5.  The applicant was born in 1978 and is currently detained in Herby Stare Prison, Poland. 6.  The applicant has been suffering from epilepsy since his early childhood. More recently he has been diagnosed with schizophrenia and other serious mental disorders. Prior to his detention, he had attempted to commit suicide and had received in-patient treatment in a psychiatric hospital. 7.  On 19 April 2005 the Będzin District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) remanded the applicant in custody on suspicion of committing robbery and battery. Subsequently, the applicant's pre‑trial detention was extended by the Będzin District Court in decisions of 14 October 2005 and 11 January 2006, and by the Myszków District Court in decisions of 5 June and 28 September 2006. 8.  On being taken into detention, the applicant was committed to an unspecified remand centre, presumably Sosnowiec Remand Centre. 9.  On 20 April 2005 he was taken to a State psychiatric hospital in Czeladź experiencing intensive auditory hallucinations of a psychotic nature. He remained there for two days. 10.  On 22 April 2005 the applicant was committed to Zabrze Remand Centre but on the same day he was transferred to Rybnik Psychiatric Hospital for observation. On 17 or 18 July 2005 the applicant was transferred back to Zabrze Remand Centre and he remained there until 4 January 2006. 11.  During his detention in Zabrze Remand Centre the applicant was taking psychotropic medicines and he was examined by a psychiatrist on 19 July, 23 August, 6, 21 and 27 September, 8 and 22 November, and 20 and 30 December 2005. In addition, the applicant was under the constant supervision of a psychologist who examined him on 19 July, 23 August, 15 November and 15 December 2005. Finally, the applicant was examined by a prison general practitioner in connection with dermatological problems, coughs, backaches and gastrological disorders. 12.  From 4 January until 5 April 2006 the applicant was detained in Sosnowiec Remand Centre. 13.  On 15 January 2006 he was again taken to Czeladź Psychiatric Hospital experiencing auditory hallucinations and suicidal thoughts. On the following day the applicant's condition stabilised. He was prescribed medicines and returned to Sosnowiec Remand Centre. It was suggested that he should remain under psychiatric supervision. 14.  On 23 January 2006 at about 11 p.m. the applicant attempted to hang himself in Sosnowiec Remand Centre. He was rescued by his fellow cellmates. Immediately afterwards he was examined by the in-house doctor, who did not find any injuries. 15.  On 24 January 2006 the applicant was taken to Czeladź Psychiatric Hospital. Because of the lack of places, he was transported to Opole Psychiatric Hospital, where he was examined by doctors. The applicant was diagnosed with schizophrenia and it was suggested that he remain under psychiatric supervision. Nevertheless, the applicant was not admitted to the hospital as there was no room. As a result, he was taken back to Sosnowiec Remand Centre. 16.  During his remaining time in Sosnowiec Remand Centre the applicant claimed that he had experienced hallucinations. He received regular pharmacological treatment, including psychotropic medicines. Between January and April 2006 he was examined nine times by a psychiatrist or a general practitioner. 17.  On 22 May 2006 the applicant was transferred to Herby Stare Prison. 18.  On his admission to Herby Stare Prison the applicant was examined by a neurologist. The examination did not confirm that the applicant suffered from the disorders which he had described, such as epilepsy, hallucinations and anxiety; nevertheless, the doctor prescribed pharmacological treatment and ordered a psychiatric consultation and observation. 19.  On 25 May 2006 the applicant was examined by a psychiatrist. He complained that he was suffering from insomnia and auditory hallucinations. Moreover, he claimed to have been followed and spied on by his cellmates. The doctor prescribed a drug to treat the applicant's schizophrenia and ordered that he should remain under the supervision of a psychiatrist. 20.  On 1 June 2006 the applicant missed his appointment with a psychiatrist but he was examined one week later. On 27 June 2006 he was examined by a general practitioner and on 10 July 2006 once more by a psychiatrist. During the latter visit, the applicant declared that he was well. 21.  Subsequently, between July 2006 and August 2007 the applicant was examined thirty-five times by doctors with different specialities, including a psychiatrist and a neurosurgeon. 22.  It appears that from 2 April until 4 June 2007 the applicant was hospitalised in a prison psychiatric ward. 23.  From 4 June until 23 or 28 August 2007 he was again detained in Herby Stare Prison. On the day of his release the applicant declared that he was well and had not been experiencing any hallucinations lately. 24.  On 7 September 2007 the applicant was again committed to Herby Stare Prison. He has been detained there to this day. 25.  The parties' statements relating to the conditions of the applicant's detention are, to a large extent, contradictory. 26.  In Zabrze Remand Centre, from 18 July until 20 October 2005, the applicant was detained in cell no. 41 and from 20 October 2005 until 4 January 2006 in cell no. 42. Both cells measured approximately 6.7 square metres.
(b)  Facts in dispute
(i)  The Government 27.  The Government did not provide any information as to the number of detainees sharing cells with the applicant. They submitted, however, that Zabrze Remand Centre had faced the problem of overcrowding; indeed, its governor decided to reduce the statutory minimum standard of three square metres per person. On 14 June, 30 September and 29 November 2005 a penitentiary judge was informed about the Governor's decision. 28.  The Government also submitted that in Zabrze Remand Centre each of the applicant's cells had had an annex with a toilet cubicle and a washbasin. That area was separated from the rest of the cell and offered privacy. Detainees were supplied with toiletries and bed linen was changed once every two weeks. The window surface in each of the applicant's cells was over one square metre. The applicant was allowed to take a shower once a week. The shower room had eight shower heads. Sixteen people were allowed inside and they showered in two groups on a rotation basis. 29.  In the Government's submission the applicant had been allowed to have one hour of outdoor exercise in one of seven yards, two of which measured 150 and 120 square metres. The applicant could also participate in social activities two or three times per week for approximately two hours. In addition, he could stay in an entertainment room watching television, reading or playing board games. Finally, in the Government's submission the applicant had access to radio and television programmes through the prison internal broadcasting system and he could rent five books per week from a prison library. 30.  The Government submitted that the applicant had not been given any disciplinary punishments while in Zabrze Remand Centre. On the contrary, he had twice been rewarded for good behaviour.
(ii)  The applicant 31.  The applicant submitted that he shared the cells in question with two other inmates. 32.  Moreover, he maintained that his cells had been dirty and infested with bedbugs, cockroaches and fungus. Detainees had smoked cigarettes all day long inside the cells. The bed linen and towels were not properly washed and there was a stench in the air. The detainees had washed in cold water. The applicant also claimed that there had been no television set or board games in the entertainment room and that he had not been informed about any social activities available in the remand centre. 33.  The applicant also complained of the practice of bullying detainees by the staff of Zabrze Remand Centre. He submitted that warders had ordered disciplinary punishment under any pretext, demolished cells during frequent and unjustified searches, made detainees undress and do squats and also deprived them of sleep. 34.  In Sosnowiec Remand Centre, between 4 January and 5 April 2006, the applicant was initially detained in cell no. 37, which measured almost sixteen square metres and was shared by four to five persons including the applicant. From 6 February until 30 March 2006 he was detained together with two other detainees in the medical wing's cell no. 58. That cell measured thirteen square metres. Finally, from 30 March until 5 April 2006 he was detained in cell no. 56, which measured ten square metres and a half and was shared by two people. When the number of new admissions increased as of January 2006, the governor of Sosnowiec Remand Centre decided to reduce the available cell space below the minimum statutory limit and to convey the necessary information to the competent penitentiary judge.
(b)  Facts in dispute
(i)  The Government 35.  The Government submitted that the sanitary conditions in Sosnowiec Remand Centre had been decent. Each cell had a separate sanitary annex with a toilet cubicle and a washbasin. Detainees took a hot bath or shower once a week. During his detention in cell no. 58 the applicant could take one bath per day. In that cell detainees had access to hot water. In all other cells they were allowed to use a water immersion heater or a wireless kettle. All cells were sufficiently lit and ventilated. Detainees had one hour of outdoor exercise per day and they were also allowed to spend time in an entertainment room. The entertainment room in Wing IV of Sosnowiec Remand Centre, where the applicant had been detained, was equipped with board games and tables to play table football and table tennis. In addition, in the remand centre detainees had access to a library and, in the spring and summertime, to a volleyball court.
(ii)  The applicant 36.  The applicant contested the above submissions by saying that sanitary conditions in Sosnowiec Remand Centre had been inadequate. The cells were damp and dirty, the towels and bed linen were not washed and the detainees washed in cold water. 37.  The applicant was detained in Herby Stare Prison during three separate periods: from 22 May 2006 and 2 April 2007, from 4 June and 28 August 2007, and from 7 September 2007 onwards.
(b)  Facts in dispute
(i)  The Government 38.  The Government supplied the list of cells which the applicant had occupied at different periods. The surface area of these cells varied between ten and eighteen square metres. Their occupancy rate, however, had not been disclosed. On the other hand, the Government submitted that the prison's governor had made a decision to reduce the available cell space below the minimum statutory limit and that between May 2006 and October 2007 he had informed a penitentiary judge about that fact on nineteen occasions. 39.  They claimed that in Herby Stare Prison the sanitary conditions had been decent. Each cell had a separate sanitary annex with a toilet cubicle and a washbasin. Detainees took a hot bath or shower once a week. The bath house was equipped with nineteen shower heads and four or five persons were allowed inside at a time.
(ii)  The applicant 40.  The applicant argued that all the cells in which he had been detained had been seriously overcrowded. For example, cell no. 32, which measured eighteen square metres, had been shared by nine or ten persons. 41.  The applicant also submitted that sanitary conditions in Herby Stare Prison had been inadequate. Similarly to the other detention facilities where he had been held, the cells were damp and dirty, the towels and bed linen were not washed and the detainees washed in cold water. In addition in Herby Stare Prison the shower room was located in a separate building. In wintertime in particular, it had been difficult for detainees to walk back to the living quarters with wet hair and without proper clothing. Moreover the applicant complained of the lack of privacy because the showers had not been separated. 42.  The applicant did not lodge any formal complaints with the penitentiary authorities on the basis of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences. He complained, however, to various State authorities, i.e. to the Ombudsman (Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich) about the inadequate medical care he had received and the conditions of his detention. He also filed several requests for release on health grounds. 43.  In a letter of 6 July 2006 the Ombudsman informed the applicant that his allegations had been considered ill‑founded. It was emphasised that the applicant had been under constant psychiatric supervision and that he had been hospitalised whenever necessary. 44.  On 31 July 2006 the Myszków District Court refused to release the applicant from pre‑trial detention on health grounds as requested by his lawyer. The court referred to unspecified medical reports which stated that the applicant was not suffering from any mental illness, but merely from an antisocial personality disorder. 45.  On 23 November 2006 the Częstochowa Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) dismissed an interlocutory appeal by the applicant against a decision of 28 September 2006 by which the Myszków District Court had extended his pre‑trial detention. 46.  The applicant argued that, because of his mental illness, he should not be held in a detention centre but in a psychiatric hospital. He referred to a number of medical reports which had confirmed his schizophrenia diagnosis and in which it had been recommended that he should remain under psychiatric supervision. 47.  The Częstochowa Regional Court held that there were no contraindications to the applicant's detention in a remand centre. The court stated that, admittedly, a number of psychiatrists from both State and prison hospitals had directed that the applicant should be placed under psychiatric supervision. The court observed, however, that the diagnosis was not credible since the doctors had not had long‑term contact with the applicant and had not had full access to his medical records. Instead, the court relied on an opinion delivered by experts in psychiatry from Rybnik Hospital, who were of the view that the applicant was not suffering from any psychotic disorder. The court stressed that, unlike the others, the latter expert opinion was thorough, as it had been drawn up further to the applicant's five‑week period under psychiatric observation at Rybnik Hospital in 2005 and based on the medical records of his psychiatric treatment prior to his detention. On the other hand, the court took note of discrepancies between the medical reports before it and recommended that the report of the experts from Rybnik Psychiatric Hospital be updated. Nevertheless, the court did not agree to release the applicant from pre‑trial detention in a remand centre.


5.  The applicant, Mr Zdeněk Jirsák, is a Czech national who was born in 1953 and is currently serving a sentence in Karviná Prison. 6.  The applicant served his prison sentence in Valdice Prison in Sections C and D between 2000 and 2005. 7.  Between 10 November 2000 and 29 January 2001, he shared cell no. 223, of a total surface area of 35.816 sq. m., with nine other prisoners. The cell was rectangular in shape with bunk beds along both of the longer walls. Next to the entrance, which was at one end of the cell, was a separate room with a toilet. At the opposite end of the cell were two large windows, measuring 1.44 sq. m each. One window and half of the second one could be opened. Yellow translucent pieces of fibreglass covered them from the outside at a distance of approximately 1.5 m. It was up to the detainees how and when the windows were opened. The cell was equipped with ten lockers, two tables and ten chairs. 8.  During the whole period of his detention in cell no. 223 the applicant was employed in the prison laundry where he spent nine hours every working day. He was allowed to spend one hour a day outside in the yard. He could also watch television or take part in other recreational activities outside his cell. The applicant could take a hot shower twice a week and wash after work. He was guaranteed one warm meal per day and two hot meals four times a week. He had access to a range of cultural and sports activities, books, newspapers and magazines. 9.  On 28 January 2001 at 7.30 p.m. the applicant broke his ankle in his cell while climbing down from his bunk bed. According to him, he fell because he was dizzy due to the stuffy air in the cell. He did not call for medical assistance as he thought that his ankle was just sprained. He took some pills containing Ibuprofen as a painkiller. In the morning, he was unable to walk due to a severe pain in his ankle, so his cell mates took him to the prison infirmary. 10.  The prison doctor visually examined the applicant and considered him to be heavily intoxicated with medicaments, although he did not conduct a medical test. The doctor did not send him for an x-ray, because the person operating the prison’s x-ray machine was on holiday and due to the applicant’s alleged intoxication, his transfer to a hospital was, in his view, impossible. The applicant, having been proclaimed intoxicated, was sent to solitary confinement. 11.  On the next day, 30 January 2001, the applicant was x-rayed and it was found that his ankle was broken. He was transferred to a prison hospital in Prague. The record shows that the applicant fully cooperated with the medical staff and was operated on at the hospital on 31 January 2001. He then stayed in Prague Prison, where he was treated until 20 March 2001. He was subsequently transferred to Brno Prison, where he continued his treatment, including physiotherapy. The treatment lasted for seven months overall, but the applicant has continued to see a doctor afterwards as he has developed arthritis in his broken ankle. 12.  On 26 March 2001 the applicant was found guilty of the disciplinary offence of self-intoxication. He was sentenced to five days under the “closed prison” regime (uzavřené oddělení). He did not appeal. 13.  He was also dismissed from his prison job because it was considered that on 29 January 2001 he had been absent from work due to his self-intoxication. 14.  In November 2001 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against the director of Valdice Prison alleging inadequate treatment of his injury. 15.  On 1 February 2002 the Hradec Králové Regional Prosecutor’s Office informed him that his complaints were unjustified. 16.  On 22 August 2002 the High Prosecutor’s Office expressed doubts about the conduct of the prison authorities towards the applicant and forwarded the complaints to the Ministry of Justice, Department of Prison Inspections (odbor generální inspekce, oddělení vězeňství) to investigate the matter. The prosecutor noted with concern that even though a medical report had found that the applicant had no longer been intoxicated at 3.10 p.m. on 29 January 2001, he still had not been sent for an x-ray but had been kept in solitary confinement until the next day; that the applicant had been dismissed from his prison job during the time of his injury; that he had not been paid sickness benefit; and that he had been subjected to disciplinary punishment for intoxication without any consideration to his claim that he had taken painkillers due to the injury he had suffered. The applicant did not inform the Court about the outcome of this investigation. 17.  On 13 February 2004, in reply to another complaint by the applicant alleging overcrowding in the prison, the High Prosecutor’s Office informed him that it was aware of the fact that some sections in Valdice Prison were overcrowded and that the competent prosecutor had been taking steps to remedy the situation. 18.  On 20 October 2005 the applicant sent another complaint challenging his treatment on 29 and 30 January 2001 to the Prison Directorate General (Generální ředitelství Vězeňské služby) which, on 29 November 2005, found it unsubstantiated. 19.  The applicant instituted civil proceedings against the Czech Republic claiming compensation in respect of pecuniary damage arising from his injury, which had been caused by the unsatisfactory conditions of detention in cell no. 223 in Valdice Prison and inadequate treatment of the injury by the prison doctor. 20.  In a judgment of 7 April 2005 the Jičín District Court (okresní soud) rejected his action, finding that at the material time the applicant had been held together with nine other inmates in a cell measuring 35.816 sq. m. (or 107,448 cubic metres) including a toilet, which was in accordance with Order of the Minister of Justice no. 20/1977 in force at the relevant time, which had required a minimum of 7 cubic metres per prisoner. The court based its findings on the testimony of the applicant, two of his cellmates at the time of the injury, other witnesses and several documents. The information about the cell dimensions was based on a report by the prison authorities and the court did not consider it necessary to measure the cell itself, as requested by the applicant. It did not find any illegality in the prison doctor’s conduct. It dismissed the applicant’s request to admit additional evidence as unnecessary. 21.  The applicant appealed, arguing that the conditions of his detention had been unsatisfactory. He claimed that the court had rejected his request to admit in evidence a medical expert report to assess the conditions of his detention and his request that the court measure the cell itself and not rely on the prison report. 22.  On 19 October 2005 the Hradec Králové Regional Court (krajský soud) upheld the first-instance judgment endorsing the District Court’s opinion. 23.  On 10 May 2007 the Supreme Court (Nejvyšší soud) dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law (dovolání). It upheld the conclusions of the lower courts that the conditions of the applicant’s detention, including the dimensions of his cell, complied with domestic law. 24.  The applicant lodged a constitutional appeal (ústavní stížnost) complaining about the conditions of his detention and violations of his right to a fair trial in the precedent proceedings. 25.  The Constitutional Court (Ústavní soud) sent the appeal to the lower courts that had previously been involved in the case for comments. 26.  On 24 October 2007 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional appeal as manifestly ill-founded, holding that the applicant had merely disagreed with the outcome of the proceedings. It added that the decisions of the ordinary courts had been logical and sufficiently reasoned without any appearance of arbitrariness. The court did not refer in its reasoning to the written observations submitted by the lower courts. It appears from the decision that the District Court maintained, in a short submission, that its decision had not violated the applicant’s constitutional rights and that the Regional Court referred only to the text of its judgment. None of these observations were sent to the applicant, the court finding that they did not bring anything new to the case. 27.  In 2007 the applicant instituted proceedings against the prison doctor who treated him on 29 January 2001, for the protection of his personality rights. On 3 December 2010 the claim was dismissed on the ground that the doctor had been acting in his official capacity and therefore it was the State which should have been sued. At the same time, the prescription period for the claim had already expired. 28.  On 22 July 2010 the applicant instituted proceedings for damages against the State before the Prague 2 District Court (obvodní soud) under the State Liability Act for inhuman conditions of detention for the whole period of his sentence. Those proceedings are pending.


5.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Jesenice. 6.  On 15 April 1998 the Kranj District Court instituted insolvency proceedings against the company S., at that time the applicant’s employer. 7.  On 29 April 1998 the receiver in insolvency issued a decision on the termination of the applicant’s employment contract with the company S. 8.  On an unknown date, the applicant lodged his claim for a redundancy payment in the insolvency proceedings. Since the receiver disputed the claim, the Kranj District Court on 11 September 1998 referred the applicant to labour proceedings. 9.  On 22 December 1998 the applicant instituted proceedings before the Kranj Divison of the Labour and Social Court. 10.  In the same period about 150 claims similar to that of the applicant were lodged before the same court. 11.  In 1999 the Kranj Labour and Social Court issued decisions in four cases similar to the applicant’s, dismissing the claims. It held that the workers who had lost their jobs owing to the employer’s insolvency before section 19 of the 1999 Act Amending the Guarantee Fund of the Republic of Slovenia Act (“the 1999 Act”) became effective were not entitled to a redundancy payment. Section 19 explicitly foresaw a right to a redundancy payment for workers who were let go after a company had become insolvent. 12.  In 2000 several applications for a constitutional review of section 19 of the 1999 Act were lodged with the Constitutional Court, challenging the constitutionality of non-retroactive application of that provision. 13.  On 5 October 2001, following the negative decisions issued in the four cases (see paragraph 11 above), the trade union which was also representing the applicant requested the court to postpone hearings scheduled in other cases. The union wanted to first check whether the other workers wanted to withdraw their claims in order to avoid the costs of the proceedings. 14.  No formal decision on adjourning or staying the proceedings was issued by the court. 15.  On 10 April 2003 the Constitutional Court dismissed the motions for review of the constitutionality of section 19 of the 1999 Act. It held that they were unfounded, since they were based on the false premises that the right to a redundancy payment for workers laid off because of their employer’s insolvency was introduced only by section 19, and that moreover it did not apply retroactively. Referring to its own decisions issued in 1994, 1995 and 2000, it stressed that this right had already been foreseen by the general labour legislation in force prior to the adoption of the 1999 Act. It explained that the purpose of Section 19 was solely to explicitly clarify that also workers who lost their jobs because of the insolvency of their employers were entitled to redundancy payments. Such clarification was needed because of the conflicting case-law of the lower courts. In this respect the Constitutional Court emphasised that while it could not interfere with the correct interpretation of legal norms by the lower courts, the latter could not apply an interpretation which would be unconstitutional, arbitrary, or clearly wrong. 16.  On 14 July 2003, the parties settled with the company S., which acknowledged the applicant’s claim. 17.  On 13 July 2006 the applicant lodged a claim for compensation for damage sustained because of the length of the labour proceedings. 18.  On 27 September 2007 the Ljubljana Local Court dismissed his claim. It held that Section 25 of the 2006 Act on Protection of the Right to a Trial without Undue Delay (“the 2006 Act”) was not applicable, since that provision only applied to cases where an individual had already lodged an application on account of length of proceedings before an international court. Applying the general rules of the 2001 Code of Obligations on pecuniary damages, it further concluded that since the case had been settled the applicant had failed to prove that he had incurred any damage. In any case, there was also no causal link between the conduct of the court and the damage allegedly sustained. The applicant appealed. 19.  On 9 January 2008 the Ljubljana Higher Court upheld the applicant’s appeal and remitted the case back to the first-instance court. 20.  On 8 May 2008 the Ljubljana Local Court, in a renewed set of proceedings, again dismissed the applicant’s claim. It concluded that he had failed to prove either any damage on account of delays in the proceedings or any causal link. The applicant appealed. 21.  On 5 November 2008 the Ljubljana Higher Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. 22.  On 27 May 2010 the Constitutional Court granted the applicant’s constitutional appeal by referring to its decision of 18 March 2010 (see paragraph 29 below) and remitted the case to the higher court. 23.  On 15 September 2010 the Ljubljana Higher Court remitted the case back to the first-instance court. 24.  On 25 October 2010 the Ljubljana Local Court, applying by analogy, in accordance with the instructions of the Constitutional Court, the provisions of the 2006 Act, dismissed the applicant’s claim. Referring to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, it held that it had been reasonable to suspend the examination of the applicant’s claim pending the outcome of some similar cases and of the proceedings before the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 15 above). It held that it could not identify any unreasonable delays in these similar cases, which took five years at three levels of jurisdiction, of which three years were before the Constitutional Court. The applicant appealed. 25.  On 13 April 2011 the Ljubljana Higher Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The applicant lodged an application for leave to appeal on points of law and a constitutional appeal. 26.  On 14 July 2011 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s request for leave to appeal on points of law. 27.  On 8 May 2012 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s constitutional appeal.


5.  The applicant was born in 1989 and lives in Arad. 6.  At around 4 a.m. on 8 August 2010, the applicant and his friends were involved in a fight with a group of people outside a bar. S.L., who was inside the bar, called the police. When the police arrived the group of aggressors ran away. The applicant and his friends were taken to the police station to give statements and possibly complain against their aggressors. 7.  While he was waiting inside the police station, the applicant saw a police officer who was behaving roughly with an arrestee who had just been brought in. He commented loudly that the police officer represented the State authority and should not hit people. D.C.I., the police officer in question, became angry and asked a colleague, M.C., to “take him [the applicant] to the toilets to teach him how to speak”. The applicant, who resisted entering the toilets, was taken outside and then into a back office where the two police officers, D.C.I. and M.C., handcuffed him to a radiator and started punching and kicking him. Alerted by the applicant’s screaming, another police officer entered and put an end to the hitting. At that point, one of the officers who had assaulted the applicant warned him not to say anything or he would find him and beat him again. The applicant and his friends were then escorted home by police officers.
(b)  The Government’s account of the events 8.  On 8 August 2010 the police were called in order to stop a fight between several people on a street in Arad. By the time the police arrived, the applicant and his friends had had their clothes torn and had already been injured. They were accompanied to the police station to make statements. The police officers took statements from S.L. and D.V. 9.  S.L. declared that he had been in a bar when he had seen that his brother, S.N., was involved in a fight outside. He called the police emergency number and then went outside to help his brother. He and his brother received blows to their bodies. He further stated that he did not wish to lodge a complaint against the aggressors at that time but reserved his right to do so later. D.V. stated that when he had left the bar he had seen some people fighting. Someone was throwing stones, one of which hit him in the leg. He stated that he did not wish to lodge a complaint. 10.  Afterwards the applicant and his friends were all escorted home by the police in order to avoid further violent incidents. 11.  An investigation was opened nonetheless in order to clarify the circumstances surrounding the incident. However, after a discussion on 20 August 2010 with the bar attendant and a sales woman at a nearby store, who said they had not seen or heard anything, the case was closed on 23 August 2010. 12.  Later on 8 August 2010, the applicant went to the emergency unit of Arad County Hospital, where he was diagnosed with maxillofacial trauma, and contusion of the lower lip and of the thorax. His injuries were treated. 13.  On 9 August 2010 a forensic medical certificate was issued by the Arad County Forensic Service at the request of the applicant. According to the certificate, the applicant had a sutured cut on the lower lip and bruising on the upper lip, bruising on the left side of the chest, two excoriations on the left side of the back, grazes and bruising on the right elbow, right leg and the left knee. The applicant also had two excoriations covered with brown scabs measuring 1 by 0.2 cm to 2 by 0.2 cm on the back of each wrist. The injuries may have been caused by an impact with or on a hard object on 8 August 2010. The injuries would require nine days of medical treatment if no complications developed. 14.  On 15 September 2010 the applicant lodged a complaint against the two officers who had assaulted him, accusing them of abusive investigative conduct and bodily harm. He lodged his complaint with both the Arad Police and the Prosecutor’s Office of the Timişoara Military County Court. He requested that S.L., S.N. and K.E., who had been taken to the police station with him, be called to testify as witnesses. 15.  On 23 September 2010 the applicant was heard at the Timişoara Military Prosecutor’s Office. He declared that he had been taken to the police station after a street brawl. Once inside the police station, the applicant drew an officer’s attention to his disrespectful behaviour towards someone else. The police officer in question and another colleague of his became angry with him and tried to drag him into the toilets, but he resisted. They then told him to go outside, where one of them, officer D.C.I., punched him in the mouth. He was then handcuffed with his hands behind his back and taken to a room where he was punched and kicked. The applicant further stated that he had suffered severe injuries, for which he was submitting a forensic medical certificate and claiming civil damages from his aggressors. 16.  On 27 September 2010 the Timişoara Military Prosecutor’s Office decided that the Prosecutor’s Office of the Arad County Court should deal with the case because the two police officers in question were not members of the military. 17.  In February 2011 the applicant, S.L. and S.N. were heard by a prosecutor from the Prosecutor’s Office of the Arad County Court. In a statement dated 1 February 2011, handwritten in front of the prosecutor, S.L. stated that he had been taken to the police station on 8 August 2010 following a dispute with a group of people in the street. Once inside the police station he was taken to the second floor together with his brother. Half an hour later, he overheard through an open window a person screaming with pain outside the building and recognised the applicant’s voice. Afterwards he was taken home together with his brother in a police car. Later that day they met the applicant in front of his house and he told them that he had been handcuffed and beaten up by police officers. The applicant showed them his injuries and the marks on his hands. S.L. declared that he knew for sure that the applicant had been beaten up at the police station because he had seen him when they were leaving the police station. On 8 February 2011 S.L.’s statement was typed on a witness statement form bearing the heading of the Prosecutor’s Office of the Arad County Court and S.L. signed it. In addition to the facts described in the previous handwritten statement, the typewritten statement included the following phrase: “... one of my friends, V., came to me and told me that some ... were beating up my brother and Miclea Alexandru.” In that statement S.L. also mentioned that, after he had heard the applicant shouting outside the police station, he had received on his mobile phone a message from the applicant who was telling him that he was being “beaten by policemen”. At that point he wanted to go outside but he was not allowed to and one hour later he was taken home in a police car together with his brother. 18.  On 1 February 2011 S.N. also gave a handwritten statement in front of the prosecutor. He declared that he had been taken to the police station following a street fight. The applicant was with him. After his arrival at the police station, while he was upstairs to give a statement, he heard the applicant screaming outside. Approximately one hour later he was taken home in a police car together with his brother. Later that day he met the applicant in front of his house. The applicant told him and his brother that he had been beaten up by police officers. He showed them the injuries on his lips and hands. Like his brother, S.N. also stated that he knew the applicant had been beaten inside the police station because he had seen him when they were taken home. That statement was subsequently typed on a witness statement form bearing the heading of the Prosecutor’s Office of the Arad County Court and was signed by S.N. on 17 February 2011. 19.  On 8 February 2011 the applicant declared that he maintained the account he had given in his initial complaint as well as in his statement of 23 September 2010. 20.  On 15 March 2011 the Prosecutor’s Office of the Arad County Court decided to join the applicant’s complaint to two complaints lodged by other individuals who claimed that they had been physically assaulted by the same police officers on a previous date. Subsequently, the prosecutor decided not to institute criminal proceedings for abusive investigative conduct as requested by the applicant, since he had not been under investigation at the relevant time. Lastly, the prosecutor held that the investigation for the three counts of abusive behaviour of which D.C.I. and M.C. were accused would be continued by the Prosecutor’s Office of the Arad District Court, which was the competent authority in view of the defendants’ functions within the police force. 21.  On 22 June 2011 an officer in charge of internal affairs at the Arad County Police took statements from the two police officers who had allegedly physically assaulted the applicant. D.C.I. stated that in the early hours of 8 August 2010 he had taken an arrested person to the police station. When he entered the waiting room he saw a group of six people who were drunk, had had their clothes torn and were visibly injured. They were arguing and swearing at each other. When he asked them politely to wait outside, one of them swore at him. M.C. stated that he had accompanied D.C.I. on the night of the incident. When he saw a group of people in the police station waiting room, he asked what had happened to them and they replied that they had been beaten up by some people on the street and were waiting to give statements. Then he asked them to wait outside. 22.  On 22 July 2011 the police officer in charge of the investigation took statements from T.I., G.S.S. and B.I.M., three of the police officers who had responded to the emergency call. 23.  Officer T.I. stated that he had gone to the scene of the incident accompanied by two police patrols. He found a group of people who claimed to be the injured parties. Amongst them was the applicant. They said that they wished to lodge a criminal complaint against their aggressors, so he accompanied them to the police station. There he took statements from S.L. and D.V., but he did not know whether any of the police officers physically assaulted any of the above-mentioned people. T.I. also stated that after statements had been taken, the applicant had been taken home by officer G.S., while he had accompanied the others home in order to avoid further possible conflicts if they decided to go back to the scene of the incident. 24.  G.S. stated that he was a member of one of the police patrols that had been called to the scene of the incident. When he arrived S.L. told him that he had been physically assaulted by a group of people who had then run away. He maintained that he did not recognise any of the aggressors. The officer further stated:
“... I accompanied to the police station the person who had been assaulted [S.L.] and Mr D.V., who was also at the scene when the incident took place. The accompanied people had injuries on their bodies, probably caused by the stones with which they had been aggressed and their clothes had also been torn as a result of the incident. ... Subsequently, I was asked by T.I. to accompany home another person involved in the incident in order to avoid other unpleasant incidents, this person was Miclea Alexandru. While I was with Miclea Alexandru and until reaching his home ..., he did not tell me that he had been beaten by a police officer, he had traces of violence on his face, his tee-shirt was torn but I did not ask him where this came from, I assumed it had come from the street fight.” 25.  B.I.M. declared that the applicant could not have been assaulted by police officers since he was one of the people who had been injured in the street fight. 26.  On 12 January 2012 the Prosecutor’s Office of the Arad District Court decided not to pursue the criminal proceedings with respect to the three counts of abusive behaviour for which officers D.C.I. and M.C. had been investigated. As for the applicant’s complaint, the prosecutor held that the statements given by the applicant and the two persons accompanying him on the day of the incident had been contradicted by the statements of the officers under investigation as well as by those of three other police officers, namely T.I., G.S. and B.I.M. Therefore, it could not be established with certainty that the applicant had been assaulted by the two police officers. 27.  The applicant complained against that decision, claiming that the statements of the two police officers and their colleagues were subjective and should have been corroborated by other evidence. He requested again that K.A. (referred to as K.E. in the initial complaint) be called as a witness and gave his address. He added that K.A.’s testimony would have been relevant, since he had witnessed the applicant receiving a punch from D.C.I. outside the police station. 28.  On 7 February 2012 the applicant’s complaint against the decision not to bring charges was dismissed by the head prosecutor of the Prosecutor’s Office of the Arad District Court with the same reasoning, namely that the statements of the injured party had not been corroborated by the statements of the alleged perpetrators and their colleagues. 29.  The applicant contested the prosecutor’s decision before the court, requesting non-pecuniary damages for the injuries sustained. In his submission before the court, the applicant emphasised that as he had been escorted to the police station by only two officers, the statement of the third officer should not have been taken into consideration. In addition, the applicant complained that the prosecutor had overlooked important evidence. The only pieces of evidence he had taken into account were the statements of the two officers under investigation and the statements of their colleagues, who could not have been impartial. The applicant argued that K.A., who had accompanied him to the police station on the day of the incident, should also have been heard by the prosecutors, as he had partially witnessed the alleged ill-treatment. 30.  The applicant’s complaint, together with the other two complaints against the two police officers, were analysed jointly and rejected as manifestly ill-founded by a final decision of the Arad District Court on 18 April 2012. 31.  The court considered that the evidence administered during the criminal investigation had sufficed to conclude that “it had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt that on 8 August 2010 the defendants had physically abused [the applicant]”. The court based its verdict on the discrepancies found between the applicant’s account of the events and the statement given by S.L. More specifically, S.L. declared that he had heard the applicant screaming outside the police station, whereas the applicant claimed that he had been beaten inside. S.L. also declared that the applicant had told him that he had been handcuffed with his hands behind his back, whereas the applicant stated that he had been handcuffed to a radiator. In addition, the injuries on the applicant’s body may very well have been caused during the street brawl. That fact had been confirmed by the three police officers who had intervened at the scene, namely T.I., G.S. and B.I.M., as well as by the witness, S.L., who had declared in his statement of 8 February 2011 that he had been told when he was inside the bar that a group of people were “beating up my brother and Miclea Alexandru”.


11.  At the beginning of the events relevant to the application, K. had a daughter, P., and a son, M., born in 1986 and 1988 respectively. P.’s father is X and M.’s father is V. From March to May 1989 K. was voluntarily hospitalised for about three months, having been diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia. From August to November 1989 and from December 1989 to March 1990, she was again hospitalised for periods of about three months on account of this illness. In 1991 she was hospitalised for less than a week, diagnosed as suffering from an atypical and undefinable psychosis. It appears that social welfare and health authorities have been in contact with the family since 1989. 12.  The applicants initially cohabited from the summer of 1991 to July 1993. In 1991 both P. and M. were living with them. From 1991 to 1993 K. and X were involved in a custody and access dispute concerning P. In May 1992 a residence order was made transferring custody of P. to X. 13.  K. was again hospitalised from 22 April to 7 May 1992, from 13 May to 10 June 1992, and from 11 to 17 January 1993, on account of psychoses. She was in compulsory care between 15 May and 10 June 1992. According to a medical report dated 15 May 1992, K. was paranoid and psychotic. 14.  On 19 March 1993, according to the social welfare authorities’ records, a discussion took place between a social worker and K.’s mother. K.’s mother said that her daughter’s health condition was really bad and that K. had destroyed a childhood picture of hers, a wedding photo of the mother, broken a glass and “pierced the eyes” of all appearing in the photos. K.’s mother had said that she was tired of the situation, as she did not get any support from the mental health authorities. She added that she was worried and afraid that “again something must happen before K. is admitted to care”.
On 24 March 1993 K. was placed under observation with a view to determining whether she should be placed in compulsory psychiatric care, having initially been diagnosed as suffering from psychosis. The conditions for compulsory care were not considered to be met but she remained in voluntary care until 5 May 1993. 15.  Allegedly, X did not allow K., P. and M. to meet. On 11 May 1993, when K. was again pregnant, her access to P. was further limited by an order of the District Court of R. Basing itself on a doctor’s opinion, the court held that the child’s mental development would be endangered if the meetings between P. and K. continued without supervision as had been ordered in 1992. 16.  According to the records of the social welfare authorities, M. showed signs of behavioural problems. On 30 March 1992 a psychologist reported how M. had played with two dolls saying – in very vulgar terms – that they were performing sexual acts. On 17 February 1993 K. was said to have broken a mirror in the presence of M. who had kept repeating: “mummy broke the mirror ...”
Notes of the social authorities of 24 and 30 March 1993 among others state that games which M. played and pictures he drew were of a destructive nature. According to the notes taken on 30 March, he had lately, while the children were singing together at the day-care nursery, shown immense hatred, threatening “to kill everybody”. The occasions when K. fetched him were described as “unpleasant scenes”, M. shouting and hitting his mother who did not react. It was noted, however, that he no longer played doll games with sexual connotations. 17.  According to the records of the social welfare authorities, a discussion between K., her mother, T. and a number of social and mental-health care officials took place on 31 March 1993, during which it was mentioned that the authorities might have to intervene in M.’s upbringing, from the child-protection point of view, in a more drastic way than had been the case so far. It appeared that in connection with K.’s recent hospitalisation T. had “forcibly” taken her from a restaurant, which had made K. furious, with the consequence that she had thrown things around; for example, the microwave oven had ended up on the floor. T. had said that K. was unable to control herself. 18.  On the following day the child welfare support group, consisting of various social and health authorities, agreed that the aim should be to place M. in a children’s home for three months as an assistance measure of open care under section 14 of the 1983 Child Welfare Act (lastensuojelulaki, barnskyddslag 683/1983 – “the 1983 Act”), during which period psychological examinations of the child would be carried out. 19.  On 3 May 1993 a social welfare official decided on behalf of the Social Welfare Board (perusturvalautakunta, grundtrygghetsnämnden) of S. to place M. in a children’s home for a period of three months. This was to be regarded as a short-term support measure pursuant to the 1983 Act. The applicants had been consulted, together with K.’s mother and sister, on 8 April 1993, in order to find an open-care measure which would be practicable. According to the records of that meeting, no such practical measure had been proposed by any of the participants. The applicants had then been heard again on 21 April 1993 and had not objected to the placing of M. in a children’s home. 20.  In an opinion of 12 May 1993, requested by the Social Welfare Board, doctors M.L. and K.R. considered that K. was not at that time able to care for M., but that her mental state would not necessarily permanently prevent her from caring for him. Doctors M.L. and K.R. worked at the hospital of H., where K. had been cared for since 1991 during the periods indicated above. 21.  On 7 June 1993 it was reported by the social welfare authorities that, when K. and T. had come to the children’s home where M. was staying, the boy had undergone a total change in his behaviour, characterised by anger, hatred, swearing, etc. T. had said that he was really tired of the situation and that in his view K. was in need of hospitalisation. When a visit to the health centre had been suggested to her, she had become very angry.
According to a statement of 22 June 1993 by the children’s home, K. and T. had come to the home on 17 June 1993. While T. had been playing with M., other children had come to tell the staff that K. had asked a 3-year-old girl what her name was. As the girl did not reply, K. had raised her voice and shaken the girl, not letting her go until an older girl had given the child’s name. The other children had been frightened by K.’s behaviour. 22.  On 11 June 1993 the social welfare official who had decided on 3 May 1993 to place M. in a children’s home informed the University Hospital of T. and the local hospital of S. in writing that she was very worried about the health of K. and the baby she was carrying. She requested the hospitals to contact her as soon as K. arrived at the hospital and, more particularly, at the time of the baby’s delivery. She also expressed the wish that health-care professionals should pay special attention to the relationship between the mother and the new-born baby from the very beginning. 23.  On 18 June 1993 K. was taken to a district hospital, where she gave birth to J. on the same day. According to the hospital records, the mother stayed calm during the delivery. After the delivery a written decision concerning an emergency care order was served on the hospital. The child was taken to the children’s ward. The mother’s behaviour in the ward was later found to be somewhat restless but not completely disorderly. The hospital records indicate that she understood the situation and wanted to leave hospital the following day. Medication to prevent the secretion of milk was prescribed. It seems that K. left the hospital on 19 June 1993, that is, the following morning, without any post-natal examination. She went to her mother’s home, where she started pushing an empty pram around the place. 24.  J. was immediately placed in emergency care, pursuant to section 18 of the 1983 Act. After the birth of their child, K. and T. were informed of this decision by two social workers at the hospital of H. The Social Director, who had made the decision on behalf of the Social Welfare Board, noted that K.’s mental state had been unstable during the last stages of her pregnancy. He considered that the baby’s health would be endangered since K. had found out about the plans to place the baby in public care. Lastly, he considered that the baby’s father, T., could not guarantee its development and safety. In addition the Social Director referred to the family’s long-standing difficulties, namely, K.’s serious illness and occasionally uncontrolled emotional reactions which could be traumatic for the children, T.’s inability to care for both J. and K., K.’s reluctance to accept guidance, the impossibility of putting the whole responsibility for J.’s development on T., and the impossibility of providing open-care support measures to the necessary extent. The applicants were not heard prior to the decision. On 24 June 1993 the applicants were notified in writing of the decision to take the new-born baby into public care. The notification was also faxed to K. 25.  On 21 June 1993 the Social Director also placed M. in emergency care, citing principally the same reasons as in his decision of 18 June 1993 concerning J. 26.  The applicants did not appeal against the emergency care orders. 27.  On 21 June 1993 the Social Welfare Board took note of the emergency care orders and prohibited all unsupervised access between K. on the one hand, and J. and M. on the other. The number of supervised visits, however, was not restricted. The Board decided to continue preparations for taking M. and J. into care. 28.  A meeting was held by social workers at the family centre on 21 June 1993, before the arrival of the baby from the hospital and in the absence of the applicants. It is mentioned in the report that there was a plan to prohibit the mother’s visits for a month on the ground that her reactions could not be predicted as she had, for example, broken things at home. After this initial period she would be allowed to visit the baby without restriction, but accompanied by her personal nurse. However, this plan was not implemented. The following entry appears in the register for 24 June: “The mother may come with her personal nurse if she wants. Other visitors not allowed for the time being.” 29.  K. was asked to come with T. to the social welfare office on 22 June 1993 at 11.30 a.m. in order to be informed of the decision of 21 June 1993 by the Social Director concerning M. On 24 June 1993 K. and V. (M.’s biological father) were notified in writing of the decision of 21 June 1993. The notification was also faxed to K. 30.  On 22 June 1993 K. was hospitalised voluntarily at the hospital of H. on account of psychosis, having obtained a referral from a doctor at a health care centre. She was treated there until 30 June 1993. 31.  On 23 June 1993 J. was placed in the family centre. T. visited her the same day. 32.  At the beginning of July 1993 T. left the applicants’ home, having been told by the social welfare officials that he had to break off his relationship with K. “if he wanted to keep” J. The applicants nevertheless continued their relationship. 33.  On 15 July 1993 the Social Welfare Board gave its decisions taking J. and M. into “normal” public care, giving reasons similar to those mentioned in the emergency care orders (see paragraph 24 above), and prolonged the access restriction until 15 September 1993. K. was allowed to see the children only in the company of her personal nurse. The Board essentially considered that K.’s state of health remained unstable; that she was subject to aggressive and uncontrolled emotional moods; and that public care proceedings were a severe mental ordeal for a patient. As regards J., the Board therefore believed that her personal security could be jeopardised if access were to take place without supervision. As regards M., the Board feared that K.’s visits to the children’s home “could no longer be supervised by its staff, which would not be in his interest”. Before the decisions of 15 July 1993 the applicants had been heard and had expressed their objection to the care decisions envisaged. 34.  On 15 July 1993 K. visited both her children, accompanied by her personal nurse. The register indicates that it was “a difficult situation”. 35.  On 19 July 1993 T. moved to the family unit of the family centre with J. 36.  On 20 July 1993 K. was again hospitalised in voluntary care at the open ward of the hospital of H., suffering from psychosis. She left hospital the following day, however. On 26 July 1993 she was placed under observation with a view to determining whether she should be placed in compulsory psychiatric care. On 30 July 1993 she was committed to compulsory psychiatric care. According to the file, her relatives had earlier been worried about her and had contacted the hospital in order to get her into hospital care. They reported that K. had disappeared from her home, where she had behaved in an unsettled and aggressive manner. Her hospitalisation lasted until 27 October 1993, that is, three months. 37.  During the period between 18 June and 31 August 1993 K. visited her children at their respective children’s homes. During the visits she was accompanied by her personal nurse from the hospital, who was in contact with the social welfare authorities and arranged the visits having regard to K.’s state of mental health. According to the centre’s register, she visited J. twice during this period. 38.  According to a statement made by a social worker on 4 August 1993, T. had taken good care of J., first at the hospital until 23 June 1993 and later on at the family centre. It was agreed that J. would stay at the family centre and that T. would visit her every other day. J. would visit her father for the first time from 13 to 15 August 1993, during which time T. would organise her christening. The intention was that the baby could move in with her father later on. 39.  After T.’s paternity had been established on 13 July 1993, T. and K. were granted joint custody of J. on 4 August 1993. 40.  T.’s travel expenses to the centre were paid for by the social welfare authorities. From the centre’s records it can be deduced that T. succeeded in creating a relationship with the baby and learned to take good care of her. The home leaves were spent with T. first at his mother’s house and later in his new home. 41.  On 12 August 1993 the Social Welfare Board referred both public care orders to the County Administrative Court (lääninoikeus, länsrätten) for confirmation, as the applicants had opposed them. In support of its referrals, the Board submitted a statement by a social welfare official dated 25 August 1993, according to which T. would not be able to care both for M. and the new-born J. alone, since K. was living in the same home and had been psychotic for the last four years. T. had been in contact with J. at the children’s home three to four times a week. While staying in a flat attached to a municipal children’s home, he had cared for J. for two whole weeks and had subsequently cared for her three days a week in his new home. The Board had therefore begun investigating whether it would be possible to entrust him with the responsibility for J. with the help of support measures taken by the Board. 42.  On 9 September 1993 the County Administrative Court confirmed the care order concerning J., considering that K. had been mentally ill; that the applicants had had conflicts “as a result of which T. had moved away from their home at the beginning of July 1993”; that because of K.’s illness and the family’s other problems the applicants had been unable to provide J. with adequate care; that the care support provided to the family had not sufficiently improved the family’s situation and that the measures could not be expected to satisfy J.’s care needs. No hearing was held. 43.  On 11 November 1993 the County Administrative Court confirmed the care order concerning M., repeating the reasons put forward in its decision of 9 September concerning J. No hearing was held. 44.  In an appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court (korkein hallinto-oikeus, högsta förvaltningsdomstolen) against the confirmation of the public care order concerning M., the applicants were represented by the Public Legal Adviser (yleinen oikeusavustaja, allmänna rättsbiträdet) of S. The Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the appeal on 23 September 1994. 45.  On the same date the Supreme Administrative Court extended the time allowed for an appeal by K. against the confirmation of the care order made in respect of J. 46.  On 18 October 1994 K. appealed against the care order in respect of J. as confirmed by the County Administrative Court on 9 September 1993. On 21 August 1995 the Supreme Administrative Court granted K. cost-free proceedings as from 1 March 1994, appointed Ms Suomela as her representative and upheld the County Administrative Court’s decision of 9 September 1993. 47.  By a decision of 21 January 1994 the Social Welfare Board placed J. in a foster home in K., a town some 120 km away from the applicants’ home. M. joined her on 7 February 1994. The foster parents had no children of their own. Social welfare officials told the applicants and the foster parents that J.’s and M.’s placement would last “for years”. The applicants had proposed that the children’s public care be implemented in the homes of relatives. 48.  In the meantime, on 15 August 1993, J. was christened in the presence of K., T. and M. 49.  A consultation was held at the children’s home, on 18 August 1993, in the presence of T. According to the records, K.’s mental health was very unstable and her psychiatric treatment was expected to have to be continued for four to five years. T., however, had expressed his hopes that K. and he could, together, take care of J. in the future. It was agreed that J. would stay at the children’s home and would visit T. every week from Thursday until Saturday, beginning on 28 August 1993. T. would visit J. on other days, according to an arrangement to be agreed with the children’s home. 50.  On 14 September 1993 the Social Welfare Board prolonged the access restriction until 15 December 1993. 51.  The following notes of a social welfare official appear among those in the case records of the Social Welfare Board:
“14 September 1993:
… 2.  ... In addition, the importance of future access between J. and T. has now been questioned, since J.’s placement in [public foster care] is under preparation. It will be difficult for T. to give up J. ...”
“13 October 1993: 52.  On 27 October 1993 K. was discharged from the hospital of H. 53.  On 2 February 1994 the Social Welfare Board drew up a plan concerning the implementation of the public care. The applicants’ alternative plan was allegedly ignored. For instance, the children could not meet their maternal grandmother at her home. 54.  After the adoption of the care plan on 2 February 1994, the applicants requested a relaxation of the access restriction. For example, T. had been permitted to see J. only once a month. 55.  On 21 March 1994 the applicants requested, inter alia, that the Social Welfare Board should draw up a public care plan aiming at the reunification of the family. 56.  On 3 May 1994 the social welfare authorities organised a meeting in order to revise the care plan of 2 February 1994. The applicants and their representative did not attend the meeting. 57.  On 17 May 1994 the Social Director restricted both applicants’ access to the children to one monthly visit at the foster home, to take place under supervision and last three hours. The Social Director considered that the grounds for public care still existed. In his view, although the applicants were dissatisfied with the visits set out in the care plan, affording the children an unlimited right to see their parents would create an obstacle to their successful placement. The applicants appealed. 58.  On 28 September 1994 the County Administrative Court held an oral hearing concerning the access restriction imposed on 17 May 1994. It took evidence from two psychiatrists, who had interviewed K. One of them, Dr T.I.-E., did not know K. personally but commented on a diagnosis concerning her mental state by indicating that K. had a tendency to react in a psychotic manner to conflict situations. Dr K.P. stated that K.’s state of health did not prevent her from caring for her children. Consequently, if her illness had been the reason for the access restriction, that reason no longer existed. 59.  In a written expert opinion, requested by the Social Welfare Board and submitted to the County Administrative Court, Dr E.V., a child psychiatrist, expressed the opinion that the children should be permanently cared for by the foster parents and that the applicants’ visits should, for the time being, be discontinued so as to protect the children and the foster parents. According to the applicants, Dr E.V. had not met them or the children, nor had he consulted the other psychiatrists before making his proposal. 60.  On 11 October 1994 the County Administrative Court upheld the access restriction issued on 17 May 1994. It noted that neither of the witnesses who had been heard orally had been willing to state any opinion as regards the children’s development. It reasoned, inter alia, as follows:
“... [By allowing] access to take place once a month and [by allowing contact through correspondence] it will be ensured that the children will retain knowledge about their biological parents. If the grounds for public care later cease to exist, a reunification of the family will thus be possible. ...” 61.  The County Administrative Court dismissed the applicants’ request for exemption from costs, since the relevant legislation did not cover disputes concerning access restrictions. At the court’s hearing, the applicants were nevertheless assisted by Ms Suomela. 62.  On 26 May 1994 the applicants requested that the Social Welfare Board discontinue the public care of M. and J. 63.  On 18 September 1994 the Social Director allegedly told the applicants that any further children born to them would also be placed in public care. According to the Government, the Social Director only told them, when expressly asked, that it was possible that any further children born would be taken into public care. 64.  In an opinion of 22 September 1994 submitted at the Social Welfare Board’s request, Dr K.P., a psychiatrist, commented on the possibility of revoking the public care orders. She concluded that K.’s mental state would not prevent her from having custody of the children. According to Dr K.P., K.’s efforts to have public care discontinued and access restrictions relaxed showed that she possessed psychological resources. She noted, inter alia, that T. was K.’s closest support in the care and upbringing of the children. In addition, K.’s mother, at the time her guardian ad litem, was ready to help in caring for them. Dr K.P., however, added that she could not, as a psychiatrist for adults, take any stand as regards the interests of the children. Dr K.P.’s opinion was also based on a report submitted by Dr K.Po., a psychologist, who had come to the same conclusion as regards K.’s ability to have custody of her children. 65.  The Public Legal Adviser advised against requesting revocation of the care orders. 66.  K. was hospitalised from 15 to 24 February and from 11 April to 29 May 1995, apparently on account of psychosis. 67.  On 14 March 1995 the Social Welfare Board rejected the applicants’ request of 26 May 1994 that the care order be revoked, stating as follows:
“At the moment the health of the children’s mother, K., is better and the family situation has changed in other respects in comparison with the situation in 1993 when the decisions to take the children into care were made.
...
According to Dr K.P., a psychiatrist, K. still has ‘a lot of instability’ in her emotional life as well as fragility, brought about by the last five years’ experiences and the diagnosis of mental illness for which she needs – and will need for a long time to come – therapeutic support and treatment. A regular medication is also needed in order to guarantee her continued well-being and to make it possible for her to manage in open care and to have custody of her children. Dr K.P., however, did not give her more precise opinion as to K.’s ability to take care of and bring up her children even though Dr K.P. was explicitly asked to give such an opinion. 68.  The applicants appealed on 5 April 1995, requesting that they be granted exemption from costs and afforded free legal representation. They also requested an oral hearing. 69.  On 7 April 1995 a further child, R., was born to the applicants. Having given birth, K. left the hospital for a while on the same evening with the new-born baby wrapped in a blanket, walking barefoot in the cold weather until the hospital staff realised what had happened and intervened. 70.  On 13 April 1995 K. was committed to compulsory psychiatric care and treated at the hospital of H. until 29 May 1995, while R. was being cared for by T. According to a psychiatrist’s observation of 10 April 1995, K. “must have been suffering from paranoid schizophrenia for some time”. 71.  On 15 June 1995 the County Administrative Court granted the applicants exemption from costs and appointed Ms Suomela as their representative in the case concerning their appeal against the Social Welfare Board’s decision of 14 March 1995. It decided not to hold a hearing in respect of the applicants’ request for a revocation of the care orders and provided the parties with an opportunity to supplement their written observations. 72.  On 28 September 1995 the County Administrative Court rejected the applicants’ appeals of 5 April 1995 without holding an oral hearing. The court noted, inter alia, that according to the medical certificates, K.’s state of health had improved but her emotional life was still unstable. She therefore continued to be in need of psychotherapy and medication. In addition, a further child had been born to the applicants and K. had again been treated at the hospital of H. These two factors had caused an additional strain militating against a revocation of the care orders. 73.  On 17 November 1994 social welfare officials revised the public care plan, proposing that the children meet the applicants once a month on neutral premises at the Family Advice Centre of K., where the foster parents were living. The applicants objected to this proposal, considering that it would have entailed a further restriction of their access to the children. Instead, they requested two meetings a month, one of which was to be at their place of residence. On 22 December 1994 they asked for a separate written decision concerning their access request, so that they could appeal against it. 74.  In a letter of 22 December 1994 the Social Director informed the applicants that there were no longer any grounds for the access restriction. Meetings between the applicants and the children were nevertheless only authorised for three hours once a month on premises chosen by the Social Welfare Board. They were also informed that the meetings would be supervised. 75.  In his decision of 11 January 1995 the Social Director confirmed that there were no longer any grounds for the access restriction. On 31 January and 28 February 1995 the Social Welfare Board confirmed the decision of 11 January 1995. The applicants appealed. 76.  As regards the applicants’ appeal against the Social Welfare Board’s decisions of 31 January and 28 February 1995, the County Administrative Court considered, on 15 June 1995, that the revised care plan drawn up on 17 November 1994 had already entailed an access restriction which had later been renewed by further decisions, without the applicants having been properly heard, in respect of their access request. The matter was referred back to the Social Welfare Board for further consideration. 77.  In the light of the County Administrative Court’s decision the Acting Social Director, on 28 June 1995, formally restricted the applicants’ access to the children to one meeting a month up to 31 May 1996. The meetings were to take place in the foster home. In addition, the foster parents were to visit the applicants with the children every six months. The Director considered, inter alia, that it was important that the children settle themselves in the foster family environment in which they would grow up. Closer contacts with their parents would mean change and insecurity as well as the creation of a new crisis in their development. The process of settling which had started well would be jeopardised. For the children’s progress it was therefore necessary that their situation remain stable and secure. The Director’s decision was confirmed by the Social Welfare Board on 22 August 1995. The applicants appealed. 78.  On 3 November 1995 the County Administrative Court rejected the applicants’ appeal against the access restriction confirmed on 22 August 1995. 79.  On 25 May 1996 social welfare officials revised the public care plan, proposing that the children meet the applicants once a month on the premises of a school at the children’s place of residence. As the applicants were not present when the proposal was made, the care plan was again revised on 9 October 1996 in so far as the access restriction was concerned. The applicants then proposed that the children meet them without supervision once a month. The public care plan was, however, revised as proposed by the social welfare officials. 80.  On 17 June 1996 the Social Director restricted both applicants’ access to the children, until 30 November 1997, to one monthly visit on the premises of a school at the children’s place of residence, where access was to take place under supervision for three hours. One of the foster parents was also ordered to be present at the time of the access. The Social Director’s decision was confirmed by the Social Welfare Board on 20 August 1996. The applicants’ appealed against the decision to the County Administrative Court, requesting an oral hearing. The court obtained a statement from a child psychiatrist, Dr J.P., who was also recommended by the applicants’ representative to the Social Welfare Board. Dr J.P.’s statement included the following observations:
“The right of access of M. and J. to the persons close to them must primarily be examined in the light of their psychological growth and development and their health. This requires an examination of the quality, permanence and durability of their human relationships, because psychological growth and development take place in interaction with human relationships. In my opinion, the human relationships are to be examined from the children’s point of view. ...
... In conclusion, I note that before M. was placed in the children’s home ... the mother had been in psychiatric hospital for treatment eight times, making a total of thirteen months. Thus, M. had lived with his mother for forty-five months, namely, three years and nine months. The longest that they spent together was two years and one month. ... T. has, as ‘stepfather’, helped to look after M. for at most ten months. ... the foster parents have so far looked after M. for three years and three months without interruption. ... In practice, M. has not had any kind of relationship with his biological father ...
In the light of the above, I note that the human relationships in M.’s early childhood have, owing to the circumstances, been non-continuous, short-term and changing. The most stable and continuous relationships have been with his foster parents ... Therefore, these relationships are the most relevant and important ones for M.’s psychological growth and development.
... J. was born in June 1993. She was taken into public care immediately after she was born. At first, she stayed in the district hospital for a short time, and later at a reception home for small children. T., as the biological father of J., looked after her for two weeks in June and August 1993. J. was placed in the foster family ... in January 1994, when she was some seven months old. So far, J. has stayed with her foster family for some three years and three months without interruption. J. is now a little over 3 years and 10 months old.
In the light of the above, I note that, due to the circumstances, J. has not had any significant and important relationships other than those with her foster parents. J.’s relationship with her foster parents is of primary importance for her psychological growth and development. ...
... From the children’s point of view, especially, but naturally also from that of the foster parents, the foster family is a family to which the principles concerning family life enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and in the European Convention on Human Rights can be applied in the same way as to biological families. This point of view is especially important when, due to the circumstances, the biological family has not lived together.
In the light of the above, I note that the arrangements for helping and supporting the foster parents of M. and J. are in the best interests of the children. The arrangement will, in the first place, ensure the important, continuous and safe human relationships of M. and J. with their foster parents ...
It is also important for M. and J.’s psychological growth and development that, in the safe and stable conditions provided by the foster family, they are able to form and maintain a good internalised picture of their biological parents ... from whom they have been separated because of the circumstances.
In my opinion, this can be done by complying with the decision of the Social Welfare Board of S. of 20 August 1996 concerning the right of access. At present, an unrestricted right of access or a right of access of the extent suggested by the applicants is not in the interests of the children, because K. and T. are not capable of meeting the emotional needs of M. and J. ... Such arrangements concerning the right of access would clearly endanger the health and development of M. and J. In my opinion, the question of an unrestricted right of access should be evaluated when the children have attained the age of 12.” 81.  In a statement of 10 September 1996 Dr K.P. stated that in her opinion K.’s psychiatric state did not preclude K.’s having custody of her daughter R. 82.  On 2 April 1997 the care plan was again revised by the social welfare authorities. The applicants had been informed of the time of the meeting concerning the revision of this care plan on home visits on 15 January and 10 March 1997. Their representative had also been informed of the meeting by a letter sent on 10 February 1997. The applicants did not attend the meeting, and neither did their representative. The applicants were thus not explicitly heard in this connection but, as they had expressed their opinion on other occasions, the authorities recorded their point of view in the plan. 83.  On 12 June 1997 the County Administrative Court rejected the applicants’ appeal against the Social Welfare Board’s decision of 20 August 1996 to restrict the applicants’ access right (see paragraph 80 above). It refused the applicants’ request for an oral hearing. 84.  Although the applicants had stated only in their reply that the appeal was also made on R.’s behalf, the County Administrative Court found in its decision that it was in part made in her name. The court stated that a person to whom a decision was directed, or upon whose right, duty or interest it had a direct effect, had the right of appeal. The court considered that the Board’s decision, which concerned R.’s siblings’ and parents’ right of access, was not such a decision. 85.  On 28 November 1997 the Social Director restricted the applicants’, and consequently their youngest child R.’s, access to J. and M. to one monthly visit of three hours on the premises of a school at the children’s place of residence until the end of 1998. The applicants did not appeal. 86.  The care plan was again revised on 1 December 1998. 87.  According to a statement made on 3 July 1998 by Dr K.M. (formerly Dr K.P.), K. had not been hospitalised since May 1995 and her health had been stable since the beginning of 1995. There had been no problems concerning the care of R. (who had lived with her parents all the time and had not been taken into care). It was recommended by Dr K.M. that the social welfare authorities should reduce or discontinue control visits to the applicants’ home in order to give K. the possibility of settling down to normal life without constant supervision by the authorities. 88.  The restriction orders were extended by the Social Director on 11 December 1998, until the end of 2000. The visits were to take place under supervision on the premises of a school at the children’s place of residence. However, one of the visits was to take place at the applicants’ home in the presence of the foster parents. The Social Director considered, inter alia, that the reunification of the family was not in sight as the foster family was now the children’s de facto home; that the applicants’ access to the children once a month and through correspondence was enough to maintain the children’s awareness of their biological parents; and that closer contacts with the applicants would endanger the children’s development, bring change and insecurity and create a new crisis in their development. The applicants appealed against this decision to the Social Welfare Board which, on 2 February 1999, rejected the appeal and upheld the Social Director’s decisions. In its reasoning, the Board quoted both the County Administrative Court and Dr J.P. 89.  According to the reports drawn up by the supervisor who attended the meetings of the children and the applicants during the period from 25 May 1996 to 10 January 1999, the adults got on quite well together during the meetings. J. often played games with M. When R. was smaller, J. played by herself, but later it seemed that the girls, J. and R., spent more time together. On the other hand, it seemed that the first applicant made very little contact with J. and M. According to the supervisor’s description, especially in the earlier reports, the first applicant seemed to have concentrated on R. 90.  M. visited K. and T. at their home for the weekend of 21 to 23 July 2000 without supervision. 91.  The applicants appealed against the Social Welfare Board’s decision of 2 February 1999, concerning the right of access, to the Administrative Court (formerly the County Administrative Court). An oral hearing, at which M. was also heard, was held on 3 October 2000. In its decision of 13 October 2000 the administrative court upheld the Social Welfare Board’s decision. 92.  The social authorities reviewed the care plan on 23 November 2000, having consulted the applicants, among others. It was decided that the children would remain in the foster home. According to the care plan, M. and J. are allowed to meet K. and T and others close to them, as from 1 January 2001 until 31 December 2001, without supervision once a month alternately at the applicants’ home and the foster parents’ home. The meetings at the applicants’ home will take place from Saturday 11 a.m. until Sunday 4 p.m., and the meetings at the foster parents’ home on Sundays, from 11 a.m. until 5 p.m. The children are also allowed to meet their other relatives freely during those meetings. In addition to the above, the children will also spend a day and a night with the applicants each Christmas, and two weeks each summer during their school holidays. 93.  J. and M.’s foster mother died in May 2001.