4.  The applicant was born in 1917 and lives in the town of Ternopil. 5.  In 1989 her husband and son, Mr B.P. and Mr B.I., became members of the Cooperative Society for Construction and Repair “Kooperator” (the “Society”). On 22 May 1990 the Ternopil Town Executive Committee (the “Committee”) transferred two plots of land in Ternopil to the Society for the construction of three houses. By decision of 14 November 1990, the Committee transferred a part of that land to the applicant's husband and son for the erection of a two-flat house. On 27 November 1990 the general assembly of the Society adopted a decision similar to the Committee's decision of 14 November 1990. On an unspecified date the Committee transferred the land, with which Mr B.P. and Mr B.I. had been provided, back to the Society. 6.  On 2 December 1991 the general assembly of the Society, headed by Mr B.I., decided to terminate the Society's activity. It further decided to transfer the Society's property to its members. In particular, Mr B.P. was granted the left side of a house and Mr B.I. was granted its right side. As it was later established by the domestic courts, in 1991 there was only the foundation of the future house. In December 1991 the Society closed its bank account. The Society's state registration was annulled in September 1995. 7.  The house was erected by autumn 1994. 8.  Between 1995 and 1997 Mr B.P. unsuccessfully lodged with the Ternopil Town Council (the “Council”) a number of applications, requesting the Council to grant him a right to use the plot of land on which the left part of the house had been constructed. 9.  On 17 February 1997 Mr B.P. died. The applicant inherited all his possessions. 10.  On 8 April 1997 the Council granted Mr B.I. a right to use the plot of land on which the right side of the house had been built. 11.  In June 1997 the applicant lodged with the Ternopil Town Court an administrative law complaint against the Council for failure to consider the request to grant her a right to use the plot of land on which the left part of the house had been constructed. On 9 July 1997 the court found in favour of the applicant and ordered the Council to consider the merits of the applicant's request at its next session. 12.  On 23 July 1997 the Council granted Mr M. a right to use the plot of land, on which the left side of the house had been built, for construction purposes. 13.  In 1996 Mr M. lodged with the Ternopil Regional Prosecutor's Office a criminal law complaint against Mr B.I., accusing the latter of fraud. Mr M. alleged that Mr B.I. had unlawfully attempted to take possession of the left part of the house, which Mr M. had bought from him according to a sales contract of 18 March 1993. On 9 July 1996 the prosecutors initiated criminal proceedings against Mr B.I. 14.  In 1997 Mr B.I. lodged with the Ternopil Regional Security Service Department a criminal law complaint, accusing Mr M. of fraud. Mr B.I. alleged that Mr M. had falsified the official documents in respect of the left part of the house in order to become its owner. On 13 March 1997 the department initiated criminal proceedings against Mr M. 15.  On 25 May 1997 both criminal cases were joined. On 15 July 1997 the Ternopil Town Police Department terminated the criminal proceedings on the ground of absence of corpus delicti in the actions of Mr B.I. and Mr M. The police established that Mr M. had not been a member of the Society in 1991. It also found that there were two different copies of the decision of the general assembly of the Society of 2 December 1991, one of which confirmed the membership of Mr M. and contained his name instead of the name of Mr B.P., the latter being mentioned in the other copy of that decision. The police held that the existence of two different versions was of no importance, as none of the copies had been duly certified by a notary. It further stated that, according to the expert examination of the sales contract of 18 March 1993, the contract had been forged by way of combination of two printed texts. The police also found that the contract had no binding force, as it had not been certified by a notary or by the Society. 16.  In July 1997 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Ternopil Town Court against the Council, seeking the annulment of the latter's decision of 23 July 1997 to grant Mr M. a right to use the plot of land, on which the left side of the house had been built. She further requested the court to oblige the Council to grant her a right to use the plot of land under the left side of the house for an indefinite period of time. The applicant was represented in the proceedings by her son, Mr B. I. Mr M. joined the proceedings as a third party. 17.  In the course of the proceedings, the applicant submitted that her late husband had been the owner of the left part of the house, which had been constructed on the plot of land at issue, as he had been granted that part of the house pursuant to the decision of the Society of 2 December 1991. After her husband's death she inherited his property, including the left part of the house. The construction works were carried out at her and her late husband's expense. She further argued that, although her son had initially agreed to sell the part of the house to Mr M., the latter had refused to pay the price, upon which they had agreed. Thus, the left part of the house was not sold to Mr M. 18.  Mr M., in his turn, argued that in 1993 he had bought from Mr B.I. the foundation of the left part of the house and some construction materials, which formally belonged to Mr B. P. Mr M. further argued that they had agreed that Mr B. I. would complete the construction works. The latter having failed to do so, Mr M. built the left part of the house at his own cost. Between 1993 and 1994, Mr M. paid Mr B. I. around USD 10,000[1] by instalments. Following this, Mr M. refused to pay Mr B. I. higher amounts, as he had completed the construction works himself. Mr M. submitted copies of two documents dated 20 January 1995, according to which Mr B. I. had received from Mr M. 1,550,000,000 karbovanets (the former transitional currency of Ukraine before September 1996) for the left part of the house and that the latter had built that part of the house and reimbursed the money, which Mr B. I. had paid for the construction materials. Mr M. alleged that Mr B. I. had signed these documents as the head of the Society. 19.  The applicant, in reply, contended that the documents, submitted by Mr M. in support of his claim that he had constructed the house and that he had purchased it, including the contract of 1993, had been forged. Referring to the general interpretation of the relevant domestic law given by the Plenum of the Supreme Court of Ukraine, she further argued that, even assuming that Mr M. had participated in the construction of the left part of the house, he could not claim ownership rights in its respect. 20.  The Council submitted that its decision of 23 July 1997 was lawful, as Mr M. had provided it with the documents which had proved that he had constructed the left part of the house. 21.  On 27 August 1997 the Ternopil Town Court found for the applicant and quashed the Council's decision of 23 July 1997. It further ordered the Council to grant the applicant the right to use the land at issue for an indefinite period of time. The court held that Mr M. had not qualified to be granted that right, as he had not been a member of the Society and there was no information in the notary's register that the Society had transferred the plot of land in question to him. 22.  The Council appealed in cassation. 23.  On 29 September 1997 the Ternopil Regional Court informed the Supreme Court of Ukraine about the Council's request for the case to be transferred to another court. The Council alleged that the applicant's son was a member of the family of one of the judges of the Ternopil Regional Court. On 7 October 1997 the Supreme Court ordered that the appeal in cassation against the first instance court's decision was to be heard by the Khmelnytsk Regional Court, instead of the Ternopil Regional Court. The applicant was not informed either about the Council's request or about the decision of the Supreme Court to reassign the case. 24.  On 20 November 1997 the Khmelnytsk Regional Court upheld the decision of 27 August 1997. 25.  On 10 April 1998 the Deputy Prosecutor of the Khmelnytsk Region lodged a protest with the Presidium of the Khmelnytsk Regional Court, seeking initiation of supervisory review proceedings in the applicant's case. On 27 April 1998 the Presidium allowed the protest, quashed the decisions of 27 August and 20 November 1997, and remitted the case for a fresh consideration to the Ternopil Town Court. It held that the courts had failed to examine all the circumstances of the case. In particular, they had disregarded the sales contract of 1993 and the receipts for the money paid by Mr M. pursuant to that contract. The Presidium emphasised that there was no evidence in the case file that Mr B.P. had been a member of the Society. It also noted that there had been no building at the time when the Society had decided to transfer its part to Mr B. P. Moreover, the parties failed to submit documentary evidence in support of their claims for ownership rights. 26.  On 22 June 1998 the Supreme Court ordered the Ternopil Town Court to transfer the case to the Khmelnytsk Regional Court, the latter being responsible for selecting a first instance court to reconsider the case. According to the Government, the Ternopil Town Court did not comply with the instructions of the Supreme Court and did not transfer the case. 27.  On 3 July 1998 the Ternopil Town Court found for the applicant. On 25 August 1998 the Ternopil Regional Court upheld the decision of the first instance court. The courts of both instances held that there was enough evidence that Mr B.P. had been a member of the Society. This fact had been established by the Ternopil Town Court in its judgment of 9 July 1997, which had not been appealed against and had become final, and the applicant could not be held responsible for the absence of other documents proving the membership of her deceased husband. The courts also held that the decision of the general assembly of the Society of 2 December 1991 had, in fact, provided for the transfer of certain objects situated on the plot of land at issue, i.e. the foundation and some construction materials, erroneously referring to them as a building. With regard to the sales contract of 1993, the courts stated that Mr B.I. had not been entitled to sell the left part of the house, irrespective of whether he had acted in his capacity as the head of the Society or as a private person. They also referred to the findings of the police of 15 July 1997 that the contract had been falsified. Similarly, they found that the documents submitted by Mr M., in particular a copy of the decision of the general assembly of the Society of 2 December 1991, stating that he had been one of its members and had been granted the left part of the building, and the receipts in respect of the construction expenses were not valid. In any event, a contribution to the construction expenses could not be a valid ground for an ownership claim. 28.  By letter of 12 October 1998, the Deputy President of the Supreme Court requested the Ternopil Town Court to send the case file to the Supreme Court for supervisory review. By the same letter, he informed the Ternopil Town Court and Mr M. that the execution of the judgment of 3 July 1998 was suspended. 29.  On 22 December 1998 the Deputy President of the Supreme Court lodged a protest with the Chamber in Civil Cases of that court, seeking the initiation of supervisory review proceedings in the applicant's case. On 24 March 1999 the panel of three judges of the Supreme Court allowed the protest, quashed the decisions of 3 July and 25 August 1998, and remitted the case for a fresh consideration. It held that there was no evidence that the left part of the house was owned by either the Society or Mr B.P. Moreover, there was no information as to the latter's membership of that Society, and the lower courts had not verified whether the house had been erected by him in compliance with relevant regulations. The panel further stated that the first instance court had failed to take into consideration the written testimonies of the persons, who had participated in the construction of the house. It stressed that its findings should be taken into account in the new consideration of the case. 30.  On 25 August 1999 the Ternopil Town Court found for the applicant. The court for the most part reiterated the findings contained in the decision of 3 July 1998. It also held that the Society had been the owner of every construction object on the land at issue before it transferred the title to these objects to its members, including Mr B.P. On 28 September 1999 the Ternopil Regional Court upheld the decision of 25 August 1999. 31.  On 6 June 2000 the Deputy President of the Supreme Court lodged a protest with the Chamber in Civil Cases of that court, seeking again the initiation of supervisory review proceedings in the applicant's case. On 5 July 2000 the panel of three judges of the Supreme Court allowed the protest, quashed the decisions of 25 August and 28 September 1999, and remitted the case for a fresh consideration. It held that the lower courts had failed to take into account the instructions contained in its decision of 24 March 1999. The panel reiterated that the first instance court had failed either to verify whether the Society had been the owner of the objects in question; whether the Society had been in fact liquidated and, if so, when it had been liquidated; whether the Society had been granted a construction permit; or to establish who had actually constructed the part of the house at issue. The panel found that the Society had not had authority to transfer the land to third parties and its members had not had rights to build houses on that land. It finally held that Mr M. had in fact obtained the plot of land at issue as well as all the documentation in respect of the left part of the house, which remained in his actual possession. 32.  On 9 October 2000 the Supreme Court, following the request of Mr M., invited the Khmelnytsk Regional Court to assign the case to one of the first instance courts in the Khmelnytsk region. On 1 November 2000 the regional court transferred the case to the Chemerovetsk Town Court. 33.  In November 2000 Mr M. lodged a counter claim, seeking recognition of his ownership rights in respect of the left part of the house. 34.  On 19 January 2001 the Chemerovetsk Town Court ruled in favour of Mr M. and rejected the applicant's claims. It held that Mr M. had lawfully bought the foundation of the left part of the building and had completed the construction himself, which was supported by the evidence examined in the proceedings. In particular, the court stated that the contract of 1993 was valid, as it had been seized by the police from the flat of Mr M. in 1997, and the two documents of 20 January 1995 were, according to the expert's conclusions, also valid. The court further noted that the written testimonies, certified by a notary, of 16 witnesses, who had carried out construction works, and Mr D., who had been heard by the court as a witness, confirmed that Mr M. had built the left part of the house at his own cost. The court also relied on the letter of 28 February 1996, submitted by Mr M., in which the Ternopil Regional Prosecutor's Office stated that, according to the conclusions of its inquiry into the matter, the left part of the house was built by Mr M. The court also found that the latter was in actual possession of that part of the house, as he had been paying all the communal charges in its respect. The court refused to admit as evidence copies of the bills of costs in respect of construction materials, submitted by the applicant, on the ground that it was not possible to establish whether these construction materials had been used to build the left part of the house. 35.  On 16 February 2001 the applicant requested the Supreme Court to transfer the case to another court on the grounds that it would be difficult for her to participate in the hearings before the Chemerovetsk Town Court with regard to her age and state of health, on one hand, and the distance between her place of residence and the place of the hearing, on the other. On 25 February 2001 the Supreme Court rejected her request as unsubstantiated. 36.  On 1 March 2001 the Khmelnytsk Regional Court upheld the decision of 19 January 2001. It also considered that Mr B.P. had not been a member of the Society, as there were no documents proving his membership and he had resided in another location. 37.  In the course of the proceedings before the Chemerovetsk Town Court and the Khmelnytsk Regional Court, the applicant requested the courts to summon the witnesses, on whose written statements Mr M. had relied to show that he had constructed the left part of the building. She argued that these testimonies were false and that some of these witnesses could confirm her submissions that certain construction works had been carried out at her and her late husband's expense. The courts did not reply to her request. 38.  In September 2001 the applicant lodged an appeal in cassation against the decisions of 19 January and 1 March 2001 under the new transitional cassation procedure. She complained of the lower courts' incorrect assessment of the evidence. The applicant also argued that the courts had refused to summon the witnesses on whose written testimonies they had relied in their decisions. She maintained that neither she nor her representative had had an opportunity to question these witnesses. 39.  On 22 August 2002 the Chamber in Civil Cases of the Supreme Court considered the merits of the applicant's appeal in cassation and rejected it. The Supreme Court held that Mr M. had lawfully purchased a part of the foundation of the building and had valid grounds to use the plot of land on which the left part of the building had been constructed. The court also held that the written statements of the witnesses, confirming that Mr M. had completed the construction, had been lawfully admitted as evidence in the case. 40.  In 2002 the applicant and Mr B. I. instituted another set of proceedings in the Ternopil Town Court against Mr M., two other members of the family of Mr M., and the Ternopil Town Council, seeking the annulment of the ownership certificate of Mr M. in respect of the house. The applicant and Mr B. I. also sought the annulment of certain other official documents, in which it was mentioned that Mr M. had built a part of the house. 41.  On 12 November 2002 the court found against the applicant and Mr B. I. On 4 February 2003 and 26 May 2004, respectively, the Ternopil Regional Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the first instance court. 42.  According to the applicant, the courts, which considered her second claim, based their decisions on the findings of the Chemerovetsk Town Court, the Khmelnytsk Regional Court and the Supreme Court of Ukraine made in the course of the first set of civil proceedings (see paragraphs 34, 36 and 39 above).


6.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Volgograd. 7.  On 21 April 2003 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of aggravated murder. 8.  On 23 April 2003 the Elista Town Court of the Kalmykiya Republic formally remanded the applicant in custody, referring to the gravity of the charge and the risk that he might abscond or interfere with the investigation. 9.  On 12 June 2003 the Tsenteralniy District Court of Volgograd extended the applicant’s detention until 10 September 2003, referring to the gravity of the charges and the risk of his absconding, reoffending and interfering with the investigation. 10.  On 8 September 2003 the Tsenteralniy District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 10 December 2003, referring to the gravity of the charges and the complexity of the case. It stated that there was no reason to amend the preventive measure. 11.  On an unspecified date the applicant’s case was joined with the cases of five other persons, who had allegedly acted in conspiracy with the applicant. 12.  In October 2003 the applicant and his co-defendants were charged with organising an armed criminal gang, several counts of aggravated robbery, kidnapping, extortion, infliction of serious injuries and murder. 13.  On 4 December 2003 the Tsenteralniy District Court extended the applicant’s and a co-defendant’s detention until 10 April 2004, referring to the need for an additional investigation and the gravity of the charges. Moreover, the applicant had no permanent place of residence in Volgograd. The court found that there was a risk of the defendants’ absconding or re-offending. 14.  On 12 April 2004 the investigation was completed and six defendants, including the applicant, were committed for trial before the Volgograd Regional Court. 15.  The defendants asked for a trial by jury. 16.  On 20 April 2004 the Volgograd Regional Court fixed a preliminary hearing for 27 April 2004 to examine the request. It further held that the defendants should meanwhile remain in custody. 17.  On 27 April 2004 the Volgograd Regional Court ordered that the defendants be tried by jury and that they remain in custody pending trial. 18.  On 13 October 2004 the Volgograd Regional Court extended the defendants’ detention until 12 January 2005, referring to the gravity of the charges. 19.  On 12 January 2005 the Volgograd Regional Court extended the defendants’ detention, referring to the gravity of the charges and the risk that they might put pressure on witnesses and jurors. 20.  On 7 April 2005 the Volgograd Regional Court extended the defendants’ detention until 12 July 2005. The Regional Court found that, in view of the gravity of the charges, it was “opportune” to keep the defendants in custody. It rejected their requests to release them under an undertaking not to leave the town, since it could not exclude the risk that they would put pressure on witnesses or jurors. 21.  On 29 June 2005 the Volgograd Regional Court extended the defendants’ detention until 12 October 2005. It found that the defendants might interfere with the proceedings, as they were charged with serious criminal offences, including the charge of being members of an armed criminal gang. 22.  On 4 October 2005 the Volgograd Regional Court extended the defendants’ detention until 12 January 2006 for the same reasons as before. 23.  The applicant appealed against the extension order of 4 October 2005. In his grounds of appeal he complained that the Regional Court’s conclusions that he could interfere with the investigation or abscond had been hypothetical and had not been supported by facts. He had a permanent place of residence, a minor daughter and elderly parents, and there was therefore no danger of his absconding. On 8 December 2005 the Supreme Court upheld the extension order on appeal, finding that it had been lawful and justified. 24.  On 22 December 2005 the Volgograd Regional Court extended the defendants’ detention until 12 April 2006 for the same reasons as before. 25.  On 10 April and 5 July 2006 the Volgograd Regional Court extended the defendants’ detention for the same reasons as before. 26.  On 2 October 2006 the Volgograd Regional Court extended the defendants’ detention until 12 January 2007, referring to the gravity of the charges and the defendants’ “characters”. The court also indicated that the purpose of the detention was to eliminate any risk of the defendants’ absconding, re-offending or hampering the court proceedings. 27.  The applicant appealed, claiming that the Regional Court had used a stereotyped formula to justify his detention and that its conclusions that he might abscond, reoffend or interfere with the proceedings were not supported by relevant facts. He referred to his positive references and frail health and submitted that he had a minor child and elderly parents. He also complained that his detention had exceeded a reasonable time. 28.  On 28 December 2006 the Supreme Court upheld the extension order on appeal, finding that it had been lawful, well-reasoned and justified. The defendants were charged with serious criminal offences, and they might therefore abscond, re-offend or obstruct the proceedings. The allegedly excessive length of their detention, their poor health, minor children, elderly parents or permanent place of residence were not sufficient reasons to warrant release. 29.  On 27 December 2006 the Volgograd Regional Court extended the defendants’ detention until 12 April 2007 for the same reasons as before. 30.  On 10 April 2007 the Volgograd Regional Court extended the defendants’ detention until 12 July 2007 for the same reasons as before. 31.  On 9 July 2007 the Volgograd Regional Court extended the defendants’ detention until 12 October 2007, finding that there was no reason to vary the preventive measure. 32.  On 11 October 2007 the Volgograd Regional Court extended the defendants’ detention until 12 January 2008, referring to the gravity of the charges and the risk of absconding or intimidating the witnesses or jurors. 33.  On 9 January 2008 the Volgograd Regional Court extended the defendants’ detention until 12 April 2008 for the same reasons as before. 34.  On 8 April 2008 the Volgograd Regional Court rejected the applicant’s request to be released under an undertaking not to leave the place of residence and extended the defendants’ detention until 12 July 2008. The decision reads as follows:
“As the trial has not yet been completed, it is necessary to extend the defendants’ detention.
The court considers that the gravity of the charges justifies applying to the defendants a preventive measure in the form of detention.
However, in addition to the gravity of the charges - namely the organisation of an armed gang ... and commission of assaults on citizens and murders - carrying a sentence of up to twenty years’ imprisonment for each of the defendants, the court also takes into account other factors.
Thus, the court is entitled to believe that ... application to the defendants of an undertaking not to leave the town or other preventive measures will not exclude the possibility of their absconding or exercising pressure on participants to the proceedings and jurors.
The defendants’ argument that their detention has been excessively long is not in itself sufficient to warrant release.
The defendants have not produced any material showing the existence of factors making impossible [sic] their stay in detention facility conditions.
The court is not convinced by the defendants’ argument that they have not been granted access to the materials submitted by the prosecution in support of their requests for extension. The court has at its disposal only the materials from the criminal case file, which had been studied by the defendants.
The court considers that the grounds for the detention of the defendants, charged with serious and particularly serious criminal offences, are relevant and sufficient. Their detention serves the interest of society, as it prevents the commission of similar criminal offences and ensures high-quality and effective examination of the present criminal case.
The criminal case file contains sufficient evidence against each defendant justifying an extension of their detention...” 35.  On 7 July 2008 the Volgograd Regional Court extended the defendants’ detention until 12 October 2008, repeating verbatim the decision of 8 April 2008. 36.  On 10 October 2008 the Volgograd Regional Court extended the defendant’s detention until 12 January 2009, repeating verbatim the decision of 8 April 2008. 37.  The proceedings are still pending before the trial court.


5.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Šiauliai. 6.  The applicant was married to V.J., with whom he had two boys – T.J., who was born in 1985, and Do.J., who was born in 1986. 7.  In 1993 the applicant divorced his wife, but they remained living together and had one more boy – Ž.J., born in 1997. 8.  On 18 May 2003 V.J. gave birth to twins – a boy, D.J., and a girl, K.J. 9.  On 5 December 2003 the applicant’s former wife and the mother of their five children died. Immediately afterwards, I.N., a cousin of the applicant’s late wife, took the twins to her home to take care of them. As the applicant wrote in his application to the Court, he had agreed that I.N. would take care of the twins because she had experience in raising children – she had two children of her own. He also mentioned having started dating I.N. and having planned to marry her later. In the applicant’s words, I.N. wanted to get married in church and not to disclose that fact to the State authorities so that it would be possible to keep receiving child benefits. The applicant wrote that then, “seeing such prospects for a bright future, [he] had agreed that I.N. would become official guardian of the twins and [he] had helped her to prepare paperwork for that purpose”. 10.  On 27 January 2004 the Šiauliai City Municipality’s Children’s Rights Protection Service (Vaiko teisių apsaugos tarnyba, hereinafter – “the Service”) decided that I.N. could be the temporary guardian of the twins who, in turn, were to reside with her. The applicant took part in the hearing held at the Service’s premises and agreed with the decision. He noted that he could barely take care of his three other children, who were schoolboys, and was thus unable to raise the babies. He stated that if he had to bring the babies back to his home, he would be forced to quit his job and this would ruin him financially. His job also included working at night. If I.N. had not agreed to take the twins, he would have given them to a foster home for infants. The applicant agreed to have his parental rights limited should I.N. be appointed as the twins’ guardian. He also agreed to pay money towards the twins’ upbringing. 11.  A few days later, on 3 February 2004, the Director of Administration of Šiauliai City Municipality decided that I.N. should be appointed as the temporary guardian of the twins. 12.  Later on, the Service applied to the Šiauliai City District Court, asking it to appoint I.N. as the twins’ permanent guardian (nuolatinė globėja) and manager of their property. 13.  The applicant took part in the court hearing concerning that application and explained that even though he loved all of his children and had been raising the three older ones to the best of his abilities, he was not able to take care of the twins because of a lack of money and knowledge of how to take care of very young children. If he had to quit his job in order to bring up the twins, there would be no money to live on. Whilst noting that he was not giving the twins up, the applicant agreed that I.N. could be appointed as their guardian. He promised to help the twins financially to the best of his abilities. 14.  On 29 April 2004 the Šiauliai City District Court granted the Service’s application and granted permanent guardianship of the twins in favour of I.N., who was also to be manager of their property. The court also made a custody order concerning the twins in I.N.’s favour. The applicant was ordered to pay 50 Lithuanian litai (LTL) (approximately 15 euros (EUR)) per month in financial support for each child, until the children came of age. The court noted that the applicant could not take care of the twins because of his lack of knowledge of how to take care of infants. Yet it observed that the applicant worked and took care of his three older children, did not exercise his parental rights improperly, and had no negative influence on the older children. The applicant was also ready to support the twins financially, visit them and communicate with them when they became older. The twins were to be removed from the applicant’s care, although he would retain his parental rights, in accordance with Article 3.179 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 70 below). 15.  The decision could be appealed against to a higher court. The applicant notes that he did not appeal against the decision. 16. According to doctors who examined the twins, during the first years of their lives their development of motor skills was slower than normal, and by the age of three they had specific mixed development disorder (specialus mišrus raidos sutrikimas), and their language development was delayed. They needed speech therapy, physiotherapy and an undemanding regimen (tausojantis režimas). On 7 November 2006, at I.N.’s request and on the basis of reports by psychologists and doctors, the twins received learning support at the Šiauliai Special Upbringing Centre. At the centre the twins received help from a speech therapist and special educational needs teachers (specialieji pedagogai), and benefited from such procedures as massages, medical exercise therapy and herbal baths. Upon the request of I.N., who stated that she was ill herself and had to take care of her elderly mother, from 7 November 2006 onwards the twins became weekly boarders (from Mondays to Fridays) at the Special Upbringing Centre. As the doctors later noted during court proceedings, they made no recommendation either in favour of or against the twins boarding there during the week. As I.N. later specified during court hearings, she had not felt it appropriate for the twins to go to a regular kindergarten, because there were twenty-two children in one class (grupė) there, whereas at the Šiauliai Special Upbringing Centre there were only eight children in a class. According to the Government, the children stayed at the Special Upbringing Centre until 31 May 2009. It also appears from the documents before the Court that in the event of illnesses and during holidays the children were taken home (for example, in accordance with a doctor’s recommendation that the children stay at I.N.’s home from 23 December 2008 for four months). 17.  As of 1 September 2009 the twins attended daily pre-school classes at the Šiauliai Special Upbringing Centre. On 7 December 2009 the director of the centre noted that the twins were always brought to and collected from the centre by I.N. on time, they were well-rested, properly dressed, and had all the necessary materials for class with them. The applicant came to visit them at the centre twice. After his visits the children acted normally, although they were more interested in the presents he brought and did not communicate much. In May 2010 the institution noted that the applicant would come and see the twins at the centre two to three times a month, teachers were present at the meetings and the children’ behaviour after the meetings was normal. 18.  In autumn 2008 disputes arose between the applicant and I.N. In September 2008 I.N. complained to the Service that the applicant had withdrawn money from the twins’ bank account, without her knowledge or permission, as the administrator of the twin’s property. A criminal case for fraud was opened against the applicant. On 12 April 2010 the applicant was acquitted of that charge the court, having established that he had acted in good faith and in the interests of the twins. 19.  On 9 December 2008 the applicant applied to the Šiauliai City District Court, asking that the twins be returned to him. He argued that the reasons for his two children being removed from his care had ceased to exist. The applicant lived in a three-room apartment and, above all, the twins were now older and he therefore felt able to raise them. Two of his older children, Do.J. and T.J., were now students. The applicant submitted that it would be in the best interests of all his children to grow up together. He also sought to have the twins summoned and questioned in court. 20.  In response, on 15 December 2008 I.N. lodged an application with the same court, seeking to have the applicant’s parental rights permanently limited (as for the outcome of this case, see paragraph 52 below). 21.  By a ruling of 16 March 2009, at I.N.’s request, the Šiauliai City District Court suspended the examination of the case initiated by the applicant for the twins’ custody until the civil case initiated by I.N. for termination of his parental rights was decided. 22.  The applicant appealed against that ruling, arguing that a delay in the proceedings was harmful to his interests and, even more so, to those of his minor children. He emphasised that in 2004 he had been separated from his children not because of his fault but because of circumstances that were beyond his control – the death of his former wife and the particularly young age of the twins. The applicant also noted that it was he who had addressed the Šiauliai City District Court first; only afterwards had I.N. initiated another set of court proceedings against him. Taking into account that a case concerning termination of his parental rights could reach the appellate courts, such proceedings could last a very long time, in breach of the requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The delay in court proceedings could also push the twins away from their biological father and thus was detrimental to their interests. 23.  By a decision of 21 April 2009 the Šiauliai Regional Court granted the applicant’s appeal, on the ground that a delay in the proceedings would be in breach of the twins’ best interests. The court also established that the applicant had been the first to open court proceedings concerning the twins’ future residence. 24.  In July 2009 the Šiauliai City District Court held a hearing in the case initiated by the applicant regarding the twins’ return to him (see paragraph 19 above), at which the applicant, I.N., their lawyers and the Service’s representative were present. The court considered that an expert report was necessary to establish whether the twins were ready to be returned to the applicant’s home. The applicant’s lawyer insisted that, apparently for reasons of impartiality, if experts were to be appointed, those experts should be from Vilnius, and not from Šiauliai. During another court hearing on 31 August 2009 the applicant testified that he had not had problems with I.N. until 2008 when he found out that the twins had attended weekly boarding. 25.  On 7 December 2009 officials from the Service visited I.N.’s home and had a conversation with the twins, without I.N. being present. The two children called I.N. “mummy”, and the applicant “daddy”, and expressed negative feelings towards their father and about being with him in either his or I.N.’s apartments. The child care specialists admitted, however, that the phrases the twins had used did not always correspond to the language used by children of their age. The conversation with the children also clearly showed that there was a dispute between the applicant and I.N. The child care specialists thus recommended, in the interests of the children, that the applicant and I.N. improve their relationship and strive to ensure that the applicant was able to communicate with his children. The Service concluded that the twins were not yet ready to live with the applicant.
According to a further report, the child care specialists had also previously visited the applicant’s apartment in Šiauliai and found that the conditions there were suitable for children. 26.  In reply to a complaint by the applicant, on 4 March 2010 the Ombudsperson for the Protection of Children’s Rights (Vaiko teisių apsaugos kontrolierius, hereinafter – “the Ombudsperson”) issued a report about his case. The Service informed the Ombudsperson that if the applicant had agreed to raise the twins himself at the time the question of guardianship had been examined, he would have been eligible to receive a monthly payment of around LTL 400 (approximately EUR 116) from the State in support. However, at that time the applicant had refused to raise the twins, even though he had stated that he intended to do so “in the future”, without indicating when, and had only applied to the Šiauliai City District Court for a residence order in respect of the twins on 9 December 2008. 27.  The Ombudsperson noted that the Service had an obligation to establish which help, in particular, the applicant’s family would have benefited from, including all the social services and other assistance available. However, in the Ombudsperson’s view, that had not been done, and the authorities had not taken specific steps to enable the twins to be returned to their biological family. 28.  That being so, the Ombudsperson also observed that since the 29 April 2004 court decision to establish permanent guardianship for the twins, the applicant had never contacted the Service regarding his communication with the twins until November 2008. Neither had he applied to have those two children returned to him. Similarly, until November 2008 the applicant had never claimed that I.N. was not taking care of the twins properly. Child care specialists had visited I.N.’s home during the intervening years and there was no evidence that the children had not been taken care of properly. 29.  Whilst noting the conflict between the applicant and I.N. over when and how the applicant could see the twins, the Ombudsperson urged the two to act prudently so that their dispute did not affect the children. The Service was ordered to take steps towards the improvement of the relationship between the applicant and the twins, provided that this was in the children’s best interests. It was necessary to find a proper balance between the interests of the children, namely, their health and development, and their communication with the applicant. That being so, the Service’s finding of 7 December 2009 that the twins were not yet ready to return to their father’s home was not unreasonable. It was pertinent that a sudden termination of the guardianship could cause distress, especially when the twins’ guardianship had been established at a very early age. I.N. had become their guardian when they were infants and, according to the information collected, they were very attached to her. Moreover, they had negative feelings towards their father, which, to a certain extent had been caused by the dispute between I.N. and the applicant. A transitional period was therefore necessary. 30.  As the dispute between the applicant and I.N. escalated, on 24 March 2010 the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Šiauliai City District Court seeking a formal decision setting up a contact schedule (dėl bendravimo tvarkos nustatymo) for him and the twins. 31.  On 27 May 2010 the Šiauliai City District Court suspended the proceedings for a contact schedule until the civil case concerning the return of the children to reside with the applicant, wherein a psychological assessment of the children had been ordered by the court, had been concluded (see paragraphs 19–24 above). 32.  The applicant also asked the court to issue interim protective measures (laikinosios apsaugos priemonės), so that he could regularly communicate with the twins. The applicant asked to spend twenty days in a row with the twins during the summer, see them twice a week for no less than four hours each time every week, and for the twins to stay at his home overnight once a week. The applicant also sought to have his two children stay with him overnight during public holidays, every second year. I.N. partly agreed to the request, but asked that the children not be left with the applicant overnight, because they had health problems and were not used to spending the night in another home. When questioned, the twins stated that they wanted to have contact with the applicant, but did not want to stay at his place overnight or to go on holiday with him for more than one day. The Service noted that the twins had not lived with the applicant for a long time and considered that, in order to restore their relationship, an adaptation period was necessary. The Service left the details of the contact order to the court’s discretion. 33.  On the request of the Šiauliai City District Court (see paragraph 24 above), experts at the Vilnius city psychiatric institution (Vaikų ir paauglių teismo psichiatrijos skyrius) examined the twins. Questions were put to the experts by the court, the applicant and I.N.
In their report of 10 September 2010, the psychiatrists concluded that D.J. had a strong and positive emotional relationship with I.N., with whom he felt safe. The boy also had an emotionally positive relationship with his father, who was an important person for him, but their contact was insufficient. Such a lack of contact could be one of the reasons why the boy wanted to live with his father. On this last point the psychiatrists also noted that while the boy was able to freely express his wish to live with his father, he did so without being able to think critically and to foresee the consequences of his choice. The psychiatrists also noted:
“it was not possible to state or to foresee how the change of living place would affect D.J.’s further development. However, taking into account the wish which D.J. had expressed to live with his father, it was unlikely that the change would affect the child negatively, or even cause him harm. [Nonetheless], taking into consideration that from his infancy to [the present] date I.N. had been raising him, it was not recommended to disrupt the relationship between the boy and I.N. completely”.
The experts considered that it was for the court to decide how often the child should have contact with his father so that their emotional relationship could resume.
As regards the girl, K.J., the psychiatrists concluded that she had an emotionally strong relationship with her guardian, with whom she felt safe. Her relationship with her father was ambivalent, but it had not broken down entirely. Both the applicant and I.N. were important people in K.J.’s life. All things considered, it was not possible to state or to foresee how a change of living place would affect K.J. It was thus for the court to decide how often the child should have contact with her father so that their emotional relationship could resume. The experts also recommended that the applicant and I.N. should share the duties of taking care of the children, and I.N. should actively cooperate by helping the twins to communicate with their father. 34.  On 4 July 2011 the Šiauliai City District Court held that, in order to gradually restore the twins’ emotional connection with their father, contact should be as follows: the applicant could collect the children from I.N.’s home every Wednesday and be with them for two-and-a-half hours; every Saturday he could spend nine-and-a-half hours with them. The court considered that it would only be appropriate for the twins to be with the applicant during school and public holidays once their bonds with him had become stronger. In the court’s view, such a contact order corresponded to the best interests of the children. The court also noted that, should the circumstances change, the applicant or I.N. could ask the court to amend the contact order.
In August 2011 and upon I.N.’s request, the court amended the contact order to the effect that, should the applicant be unable to see the twins on Wednesday or Saturday due to their sickness or another justifiable reason, he could meet with them on Thursday or Sunday.
The applicant and his lawyer took part in both court hearings. 35.  On 12 September 2011 the Šiauliai City District Court delivered its decision as to the applicant’s application for a residence order. The applicant, I.N., their lawyers, and the Service took part in the hearings before the court. The twins also took part in the hearings, giving evidence without the applicant, I.N. or their lawyers being present. 36.  The court noted that on 24 April 2004 the twins had been removed from the applicant’s care by a court decision for a legitimate reason – namely, because he could not take care of them (Article 3.179 of the Civil Code, see paragraph 70 below). It was important to observe that their separation was in no way linked to fault on the part of the applicant. Moreover, the measure was temporary in that it could be lifted if the circumstances justifying the separation from the twins no longer existed. Accordingly, it was necessary to examine whether those circumstances still existed, and, if not, whether the children’s being returned to live with the applicant would be in their best interests, which were the overriding consideration. The court noted that the best interests of the children, as the primary consideration, were indicated in Article 3 § 1 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and in Article 3.3 of the Civil Code. 37.  The Šiauliai City District Court agreed with the applicant’s argument that the grounds for removal of the twins from his care in 2004 had ceased to exist, because the twins were now eight years old and had been taken from the applicant because he had not possessed the appropriate knowledge of how to take care of them when they were infants. That being so, the court nevertheless held that the twins had a strong emotional link with I.N. and their emotional link with the applicant was not sufficient, which situation had clearly been influenced by the fact that the twins had lived separately from the applicant since June 2004. The court also observed that because of the dispute over money between the applicant and I.N. which had started in summer 2008, he had had limited opportunities to take part in educating his children and to communicate with them. It was only from July 2011, when the court had issued an interim order providing for the applicant’s contact with the twins in accordance with a fixed schedule, that the applicant had started to have regular contact with the twins. Even so, the applicant had not taken all possible steps to participate in the upbringing of the twins on an equal basis with I.N. Namely, even though the twins had been removed from his care in June 2004, the applicant had never asked for the twins to be returned to live with him until the disagreement with I.N. arose in summer 2008, even though his two other sons were no longer minors as of December 2003 and December 2004 respectively. The court also noted the applicant’s acknowledgement that until 2008 he had not encountered any obstacles to communicating with the twins. Yet, he had communicated with them only “episodically”, with the result that the emotional connection between the twins and the applicant and his other children was less strong than that existing between the twins and I.N. and her children. As the twins had testified in court, they did not want to live with the father. They did not even want to stay at his home during the weekends, this being confirmed by the applicant’s eldest child, Ž.J. 38.  The Šiauliai City District Court also dismissed the applicant’s argument that I.N. had not been taking care of the twins properly because they had been weekly boarders at the Šiauliai Special Upbringing Centre for three years. On the contrary, the court observed that according to the twins’ doctor, the care centre was of great benefit to the family, because the twins received specialist help there. The court found that the applicant ought to have been more active in making inquiries about the twins’ development and health. Lastly, the court noted the applicant’s statement that he had been aware as early as 2006 that the twins were weekly boarders at the care centre. 39.  The first-instance court concluded that because of the twins’ negative feelings towards the applicant, he would not be able to perform his fatherly duties properly. The court also took the psychiatrists’ report into account and held that the twins’ connection with the applicant was not strong enough, whereas they had a strong emotional connection with I.N. It followed that the grounds for removing the twins, who had expressed their wish to live with I.N. in court, from the applicant’s care persisted. Being returned to live with their father was not in the best interests of the children. Nonetheless, the applicant maintained his parental rights, including the right to have contact with his children, who would be well able to communicate with him whilst staying in a familiar environment, with I.N., where they felt safe. Should the circumstances change, that is to say, once the emotional relationship between the twins and the applicant became stronger, the applicant could apply to the courts again and seek the revocation of I.N.’s guardianship of the twins. The court thus dismissed the applicant’s request that the twins be returned to him. 40.  The applicant appealed, submitting that the first-instance court had erred in establishing that the circumstances on the basis of which the twins had been removed from his care in 2004 were no longer valid, but then going on to examine whether there were other reasons why he would not be able to take care of his children properly. He maintained that he had visited his children and communicated with them regularly from the date of their separation. However, as of 2008 I.N. had started turning the children against him. The court had established that there was a lack of a strong emotional relationship between the applicant and the twins, but had not taken into consideration that I.N. had deliberately taken steps to ensure that the children would be hostile to their father. 41.  The applicant also argued that the lower court had erred in establishing that I.N. had been taking care of the twins properly. He submitted that I.N. had without good reason sent the twins to be boarding pupils at the Šiauliai Special Upbringing Centre. Even though during the hearings at first instance the twins’ family doctor and another doctor had confirmed that the twins’ attendance at the centre had been recommended, those specialists had not recommended that the twins board at the centre. The applicant also submitted that until mid-2011 I.N. had not had a job and it was thus not unreasonable to conclude that her sole means of subsistence was child benefit payments, although domestic law required such monies to be used exclusively in the interests of children under guardianship. 42.  The applicant also observed that the first-instance court had completely disregarded the Ombudsperson’s report (see paragraphs 26-29 above). Likewise, the lower court had disregarded the psychiatrists’ reports about the twins (see paragraph 33 above), which had clearly stated that the boy wanted to live with the applicant and that there was no reason to believe that the boy’s well-being would suffer should he be returned to his biological father. 43.  Neither could the applicant agree with the lower court’s conclusion that he had not taken as much of a role in taking care of the twins as I.N. On this point he noted that his participation in the twins’ life had only been restricted as of 2008, when I.N. had taken steps to limit his communication with them. It was also noteworthy that in 2008 the applicant had applied to the courts for an order establishing a schedule for him to have contact with the twins. Lastly, the applicant maintained that the Service had from the very beginning and up to the present date, and by unjustified means, sought to further I.N.’s interests and not those of the children. 44.  By a ruling of 2 February 2012 the Šiauliai Regional Court upheld the lower court’s decision, noting that as an appellate court it was free to interpret the evidence as it saw fit. The applicant and I.N. took part in the appellate court’s hearing. The court noted that the case had a public interest element, because it concerned children’s rights. Accordingly, it examined supplementary evidence of its own motion and took notice of an earlier court decision to dismiss the applicant’s claim that I.N. had been embezzling the twins’ money (see paragraph 18 above). It therefore considered that the applicant’s accusations of selfishness and property mismanagement against I.N. were unfounded. 45.  The court considered that both the applicant and I.N. had not made enough effort to ensure that “the twins would return to the family”. The dispute between the two had negatively influenced the twins’ feelings towards their father, and had had a long term negative impact on the twins’ emotional and psychological development. The court noted the experts’ conclusion that so far the children had developed a firm, safe and positive emotional connection with I.N. Even so, the experts had also acknowledged that the twins’ connection with the applicant still existed and it was emotionally positive. Accordingly, it was crucial to develop that connection, and both the applicant and I.N. had to contribute to that development. The assistance of the Service would also be particularly important. 46.  The court also emphasised that it would necessarily take time for the children to be ready to be returned to their father: the latter and I.N. had to make an effort towards that goal. The children were to get used to the fact that they could see their father when they wanted, and not when I.N. sent them to visit him. On this point the court noted that children of the twins’ age already understood and were affected by the fact that their guardian, I.N., was not enthusiastic about them being in contact with the applicant. Equally, as regards the applicant’s attitude towards the situation, the court considered that the applicant blamed everybody else without seeing any fault on his own part. The panel of judges noted that the applicant was a very uncompromising individual who only accepted the validity of his own viewpoint and was not willing to have regard to the opinions of others. The panel concluded that so long as the applicant was not taking any steps to work on his issues, such as by seeking psychological assistance, the children could not be returned to an emotionally cold and harsh environment. A sudden removal of the children from the environment provided by I.N., which was safe and comforting for the children, would absolutely be a disproportionate and traumatic step which the court could not allow. 47.  The appellate court also noted that from birth the twins had had serious health problems, which had never gone away. In 2008 D.J. had been diagnosed with a medium level of disability; in 2010 the disability’s assessment had been changed to a mild level. K.J had a light level of disability, established in 2008. Both children were hyperactive, had numerous health problems and thus needed a greater level of attention. Accordingly, the applicant’s argument that the twins could stay at home until he returned from work showed that it would not be possible for him, and he was not ready, to take concrete steps to take care of the two children, who came home from school at noon. The applicant’s other children were busy to the extent that they also could not stay with the twins all the time. 48.  Lastly, the appellate court dismissed the applicant’s argument that the children should be returned to him on the basis of Article 3.181 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 70 below), which, in the applicant’s view, provided that a child should be returned to a parent once the grounds which necessitated their separation no longer existed. The court held that the best interests of the child were the priority. In the applicant’s case the appellate court had not established the existence of any new circumstances. Nevertheless, this did not automatically mean that the twins had to be returned to the applicant’s home immediately. A transitional period was necessary, which, in the court’s view, might be six months. In arriving at that timeframe it took into particular account the fact that this period would include the summer holidays, when the twins could leave their familiar environment, I.N.’s apartment, and re-establish a close relationship with their father. If the twins could have contact with their father for a longer period than the current sporadic, twice-a-week arrangement, they would be able to see that their father was there for them and that they could resolve everyday problems with their father’s assistance. 49.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, but on 13 April 2012 the Supreme Court refused to examine it on the basis that it raised questions of fact only. 50.  On 22 February 2012 the applicant asked the Šiauliai City District Court to resume the suspended civil proceedings regarding his contact rights with the twins, noting that the other civil case concerning his application for the twins’ return had already ended (see paragraph 31 above). Six days later the court resumed the examination of the civil case concerning his application for a contact order, and with the aim that the case be examined expeditiously, set an oral hearing in that case for 26 March 2012. In May of that year the court also decided to join the two civil cases pending in relation to the twins (the civil case concerning the application for a parental contact order initiated by the applicant on 24 March 2010 and the civil case concerning the application for termination of the applicant’s parental rights initiated by I.N. on 15 December 2008; see, respectively, paragraphs 30 and 20 above). 51.  During the hearing of the joined civil case on 27 June 2012 a psychologist was present, the children were questioned (the applicant and I.N. were asked to leave the courtroom, their lawyers were present) and the psychologist made the following comments:
“... From the statements made by K.J. we understand that the relationship between I.N. and her father is difficult and that the child sees and understands this. The girl mentioned a wish to meet [go out] with both of them if their relationship was better. I did not note entirely negative feelings towards her father, however there is no close relationship, and the relationship between the girl and I.N. is very strong. I understood from both of the children that their father promises things which never come true [and] this fell short of their expectations. D.J. states that he is willing to have contact with his father but only when he [the boy] so wishes, hence the child should not be forced to contact his father. ... The girl has no emotional relationship with her father, because she has seen him disputing [things] and [experienced him making] promises which never came true. The boy wishes to have contact with his father but at the present date the latter cannot arrange that. <...>” 52.  On 13 July 2012 the Šiauliai City District Court rejected I.N.’s civil claim for termination of the applicant’s parental rights (see paragraph 20 above) and partly granted the applicant’s civil claim for a contact order. The court noted that there was no basis for I.N.’s claims that the applicant had harmed the twins or had not taken care of them at all until autumn 2008. On the contrary, the evidence showed that he had been seeking contact with the children. The boy wanted to have contact with the applicant, and the girl would agree to have contact with him if he ceased his dispute with I.N. However, the twins’ contact with the applicant could not be forced. Whilst observing that the child’s best interests were paramount, the first-instance court also relied on the Court’s case-law, noting that in matters of child custody, for example, the reason for considering the “child’s best interests” may be twofold: firstly, to guarantee that the child develops in a sound environment and that a parent cannot take measures that would harm its health and development; secondly, to maintain its ties with its family, except in cases where the family has proved particularly unfit, since severing those ties means cutting a child off from its roots (the court referred to Maumousseau and Washington v. France, no. 39388/05, § 67, 6 December 2007). Lastly, the court rejected all the accusations by I.N. that the applicant had been antagonistic, because a criminal case initiated by her had been dismissed by the authorities (see paragraphs 18 and 44 above). The applicant thus had a right to have contact with the twins and an inherent duty to take part in educating them. He was also able to offer them appropriate living conditions. 53.  The Šiauliai City District Court also noted that both parties to the dispute – the applicant and I.N. – had put their own ambitions and their subjective views as to what would be best for the children first. For that reason, the applicant had sometimes tried to have contact with his daughter when she did not want to spend time with him, although his son was prepared to meet him. As for I.N., she had not attempted to restore the twins’ relations with their father and had showed no concern for the fact that the applicant’s and his daughter’s relationship was getting weaker and was close to breaking down. Accordingly, the parties’ failure to take care of the children’s best interests required that those interests be protected by the courts. Moreover, considering that the biggest issue was the communication between the applicant and his daughter, the court saw it appropriate to set, on its own initiative, a further schedule for their communication during the transitional period, so that the girl’s contact with the applicant be re-established. In particular, a psychologist or child care specialist was to assist the applicant and his daughter, during contact sessions which would take place in a neutral setting. Lastly, the court reiterated that the principle of the rights of the child having priority was relevant not only when setting a schedule for the contact between the applicant and the twins, but also when executing the court decision establishing that schedule. The applicant thus should not make use of his right to see the children, including taking them to his apartment, if this would breach the twins’ rights, even though his right to see them had been established in the court’s decision. 54.  The order establishing a contact schedule between the applicant and his two children essentially specified that, until a psychologist determined the readiness of K.J. to have contact with her father without the presence of a psychologist or a social worker, the applicant should have contact with her once a week in the presence of either a psychologist or a social worker and at a place and time agreed upon in advance. In addition to that, if the twins so agreed, the applicant could see them two or three times a week, for up to four hours, during the working week. He could also have them over every second week from Friday evening to Sunday evening, and also during some of the State holidays and spend with them two weeks during his vacations. 55.  I.N. appealed against the decision, seeking to have the applicant’s application for a contact order rejected and her application to have his parental rights terminated granted. The applicant submitted a response to the appeal, submitting that the decision of the first-instance court had been reasoned and lawful and thus that there were no legal grounds for quashing or changing it. He also claimed that I.N. was influencing the children’s testimony. 56.  On 20 November 2012 the Šiauliai Regional Court fully upheld the lower court’s decision to reject I.N.’s application to have the applicant’s parental rights terminated. In any event, the applicant’s parental rights could only be terminated if he failed to perform his fatherly duties, and there were no indications of this in his case. That being so, the appellate court also noted that at the time of the first-instance proceedings the twins had expressed a categorical and consistent wish not to stay at the applicant’s apartment overnight. In addition, according to the most recent reports by the doctors, the twins had become more nervous and agitated, and their emotional and psychological state and behaviour had become worse. It was therefore considered better for them to reside at I.N.’s home. The psychologist had testified that the boy wanted to see his father, but on a schedule of his choosing. The girl avoided meeting with her father at all. 57.  As concerns the issue of the parental contact order, the appellate court stated as follows:
“... The panel of judges notes that it is impossible to raise a child without having contact with him/her. In Article 24 of the Law on the Fundamentals of Protection of Children Rights it is also established that if a child’s mother or father does not live with him/her, [the child] must have the opportunity to spend time with [his or her] mother or father, save for the exceptions established by law, [in the event that] such contact could prove to be of detriment to the child. Minimum contact may be established only if permanent maximum contact would be harmful to the interests of the child, if frequently spending time with the [non-resident] parent would traumatise the child psychologically, if the contact and parenting (auklėjimas) [offered] by a parent does not satisfy the interests, wishes and views of the child at all, [or] if [there would be] a negative impact on the child’s maturity and outlook [on life].
The evidence in the [instant] case allows the panel of judges to hold that at present there are grounds for changing the maximum parental contact order established by the [lower] court to a minimum [contact order]. The court has had regard to the current categorical and consistent position of the children towards the opportunity to stay overnight with their father as envisaged in the [lower court’s] parental contact order. The medical certificates included in the case file allow the court to state that the children’s state of health, anxiety, and irritability strengthened, their emotional state and behaviour worsened, hence treatment at home is recommended for them. The medical documents recording the existence [of] weakness of the central nervous system, attention-deficit disorder, [delayed] language development, learning [difficulties], etc. were neither refuted during the examination of the case before the court of the first instance, nor during the examination on appeal. While commenting on the children’s feelings towards their father the psychologist has noted that there is not currently a close relationship between the father and the children, the son [D.J.] states that he only wants to have contact with his father when he [D.J.] so wishes, the daughter [K.J.] is avoiding contact with her father. The twins [D.J.] and [K.J.] were examined in terms of their psychological state, heightened fear of separation from their guardian, and feelings of insecurity. While stating that the major problem is the daughter’s [K.J.’s] communication with her father, the court of first instance correctly emphasised the need [for it] to establish additional conditions for contact between the girl and her father, hence it justly noted that the father’s contact with his daughter was essential to restore a normal relationship with his daughter. A transitional period had to be established given that [it would take] a reasonable period of time for the child to become accustomed to [spending time] her father.
Accordingly, the [lower] court’s conclusion in the present case that it is not currently possible for the father to have maximum contact with his minor daughter [K.J.] is correct, because it is indisputably established in the case that any ties, including emotional ones, between father and daughter have almost broken down. The panel of judges also considers that contact with the [applicant’s] son [D.J.] contrary to his wishes (involuntarily) would not satisfy the interests of the child. In view of the aim of reinstating the lost connection, forced (involuntary) contact [on the part of] the children with their father would be meaningless because forced contact [sessions] may even result in intense hostility towards their father. Hence, on the basis of the arguments presented the existing order should be changed by removing the possibility for the children to stay at their father’s home overnight. Being active in such category of cases the court draws attention to the existing contact order [which provides for] contact sessions during the working week [for] up to four hours. The panel of judges considers that such frequent contact may unbalance the children’s rest periods and in the present case a transitional period is required for rebuilding of the relationship. Hence the panel of judges decides that voluntary contact between the children and [the applicant] on weekends and on holidays would contribute to a proper balancing of the father’s and the children’s interests. Thus the panel decides that the time for collecting and returning the children on weekends and on holidays, with the exception of the father’s and daughter’s contact sessions in the presence of the appointed specialist once a week, should be changed. The court considers that the children may be taken by their father on Saturdays from 12 p.m. until 7 p.m. because these particular hours are optimal - the children’s rest periods during the week and on Sundays will not be disrupted. Accordingly, the [relevant] part of the [lower court’s] decision on the contact order should be changed. Moreover, the panel considers that in view of the transitional period it has emphasised [will be necessary] for the building of relations with their father, the issue of the children spending their holidays with their father has been decided far too early, hence this part of the [lower court’s] decision is to be quashed. The appeal court notes that the [legal] relations [established by] a contact order concerning a child and [by] raising a child are of a continuing nature, hence when the factual circumstances change the father of the children [the applicant] or the guardian [I.N.] have the right to apply to the court seeking a change to the existing order.
The panel of judges notes that having regard to the circumstances of the case it might be concluded that there are ongoing disputes between the father and the guardian of his children. The panel of judges emphasises that the parties to the case [have been putting] their own ambitions above those of the children and thus [have] failed to show due loyalty, respect, and tolerance towards each other. Accordingly, the [applicant’s] contact with the children is marked by unnecessary conflict, the children experience and feel it, [the ongoing disputes] make them feel insecure, cause severe damage and have had an impact on [D.J.’s] and [K.J.’s] health and impeded the rebuilding of their relationship with their biological father.
In the panel’s view restriction of contact between the father and the children would undoubtedly infringe both the non-resident (skyrium gyvenantis) parent’s right to take part in educating the children and the children’s best interests. [It] would impede the rebuilding, steadying and maintenance of the relationship between father and son, and especially [between father and] daughter. It should be explained to the parties that all issues relating to the raising of the children, as well as issues relating to their needs and interests not included in the order ... established by the procedural decision of the court, should be agreed upon between the parties with due regard to the principles of cooperation and safeguarding the children’s rights and legitimate interests as a priority.” 58.  The amended contact order thus confirmed the transitional period for the applicant’s and his daughter’s communication in the presence of a psychologist and a social worker. Upon a determination by a psychologist of K.J.’s readiness to have contact with her father, the applicant also could see the twins (or one of them) on Saturdays from 12 p.m. until 7 p.m. if the children voluntarily so agreed and did not object. He could also see them on Father’s Day and on his birthday, from 10 a.m. until 7 p.m. Lastly, the applicant could take them from their permanent place of residence and have contact from 10 a.m. until 7 p.m. on 24 December, from 10 a.m. until 7 p.m. on 26 December and from 10 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the first day of Easter in even calendar years; and from 10 a.m. until 7 p.m. on 31 December and from 10 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the second day of Easter in odd calendar years. 59.  The decision of the Šiauliai Regional Court became effective after neither of the parties to the proceedings lodged a further appeal. 60.  According to the documents in the Court’s possession, between December 2008 and 25 March 2013 specialists from the Service had frequent meetings and consultations with the applicant and I.N., and individual conversations with the twins (without the presence of their father and/or I.N.). The child care specialists urged the applicant and I.N. to get in touch with the psychologists involved in the case in order to arrange sessions individually and together with the twins concerning their communication problems. 61.  In particular, on 27 February 2012 the applicant contacted the Service asking for assistance in arranging contact sessions with his daughter K.J., claiming that she had been turned against him by I.N. and hence did not want to have contact with him. 62.  On 13 March 2012 child care specialists had a conversation with K.J. at the Service’s premises. I.N. was not present during the conversation. The specialists sought to ascertain the girl’s opinion concerning her contact with the applicant. The girl expressed negative feelings towards contact with her father and towards staying at his home, his visits to I.N.’s home and going out with her father to other places (such as the cinema, a café, or shopping centres). The girl stated that at that time she was not willing to have contact with her father under any circumstances. She also stressed that nobody was influencing her and that she was expressing her own opinion. The specialists concluded that given the need to safeguard the child’s best interests as a priority and the recommendations of the Šiauliai Regional Court (in the decision of 2 February 2012, paragraphs 45-49 above) it was advisable that the applicant and I.N. did not resolve any disputes that might arise in the presence of the children. The specialists also advised that the applicant and I.N. improve their relationship and contact the psychologists to set up consultations and obtain recommendations. 63.  Immediately after the Šiauliai Regional Court decision of 20 November 2012 (see paragraphs 56–59 above), the applicant contacted the Service asking for assistance in arranging contact sessions with his daughter K.J., which were to take place in the presence of a child care specialist and a psychologist. The authority responded the following day, and a session took place on 6 December 2012. The applicant and I.N. were both present. It was decided that individual sessions with the psychologist would be provided for K.J. It was also agreed that the applicant and the guardian would be invited to discussions giving a general summary of K.J.’s sessions with the psychologist. A specialist from the Service would also be invited to the discussions. 64.  Five sessions with the psychologist were provided from 6 December 2012 until 14 February 2013. During the last session, earlier sessions were discussed and conclusions concerning K.J.’s readiness to have contact with her father were made. The applicant, I.N. and a child care specialist were present at the consultation. The psychologist emphasised that K.J. was not yet ready for contact with her father and refused to have that contact. The psychologist also drew attention to the fact that during individual sessions K.J. had become tired quickly, her anxiety and motor activity had increased, and she had sought to finish every session earlier. I.N. confirmed that K.J. was anxious and quickly became tired. The applicant considered that “in order to spare [his] daughter’s emotional and psychological state individual sessions should be terminated”. 65.  On 25 March 2013 specialists from the Service visited the twins. The specialists concluded that the children enjoyed suitable living conditions that were conducive to their development, and noted that they were very affectionate towards I.N. They observed that K.J. enjoyed spending time with the guardian’s daughter, whom she called “sister”, but refused to have contact with her father. K.J. did not have contact with her older biological brothers. 66.  The child care specialists noted that D.J. spoke of I.N. only positively. He also had contact with his father during the times set in the court order – they would go to the shopping mall, cinema, and his father’s apartment. He would also spend time with his older biological brother, Ž.J. D.J. was willing to continue having contact with his father. 67.  In their observations on the admissibility and merits sent to the Court on 11 April 2013 the Government noted that the Service next planned to visit the twins later that month.


4.  The applicants were born in 1919, 1941, 1947 and 1955, and live in Etes, Bátonyterenye, Salgótarján and Etes, respectively. 5.  In a real estate dispute, on 23 June 1994 Mr S. and others brought an action for a servitude (szolgalom) against the applicants. 6.  After three hearings, the preparation of an expert opinion and the identification of a plaintiff's successor, on 18 June 1998 the Salgótarján District Court found for the plaintiffs. On appeal, on 12 November 1998 the Nógrád County Regional Court quashed this decision. 7.  In the resumed proceedings, on 4 March 1999 the plaintiffs changed their action and claimed ownership. Subsequently, the proceedings were suspended pending the outcome of an underlying land register procedure. The latter ended on 8 January 2001. On 23 April 2001 the plaintiffs' representative requested the resumption of the principal case. 8.  The proceedings resumed on 6 June 2001. After several hearings and the opinion of an expert, on 2 December 2003 the District Court dismissed the action. 9.  On appeal, on 11 May 2004 the Regional Court changed this decision and granted the plaintiffs the servitude they sought. 10.  On 20 September 2004 the applicants requested the re-opening of the case. On 27 April 2005 the Regional Court admitted their request. 11.  In the reopened proceedings, on 8 December 2005 the District Court established that the plaintiffs' adverse possession of the servitude in question had not taken place. It ordered the servitude to be deleted from the land register. 12.  On appeal, on 25 April 2006 the Regional Court changed this decision and upheld its decision of 11 May 2004.


4.  The applicant was born in 1939 and lives in Kharkiv. 5.  In November 1997 the applicant instituted civil proceedings in the Kyivskyy District Court of Kharkiv (“the District Court”) against her neighbour, Ms. G., disputing her right to use a plot of land. 6.  On 9 February 1999 Ms G. lodged a counterclaim, alleging that she was so entitled.. 7.  On 29 June 2006, following one remittal of the case to the first-instance court for fresh examination, the proceedings were completed by a final ruling of the Supreme Court finding against the applicant. 8.  In the course of proceedings six forensic technical examinations were conducted at the parties’ requests.


8.  The applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Nonnweiler, Germany. 9.  In 1971, the applicant and a company engaged in negotiations with the city of Saarbrücken to obtain a building permit for a plot of land they had bought. In the course of these negotiations, the applicant and the said company undertook to pay 2,535,000 Deutschmarks (DEM) (approximately 1,296,000 Euros (EUR)) of the costs for the provision of the public infrastructure (Erschließung). The applicant also undertook to construct a shopping centre within two years following the grant of the building permit. 10.  On 1 April 1974 the applicant applied for the building permit with the municipal authorities. He offered to submit a bank security to cover the costs for the provision of the public infrastructure concerning the shopping centre, estimated to amount to some DEM 1,500,000. He also suggested that a contract on this point be signed by him and the city. 11.  In August 1974, following municipal elections, the city requested the applicant to submit a bank security of DEM 4,500,000 (approximately EUR 2,300,813) to cover the costs for the provision of the public infrastructure for the plot of land as a whole. Upon his refusal to do this, the city refused its consent to his request for a building permit. It also refused to conclude a contract concerning the construction of the shopping centre and the costs for the provision of the public infrastructure. 12.  On 23 August 1974 the applicant brought an official liability action (Amtshaftungsklage) for compensation in the Saarbrücken Regional Court against the city of Saarbrücken. He complained that the city's sudden decision to request a bank security of DEM 4,500,000, thereby setting up further inequitable conditions for its agreement to the applicant's building project, was a result of informal negotiations between different local political parties before the municipal elections. It constituted a voluntary breach of the principle of continuity in administrative actions. 13.  On 24 February 1975 the local building authorities refused to grant the applicant the requested building permit. This decision was later confirmed by the administrative courts. 14.  On 21 March 1975 the Saarbrücken Regional Court dismissed the applicant's official liability action. According to the Regional Court, nothing suggested that the city of Saarbrücken had acted in breach of its obligations as a public organ. 15.  On 27 June 1975 the applicant lodged an appeal against this decision with the Saarbrücken Court of Appeal (Fourth Senate). 16.  In autumn 1976 the applicant's real estate concerned was sold by compulsory auction. 17.  On 3 February 1978 the Saarbrücken Court of Appeal (Fourth Senate) dismissed the applicant's appeal as ill-founded. 18.  On 7 February 1980, following the applicant's appeal on points of law, the Federal Court of Justice quashed this decision and remitted the case to the Court of Appeal (Fourth Senate). It requested the Court of Appeal to examine whether the city had discontinued abruptly the contractual negotiations with the applicant for arbitrary reasons, because the city was liable to pay damages to the applicant if it had done so. 19.  On 23 October 1981 the Saarbrücken Court of Appeal (Fourth Senate) again dismissed the applicant's appeal. It found that, even assuming that the city had breached its duty as a public organ to act in a consistent manner, the applicant had failed to establish that there was a causal link between the city's conduct and the damage sustained by him. 20.  On 14 October 1982 the Federal Court of Justice decided partly to admit the applicant's renewed appeal on points of law. 21.  On 5 May 1983 the Federal Court of Justice partly quashed the Court of Appeal's decision and remitted the case to the Seventh Senate of that court. It found that the Court of Appeal, in its finding that a causal link was missing between the city's conduct and the damage sustained by the applicant, erroneously did not assess the evidence offered by him. 22.  On 10 July 1984 the Saarbrücken Court of Appeal (Seventh Senate) amended the Regional Court's decision of 21 March 1975. It declared that the applicant was entitled to compensation, but did not yet assess the exact amount of the damages payable (Grundurteil). The Court of Appeal found that the city of Saarbrücken had unforeseeably and without legitimate reasons requested the applicant to submit a bank security of DEM 4,500,000, thereby willingly causing the breakdown of the negotiations about the grant of a building permit. Therefore, it breached its duty as a public organ to act in a consistent manner. 23.  On 11 July 1985 the Federal Court of Justice refused to admit the appeal on points of law lodged by the city of Saarbrücken. 24.  On 19 December 1985 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit the city's constitutional complaint. 25.  On 8 July 1986 the Saarbrücken Court of Appeal ordered the city of Saarbrücken to pay DEM 5,798,142 (approximately EUR 2.964.543) plus interest to the applicant and dismissed the remainder of his claim. 26.  On 22 June 1989, following both parties' appeals on points of law, the Federal Court of Justice quashed the Court of Appeal's decision as far as the amount of damages was concerned and remitted the case to the Court of Appeal. 27.  On 9 January 1995 the Court of Appeal (renamed Saarland Court of Appeal) ordered that an expert report be prepared on the amount of damages sustained by the applicant. 28.  On 12 January 1999 the Court of Appeal ordered that a further expert report be prepared on the amount of damages sustained by the applicant, taking into consideration additional tax-related aspects. 29.  On 20 July 2000 the Federal Constitutional Court allowed the applicant's constitutional complaint about the length of the official liability proceedings (see in detail paragraphs 36-37 below). 30.  On 25 and 26 September 2000, two different Senates of the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant's challenges of the judges of the Court of Appeal on grounds of bias as ill-founded. 31.  On 20 November 2001 the Saarland Court of Appeal (Seventh Senate), after having held a hearing, dismissed the applicant's action for compensation. It found that it was not established that the applicant would have been in a financial position to realise his building project if he had been granted the building permit, regardless of the city's behaviour. The city's actions thus had not caused any financial losses to him. The court ordered the applicant to pay the costs of the court proceedings (amounting to some EUR 2,512,222). 32.  On 24 April 2003 the Federal Court of Justice refused to admit the applicant's appeal on points of law against the Saarland Court of Appeal's judgment of 20 November 2001. It fixed the value in dispute (Streitwert) at some EUR 109,000,000 and ordered the applicant, being the party failing in his action, to bear the costs of the proceedings (amounting to another approximately EUR 657,322). 33.  On 28 May 2003 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court, claiming that his property rights, his rights to be heard, to a fair trial and to a decision by the judge having jurisdiction (gesetzlicher Richter) had been violated. 34.  On 28 July 2003 (decision served on 4 August 2003) the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit the applicant's constitutional complaint. It found that he failed sufficiently to substantiate his complaint, which therefore was inadmissible. 35.  On 24 February 2004 the Saarbrücken District Court decided to start insolvency proceedings against the applicant. 36.  On 24 February 2000 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court, arguing that his right to a hearing within a reasonable time had been violated in the official liability proceedings pending in the Saarland Court of Appeal. 37.  On 20 July 2000 the Federal Constitutional Court held that the applicant's right to an effective judicial remedy under the Basic Law had been violated in that the Saarland Court of Appeal did not render a decision on the amount of compensation to be granted to the applicant within a reasonable time. In its reasoning, it found that, despite the complexity of the case, the length of the proceedings, which had been pending since 1974, was obviously excessive. It concluded that, pursuant to Section 95 para. 1 of the Federal Constitutional Court Act (Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz), it was restricted to the finding of a violation of the Basic Law. The Court of Appeal was now obliged to take effective measures in order to terminate the proceedings as soon as possible. 38.  On 24 April 2001 the applicant brought another official liability action under Article 34 of the Basic Law taken in conjunction with Section 839 of the Civil Code against the Land Saarland with the Karlsruhe Regional Court. He applied for a declaration (Feststellungsklage) that the Land Saarland was liable to compensate him for the damage which has been and will be caused by the excessive length of the proceedings before the Saarland Court of Appeal. 39.  On 9 November 2001 the Karlsruhe Regional Court allowed the applicant's action and ordered the defendant Land to pay the costs of the proceedings. 40.  On 20 December 2001 the Land Saarland lodged an appeal against the judgment of the Karlsruhe Regional Court of 9 November 2001 with the Karlsruhe Court of Appeal. The proceedings, which had been suspended on the motion of both parties awaiting the outcome of the official liability proceedings against the city of Saarbrücken, are to date still pending.


4.  The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Geretsberg. 5.  On 24 June 1999 the Braunau District Administrative Authority (Bezirkshauptmannschaft) charged the applicant with drunken driving. The applicant, represented by counsel, submitted observations on 13 July and 8 September 1999. 6.  On 21 September 1999 the District Administrative Authority issued a penal order (Straferkenntnis) finding the applicant guilty of drunken driving contrary to Sections 5 § 1 and 99 § 1 (a) of the Road Traffic Act (Strassenverkehrsordnung). As to the alcohol level the authority had regard to the results of a breathalyser test and to the corroborating results of a blood alcohol analysis carried out the following day. It imposed a fine of 16,000 Austrian schillings (approximately 1,160 euros) on him with 14 days' imprisonment in default. 7.  The applicant appealed on 12 October 1999. 8.  On 9 December 1999 the Upper Austria Independent Administrative Panel (Unabhängiger Verwaltungssenat) held a hearing at which it questioned the applicant and the two police officers who had carried out the breathalyser tests and a further witness. 9.  By decision of 21 December 1999 the Independent Administrative Panel, having held a hearing, dismissed the applicant's appeal. It found that the applicant had driven his car on 15 June 1999 at 8 p.m. having a proportion of alcohol in his breath exceeding the statutory level. He admitted to having consumed alcohol in the afternoon. Having run out of petrol, the applicant had left the car and had gone to the next petrol station. Upon his return, he had been requested by two police officers to undergo breathalyser tests. The tests, carried out at 8.52 and 8.54 p.m. respectively, had yielded results of 0.84 and 0.86 mg alcohol/litres. The Independent Administrative Panel dismissed the applicant's request to take an expert opinion in order to show that the difference in these results was due to his having consumed one and a half litres of beer when he went to fetch petrol and that he had, before that, not been driving his car in a state of drunkenness. Having regard to the instructions for use of the breathalyser at issue, the Independent Administrative Panel noted that the difference in the two test results was not significant. 10.  In any case, it found that the applicant's defence was not credible as he had stated at his first interrogation to have parked his car at 8 p.m. and had explicitly answered the police officers' question whether he had consumed alcohol after that in the negative. It was only in his written submissions of 13 July that he had claimed to have consumed more beer after 8 p.m. The bill submitted by the applicant did not support his defence as the innkeeper had stated that he had given the applicant this bill two weeks after the incident on his explicit request. He had not remembered the applicant and could not confirm whether he had actually consumed beer at his inn at the relevant time. 11.  The applicant lodged a complaint with the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof) on 3 February 2000. He complained in particular about the refusal of his request to take an expert opinion. On 3 April 2000 the Independent Administrative Panel submitted observations in reply. The applicant made further submissions on 3 May and 21 June 2000. 12.  On 7 August 2003 the Administrative Court, having deliberated on 4 July 2003, dismissed the applicant's complaint as being unfounded. It found in particular that the Independent Administrative Panel's assessment of evidence did not suffer from any defects and that it had given detailed and convincing reasons for its refusal to take the expert opinion requested by the applicant. 13.  The decision was served on the applicant's counsel on 1 September 2003.