent from the evidence and in particular from the medical certificate issued by the prison hospital and health-care service on 13 July 1999, as produced by the applicant, that he suffers from hepatitis C. His state of health is such that he requires imperative treatment with two associated drugs, interferon and ribavirin, which were not available in Algeria on the date of the impugned decision. Accordingly, having regard to the exceptionally serious consequences that the measure taken against him may entail, the decision by the prefect of the département of Isère whereby Algeria was designated as the country to which Mr Aoulmi was to be removed in execution of the deportation order issued against him on 10 April 1988 must be set aside.”
That judgment was irrevocable. 30.  On 17 June 2003 the applicant's lawyer indicated that his client had encountered difficulties in obtaining a passport. The lawyer enclosed with his letter an attestation to that effect issued on 5 February 2003 by the chief of Bejaia district. 31.  On 13 October 2003 the applicant's lawyer explained that his client could not return to France because the Algerian authorities would not issue him with a passport and he could not obtain a laissez-passer from the French authorities. He added that, according to the information he had received through the applicant's family, his health was continuing to decline and he had not been receiving the necessary medical treatment. 32.  In a letter of 5 November 2003 he provided the Court with a copy of the visa refusal issued by the French Consulate-General in Algiers on 13 October 2003. 33.  According to a medical certificate issued by an Algerian doctor on 31 July 2005, the applicant is suffering from the following complaints:
“ulcer-related condition, only treatable with omeprazole,
erythematous gastropathy, intestinal functional disorder and chronic constipation,
chronic viral hepatitis type C, for which interferon was prescribed in France some ten years ago and which has not been treated or checked for about ten years.” 34.  On 11 August 1999 the President of the Third Section decided to indicate to the Government, pursuant to Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, that it was desirable in the interests of the parties and the proper conduct of the proceedings before the Court not to expel the applicant to Algeria prior to the forthcoming meeting of the appropriate Chamber on 24 August 1999. Under Rule 49 § 2 (a) the Government were also requested to submit information, in particular concerning treatment available in Algeria. 35.  The competent authorities decided to stay the execution of the removal until 16 August 1999 in order to obtain an expert medical opinion (see paragraph 27 above). 36.  On 19 August 1999 the applicant was removed to Algeria. 37.  On 20 August 1999 the Government submitted answers to the questions put to them. 38.  The applicant's representative submitted his answers on 24 September 1999. 39.  On 9 November 1999 the Court decided to request the Government to submit their observations on the admissibility and merits of the application, and on the fact that the applicant had been expelled notwithstanding the application of Rule 39. 40.  The Government submitted their observations on 3 February 2000 and those of the applicant's representative were submitted on 23 March 2000. 41.  On 9 September 2003 the Court decided to adjourn its examination of the case pending the Grand Chamber judgment in Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey ([GC], nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, ECHR 2005‑I). 42.  On 10 May 2005 the Court requested the parties to provide information about the applicant's state of health, his administrative situation, and any action taken further to the Administrative Court's judgment of 13 December 2000. They were also requested to address once again the possibility of a breach of Article 34 of the Convention, in the light of the Mamatkulov and Askarov judgment (cited above), which had been delivered on 4 February 2005. 43.  The parties submitted their observations on 26 September 2005.


6.  The applicants are:
1) Ms Zayra Benuyeva, born in 1951,
2) Ms Kheda Benuyeva, born in 1985,
3) Ms Razet Benuyeva, born in 1976,
4) Ms Larisa Benuyeva, born in 1977,
5) Ms Khava Benuyeva, born in 1994,
6) Ms Rezida Benuyeva, born in 1982,
7) Mr Saydmagomed Benuyev, born in 1986,
8) Mr Zelimkhan Benuyev, born in 1989,
9) Mr Magomed Zhanalayev, born in 1941,
10) Ms Lula Zhanalayeva, born in 1951,
11) Ms Billant Musayeva, born in 1975,
12) Ms Kheda Zhanalayeva, born in 1979,
13) Mr Denis Zhanalayev, born in 1971,
14) Mr Ilyas Zhanalayev, born in 1983, and
15) Mr Imam Zhanalayev, born in 1993. 7.  The applicants live in the Chechen Republic. The third applicant lives in the town of Urus-Martan. The twelfth applicant lives in the village of Grushevoye, the Urus-Martan District. The other applicants live in the village of Martan-Chu, the Urus-Martan District. 8.  The first applicant was married to Mr Mumad Benuyev, born in 1951. The couple were the parents of the second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth applicants, and of Mr Sayd-Selim Benuyev, born in 1982. Mumad Benuyev died in 2005. 9.  The ninth and tenth applicants are the parents of the eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth applicants, and of Mr Abu Zhanalayev, born in 1973. 10.  Abu Zhanalayev and his parents lived at 31 Pervomayskaya Street, in the village of Martan-Chu. Their house shared a courtyard with three other houses belonging to their relatives, including that of Mr Khasmagomed Dzhanalayev, Abu Zhanalayev's uncle. 11.  In the evening of 24 November 2002 around twelve armed men wearing masks entered Khasmagomed Dzhanalayev's house without identifying themselves and started searching it. They asked if someone named Ayup lived there; Khasmagomed Dzhanalayev replied in the negative. 12.  In the meantime, other armed men searched the houses of two other relatives of the Zhanalayevs. Abu Zhanalayev's house was not searched. 13.  At some point the armed men decided to leave Khasmagomed Dzhanalayev's house. In the courtyard they met Abu Zhanalayev and ordered him to produce his identity papers. Abu Zhanalayev asked his uncle to bring the papers. Khasmagomed Dzhanalayev went to the Zhanalayevs' house and told the tenth applicant about the armed men; then they took Abu's identity papers and rushed to the courtyard. They saw no trace of Abu Zhanalayev or the armed men and noticed a UAZ vehicle driving away from their courtyard.
(b)  Abduction of Sayd-Selim Benuyev 14.  In the evening of 24 November 2002 Sayd-Selim Benuyev, his parents, siblings and other relatives were at their family home at 24 Pervomayskaya Street, in Martan-Chu. It appears that on that night there was a blackout in the village as the electricity had been cut off. 15.  At about 9 p.m. around twelve armed men wearing camouflage uniforms and armed with machine guns burst into the Benuyevs' house. All but four of them wore masks; those that were unmasked had Slavic features. The armed men spoke unaccented Russian. The Benuyev family inferred that the armed men belonged to the Russian military. 16.  The servicemen locked the first applicant in one of the rooms. Then they forced Mumad Benuyev to the floor and asked him where his sons were. Then they asked for Sayd-Selim Benuyev. When Sayd-Selim identified himself, the servicemen kicked and beat him and his father with machine gun butts until the two Benuyev men started to bleed. The servicemen also beat the second applicant. 17.  At some point the servicemen put a sack on Sayd-Selim Benuyev's head and took him barefoot into the street. The first applicant saw two UAZ vehicles parked near her house. The seventh applicant pointed at one of the UAZ vehicles with a flashlight and the first applicant noticed scratches on its right side; the vehicle had an aerial on its roof. The servicemen put Sayd‑Selim Benuyev into the UAZ with the aerial and drove off.
(c)  Subsequent events 18.  Immediately after Abu Zhanalayev's abduction the tenth applicant and Khasmagomed Dzhanalayev followed the UAZ vehicles. A few minutes later they met the first applicant and her brother-in-law. 19.  The relatives of the two abducted men chased the UAZ vehicles in a car. At some point Mr S., a serviceman of the military commander's office, managed to stop their car and told them not to follow the vehicles because they might be shot. Mr S. added that the UAZ vehicles belonged to the department of the interior of the Urus-Martan District (“the ROVD”). 20.  Later, villagers of Martan-Chu saw red and a green flares in the sky. At about 10 p.m. some of them noticed two UAZ vehicles parked next to the military commander's office of Martan-Chu. Five or ten minutes later three military servicemen got out of the vehicles and entered the military commander's office, while a few men walked out of it and got into them. The two vehicles then drove away in the direction of Urus-Martan. 21.  At about 11 p.m. two servicemen, acquaintances of the applicants, saw two UAZ vehicles driving in the direction of Urus-Martan. At some point they contacted other servicemen on duty at several checkpoints via portable radio and found out that the two vehicles had arrived at the ROVD. 22.  On 24 November 2002 Abu Zhanalayev and Sayd-Selim Benuyev were kidnapped from the village of Martan-Chu. 23.  At about 11 p.m. on 24 November 2002 the first and tenth applicants went to the house of Mr M., the head of the ROVD. Mr M.'s bodyguards fired at the two women. They shouted and the firing ceased. Then the first and tenth applicants talked to Mr M. who told them not to worry and to go home. 24.  On 25 November 2002 the first and tenth applicants lodged written complaints about their relatives' abduction with the ROVD, the military commander's office of Urus-Martan, the prosecutor's office of the Urus‑Martan District (“the district prosecutor's office”) and the local administration. 25.  At about 11 a.m. on 26 November 2002 the first and tenth applicants saw two UAZ vehicles without registration numbers leaving the courtyard of the ROVD. They recognised the vehicles by their distinctive marks because one of them had a thick scratch and an aerial and the other one had white oil-cloth replacing broken windows. 26.  On 25 November 2002 the head of the ROVD told the applicants that he had contacted those who had abducted Abu Zhanalayev and Sayd‑Selim Benuyev and had asked them not to use force against the two men. 27.  Trying to establish the fate and whereabouts of their missing sons, the first and tenth applicants repeatedly contacted, in person and in writing, various State agencies and officials requesting assistance in the search for Abu Zhanalayev and Sayd-Selim Benuyev. In particular, they applied to the Russian State Duma, the President of the Chechen Republic, the Administration of the Chechen Republic and the local administration. Most of those complaints were forwarded to prosecutors' offices at different levels. 28.  On 25 November 2002 the tenth applicant complained to the district prosecutor's office about her son's abduction. She mentioned the searches of her relatives' homes. On the same date the first applicant asked the district prosecutor's office to establish her son's whereabouts; she noted that her husband and daughter had been beaten. 29.  On 27 November 2002 the district prosecutor's office instituted an investigation into the disappearance of Abu Zhanalayev and Sayd-Selim Benuyev under Article 126 § 2 of the Russian Criminal Code (aggravated kidnapping). The case was assigned the number 61161. 30.  On 29 November 2002 the local administration of the Urus-Martan District informed the first applicant that her complaint about the beating of Mumad Benuyev and the second applicant, as well as about the arrest of Sayd-Selim Benuyev had been forwarded to the military commander's office. 31.  On 20 December 2002 the prosecutor's office of the Chechen Republic forwarded the tenth applicant's complaint about her son's abduction by State agents to the district prosecutor's office. 32.  On 25 January 2003 the district prosecutor's office granted victim status in case no. 61161 to Mumad Benuyev and Khasmagomed Dzhanalayev. 33.  On 27 January 2003 the district prosecutor's office informed Mumad Benuyev and Khasmagomed Dzhanalayev that the investigation in case no. 61161 had been suspended for failure to identify those responsible. 34.  On 7 April 2003 the first applicant complained to the prosecutor's office of the Chechen Republic that Russian servicemen had abducted her son and beaten her husband and daughter. 35.  On an unspecified date the tenth applicant asked the district prosecutor's office to resume the investigation into her son's kidnapping. On 11 April 2003 the request was declined for the reason that all possible investigative measures had been taken to solve the crime. 36.  On 12 May 2003 the prosecutor's office of the Chechen Republic forwarded the first applicant's complaint to the district prosecutor's office. 37.  On 14 and 16 May 2003 respectively, the district prosecutor's office informed the tenth and first applicants that the investigation in case no. 61161 had been resumed. 38.  On 30 May 2003 the military prosecutor's office of the United Group Alignment forwarded the first applicant's complaint to the military prosecutor's office of military unit no. 20102 (“the unit prosecutor's office”). 39.  On 6 June 2003 the district prosecutor's office informed the first applicant that on 19 May 2003 the investigation in case no. 61161 had been resumed. They also noted that they were verifying whether the vehicles belonging to the ROVD could have been used in the kidnapping. 40.  On 7 June 2003 the unit prosecutor's office forwarded the tenth applicant's complaint to the district prosecutor's office pursuant to jurisdiction rules. 41.  On 7 June 2003 the head of the Department of the Federal Security Service of the Chechen Republic (“the Chechen FSB”) informed the first and tenth applicants that required measures were being taken to establish their sons' whereabouts and that Abu Zhanalayev and Sayd-Selim Benuyev had not been arrested by the Chechen FSB because there had been no legal grounds for their arrest. 42.  On 10 June 2003 the prosecutor's office of the Chechen Republic informed the tenth applicant that the investigation in case no. 61161 had been suspended on 27 January 2003. They also noted that law-enforcement agencies would search for her son more vigorously. 43.  On 19 June 2003 the prosecutor's office of the Chechen Republic asked the district prosecutor's office for an update on progress in the investigation in case no. 61161. 44.  On 7 July 2003 the prosecutor's office of the Chechen Republic informed the first and tenth applicants that the decision on suspension of the investigation had been quashed on 19 May 2003 and that investigative measures were being taken to solve their sons' kidnapping. 45.  On 31 July 2003 the first and tenth applicants asked the district prosecutor's office to update them on the progress of the investigation. 46.  On 8 August 2003 the tenth applicant complained to the prosecutor's office of the Chechen Republic that the district prosecutor's office was taking no action. 47.  On 18 August 2003 the district prosecutor's office informed the applicants that the investigation in case no. 61161 had been suspended on 19 July 2003. 48.  On 25 August 2003 the prosecutor's office of the Chechen Republic informed the first and tenth applicants that the decision on suspension of the investigation in case no. 61161 had been quashed on 20 August 2003 and that investigative measures were being taken to solve the crime. 49.  On 4 September 2003 the first applicant complained to the district prosecutor's office about her son's abduction by Russian servicemen and asked them to take certain investigative measures in order to establish his whereabouts. 50.  On 8 September 2003 the district prosecutor's office informed the first applicant that the investigation in case no. 61161 had been resumed on 20 August 2003 and was under way. 51.  On 30 December 2003 the SRJI asked, on behalf of the applicants, the district prosecutor's office to take certain measures in order to establish the whereabouts of Abu Zhanalayev and Sayd-Selim Benuyev. 52.  On 27 and 30 April 2004 respectively, the district prosecutor's office informed the tenth and first applicants that the investigation in case no. 61161 had been suspended on 20 September 2003 for failure to identify those responsible. 53.  On 23 June 2004 the first and tenth applicants asked the district prosecutor's office to allow them access to the investigation file. 54.  On 26 October 2004 an investigator of the district prosecutor's office told the first and tenth applicants that there was no need to search for Abu Zhanalayev and Sayd-Selim Benuyev as they were most probably dead. 55.  On 19 December 2005 the first and tenth applicants complained about their sons' abduction and the suspension of the criminal investigation to the military commander of the Urus-Martan District. 56.  On 24 January 2007 the first and tenth applicants asked the district prosecutor's office to update them on the progress of the investigation in case no. 61161 and to resume it if it had been suspended. 57.  On 31 January 2007 the district prosecutor's office informed the first and tenth applicants that the investigation had been suspended on 20 September 2003 but that investigative measures were being taken to find their sons and the perpetrators despite the suspension. 58.  On 27 November 2002 the district prosecutor's office instituted an investigation into the kidnapping of Abu Zhanalayev and Sayd-Selim Benuyev in case no. 61161 on the basis of complaints lodged by the first and tenth applicants. 59.  Mumad Benuyev and Khas-Magomed Zhanalayev were granted victim status. 60.  On 15 December 2002 the first applicant was questioned as a witness and stated that on 24 November 2002 around twelve armed men wearing camouflage uniforms and masks had arrived in two UAZ-469 vehicles at her house; one of the vehicles had been khaki with an aerial on its roof and a dent on its right door. The armed men had beaten the first applicant's husband, the second applicant and two other relatives. They had demanded that the Benuyevs produce identity papers; while Sayd-Selim Benuyev had been trying to reach for his papers, they had captured him and dragged him outside, put a plastic bag over his head and taken him away. Sayd-Selim Benuyev had not participated in illegal armed groups. 61.  On 16 December 2002 Mumad Benuyev was questioned and made a statement identical to that of the first applicant. He noted that the UAZ vehicles had been grey and khaki. 62.  On 16 December 2002 Khas-Magomed Zhanalayev was questioned as a witness and stated that on 24 November 2002 Abu Zhanalayev had stepped out of his house and encountered armed men who had demanded to see his identity papers. Abu Zhanalayev had asked Khas-Magomed Zhanalayev to bring the papers from his house. While Khas-Magomed Zhanalayev had been absent, Abu Zhanalayev had been taken away by the armed men in a UAZ-469 vehicle. Abu Zhanalayev had not participated in illegal armed groups. 63.  On an unspecified date the first applicant was again questioned. She stated that the armed men in camouflage uniforms had beaten her guests who had arrived to attend a neighbour's wedding. There had been around twelve armed men, they had all been tall. Four of them had not been masked and one armed man had had red hair and a beard. 64.  On 24 January 2003 the department of the interior of the Vedenskiy District established that Abu Zhanalayev and Sayd-Selim Benuyev had not been kept in temporary detention facilities and that their dead bodies had not been found. 65.  On 22 May 2003 the investigators requested information on vehicles used by the ROVD between 10 November 2002 and 25 May 2003 from the head of the ROVD. According to the reply received, the ROVD owned twenty-eight vehicles, none of which was an UAZ-469. 66.  On 8 July 2003 an ROVD officer questioned the second applicant and Mr U., a relative of the Benuyevs. They both stated that at about 11 p.m. on 24 November 2002 armed men speaking Russian had arrived at their house in two UAZ vehicles – one grey and one khaki – and had taken away Sayd-Selim Benuyev. 67.  On 14 September 2003 ROVD officers presented seven UAZ vehicles used by the ROVD for the first applicant to identify. She did not recognise any of those as the vehicle used by her son's kidnappers. 68.  On 20 September 2003 the investigation into the kidnapping was suspended for failure to identify those responsible. 69.  The investigation into the kidnapping of Abu Zhanalayev and Sayd‑Selim Benuyev was repeatedly suspended and then resumed. The proceedings were pending and the required investigative measures were being taken to solve the crime. 70.  Despite specific requests from the Court, the Government refrained from disclosing most of the documents from the investigation file in case no. 61161, except for copies of the decision to institute the investigation, transcripts of witness interviews, a record of the first and tenth applicants' identification of UAZ vehicles and the court judgments of 18 March and 6 April 2005. Relying on information obtained from the Prosecutor General's Office, the Government stated that the investigation was in progress and that disclosure of the documents would be in violation of Article 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure since the file contained information of a military nature and personal data concerning witnesses or other participants in the criminal proceedings. 71.  On 14 April 2003 the first applicant complained to the Urus-Martan District Court that the district prosecutor's office was taking no action in case no. 61161. It is unclear whether the complaint has been examined. 72.  On 28 December 2004 the first and tenth applicants challenged the lawfulness of the decision on suspension of the proceedings of 20 September 2003 before the Urus-Martan District Court. 73.  On 27 January 2005 the Urus-Martan District Court upheld the decision arguing that the district prosecutor's office had taken all the required investigative measures. The applicants appealed. 74.  On 16 February 2005 the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic allowed the first and tenth applicants' appeal, quashed the judgment of 27 January 2005 and remitted the case for fresh examination at the first instance. 75.  On 18 March 2005 the Urus-Martan District Court again dismissed the first and tenth applicants' complaint reproducing the reasoning of the judgment of 27 January 2005 verbatim. 76.  On 6 April 2005 the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic upheld the judgment of 18 March 2005.


4.  Between 5 July and 27 December 1991 the applicant worked as a manager of a joint stock company (“the employer”). On 7 February 1992 he was dismissed by the employer’s disciplinary commission, a decision which was confirmed by the executive board on 17 March 1992. 5. On 23 March 1992 the applicant brought an action against the employer to annul his dismissal and for his reinstatement as a manager. 6. On 16 June 1992 the then Štip Municipal Court (Општински Суд Штип) dismissed his claim. 7. On 25 January 1993 the then Štip District Court (Окружен Суд Штип) upheld his appeal of 19 November 1992 and remitted the case for a re-examination. 8.  Of nine hearings scheduled before the first-instance court, none was adjourned at the applicant’s request. 9. On 29 December 1993 the then Municipal Court dismissed his claim. That decision was upheld by then District Court’s decision of 30 March 1994 dismissing his appeal of 10 February 1994. 10. On 30 May 1994 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law (ревизија) which was granted by the Supreme Court’s decision of 20 December 1995. On 22 February 1996 the then District Court again upheld the first-instance decision of 29 December 1993. 11. On 17 April 1996 the applicant submitted a fresh appeal on points of law before the Supreme Court. On 20 November 1997 the Supreme Court quashed both the first- and second-instance decisions and remitted the case for a renewed examination. It ruled that the lower courts had erroneously established that the employer’s meeting of shareholders (собрание на акционери) and the strike board (штрајкувачки одбор) had discharged the applicant as the employer’s manager prior to the disciplinary commission having given the dismissal decision (see paragraph 4 above). According to the minutes of their meeting of 27 December 1991, they had only voted against him, but had left the matter to be decided by the disciplinary commission. 12. On 29 May 1998 the applicant requested the removal of the first-instance judge for bias. On 3 June 1998 the President of the Štip Court of First Instance dismissed that request as unsubstantiated. 13. According to the information submitted by the parties, none of the six hearings fixed by the first-instance court was adjourned at the applicant’s request. 14. On 17 December 1998 the Štip Court of First Instance annulled the 1992 dismissal order finding that it was not given by an authorised body. However, it dismissed the applicant’s claim for his reinstatement to a post corresponding to his qualifications since bankruptcy proceedings had been meanwhile launched against the employer. The employer’s receiver (стечаен управник) could decide the reinstatement issue. 15. On 29 December 1999 the Court of Appeal quashed this decision as incoherent and ordered a retrial arguing that the lower court had erred in establishing the facts concerning the body competent to decide on the dismissal. 16. After three hearings being fixed, on 24 April 2001 the Štip Court of First Instance dismissed the applicant’s claims finding that: he was discharged as the employer’s manager by the executive board on 27 December 1991; under an application for disciplinary proceedings submitted by the strike board, the newly appointed manager requested the disciplinary commission to dismiss him for having committed serious work-related violations, which was actually done by the commission’s decision of 7 February 1992; and the executive board dismissed his objection by decision of 17 March 1992. The court therefore concluded that the applicant’s claims were ill-founded. This decision was given by another first-instance judge. On 29 November 2001 the Court of Appeal upheld this decision. 17. On 21 January 2002 the applicant submitted an appeal on points of law before the Supreme Court arguing that the lower courts had wrongly established and assessed the facts. 18.  The applicant died on 31 October 2002. 19. On 11 September 2003 the Supreme Court finally dismissed his appeal finding that the lower courts had properly established the facts and correctly applied the national law. According to a note written on the slip receipt, on 3 December 2003 there was an unsuccessful attempt to serve this decision due to the applicant’s death. The applicant’s successors maintained that they learnt about this decision only on 29 July 2004 when they received the Government’s observations. The Government did not contest that assertion. 20. During the proceedings, the applicant applied several times to the first-instance court to expedite the proceedings. His requests for priority treatment submitted before the Supreme Court were refused. He also notified the State Judicial Council about the protracted length of the proceedings.