4.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Silistra. 5.  In 2003 an individual installed a printing company in a building situated in close proximity to the building where the applicant was living with his family. Shortly after the printing company began operating, the applicant and his family started resenting the nuisance it was causing. In particular, they found the constant smell of ink and solvents intolerable; also, they were continuously disturbed by the vibrations caused by the printing machines, which reverberated through the walls of their dwelling. Moreover, as time went by, the applicant’s young daughter developed an allergy, which the applicant believed was due to the chemicals used in the printing process and had to take daily medication to keep it under control. 6.  Between July 2006 and August 2007, the applicant turned to several State institutions, including regional branches of the hygiene and epidemiological inspectorate, the public health directorate at the Ministry for Health, the regional building inspectorate, the mayor of Silistra and the prosecution service. He complained to them in writing about the nuisance caused by the printing company. He claimed that the latter was operating contrary to a number of legal requirements found in different ministerial regulations. He also asked the authorities for help in forcing the printing company to cease its operations. 7.  More specifically, the chronology of his correspondence with the authorities can be traced as follows. 8.  On 15 August 2006, the director of the regional agency for public health (Регионална инспекция за опазване и контрол на общественото здраве – hereafter “the public health agency”) informed the applicant that on 10 August 2006 two junior inspectors from the agency had visited the printing company in question. He did so in a brief one-paragraph letter in reply to a complaint made by the applicant on 31 July 2006. The inspectors had established during that visit that two printing machines (without specifying their type, power or capacity) were operating at that time in the printing company and that this number was in line with the requirements set out in Regulation No. 7 of 1992 of the Ministry for Health. The letter invited the applicant to propose a day and time for the measuring of the noise generated by the printing company. 9.  Two days later, on 17 August 2006, the applicant together with three of his neighbours complained in writing to the public health directorate at the Ministry for Health that the printing company was operating in contravention of relevant legal requirements. On 22 August 2006, the applicant and the same three neighbours wrote again to the same directorate expressing concern about and dissatisfaction with the manner in which the measurements in respect of noise and air pollution had been taken on 18 August 2006. In particular, two individuals who had not shown any credentials had turned up and measured the noise with a machine which had not reacted to sudden high-pitched noises but was set up to measure only background noise. Furthermore, when the applicant had invited the inspectors to also measure the purity of the air, one of them had opened the window, sniffed the air and stated that it was not that bad and that, in all likelihood, it would turn out to be within the relevant norms when measured. The applicant further stressed in the letter that the printing company was operating in close proximity to inhabited dwellings, whereas according to the relevant regulations this was prohibited within less than 50 metres of such buildings. 10.  The applicant and his three neighbours also wrote to the building inspectorate on 23 August 2006, complaining that the printing company’ premises had been built in contravention of the relevant construction norms. 11.  On 25 August 2006 the Ministry for Health wrote to the public health agency, asking that a check be carried out and the applicant informed of the results accordingly. On 29 August 2006 the Ministry for Health issued an instruction to the owner of the printing company, inviting him to bring the noise levels generated by his business within the limits stipulated in the relevant regulations. 12.  On 30 August 2006, apparently in reply to the applicant’s letter of complaint of 31 July 2006, the head of the public health agency informed the applicant that: the chemical agents identified at the work stations at the printing company in question were within the limits listed in Regulation No. 13 of 2003 for the protection of individuals exposed to chemical agents at their work station; the noise reaching the applicant’s home when the windows were open, as well as the dwelling of one of his neighbours, was not in conformity with the requirements of Regulation No. 6 of 2006; and that instructions had been issued to the owner of the printing company to ensure that the noise levels produced by his business were brought within the legal limits. 13.  On 5 October 2006 a representative of the Ministry for Health wrote to the applicant informing him that staff from the public health agency had carried out two checks at the printing company; neither the dates of those checks, nor any further details about them were mentioned. The letter then read that on 18 August 2006 officials had measured the reverberating noise and the chemical agents produced at the printing company. As the noise levels had been found to be beyond the legal limits, the owner had been instructed to lower them by 29 October 2006. 14.  On 27 October 2006 the applicant and his three neighbours wrote to the Ministry for Health, expressing their dissatisfaction with the reply they had received on 5 October 2006. They reiterated that the printing company was surrounded on three sides by inhabited dwellings, in which a number of small children lived. They referred to point 393 of Regulation No. 7 of 1992, which prohibited the installation of printing houses less than 50 metres from inhabited buildings and to the fact that the owner of the printing company had not obtained an agreement from any of his neighbours for installing his business at that location. They pointed out too that the noise levels had not been lowered, contrary to the authorities’ instructions, and stressed that the record which they had signed on the day when the noise measurements had been taken had indicated 58 decibels (dB) and not 38 as stated in the record included in the file. They asked once again that the authorities order the printing company to cease its operations on the ground that they were in breach of point 393 of Regulation No. 7 of 1992. 15.  On 20 August 2007 the applicant and four of his neighbours wrote to the regional inspectorate for the environment and water in Ruse (Регионална инспекция за околната среда и водите). They stated that, although the printing company had been apparently functioning on the basis of a lawful permit since 2003, given that it was located in a densely populated area, in their opinion, this was inappropriate. The letter then listed the exact name of the machines operating at the printing company and the type of ink used. The applicant and his neighbours further pointed out that, according to Regulation No. 7 of 1992 of the Ministry for Health, printing houses had to be located at least 50 metres from inhabited dwellings and that the printing company in question was joined on three sides to the complainants’ dwellings. The printing business in question had been formally registered as “a workshop for printing services with up to two work stations” and not as a “printing house”; in this way it had successfully circumvented the legal requirements applicable to printing houses, despite the fact that the notice exhibited at its entrance read “printing house” (печатница). 16.  The letter further stated that in reality, for a number of consecutive years, more than two people had been working at the printing house at any given time. The applicant and his neighbours had learned from the staff that no antidote was being given to them; this was obligatory as protection against carcinogens present in printing inks and solvents used to clean the machines (up to ten times a day on a busy day). The authors of the letter then wondered whether they as well as the people living in the immediate vicinity of the printing house should also have been taking such antidotes. The applicant’s daughter had developed an allergy towards some of the chemicals used by the printing house and was taking daily medication called Zertec. Whenever the door of the printing house was opened a pungent smell entered directly into the bedroom of the applicant’s children, the window of which was situated directly opposite it at about seven metres’ distance. 17.  Like the staff at the printing company, the applicant and his neighbours suffered frequently from headaches, their washing turned grey whenever it was hung to dry and the noise produced by the machines when operating was unbearable. In particular, at the house of one of the applicant’s neighbours the noise was so loud it was as though an earthquake had started every time the guillotine was operating. The applicant and his neighbours had sought a copy of the original record signed at the time the noise had been measured but had not received one. The letter concluded that the residents whose dwellings adjoined the printing company were doomed to bringing up their children for the foreseeable future in an environment of noise and chemicals, without any guarantee for their health and normal development. One of the staff working for several years at the printing company had developed a brain tumour, which was a source of serious worry for everyone in the vicinity. The applicant and his neighbours were also worried that the owner did not wish to hear any suggestion of moving his printing business away, but insisted that it was harmless as he preferred to profit from the commercial advantages a central location offered. The letter’s authors then invited the authorities to carry out an unannounced nuclear magnetic resonance spectrometry in order for the community to learn about the poisons they were being exposed to, as well as to proceed with closing down the business. They enclosed a copy of the 810 signatures collected in support of their cause. 18.  On 10 September 2007 the head of the Ruse regional inspectorate for the environment and water wrote to the applicant in reply to the letter of 20 August 2007. The reply stated that two experts sent by the inspectorate had carried out a check on 30 August 2007 at the printing company in the presence of its owner. The conclusions of that check were that the printing company was operating on the basis of a permit issued by the building authorities on 25 July 2003. The type of operation – offset printing on sheets of paper – was not among the operations listed in Annex I of Regulation No. 7 of 2003 on limiting emissions of volatile organic compounds released into the environment as a result of the use of solvents in certain installations. Lastly, the noise emissions had been measured at 49.7 dB, which was lower than the legal limit of 60 dB to be found in Annex II – Table 2, point 2 of Regulation No. 6 of 26 June 2006. 19.  In addition to his appeals to the above-mentioned institutions, the applicant decided to attract public attention to his dispute with the printing company. He produced some posters for that purpose, calling on the community in the town of Silistra to express support for the termination of the printing company’s operations. The text on the posters claimed that the printing company had been licensed in breach of the relevant legal requirements and that the pollution it was causing was harmful to the people living in the vicinity. The posters also listed parts of three regulations issued by the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Regional Development and concerning sanitary requirements and, protection of public health in an urban environment. 20.  The applicant exhibited the posters described above on the windows of his own shop, which was situated close to both his home and the printing company. The posters were exhibited between 12 December 2006 and 22 February 2007, and within a little over a month the applicant had collected more than 800 signatures from individuals in support of his cause. 21.  On an unspecified date the owner of the printing company, V.V., brought defamation proceedings against the applicant under Article 147 of the Criminal Code 1968. V.V. complained in particular that the applicant’s actions had damaged his printing business and his personal reputation. 22.  The applicant’s three neighbours, who together with the applicant had been continuously complaining to the authorities, submitted a signed declaration in support of the applicant. They stated that, irrespective of all the different permits which the printing company might have obtained from the authorities, this did not change the fact that it was causing a chemical and noise-related nuisance to the community on a daily basis. 23.  On 5 June 2007 the Silistra District Court found the applicant guilty of libel. It held that he had defamed V.V. by complaining in writing to various institutions about the latter’s printing operations and by printing and publicly disseminating material which claimed that the business was operating unlawfully. Contrary to the requirements of Article 147 of the Criminal Code 1968, the applicant had not submitted proof showing that his complaints to the authorities and the claims he had made in the posters were true. While officials from the Ministry of Health had indeed established that the noise emitted by the printing business had been beyond the authorised limits, the authorities had instructed its owner to bring it within the relevant norms and had given him a deadline, with which he had complied. The court then stated that, as seen from a chemical agents inspection report of August 2006 and from the subsequent explanations of the person who had carried out the check, it was clear that measurements had been taken throughout the working process at the printing premises and that the level of the chemical agents measured was not above the norms. 24.  As to the claim that the printing business had been set up in breach of Regulation No. 7 of 2003, that was impossible as the said regulation had become applicable as of 13 January 2004, whereas the printing business had been lawfully operating since 25 July 2003. In respect of the claim that Regulation No. 7 of 1992 had also been breached, the court found that while point 393 of that regulation indeed provided that printing houses had to be at least fifty metres away from inhabited dwellings, this only concerned “printing houses”, while the business in question had been registered as a “workshop for printing services and a shop with an office”, and the printing-house regulations did not apply to workshops. 25.  The allegation that the applicant’s daughter had developed an allergy had also remained entirely unproven, given that the applicant had presented as evidence only a medical document stating that she was suffering from “bronchitis”. The court went on to say that “every biological parent of average intelligence whose child was frequently ill had to know that respiratory ailments were the most frequent ones in early childhood”. 26.  The court concluded that, given that the applicant’s claims were factually wrong, they had inevitably damaged the printing business owner’s reputation. That amounted to defamation, which was in breach of the law and had to be sanctioned. The court then waived the applicant’s criminal liability and imposed on him an administrative penalty in the form of a fine in the amount equivalent to 250 euros (EUR). It further partially upheld the claimant’s civil claim submitted in the criminal proceedings and ordered the applicant to pay EUR 500 for non-pecuniary damages to V.V. and EUR 20 in court fees. 27.  Following an appeal by the applicant, the Silistra Regional Court upheld the first-instance court’s findings in a final judgment of 30 October 2007. It observed that the relevant authorities had carried out a number of inspections at the printing business in question in response to the applicant’s complaints. Contrary to the applicant’s allegations, none of those checks had established either a breach of the relevant legislation or the existence of pollution caused by the printing company. Despite this, the applicant had continued to disseminate false and discrediting information about V.V. by exhibiting posters on the windows of his own shop. 28.  The court agreed with the finding at first instance that the applicant could not be absolved from responsibility as he had been unable to prove the veracity of his allegations. It further found that the punishment had been neither excessive nor unfair and, if anything, it had been too lenient.


4.  The applicant lives in Shnogh village. 5.  In the 1970s a copper-molybdenum deposit (‘Teghout’) was discovered about four and six km away from the villages of Teghout and Shnogh respectively, in the Lori Region. 6.  In 2001 a private company, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC, was granted a mining licence for the exploitation of the Teghout copper‑molybdenum deposit for a period of twenty-five years. 7.  On 1 November 2007 the Government adopted Decree no. 1279-N approving the designation of territories situated within the administrative boundaries of the rural communities of Shnogh and Teghout in the Lori Region as expropriation zones, to be taken for State needs, thus changing the category of land use. According to the Decree, Armenian Copper Programme CJSC or Teghout CJSC, founded by the former for the purpose of the implementation of the Teghout copper-molybdenum deposit exploitation project, were to acquire the units of land listed in its annexes. 8.  The plots of land belonging to the applicant were listed among the units of land falling within these expropriation zones. 9.  The applicant lives in Shnogh village and earns his living from agriculture and bakery production. He owned eight plots of agricultural land in the village measuring 0.420 ha, 0.890 ha, 0.904 ha, 1.206 ha, 0.780 ha, 0.900, 0.974 and 0.354 ha. The land was used for growing crops for the family, gardening, beekeeping and feeding their livestock. 10.  On an unspecified date Teghout CJSC addressed a letter to the applicant containing an offer to buy his eight plots of land for 194,000 Armenian drams (AMD, approximately 422 euros (EUR)), AMD 422,000 (approximately EUR 917), AMD 417,000 (approximately EUR 907), AMD 555,000 (approximately EUR 1,207), AMD 328,000 (approximately EUR 713), AMD 426,000 (approximately EUR 990), AMD 409,000 (approximately EUR 890), and AMD 240,000 (approximately EUR 522) respectively, plus an additional 15% on each amount offered as required by law, making the final offer AMD 3,439,650 (approximately EUR 7,478) in total. 11.  The applicant did not reply to the offer, not being satisfied with the amount of compensation. It appears that he tried to obtain an alternative valuation of his property by other companies but did not succeed. He claims that no other valuation company was willing to make an independent assessment of the market value of his land. 12.  On 13 May 2008 Teghout CJSC lodged a claim against the applicant, seeking to oblige him to sign the agreement on the taking of his property for State needs. The company based its claim, inter alia, on valuation reports prepared at its request by Oliver Group LLC, a licensed valuation company. According to the reports, the market value of the applicant’s plots of land was estimated at 3,439,650 (approximately EUR 7,478) in total. 13.  In proceedings before the Lori Regional Court, the applicant argued that the market value of his land had apparently been underestimated. He further submitted that the valuation of his property had not been carried out correctly, since no account had been taken of the amounts he had actually paid for the plots of land in question and of the significant investments he had made. He also claimed that the deprivation of his property was not in the public interest since it was aimed at securing high profits for several individuals. 14.  In the course of the proceedings, Teghout CJSC submitted other valuation reports in respect of the applicant’s property, stating that after the institution of the proceedings Oliver Group LLC had prepared corrected reports according to which the market value of the applicant’s eight plots of land was estimated at respectively AMD 187,000 (approximately EUR 407), AMD 456,000 (approximately EUR 991), AMD 437,000 (approximately EUR 950), AMD 535,000 (approximately EUR 1,163), AMD 343,000 (approximately EUR 746), AMD 411,000 (approximately EUR 893), AMD 427,000 (approximately EUR 928), and AMD 268,000 (approximately EUR 583). The representative of Teghout CJSC asked the court to take into account the relatively higher amounts of the initial valuations in respect of those plots of land that were valued lower as a result of the new valuation. The final amounts of compensation would therefore be equal to the amounts mentioned in the corrected reports for those plots of land valued higher than previously, and would stay the same as in the initial offer for the rest, together with the additional 15% required by law. 15.  On 7 November 2008 the Regional Court granted Teghout CJSC’s claim, awarding the applicant AMD 223,100 (approximately EUR 485), AMD 524,400 (approximately EUR 1,140), AMD 502,550 (approximately EUR 1,093), AMD 638,250 (approximately EUR 1,388), AMD 394,450 (approximately EUR 858), AMD 489,900 (approximately EUR 1,065), AMD 491,050 (approximately EUR 1,068). and AMD 308,200 (approximately EUR 670) respectively in compensation for his eight plots of land. 16.  The applicant lodged an appeal. Relying, inter alia, on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, he complained that the Regional Court had deprived him of his property. 17.  On 18 March 2009 the Civil Court of Appeal upheld the Regional Court’s judgment, finding that the latter had properly determined the market value of the property on the basis of the corrected valuation reports prepared by Oliver Group CJSC. 18.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, raising similar arguments to those submitted in the previous appeal. 19.  On 18 June 2009 the Court of Cassation declared the applicant’s cassation appeal inadmissible for lack of merit.


4.  The applicant was born in 1973 and is detained in Kybartai. 5.  On 22 December 2011 the applicant was arrested and taken to Klaipėda police station, where he was detained for various periods until 5 March 2013, for 130 days in total. For twenty-two days the applicant had between 3.25 and 4 square metres of personal space at his disposal; for the remaining period he had more than 4 square metres of personal space, sometimes even up to 9.36 square metres. 6.  On 4 January 2012 the applicant was taken to Šiauliai Remand Prison, where he was detained for various periods until 13 March 2013. No information concerning separate cells, their sizes and the number of inmates has been provided to the Court. 7.  On 4 March 2013 the applicant was convicted of murder and sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment. On 11 October 2013 the Court of Appeal rejected an appeal by the applicant and the judgment became final. 8.  On 13 March 2013 the applicant was taken to Lukiškės Remand Prison to serve his sentence, and was detained there until 23 December 2015, when he was transferred to Kybartai Correctional Facility. 9.  According to the documents in the Court’s possession, the conditions of the applicant’s detention were as follows. Between 13 March 2013 and 5 May 2014 the applicant was held in five different cells: nos. 88A, 93, 111, 223 and 228 and he was detained there for 419 days in total. For 316.5 days the applicant was alone in the cells, the plot of which varied between 6.83 and 7.94 square metres. For the remaining period he had between 3.82 and 3.87 square metres of personal space, except for one evening, when he had 2.48 square metres of personal space at his disposal. 10.  The applicant submitted two schemes of different cells in Lukiškės Remand Prison. It is indicated in the schemes that the toilets were separated from the rest of the cells by partitions but that they were visible from the entrance of the cell. The Government have not provided any information regarding this matter. 11.  On 3 June 2014 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court. He asked the court to oblige Lukiškės Remand Prison to immediately terminate his inhuman and degrading treatment, transfer him to a cell where he would have no less than 4 square metres of personal space (not including space for the toilet and the furniture), and award him 86,886 euros (EUR) in compensation. He complained regarding overcrowding, low temperatures, damp, the lack of proper partitions between toilets and cells, the fact that he was held with convicted inmates who were serving sentences for grave crimes, the insufficient nutritional value of the food, the fact that he could only shower once a week for fifteen minutes, and the lack of time spent in the open air. He also complained about the lack of long-term visits in Lukiškės Remand Prison from 23 November 2011 until October 2013, and claimed that consequently he had separated from his partner.
The applicant further complained regarding his conditions of detention in Klaipėda police station between 23 December 2011 and 5 March 2013. He complained regarding overcrowding, the lack of ventilation, damp, low temperatures, the lack of proper partitions between toilets and cells, the lack of time spent in the open air, the fact that the shower had only been available once a week for fifteen minutes, the insufficient nutritional value of the food, the fact that there had been no long-term or short-term visits, and the fact that there were no separate cells for non-smokers and inmates who had tuberculosis or HIV.
He also complained regarding his conditions of detention in Šiauliai Remand Prison between 4 January 2012 and 13 March 2013. He complained regarding overcrowding, low temperatures during the winter and high temperatures during the summer, insufficient ventilation, the fact that he could only shower once a week, the lack of proper partitions between toilets and cells, and the fact that there had been no long-term visits. 12.  On 26 January 2015 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court allowed the applicant’s claim in part. The court held that he had spent 419 days in Lukiškės Remand Prison, and had had more than 3.6 square metres of personal space at his disposal for 418 days. On one evening the applicant had had 2.48 square metres of personal space at his disposal. The court further held that the partition between the toilet and the cell of 1.5 < metres in height did not constitute sufficient implementation of national hygiene norms and the standards of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT). The other complaints by the applicant (regarding high temperatures in the summer, damp, a lack of proper ventilation, mould, a lack of cleaning materials, not having enough time to shower, the low energy value of the food, and having insufficient time outside) were dismissed as unsubstantiated. As regards long-term visits, the court held that the applicant could not receive them, as he was a remand prisoner and not a convicted inmate.
As regards Šiauliai Remand Prison, the court held that the applicant had spent 296 days there. The court further held that he had had insufficient personal space in the cells for 283 days (insufficient cell space had been unquestionably proved in respect of forty-eight days, and for the remaining 235 days the applicant had had a varying amount of personal space at his disposal) and found that the lack of proper partition walls between toilets and cells had breached both domestic requirements and the standards of the CPT. The court also found that the air temperature in cell no. 9 had been 0.19˚C lower than the standard. As regards long-term visits, the court held that the applicant had not been entitled to them, in accordance with domestic law.
With regard to Klaipėda police station, the court found that the applicant had had insufficient personal space (less than 5 square metres) for fifty‑seven days, and that the partition wall between the toilet and the cell, which was 1.2 and 1.3 metres in height in different cells, had been too low and had not satisfied the standards of the domestic law or the CPT. In relation to visits, the court held that people did not have a right to receive any visits from their relatives when they were transferred to police stations temporarily.
As a result, the court awarded the applicant compensation of EUR 1,200 from Šiauliai Remand Prison and EUR 200 from Klaipėda police station. 13.  The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision, but on 10 November 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance decision. The court only noted that with regard to Klaipėda police station, the first-instance court had miscalculated the time that the applicant had spent in overcrowded cells and stated that he had had less than 5 square metres of personal space for eighty-three days. However, the higher court found that for twenty-six days he had had between 4.77 and 4.84 square metres of personal space, which was less than the domestic requirement at the time (see paragraph 18 below). However, the court held that for those twenty-six days the deviation from the domestic norms had not been significant and thus it agreed with the first-instance decision. 14.  From the information available to the Court, it appears that the applicant never asked the prison administration if he could receive long‑term conjugal visits from his partner, and although short-term visits were available to him, he only used his right to receive them once, on 26 June 2013. Two other short-term visits were changed into phone calls (the visits of 12 June 2015 and 29 October 2015).


4.  The applicant was born in 1980 in Abakan, the Khakassiya Republic. 5.  The applicant stood accused of theft and murder. On 22 November 2004 the Sayanogorsk Town Court in Khakassiya fixed, in the hearing held without the applicant’s attendance, the opening date for the trial and ordered an extension of his pre-trial detention. On 2 December 2004 the applicant was convicted and given a custodial sentence. 6.  On 22 March 2005 the Constitutional Court held, in unrelated proceedings, that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure ought to be interpreted as guaranteeing the right of the defendant to take part in the hearing where the matter of detention was decided, to make submissions to the court and to produce evidence (Judgment no. 4-P, point 4 of the operative part). 7.  On 8 August 2013 the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Khakassiya Republic quashed the Town Court’s decision of 22 November 2004 in the part relating to the detention matter. Referring to the case-law of the Constitutional Court, it found that the District Court had unlawfully extended the applicant’s detention without giving him an opportunity to take part in the hearing or to make submissions to the court. 8.  The applicant sued the Ministry of Finance, seeking compensation for the unlawful detention from 22 November to 2 December 2004. By judgment of 16 September 2013, as upheld on appeal on 27 November 2013, the Abakan Town Court rejected his claim, holding that he was not eligible for compensation in respect of pre-trial detention because he had been found guilty and given a custodial sentence.


5.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Moscow. 6.  On 10 November 2009 the applicant gave birth to a son, I., whose father was E., her partner. 7.  Following their separation in November 2010, the applicant and E. agreed that I. would live with the applicant and E. would visit him regularly. 8.  On 22 October 2013 E. took the boy to Grozny in Chechnya. 9.  The applicant followed them to Grozny, where she attempted to visit her son, but was prevented from doing so by E. 10.  On 18 February 2014 the applicant applied to the Leninskiy District Court of Grozny (“the District Court”) for a residence order under which I. would live with her. She submitted that I. had lived with her from birth until his removal by his father the previous October. They were very attached to each other. She had a stable income, a spacious flat, good character references, and was capable of providing I. with everything necessary in terms of his living expenses, education and development. She also complained that since the removal she had made many attempts to visit her son, but E. had prevented her from seeing him. 11.  On 19 March 2014 the childcare authority of the Chertanovo District of Moscow visited the applicant’s flat in Moscow and found the living conditions there suitable for a small child. 12.  On 19 March 2014 the Justice of the Peace of the 230 Court Circuit of the Chertanovo District of Moscow convicted E. of assault and battery, finding E. guilty of assaulting and injuring the applicant in August 2013, and sentenced him to a fine. 13.  On 9 April 2014 the childcare authority of Grozny visited E.’s flat in Grozny and found that the living conditions there were suitable for a small child. The officials noted that E. lived in the flat with his mother A. and his son I. 14.  On 15 April 2014 the childcare authority of Grozny issued its report on the case. The report reiterated that E.’s living conditions were suitable and further read as follows:
“[E.] works as a senior medical officer at [a private medical clinic] and, according to him, has a monthly income of 50,000 roubles ...
The child has been living with his father [E.] for a long time. His mother lives in Moscow and does not participate in his upbringing. The boy is very attached to the father and receives a lot of attention, tenderness and care. Bearing in mind the best interests of [I.], [the childcare authority of Grozny] considers that a residence order in respect of [I.] in favour of his father [E.] would not be contrary to the child’s interests and would not hinder his contact with the mother.” 15.  At the hearing concerning the applicant’s application for a residence order, E. stated that I. had indeed lived with his mother until recently, but he was not at all attached to her. E. had financially supported them and had visited them regularly. The applicant was “not leading the right kind of life” and she would have a bad influence on I. 16.  At the hearing, an official of the childcare authority of Grozny reiterated the findings contained in the report of 15 April 2014. 17.  On 17 April 2014 the District Court dismissed the applicant’s application for a residence order in her favour. It held that a residence order in respect of I. should be granted to his father, even though he had not requested it. The court held as follows:
“Article 196 § 3 of [the Code of Civil Procedure] provides that a court decides on the claims submitted by a claimant. However, the court may go beyond those claims in cases provided for by the federal law.
Article 65 of [the Family Code] provides that if no agreement can be reached, a dispute between parents must be decided by a court, having regard to the child’s best interests.
It follows that the court may go beyond the parties’ claims and make a residence order in respect of the child in favour of the father [E.].
The report of the childcare authority of Grozny no. ... of 15 April 2014 indicates that it is preferable to make a residence order in respect of the child [I.] in favour of his father [E.], and not to hinder his contact with his mother.
The available information shows that both parents have good character references from their employers and their neighbourhoods, have permanent employment, stable incomes, and real estate.
According to inspection reports, the living conditions of both parents meet the conditions necessary for raising and accommodating a child.
Point 5 of Ruling no. 10 of the Plenary Supreme Court of 27 May 1998 enumerates, in line with Article 65 § 3 of [the Family Code], factors which must be taken into account when deciding on a dispute concerning a child’s residence arrangements. These factors are the child’s attachment to each of the parents and [any] siblings, the relationship between the child and each of the parents, the child’s age, the parents’ moral and other personal qualities and the possibilities each of them have for creating [proper] conditions for the child’s upbringing and development (in the light of such considerations as each parent’s occupation, employment schedule, and financial and family situation), and other factors defining the situation in each parent’s place of residence. The Plenary Ruling stresses, in particular, that the better financial or living conditions of one of the parents cannot, in themselves, constitute a decisive reason for granting this parent’s application for a residence order in his [or her] favour.
The better financial and living conditions of one of the parents (the claimant has a higher income and owns residential property in Moscow) cannot constitute a decisive reason for making a residence order in her favour and for rejecting the other parent’s claim, because there are other factors.
By contrast, [the applicant] is a single mother who has one more child from her previous marriage: a daughter [R.] born on 25 June 1997. This age is most difficult, and requires special attention from the mother.
Because she works, on 2 September 2013 the claimant placed I. in a [nursery school] in Moscow, despite the fact that, by her own admission, he suffers from a congenital central neural system anomaly: dysgenesis of the corpus callosum.
The [factors considered] above indicate that [the applicant] is unable to create [proper] conditions for the child’s upbringing and development. Because of her work, she does not have enough time to devote to her children. These circumstances could have a disastrous impact on the child’s immature mind.
It has been established that the defendant occupies a managerial position at work. His income allows him to create comfortable financial and living conditions. He lives with his mother [A.], who helps to raise [I.]. The childcare authorities’ report indicates that the child is attached to his father.
The defendant has not hindered [the applicant’s] contact with the child.
Under Articles 56 and 57 of [the Code of Civil Procedure], each party must prove the circumstances on which [he or] she relies in support of [his or] her claims or submissions.
In the court’s opinion, the claimant has not submitted evidence in support of her arguments in [the] adversarial proceedings.” 18.  The applicant appealed. She complained, in particular, that the residence order had been granted to E. at the District Court’s own initiative, as E. had never requested it. She further submitted that she was perfectly capable of providing I. with everything which he needed for his development. Her elder daughter was healthy and self-reliant and did not require any special attention. Her daughter would therefore not hinder her ability to take care of I.; on the contrary, she was of great help. The applicant had placed I. in a nursery school to give him a pre-school education and to further his social adaptation. His medical condition was not an obstacle to his attending a pre-school. The District Court’s finding that she did not have enough time to take care of her children was not based on any evidence. Neither her working schedule nor that of E. had been examined. Nor had the court explained how, within such a short period of time, I. could have become more attached to his father than his mother, with whom he had lived from birth until his recent abduction. Lastly, the applicant complained that E. was preventing her from seeing her son. That fact had been confirmed by the childcare authorities’ representative at the hearing, who had recounted E.’s assertions that he would not allow any contact between I. and his mother. 19.  On 3 July 2014 the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic upheld the judgment on appeal, finding that it was lawful, well-reasoned and justified. The judgment was based on the best interests of the child, taking into account his age, his attachment to the father, and the father’s ability to create proper conditions for his son’s upbringing and development. 20.  In reply to a complaint by the applicant that she had been prevented from seeing her son for a long time, by a letter of 7 August 2014, a deputy mayor of Grozny informed her that E. had stated to the childcare authorities that he would not allow any contact between I. and his mother. 21.  By a letter of 12 September 2014, the head of the childcare authority of Grozny informed the applicant that the childcare official who had issued the report of 15 April 2014 had been disciplined. An internal inquiry had established that the report was based on incorrect and incomplete information. In particular, E.’s statement that he had high income had not been checked. The finding that the applicant had not participated in I.’s upbringing was not based on any evidence. The length of time I. had lived with each of the parents had not been established. Lastly, the fact that I. had a half-sister living with his mother had not been taken into account. The report of 15 April 2014 had therefore violated the applicant’s rights and legitimate interests. 22.  The applicant lodged a cassation appeal, referring, in particular, to the letter of 12 September 2014. 23.  On 27 November 2014 a judge of the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic refused to refer the applicant’s cassation appeal to the Presidium of that Court for examination, finding no significant violations of substantive or procedural law which had influenced the outcome of the proceedings. Relying, in particular, on the childcare authorities’ report of 15 April 2014, the judge found that it was in I.’s interests to live with his father. 24.  On 5 December 2014 E. died in a car accident. I continued to live with his paternal grandmother A. 25.  On 14 January 2015 the applicant applied to the Shali Town Court of the Chechen Republic (“the Town Court”), asking that I. be returned to her. 26.  On 31 July 2015 the Town Court granted her application. The court held that I. should be taken away from A. and returned to the applicant, with whom he should live from that point onwards. On 12 November 2015 the Supreme Court of the Chechen Republic upheld the judgment on appeal. 27.  On 24 November 2015 the Town Court issued a writ of execution. On the same day bailiffs initiated enforcement proceedings. 28.  On 28 November 2015 the bailiffs visited A. and ordered that she return I. to the applicant on 3 December 2015. When the bailiffs visited A. on 3 December 2015 to take I. away, A. and I. were not at home. The bailiffs visited A. again on 5 and 25 December 2015 and 4 February 2016, but could not find her or I. The childcare authorities also visited A.’s address on several occasions, but found nobody at home. It was finally established that A. had moved out with I. 29.  On 24 December 2015 the bailiffs banned A. from leaving the country. 30.  On 10 February 2016 A.’s and I.’s names were put on the list of wanted persons. 31.  On 28 April 2016 I. was returned to the applicant by the police. On the next day the enforcement proceedings were closed.


4.  The applicant company has its registered office in Essingen, Germany. 5.  From the 1990s onwards the applicant company regularly purchased scrap metal from A. Safaryan and Associates LLC, a limited liability company registered in Armenia (“the LLC”). 6.  On 8 February 1999, 10 April 2000 and 2 April 2003 the applicant company and KBKS (another German company owned by the applicant company) concluded three contracts with the LLC, under which KBKS and the applicant company were to make advance payments to the LLC in return for scrap metal. The contract of 2 April 2003 contained the following dispute resolution clause:
“... 7.  Arbitration 7.1  The parties agree that any disputes and differences arising out of the performance of this contract shall be resolved through negotiations in order to reach a mutually beneficial resolution. 7.2  If it is not possible to settle such disputes amicably, these matters shall, with the exception of those falling within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, be referred to the Arbitration Tribunal of the Chamber of Commerce of the country of the respondent.
...” 8.  On 8 April 2002 KBKS and the applicant company concluded an assignment agreement whereby KBKS transferred all its contractual rights, including those towards the LLC, to the applicant company. 9.  On 8 November 2002 the applicant company provided the LLC with a loan in the amount of 100,000 euros (EUR), which was due to be repaid by 31 January 2003. The purpose of the loan was to assist the LLC in paying off a bank loan. It appears that it was not paid back to the applicant company. 10.  It further appears that the LLC failed to meet its contractual obligations vis-à-vis the applicant company, in that it supplied less scrap metal than the advance payments that it had already received. 11.  On 28 October 2005 representatives of the applicant company and the LLC made a calculation of their liabilities as at that date and it was revealed that the LLC owed 1,213,824 US dollars (USD) to the applicant company. As a result of negotiations, the applicant company agreed to provide debt relief in the amount of USD 613,824 on the condition that the LLC paid off the rest of the debt, namely USD 600,000, in accordance with a debt repayment schedule which was set up in a separate agreement signed on the same day by the directors of both companies. According to this agreement, the LLC undertook to repay the debt in five instalments, with the first payment due by 15 December 2005. If the LLC failed to meet its obligations as set out in the repayment schedule, it would be immediately liable to repay the entire debt, and any disputes with regard to repayment would be resolved through litigation. 12.  On the same day the parties concluded another agreement, setting out a repayment schedule in respect of the loan of EUR 100,000 and arrears in the amount of EUR 10,000. It also stated that an additional 6% would be payable in the event of failure to respect the repayment schedule. 13.  It appears that the LLC missed the required payments. In subsequent correspondence, the director of the LLC acknowledged the debt but deferred its repayment, each time providing different reasons. 14.  On 15 January 2007 the applicant company lodged a claim with the Commercial Court against the LLC, seeking to recover USD 10,000 from the initial debt of USD 1,213,824. 15.  On 2 October 2007 the applicant company amended its initial claim, seeking to recover a total of USD 1,516,442 and EUR 116,600 from the LLC, including the principal debt, the loan and interest on both. It also requested a waiver of the court fees. 16.  On 4 October 2007 the LLC filed a counterclaim, contesting the applicant company’s claims. The director of the LLC requested the annulment of the two documents dated 28 October 2005, arguing that, having no command of German, he had been unaware of their content and had signed them as a result of fraud. 17.  On 15 October 2007 the applicant filed a response to the counterclaim, arguing, inter alia, that the director of the LLC had been personally present during the negotiations in Germany when a recalculation of liabilities between the companies had been carried out. Since the director of the LLC was fluent in Russian, the negotiations had been conducted in Russian and there had also been a copy in Russian of the documents signed. Moreover, the fact that the director of the LLC had been fully aware of the content of the documents he had signed of his own free will was confirmed by his numerous letters, where he had provided justification for having failed to transfer the amounts due in a timely manner. 18.  On 7 November 2007 the LLC requested the Commercial Court to leave the applicant company’s claim unexamined on the grounds that the contracts of 8 February 1999, 10 April 2000 and 2 April 2003 contained a dispute resolution clause whereby disputes concerning their performance would be resolved by the Arbitration Tribunal of the Chamber of Commerce of the country of the respondent. The LLC therefore claimed that, it being the respondent, resolution of the dispute was within the jurisdiction of the Arbitration Tribunal of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Armenia (“the Arbitration Tribunal”). 19.  On 16 November 2007 the Commercial Court granted the request and decided to leave the applicant company’s claim and the counterclaim lodged by the LLC unexamined. In doing so, it referred to Article 103 § 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure and found that the resolution of the dispute fell within the jurisdiction of the Arbitration Tribunal. It found that, as the contract of 2 April 2003 contained an arbitration clause, the agreement of 28 October 2005 was also subject to arbitration. The decision was amenable to appeal before a three-judge bench of the Commercial Court within three days of receipt by the party. 20.  On 23 November 2007 the applicant company lodged a complaint concerning the decision to leave the claim and counterclaim unexamined. It argued, inter alia, that the agreements signed on 28 October 2005, which had succeeded the contracts of 8 February 1999, 10 April 2000 and 2 April 2003, provided that disputes concerning the failure of the LLC to respect the repayment schedules set out in them would be determined by the courts. It further argued that, subsequent to the agreements of 28 October 2005, no other arrangements concerning dispute resolution had been concluded between the parties. Relying on section 8(1) of the Commercial Arbitration Act, the applicant company also argued that, contrary to its requirements, the court had decided to leave the claim unexamined, even though the LLC had submitted the relevant request several months after the litigation had started and had already made its submissions on the merits of the claim. Lastly, the applicant company argued that its claim in the part relating to the recovery of the amount of the loan of EUR 100,000 was not connected in any way to the contracts of 8 February 1999, 10 April 2000 and 2 April 2003. However, the court had decided that the entirety of its claims were to be determined through arbitration. 21.  On 10 December 2007 a three-judge bench of the Commercial Court rejected the complaint submitted by the applicant company. The decision stated that, inter alia, the claims concerning the debt and the loan were interconnected and stemmed from the commercial relationships between the parties based on the contract for the supply of scrap metal. 22.  On 23 July 2008 the applicant company’s representative sent a request for information to the President of the Arbitration Tribunal, asking whether the arbitration clause contained in the contracts concluded between the parties was sufficient for the tribunal to accept the claim for examination, and whether the decisions of the Commercial Court to leave the claim unexamined on the grounds that the determination of the dispute fell within the jurisdiction of a commercial arbitration court provided sufficient grounds for accepting the claim. Translations into Armenian of extracts of the contracts containing the arbitration clause and copies of the two decisions of the Commercial Court were enclosed with the letter. 23.  On 1 August 2008 the President of the Arbitration Tribunal replied that the question of whether the arbitration clause stipulated in the contracts concluded between the parties was sufficient for it to accept the claim for examination could only be determined once the claim had been lodged. 24.  At the same time, the registrar of the Arbitration Tribunal submitted to the representative of the applicant company a draft arbitration agreement to be concluded with the LLC. According to the applicant company, its representative told the registrar that the conclusion with the LLC of this type of new agreement was at that point impossible and unreasonable, since the Commercial Court had already found that the arbitration clause contained in the contracts was sufficient to start arbitration proceedings. 25.  On 17 September 2008 the applicant company lodged a claim with the Arbitration Tribunal, seeking to recover EUR 116,600, the amount of the loan and interest. A copy of the promissory note signed on 8 November 2002 on providing a loan to the LLC in the amount of EUR 100,000, together with other documents, was attached to the claim. In addition, it was stated in the claim that the decisions of the Commercial Court and extracts of the contracts containing the arbitration clause had already been submitted to the President of the Arbitration Tribunal with the letter of 23 July 2008. 26.  On 7 October 2008 the President of the Arbitration Tribunal informed the applicant company that its request to start arbitration proceedings would not be granted. The relevant parts of the letter read as follows:
“... The promissory note of 8 November 2002 and the agreement of 28 October 2005, on which your claim was based, do not contain an arbitration clause and, moreover, the parties have not concluded any agreement to submit the disputes arising out of the performance of the above-mentioned promissory note and the agreement to the permanent arbitration institution of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Armenia for determination. Consequently, in the absence of an arbitration agreement between the parties, the [Arbitration Tribunal] cannot start arbitration proceedings.” 27.  In view of the fact that the Commercial Court had been abolished by that time, on 17 October 2008 the applicant company lodged a claim with the Yerevan Civil Court, seeking to recover EUR 116,600 from the LLC, representing the amount of the loan and interest. It submitted that the Arbitration Tribunal had refused to accept the claim for examination even though the Commercial Court had already found that the determination of the dispute fell within the tribunal’s jurisdiction. In such circumstances, the applicant company’s right of access to a court had been violated. The applicant company also applied for a freezing injunction in respect of the respondent’s assets in the amount of the claim. 28.  On 12 November 2008 the Yerevan Civil Court accepted the applicant company’s claim for examination and scheduled a preparatory hearing. On the same day it allowed the applicant company’s interlocutory application for a freezing injunction in respect of the property of the LLC in the amount of the claim. 29.  On 27 February 2009 the Yerevan Civil Court transferred the case to the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan (“the District Court”) based on territorial jurisdiction, in view of the fact that on 1 March 2009 the Yerevan Civil Court would be abolished. 30.  On 13 March 2009 the District Court accepted the case for examination. 31.  On 12 June 2009 the LLC, relying on the decision of the Commercial Court of 16 November 2007, requested the District Court to leave the applicant company’s claim unexamined. It submitted, in particular, that the applicant company had failed to substantiate that the grounds for leaving its claim unexamined no longer existed. 32.  The applicant company contested the arguments put forward by the LLC, arguing that the possibility of applying to the Arbitration Tribunal no longer existed since, by a letter of 7 October 2008, examination of the claim had been refused. 33.  On 16 June 2009 the District Court decided to leave the claim lodged by the applicant company unexamined, finding that the refusal to start arbitration proceedings stated in the letter of 7 October 2008 did not substantiate the fact that there was no possibility of applying to the Arbitration Tribunal. The District Court further referred to the previous findings of the Commercial Court to conclude that the claim should be left unexamined. 34.  On 25 June 2009 the applicant company lodged an appeal. It argued, in particular, that the Arbitration Tribunal had been provided with the decisions of the Commercial Court and the contracts concluded between the parties. Having examined them, it had concluded that it had no jurisdiction to determine the dispute. In such circumstances, the rationale for considering that the dispute should be determined by the tribunal was incomprehensible. 35.  In its reply to the applicant company’s appeal, the LLC submitted, inter alia, that the applicant company had failed to provide the Arbitration Tribunal with copies of the relevant extracts of the contracts that contained the arbitration clause and the relevant decisions of the Commercial Court. Therefore, the tribunal had refused to accept the claim. 36.  On 21 July 2009 the Civil Court of Appeal upheld the decision of 16 June 2009. In doing so, it stated, in particular, that the applicant company had failed to submit to the Arbitration Tribunal extracts of the contracts containing the arbitration clause, as a result of which its claim had not been accepted. 37.  On 4 August 2009 the applicant company lodged an appeal on points of law. It argued, in particular, that the Civil Court of Appeal had upheld the lower court’s decision, despite the fact that there was no possibility of applying to the Arbitration Tribunal. The applicant company further pointed out that the argument that it had failed to submit the relevant extracts of the contracts to the tribunal was groundless since, in its claim lodged with that institution, it had expressly mentioned that copies of the decisions of the Commercial Court and extracts of the contracts in question had already been submitted with the letter of 23 July 2008. 38.  On 23 September 2009 the Court of Cassation declared the applicant company’s appeal on points of law inadmissible. In doing so, it stated the following:
“... As for the letter of the President of the Arbitration Tribunal of the Chamber of Commerce of 7 October 2008 concerning non-acceptance of the claim lodged by [the applicant company], it was based on the grounds that [the applicant company] had not submitted the original arbitration agreement or a certified copy, as required by the Commercial Arbitration Act and [the provisions contained therein], in the absence of which arbitration proceedings could not be started.
The Court of Cassation finds that, taking into account the failure to submit to the Arbitration Tribunal of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry the original arbitration agreement or a certified copy ... and non-examination of [the applicant company’s] claim, [the applicant company] is not deprived of judicial protection in accordance with the general provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure ...”


4.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Kayseri. 5.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6.  The applicant, who was a sergeant in the Army had a traffic accident in 2007 and was declared “disabled” (Adi malül”). 7.  On unspecified date, the applicant requested the General Directorate of Pension Fund (the Fund) (“Emekli-Sandığı”) to modify his retirement statute as service-disabled (“vazife malülü”), but the fund rejected that request. 8.  On 9 August 2007 the applicant brought an action before the Supreme Military Administrative Court seeking the annulment of the Fund’s decision. 9.  On 22 May 2008 the Supreme Military Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s request. 10.  On 11 September 2008 the applicant’s rectification request was rejected. 11.  During the proceedings, namely on 12 May 2008 and 29 July 2008 the Public Prosecutor at the Supreme Military Administrative Court filed lengthy written opinions on the case. However these opinions were not communicated to the applicant.


5.  The first applicant, Mr Eugeniusz Bukowski, the second applicant, Ms Grażyna Zmysłowska, and the third applicant, Ms Jolanta Barszcz, were born in 1931, in 1960 and 1959 respectively and live in Warsaw. 6.  The property in Warsaw which gives rise to the present application (two adjacent plots of land with a detached house situated on it) was originally co-owned by the applicants’ predecessors, the D. family and the K. family. 7.  The land and the building in question fell under the Decree of 26 October 1945 on Ownership and Use of Land in Warsaw by virtue of which the Warsaw Municipality (and after 1950, the State Treasury) became the owner of all plots of land located in Warsaw. Due to subsequent amendments of law, on 6 January 1992 (“the 1992 decision”) the land in question was transferred ex lege to the Warsaw Municipality. 8.  According to a further donation contract, a sale contract and the rules on inheritance, since 1998 the rights and claims to the land and the building have belonged in 3/6 to the third applicant, in 2/6 to the second applicant and in 1/6 to the first applicant. 9.  On 22 June 1988 the third applicant filed with the Mayor of Warsaw an application for restitution of the right of ownership of the building and the land in question pursuant to the Land Administration and Expropriation Act of 29 April 1985 (Ustawa o gospodarce gruntami i wywłaszczaniu nieruchomości). On 12 September 1996 the first applicant and on 25 February 1998 the second applicant joined the proceedings. 10.  In a decision of 3 January 2005 the Mayor of Warsaw noted that on 1 January 1998 the new Land Administration Act of 21 August 1997 had entered into force. Pursuant to section 214 of that act restitution of the right of ownership of the land was not possible. The former owners whose property had been taken over by the State and whose claims for restoration had expired were only entitled to apply for perpetual use of the land. Consequently, the Mayor granted the applicants the right of perpetual use of the land and declared that they retained the ownership of the building located thereon. 11.  On 17 January 2005 the applicants applied to have this decision amended and the ownership of the land restored. 12.  On 6 June 2005 the Warsaw Self-Government Board of Appeal quashed the impugned decision and remitted the case for re-examination. 13.  On 21 November 2005 the Mayor of Warsaw issued a decision, granting the applicants the right of perpetual use of the land. The Mayor decided to return the ownership of the building to the applicants and decided on the annual amount of fees to be paid for the perpetual use of the land. 14.  On 8 December 2005 the applicants appealed against this decision objecting to the amount of fees. 15.  On 5 December 2007 the Warsaw Self-Government Board of Appeal quashed the decision of 21 November 2005 (see paragraph 13 above) and remitted the case for re-examination. 16.  On 15 October 2008 the applicants lodged with the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court a complaint about the inactivity on the part of the Mayor of Warsaw. 17.  By a judgment of 28 January 2009 the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court obliged the Mayor of Warsaw to issue a decision within four weeks. 18.  On 18 June 2009 the Mayor of Warsaw issued a new decision, granting the applicants a right of perpetual use of the land and the ownership of the house. It further fixed the amount of annual fees to be paid for the perpetual use of land. 19.  On 30 June 2009 the applicants applied to the Warsaw Self‑Government Board of Appeal contesting the amount of fees for the perpetual use of land. 20.  On 5 November 2009 the Warsaw Self-Government Board of Appeal upheld the impugned decision. 21.  On 27 November 2009 the applicants lodged an appeal with the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court. On 1 June 2010 the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court rejected their appeal as lodged out of time. However, subsequently, it granted them leave to appeal out of time. 22.  On 26 January 2011 the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court dismissed the applicants’ appeal. 23.  The applicants lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court, which was dismissed on 9 August 2012. 24.  On 24 May 2013 the applicants signed a notarial deed by virtue of which they acquired the ownership of the building and a right of perpetual use of the land. 25.  On 6 April 2010 the applicants filed an application to declare the 1992 decision (see paragraph 7 above) null and void. 26.  On 25 February 2011 the Minister of the Interior refused to declare the 1992 decision null and void. 27.  Subsequently, on various dates, the applicants applied to have the case re-examined. Following several remittals on 12 February 2013 the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court refused the applicants’ request. 28.  On 14 March 2013 the applicants lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court. However, they have failed to submit any information about the further course of the proceedings. 29.  On 20 June 2013 the applicants applied to the Mayor of Warsaw for transformation of their right of perpetual use of land into the right of ownership under the Act of 25 July 2005 on Transformation of a Right of Perpetual Use into a Right of Ownership. 30.  On 28 August 2013 the Board of the Mokotów District (Zarząd Dzielnicy Mokotów) refused to grant the application. The applicants appealed against this decision on 13 September 2013. 31.  On 3 October 2013 and 3 September 2014 the Warsaw Self‑Government Board of Appeal and the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court, respectively, upheld the first-instance decision. 32.  On 3 November 2015 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed both decisions. 33.  On 14 April 2016 the Board of the Mokotów District issued a decision on the free of charge transformation of the right of perpetual use of the land into the right of ownership.


5.  The applicant was born in 1983 and lives in Krasnodar. 6.  The applicant had a press card issued to him as a photographer, stating that he was a “correspondent at Agency.Photographer.ru”. According to the applicant’s submissions, he also prepared various texts for publication in print and Internet media outlets on an occasional basis. 7.  In August 2009 the applicant and Ms D. travelled to Abkhazia to prepare a report with photographs on, as he described it, “the life of this unrecognised republic”. 8.  On 27 August 2009 they returned to Russia, arriving on foot at the Adler customs checkpoint. The applicant presented his Russian passport, press card and a customs declaration, stating that he had electronic information devices (a laptop and flash memory cards) in his luggage. The laptop was his own property, however, he also used it for professional purposes. 9.  The applicant and D. were examined by Officer K. In his report to his superior, drawn up at 10.40 a.m. on 27 August 2009, he stated that in view of the applicant’s answers to questions and because of his behaviour, neither of which have been specified to the Court, there was a need to verify the information contained in the applicant’s customs declaration by way of an “inspection procedure” (see paragraph 31 below) in respect of the items in his bag and backpack and to “apply the measure for minimising risk as per profile no. 55/1000000/11062008/00228 ...”. 10.  The Government have submitted to the Court a written statement from K., which reads as follows:
“Following the customs control measure of an interview and given [D.’s and the applicant’s] behaviour and the nature of their professional activities, a supposition/assumption (предположение) arose that they might have banned printed and/or audio- and video-material with extremist content in their bags ... Since [the applicant] noted in his declaration that he had electronic storage devices, I made a written report to the acting chief officer of the customs checkpoint concerning the need for carrying out an inspection of [the applicant’s] bags in the framework of the risk management system and for involving Officer B., an IT specialist. The inspection was approved by the chief officer by way of his handwritten approval on my report ... The chief officer issued an order for an inspection and authorised B. and myself to use the sampling procedure ... The above-mentioned supposition/assumption was based on the presence of a folder labelled “Extremist” in the laptop ... Data from it was copied on the same day [on the spot] ... to DVD RW disks, which were then sealed in a plastic bag ... [The applicant], B. and two attesting witnesses were present ... The sampling report contained a detailed description of the data that was copied, including the names of the folders that had been copied, their number and the number of files in each folder ... The copying was carried out by Officer B. I did not open or copy any electronic folders or files ... I did not read any ‘correspondence’ (personal correspondence or other text material) ... An order to carry out a forensic examination was issued on 8 September 2009 ... because on 27 August 2009 we had no information about the relevant expert organisations for that type of forensic examination ...” 11.  The Government have also submitted a written statement from Officer B., which reads as follows:
“In accordance with the order for an inspection [no. ...], which required sampling and which also indicated ‘other’, I copied data from [the applicant’s] laptop to six DVD RW disks ... because we had no other type of disks or electronic storage devices ... Since the laptop’s hard drive was some 160 Gb and at the time we had no means for fast copying, I decided only to copy folders with strange names. I did not read any ‘correspondence’ (personal correspondence or other text material) from the laptop.” 12.  According to the Government, after finding in the directory of the laptop an electronic folder entitled “Extremism (for RR[1])”, which contained a number of photographs, the customs officer decided to copy it and some other folders from the laptop for further examination by an expert, who could determine whether they contained any information of an extremist nature. 13.  The folder contained seven subfolders and 180 files. The applicant made a note in the record, stating that the material had been copied onto rewritable DVD disks (thus technically allowing the data to be modified, including by way of adding data). According to the applicant, the folder had some photographs and a PDF copy of an article entitled “How to incite hatred?” on anti-extremism legislation. The article, written by Ms V., was published in the Russian Reporter magazine in June 2009 and was accompanied by photographs taken by the applicant. The author of the article discussed the controversies and difficulties relating to the interpretation and application of Russian anti-extremism legislation, with reference to four criminal cases under Article 282 of the Criminal Code. According to the applicant, the material that was copied included documents and text concerning two ethnic groups (the Yazidis and the Meskhetian Turks), who were allegedly under pressure from the Krasnodar regional administration. For instance, a folder named “Isolation” contained texts describing the social problems facing thirty-seven Yazidi families (with references to their personal details), who had been discriminated against by the regional administration. 14.  It can be seen from the record of the sampling that thirty-four folders (containing some 480 subfolders with over 16,300 electronic files) were copied. The folders had the following names (mostly in Russian): In motion, Miscellaneous, Desktop, Foto_projects, On the road, Isolation, Drawings, 1 May, 9 May, 14 February, Law, Extremism (for RR). 15.  It appears that the data from the laptop was first copied to a mobile or external hard drive and then recopied to six DVDs. According to the Government, the information was then deleted from the external hard drive. The original data in the laptop was not deleted and remained intact. 16.  According to the applicant, his laptop remained with Officer B. for several hours. Allegedly, the officer read through the applicant’s correspondence in the ICQ messaging program and copied some 26 gigabytes of data, including the applicant’s personal correspondence, personal photographs and FTP[2]-type passwords. 17.  The applicant submitted the following written statement by Ms D. to the Court:
“At 10 a.m. we presented ourselves at the border control and presented our passports ... We were then taken to the customs control area ... There the customs officers asked [the applicant] to hand over his press card; so they were aware that he had one ... Officer K. interviewed us about the purpose of our visit to Abkhazia and our professional and civic activities ... I heard an FSB border officer tell the customs officers about the need for a ‘special check’ of our electronic storage devices ... Seeing a laptop in [the applicant’s] bag, the customs officers expressed their intention to copy all the available information ... I was interviewed (again) about my civic activities, my political views and about [the applicant’s] professional activities ... the type of work done and the publications ...” 18.  On 9 September 2009 the applicant was informed that a report had been commissioned from a criminal forensics expert to determine whether the data copied from his laptop had any prohibited “extremist” content. 19.  In November 2009 the expert organisation returned the DVDs to the customs office, stating that it was not possible to carry out the examination, although it gave no reasons. In December 2009 a report was sought from another expert organisation. Apparently, it concluded that the data contained no extremist material. According to the applicant, the DVDs with his data were handed over to him in November 2011. 20.  In the meantime, the applicant brought judicial review proceedings under Chapter 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”), challenging the adverse acts and actions of the customs officials. 21.  By a judgment of 25 January 2010 the Prikubanskiy District Court of Krasnodar dismissed his claims. The court held as follows:
“Laptops, storage devices, photo- and video-cameras should be considered as ‘goods’ within the meaning of Article 11 of the Customs Code. All goods should be presented for checking by customs, as required under Article 14 of the Code ... The customs authorities are authorised to take samples of goods for examination ... and to use technical devices to speed up the checks ... The data from the applicant’s laptop was copied for the purposes of examination in compliance with Presidential Decree no. 310 on combating fascism and political extremism ... In the circumstances, the fact that the samples taken for examination constituted all the relevant data was justified ...” 22.  The applicant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the first-instance court’s assessment had not taken into account the requirements relating to Articles 8 and 10 of the European Convention, in particular, the requirement that any interference by a public authority had to be shown to be “necessary in a democratic society” and proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued. He mentioned the Court’s case-law relating to the seizure of printed material and electronic devices, an action which adversely affects the maintenance of professional secrecy. The applicant also argued as follows:
(a)  Compliance with Decree no. 310 was not possible without actually reading someone’s correspondence and other personal information, thereby interfering with the constitutional right to the protection of the secrecy of correspondence and other communications. Article 55 of the Constitution only permitted restrictions on people’s rights on the basis of a federal statute; the decree in question was secondary legislation (подзаконный акт) and could not lawfully introduce additional limitations on constitutional rights;
(b)  The trial court had mentioned that laptops, flash memory cards and the like were “goods” for the purposes of customs legislation. However, the sampling had been carried out in respect of the information they contained rather than the carriers or containers of the information (“the goods”). Access to that information, however, was only allowed on the basis of a court order, as stated in Article 23 of the Constitution;
(c)  In his “written explanations” to the appeal court, the applicant insisted that in Chapter 25 proceedings a public authority had the burden of proving that its acts were lawful and justified. However, the first-instance court had not required the customs authority to cite a specific legal provision authorising its officials to examine electronic data. According to the applicant, the customs authority representative had refused at the hearing to explain the specific content of the risk profile concerning the applicant, referring to the fact that the information in question was classified and was for internal use only. However, a 2004 Instruction by the Federal Customs Authority only authorised a customs inspection where the risk profile in question provided for that type of measure (see also paragraph 37 below). 23.  On 22 April 2010 the Krasnodar Regional Court upheld the judgment, essentially reproducing the lower court’s reasoning as follows:
“Under Articles 403 and 408 of the Customs Code, customs authorities fulfill the tasks and functions assigned to them by federal and other legislation ... and have the authority to apply measures prescribed by the Customs Code for ensuring compliance with customs legislation ...
Article 11 of the Customs Code defines goods (for the purposes of customs legislation) as movable property which is being transferred across the customs border. This includes laptops, memory flash cards, photo-cameras, video-cameras, printed material and the like. Article 14 of the Code provides that all such goods should be subject to customs clearance and customs control. Article 123 of the Code provides that goods should be declared when being transferred across the customs border. Article 124 of the Code provides that the declaration is made by way of presenting a written declaration or otherwise ... The transfer of goods by individuals for personal use is prescribed by Chapter 23 of the Customs Code, and Government decree no. 715 of 27 November 2003 and no. 718 of 29 November 2003. Article 13 of the Code provides that goods which are prohibited from being transferred to Russia must be removed from Russia.
By a letter of 16 July 2008 the Federal Customs Authority listed the goods which are banned from Russian territory ... By a letter of 3 May 2006 the Authority listed the goods that must be declared to customs.
The procedure for and the types of customs checks are described in Chapters 34-37 of the Code. Article 358 of the Code provides that customs checks are based on the principle of selectiveness and, as a rule, should be limited to such forms of control as are sufficient for ensuring compliance with customs legislation ... When selecting the form of control, the risk management approach is applied, which is based on the effective use of resources for preventing violations of the legislation ... Risk is defined as a probability of non-compliance with customs legislation.
When carrying out a customs check, the customs authority is allowed to take samples of goods which are needed for further assessment. The relevant procedure is defined in Article 383 of the Code and Customs Authority order no. 1519 of 23 December 2003. When carrying out a customs check, the authority is allowed to use technical means to limit the time of such checks; the list and procedures for their use are defined in Article 388 of the Code and in Customs Authority order no. 1220 of 29 October 2003 ...
Order no. 677 of 10 November 1995 by the Customs Authority (‘On preventing the transfer of prohibited printed, audio- and video-material across the customs border’) does not contradict the current customs legislation and has not been revoked because the current Customs Code contains Article 13 concerning bans and limitations on the transfer of goods across the customs border ...
In view of the above, the court agrees with the first-instance court that the customs inspection was authorised and carried out within customs control procedures and that the data was copied in line with Russian Presidential Decree no. 310 of 23 March 1995 ... Article 2 of the decree clearly requires the customs authority to ‘arrest and bring to liability persons who disseminate printed, cinematographic, audio-, photo- or video-materials which are aimed at being propaganda in favour of fascism, at inciting social, racial, ethnic or religious enmity; and to take measures for seizing printed material of that kind’ ...
Article 383 of the Code concerning the minimal amount of samples was complied with because the information taken for sampling was not homogenous. Thus when the samples were taken, it was necessary to take the full amount of information from the device ...
In addition, it is noted that under Article 10 of the Customs Code, information received by customs officials may be used exclusively for the purposes of customs legislation ...
Customs officials are not authorised to disclose that information or transfer it to third persons, except as set down in the Code or other legislation ...” 24.  The applicant does not appear to have been prosecuted subsequently in criminal, administrative or other proceedings in connection with the data obtained from his laptop by the customs authorities.