9.  The applicants are Irish citizens, born in 1958 and 1957, respectively, and they both live in County Wicklow, Ireland. 10.  On 12 September 1990 they agreed to buy a site with planning permission from “the vendors” on which they intended to build a house. The sale was completed in October 1990. It subsequently emerged that, because of discrepancies in the relevant site maps on which they relied during the sale, they did not have access to the site from the road. They were obliged to discontinue building and to sell the site. 11.  On 31 May 1991 the Minister for Agriculture and Food established the Tribunal of Enquiry into the Beef Processing Industry (“Beef Tribunal”) and nominated the President of the High Court to be the sole member of the Tribunal. While conducting the Beef Tribunal, the President continued, when possible, to sit in cases in the High Court. 12.  On 17 July 1991 the applicants instituted High Court proceedings for negligence, negligent misstatement, breach of contract, misrepresentation and breach of warranty against their own solicitors (“the applicants' solicitors”), the vendors and “the vendors' solicitors”. On 10 March 1992 the High Court ordered discovery on a consent basis. Pursuant to the applicants' motion and the defendants' consent, on 4 May 1992 the High Court ordered the defendants to file their defence within 4 weeks. Further motions of the applicants were struck out on 22 and 24 June and on 19 October 1992. On 18 May 1993 the case was certified ready for hearing by the applicants' senior counsel. 13.  The case was originally listed for hearing on 8 July 1993 but it was adjourned (the applicants objected) due to the illness of one of the defendants to 15 July 1993 when another hearing date would be fixed. On 15 July 1993 a hearing date was fixed for 6 October 1993. On that date there was no judge available and the matter was heard on 7 October 1993 when the President of the High Court (“the trial judge”) made himself available.
The Government maintained that the trial judge was advised by counsel present that the hearing required two days, that the judge had notified the parties that his tribunal commitments meant that he had only two days for their case so that, if the case took longer, he would be obliged to adjourn until after the Beef Tribunal, that he would only deal with issues of liability and that the applicants agreed to this. The applicants denied that their counsel so advised the trial judge, that the trial judge had informed them that the trial would be so adjourned, that their counsel would have agreed to an indefinite adjournment (given the second applicant's psychological state) or that they agreed to the separation of issues of liability and damages. 14.  The applicants' case was heard on 7 and 8 October 1993 and, since it was unfinished, the trial judge adjourned it. On 2 November 1993 and 8 February 1994 the applicants wrote to the Chief Registrar of the High Court asking for enquiries to be made as to when the action would be resumed. On 16 March 1994 they wrote to the Registrar asking him to intervene with the trial judge to fix a date and enclosing a medical report of the second applicant's doctor dated 12 March 1994 (see paragraph 32 below). The Registrar was also contacted by telephone on numerous occasions by the applicants regarding a hearing date. In March 1994 the Registrar informed the applicants by telephone that the trial judge had confirmed a hearing date in July 1994. A letter to the Registrar of 9 June 1994 requested that a hearing date be fixed. 15.  During this period, the applicants wrote also wrote to, inter alia, numerous members of Dáil Eireann (the House of Representatives) including to the Minister for Justice. The Deputy Chair of Dáil Eireann indicated, in a letter dated 25 March 1994, that he had contacted the Acting President of the High Court asking the latter to intercede on the applicants' behalf. On 7 April 1994 the Acting President responded that the case would be taken in July 1994. 16.  On 29 July 1994 the trial judge completed his report on the Beef Tribunal. On 19 September 1994 he was appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The trial judge resumed the hearing of the applicants' case on 5 October 1994. He heard the last two witnesses and requested legal argument in writing. He reserved judgment, indicating that he would deliver it approximately one week after receipt of the written submissions. Those submissions were made by the end of October 1994 17.  On 29 November 1994, 2 February, 12 April and 22 May 1995 the applicants wrote to certain Registrars of the High Court requesting information as to when the judgment would be delivered. A response, dated 26 May 1995, stated that the trial judge could not confirm when he could deliver his judgment given his heavy commitments. Further to the applicants' letter, the Minister for Justice indicated in a letter of 10 July 1995 that, while she could not intervene, she had brought the matter to the attention of a Registrar of the High Court. The applicants also wrote to a Registrar on 12 July 1995 again requesting an early delivery date. A Registrar's letter of 13 July 1995 indicated a delivery date before the end of the month. By letter dated 25 July 1995 the Minister for Justice responded to a further letter from the applicants indicating that she had forwarded a copy of the applicants' correspondence to the trial judge. Further to another letter from the applicants, a Registrar subsequently confirmed delivery of the judgment on 12 September 1995. 18.  Judgment was orally delivered on that date. Both the vendors and the applicants' solicitors were found liable in damages and the claim against the vendors' solicitors was dismissed. On 21 September 1995 the Court made various orders concerning damages (adjournment of the assessment of damages) and costs to be paid by the unsuccessful parties. Pending finalisation by the trial judge of the written judgment, the form of order was not to be perfected in order to allow the applicants time to consider the text of that judgment prior to the expiration of the time-limit for appealing any orders of the High Court. The applicants wrote two letters to a Registrar of the High Court (dated 6 and 13 October 1995) and the text of the judgment became available in mid-October 1995. The order of the High Court was perfected on 17 October 1995 and on 3 November 1995 the applicants appealed the findings in favour of the vendors' solicitors to the Supreme Court. The vendors also appealed the High Court findings against them. 19.  Since a stenographer had not been present during the High Court hearings, it was necessary to prepare and agree a record of the evidence given during those hearings for the purposes of the appeal. By 9 February 1996 the applicants had completed a substantial note of evidence and on 29 March 1996 they submitted it to the vendors and to the vendors' solicitors for their agreement. On 17 July 1996 the applicants issued two motions. The first sought the comments of the vendors' solicitors on the note of evidence and the second requested that the vendors' appeal be struck out for “want of prosecution” since the vendors had not filed documents in their appeal. 20.  On 26 July 1996 the Supreme Court heard both motions with the trial judge (then Chief Justice) presiding. The court requested the vendors and the vendors' solicitors to submit their comments on the note of evidence within two weeks, in default of which the trial judge would finalise the note. On the second motion, the vendors were given until 7 October 1996 to file the relevant appeal documents, in default of which the Supreme Court envisaged striking out the vendors' appeal. Both motions were adjourned until 11 October 1996. The vendors' appeal and the related motion were later dropped. 21.  Following further letters from the applicants in August 1996, on 17 September 1996 the vendors' solicitors indicated that they disagreed with 16 items in the note of evidence. On 11 October 1996 the applicants' motion concerning the note of evidence was adjourned to 18 October 1996. Three days later the vendors' solicitors confirmed that agreement would not be reached on the note. On 18 October 1996 three judges of the Supreme Court (not including the trial judge) directed the trial judge to settle the note of evidence. On 24 October 1996 the applicants submitted the note of evidence together with a note of the 16 disputed points to the trial judge. 22.  In or around November 1996 the President of the High Court gave directions that all complaints about delays in proceedings should be forwarded to him. A memorandum of the President of the High Court published in the Bar Review of January/February 1997 noted the delays in delivering reserved judgments due to the shortage of judges and requested legal practitioners formally to notify the President of the High Court of their concerns about such delays. 23.  Subsequently, the applicants wrote to a Registrar of the High Court on a number of occasions (including on 14 January, 12 March and 25 June 1997) requesting the early settlement of the note of evidence. On 8 July 1997 the applicants wrote to the President of the High Court requesting him to intervene given the delay in their proceedings. In July 1997 a Registrar of the High Court indicated orally that the trial judge would deal with the matter after 20 August 1997. The applicants sent a further reminder to that Registrar on 18 September 1997. On 10 October 1997 the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform (“the Department of Justice”) requested the Chief Registrar's comments on the alleged undue delay in the case. On 16 October 1997 a Registrar indicated to the Department of Justice that the note of evidence matter would be resolved in one week. 24.  By letter dated 22 October 1997 the trial judge forwarded a report (six pages) he had prepared on the evidence and on the points disputed by the relevant parties and he apologised to the applicants for the delay. By letter dated 24 October 1997 a Registrar assured the Department of Justice that the note of evidence matter had been resolved and that an early date for a hearing of the appeal would be made available. 25.  Further to the applicants' complaints to their member of Dáil Eireann and to the Tánaiste (the deputy Prime Minister), the Attorney General expressed, by letter dated 30 October 1997 to the applicants, his concern at the delay in their case. While he was constitutionally obliged not to interfere in judicial matters, he had mentioned the matter informally to the trial judge and the latter assured him that all outstanding matters had been dealt with. In a letter dated 4 November 1997 the Attorney General confirmed to the Tánaiste that he was concerned about the delays which the applicants had experienced in their case and that he had raised these matters in a private and informal manner with the trial judge who had assured him that all outstanding matters had been dealt with. Following an invitation, the applicants met with a member of the Attorney General's Office in late November 1997, although the advice was that that office could not interfere in judicial processes. 26.  By motion dated 9 December 1997 the applicants amended their appeal. By letter dated 21 January 1998 the Minister for Justice responded to queries of the Taoiseach (Prime Minister) concerning the applicant's case pointing out that on 21 November 1997 the appeal hearing had been fixed for 2 February 1998. 27.  The Supreme Court delivered its reserved judgment on the applicants' appeal on 9 March 1998 and found in the applicants' favour, considering that the vendors' solicitors were also liable in negligence to the applicants. 28.  The case was remitted to the High Court for the assessment and apportionment of damages. By letter dated 7 May 1998 the Attorney General responded to queries raised by the applicants' member of Dáil Eireann: he indicated that their case was “concerning” and that it was hoped that the recently established system for monitoring judicial delays would ensure that their experience would not be repeated. 29.  The vendors' solicitors filed an amended defence in May 1998 and the applicants filed further particulars of damage in June 1998. On 26 June 1998 the vendors' solicitors made a late lodgement into court in the sum of 85,000 Irish pounds (IR£). The applicants objected. A letter dated 13 July 1998 from the Attorney General's office to the applicants explained that his previous intervention related to an administrative act by the trial judge (the note of evidence) but that the outstanding matters were judicial in which he could not interfere. By letter dated 22 July 1998 the Attorney General's office confirmed that it had been informed that a hearing date had been fixed by the High Court for 13 October 1998. A letter dated 6 August 1998 from the Taoiseach's office to the applicants confirmed that increased resources to the courts meant that it was hoped that their experiences would not be repeated. On 9 October 1998 the applicants also met with the Tánaiste to discuss the length of their ongoing proceedings. 30.  On 13-16 October 1998 an assessment hearing took place in the High Court. On 25 November 1998 the High Court awarded the applicants approximately IR£200,000 in respect of pecuniary loss and IR£10,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage (the High Court finding that both applicants had been put through “a high degree of anxiety and upset” as a consequence of the defendants' negligence). The applicants were also awarded their costs when taxed and ascertained. On 11 December 1998 the High Court dealt with matters concerning the attribution of liability between the defendants. The order of the High Court was perfected in early February 1999. There was no appeal on these matters to the Supreme Court. 31.  The Taxing Master abridged the time for service of the applicants' bill of costs (Order 99, Rule 28(1) of the Rules of the Superior Courts) and fixed a hearing for 29 July 1999. The bill of costs contained 519 items and comprised 172 pages. This hearing was then adjourned on the application of the vendors' solicitors until 20 October 1999. The hearing took place on that date and, since it did not finish, it was adjourned to and continued on 20 November 1999. It was again adjourned and concluded on 22 November 1999, when the Taxing Master delivered his reserved ruling. The Certificate on Taxation (approximately IR£300,000) was signed by the Taxing Master on 15 December 1999. 32.  The applicants submitted a number of medical certificates to the Court.
A certificate prepared by the second applicant's doctor on 26 May 1993 attested to her severe symptoms of anxiety since the legal problems had arisen. She had required repeated courses of medication and she was, at that stage, depressed and on medication. Her anxiety symptoms were likely to continue until the legal situation was resolved. The same doctor confirmed, in a certificate dated 12 March 1994, a deterioration of the second applicant's condition into “frank depression”. Medication had initially helped but the delay in the proceedings was worsening her condition. A psychiatric report on the second applicant dated July 1998 recorded her significant clinical depression since the start of the proceedings which warranted anti-depressants and tranquillisers on many occasions. It was considered that the proceedings continually threatened to bring about a relapse, in spite of certain periods of recovery following appropriate treatment. It was also considered that a full recovery was foreseeable only after the proceedings terminated. A psychiatric report on the first applicant dated August 1998 attested to the great strain the proceedings had caused him.


5.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Žetale. 7.  At 8.10 p.m. on 18 February 2001 the Podlehnik police patrol, consisting of two officers, J.Š. and G.K., was called to a bar, B. According to the Government the officers were told by customers and a waitress there that the applicant had been shouting at customers and threatening them with a gun. The officers were also told that a person they believed to be the applicant had headed to another bar, Š,. in the town of Čermožiše. 6.  At 8.30 p.m., the two police officers entered bar Š. They asked the owner of a white VW Golf to come forward. The applicant, who was the owner of the car in question and was in the bar that evening, approached the officers and followed them out to the car. The events which followed are in dispute between the parties. 7.  According to the applicant, on the way out the officers asked him where his gun was. The applicant replied that he had no gun. One officer requested the applicant to open the boot of the car. The applicant took the keys from the car to unlock the boot. At that point one of the officers hit him on the head. Both officers continued to beat the applicant until they knocked him down. They then kicked him all over his body. When the applicant started to get up, he received several punches to the stomach. The police officers then handcuffed him and took him to Podlehnik Police Station in a police car. In his criminal complaint (see paragraph 11 below), the applicant also alleged that he was hit twice in the face in the police car. At the police station one of the officers punched the applicant, who was still handcuffed, several times in the face. 8.  According to the Government, the police officers informed the applicant that he was charged with breach of the peace and possession of a weapon. The applicant then starting hitting his car. When he learned of the officers’ intention to search the car the applicant opened the boot and took out a metal bicycle wrench. Officer J.Š. asked the applicant to put the wrench down. The applicant refused, and lifted the wrench above his head. The officer then hit the applicant on the head, at which point the wrench fell to the ground. The applicant then attempted to run away. Officer J.Š. caught the applicant by the shirt. The applicant then fell to the ground, but got up again immediately. At that point he also told officer G.K. that he would kill his family. Not having been able to restrain the applicant, G.K., using professional skills, threw the applicant over his hip by gripping his neck. The officers then handcuffed the applicant, who was lying on the ground but still trying to resist, and searched him, as well as the car, but found no weapons. On suspicion that the applicant, who was believed to be under the influence of alcohol, would continue to commit offences, the officers ordered his detention at around 9.15 p.m. The officers took the applicant to Podlehnik Police Station, where the handcuffs were taken off him. The applicant was bleeding from the mouth. 9.  The applicant, who was complaining of pain, was taken to hospital by officers B.H. and M.B., who had taken over for the night shift. He remained hospitalised until 22 February 2001. According to the hospital reports, the applicant had suffered concussion, injury to the upper arm (fracture of the left humerus), excoriation, haematoma and contusion on the head, neck and thorax, and a rupture of the eardrum (perforation of tympanums). The applicant also submitted that two of his teeth were loose and one had been broken during the alleged ill-treatment. He continued outpatient treatment until 19 June 2001. The medical records noted that the results of the treatment were “satisfactory”. 10.  On 12 March 2011 the police lodged a criminal complaint of violent behaviour against the applicant. A bill of indictment was lodged by the Ptuj District Prosecutor, S.E., whereupon the Ptuj Local Court heard the applicant, as well as four witnesses. On 15 May 2006 the charges were reclassified to the criminal offence of endangering security. Since the proceedings concerning the latter offence could only have been conducted at the request of an aggrieved party, the court requested the presumed aggrieved party, G.H., to inform the authorities whether he wished to pursue proceedings. On 18 September 2006 the proceedings were discontinued, as G.H. refused to submit a request for them. 11.  On 28 March 2001 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the Ptuj District Prosecutor’s Office against unidentified officers, of aggravated bodily harm and violation of human dignity by abuse of authority or official position. The applicant supported his criminal complaint with hospital records and photographs of his injuries. He also proposed that A.K., who saw the incident, be examined. 12.  On 6 November 2001 the Ptuj District Prosecutor, S.E, dismissed the criminal complaint on the basis of the police report prepared by Maribor Police (to which Podlehnik Police Station was subordinate). The latter was based on official notes concerning interviews held by officer S.P from Podlehnik Police Station with officers J.Š., G.K., B.H. and M.B. It would appear that in the context of the police inquiry, statements were taken by an officer from Maribor Police from five persons who had been present in the two bars but had not witnessed the relevant events outside the bar. The police report noted that witness A.K. had not been questioned, as he was working in Austria. The public prosecutor found that the police officers, who were identified as J.Š. and G.K., had acted in accordance with the law. In the decision dismissing the applicant’s criminal complaint the public prosecutor found that the applicant had allegedly breached the peace in bar B., where he had threatened customers with a gun. Further to that allegation, which had been communicated to the police by a person from that bar, the two officers attempted to find the applicant. They entered bar Š. for that purpose. As regards the subsequent events, the public prosecutor found in her decision that the applicant had refused to cooperate with the officers and had taken a metal tool out of his car in an attempt to attack officer J.Š. She concluded that this, and the fact that the applicant had presumably been carrying a gun, justified the use of force and the injuries the applicant had sustained as a result. The applicant was not heard by the public prosecutor or involved in those proceedings in any way. The public prosecutor’s decision was served on his representative on 16 November 2001. 13.  On 22 November 2001 the applicant, acting as a subsidiary prosecutor represented by a lawyer, lodged a request with the Ptuj District Court for an investigation. 14.  On 24 January 2002 the two accused officers appeared before the investigating judge. Both of them refused to give statements. On the same day the investigating judge upheld the request for an investigation. The officers appealed against the decision. On 23 April 2002 their appeals were rejected by an interlocutory-proceedings panel, which found that the applicant’s criminal complaint, and in particular the medical records, gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that the offences had been committed. 15.  Further to the investigating judge’s request, the police informed her that no disciplinary proceedings had been instituted against the officers in question with respect to the alleged abuse of power. 16.  On 3 June 2002 the investigating judge heard evidence from the owner of bar B., who testified that she had seen the applicant with a gun in the bar that evening and that the applicant was known as an aggressive person. 17.  On 1 July 2002 the investigating judge heard the applicant. The applicant’s testimony essentially corresponded to the description of the arrest as provided in his application to the Court; however, before the investigating judge, he denied having been beaten up in the police car. The applicant maintained that he did not possess a gun and that that was why the police had not found one. He also stated that nobody had witnessed the arrest except A.K., a customer from bar Š. Lastly, the applicant stated that he had no interest in pursuing a pecuniary claim for compensation in these proceedings, because he was seeking damages in civil proceedings.
 18.  On the same day the investigating judge examined six witnesses: four from bar B. and two from bar Š. As regards the latter, a waitress testified that she had noticed nothing unusual that day and confirmed that the officers had entered the bar and asked the applicant to step outside with them. She had not witnessed the events outside the bar. A.K. testified that he had heard the applicant screaming outside and as he was leaving the bar had seen the applicant lying on the ground being beaten by the officers. He had observed the situation for only a few seconds, however, and had not been able to see the incident very well because it was night. 19.  On 25 September 2002 the investigating judge heard evidence from a forensic expert in general surgery, L.T. The latter stated, on the basis of the applicant’s medical records relating to his hospitalisation following the arrest in question, that the applicant had sustained at least five blows during the arrest: at least two to the head, one to the neck, one to the left side of his thorax and a hard blow to the left shoulder, and had possibly also been kicked while he was on the ground. He further specified that it was possible that the applicant’s face had been hit with an open hand, but powerful force would have had to be used to cause such an ear injury. As regards the injury to the upper arm, L.T. explained it could have been the result of a hard direct blow or kick, but could also have been caused during a professional hit or throw. 20.  On 27 January 2003 one of the customers from bar B., M.K., was examined. He denied seeing the applicant carrying a gun or noticing anything special that evening. After further questioning, M.K. admitted that he had known that the police had been called to the bar because of the applicant’s threatening customers with a gun. He indicated that he had not said that earlier during questioning because he was afraid of the applicant. However, M.K. later denied having had any previous negative experience with the applicant. 21.  On 12 February 2003 the applicant lodged an indictment against the two police officers. The officers lodged objections to the indictment. On 5 May 2006 the interlocutory proceeding panel rejected the objections, finding that the evidence collected so far supported a reasonable suspicion that the alleged acts had been committed. 22.  The Ptuj District Court, sitting as a panel, held hearings on 12 and 29 December 2006 and on 23 March, 13 April, 31 May, 22 and 31 August and 6 September 2007. It heard the accused officers, the applicant and a number of witnesses from the bars in question, as well as the officers who had taken over for the night shift. In addition, the court obtained a forensic report from an expert in general surgery, L.T., and a report by the Commission of the Faculty of Medicine prepared by V.S., an expert in traumatology and surgery, and L.Š, an expert in otorhinolaryngology. It also examined all three experts at the hearing. It furthermore obtained the opinion of an expert in fighting techniques, B.Z. 23.  At one of the hearings, expert L.T. testified that the rupture of the eardrum could only have been the consequence of a slap. The shoulder injury could have occurred as a result of a professional throw. He further explained that the haematoma on the right side of the applicant’s face could have been the result of a blow to the right cheekbone. The haematoma on the forehead was caused by a blow or a kick from the heel of a shoe while the applicant was either kneeling or lying down. Expert V.T. testified that the bruises on the applicant’s forehead and the right side of his face could have been caused by a blow from a closed fist. Furthermore, he said that the damage to the eye socket was very unlikely to have been caused by the pressure employed during the professional throw, but must have been the result of a direct blow with a fist or a kick to this area. Expert L.Š. testified that being thrown down, or pressure on the thorax, would be very unlikely to cause perforation of the eardrum. He further stated that in his opinion there had been two or more blows to the applicant’s face. Lastly, the expert in fighting techniques, B.Z., gave an opinion that the professional throw, which was called koshi guruma, and the blow with a hand, called oi tsuki jodan, were professionally justified during the applicant’s arrest. 24.  On 6 September 2007 the court convicted J.Š. and G.K. of the criminal offence of violation of human dignity by abuse of powers or official position under Article 270 of the Penal Code and sentenced them to imprisonment of four and three months respectively, suspended for two years. The court found that J.Š. and G.K. had been beating and kicking the applicant while he was lying on the ground after he had been thrown down by G.K. In addition, the court found that J.Š. had hit the applicant at least once on the right side of the face at Podlehnik Police Station. The officers were acquitted of the charges of aggravated bodily harm. 25.  In its judgment the Ptuj District Court, referring to the case of Matko v. Slovenia, (no. 43393/98, 2 November 2006), noted that it had reached the decision independently of the findings of the initial police inquiry and the public prosecutor’s decision, which had not complied with the requirement of an effective investigation. The court accepted the accused officers’ assertion that the applicant had attempted to attack them with a tool, which, however had not been seized. It also accepted the accused officers’ explanation that they had used a professional hit and a professional throw to overcome his resistance, which was lawful. It also considered that there was insufficient evidence that the applicant had been hit while he was in the car, an allegation that had, moreover not been made consistently. On the other hand the court found, on the basis of the evidence gathered in the criminal investigation and during the trial, in particular from the testimony of A.K. and the forensic medical reports, that the applicant had not been subjected only to the above-mentioned use of force. In particular, the court concluded, referring to the opinions of forensic experts, which it found to be consistent, that the applicant had received several blows to the head, not just one. As regards witness A.K., who had passed the scene of the incident when leaving the bar, the court noted that although A.K. had known the applicant, there was no close relationship between them which could call into question A.K.’s credibility as a witness. It further noted that A.K. had first stated during the investigation that he had seen the applicant being beaten up by the officers while he was lying on the ground, but that subsequently, at the hearing at which the two accused officers had been present in their uniforms, he had modified his statement by saying that he had seen one of them kick the applicant. The court, which took into account the evidence concerning the visibility at the scene of the incident and heard witnesses for the defence, who failed to undermine A.K.’s credibility, concluded that it was to be believed that A.K. had seen the applicant being kicked by at least one of the officers. It also rejected the accused officers’ assertion that, given the circumstances, they had been entitled to use even lethal force. It noted in this respect that the officers outnumbered the applicant, were in excellent physical condition and were trained in fighting techniques. In addition, they had been aware of the possibility that the applicant might be carrying a gun and could therefore have predicted his behaviour. The court concluded that the accused officers had ill-treated the applicant in breach of Article 3 of the Convention and Article 18 of the Slovenian Constitution and committed the criminal offence under Article 270 of the Penal Code. As regards the charges of aggravated bodily harm, the court found that it could not determine with the degree of certainty required in criminal cases whether the injuries with long-term consequences, namely, the fracture of the left humerus and rupture of the eardrum, had been caused intentionally by the unlawful use of force. Finally the court ordered the applicant to pay court fees in the amount of 400 euros (EUR). 26.  The applicant appealed on 5 November 2007. The officers also lodged appeals against the judgment in so far as it related to their conviction. 27.  On 27 February 2008, after deliberations, the Maribor Higher Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the accused officers’ appeal. As regards the quashing of the conviction, the court found, in a reasoning of less than two pages, that the first-instance court had erred in establishing the facts. However, referring to sections 392 (5) and 394 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, it was of the opinion that a reassessment of the evidence could be done without a remittal of the case or a fresh hearing. The Maribor Higher Court then found that the defence statements of the accused officers were consistent and credible and should be fully followed and that the operation had not been a random one, as the applicant had a reputation as a dangerous person and had attacked the officers with a tool. The court found that the applicant’s statements had not been consistent and called into question the credibility of witness A.K. In this connection it rejected the reasoning given by the first-instance court, that the change in A.K.’s testimony had been understandable. It found that “the conduct of both accused officers, who had ultimately managed to get the applicant under control, had therefore proved to be correct and lawful”. The court concluded that “there was no evidence that the officers had committed the criminal offence concerned, but only certain indications on the basis of which the court could not conclude with all certainty that the accused had committed the alleged criminal offence”. It acquitted them of all the charges and ordered the applicant to pay court fees in the amount of 600 euros (EUR). The judgment was served on the applicant on 19 March 2008. 28.  By the Ptuj District Court’s decision of 5 May 2008 the applicant was ordered to pay EUR 14,572 for the costs and expenses of the proceedings, which was broken down to EUR 3,214 for procedural costs such as expert fees, and EUR 11,358 for the officers’ legal representation. Following an appeal by the applicant, the Ptuj District Court altered the decision concerning the costs and expenses so that the applicant was now required to pay EUR 2,441 for the procedural costs and EUR 413 for the costs relating to the preparation of G.K.’s appeal. The court found that the remaining costs of the legal representation of the officers had already been paid by the Ministry of the Interior during the trial, and reimbursement could therefore no longer be claimed by the officers. 29.  On 16 May 2008 the applicant requested the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office to lodge a request for protection of legality against the Maribor Higher Court’s judgment. On 15 September 2008 the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office rejected his request. 30.  On 19 May 2008 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal in which he argued that the subsidiary prosecutor should have locus standi in proceedings before the Constitutional Court, and that he should have been able to lodge a request for protection of legality with the Supreme Court, as the public prosecutor had. He complained that the proceedings, in particular the judgment of the Maribor Higher Court, had been unfair and arbitrary. He submitted that the Maribor Higher Court’s judgment was biased, which could also be because the judge rapporteur was a former police officer. The applicant also referred to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, which had found that a subsidiary prosecution was not a proper remedy for the protection of human rights. Lastly, the applicant complained that he, unlike other parties in criminal proceedings, was not able to be exempted from payment of the costs of the proceedings. 31. On 14 December 2010 a panel of three judges of the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s constitutional appeal without further examination. It found that the applicant presented no reason to distinguish his case from case no. Up-285/97, in which it had taken the position that the aggrieved party could not lodge a constitutional appeal against acquittal. It moreover noted that the applicant’s case was also to be distinguished from cases nos. Up-555/03 and Up-827/04, which concerned lack of independent investigation into a death during police intervention (see paragraphs 50 and 51 below). As regards the complaint concerning the costs of the proceedings, the Constitutional Court rejected it is as manifestly ill-founded. 32.  On 27 December 2001 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the State in the Ptuj District Court, seeking damages for the injuries he had sustained as a result of ill-treatment by the police. 33.  In the course of the proceedings the applicant modified his claim for non-pecuniary damages to 2,800,000 Slovenian tolars (SIT) (approximately EUR 11,700). The court heard several witnesses, including officers K.G. and J.Š., obtained a medical report from an expert, S.T. (see paragraphs 38 and 39 below), and took account of the evidence obtained in the criminal proceedings. 34.  The court delivered its judgment on 22 August 2006. It found that the officers had admitted to using only one “professional hit” and one “professional throw” against the applicant. They maintained that they had not used any other force against him and that all the injuries he had sustained had been caused by his passive resistance to arrest. Having regard to the medical opinions of experts S.T. and L.T., which confirmed that the applicant had sustained injuries as a result of several kicks or blows, the court concluded that the officers had “clearly overstepped their powers”. It continued by saying that there was no excuse for the behaviour of the police officers and that “there was nothing to be proud of in this under the rule of law”. The court further stated that “no officer in this country was authorised to kick a person who was lying on the ground, no matter how violent that person was”. It concluded that the applicant was responsible for 30% of the injuries and the State was responsible for the rest. The court noted that the State, through its agents, had not acted “diligently and within its powers” but had acted “negligently, irresponsibly and culpably and therefore should be liable for damages in accordance with section 154 č of the Civil Code”. The applicant was granted compensation for non-pecuniary damage in the amount of SIT 1,820,000 (approximately EUR 7,600). 37.  On 13 November 2007 the Maribor Higher Court upheld the first-instance court’s conclusion as regards the unlawfulness of the use of force against the applicant, finding that the police officers had “greatly overstepped their powers” and that the applicant had sustained injuries as a result. However, it allowed the State’s appeal in part, and reduced the amount of compensation awarded for damage suffered as a result of “fear” and “bodily pain” related to the injuries. The court reduced the award of damages to EUR 5,853. 38.  The report lists the following injuries sustained by the applicant on the day of the incident and their most probable cause:
- Lesions on the face: caused by a punch, kick or fall on to hard ground.
- Rupture of the right eardrum: normally caused by a slap.
- Several excoriations: caused by friction between the skin and an object.
- Fracture of the left humerus: likely to have been caused during a direct fall or by a blow to the shoulder. 39.  As regards the above-mentioned injuries, the forensic expert concluded that the applicant had received several hard blows to the right side of his face, one of which had resulted in the eardrum injury. He also considered it possible that the applicant had received a hard blow to his left shoulder. Most of the injuries could have been caused by a punch or a kick. As regards the remaining skin excoriations, these had been caused by a lighter application of force. 2.  Report of 16 February 2007 by the Commission of the Faculty of Medicine, Ljubljana, prepared in the context of the criminal proceedings by experts L.Š. and V.S. 40.  The report lists the following injuries sustained by the applicant on the day of the incident, with their most probable cause:
- Fracture of the left humerus (abruptio tuberculi maioris humeri sin): most likely caused by a fall on to hard ground.
- Concussion: caused by a punch, kick or fall on to hard ground.
- Excoriation on the neck and thorax: caused by a punch, kick or fall on to hard ground.
- Rupture of the right eardrum: caused by a punch or a slap.
- Lesions on the thorax, left shoulder, neck and head: caused by a punch, kick or fall on to hard ground.


5.  The applicants live in Katowice. 6.  On 8 May 2002 the Warsaw Regional Court allowed the applicants’ claim under Articles 23 and 24 of the Civil Code for the protection of personal rights. The court found that B.K. and A.M., journalists working for the national daily newspaper Rzeczpospolita, had published an article about a number of politicians. The journalists had alleged that the applicants, who were lawyers, had made a fortune over the years by assisting in shady business deals in which these politicians were involved. The journalists had alleged that the applicants had taken advantage of their positions at the expense of the public purse by obtaining unjustified benefits from the manner in which they had carried out their professional roles as liquidators of State‑owned companies in bankruptcy. 7.  The court observed that the journalists had failed to contact the applicants and that their allegations were, to a large extent, based on gossip and hearsay. It noted that journalists had a right and an obligation to inform society about important issues and that they enjoyed freedom of expression, guaranteed by the Constitution. However, the authors of the article had failed to take the minimum steps necessary in order to verify the information contained in the article by at least getting in touch with the applicants and trying to obtain their comments. The allegations had not been shown to have had a plausible factual basis. The journalists had smeared the applicants’ good name and reputation. The court allowed the applicants’ claim in its entirety, by ordering the journalists and the editor‑in‑chief to pay, jointly, PLN 30,000 to a charity and to publish an apology in the newspaper. 8.  The defendants appealed. On 24 April 2003 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed their appeal, endorsing the findings of fact and the reasoning of the first‑instance court. The obligations imposed by the courts were subsequently complied with by the defendant newspaper. 9.  On 7 July 2004 the applicants sued again the newspaper under the same provisions of the Civil Code (see paragraph 6 above). They alleged that they had recently found out that the article remained accessible on the newspaper’s Internet website. They submitted that the article was positioned prominently in the Google search engine and that anyone seeking information about them had very easy access to it. The article’s availability on the newspaper’s website, in defiance of the earlier judicial decisions, created a continuing situation enabling a large number of people to read it. The applicants’ rights were thereby breached in the same way as had occurred through the publication of the original article. It rendered the protection granted by the judgments in their favour ineffective and illusory.
The applicants sought an order requiring the defendants to take down the article from the newspaper’s website and publish a written apology for their rights having been breached by way of the article’s continued presence on the Internet. They sought compensation in the amount of PLN 11,000 for the non‑pecuniary damage. 10.  In their reply to the statement of claim, the defendants submitted that the case was res judicata, The applicants had already obtained a judgment in their favour. Moreover, the article had been placed in the archive of the website. Readers would therefore be aware that the article had been published in the past. The article had been published and could by no means be erased from history or, for that matter, from copies of “Rzeczpospolita” kept in numerous libraries and archives throughout the country. The applicants’ request to have it expunged was therefore ill‑founded, not only because it lacked a legal basis but also because it was absurd.
The defendants further submitted that the applicants had referred to the publication of the article on the newspaper’s website in the first set of proceedings. They had therefore already been well aware that the article had been disseminated in that way. As they had failed to submit any specific claims in respect of the Internet publication in the first set of proceedings, it had to be inferred that they had not sought to have any measures taken in respect of the online version of the article and that they had been fully satisfied by their situation having been remedied in the manner ordered by the judgments given in the first set of proceedings. 11.  The Warsaw Regional Court, by a judgment of 28 September 2005, dismissed the applicants’ claim. It first referred to the judgments of 8 May 2002 and 24 April 2003. It noted the applicants’ submission that they had discovered, a year after the latter judgment had been given, that the article was still available on the newspaper’s website.
It observed that the facts of the case were not in dispute betweeen the parties. The applicants’ submissions had addressed facts – namely the article’s continued presence on the newspaper’s website five years after the publication of the article in the newspaper – which had occurred after the judgment in the first case had been given. The gist of the legal issue to be determined by the court was whether the discovery of a new source of publication – including on the Internet – provided a factual basis for a new claim for the protection of personal rights within the meaning of the Civil Code. In the court’s view, the response to such a question should be in the positive. The court was of the opinion that the discovery of a new source of publication, namely the newspaper’s website, of the defamatory article had given rise to a new claim on the applicants’ part. The issues involved in the case were therefore not res judicata.
However, in the circumstances of the case the court was of the view that the defendants’ arguments had to be given an equal weight. The court referred to the constitutional guarantees of free speech and noted that preventive censorship was incompatible with the Constitution. It was the journalists’ right and obligation to inform the general public of matters of public interest. 12.  Adressing the three claims made by the applicants, the court stressed that removing the article from the website would have been devoid of any practical purpose and would amount to censorship and to rewriting history. Moreover, it would run counter to the principles of archiving.
The court pointed out that the applicants have already received a public apology. Allowing the applicants’ claim to have a new apology published would not offer adequate protection to the applicants. Had they sought an order in the present set of proceedings that the Internet publication be supplemented by a footnote or a link informing a reader about the judgments of 8 May 2002 and 24 April 2003, or had they asked the court to order the defendants to publish an apology on the newspaper’s website, the court would have given serious consideration to such a request. 13.  The court further noted that the applicants had already received compensation in the first set of the proceedings. It was further stated that if they had discovered circumstances relevant for the assessment of the case but unknown to them during the first set of the proceedings, they should have requested that the proceedings be reopened rather than bringing a new civil case before the courts. 14.  The applicants appealed. They argued that the case was important in that it raised new issues which had hitherto not been addressed by judicial practice. They submitted that each new reading of the article on the newspaper’s website, which was open to the general public, amounted to a new publication of that article. Traditional principles governing the archiving of various printed materials and documents in traditional archives were not the same as those applicable to the operation of a website, regardless of whether a part of it had been labelled as an “archive” or not. The term “archive” was to be understood as a set of documents which had lost their currency. The Internet was not an instrument for archiving materials, but had to be regarded as a means of communication of information on current topics. The mere fact that a part of a website was called an “archive” did not affect this in any way. 15.  In so far as the first-instance court had been of the view that the publication of a printed apology would have been, in the circumstances of the present case, devoid of any practical purpose, the applicants argued that under Article 24 of the Civil Code it had been open to that court to order other measures to remedy the breach of their rights. Article 24 provided that in order to remedy an infringement of personal rights “necessary steps” could be taken, but did not specify the concrete nature of such measures. The court had unequivocally acknowledged that the impugned article had violated their rights. It had, however, limited itself to dismissing the claim. It had failed to consider, contrary to its duty, other remedial measures, including those it had expressly referred to in its judgment. 16.  On 20 July 2006 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. It was of the view that it was of cardinal importance for the assessment of the case that the article had been published on the newspaper’s website in December 2000. The court noted that the applicants had submitted that they had only learned of its online publication a year after the judgment given in April 2003 had become final. However, the fact that in the first set of proceedings they had failed to make a specific request for remedial measures in respect of the online publication made it impossible for the court in the present case to examine facts which had already existed prior to that judgment.  The plaintiffs could not lodge a new claim based on factual circumstances which had already existed during the previous set of proceedings. The court noted in passing that the existing online publication was not a fact which would have been impossible to establish at that time (“nie była to tzw. okoliczność nieujawnialna”). 17.  The applicants submitted an appeal on points of law, invoking their right to the effective legal protection of their personal rights, including their reputation. They reiterated that the continued availability of the article on the newspaper’s website infringed their personal rights. 18.  On 3 November 2006 the Warsaw Court of Appeal requested the applicants’ legal representative to amend the statement of appeal’s formal deficiencies by specifying whether it had been lodged on behalf of one or both of the applicants. It noted that the court fee paid in connection with the appeal had corresponded to the sum to be paid for an appeal lodged by one person only. 19.  By letter of 10 November the applicants’ lawyer clarified that the appeal had been lodged by the second applicant, Mr Smolczewski. 20.  On 17 November 2006 the Warsaw Court of Appeal rejected the appeal in so far as it related to the first applicant, having regard to the fact that the relevant court fee had not been paid. This decision was served on the applicants’ lawyer on 4 December 2006. No appeal was lodged against this decision. 21.  By a decision of 7 February 2007 the Supreme Court, sitting in camera, refused to entertain the first applicant’s cassation appeal (odmówił przyjęcia kasacji do rozpoznania).


5.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Istanbul. 6.  At approximately 11 p.m. on 24 August 1995, a police car stopped outside the shop run by the applicant in Istanbul’s Beyoğlu district. Three police officers got out of the car and asked the applicant to remove the letters “DHKP/C” (the abbreviation for the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front, an illegal organisation) written on a wall, two shops down the road from the applicant’s shop. 7.  When the applicant refused to comply with that request and told the police officers that it was not his wall and therefore he had no obligation to clean it up, the police officers started to beat him. A number of other police officers, who were driving in the area at the time, also stopped and took part in the beating. The police officers then took the applicant into custody where they continued to beat him in order to force him to sign statements, confessing to the offence of obstructing the police in the course of their duty. 8.  According to the incident report prepared by the three police officers who had beaten the applicant, the letters “DHKP/C” had been on the wall of the applicant’s shop and the applicant had told them that he would “rather die than wipe them away” and had then run away. When the police officers gave chase, the applicant had thrown stones at them and had kicked and punched them, injuring one of them in the process. Consequently, the officers had taken the applicant to the police station. 9.  The following day the applicant was taken to the First Aid Hospital in Istanbul’s Taksim district where a medical report was prepared. According to this report, the applicant’s body bore a number of ecchymoses and lacerations. 10.  The applicant was then brought to the office of the public prosecutor in Beyoğlu district where he told the prosecutor that the police officers had tortured him. 11.  The same day the prosecutor referred the applicant to the Beyoğlu branch of the Forensic Medicine Institute where he was examined by a doctor. The following injuries are recorded in the medical report prepared at the end of that examination: a one centimetre long abrasion on the left side of the rear parietal region; a thirty centimetre long ecchymosed area stretching from the back of the left shoulder to the right scapular area; an ecchymosed area measuring fifteen by three centimetres below the left scapular region; an ecchymosed area, measuring fifteen by five centimetres, on the left lumbar; two ecchymosed areas, measuring seven by three and seven by fourteen centimetres, on the right side of the chest; four one centimetre long bleeding grazes and two ecchymosed areas, each measuring three centimetres in diameter, on the inside of the left arm; two ecchymosed areas, each measuring two centimetres, on the left cheek; and another ecchymosed area on the right tibial region. The report concluded that the applicant would be unable to work for a period of ten days. 12.  The same day the prosecutor ordered the applicant’s release. 13.  On 10 October 1995 the applicant lodged a formal complaint with the Beyoğlu prosecutor, seeking the prosecution of the three police officers responsible for the ill-treatment. 14.  The following day the Beyoğlu prosecutor rendered a decision of non-jurisdiction, under the Law on the Trial of Civil Servants, and transferred the case file to the governor’s office in Beyoğlu for the “necessary action to be taken”. 15.  On 21 July 1997 the Beyoğlu District Administrative Council, presided over by the Beyoğlu governor, granted authorisation for the prosecution of the three officers. 16.  In its decision of 29 February 2000, the Beyoğlu Criminal Court of First Instance (hereinafter “the trial court”) convicted the three police officers of the offence of ill-treatment contrary to Article 245 of the Criminal Code, and sentenced each of them to three months’ imprisonment. The trial court also ordered their suspension from duty for a period of three months. Considering that the applicant’s “refusal to wipe away the writing on the wall and his attacks on the police officers” amounted to a “provocation”, within the meaning of Article 51 § 1 of the Criminal Code, the trial court reduced the prison sentences by a quarter and sentenced each officer to two months and seven days’ imprisonment. Taking into account the way in which the incident had taken place and the unlikelihood of police officers committing offences, the trial court was of the opinion that these particular officers would not reoffend if their sentences were suspended. Accordingly, it suspended their sentences under Article 6 of Law no. 647. 17.  Two of the three police officers lodged appeals against the judgment. The judgment became final in so far as it concerned the third police officer, who did not appeal. 18.  On 30 January 2002 the judgment was quashed by the Court of Cassation in so far as it concerned the two appellant police officers. The Court of Cassation held that the provisions of Law no. 4616 should be applied to them. 19.  On 26 April 2002 the trial court suspended the proceedings against the two police officers in accordance with Law no. 4616, which had entered into force on 22 December 2000 and which provides for the suspension of criminal cases in respect of certain offences committed before 23 April 1999. 20.  The applicant lodged an objection with the Beyoğlu Assize Court against the trial court’s decision, pointing out that the Court of Cassation had waited two years before rendering its judgment, and had only quashed the judgment following the entry into force of Law no. 4616. In any event, criminal proceedings concerning the offence of torture were outside the scope of that Law and could not, therefore, be suspended. Since, under Turkish law, ill-treatment could only be classified as torture if it was inflicted with the aim of extracting information from the victim (the offence defined in Article 243 of the Criminal Code), the trial court had no choice but to apply Article 245 of the Criminal Code in the present case. Nevertheless, the fact remained that the ill-treatment to which he had been subjected constituted “torture” within the meaning of the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 21.  On 28 May 2002 the Beyoğlu Assize Court rejected the applicant’s objection.


4.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Artashat, Armenia. He is a member of the National Democratic Union (NDU) political party. He is also the party's representative in the Ararat Region of Armenia. 5.  In 2003 a presidential election was held in Armenia with its first and second rounds taking place on 19 February and 5 March respectively. The applicant was involved with the work of the main opposition candidate and his responsibilities included monitoring the voting process. He alleges that, following the election, he prepared a report on various irregularities which had allegedly taken place during the election, but high officials from the Government and the Ararat Region tried to prevent him from making his report public, which he refused. 6.  The applicant further alleges that from February 2003 until his arrest on 20 May 2004 he was repeatedly harassed because of his political activity. In particular, the police frequently called him to the local police station without any reasons and demanded that he stop his political activities. Furthermore, on 9 April 2004 his son was arrested and subjected to an administrative fine for disobeying the lawful orders of police officers and using foul language. Finally, from the date of his participation in a major demonstration held on 10 April 2004 until 19 May 2004, the police officers of the Ararat Police Department visited his home on a daily basis between 5 a.m. and 9 a.m., demanding that his whereabouts be disclosed. As a result of these actions, he was forced to stay away from his home and returned there only on 20 May 2004 after, in reply to his complaint, he had allegedly been assured by the Ombudsman that these visits would stop. 7.  On 20 May 2004 the applicant was taken to Ararat Police Department. According to the record on bringing the applicant into custody (արձանագրություն անձին բերման ենթարկելու մասին), he was brought to the police station by two police officers at 1.15 p.m. for disobeying the lawful orders of a police officer and for using foul language. 8.  At the Police Department an administrative case was prepared against the applicant. One of the arresting police officers reported to the Chief of Police:
“On 20 May at 1 p.m. [we] were in the yard of building no. 26 on Kharazyan Street in Artashat where the resident of flat no. 55 of the same building, [the applicant], was speaking loudly with an unknown man. We approached and demanded [the applicant] to lower his voice and not to violate public order. Having heard this, [the applicant] turned from the unknown man towards us and spoke to us in the same manner, saying that it was not our business to judge how he was speaking and then he said that we should stop poking our noses into everything and pestering. We tried to calm him down but he continued insulting us and using insulting language. This lasted about five minutes, after which he was brought to the police station.” 9.  A record of an administrative arrest was drawn up in which it was stated that the applicant had “disobeyed lawful orders and used foul language” which constituted an offence under Article 182 of the Code of Administrative Offences (CAO). It was also stated that the applicant had refused to make any statements. This record was signed by the applicant. 10.  On the same date the applicant was taken to the Ararat Regional Court (Արարատի մարզի առաջին ատյանի դատարան) where Judge S. examined his case and found him guilty under Article 182 of the CAO, sentencing him to eight days of administrative detention. This decision stated the following:
“On 20 May 2004 at around 1.15 p.m. next to building no. 26 on Kharazyan Street in Artashat the resident of the same building, [the applicant], was speaking loudly and making a loud noise with an unknown person, disturbing public order[. In this connection the police officers of the Ararat Police Department] tried to call him to order but [the applicant] continued to make a loud noise and to use foul language, not obeying the lawful orders of [the police officers].
[The applicant] refused to give explanations at the court hearing.
Police officers of the Ararat Police Department [N.S. and G.N.] stated that indeed on 20 May 2004 at around 1.15 p.m. next to building no. 26 on Kharazyan Street the resident of the same building, [the applicant], while being called to order, used foul language, telling them: “stop poking your noses into everything and pestering”, and [using] other disrespectful words, and disobeyed their lawful orders.
The court finds that [the applicant] has violated public order and disobeyed the lawful orders of [the police officers] so he should be subjected to an administrative penalty.” 11.  According to the record of the court hearing, the hearing started at 4.30 p.m. with the participation of the applicant and the two arresting police officers. The applicant did not wish to have a lawyer and did not file any motions. The judge read out the materials of the administrative case. The applicant refused to make any submissions. The two arresting police officers testified, repeating their earlier statements. The judge departed to a deliberation room, after which he came back and pronounced the decision. 12.  The applicant contests the circumstances of his trial as presented in the above record and alleges that he was taken to Judge S.'s office where the hearing took place at 3 p.m. He was not allowed legal representation. Nor was he allowed properly to familiarise himself with the materials of the case but was only told of the formal charges against him. Despite his requests he was not allowed to make any submissions, to question the two arresting police officers or to call other witnesses. The entire hearing lasted about 10 to 15 minutes. 13.  Following the hearing the applicant was taken to a detention facility. It appears that, while serving his sentence, he decided to go on a hunger strike. 14.  It appears that on 26 May 2004 the administration of the detention facility applied to the Regional Court, seeking to have the detention imposed on the applicant changed to some other administrative penalty due to the deterioration of the applicant's health. 15.  On 26 May 2004 the same Judge S. examined this request and decided to grant it partially. While refusing to change the type of penalty imposed on the applicant, the judge ordered that the applicant be released and the sentence be postponed for one month. 16.  On 3 June 2004 the applicant lodged an extraordinary appeal with the President of the Criminal and Military Court of Appeal (ՀՀ քրեական և զինվորական գործերով վերաքննիչ դատարանի նախագահ). In his appeal, he argued in general terms that the decision of the Regional Court had been unfounded and unlawful and had been taken in violation of the procedural law. The Regional Court had failed to carry out an objective and thorough examination of the case and had convicted him without any compelling evidence, relying on the false testimony of the police officers. In support of his allegations the applicant presented in detail his account of the events of 20 May 2004. He submitted that this account could be confirmed by a number of witnesses, including his neighbours and family members, but the Regional Court had not summoned and examined them. Finally, he complained about the persecution by the police to which, allegedly, he had been subjected in the past. 17.  On 8 June 2004 the President of the Criminal and Military Court of Appeal, on the basis of the written materials of the case, reviewed the decision of the Regional Court of 20 May 2004 with the following reasoning:
“[The applicant] was subjected to eight days of administrative detention under Article 182 of the CAO by the decision of the Ararat Regional Court of 20 May 2004 for having made loud noise, violated public order and maliciously disobeyed the lawful orders of the police officers who tried to prevent those acts, next to building no. 26 on Kharazyan Street in Artashat on 20 May 2004 at around 1 p.m. ...
By applying to the Criminal and Military Court of Appeal [the applicant] seeks to have [the above decision] quashed and the proceedings terminated in view of the fact that he has not committed an administrative offence.
Having acquainted myself with the appeal and the materials of the administrative case (the reports [and] the records), I find that the appeal must be dismissed because [the applicant] did commit the acts in question on 20 May 2004, in connection with which he had been brought to the police station, an appropriate record had been drawn up and an administrative penalty under Article 182 of the CAO had been imposed by the first instance court.” 18.  The President of the Court of Appeal nevertheless decided, due to the applicant's state of health, to mitigate the sentence to six days of administrative detention, which the applicant had already served.


4.  The second applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Espoo. 5.  The applicant company, which is wholly owned and administered by the second applicant, bought shares in a housing corporation on 18 June 1992. Later the applicants found out that the same shares had been given as security by company X. which had been declared bankrupt. They also found out that the whole of the real estate had been placed under an interdiction against sale or dispersal. 6.  On 23 August 1993 the applicant company initiated an action for damages in the Espoo District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätten) against the bank and the bank director responsible for selling the shares, claiming compensation for the loss of the shares. On 25 October 1993 the District Court dismissed the claim as premature without considering the merits. 7.  On 23 December 1993 the applicant company initiated, together with the other share holders, a new action for damages against the bank as the rules on civil procedure had changed in the meantime. The company claimed that the damage had been caused by a bank manager and that the bank as employer was liable for its employees. Allegedly, the bank manager had given incorrect information, had not acted diligently but in breach of good banking practice and was guilty of criminal conduct. The company claimed that the bank was obliged to compensate, inter alia, by reimbursing the purchase price of the shares, the condominium charges paid to the housing corporation and the company’s legal expenses incurred in the criminal case. 8.  The case was postponed pending the outcome of other civil proceedings related to the present case. The final judgment in those proceedings was rendered on 7 December 1995. 9.  After the conclusion of the above-mentioned civil proceedings, the present case was postponed once more pending the outcome of criminal proceedings which had been brought against the representatives of the bank and which concerned the same sale of shares. The Helsinki District Court judgment in the criminal proceedings was issued on 19 December 1997. 10.  In letters dated 14 January and 2 April 1998 and addressed to the Espoo District Court, the applicant company requested that, despite the pending appeal against the judgment in the criminal case, the consideration of the present case be resumed. 11.  On 2 April 1998 the applicant company also informed the Espoo District Court that the shares in the housing corporation had been declared part of the bankruptcy estate of company X. pursuant to the above-mentioned final judgment of 7 December 1995. The shares were thus worthless since the housing company was de facto bankrupt. 12.  On 18 June 1998 the defendant bank requested that the proceedings remain adjourned pending the outcome of criminal proceedings since the proceedings were still pending on appeal. 13.  On 6 November 1998 the Espoo District Court held a preparatory meeting. On 4 March 1999 it decided to adjourn the proceedings pending the final outcome of the criminal proceedings. According to the court, it was important to await that outcome as the question of criminal liability formed the basis of the civil proceedings and the cases partly overlapped. 14.  On 8 March 1999 the applicant company lodged an appeal with the Helsinki Appeal Court (hovioikeus, hovrätten), requesting that the Espoo District Court decision of 4 March 1999 be annulled and that the civil proceedings be immediately resumed. It claimed that, due to the adjournment, the proceedings would necessarily last over ten years and that, as a result, the excessive length of the proceedings would violate its rights under Article 6 of the Convention. It requested that the proceedings in the Appeal Court be examined urgently. 15.  On 6 May 1999 the Appeal Court found that the applicant company’s appeal did not give reason to take any action. 16.  By an appeal dated 21 June 1999 the applicant company appealed against this decision to the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen), which refused leave to appeal on 10 December 1999. 17.  The applicant company filed a written statement dated 31 July 2001 informing the Espoo District Court that the criminal proceedings had been terminated by a final judgment given on 9 March 2001 and requesting the resumption of the civil proceedings. 18.  On 27 November 2001 the second applicant lodged a request to intervene in his own name in the proceedings before the Espoo District Court and claimed compensation. The applicants presented as written evidence a deed of sale with which the second applicant had purchased the said shares of the housing corporation from the applicant company on 1 December 1992 and with which the claim for compensation had been transferred to the second applicant. 19.  The court held an oral hearing in the case on 3 and 7 May 2002. 20.  By a judgment of 10 July 2002, the Espoo District Court first rejected the second applicant’s request to intervene and found that the first applicant was the correct plaintiff. The court rejected the remainder of the complaints and considered that the circumstances of the sale of the shares and the documents relating to it were so obscure that the risk involved in the purchase had been apparent. Moreover, the court found no causal link between the acts of the defendant bank and the damage suffered by the first applicant. 21.  By an appeal dated 2 September 2002, the applicants appealed to the Appeal Court, requesting that the Espoo District Court judgment be quashed. By a letter dated 6 August 2003, the applicants asked the appellate court to accelerate the proceedings. 22.  On 1 February 2005 the Appeal Court found that the rightful owner of the shares was the second applicant and that, consequently, only the second applicant could claim damages. The court noted, however, that the defendant bank had already paid compensation and interest due from 6 February 1996 onwards. Since the second applicant had claimed damages in his own name only on 27 November 2001, he no longer had any claims against the bank. The Appeal Court thus rejected the applicants’ appeal. 23.  On 4 April 2005 the defendant bank appealed to the Supreme Court, complaining about the partial rejection by the Appeal Court of its claim for costs and expenses. On 18 January 2006 the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal.


5.  The applicants live in Vladikavkaz. 6.  The applicants are former policemen. They were all involved in the conflict-resolution and peace-keeping operation in the zone of the armed Ossetian-Ingush conflict in October and November 1992. As a consequence they were entitled to certain social payments. 7.  The applicants sued the Severnaya Osetiya-Alaniya Regional Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (hereafter “the regional internal-affairs department”) for social-payments arrears. On various dates in 2001 or 2002 the Leninskiy District Court of Vladikavkaz allowed their claims and ordered that the regional internal-affairs department pay the arrears. The dates of the judgments and the amounts of the awards are listed in the Annex. 8.  The applicants submitted the writs of execution to the Ministry of Finance. However the Ministry returned the writs of execution on the ground of lack of funds to pay the judgment debts. 9.  The judgments in favour of all the applicants were eventually enforced between September 2004 and April 2005. The dates of payment in respect of each applicant are listed in the Annex. 10.  All the applicants except Mr Varziev sued the regional internal-affairs department for pecuniary damage incurred through the belated enforcement of the judgments in their favour. On various dates in 2005 the Leninskiy District Court of Vladikavkaz acknowledged that the delays in enforcement had violated the applicants’ rights and awarded each of them a sum to cover inflation losses sustained as a result. The awards were paid on various dates in 2005. One of the applicants, Mr Tsallagov, did not submit the writ of execution to the Ministry of Finance and did not therefore receive his award. 11.  On 15 September 2003 the applicants notified the Vladikavkaz Town Administration of their intention to hold a demonstration in Svoboda Square in Vladikavkaz to protest against the regional internal-affairs department’s failure to settle the social-payments debt. The demonstration was scheduled to start on 30 September 2003 and was announced as being of unlimited duration. 12.  On 24 September 2003 the Town Administration refused to approve the venue and suggested that the demonstration be held in front of the Tkhapsayev theatre. 13.  On 30 September 2003 the applicants began their demonstration in Svoboda Square in front of the Severnaya Osetiya-Alaniya Regional Government building. About one hundred people participated in it. They put up tents and remained in the square day and night. They displayed placards and banners stating their criticisms and demands. 14.  On 3 October 2003 the Vladikavkaz Town Legislature annulled the decision of 24 September 2003 at the request of the regional internal-affairs department “in connection with a risk of terrorist acts in the places of mass gatherings of people”. It asked the regional internal-affairs department to take measures to break up the demonstration and restore public order in Svoboda square. 15.  On 11 October 2003 the Leninskiy District Court of Vladikavkaz declared the demonstration unlawful because it violated the rights of others. The court found that it hampered citizens’ access to public transport and to the cinema and officials’ access to the administrative buildings situated in Svoboda Square. The chanting of slogans by the applicants also disturbed the officials’ work. Moreover, the regional internal-affairs department had information about an expected outbreak of terrorist activities in the region. The mass gathering of people in the vicinity of the administrative buildings increased the risk of terrorist acts and other offences being committed and impeded the conduct of preventive operations by the law-enforcement agencies. The court further noted that the Vladikavkaz Town Administration had ordered that all meetings and assemblies be held in front of the Tkhapsayev theatre; therefore the demonstration in Svoboda Square was in breach of that order. Lastly, the court found that public gatherings of unlimited duration were not authorised by Russian law. 16.  It appears from the videotape and press articles submitted by the applicants that on the same day the police ordered the protesters to disperse. As the protesters refused to stop the demonstration, the police dismantled the tents they had erected. The protesters, however, put the tents back up and continued their demonstration. 17.  On 18 November 2003 the Supreme Court of the Severnaya Osetiya-Alaniya Republic upheld the judgment of 11 October 2003 on appeal. 18.  On 27 November 2003 the Parliament of the Severnaya Osetiya-Alaniya Republic decreed that Svoboda Square in Vladikavkaz was reserved for meetings, assemblies and demonstrations organised at the initiative of the authorities of the Severnaya Osetiya-Alaniya Republic and the town of Vladikavkaz. Other public gatherings were to be held at a venue to be determined by the Vladikavkaz Town Administration. 19.  On an unspecified date in December 2003 the protesters ended the demonstration.


5.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lived in Łódź, Poland. 6.  On 14 June 1998 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of attempted murder. 7.  On 15 June 1998 the Łódź District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) remanded the applicant in custody until 14 September 1998. The court notes that the applicant was suspected of having committed a serious offence and that there was strong evidence against him. There was also the risk that he might attempt to intimidate witnesses, abscond or go into hiding. The court also stressed the likelihood that a heavy penalty would be imposed on him. 8.  On 24 June 1998 the Łódź District Prosecutor (Prokurator Rejonowy) dismissed the applicant’s request for release. The decision was upheld by the Łódź Regional Prosecutor (Prokurator Okręgowy) on 7 July 1998. The prosecutor relied on the fact that the applicant, shortly before his arrest, had been wanted by the police in another case and that he had no permanent place of residence. 9.  The applicant’s detention was subsequently extended pending trial several times by the Łódź Regional Court. Each time, the court repeated the reasons previously given for the applicant’s detention and, further, relied on the need to take expert evidence. The court requested that an expert opinion be prepared by the end of November 1998. 10.  On 18 December 1998 the Łódź District Prosecutor indicted the applicant for attempted murder. 11.  On 2 June 1999 the trial began, the bill of indictment was read and the court began hearing statements from the applicant. In the course of giving explanations the applicant felt unwell and the hearing was adjourned. 12.  The applicant’s state of health did not prevent him from participating in the proceedings. The next hearing was held on 2 September 1999. Subsequent hearings were held at regular intervals ranging from one to four months. Several hearings were adjourned for different reasons, such as the absence of one of the judges, the need to examine the victim’s place of residence and to request expert opinions on biological and chemical examination of tracks. 13.  On 5 June 2000 the Łódź Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) convicted the applicant of attempted murder and sentenced him to 12 years’ imprisonment. The applicant appealed on 15 September 2000. 14.  On 22 January 2001 the Łódź Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case to the prosecutor for further investigation. The applicant remained in custody. 15.  On 30 March 2001 the prosecutor refused an application for release by the applicant. He found that there were no reasons for releasing him. 16.  The applicant’s detention was extended by the Regional Court on 23 March, 22 June, 17 August and 16 November 2001. Appeals by the applicant against those decisions, and requests for release, were dismissed. 17.  On 6 July 2001 the prosecutor lodged a new bill of indictment with the Łódź Regional Court and accused the applicant of attempted murder. 18.  The Regional Court held five hearings at regular intervals. 19.  On 30 January 2002 the Łódź Regional Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to 10 years’ imprisonment. 20.  On 22 October 2002 the Łódź Court of Appeal upheld the first‑instance judgment. 21.  On 12 December 2002 the applicant’s officially appointed lawyer refused to lodge a cassation appeal on his behalf because he had found no grounds for doing so. 22.  The applicant died on 6 April 2006. On 30 January 2007 the Government informed the Court that the applicant had died nearly 7 months before the application was communicated to the Government. Furthermore, the Government requested the Court to adjourn the examination of the application until the applicant’s successors declared whether they intended to pursue the application. The Court requested Ewa Kocik, the applicant’s life partner, mentioned as his successor before the Court in his letter of 31 March 2005, to submit information as to whether she wished to continue the proceedings in her partner’s stead. On 21 February 2007 Ewa Kocik informed the Court that she wished to continue the proceedings before the Court.


4.  The applicant was born in 1970. He is serving a life term in the Leopoldov prison. 5.  On 22 March 2004 the applicant claimed compensation before the Bratislava I District Court for damages allegedly caused by legal malpractice of his former lawyer. 6.  On 31 August 2004 the District Court exempted the applicant from the obligation to pay the court fees. 7.  Subsequently, between 22 October 2004 and 4 August 2008, the District Court appointed one-by-one four legal-aid lawyers for the applicant who appealed against the appointment or refused to take up the legal representation submitting that they were in a friendly relationship with the defendant or that their illness or business prevented them from providing legal aid to the applicant. 8.  The Bratislava Regional Court, on the appeal of the appointed lawyers, twice quashed the District Court’s decisions to appoint a legal-aid lawyer and remitted the matter for a new determination and in one instance it dismissed the attorney’s appeal. 9.  On 24 September 2008 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint about alleged delays before the District Court. It held that the District Court had been proceeding in a continuous manner and that short periods of inactivity of the court had not violated the applicant’s right invoked. It further held that the lawyers’ refusals to take up the legal representation were supported by reasonable grounds and therefore the delays caused by this fact could not be attributable to the District Court. 10.  By a decision of 12 January 2009 the District Court appointed a fifth legal-aid lawyer and in March 2009 it requested the applicant to eliminate shortcomings in his action within ten days. 11.  The applicant’s legal-aid lawyer asked for extension of the given time-limit or alternatively the appointment of another legal-aid lawyer on account of her temporary illness presumably to last until the end of April 2009. 12.  On 10 November 2009 the District Court repeatedly requested the lawyer to complete the petition. 13.  On 15 March 2010 the lawyer requested that her appointment be quashed. The District Court dismissed her request and on 2 September 2010 again requested her to amend the petition. 14.  The proceedings are still pending.


4.  The applicants were born in 1968, 1972, 1964, 1966, 1973, 1962, 1976, 1962, 1963, 1971, 1970 and 1969 respectively. They were detained in the Buca prison, in İzmir, at the time of the events giving rise to the present application. 5.  On 20 July 1995 the applicants, along with ten other prisoners, were taken from their cells to an area of the prison in order to be brought before the İzmir State Security Court for trial. According to the applicants, while they were waiting to be collected, they were attacked by prison administrators, prison warders and gendarmes using truncheons and wooden planks, because they had objected to being searched. According to the Government the applicants had resisted the search, attached themselves to one another and subsequently fallen down the stairs and injured themselves. The applicants were then taken to the İzmir State Security Court in prison vehicles. 6.  At the hearing before the State Security Court, the applicants' complained that they had been beaten before being brought before the court. The court noted the applicants' condition and decided to postpone the proceedings on the ground that it was impossible to hold a hearing in such circumstances. It ordered that the applicants be medically examined and that the results be sent to the İzmir public prosecutor's office with a view to the opening of an investigation. A letter to that effect was sent the same day to the public prosecutor. 7.  A preliminary investigation was instigated by the İzmir public prosecutor's office into the allegations of the applicants. On 20 July and 14 August 1995 the prosecutor took statements from the applicants who reiterated that they were beaten by the gendarmes and the prison wardens. 8.  On 20 July 1995 a forensic expert examined Ahmet Güven, Kadri Sönmez, Metin Göktepe, Neslihan Göktepe, İzzettin Koç, Kadir Issı, Mehmet Kışanak, Rıdvan Karatay, Ali Kemal Yıldız and Ms Emsihan Karatay in prison. 9.  In his report, the doctor noted that Emsihan Karatay complained of a pain in her head and her left leg. The doctor decided that the applicant be referred to the orthopaedist at the Izmir State Hospital. 10.  As regards Neslihan Göktepe, he observed that there were swellings on her head, behind her left ear and an erythema on her back as a result of blows. He also noted a graze on her neck. The doctor concluded that Neslihan Göktepe should be re-examined by a forensic expert at the Izmir Forensic Medicine Institute in seven days. 11.  In respect of Kadri Issı, the doctor noted erythemas on the upper left part of his back and on his left arm. He further observed a wound and haemorrhage under his left ear. Kadri Issı further complained of pain in the lower right part of his back. The doctor considered that the injuries rendered the applicant unfit for work for fifteen days. 12.  As to İzzettin Koç, the medical report referred to wounds over his eyebrows and nose and several ecchymoses, erythemas and grazes on his back and his left knee which had been caused by blows. The doctor concluded that the injuries rendered İzzettin Koç unfit for work for ten days and that he would recover within twenty days following a medical treatment. 13.  As regards Mehmet Kışanak, the doctor observed swellings and erythemas on the upper part of the back, underneath the chin and around the nose and mouth as a result of blows. He further noted an erythema on the applicant's right leg. The doctor concluded that the injuries rendered Mehmet Kışanak unfit for work for ten days and that he would recover within twenty days following a medical treatment. 14.  As regards Rıdvan Karatay, the medical report referred to an erythema and a swelling on the right eye orbit, erythemas and ecchymoses on the upper part of the back as a result of blows. The applicant further complained of pain in his head. The doctor decided that Rıdvan Karatay should be referred to the ophthalmologist at the Izmir State Hospital. 15.  With regard to Kadri Sönmez, the forensic expert noted erythemas and swellings on the upper part of his back, on both his arms and his right ear. The applicant also complained of pain in his left leg. The doctor observed that the injuries rendered the applicant unfit for work for five days. 16.  As to Ali Kemal Yıldız, the report referred to swellings and erythemas on the applicant's back, neck, and head and to an ecchymosis behind his ear as a result of blows. There were also erythemas on the applicant's left arm and left leg. The doctor further noted that the applicant complained of pain in his head and his chin. He concluded that the injuries rendered him unfit for work for seven days and considered that he would recover within five days. 17.  As regards Metin Göktepe, the doctor observed swellings, erythemas and ecchymoses behind the applicant's head, on his chin, back, neck and arms as a result of blows. The forensic expert concluded that the injuries rendered him unfit for work for ten days and considered that he would recover within twenty days following medical treatment. 18.  Finally, as regards Ahmet Güven, the medical report referred to pain in the applicant's head, wounds on the right eye orbit and around the eyebrows, to swellings and pain in his right arm and to ecchymoses and grazes on his back and around his ribs. The doctor decided that the applicant be referred to the orthopaedist at the Izmir State Hospital. 19.  On 18 August 1995 an expert from the Forensic Medicine Institute examined Ramazan Akdağ and sent the medical report to the Izmir public prosecutor's office. According to this report this applicant sustained the following injuries: haemorrhage on the right sclera, swelling of 4 x 4 cm on the post-parietal bone on the scalp, erythemas on the forehead, swellings and ecchymoses on the zygomas, the orbits and the left ear, swelling and a scar on the lower lip, a trauma on the left clavicle, ecchymosis of 10 cm in diameter on the left hemithorax and ecchymotic lesions on the right hemithorax. The forensic expert considered that the injuries were not life threatening but rendered him unfit for work for seven days and that he would recover within twenty days. 20.  On 17 November 1995 a doctor from the Forensic Medicine Institute reported that Yaşar Avcı, who was hospitalised on 20 July 1995 with the diagnosis of “general body trauma”, had sustained the following injuries at the time of the hospitalisation: ecchymoses on the back and on both shoulders, a graze of 2 x 2 cm on the right zygoma, erythemas in the forehead, sensitivity on the left tibia. The doctor considered that the applicant should wear a cervical collar. According to the report of 17 November 1995 the applicant was discharged from the hospital on 28 July 1995 and was re‑examined on 9 October 1995. The expert concluded that the injuries had not been life threatening but had rendered him unfit for work for ten days and that he would recover. 21.  On 9 April 1996 the prosecutor decided not to prosecute the Director of Buca Prison and his staff for alleged ill-treatment of the applicants. The applicants objected to this decision. On 25 June 1996 the Karşıyaka Assize Court dismissed the applicants' objection. 22.  On 11 April 1996 the prosecutor transferred the investigation file concerning the gendarmes to the İzmir Administrative Council. However, the case file subsequently went astray after it was sent to the Divisional Gendarme Command at Buca Prison. 23.  On 1 May 2000 İzmir Administrative Council decided to open an investigation against three gendarme officials in connection with the disappearance of the above-mentioned case file. It however decided not to bring proceedings against the gendarmes responsible for the transfer of the applicants to court on 20 July 1995. 24.  The Government informed the Court that the proceedings against the gendarmes who had lost the file were terminated by a decision of non‑prosecution on 15 January 2002 on account of the expiry of the statutory time-limit. 25.  The applicants claimed that they were never informed of the outcome of the proceedings and that they learned of the decision of the İzmir Administrative Council when the Court delivered its judgment in the case of Satık and Others (no. 31866/96, 10 October 2000) which had been lodged by ten other prisoners who had been injured on 20 July 1995 in Buca prison. 26.  The applicant was convicted of carrying out activities for the purpose of bringing about the secession of a part of the national territory under Article 125 of the Criminal Code and sentenced to death on 2 December 1998. This judgment became final on 17 April 2000 after the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. On 6 September 2002 the applicant's sentence was commuted to life imprisonment by the İzmir Assize Court. 27.  It appears from the case-file that the applicant took part in hunger strikes on various occasions and that as a result his health deteriorated. 28.  According to the medical report issued by Bitlis State Hospital on 26 June 2003 the applicant suffered from hypertension, anxiety and slight amnesia. On 15 July 2003 the Bitlis State Hospital Medical Commission issued an additional report in which it concluded that the medical condition of the applicant did not necessitate the suspension of his sentence. 29.  On 28 July 2003 the applicant requested the suspension of his sentence pursuant to Article 399 of the Criminal Code on Procedure. On 17 July 2003 the Bitlis public prosecutor, relying on the aforementioned reports of the Bitlis State Hospital, dismissed the applicant's request. No document has been submitted by the parties as to whether the applicant objected to this decision. 30.  According to a medical report issued by Bitlis State Hospital on 24 June 2004 the applicant suffered from hypertension, depression, vertigo (light-headedness) and head pains. The applicant was prescribed medication as well as a special diet. Following this report the prison authorities decided that the applicant be given a special diet. 31.  According to a medical report issued by two doctors, Mr U.O. and Mr N.S., on 1 November 2005, the applicant was diagnosed in 2003 as suffering from hypertension and amnesia. They noted that he was receiving drug treatment and that he could physically continue to take care of himself within a prison facility. 32.  The Government submitted a number of documents as regards the applicant's transfer to various medical centres for check-up and the results of his analyses.