5.  The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in the town of Urus-Martan, in the Chechen Republic. She is the mother of Mr Adam Khurayev, born in 1978. 6.  The applicant's house in Urus-Martan was destroyed during the military campaign in the Chechen Republic in the autumn of 1999. The applicant's family had to move temporarily to Ingushetia, where they lived at the material time. Adam Khurayev frequently visited his aunt, Ms M.M., who lived in Urus-Martan, and stayed at her house no. 14, Lomonosova Lane (the street name and the house number were later changed to 74, Kutuzova Street). 7.  In the summer of 2002 Adam Khurayev and his twin brother Arbi Khurayev submitted their documents to the Urus-Martan District Department of the Interior (the ROVD) to exchange their old Soviet passports for new Russian ones. On 22 November 2002 Adam and Arbi Khurayev went to Urus-Martan to pick up their new passports. The brothers stayed at their aunt's house at the above address. At the material time the town of Urus-Martan was under curfew. The authorities maintained manned checkpoints at the entry and exit points to the town. 8.  At about 10 p.m. on 23 November 2002 the family of M.M. was at home. When Adam Khurayev went outside, to the toilet located in the courtyard, a group of over fifteen armed masked men in camouflage uniforms broke into the house. The intruders neither introduced themselves nor produced any documents. The applicant's relatives thought that they were Russian servicemen. They dispersed into different rooms, pointed their guns at the family members and ordered everyone to stay in their rooms. M.M.'s daughter, Ms L.M., rushed to the window and heard the intruders order someone in Russian: “Lie on the ground!” She thought that the order must have been given to Adam Khurayev, as he was the only family member in the yard. 9.  Without providing any explanations or reasons for their actions, the servicemen conducted a quick but thorough search of M.M.'s house. They did not find anything of interest to them. 10.  After that the servicemen returned to the yard and walked out into the street. Shortly thereafter M.M. and L.M. heard the sound of heavy military vehicles in the street. 11.  Ms. A.M., one of M.M.'s neighbours, residing at 47 Lomonosova Street, was woken up at about 10 p.m. on 23 November 2002 by the sound of heavy military vehicles in the street. She looked out of the window and saw an APC (armoured personnel carrier) and two military UAZ vehicles (“таблетка”) parked in the street. A.M. did not go outside because of the curfew. According to A.M., at the material time APCs were frequently driven in Urus-Martan at night and servicemen often took young men away. About fifteen minutes later the vehicles started their engines and drove away. 12.  After the servicemen had left, the applicant's relatives realised that Adam Khurayev, who had been in the courtyard, had disappeared. 13.  The applicant has had no news of Adam Khurayev since 23 November 2002. 14.  The above account of the events is based on the applicant's application form and written statements by M.M. and A.M., dated 10 and 11 November 2005 respectively. 15.  The Government submitted that on 23 November 2002 Adam Khurayev had been abducted by unidentified persons. 16.  In the morning of 24 November 2002 Arbi Khurayev went to Ingushetia to inform the applicant about the disappearance of Adam Khurayev. The applicant immediately went to Urus-Martan and started searching for her son. From 24 November 2002 for almost a month the applicant, who was elderly and illiterate, complained in person about her son's disappearance to a number of local law-enforcement agencies, including the Urus-Martan district military commander's office (hereafter “the district military commander's office”), the ROVD, and the Urus-Martan district prosecutor's office (“the district prosecutor's office”). The authorities denied any involvement on the part of their officials in the abduction of Adam Khurayev. 17.  The applicant's relatives assisted her in the search for Adam Khurayev. They contacted, both in person and in writing, various official bodies, such as the President of the Russian Federation, the Envoy of the President of the Russian Federation for Ensuring Human Rights and Freedoms in the Chechen Republic, the Chechen administration, departments of the interior and prosecutors' offices at different levels, asking for help in establishing the whereabouts of Adam Khurayev. The applicant retained copies of a number of those complaints and submitted them to the Court. An official investigation was opened by the district prosecutor's office. The relevant information is summarised below.
(b)  The official investigation into the abduction of Adam Khurayev 18.  On 23 December 2002 the applicant complained in writing about her son's disappearance to a number of State authorities, including the district military commander's office, the district prosecutor's office and the ROVD. She stated that on 22 November 2002 she and her sons Arbi and Adam had gone to Urus-Martan to obtain her sons' identity documents. At about 10 p.m. on that day armed and masked members of law-enforcement authorities, wearing camouflage uniforms, had broken into the house at no. 14 Lomonosova Street and had abducted Adam Khurayev. The intruders had used an APC and two UAZ vehicles. She stressed that prior to his abduction her son had undergone stomach surgery. 19.  On 20 January 2003 the prosecutor's office of the Chechen Republic (“the republican prosecutor's office”) forwarded the applicant's complaint about her son's abduction to the district prosecutor's office for examination. 20.  On 14 February 2003 the district prosecutor's office instituted an investigation into the abduction of Adam Khurayev under Article 126 § 2 of the Criminal Code (aggravated kidnapping). The criminal case file was given number 34022. 21.  On 15 March 2003 the district prosecutor's office granted the applicant the status of a victim in criminal case no. 34022. 22.  On 24 April 2003 the applicant wrote to a number of State authorities, including the prosecutor and the military prosecutor of the Chechen Republic. She stated that her son had been abducted by servicemen from the law-enforcement agencies of the Urus-Martan district who had arrived in two UAZ vehicles and an APC. The applicant pointed out that her numerous complaints to various State bodies had failed to produce any results and that, apart from instituting an investigation into the abduction, the district prosecutor's office had failed to take any other measures aimed at establishing her son's whereabouts. She stressed that her son's abductors must have been representatives of the State as only they could have moved freely in the town during the curfew and used military vehicles. 23.  On 22 May 2003 the republican prosecutor's office informed the applicant that on 14 February 2003 the district prosecutor's office had opened criminal case no. 34022 into the abduction of her son; that on 14 April 2003 the investigation had been suspended owing to the failure to establish the perpetrators and that unspecified operational and search measures aimed at solving the crime were under way. 24.  On 9 June 2003 the military prosecutor's office of the United Group Alignment (“the UGA military prosecutor's office”) forwarded the applicant's complaint about her son's abduction to the military prosecutor's office of military unit no. 20102 for examination. 25.  On 17 June 2003 the republican prosecutor's office forwarded the applicant's request for assistance in the search for her son to the district prosecutor's office and instructed the latter to inform the applicant of any developments in the investigation. 26.  On 30 June and 2 July 2003 the military prosecutor's office of military unit no. 20102 informed the applicant that the examination of her complaints had failed to establish any involvement of Russian servicemen in the abduction of Adam Khurayev. 27.  On 11 December 2003 the applicant complained to the minister of the interior of the Chechen Republic, submitting that her son had been abducted by a group of armed men in camouflage uniforms who had arrived in two UAZ cars and an APC without number plates. She stressed that the abductors must have been State servicemen as only they could have moved freely in the town during the curfew and used military vehicles. The applicant pointed out that her numerous complaints to various State bodies had failed to produce any effect and that the criminal investigation had been suspended and reopened and had failed to produce any results. 28.  On 17 December 2003 the applicant complained to the prosecutor of the Chechen Republic, stating that her son had been abducted by a group of armed men in camouflage uniforms who had arrived in two UAZ vehicles and an APC. She averred that her son's abductors must have been representatives of the State as only they could have moved freely in the town during the curfew and used military vehicles. The applicant pointed out that her numerous complaints to various State bodies had failed to produce any effect and that the criminal investigation into her son's abduction had failed to produce any results and had been suspended and reopened on a number of occasions. She emphasised that her previous complaint to the prosecutor about the inactivity of the district prosecutor's office had not produced any results. Lastly, she requested the prosecutor to oblige the district prosecutor's office to solve the crime. 29.  On 13 January 2004 the republican prosecutor's office forwarded the applicant's complaint to the district prosecutor's office. The latter was to provide the applicant with detailed information on the investigation and its results. 30.  On 23 January 2004 the head of the ROVD informed the applicant that they had opened an operational-search file for the search for her son and that they had sent an unspecified number of requests for information to law-enforcement agencies in the Urus-Martan District and various regions of the Russian Federation. 31.  Following a complaint by the applicant to the republican prosecutor's office, on 28 January 2004 the district prosecutor's office informed her that on 28 January 2004 it had resumed the investigation in criminal case no. 34022 and that the case file had been entrusted to another investigator. 32.  On 1 March 2004 the republican prosecutor's office forwarded the applicant's complaint about her son's abduction to the district prosecutor's office for inclusion into the criminal case file and instructed the latter to inform the applicant of any developments in the case. The letter also stated that the investigation in case no. 34022 had been reopened. 33.   On 24 March 2004 the district prosecutor's office informed the applicant that on 28 February 2004 they had suspended the investigation in criminal case no. 34022. 34.  On 27 March 2004 the ROVD informed the applicant that their numerous requests for information to various law-enforcement agencies in Chechnya and other regions had failed to produce any results. 35.  On 7 May 2004 the Prosecutor General's office in the Southern Federal Circuit informed the applicant that they had forwarded her complaint about the abduction of Adam Khurayev to the republican prosecutor's office. 36.  On 31 May 2004 the district prosecutor's office informed the applicant that on 31 May 2004 they had resumed the investigation in criminal case no. 34022. 37.  On 17 June 2004 the republican prosecutor's office informed the applicant that all information concerning the investigation into her son's abduction was to be obtained from the district prosecutor's office. 38.  On 29 July 2004 the applicant wrote to a number of State authorities, including the Urus-Martan district prosecutor and the head of the ROVD. In her letter she described the circumstances of her son's abduction and pointed out that her numerous complaints to various State bodies had failed to produce any results. In particular, the criminal investigation into her son's abduction had been conducted in a superficial manner and had not produced any results. All her complaints about the ineffectiveness of the investigation, addressed to the supervisory bodies, had been forwarded to the district prosecutor's office. Although the latter body had replied to the complaints, none of those replies contained any information concerning investigative measures undertaken in the course of the criminal proceedings. Finally, the applicant submitted that her son's abductors must have been representatives of the State as only they could have moved freely in the town during the curfew, gone through existing checkpoints and used military vehicles. 39.  On 4 August 2004 the district prosecutor's office replied to the applicant, stating that the investigation in criminal case no. 34022 had been carried out in compliance with the law. The district prosecutor's office had taken all the investigative measures which could be carried out in the absence of those to be charged with the crime. They had sent numerous requests for information to various law-enforcement agencies and hospitals. The republican prosecutor's office's (unspecified) instructions concerning the investigation had been complied with. The theory that Russian military servicemen had been involved in the abduction of Adam Khurayev had been examined but had not been confirmed. The latest decision to suspend the investigation owing to the failure to identify the perpetrators was dated 30 June 2004. 40.  On 23 August 2004 the republican prosecutor's office informed the applicant that on an unspecified date the investigation in criminal case no. 34022 had been suspended, but operational-search measures aimed at solving the crime were under way. 41.  On 2 September 2004 the district prosecutor's office informed the applicant that her complaint of 1 September 2004 had been included in the case file of criminal case no. 34022. 42.  On 30 September 2004 the ROVD forwarded the applicant's complaint about her son's abduction to the district prosecutor's office for examination. 43.  On 15 May 2005 the applicant wrote to the Urus-Martan district prosecutor, describing in detail the circumstances of her son's apprehension and pointing out that her son had been abducted by representatives of the State. The applicant complained that the investigation into Adam Khurayev's abduction had been too lengthy, that basic investigative measures had not been taken and that she had no information about its progress. The applicant requested the authorities to resume the investigation, to provide her with access to the criminal case-file materials and with copies of basic investigative documents to which she was entitled by law. 44.  On 24 June 2005 the district prosecutor's office informed the applicant that on 6 June 2005 they had resumed the investigation in criminal case no. 34022 and that she could obtain a copy of the decision to grant her victim status and certain other documents from their office. 45.  On 30 July 2005 the military prosecutor's office of military unit no. 20102 informed the applicant that the examination of her complaint about her son's abduction had failed to confirm any involvement of Russian servicemen in the abduction of her son. 46.  On 11 November 2005 the applicant wrote to the Urus-Martan district prosecutor. She described in detail the circumstances of her son's apprehension and pointed out that her son had been abducted by representatives of the State. The applicant submitted that the investigation into Adam Khurayev's abduction had been ineffective and that it had failed to produce any results for more than three years. She complained about the lack of information about the investigation, requested the authorities to grant her victim status in the criminal case, to resume the investigation and provide her with access to the criminal case-file materials. 47.  By a letter of 14 November 2005 the republican prosecutor's office forwarded the applicant's complaint about her son's abduction to the district prosecutor's office for examination. 48.  On 18 November 2005 the district prosecutor's office informed the applicant that her complaint of 11 November 2005 had been granted only in part. The letter did not specify in which part, but stated that the applicant's request concerning access to the criminal case-file materials had been rejected pursuant to Article 42 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 49.  On 15 December 2005 the applicant wrote to the district prosecutor's office. She pointed out that on 11 November 2005 she had requested the authorities to resume the investigation in criminal case no. 34022 and provide her with access to the case-file materials; that on 18 November 2005 the authorities had partially granted her request but had failed to specify in which part. The lack of clarity in the decision had precluded her from appealing against it. She requested that that matter be clarified. 50.  On 23 December 2005 the district prosecutor's office replied to the applicant that she had been granted victim status on 15 March 2003 and that she was only entitled to access to procedural documents concerning investigative measures she had participated in. 51.  On 24 April 2006 the district prosecutor's office informed the applicant that on an unspecified date they had resumed the investigation in criminal case no. 34022. 52.  On 14 February 2003 the district prosecutor's office instituted a criminal investigation into the abduction of Adam Khurayev under Article 126 § 2 of the Criminal Code. The case file was attributed number 34022.
(a)  Witnesses interviewed by the investigation 53.  Being interviewed as a witness on 18 February 2003, M.M. stated that at 10 p.m. on 23 November 2002 armed persons in masks and camouflage uniforms had broken into her house and had abducted Adam Khurayev. Before coming to her household, the abductors had looked for Adam Khurayev in her brother's house. Neighbours known as “Zulay” and “Tamusa”, whose family names M.M. did not remember, had seen the abductors use APCs and UAZ vehicles. 54.  On 15 March 2003 the applicant was granted victim status and interviewed. She stated that she had learnt from M.M. that at about 10 p.m. on 23 November 2002 armed and masked persons had broken into M.M.'s house and had taken Adam Khurayev with them. 55.  I.M., questioned on 20 January 2004 as a witness, submitted that on 24 November 2002 he had learnt from M.M. about the abduction of the applicant's son. M.M. had told him that she had not witnessed the abduction and that two women known as Zulay and Tamusa had told her that the abductors had arrived in an APC and two UAZ vehicles. 56.  Zara S., interviewed as a witness on 4 February 2004, stated that in the morning of 24 November 2002 she had learnt from the applicant and other neighbours about the abduction of Adam Khurayev. Zara S. had not seen any vehicles and, apart from herself, there were no other women known as “Tamusa” who lived in the vicinity. Zara S. confirmed her statement while being questioned as a witness on 18 June 2004. 57.  M.Ch. was interviewed as a witness on 11 February 2004. She stated that on the night of 23 November 2002 she had been at home with her husband A.Ch., who worked in the local military commander's office. At about 10 p.m. she had heard noise coming from the neighbouring household of Z.Ch. (see below). M.Ch. and her husband had rushed to Z.Ch.'s house and seen armed men wearing masks there. A.Ch. had asked them why they had broken into Z.Ch.'s house. In response the armed men had forced A.Ch. to the ground. M.Ch. had run back home and had fetched her own and her husband's identity papers. She had presented them to the armed men, explaining to them that her husband worked at the local military commander's office. At that moment the armed men had been ordered over a portable radio to leave, which they did quickly. They had left in several vehicles but M.Ch. did not remember what their models were. On the next morning M.Ch. had learnt about the abduction of Adam Khurayev. 58.  On 17 February 2004 the investigation questioned A.Ch. as a witness. He stated that on the night of 23 November 2002 he had been at home with his family. One of his family members had alerted him to the fact that something had been going on in Z.Ch.'s (his brother's) house. A.Ch. had rushed outside and in Z.Ch's yard he had run into several armed men wearing masks; their clothes had borne no insignia. When A.Ch. had asked what they were doing there, the armed men had forced him to the ground and ordered him to lie down. Several minutes later A.Ch. had overheard somebody order the armed men to leave, which they had done. A.Ch. and his wife had returned home and had learnt on the following day about the abduction of Adam Khurayev. 59.  On 20 February 2004 the investigation interviewed Z.Ch. as a witness. He stated that at about 10 p.m. on 23 November 2002 he had been at home in his house in Urus-Martan. At that moment several armed men in camouflage uniforms had burst into his house and had requested his identity papers. Having carried out a passport check, they had left. 60.  M.B., the wife of Z.Ch., was questioned as a witness on an unspecified date in February 2004. She stated that on the night of 23 November 2002, while she had been at home with her husband, several armed men in camouflage uniforms and masks had burst into their house and had ordered the family members to produce their identity documents for a passport check. Upon checking the documents one of the intruders had apologised, saying that the group had come to the wrong address, and they had left. M.B. had not noticed any insignia and did not remember how many intruders there had been. On the next day she had learnt about the abduction of the applicant's son. 61.  On 9 June 2004 M.M. was again questioned as a witness. She confirmed the previous statement she had given to the investigation and stated also that the intruders had carried out a search in her house; that the applicant's son had been outside in the toilet when the armed men had burst into her house and that in the morning on 24 November 2002 she had found his slippers at the toilet entry; and that she herself had not seen whether the intruders had come in military vehicles. 62.  On 12 June 2004 the investigation questioned R.Kh., the applicant's daughter. She stated that on an unspecified date she had learnt from the applicant that on 23 November 2002 Adam Khurayev had been abducted while he had been at M.M.'s house in Urus-Martan. 63.  When questioned again on 15 June 2004 the applicant stated that on 22 November 2002 she had arrived in Urus-Martan with her sons, Arbi and Adam Khurayev, to pick up their passports. In the evening of 23 November 2002 the applicant and Arbi had stayed at Z.Ch.'s place, while Adam Khurayev had gone to stay at M.M.'s place. At about 10 p.m. several armed and masked men had burst into Z.Ch.'s house and had forced Z.Ch. to the ground. One of the intruders had said “I don't think it's him” and another armed man had replied to him “I don't think so either”. On the following morning the applicant had learnt from M.M. that armed men in camouflage uniforms had abducted Adam Khurayev on the previous night.
(b)  Further investigative steps 64.  On an unspecified date the investigator inspected the crime scene. No objects were seized during the inspection. 65.  With a view to examining the possibility that representatives of the State had been involved in the applicant's son's abduction, on unspecified dates the investigating authorities made enquires with various State bodies, including the commander of military unit no. 6779, the military commander of the Urus-Martanovskiy District, the ROVD, unspecified remand prisons, detention centres and hospitals in the region as to Adam Khurayev's whereabouts. From the replies of those State authorities it followed that their officials had not arrested Adam Khurayev, had not instituted criminal proceedings against him and had no information on his whereabouts. According to those replies, he had not been held in detention and had not applied for medical assistance. 66.  On an unspecified date the detention logs of the ROVD and its temporary detention ward were examined. No information concerning Adam Khurayev was found. 67.  On 6 July 2005 the investigation in case no. 34022 was suspended. 68.  On 18 November 2005 the investigation was resumed and the applicant was notified of that decision. 69.  Despite a specific request by the Court, the Government did not disclose most of the contents of the file in criminal case no. 34022, providing only copies of the records of the witness interviews described in paragraphs 53-63 above. The Government stated that the investigation was in progress and that disclosure of the documents would be in violation of Article 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, since the file contained personal data concerning the witnesses or other participants in the criminal proceedings. 70.  On 3 March 2006 the applicant complained to the Urus-Martanovskiy Town Court (“the Town Court”) about the ineffectiveness of the investigation into the abduction of her son. She requested that the investigation be resumed and the necessary investigative measures be taken and also sought access to the case file. 71.  By a decision of 30 March 2006 the Town Court allowed the applicant's complaint in part. In particular, it held that the district prosecutor's office had unlawfully refused to provide the applicant with information concerning the developments in the investigation, which had prevented her from challenging the investigator's acts or inaction in court. The court ordered the district prosecutor's office to provide for the applicant's access to the case file, subject to the restrictions applicable under the rules of criminal procedure. Lastly, the court declared unlawful and unfounded the decision to suspend the investigation in case no. 34022 and ordered the district prosecutor's office to carry out an effective investigation. The decision, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:
“... It emerges from the materials of case file no.34022 ... that on 23 November 2002 at about 10 p.m. unidentified masked persons carrying submachine guns broke into the household of [M.M.]'s family ... and abducted Adam Khurayev.
The investigation took steps aimed at solving the crime and identifying the perpetrators. In particular, M.M., I.M., Z.S., Z.Ch., R.B., M.Ch. and A.Ch. were interviewed as witnesses. ...
... The investigation failed to identify the persons who had abducted Adam Khurayev or establish his whereabouts. In that connection it had been suspended ... on numerous occasions and then reopened again. The latest decision to suspend the investigation is dated 18 December 2005.
However it transpires from the case file that the investigator failed to take all relevant investigative steps. In particular:
- it was not established which [military] units or power structures on the territory of the Urus-Martanovskiy District were equipped with APCs; where each military vehicle had been located at the time of the abduction, and where and on whose order it had been used [at the time of the abduction]”;
- the commanders of units equipped with APCs at the time of the abduction and the drivers of the APCs were not interviewed;
- the logbooks of the departments keeping records of the use of military vehicles at the time of the abduction were not examined;
- the heads of the military commander's office, the district department of the FSB and the district department of the Interior were not questioned with a view to establishing who had been granted authorisation to pass through Urus-Martan on 23 November 2002 at night during the curfew;
- the logbooks of detention facilities were not seized and checked and the persons responsible for detainees were not questioned with a view to verifying whether the abducted person was being or had been held in any detention facility.” 72.  On 5 July 2006 the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic upheld the decision on appeal.


5.  The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in the Cēsis District (Latvia). 6.  On 16 June 1997 the applicant gave birth in the Cēsis District Central Hospital (a municipal enterprise, hereinafter “the Cēsis hospital”). Caesarean section was used, with the applicant’s consent, because uterine rupture had occurred during labour. 7.  In the course of that surgery the surgeon performed tubal ligation (surgical contraception) without the applicant’s consent. 8.  On 4 February 2005, after her attempt to achieve an out-of-court settlement with the hospital had failed, the applicant initiated civil proceedings against the hospital, seeking to recover damages for the unauthorised tubal ligation. In December of 2006 her claim was upheld and she was awarded compensation in the amount of 10,000 Latvian lati for the unlawful sterilisation. 9.  On 19 February 2004 the director of the Cēsis hospital wrote to the Inspectorate of Quality Control for Medical Care and Fitness for Work (hereinafter “the MADEKKI”), requesting it to “evaluate the treatment received by [the applicant] during childbirth in accordance with the legislation in force in 1997”. The MADEKKI initiated an administrative procedure on the following day. The administrative inquiry concerned the applicant’s health care and in particular the gynaecological and childbirth assistance she had been provided from 1996 to 2003. In the process of that inquiry the MADEKKI requested and received medical files from three different medical institutions, containing detailed information about the applicant’s health over that period. 10.  In April 2004 M.Z., a MADEKKI staff member, telephoned the applicant and informed her of the on-going inquiry. M.Z. invited the applicant to comment on the case, which she declined to do, referring the MADEKKI to her legal representative, Ms Olsena, instead. During the conversation M.Z. allegedly admonished the applicant for wanting to sue the hospital for damages, and told her that she herself was to blame for her sterilisation. 11.  On 7 May 2004 Ms Olsena asked the MADEKKI for information on the legal grounds for, and the factual circumstances of, the inquiry. 12.  On 14 May 2004 the MADEKKI issued a report concerning the medical treatment given to the applicant during childbirth in 1997. The report contained medical details about the applicant of a particularly private and sensitive character. It concluded that no laws had been violated during the applicant’s antenatal care or during childbirth. A summary of the findings of the report was sent to the director of the Cēsis hospital on 21 May 2004. 13.  On 18 May 2004 the MADEKKI answered Ms Olsena’s questions concerning the administrative inquiry, setting out its opinion on the legal basis for it and providing information on the steps that had been taken in the course of the inquiry. 14.  The applicant’s representative lodged a claim with the Administrative District Court, alleging that the MADEKKI had initiated the inquiry unlawfully, since in essence its purpose had been to help the Cēsis hospital to gather evidence for the impending litigation, which was outside the MADEKKI’s remit. It was also alleged that the MADEKKI had acted unlawfully in requesting and receiving information about the applicant’s health, as it had violated the applicant’s right to respect for her private life. That right had been further violated when the MADEKKI unlawfully transferred the applicant’s data to the Cēsis hospital. Lastly, the court was requested to annul an administrative act – the MADEKKI’s report – since its findings were erroneous. Compensation in the amount of 500 Latvian lati was requested in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 15.  On 12 May 2005 the Administrative District Court adopted a judgment by which it terminated the proceedings with regard to the request to annul the MADEKKI report, as in the court’s opinion the report did not create any specific rights or obligations for the applicant and thus could not be considered an administrative act, and dismissed the remainder of the application as ill-founded. 16.  Counsel for the applicant appealed and on 16 June 2006 the Administrative Regional Court adopted a judgment by which it upheld in full the first-instance court’s judgment and endorsed that court’s reasoning, essentially equating the activities of the MADEKKI with the provision of health care, which, according to domestic law, was a legitimate reason for gathering personal data. 17.  On 8 February 2007 the Senate of the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant, in which reference was made, inter alia, to Article 8 of the Convention and to the cases of Z v. Finland (25 February 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑I) and M.S. v. Sweden (27 August 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑IV). 18.  The Senate agreed with the lower courts that the MADEKKI report could not be considered an administrative act. It further considered that this report was not an action of a public authority (faktiskā rīcība) and thus was not amenable to review in administrative courts. 19.  It thus remained for the Senate to address the applicant’s claims that the MADEKKI’s actions in preparing the report had been unlawful. In this regard the Senate considered that the Medical Treatment Law gave the MADEKKI the right to examine the quality of medical care provided in medical institutions not only upon receiving a corresponding complaint from a patient but also when a request for such examination had been submitted by a medical institution, which had an obligation to protect the interests of the society so that, should any irregularities be found by the MADEKKI, they might be eliminated and their recurrence with respect to other patients avoided in the future. 20.  The Senate agreed with the applicant that the processing of sensitive data concerning her constituted an interference with her rights guaranteed by, inter alia, Article 8 of the Convention. The Senate then went on to summarise the findings of the Strasbourg Court in the two cases invoked by the applicant, emphasising in particular that the Convention left to the States a wide margin of appreciation in balancing the confidentiality of medical data and the necessity to preserve patients’ confidence in the medical profession and in the health services in general. 21.  The Senate further held that both the Medical Treatment Law and the Personal Data Protection Law contained exceptions that permitted the MADEKKI to collect and process the otherwise confidential medical data. The former listed such exceptions explicitly (see paragraph 30 below), while the latter allowed processing of medical data for the purposes of medical treatment or the provision or administration of heath care services (see paragraph 28 below) or if processing of personal data was necessary for a system administrator to carry out his legal duties (see paragraph 29 below). The Senate continued as follows: “according to [the law] the MADEKKI has a duty to control the quality of medical care. In order to carry out such control, the MADEKKI requires information about the patient and his care”. 22.  The Senate concluded as follows:
“Taking into account the aforementioned, the [Senate] finds that restrictions to a person’s private life connected to gathering and processing of sensitive personal data are provided for by law. When regulating this question, the legislator has already assessed the aim and proportionality of such restrictions, as well as has provided for safeguards against unjustified disclosure of the above-mentioned data. Consequently [the applicant’s] argument that the Regional Court ought to have assessed the aim and proportionality of the restriction is unfounded.
Additionally the [Senate] considers that the Regional Court has correctly interpreted and applied the above-mentioned legal provisions and has come to the correct conclusion that the MADEKKI, in order to carry out the control of the quality of medical care, which it is competent to do, had a right to receive and process [the applicant’s] sensitive data without asking for her consent and that the MADEKKI has acted within its sphere of competence and in accordance with the provisions of the law concerning the processing of sensitive personal data. The MADEKKI used the information it had collected about [the applicant] in order to carry out its functions, namely, to control the quality of the medical care provided to [the applicant], while to the Cēsis hospital it only handed over its conclusions concerning the legality of the doctors’ actions, which did not contain [the applicant’s] sensitive data.” 23.  For these reasons the Senate decided to uphold the lower courts’ decisions. 24.  Section 10 of the Medical Treatment Law (Ārstniecības likums) at the relevant time provided that the MADEKKI was the institution responsible for monitoring the quality of medical care provided in medical institutions. 25.  The MADEKKI’s work at the relevant time was governed in more detail by its statute (nolikums), which had been approved by the Cabinet of Ministers. The statute provided that the MADEKKI was a government institution, whose main functions were to inspect and monitor the professional quality of health care in medical institutions irrespective of their ownership status (paragraph 1). Paragraph 3 of the statute listed the principal functions of the MADEKKI, such as to examine complaints in order to protect the rights of patients (paragraph 3.3), to oversee and issue reports concerning the professional quality of medical care in the event of complaints (paragraph 3.4), to issue reports on the quality of medical care in medical institutions (paragraph 3.6) and the like. 26.  According to its statute the MADEKKI had a right to carry out scheduled (“plānveida”) checks on the quality of medical care as well as to carry out the required checks in response to complaints and requests (paragraph 4.1). Paragraph 4.2 authorised the MADEKKI “to request from private individuals and officials documents and information concerning questions within its field of competence”. If the MADEKKI found that laws had been broken in the course of providing health care, it was authorised to apply administrative fines and issue warnings, as well as to give appropriate recommendations to doctors and administrators of medical institutions. 27.  Lastly, section 72 of the MADEKKI statute provided that its staff had to maintain confidentiality with regard to any information obtained in the performance of their professional duties. 28.  The Personal Data Protection Law (Fizisko personu datu aizsardzības likums) provides, in section 11, that the processing (which is defined as any activities with personal data, including collecting, registering, using, and so on) of sensitive personal data (including information about a person’s health) is permitted only after having received written consent from the data subject. Without such consent personal data may be processed only in a limited number of situations, including “if ... necessary for the purposes of medical treatment [or] the provision or administration of heath care services” (section 11(5)). 29.  Section 7 of the Personal Data Protection Law provided more generally that processing of personal data was allowed only if that law did not provide otherwise and if at least one of the other conditions was present. One of the additional conditions was that the processing of the data was necessary for a system administrator to carry out his legal duties (section 7(3)). A “system administrator” for the purposes of this Law was “a natural or legal person who determines the aims of a data processing system and the means of processing [of the data]”. 30.  As in force at the relevant time, section 50 of the Medical Treatment Law provided that information concerning patients’ treatment and diagnosis could only be provided to a limited number of institutions, including the MADEKKI.


6.  The first applicant, who was born in 1974 and is a citizen of Afghanistan, left Afghanistan on an unspecified date and entered Bulgaria in 1998. 7.  On an unspecified date the first applicant unsuccessfully sought asylum in Bulgaria. The terms of his application, the reasons for the refusal and the relevant dates have not been substantiated by the first applicant. 8.  Since 1999 the first applicant has attended the Bulgarian Church of God, a Baptist Church in Sofia. In 2001 he was baptised. 9.  The first applicant has two children born in Bulgaria in 2003 and 2005 (the third and fourth applicants). Their mother (the second applicant), born in 1982, whom the first applicant married in 2004, is an Armenian national who has had a permanent residence permit in Bulgaria since an unspecified date. According to the first and second applicants, their first child, born in 2003, has no citizenship and their second child, born in 2005, is a national of Afghanistan. 10.  In August 2003 the first applicant submitted a second application for asylum. By a decision of 17 March 2004 he was granted refugee status in Bulgaria on the ground that he risked persecution in Afghanistan on account of his conversion from Islam to Christianity. The short decision stated in its relevant part that according to information from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, conversion to Christianity was “punishable by death in all Afghanistan”. No further details were stated. 11.  On 6 December 2005 the Director of the National Security Service, at that time a department of the Ministry of the Interior, issued an order withdrawing Mr M.’s residence permit, ordering his expulsion and imposing a ten-year ban on his re-entering Bulgaria on the ground that he was a “serious threat to national security”. Factual grounds were not indicated. The Director relied on an internal document of 24 November 2005 which stated that the first applicant was involved in trafficking of migrants, mainly citizens of Afghanistan, through Turkey and Bulgaria to Serbia, Montenegro, Greece and Hungary. The Director considered that this activity was as such a threat to national security. Also, it could be used for the transit of terrorists and thus discredit Bulgaria internationally. 12.  The deportation order of 6 December 2005 did not specify the country to which the first applicant should be deported. It appears that there was no legal requirement to do so and that in practice deportation orders did not indicate the country of destination. 13.  The order of 6 December 2005 also stated that the first applicant should be detained pending expulsion. 14.  On 12 October 2006 another government agency, the Migration Directorate of the national police, issued an order for the first applicant’s detention pending expulsion. The relationship between that order and the order of 6 December 2005, which also required Mr M.’s detention, has not been clarified. 15.  According to the order of 12 October 2006, Mr M.’s detention was necessary since he posed a serious threat to national security, and also in view of the fact that there was no (direct) transport connection between Bulgaria and the first applicant’s country of origin, which prevented the immediate execution of the measure against him. 16.  The orders of 6 December 2005 and 12 October 2006 were both immediately enforceable. 17.  On 18 October 2006 the first applicant was arrested and detained at the Centre for Interim Detention of Aliens. He remained there until his release on 3 July 2009 (see paragraph 43 below). 18.  The first applicant has not been deported. 19.  According to a statement by the Director of Migration, prepared for the present proceedings and submitted in 2009, Mr M.’s deportation was impeded by the fact that he did not have a document valid for international travel, the “lack of transport connections” and his refusal to cooperate. The Director further explained, without providing details, that several possible destinations for his expulsion had been considered and that unsuccessful attempts had been made to remove the obstacles to the execution of the deportation order. 20.  At least until April 2007, the first applicant did in fact have a document valid for international travel. He possessed a special refugee passport, issued by the Bulgarian authorities on 16 December 2004, which was valid for international travel until 6 April 2007. The existence of this document, including its number and date of issue, was mentioned in the deportation and detention order of 6 December 2005. It is unclear whether the first applicant presented his refugee passport to the authorities or concealed it, as suggested by the Government. 21.  In February 2007 the Migration Directorate of the police wrote to the Embassy of Afghanistan in Sofia requesting that an identity document be issued to Mr M. It reiterated the request in September 2008 and January 2009. By letter of 30 January 2009 the Embassy of Afghanistan informed the Migration Directorate that it was unable to issue the first applicant with a passport since he had expressly stated at a meeting with Embassy representatives that he did not want to have a passport issued and did not want to return to Afghanistan. In those circumstances, the Embassy would not participate in the first applicant’s forced expulsion. 22.  In a letter of 14 October 2008 to the first applicant’s representative, in reply to his request for release, the Director of the National Security Agency stated that Mr M.’s detention continued to be necessary despite the Court’s interim measures decision (see paragraph 4 above). That was so because:
“[I]n accordance with the document from the [Court], the [first applicant] should not be deported to Afghanistan. In execution of the expulsion order, he may be deported either to his country of origin or to a third country, where there is no danger for his life and health. The fact that the [deportation] order has not been enforced is the result of the obstinate conduct of [Mr M.] manifested by his frustrating and hampering his deportation from Bulgaria.” 23.  On 20 October 2006 the first applicant appealed to the Sofia City Court against the order of 6 December 2005 of the National Security Service and requested a stay of enforcement pending the determination of his appeal. In these proceedings he was legally represented. 24.  He argued, inter alia, that mere suppositions, not facts, had served as the basis for the impugned measures, there being no evidence of unlawful activities and no criminal proceedings having been brought against him. He also submitted that the expulsion order was in breach of the prohibition to deport a person to a country where his life was under threat. The first applicant further argued that his expulsion interfered with his right to respect for his family life. He also challenged the order for his detention. 25.  The defendant, the National Security Service, submitted a copy of the internal document of 24 November 2005 which had served as the basis for the expulsion order (see paragraph 11 above). It also filed submissions, maintaining, inter alia, that the impugned order did not contravene section 44a of the Aliens Act. 26.  On an unspecified date Mr M.’s representative wrote to the Migration Directorate insisting that the deportation order should be revoked in view of Mr M.’s refugee status in Bulgaria. 27.  By letter of 1 February 2007 the Director of Migration replied that the order was lawful. He stated, inter alia:
“In accordance with section 67(3) of the Refugees and Asylum Act, execution of the [deportation order] should not be suspended where there are grounds to believe that the alien seeking or having obtained protection imperils national security.
In accordance with Article 33 of the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, ‘no Contracting State shall expel or return (refouler) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion’.
The benefit of this provision cannot, however, be claimed by a refugee about whom there are grounds to believe that he imperils the national security of the country where he is ...” 28.  In October 2007, as a result of legislative amendments, the examination of the first applicant’s appeal against the order of 6 December 2005 fell within the competence of the Supreme Administrative Court. 29.  On 30 October 2007 a three-member panel of the Supreme Administrative Court refused the first applicant’s request for a stay of enforcement. The court devoted no attention to his allegations about the risk of ill-treatment in Afghanistan and his request to stay the execution of the deportation order but stated merely that the alleged interference with family life did not warrant a stay of enforcement of the order for his detention. That decision was amenable to appeal before a five-member panel of the Supreme Administrative Court. It is unclear whether the first applicant appealed. 30.  By a judgment of 9 June 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the first applicant’s appeal against his expulsion and detention. 31.  The court noted that an internal Ministry of the Interior document dated 24 November 2005 and submitted by the defendant stated that Mr M. had acted in a way that presented a threat to national security. The court did not accept the first applicant’s arguments that it should engage in detailed examination of the evidence allegedly supporting the view of the Ministry that he posed a threat to Bulgaria’s national security. It stated:
“[The document of 24 November 2005] must be regarded as an official certification which contains data collected by the National Security Service in the exercise of its functions. It has been issued in accordance with section 33 of the Protection of Classified Information Act. It contains evidence and data which have been assessed by the relevant administrative authority as sufficient grounds for ordering [Mr M.’s deportation] for having engaged in unlawful activities threatening national security... It follows that the impugned order is lawful.” 32.  The court rejected the first applicant’s argument that the deportation order should be revoked since he lived in Bulgaria by virtue of his refugee status. The court stated that the domestic provisions regulating deportation did not provide for discretion and their interpretation could not vary on the basis of such factors as residence status. 33.  The court further noted that Mr M. had been granted refugee status on the basis of his allegation that he had converted from Islam to Christianity and was afraid of persecution in Afghanistan. The court observed that there existed evidence of a danger to the first applicant’s health and life in relation to his conversion. It found, however, that this danger did not stem from the Afghan State and that the applicant had not provided evidence that the authorities would be unable to protect him. Therefore, section 44a of the Aliens Act, which reflected the guarantees of Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the Convention, did not apply. 34.  As regards the order for the first applicant’s detention, the Supreme Administrative Court found that it was not amenable to judicial review as it concerned a measure undertaken in the execution of the expulsion order and not a separate administrative decision. 35.  On 26 October 2006 the first applicant appealed to the Sofia City Court against the detention order of 12 October 2006 issued by the Migration Directorate. 36.  In these proceedings, on 21 December 2006 the Sofia City Court refused the first applicant’s request for a stay of enforcement of the detention order. It found, inter alia, that there was no evidence that its immediate enforcement would cause irreparable harm. The refusal was upheld by the Supreme Administrative Court on 13 March 2007. 37.  In the proceedings on the merits, the first applicant argued that his lengthy detention was unlawful and in breach of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention and that it disproportionately affected his family life. 38.  By a judgment of 2 April 2009 the Sofia City Court found that the order of 12 October 2006 for the first applicant’s detention had been signed by an unauthorised official and declared it null and void. The court held, however, that it did not have the power to order the first applicant’s release. No appeal was lodged against that judgment. It became final on 2 June 2009. 39.  On 15 May 2009 the Aliens Act was amended with the aim of incorporating into Bulgarian law Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals. 40.  Under the new section 46a of the Aliens Act, the director of the detention centre for aliens is required to submit to the relevant court a list of persons who have been detained for more than six months and the court must decide of its own motion on their continued detention or release. 41.  In accordance with this new procedure, the situation of a number of aliens, including the first applicant, was reviewed by the Sofia Administrative Court in a decision of 12 June 2009. The decision was presented to the first applicant to read but he was not given a copy of it. 42.  On 30 June 2009 the Director of the Migration Directorate of the national police, referring to the decision of the Sofia Administrative Court of 12 June 2009, issued an order which revoked the order of 12 October 2006 for the first applicant’s detention and imposed on him the obligation to report daily to the local police station. The judgment of the Sofia City Court of 2 April 2009 (see paragraph 38 above) was not mentioned. 43.  The order of 30 June 2009 was served on the applicant on 3 July 2009 and he was released on the same day. 44.  By a decision of 5 October 2009 the third and fourth applicants were granted refugee status in Bulgaria. The grounds for that decision have not been communicated to the Court.


7.  The facts of each case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 8.  Mr Thomas William Hobbs is a United Kingdom national, born in 1921 and living in Southampton. 9.  The applicant’s wife died on 25 February 1998. On 11 October 2000 he contacted the Inland Revenue (“IR”) and applied for widow’s bereavement allowance (“WBA”: see paragraph 21 below) for the years 1998/9 and 1999/2000. He was informed that he did not qualify for the tax allowance, since he was a man and the law provided only for payments to widows. 10.  Mr Richard was born on 21 May 1957 and lives in Dunfermline. He was widowed on 14 October 1995. There were two children of the marriage, born in 1987 and 1993. 11.  In around November 1995 the applicant telephoned the IR requesting an allowance equivalent to that received by a widow. The IR told him that he was ineligible for WBA. The applicant applied again by letter dated 19 July 2000, but by a letter dated 3 August 2000 he was informed the WBA was not available for widowers. 12.  In around June 1997 the applicant applied to the Benefits Agency (“BA”) for social security benefits equivalent to those to which a widow would have been entitled (see paragraphs 29-37 below). His claim was refused by the BA on 18 June 1997. The applicant wrote on 22 June 1997 requesting an appeal against this decision and requesting that the appeal be heard after the Court had decided the lead case on widowers’ benefits. On 8 May 2000 the applicant requested that his appeal be proceeded with. It was rejected on 15 May 2000. 13.  The applicant began living with another woman in October 1999. In August 2000 he reapplied for widows’ benefits and was refused again on 16 August 2000. 14.  Mr Walsh was born on 19 July 1955 and lives in London. He was widowed on 1 March 1997. There were two children of the marriage, born on 22 February 1991 and 29 December 1992. 15.  On 30 May 2000, the applicant applied to the BA for social security benefits equivalent to those which a widow in his circumstances would receive. He was refused by a letter dated 6 June 2000. 16.  On 3 July 2000 the applicant applied to the IR for a WBA or equivalent. He was refused by a letter dated 11 July 2000. 17.  The applicant was born on 20 October 1958 and lives in Maidenhead. His wife died on 17 October 1995. There were three children of the marriage, born 18 November 1987, 22 August 1989 and 22 April 1992. 18.  In his application form, which was lodged with the Court by facsimile under cover of an introductory letter dated 29 September 2000, there was a general complaint about the discriminatory nature of the widow’s social security and taxation systems, in standard paragraphs included in all the widowers’ applications submitted by the applicant’s solicitors. In the section dealing with the particular facts of the applicant’s case, there was no mention of any contact with the IR concerning WBA. An amended application form was sent to the Court under cover of a letter dated 15 March 2001. A paragraph had been added, stating that in or around December 1995 or January 1996 the applicant had made enquiries at his local tax office about entitlement to tax rebates or allowances following bereavement, and had been told that he had no entitlement. Reference was made in the amended application form also to “the decision of the Inland Revenue made in July 1996 which is ongoing”, and on 26 March 2001 the applicant sent the Court a copy of a letter of refusal from the IR dated 9 July 1996. 19.  On 30 May 2000 the applicant applied to the BA for survivor’s benefits. He was refused by a letter dated 5 June 2000. This information was included in the application form lodged on 29 September 2000. 20.  In their observations on admissibility dated 4 October 2002, the Government informed the Court that the applicant had also made a formal claim to the IR for WBA on 29 September 2000, which had been refused on 3 October 2000. This was confirmed by the applicant in his observations dated 28 November 2002.


5.  The applicant, Mr Mirosław Zieliński, is a Polish national who was born in 1953 and is currently detained in Włocławek Prison. 6.  From 18 November 2004 until 24 July 2008 the applicant was detained in Łowicz Prison. It is not clear whether on the latter date he was released or transferred to another detention facility. He is currently detained in Włocławek Prison. 7.  The applicant submitted that in Łowicz Prison he had been held in overcrowded and dirty cells. During the period of his detention in Łowicz, the applicant had occupied a total of seventeen cells, including cell no. 202 in wing II, in which he had been detained from 26 October 2007 until 24 July 2008. 8.  The Government acknowledged that during almost the entire period of the applicant’s detention in Łowicz Prison the space per person in his cells had been inferior to 3 square metres. They submitted that the cells had been clean and that the applicant had had one shower per week and one hour of outdoor exercise per day. 9.  The applicant also complained about the practice of mixing healthy prisoners with those who were infected with transmissible diseases, such as HIV or hepatitis C (HCV). Prisoners were not informed by the authorities about such state of affairs. On one occasion the applicant was told by his fellow cellmate that the latter was HIV-positive. To that effect the applicant submitted a statement dated 13 February 2008, in which a certain P.P., a person claiming to be an HIV-positive prisoner, certified that on 12 February 2008 he had been placed in the applicant’s cell no. 202 wing II. P.P. further stated that neither the applicant nor other inmates had been aware of his illness and that he, in fact, had been instructed by the prison administration not to reveal his HIV status. 10.  The applicant complained that he had been exposed to the risk of contamination because he had shared his cell with infected persons and he had not been informed about it. He also had not been advised of the dangers relating to HIV and HCV and of the means of protection against it. Moreover, he submitted that from the moment when he had found out that his fellow cellmates were either infected or could potentially be infected, he feared for his well-being. 11.  In 2001 the applicant suffered a fracture of the skull and underwent surgery in which a small part of his skull was removed. In addition, prior to his detention he had been hospitalised on several occasions because of his epilepsy, chronic ischemic heart disease (choroba wieńcowa) and thinning of the cervical cortex (zanik kory mózgowej). Prior to his detention in Łowicz Prison the applicant was under regular medical supervision; he received pharmacological treatment and had numerous medical check-ups. On 1 July 2004 he was tested for HIV and HCV. On 12 July 2004 he underwent coronary catheterisation (koronografia). 12.  On 20 May 2004 the applicant was certified as “temporarily disabled” with a mild degree of disability (umiarkowany stopień niepełnosprawności). It was indicated that the applicant occasionally required the help of a third person in his daily life. The certificate was valid until 20 May 2007. 13.  The parties did not furnish any medical reports or certificates related either to the period when the applicant was detained in Łowicz Prison or after his release. 14.  The applicant lodged several complaints about overcrowding in Łowicz Prison. In reply the authorities acknowledged the existence of the problem and pointed to its systemic nature. On the other hand the applicant did not bring a civil action in tort to seek compensation for the alleged infringement of his personal rights on account of overcrowding and inadequate conditions of his detention. 15.  The applicant instituted three sets of criminal proceedings against the prison administration and filed penitentiary complaints in relation to the alleged fact that from March until October 2006 and from March 2006 until February 2008 he had been forced to share his cell with inmates infected with HIV and HCV. 16.  On 8 December 2006 the Łowicz District Prosecutor (Prokurator Rejonowy) discontinued the criminal inquiry into the allegations described above. It was established that, as a matter of law, namely because of medical secrecy and antidiscrimination laws, the prison administration had never been informed about prisoners’ health. In consequence, potentially ill prisoners were mixed with potentially healthy prisoners. The practice, however, could not be considered as criminal negligence on the part of the prison administration. 17.  A similar decision was issued by the Łowicz District Prosecutor on 30 April 2007. On 26 September 2007 after the applicant’s interlocutory appeal the decision was upheld by the Łowicz District Court (Sąd Rejonowy). In addition to the reasoning presented in the prosecutor’s 2006 decision, the court relied on the submissions of the doctor in charge of the prison hospital, who had stated that mixing healthy prisoners with those who were HIV or HCV positive did not create any health risks to the prior group. 18.  Lastly on 25 June 2008 the Łowicz District Prosecutor refused to open an inquiry into similar allegations related to the longer period from March 2006 until February 2008. On October 2008 the Łowicz District Court upheld that decision. 19.  The applicant lodged at least eleven complaints with State authorities about the quality of medical care in Łowicz Prison. It appears that he also tried to institute criminal proceedings against the medical staff and administration of Łowicz Prison and applied for a prison break on health grounds. 20.  The penitentiary authorities considered the applicant’s allegations groundless. It was found that the applicant had received good quality medical care and that he had been under the regular supervision of medical specialists. On the other hand, it was repeatedly stated that the applicant had been a difficult and vexatious patient who did not cooperate with prison doctors and did not follow their recommendations. 21.  On 28 September 2006 the Łódź Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) rejected the applicant’s application for a prison break which he claimed to need in order to undergo surgery. The applicant wished to have an implant which would fill the bone gap created in his skull as a result of his 2001 surgery. The regional court considered the procedure which was sought by the applicant unnecessary in the light of the fact that he was under regular medical supervision and received adequate medical treatment. 22.  On an unspecified date the applicant was convicted by a criminal court of the first-instance. He appealed against that judgment and informed the authorities that, despite being represented by a lawyer, he wished to be brought to the appellate hearing under escort from the remand centre in order to present his case in person. 23.  On 15 March 2006 the Płock Regional Court rejected the applicant’s request. The court reasoned that the applicant’s presence was unnecessary in the light of the fact that his legal-aid lawyer was under a duty to participate in the hearing and that the applicant had already presented his case to the appeal court in writing. 24.  The applicant did not submit any further information about the course and the outcome of the proceedings in question. 25.  The applicant’s first letter to the Court, which was dated 1 January 2005, was deposited by the applicant with the administration of Łowicz Prison on 3 January 2005 and was received by the Registry of the Court on 21 January 2005. The envelope of that letter bears a stamp reading “Censored Deliver to the addressee Date ... Judge” (Ocenzurowano Doręczyć adresatowi Data ... Sędzia). The date of 14 January 2005 has been written by hand on the dotted line. An illegible signature is visible under the heading “Judge”. 26.  In his second letter to the Court, which was dated 7 February 2005, the applicant complained about the regular withholding and monitoring of his correspondence by the authorities. That letter was received by the Registry of the Court on 21 February 2005. The envelope of the letter in question bears a stamp and a signature identical to those described above. The date of 17 February 2005 has been written by hand on the dotted line. 27.  The other letters which were sent by the applicant to the Court do not bear any similar stamps.


4.  The applicants were born in 1923, 1959 and 1963, respectively, and live in Casteltermini. 5.  The applicants are the joint owners of a plot of land designated as agricultural land in Casteltermini. The land in issue was recorded in the land register as Folio no. 40, Parcel no. 185. 6.  On 13 July 1989 the regional councillor for public works issued a decree authorising the Municipality to take possession, through an expedited procedure and on the basis of a public-interest declaration, of a portion of the applicants’ land in order to begin the construction of a road. 7.  On 4 January 1991 the authorities took physical possession of the land. 8.  By a writ served on 23 June 1998, the applicants brought an action for damages against the Casteltermini Municipality before the Agrigento District Court. They alleged that the occupation of the land was illegal and that the construction work had been completed without there having been a formal expropriation of the land and payment of compensation. They claimed a sum corresponding to the market value of the land and a further sum in damages for the loss of enjoyment of the land during the period of lawful occupation. 9.  On an unspecified date the court ordered an expert valuation of the land. In a report submitted on 17 September 2001 the expert concluded that the occupied land covered a surface area of 124.87 square metres and confirmed that it could be classified as building land. He further concluded that the market value of the land on the date the occupation became unlawful, which he identified as having occurred on 13 July 1994, corresponded to 6.20 euros (EUR) per square metre, for a total of EUR 773.88. 10.  By a judgment delivered on 22 January 2003 and filed with the court registry on 23 January 2003, the Agrigento District Court declared that the possession of the land, which had been initially authorised, had become unlawful as of 4 June 1993. It found that the land had been irreversibly transformed by the public works. As a result, in accordance with the constructive-expropriation rule (occupazione acquisitiva or accessione invertita), the applicants had been deprived of their property, by virtue of its irreversible alteration, on the date on which the possession had ceased to be lawful. In the light of those considerations, the court concluded that the applicants were entitled to compensation in consideration for the loss of ownership caused by the unlawful occupation. 11.  The court drew on the expert valuation to conclude that the land could be classified as agricultural land and that its market value on the date the occupation had become unlawful corresponded to EUR 773.88. However, in contrast with the expert’s finding, the court reiterated that the occupation had become unlawful as of 4 June 1993. 12.  Therefore, the court held that the applicants were entitled to compensation in the sum of EUR 773.88, to be adjusted for inflation, plus statutory interest. 13.  The court further awarded the applicants EUR 37.43 as compensation for the damage occasioned by the unavailability of the land during the period from the beginning of the lawful occupation (13 July 1989) until the date of loss of ownership (4 June 1993). 14.  The judgment became final in March 2004.


5.  The applicant was born in 1966. He is serving a life sentence without commutation in Lovech Prison. 6.  On 4 October 1993 the applicant was placed in pre‑trial detention in Burgas Prison. 7.  On 25 July 1995 the Burgas Regional Court found the applicant guilty of murder and robbery and sentenced him to death. On 30 May 1997 a three‑member panel of the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld his conviction and sentence. On 22 July 1998 a five‑member panel of the Supreme Court of Cassation rejected the applicant’s petition for review. Throughout that time the applicant remained in Burgas Prison. 8.  Following the abolition of the death penalty in December 1998, on 25 January 1999 the Vice‑President of the Republic commuted the applicant’s sentence to one of life imprisonment without commutation. On 8 July 1999 the Burgas Regional Court ordered that the applicant’s sentence was to be served under the so‑called “special regime” (see paragraph 41 below). 9.  On 15 July 1999, when the Burgas Regional Court’s order of 8 July 1999 became final, the applicant was transferred to Lovech Prison, where he remains. Since that date he has been placed in different cells for different periods of time, each time with two or three other inmates. 10.  The applicant alleged that because of his detention regime he had been subjected to isolation. He also alleged that his cell, which he shared with three other inmates, measured ten square metres. The inmates were allowed to go to the toilet and wash three times a day, for ten to fifteen minutes each time. During the rest of the time they had to relieve themselves in a plastic bucket as the cell was not equipped with toilet facilities or a sink. 11.  The applicant also alleged that the food served in the prison was of poor quality and that he had found insects and other objects in it. 12.  The witnesses heard in various proceedings for damages brought by the applicant, including inmates detained in the same prison (see paragraphs 20, 26 and 35 below) and kitchen staff, stated that during certain unidentified periods the applicant had had no access to newspapers or books, and had not been allowed to visit the prison chapel, go to concerts or attend rehabilitative courses. He had had no access to the prison canteen and his food had been served in his cell. One inmate stated that during a period of time there had been no fresh air or natural light in the applicant’s cell. The witnesses also corroborated the applicant’s allegations that he only had access to toilets and running water three times a day and had to use a plastic bucket the rest of the time. The kitchen staff stated that the food served in Lovech Prison met the applicable quality standards. 13.  On 21 April 2004 the applicant complained to the prison governor about the conditions of his detention. The governor replied that in view of the applicant’s regime of detention, constant access to the toilet facilities could not be provided but inmates were allowed access to the communal toilets several times a day. As for the dimensions of the cells and their being overcrowded, the governor admitted that this was a problem in all Bulgarian prisons and stated that the administration of Lovech Prison was trying to provide the recommended minimum living space to every detainee. He disputed the allegation that prison food was of poor quality. 14.  According to a report drawn up by the prison governor on 15 November 2009, the applicant was detained under the so‑called “special regime” (see paragraph 41 below). During most of the time that he had spent in Lovech Prison the applicant had been held in cell no. 18, which measured 4 by 3.15 metres and had two windows. At first inmates had had access to toilets and running water three and, after October 2005, four times a day, in accordance with a schedule drawn up by the governor. In the autumn of 2008 toilet facilities had been installed in all life prisoners’ cells and all window frames had been changed. 15.  The governor further stated, without specifying time periods, that the applicant had been entitled to go into the open air once a day, for one hour, and to visit the library and take part in literary and board‑game (chess and draughts) competitions. He had received an award in one such competition. According to the governor, the applicant had regular access to newspapers and magazines. He received food prepared in accordance with the applicable regulations and standards, as did all other prisoners. He had access to medical assistance, which he could receive in his cell or in the prison’s medical wing. 16.  The governor also stated that the applicant’s “special regime” had not yet been changed to a lighter one because of numerous breaches of prison discipline on his part. 17.  The applicant did not dispute those statements. 18.  The Court has not been provided with information as to the conditions of the applicant’s detention after the refurbishment of Lovech Prison in the autumn of 2008. Nor has the applicant provided information about the regime under which he was placed after November 2009. 19.  On 27 October 2004 the applicant brought a claim against the Ministry of Justice under section 1(1) of the State Liability for Damage Act 1988 (“the 1988 Act” – see paragraph 61 below). He sought 4,000 Bulgarian levs (BGN) (2,045.17 euros (EUR)) in damages in respect of the distress and humiliation resulting from the poor conditions of his detention in Lovech Prison between August 1999 and October 2004. 20.  The judges who dealt with the case visited the prison and inspected the cells in which the applicant had been held. They also heard witnesses, ordered expert reports and gathered other evidence. 21.  On 8 July 2005 the Lovech District Court partly allowed the claim. It found, by reference to this Court’s case‑law, that the failure to ensure that inmates had access to toilet facilities and running water amounted to inhuman treatment and was incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention and domestic law. It held that having to use a bucket for toilet needs, in a cell measuring about ten square metres, without sufficient ventilation and in the presence of others, diminished human dignity and posed a serious risk to health. The court went on to say that the applicant’s allegations that the food was of poor quality and did not meet the minimum standards were unsubstantiated as the food served in prison was prepared in compliance with the Ministry of Health requirements and portions were of the recommended size. 22.  In assessing the quantum of damages, the court noted that the applicant had failed to establish the extent to which he had been affected psychologically and the degree to which he had suffered morally as a result of the conditions of his detention. Ruling in equity, the court awarded the applicant BGN 280 (EUR 143.16) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage for the period between August 1999 and October 2004, finding that the claim in relation to the period before August 1999 had become time‑barred. It applied section 10(2) of the 1988 Act (see paragraph 65 below) and ordered the applicant to pay BGN 158.80 (EUR 81.19) in court fees in respect of the part of his claim which it had dismissed. 23.  In a final judgment of 6 January 2006 the Lovech Regional Court upheld the lower court’s judgment. 24.  In above‑mentioned proceedings, the applicant acted together with a co‑claimant, Mr Plamen Radkov, who was detained in the same prison and for whom the outcome of the proceedings was similar. The courts examined the applicant’s and Mr Radkov’s claims jointly and the judgments rendered were in respect of both of them. In a judgment of 10 February 2011 this Court found breaches of Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention on account of the conditions of Mr Radkov’s detention in Lovech Prison between March 2000 and October 2004 and the lack of effective remedies in that respect (see Radkov v. Bulgaria (no. 2), no. 18382/05, §§ 45‑56, 10 February 2011). 25.  On 20 September 2004 the applicant brought another claim against the Ministry of Justice under section 1(1) of the 1988 Act (see paragraph 61 below). He sought BGN 20,000 (EUR 10,225.84) in damages in respect of the anguish suffered as a result of his isolation between October 1993 and September 2004, initially as a prisoner on death row and then as a life prisoner under the “special regime”. 26.  The courts heard witnesses, one of whom had been detained in Burgas Prison and the others in Lovech Prison, and gathered other evidence. 27.  On 14 April 2005 the Lovech Regional Court dismissed the claim, finding, inter alia, that the “special regime” applied to the applicant had been prescribed by law and that the conditions of his detention did not amount to inhuman and degrading treatment. 28.  On an appeal by the applicant, on 14 November 2005 the Veliko Tarnovo Court of Appeal quashed the lower court’s judgment. It found that the applicant had been kept in very strict isolation from October 1993 until September 2004, initially as a prisoner on death row and then under the “special regime” applicable to life prisoners. It also found that, during the applicant’s pre‑trial detention in Burgas Prison, his cell had had no toilet facilities but he had had free access to toilets outside the cell. Since 1999, when the applicant had been transferred to Lovech Prison, he had shared a cell with one or two inmates and had been allowed to use the toilet facilities three times a day; the rest of the time he had had to relieve himself in a bucket in the cell. The cell had had only one window, which had constantly remained closed, preventing the flow of fresh air. Furthermore, until 2001 the window had been covered with tin blinds, which had not allowed natural light into the cell. The applicant had not been given any newspapers. The court found that none of the above measures had been required under the legislation or regulations governing the execution of sentences; in particular, the requirement that life prisoners be kept under heightened supervision (see paragraph 41 below). Those conditions had been attributable to unlawful omissions of the prison administration, had amounted to ill‑treatment, and had caused the applicant harm. 29.  The court ordered the Ministry of Justice to pay the applicant BGN 2,000 (EUR 1,022.58) in damages. In assessing the quantum of damages, the court noted that as a result of the poor conditions of his detention the applicant had endured, in particular, “negative feelings caused by the humiliation and debasement”. He had however failed to prove that those conditions had adversely affected his health. 30.  On appeal, in a final judgment of 7 August 2007 (реш. № 330 от 7 август 2007 г. по гр. д. № 92/2006 г., ВКС) the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld the lower court’s judgment. 31.  The courts ordered the applicant to pay a court fee of BGN 1,080 (EUR 552.20) in respect of the part of his claim which they had dismissed, in accordance with section 10(2) of the 1988 Act (see paragraph 65 below). 32.  On 15 October 2007 the applicant obtained a writ of execution and on 26 November 2007 requested payment. 33.  As he did not receive payment, on 9 April 2009 the applicant brought proceedings before the Sofia City Administrative Court, requesting the court to order the Ministry of Justice to pay the sums due under the writ of execution. At the time when the applicant filed his observations in the present case (25 March 2010) the proceedings were, following a dispute between various courts as to which was competent to deal with the case, still pending at first instance before the Sofia City Administrative Court. 34.  On 12 April 2006 the applicant brought a third claim under section 1(1) of the 1988 Act (see paragraph 61 below). He sought BGN 10,500 (EUR 5,368.56) in damages in respect of the distress and humiliation resulting from the poor conditions of his detention in Lovech Prison between October 2004 and April 2006. 35.  The Sofia City Court heard witnesses and gathered other evidence. 36.  On 28 December 2007 the Sofia City Court found that during the period in question the applicant’s cells had not had toilet facilities or access to running water. The applicant had been allowed to go out of his cell and use such facilities three or four times a day, and had been required to use a bucket the rest of the time. The court found that that practice was in breach of domestic law and Article 3 of the Convention. It partly allowed the applicant’s claim, ordering the Ministry of Justice to pay him BGN 750 (EUR 383.47) in damages. It noted that applicant had been awarded damages in the two previous sets of proceedings in respect of the period preceding October 2004. In assessing the quantum of damages, the court took into account the duration of the period during which the applicant had lived in the conditions described above (one year and five months), the severity of the damage sustained, the applicant’s age and the lack of permanent or temporary damage to his health as a result of those conditions. Applying section 10(2) of the 1988 Act (see paragraph 65 below), the court ordered the applicant to pay BGN 390 (EUR 199.40) in court fees in respect of the part of his claim which had been dismissed. 37.  The applicant appealed. 38.  It appears that, on 9 April 2009, the Sofia Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s judgment in so far as the award of damages was concerned. As the applicant has not submitted a copy of that judgment, it is not clear whether the court quashed the part of the judgment which concerned the court fees (see paragraphs 67‑69 below). 39.  In a decision of 6 December 2010 (опр. № 1189 от 6 декември 2010 г. по гр. д. № 905/2010 г., ВКС, III г. о.) the Supreme Court of Cassation refused leave to appeal on points of law and the Sofia Court of Appeal’s judgment of 9 April 2009 became final.


10.  On 8 November 1993 the applicant commenced employment as an administrative assistant at the United States Embassy in London, in the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service, which is a subsidiary of the Central Intelligence Agency. She was dismissed from her employment in February 1995. Following her dismissal the applicant issued proceedings against the United States Government in the North London Industrial Tribunal, claiming that her dismissal had been the result of sex discrimination contrary to sections 1(1)(a), 4(1)(d) and 6(2)(b) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (see paragraph 15 below). In particular she alleged that she had been the victim of persistent sexual harassment from her supervisor and that working relationships had broken down in consequence. The United States Government defended the claim and did not, at any stage in these proceedings, claim State immunity. On 13 May 1996 the Tribunal upheld the applicant’s complaint. A compensation figure of GBP 12,000 was agreed between the parties. 11.  In June 1995, whilst her first claim in the Industrial Tribunal was still pending, the applicant applied for and obtained a fixed term 12 month contract as an administrative assistant within the Foreign Building Operations section of the Embassy. The contract was due to expire in June 1996. In June 1996 and August 1996 (after the finding in her favour by the Industrial Tribunal), the applicant applied for at least two of the following posts at the Embassy of the United States: secretary with the Office of Foreign Litigation of the United States Department of Justice, temporary secretary with the above office and temporary secretary with the International Marketing Centre, which is operated by the United States Foreign Commercial Service. On each occasion her application was unsuccessful. 12.  On 15 September 1996 the applicant issued a second application before the Industrial Tribunal. She claimed that the refusal of the Embassy to re-employ her in two of the above posts was a consequence of her previous successful sex discrimination claim, and accordingly constituted victimisation and discrimination within the meaning of sections 4 and 6 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. 13.  By a letter of 10 January 1997, solicitors acting for the United States notified the Regional Secretary to the Industrial Tribunal that the United States Government intended to claim immunity from the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under sections 1 and 16(1)(a) of the State Immunity Act 1978 (“the 1978 Act”: see paragraph 16 below). The letter enclosed an affidavit sworn by the First Secretary at the Embassy, deposing to the fact that each of the posts for which the applicant had applied were part of the administrative and technical staff of the Embassy, and accordingly fell within the ambit of the immunity imposed by section 16(1)(a) of the 1978 Act. 14.  On 6 February 1997 the applicant received the advice of counsel, to the effect that the United States Government were entitled to claim immunity under the 1978 Act, and that once immunity was properly asserted there was no means by which a court or tribunal in the United Kingdom could accept jurisdiction to entertain the application. Accordingly, the applicant was advised that she had no remedy in domestic law.  15.  The Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (“the 1975 Act”) creates a statutory cause of action which arises when an employer treats an employee or a potential employee less favourably by reason of her sex (“sex discrimination”), or by reason of the fact that she has taken or intends to take proceedings against any person under the 1975 Act (“victimisation”).
Section 1(1) of the Act defines “sex discrimination” as follows:
“A person discriminates against a woman in any circumstances relevant for the purposes of any provision of this Act if:              (a)on the ground of her sex he treats her less favourably than he treats or would treat a man ...”
Section 4(1) of the Act defines “victimisation” as follows:
“A person (‘the discriminator’) discriminates against another person (‘the person victimised’) in any circumstances relevant for the purposes of any provision of this Act if he treats the person victimised less favourably than in those circumstances he treats or would treat other persons, and does so by reason that the person victimised has:              (a)brought proceedings against the discriminator or any other person under this Act, or  ...              (d)alleged that the discriminator or any other person has committed an act which ... would amount to a contravention of this Act or give rise to a claim under the Equal Pay Act 1970 ...”
Section 6 of this Act defines the circumstances in which it is unlawful to discriminate against employees and applicants, on the grounds of sex discrimination or victimisation, as follows:
“(1) It is unlawful for a person, in relation to employment by him at an establishment in Great Britain, to discriminate against a woman:               (a)in the arrangements he makes for the purpose of determining who should               be offered that employment, or ...              (c)by refusing or deliberately omitting to offer her that employment.”
(2)It is unlawful for a person, in the case of a woman employed by him at an establishment in Great Britain, to discriminate against her ...              (b)by dismissing her, or subjecting her to any other detriment.” 16.  The United Kingdom’s State Immunity Act 1978 provides, inter alia, as follows:
“1(1)A State is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United Kingdom except as provided in the following provisions of this Part of this Act.              …4(1)A State is not immune as respects proceedings relating to a contract of employment between the State and an individual where the contract was made in the United Kingdom or the work is to be wholly or partly performed there.              4(2)Subject to sub-sections (3) and (4) below, this section does not apply if-              (a)              at the time when the proceedings are brought the individual is a national of the State concerned; or              (b)at the time when the contract was made the individual was neither a national of the United Kingdom nor habitually resident there; or              (c)the parties to the contract have otherwise agreed in writing.4(3)Where the work is for an office, agency or establishment maintained by the State in the United Kingdom for commercial purposes, sub-section (2)(a) and (b) above do not exclude the application of this section unless the individual was, at the time when the contract was made, habitually resident in that State.              …16(1)This Part of this Act does not affect any immunity or privilege conferred by the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964 or the Consular Relations Act 1968; and:-              (a)Section 4 above does not apply to proceedings concerning the employment of the member of a mission within the meaning of the Convention scheduled to the said Act of 1964 or of the member of a consular post within the meaning of the Convention scheduled to said Act of 1968. ...” 17.  Article 1 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations which is scheduled to the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964 provides the following definitions:
“(b)the ‘members of the mission’ are the head of the mission and the members of staff of the mission;              (c)the ‘members of staff of the mission’ are the members of diplomatic staff or the administrative and technical staff, and of the service staff of the mission.              ...(f)the ‘members of the administrative and technical staff’ are the members of the staff of the mission employed in the administrative and technical service of the mission.” 18.  The 1972 European Convention on State Immunity (“the Basle Convention”), entered into force on 11 June 1976 after its ratification by three States. It has now been ratified by eight States (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom) and signed by one other State (Portugal). It entered into force in respect of the United Kingdom on 4 October 1979, and provides, inter alia:
Article 5
“1.A Contracting State cannot claim immunity from the jurisdiction of a Court of another Contracting State if the proceedings relate to a contract of employment between the State and an individual where the work has to be performed in the territory of the State of the forum.              2.Paragraph 1 shall not apply where:(a)the individual is a national of the employing State at the time when the proceedings were brought;              (b)at the time when the contract was entered into the individual was neither a national of the State of the forum nor habitually a resident in that State; or              (c)the parties to the contract have otherwise agreed in writing, unless, in accordance with the law of the State of the forum, the Courts of that State have exclusive jurisdiction by reason of the subject-matter.              3.Where the work is done for an office, agency or other establishment referred to in Article 7, paragraphs 2(a) and (b) of the present article apply only if, at the time the contract was entered into, the individual had his habitual residence in the Contracting State which employs him.”
Article 32
“Nothing in the present Convention shall affect privileges and immunities relating to the exercise of the functions of diplomatic missions and consular posts and of persons connected with them.” 19. The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations ((1991), II(2) YBILC 13), provides at Article 11, paragraph 1, that:
“a State cannot invoke immunity ... in a proceeding which relates to a contract of employment between the State and an individual for work performed in the territory of [the host] State.”
However, this provision is specifically disapplied where “the subject of the proceedings is the recruitment, renewal of employment or reinstatement of the individual” and where “the employee has been recruited to perform functions closely related to the exercise of governmental authority”.
Although there is no explicit reference to employment at diplomatic or consular missions in these provisions, the commentary indicates that the latter exception was intended to apply in such a context and that all employees at such missions would be precluded from bringing suit on the basis of State immunity. 20.  The Committee on State Immunity of the International Law Association adopted in 1982 its Draft Convention on State Immunity, Article IIIC of which dealt with contracts of employment and was similar in its terms to Article 5 of the Basle Convention. An amendment was added to Article IIIC at the ILA’s 1994 conference, providing for immunity to be granted where “the employee was appointed under the public (administrative) law of the foreign state such as, inter alia, members of the mission, diplomatic, consular or military staff”. In the explanatory commentary on the amendment the Committee stated that it wished “to make clear that the employment relationship of any and all diplomatic and consular staff and other members of the mission should be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the forum state”.