4.  The applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Trnava. 5.  The applicant's family owned real estate to which the applicant now has the title. It is located in the municipality of Drietomá. 6.  In 1957 a road was built near the property to provide access to a neighbour's property. In 1986 the road was modified. 7.  After the road had been built, changes were made to the Land Registry maps and records in order to designate the road as a separate plot under a separate number and with a separate ownership regime. 8.  Since then the applicant has turned numerous times to the municipal authorities in Drietomá and to all levels of the Land Registry authorities. He claimed that the road had been constructed without the requisite permits; that it served solely the interests of his neighbour, which was unjust; and that it was partly located on his land without valid title, in violation of his property rights. The applicant requested, unsuccessfully, that the legal position be complied with both in the Land Registry records and in reality; that the road be removed; and that he be paid damages. 9.  In a letter of 8 June 1995 the supreme Land Registry body (Úrad geodézie, kartografie a katastra) informed the applicant that his problem could not be solved through the administrative procedure aimed at “restoring original legal borders” (obnovenie hraníc pôvodného právneho stavu) as this procedure only applied to uncontested situations. It was understood that in the applicant's case there was a dispute concerning the border between his property and the road. Such a dispute could only be resolved by a court and the applicant was advised to assert his claims there. 10.  In letters of 9 October and 6 November 1997 the Trenčín district office (Okresný úrad) informed the applicant that the Land Registry had no power to change boundaries of plots and that, in so far as the applicant was seeking such changes, he should bring his claims to the courts. 11.  In a letter of 15 December 1997 the Trenčín regional office (Krajský úrad) informed the applicant that the current Land Registry maps and records in respect of his property had been drawn up and defined in the 1960s and were considered completed. On 1 January 1998 an amendment to the relevant legislation, the Land Registration Act (Law no. 162/1995 Coll.), would enter into force, and would provide for a new administrative procedure aimed at “determination of boundaries” (určenie priebehu hranice). If the applicant believed that the existing Land Registry maps and records interfered with his property rights, from 1 January 1998 he could seek protection of such rights through this procedure. 12.  On 14 January 1998 the applicant brought an action against the district office and the Drietomá municipal office (Obecný úrad) in the Trenčín District Court (Okresný súd). He sought a judicial order against the district office, which was in charge of the relevant Land Registry records, requesting it to rectify these records by bringing them into line with his ownership claim. 13.  On 22 January 1998 the District Court instructed the applicant to provide further and better particulars and advised him that, pursuant to sections 48 to 51 of the amended Land Registration Act, since 1 January 1998 boundary disputes fell within the jurisdiction of Land Registry authorities. 14.  On 17 February 1998 the District Court discontinued the proceedings, observing that at that time land boundary disputes fell to be determined at first instance by district offices in their function as Land Registry authorities. The District Court consequently referred the matter to the Trenčín district office. 15.  On 2 April 2001 the district office sent the matter back to the District Court, holding that it fell within the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts since it concerned protection and restoration of rights in respect of real property. On 26 April 2001 the Supreme Court (Najvyšší súd) upheld this view. 16.  The District Court subsequently re-registered the action under a new file number. 17.  On 17 September 2001 the District Court requested the applicant to pay the court fees. Subsequently, on 5 and 16 October 2001 and 31 January 2002, the applicant repeatedly requested an exemption from the obligation to pay the court fees. The request was dismissed as unfounded and the dismissal was upheld on appeal. 18.  On 24 June 2002 the District Court discontinued the proceedings on the ground that the applicant had failed to pay the court fees. On 4 October 2003 the District Court corrected the decision by adding a proviso to its operative part to the effect that the decision would be rescinded if the fee was paid within the period allowed for an appeal against that decision. On 22 October 2003 the District Court corrected clerical errors in the operative part of the decision. The applicant appealed. 19.  On 23 March 2004 the Trenčín Regional Court (Krajský súd) upheld the decision to discontinue the proceedings and it thus became final. 20.  On 26 October 2000 the applicant brought a fresh action against the Trenčín district office and the Drietomá municipal office in the District Court. He argued that after his 1998 action had been transmitted to it, the district office had failed to take any steps to resolve the matter despite repeated reminders. The applicant made claims similar to those he had made in 1998. 21.  On 28 August 2001 the District Court discontinued the proceedings. It was observed that the applicant's submissions had been aimed at correcting Land Registry records, which was primarily to be done by the Land Registry authorities and, therefore, fell outside the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. 22.  On 28 January 2002 the Regional Court quashed the decision of 28 August 2001 on the applicant's appeal and remitted the matter to the District Court to continue the proceedings. The Regional Court based its decision on the finding of the Supreme Court of 26 April 2001 in connection with the 1998 action and instructed the District Court to examine whether, in the circumstances, it was appropriate to join the two actions. 23.  On 21 June 2002 the District Court requested the applicant to provide further and better particulars. He responded on 4 July 2002 and then requested an exemption from the obligation to pay the court fees. 24.  On 26 February the District Court granted the applicant a 30% exemption and on 30 June 2003 on the applicant's appeal the Regional Court granted the applicant a full exemption from the court fees. 25.  On 12 July 2005 the District Court discontinued the proceedings in so far as the action was directed against the municipal office. The District Court held that the municipal office was a body of the municipality. It had no legal personality of its own and, therefore, could not be a party to court proceedings. This shortcoming could not be corrected, as the applicant had suggested, by “replacing” the municipal office as the defendant by the municipality, because a defendant who did not exist in law could not be replaced by another entity. 26.  On 17 August and 31 October 2005, respectively, the District Court and, on the applicant's appeal, the Regional Court declared the applicant's appeal against the decision of 16 July 2005 inadmissible as being out of time. 27.  On 29 December 2005 the applicant filed new claims seeking, inter alia, an order to close the road in question. On 12 January 2006 the District Court decided to join the applicant's submission to the action of 2000. 28.  On 20 February 2006 the District Court requested the applicant to provide further and better particulars and later summoned him for an interview in chambers (informatívny výsluch) in order to explore the legal nature of his submissions. 29.  On 19 April 2006 the District Court interviewed the applicant and informed him that his submissions could not be dealt with as a civil action since they fell short of formal requirements, in particular because of their vagueness and lack of substance. In response, the applicant made a new written submission on 3 May 2006. 30.  In the meantime, the District Court sought information concerning the case from the Drietomá municipality, the land registration authorities and the Trenčín district road traffic authority (obvodný prad pre cestnú dopravu a pozemné komunikácie). 31.  The proceedings are still pending. 32.  On 8 September 2003 the applicant lodged a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution with the Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd). He argued that there had been unjustified delays in the 1998 and 2000 actions and in the proceedings before the Land Registry authorities, and claimed 200,000 Slovakian korunas[1] (SKK) in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 33.  On 14 January 2004 the Constitutional Court appointed a legal-aid lawyer to assist the applicant. 34.  On 7 July 2004 the Constitutional Court declared the part of the complaint concerning the delays in the 1998 and 2000 actions admissible and the remainder inadmissible. 35.  On 3 November 2004 the Constitutional Court discontinued the proceedings in so far as the complaint related to the 1998 action. It was observed that the admissibility of this part of the complaint had already been examined (see paragraph 38 below) and that it could not be examined again. 36.  On 8 December 2004 the Constitutional Court (Third Section) found that the District Court had violated the applicant's right to a hearing “without unjustified delay” (Article 48 § 2 of the Constitution) and “within a reasonable time” (Article 6 § 1 of the Convention) in the 2000 action. At the same time, it ordered the District Court to proceed with the matter promptly and to pay the applicant his legal costs and SKK 10,000[2] in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
The Constitutional Court found that the subject matter of the proceedings was not particularly complex and that the applicant had contributed to the length of the proceedings to some extent in that his claim had lacked clarity and that he had failed to discharge his obligation to pay the court fees in time. Delays of more than 17 months were imputable to the District Court. It was observed that the proceedings were still pending, that the courts had not held a single hearing, and that the only issue that had been resolved concerned the court fees. 37.  On 11 March 2004, without offering an explanation, the applicant lodged a new constitutional complaint, which was almost identical to his complaint of 8 September 2003. 38.  On 31 August 2004, under a different file number, the Constitutional Court declared the complaint admissible in respect of the 2000 action and inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded in respect of the 1998 action. 39.  On 14 January 2005 the Constitutional Court (Fourth Section) delivered a judgment (nález) which was substantially the same as that of 8 December 2004. Making no mention of the judgment of 8 December 2004, the judgment of 14 January 2005 varied slightly in its reasoning and in the amount of the just satisfaction awarded to the applicant, namely SKK 20,000[3].


5.  The applicant company was established in 1995 and has its registered office in Bratislava. 6.  On 17 March 1995 the applicant company concluded a contract with Slovak Radio (Slovenský rozhlas), Slovakia’s national public-service radio broadcaster, a publicly funded institution with its own legal personality, the status of which is regulated by law (at that time Law no. 619/2003 Coll., as amended, presently Law no. 532/2010 Coll., as amended). 7.  Under the contract, in return for a fee, the applicant company agreed to act as exclusive agent for Slovak Radio as the principal (“the principal”) for the sale of broadcasting time for the purposes of advertising. 8.  The venture worked well and the contract was amended several times. The amended contract was valid until 31 December 2007. 9.  However, in 2004 the relationship between the applicant company and the principal began to sour because the principal was not content with the amount of business acquired by the applicant company in 2003. 10.  The principal had accordingly issued the applicant company with a bill for the difference between the estimated profit and the real profit from such business. 11.  As the applicant company did not pay the bill, the principal served the applicant company with a notice of termination of the contract, considering the applicant company’s failure to pay the bill to be a fundamental breach of the contract. 12.  The notice period expired on 30 September 2005, following which the principal arranged for the sale of its broadcasting time by other means. 13.  On 20 October 2005 the applicant company challenged the validity of the principal’s notice of termination of the contract in court, but later withdrew the action. 14.  The principal, for its part, sued the applicant company for payment of the difference between the estimated profit and the real profit. No information has been made available about the current state and outcome of those proceedings. 15.  On 5 December 2006 the applicant company demanded that the principal pay it the equivalent of some 693,000 euros (EUR), according to the exchange rate applicable at that time, by way of indemnity for termination of the contract.
With reference to the contract, the amount of the indemnity had been calculated as the applicant company’s average yearly commission for the preceding five years, taking into account both financial and non-financial transactions between the principal and third parties, the latter being referred to as barter transactions. 16.  As the principal did not satisfy the applicant company’s claim, on 1 June 2006 the applicant company sued it for the above-mentioned amount and late-payment interest. 17.  On 29 March 2007 a copy of the action was served on the principal for observations. Hearings were scheduled for 13 and 27 April and 14 May 2007, in the course of which the Bratislava I District Court (Okresný súd) examined complex documentary evidence and heard the statutory representative of the applicant company and four witnesses. 18.  However, the principal submitted no written observations and appeared at none of the hearings. The circumstances of its absence were disputed (see below). 19.  On 14 May 2007 the Bratislava I District Court (Okresný súd) granted the action in full. It observed that despite having been represented by a lawyer, the principal had failed to submit any observations or to present a good excuse for its failure to appear at any of the hearings. It therefore proceeded to examine the case under Article 101 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Law no. 99/1963 Coll., as amended – “the CCP”), which in the event of a party’s unjustified failure to cooperate, allows for the examination of the case on the basis of the elements available.
As a preliminary issue, the District Court examined the question of validity of the notice of termination of the contract issued by the principal. It observed that the notice had not been contested and concluded that it was valid. There were no reasons disqualifying the applicant company from being eligible for the indemnity, and the barter transactions had rightly been taken into account in its calculation. 20.  The principal appealed (odvolanie) to the Bratislava Regional Court (Krajský súd).
In terms of form, it contested the first-instance judgment in its entirety. Nevertheless, in terms of substance, it acknowledged the existence of the legal basis of the applicant company’s entitlement to indemnity, disputing solely its scope, in so far as the barter transactions were concerned. Without those transactions, the acknowledged amount of the indemnity was equivalent to some EUR 526,000, according to the exchange rate applicable at that time.
In support of its challenge to the claim exceeding that amount, the principal pointed out that, in the proceedings in its action for payment of the difference between the estimated profit and the real profit (see paragraph 14 above), the applicant company had lodged a counter-claim for compensation for the barter transactions.
The principal also contended that the decision to determine the action in its absence had been arbitrary. 21.  Having examined the appeal, the Regional Court upheld the first‑instance judgment on 28 November 2007.
It considered that, except for the part related to the barter transactions, the applicant company’s claim had been acknowledged by the principal.
As to those transactions, it observed that the applicant company had offset a claim for compensation for them against the claims asserted by the principal in its above-mentioned action. The claim for compensation for those transactions was however a different matter from a claim for indemnity for the termination of the contract, which was asserted in the present proceedings, and which the Regional Court found to be well‑founded.
Lastly, as regards the principal’s absence from the first-instance proceedings, the Regional Court observed (i) that the principal had requested the adjournment of the hearing of 13 April 2007; (ii) that the summons for the hearing of 27 April 2007 had not been deliverable to the principal’s lawyer prior to that hearing; and (iii) that on 11 May 2007 the principal’s new lawyer had requested that the hearing of 15 May 2007 be adjourned so as to allow him to study the case file, although the summons for that hearing had already been served on the principal on 3 May 2007 at the latest. In those circumstances, the District Court’s assessment that the principal had been “absolutely passive” in the proceedings was right and the examination of the case in the principal’s absence had been justified. 22.  As no ordinary appeal lay against the Regional Court’s judgment, following its service on the parties, the matter was resolved with the force of a final and binding decision (právoplatnosť) on 9 January 2008.
On the expiry of a period of grace for voluntary payment, the judgment became enforceable (vykonateľnosť) on 12 January 2008. 23.  On 10 March 2008 the principal challenged the Regional Court’s judgment by way of a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution (Constitutional Law no. 460/1992 Coll., as amended). Asserting its rights of access to a court and to a fair hearing, it contended that the impugned judgment was grossly arbitrary and contrary to European Union law. In the latter respect, the Regional Court had arbitrarily refused to ask the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling. 24.  On 3 July 2008 the Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd) declared the complaint inadmissible. It held that an unjustified refusal to ask for a preliminary ruling may in certain circumstances give rise to a ground for appealing on points of law (dovolanie) under Article 237 (g) of the CCP. As that remedy had not been exhausted, the Constitutional Court lacked jurisdiction to deal with the complaint. 25.  On 25 April 2008 the principal filed a petition with the Office of the Prosecutor General (“the PG”) requesting the latter to exercise his discretionary power to challenge the above-mentioned judgments by way of an extraordinary appeal on points of law (mimoriadne dovolanie – “extraordinary appeal”). 26.  The PG decided to accede to the request and on 23 October 2008 challenged the contested judgments in the Supreme Court (Najvyšší súd).
He argued primarily that the courts had erred in finding the notice of termination of the contract valid because it had not been disputed by the parties. This was a point of law and it could not have been resolved simply with reference to the lack of disagreement of the parties over it. The courts therefore should have examined that question independently and properly. As for the substance, in his view, had the notice been invalid, there would have been no reason for an indemnity. On the other hand, had the notice been valid, the indemnity could have been refused, because it had been based on a breach of contract by the applicant company.
Moreover, the PG pointed out that the contract had neither provided for nor excluded compensation for barter transactions. In such circumstances, the contract should have been interpreted in terms of the parties’ subsequent practice, which had not involved the payment of compensation for such transactions. They should accordingly not have been taken into account for the purpose of calculation of the indemnity. 27.  Simultaneously, the PG applied for a ruling to suspend the enforceability of the impugned judgments pending the outcome of the extraordinary appeal. The Supreme Court acceded to that request on 8 December 2008. 28.  Meanwhile, on 26 November 2008, the applicant company had submitted observations in reply; it submitted further observations on 3 February and 3 September 2009.
The latter observations were not submitted until after the Supreme Court had determined the extraordinary appeal (see paragraph 30 below), as the applicant company did not know of its decision at the time. 29.  In its observations, the applicant company raised numerous arguments, including the following.
There was no justification for protecting the principal’s rights by way of an extraordinary appeal because it had failed to protect its own rights with due diligence in the lower courts and because, even at the cassation level, it had left the protection of its rights to the public authorities.
In that regard, it had been open to the principal to assert its rights before the Supreme Court directly by way of an appeal on points of law. It had not done so simply in order to avoid incurring court fees for such an appeal.
Moreover, under Article 243e § 1 of the CCP, the availability of an indirect remedy, an extraordinary appeal (on points of law), was excluded by the availability of a direct remedy, an (ordinary) appeal on points of law.
At the appellate level, the only point in dispute had been the part of the applicant company’s claim concerning the barter transactions.
The PG’s challenge to the ordinary courts’ findings as regards the validity of the notice to terminate the contract therefore exceeded the grounds of the principal’s petition for an extraordinary appeal. Indeed, it was contrary to it because the principal had not challenged the notice but rather had relied on it. In any event, the PG’s challenge was ill-founded because there was no correlation between the validity of the notice and the fact that it had been based on the applicant company’s refusal to pay the bill submitted by the principal.
Lastly, with reference to Convention case-law, the applicant company submitted that the extraordinary appeal as a remedy against a final and binding judgment in its favour was incompatible with the principles of the rule of law and legal certainty. 30.  On 12 August 2009, sitting in chambers, the Supreme Court allowed the extraordinary appeal. It quashed the judgments of both the District Court and the Regional Court and remitted the matter to the former for a new examination.
It concluded that the courts had erred in that, firstly, they had omitted to examine the validity of the contract itself and secondly, depending on the outcome of that examination, they had failed properly to examine the validity of the notice. In view of those errors it had not been possible to deal in concreto with the questions of the basis and scope of the applicant company’s claim. 31.  The Supreme Court’s decision was served on the applicant company’s lawyer on 22 September 2009. As a result, the case was remitted to the first instance, where it has been pending ever since. 32.  On 20 November 2009 the applicant company lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court, contesting the Supreme Court’s decision of 12 August 2009. It relied on its rights to access to a court, equality of arms, adversarial proceedings, legal certainty and a fair hearing.
The applicant company argued that the admissibility requirements for the extraordinary appeal had not been met, and that the extraordinary appeal had not only been belated but had exceeded the scope of the principal’s petition. In addition, by the mere fact of admitting the extraordinary appeal, the Supreme Court had set at naught the entire preceding judicial process, in violation of the principle of legal certainty.
The applicant company further argued that in view of the Supreme Court’s decision, a brand new hearing of the case had been called for, even though no procedural irregularities of the previous hearing had been established. In addition, the contested decision was biased in favour of the principal and was not amenable to review on account of lack of reasoning.
The applicant company also contended that the Supreme Court had completely ignored its observations in reply to the extraordinary appeal.
Lastly, the applicant company complained that it had been denied access to the Supreme Court’s case file in the extraordinary appeal. 33.  On 25 November 2010 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant company’s complaint inadmissible as being manifestly ill‑founded.
In so far as the applicant company had sought to contest the extraordinary appeal in principle, the Constitutional Court observed that the statutory framework for examination of individual complaints did not allow it to examine the compliance of statutes with the Constitution and international instruments as such.
To the extent that the applicant company might be understood as wishing to object to any action on the part of the PG, no such objection could be considered because the applicant company had only identified the Supreme Court as the defendant of its complaint.
As for the remainder of the complaint, which concerned the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court found that the applicant company had failed to show any constitutionally relevant arbitrariness in the interpretation and application of the relevant rules.
As regards the applicant company’s argument that the extraordinary appeal had been lodged belatedly, it was based on the premise that the principal had appealed against the first-instance judgment only in so far as it concerned the barter transactions. That premise was however mistaken because the principal had defined the target of its appeal as the first‑instance judgment as a whole (see paragraph 20 above).
As to the Supreme Court’s failure to give a specific answer to the applicant company’s arguments, the Constitutional Court considered that the right to an answer to submitted arguments was related not to a person but to substance. The Supreme Court had thus been under a duty not to reply to the arguments submitted by the applicant company as such, but rather to address the relevant aspects of the case. On the latter point, the applicant company had failed to show that any of the relevant aspects of the case had gone unanswered.
Lastly, the Constitutional Court accepted that it had been a mistake to deny the applicant company access to the Supreme Court’s case file. However, it held that that had no constitutional significance because, in view of the character of the extraordinary appeal proceedings, access to the case file or the lack of it would have had no impact on the outcome of the proceedings. 34.  A copy of the Constitutional Court’s decision was served on the applicant company on 21 January 2011.


4.  The applicants were born in 1940 and 1942 respectively and live in Budapest. 5.  In a real estate dispute, on 11 October 1995 the applicants brought an action against the Budapest Administrative Office. The Pest Central District Court dismissed their action on 6 May 1997. On 26 February 1998 the Budapest Regional Court dismissed their appeal. 6.  In the context of the above dispute, on 14 May 1996 and 4 July 1997, respectively, the applicants filed criminal reports against various individuals on charges of fraud and other offences. Their complaints against the non-pursuit of these proceedings were finally dismissed on 31 March 1999. 7.  On 26 May 1997 the applicants filed an action with the Buda Central District Court for judicial constitution of a contract of sale of a property. On 16 December 1997 they requested the suspension of the proceedings pending another action of theirs, introduced on 3 October 1997, in which they sought deletion of a related land register entry. On 6 January 1998 the District Court decided to suspend the proceedings since the issues to be determined in the other case were found to be preliminary ones. 8.  In the case concerning the land register entry, on 7 April 1998 the applicants modified their action; therefore, the action had to be extended to include further respondents. However, the applicants did so only on 21 April 1999. After several hearings, the proceedings had to be interrupted between 5 June 2000 and 19 April 2001, pending the succession of a deceased respondent. On 21 March 2002 the District Court dismissed the action. On appeal, the Budapest Regional Court held several hearings and on 15 January 2004 upheld the first-instance decision in a final judgment. The applicants filed a petition for review. On 23 May 2005 the Supreme Court's review bench refused to deal with the merits of the petition holding that the conditions thereof were not met. A further so-called appeal, not recognised under the law, was dismissed on 1 March 2006. 9.  Subsequently the applicants notified the District Court of the termination of the case concerning the land register issue, and the one concerning the constitution of a contract was resumed. Several hearings took place between 10 January 2007 and 18 April 2008. On 28 August 2008 the District Court dismissed the action. On appeal, the Budapest Regional Court held hearings on 28 May and 24 September 2009 and delivered a judgment on 1 October 2009, overruling the first-instance judgment in favour of the applicants and constituting the contract as requested. On 27 November 2009 the respondent filed a petition for review. The case is still pending before the Supreme Court.


6.  The applicants were born in 1979 and 2006 respectively and live in Würzburg, Germany. 7.  In 2009 the two applicants and V.P., the first applicant’s husband and the second applicant’s father, travelled to Germany, to take up a nine-month paid traineeship in State institutions which the first applicant had been granted there. 8.  On 27 February 2010 the father went to Bulgaria with the second applicant. He refused to return the child to Germany on 20 March 2010, despite the child’s having a ticket for that date and contrary to what had been agreed with the mother. 9.  As a result, the first applicant interrupted her training and returned to Bulgaria on 25 March 2010 where she joined V.P. and their child. 10.  The first applicant brought judicial proceedings seeking protection against V.P. The proceedings were suspended on an unspecified date, following a joint request by the first applicant and V.P. The proceedings were later resumed after the first applicant claimed that the abuse continued. 11.  The Ruse District Court issued, on 28 April 2011, a protection order in favour of the two applicants, prohibiting V.P. from approaching them for the next six months. The court established that, during the period between 25 March 2010 and 31 March 2010, V.P. had subjected the two applicants to psychological abuse. In particular, he had repeatedly insulted the mother in front of the child, had called her a bad mother, had not allowed the two of them to have contact unsupervised by him and, for that purpose, had locked the bathroom and bedroom doors in the apartment at night. The court also found that V.P. had made the first applicant sleep on the floor, had driven at a high speed with the child on the front seat of the car, had held the child over the balcony banister pressing the child’s carotid (neck) artery and had threatened the first applicant that he would “rip [her] open from top to bottom and serve the corresponding jail time”. 12.  As a result of the restraining order V.P. did not have contact with the child between 12 May 2011 and 26 November 2011. 13.  On 31 March 2010 the two applicants left the family home and the first applicant has exercised actual custody over the second applicant ever since. The first applicant was initially granted a scholarship to study for a master’s degree in Germany during the academic year 2010/2011. The father did not give his consent to the child’s travel to Germany. As a result, the second applicant lived with his maternal grand-parents from the autumn of 2010 onwards. 14.  In order to spend as much time as possible with her child, the first applicant traveled frequently between Germany and Bulgaria. She submitted that between March 2010 and October 2012 she spent around half her time in Bulgaria with her child. This negatively affected her studies: because she was often absent from classes in order to visit her child, she needed longer overall time to complete her master’s programme, namely two years instead of one year. She was awarded another scholarship for a doctorate degree in Germany, starting in the academic year 2012/2013. 15.  On 9 April 2010, the first applicant filed a claim for divorce. 16.  On 8 October 2010 the district court pronounced the divorce of the first applicant and her husband as being due to V.P.’s fault, and granted the exercise of parental rights to the first applicant. The father’s contact rights were determined with a view to the child’s possible residence in Germany and were as follows: one week every three months and twenty consecutive days in the summer before the second applicant started school, and half of every school holiday after that. 17.  Following an appeal by V.P., the regional court upheld the lower court’s findings. The Supreme Court of Cassation dismissed his subsequent cassation appeal as inadmissible. The judgment declaring the divorce final became enforceable on 28 February 2012. 18.  In parallel with the divorce proceedings, on 29 April 2010 the first applicant brought proceedings before the district court under Article 123 § 2 of the Family Code (see paragraph 26 below). She sought to obtain a court decision dispensing with the father’s consent to the child’s travel outside the country. More specifically, she requested permission freely to leave the country with her son for a period of one year as of the date of entry into force of the court judgment. 19.  Several court hearings were held. The applicant informed the court about her intended studies in Germany for the academic year 2010/2011, the fact that she had been granted a scholarship, that she had the financial means to take care of her son and that he had adapted well to the social environment in Germany. She did not specifically invoke a provision under the Convention; instead, she expressed her wish to live with and care for her child while she was pursuing her studies in Germany. However, it appears that she did not formally limit in writing her request for permission to travel with her child to Germany or to any other country. 20.  The district court granted the first applicant’s request on 31 August 2010. It found in particular that there was no reason to suspect that she would permanently leave the country with the second applicant. It also held that the father’s access rights had been determined in a preliminary court decision (определение) of 3 August 2010 and, if the first applicant were to obstruct them, V.P. could bring separate proceedings in that connection. 21.  After an appeal by V.P. the regional court upheld that judgment on 7 January 2011. The court observed that the second applicant’s right to freedom of movement was protected under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Constitution of Republic of Bulgaria and the Bulgarian Identity Documents Act (see paragraphs 25, 28 and 32 below). The right to freedom of movement could only be limited in exceptional situations, namely in order to protect national security, public order, public health and morals or the rights and freedoms of others. None of those exceptions had been established or even claimed in the applicants’ case. The court observed that the first applicant offered good material conditions to the child in Germany, that the child had adapted well during his stay there before March 2010, that the first applicant was going to specialise in European law in the Wurtzburg University and that the second applicant enjoyed considerable care and attention from his mother. The court also held that V.P.’s arguments about his access rights were unrelated to the present proceedings; those arguments had to do with the enforcement of a future court decision in which the exercise of the parental rights in respect of the second applicant were to be definitively determined. The court concluded that it was in the interest of the second applicant to have a passport issued and to travel with the first applicant abroad. 22.  Upon a cassation appeal by V.P., the Supreme Court of Cassation refused the first applicant’s request in a final judgment of 26 June 2012. The court relied on its well established and binding case-law according to which permission for a child’s unlimited travel abroad with one parent only could not be granted because, as a matter of principle, that could never be in the best interest of the child. The reasons were more specifically that there was a risk that the requesting parent could take the child to countries which were in a state of war or in which there was a high risk of natural calamities, and thus endanger the child’s well-being while depriving the State of the possibility to ensure his or her protection. Such permission could be granted, when that was in the interest of the child, in respect of concrete destinations and for a limited period of time. Finally, the court rejected the first applicant’s request that the court define of its own motion concrete boundaries within which travel could be permitted, stating that it was bound by the formulation presented in the applicant’s request. 23.  On 9 July 2012 the first applicant brought a new request for permission of the second applicant’s travel with his mother to Germany and the other European Union countries for a period of three years without the father’s consent. This time she brought her claim under Article 127a of the Family Code 2009, which provision was adopted in the meantime and which governs specifically the question of minors’ travel abroad and the issuing of identity documents for that purpose (see paragraph 26 below). She pointed out that she had consistently facilitated V.P.’s access to the child in accordance with his contact rights determined in the divorce proceedings. She submitted that, because she could not take the second applicant with her to Germany while she was pursuing her studies there, both her child and she were deprived of personal contact with each other. She claimed this negatively affected their family life as she was practically deprived of the possibility to raise her child while the exercise of parental rights had been granted to her. She submitted that her doctoral studies in Germany, which were to last three years as of the fall of 2012, would give her the flexibility necessary for her taking care of her child, given that she could do most of her work from home. Finally, she pointed out that the second applicant continuously asked to be with his mother at all times as he is very attached to her. 24.  In a decision of 6 December 2012, the Ruse District Court allowed the second applicant’s travel to Germany and within the European Union, for the period of three years, accompanied by his mother. The decision was not appealed against and became enforceable on 29 December 2012.


5.  The applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Moscow. 6.  On 13 December 2005 she complained to the police about her neighbours. She stated that a “gang” of neighbours had damaged her property and had used “psychotronic generators” in their apartments and cars to cause damage to her health and mind. The applicant also mentioned in the complaint that she had in the past made submissions to the Federal Security Service, the President of the Russian Federation and the State Duma, which had been unsuccessful. 7.  On 20 January 2006 a police officer took statements from the applicant’s neighbours, who stated that she had behaved unreasonably, walked naked on the streets, shouted at people and accused them of various illegal activities. 8.  The Psychoneurological Outpatient Clinic no. 20 of Moscow (“the POC”) was requested by the police on 20 January 2006 to carry out a psychiatric examination of the applicant. 9.  On 14 July 2006 a resident psychiatrist at the POC (Ms K.) issued a report confirming the need for a psychiatric examination of the applicant relying on the evidence obtained seven months before. The report stated that the nature of the applicant’s complaints to various authorities gave reason to believe that they were brought about by a pathology associated with a psychiatric disorder. The psychiatrist concluded that an examination of the applicant was necessary, because progressive development of the disorder might cause a deterioration in her health and aggressive behaviour towards others. The report was certified by the head physician of the POC. It is not clear whether the psychiatrist examined the applicant in person before issuing the report. 10.  On the same day Ms K. filed an application with the Kuzminskiy District Court of Moscow (“the District Court”) seeking authorisation for an involuntary psychiatric examination under section 23, subsection 4 (c) of the Law of the Russian Federation on Psychiatric Assistance and Guarantees of the Citizens’ Rights Related to Its Administration 1992 (“the Psychiatric Assistance Act”). The application stated that there was evidence of “a psychiatric disorder resulting in significant damage to health due to the deterioration of a psychiatric condition in the absence of psychiatric assistance”. It also indicated that on 20 January 2006, during a police interview, the applicant had refused to consent to undergo a voluntary psychiatric examination. The application was also certified by the head physician of the POC. 11.  Evidence attached to the application included the above-mentioned psychiatrist’s report of 14 July 2006, the applicant’s complaint to the police of 13 December 2005, the police officer’s request of 20 January 2006, and the applicant’s neighbours’ statements of 20 January 2006. 12.  The application was received by the District Court on 27 July 2006 and a hearing was scheduled for 18 August 2006. On 14 August 2006 the court sent a summons to the applicant by registered letter, but that was later returned to the sender after several unsuccessful delivery attempts. 13.  On 18 August 2006 the District Court considered the psychiatrist’s application for involuntary psychiatric examination of the applicant. Neither the applicant nor the representative of the POC were present at the hearing. It was noted in the court transcript and decision that both parties had been duly notified of the hearing but that neither had chosen to appear in court. The District Court authorised a psychiatric examination of the applicant without her consent and ordered it to be carried out either at her home or at the POC. It reasoned as follows:
“The court, having examined the evidence, namely the report of the POC on the need for a psychiatric examination, considers the application well-founded ... for the following reasons.
In accordance with Section 23, subsection 4 of the Psychiatric Assistance Act 1992 ... a psychiatric examination of a person may be carried out without his or his legal representative’s consent when the evidence available suggests that the examinee performs acts giving reason to presume the existence of a severe psychiatric disorder which causes feebleness, i.e. the inability to autonomously satisfy one’s basic needs, or significant damage to health due to the deterioration of a psychiatric condition in the absence of psychiatric assistance.
The said condition ... has been proven by the POC’s medical report, a copy of the applicant’s complaint to [the police] concerning the use of various types of secret weapons, a copy of a statement by Ms Sh. (Ms Petukhova’s neighbour), who stated that Ms Petukhova behaved unreasonably, walked naked on the streets and shouted at people, as well as by other evidence confirming the need for a psychiatric examination of Ms Petukhova.” 14.  The Court has received no evidence to suggest that the applicant was either notified of the decision or provided with a copy. 15.  More than three months later, on 1 December 2006, the POC sent a request to the police seeking their assistance in the applicant’s apprehension in order to prevent her from potentially behaving aggressively towards others. The request stated that the clinic was unable to ensure that the applicant would attend an examination. 16.  On the same day at around 10 a.m. three policemen visited the applicant’s flat and took her by force to a police station. Having spent four hours there she was transferred by ambulance to Psychiatric Hospital no. 13 (“the PH-13”). At 2.30 p.m. on arrival at the hospital, the applicant was informed that she had been brought there under the authorisation of the District Court. It is not clear whether she was allowed to read the court order. 17.  Later that day at 4.30 p.m. the applicant was examined by a medical counselling panel and diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia aggravated by paranoid syndrome. 18.  After her release from the hospital on 4 December 2006 the applicant requested the District Court to provide her with a copy of its decision of 18 August 2006 authorising her involuntary psychiatric examination. 19.  On 18 December 2006 the applicant appealed against that decision. She argued, inter alia, that the District Court had examined the case in her absence and that she had not been duly notified of the hearing; that the decision did not contain reasons and that it was based on a single psychiatric report which was accepted by the court without scrutiny. 20.  On 15 February 2007 the Moscow City Court after hearing the applicant and her representative dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the authorisation for an involuntary psychiatric examination. The court reasoned that the applicant’s presence at the District Court hearing was not required under Article 306 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Furthermore, it stated that the psychiatric report was well-founded because it contained details of the applicant’s actions giving grounds to presume the existence of a psychiatric disorder. 21.  The applicant applied for supervisory review, but to no avail. 22.  The applicant lodged a constitutional complaint about Article 306 of the Code of Civil Procedure. She alleged that this legal provision did not guarantee her a right to be present during the hearing of an application for involuntary psychiatric examination, since it specified that such applications shall be considered by “a single judge”. 23.  On 18 December 2007 the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation dismissed the applicant’s complaint. It argued that the term “single judge” for the purposes of Article 306 of the Code of Civil Procedure referred only to the composition of a court and did not preclude the parties’ participation in a hearing. 24.  On 1 December 2006 after the applicant was brought to the hospital and diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia aggravated by paranoid syndrome (see paragraphs 16-17 above), the medical panel of the PH-13 concluded that involuntary hospitalisation of the applicant was required under section 29 of the Psychiatric Assistance Act 1992 in order to prevent potentially significant damage to her health due to the deterioration of a psychiatric condition in the absence of psychiatric assistance. The application for involuntary hospitalisation was filed with the Lyubinskiy District Court of Moscow on the same day. 25.  On 4 December 2006 the applicant was discharged from PH-13 and advised to follow an outpatient treatment programme. Later that day the deputy head physician of PH-13 requested the Lyubinskiy District Court of Moscow to discontinue the proceedings concerning the applicant’s involuntary hospitalisation in the light of her discharge from the facility. The request was granted and the proceedings discontinued on 6 December 2006. 26.  The applicant did not initiate any proceedings for review of her hospitalisation.


5.  The applicant was born in 1931 and lives in Orel. 6.  On 21 October 2000 the applicant called an ambulance for her son, who was forty-two years old at the time. He had a fever and was complaining of chest pains. The paramedic examined him, and, assuming that he was suffering from intercostal neuralgia, administered a pain-killing injection. 7.  On 22 October 2000 Mr Korogodin was examined by a general practitioner, who believed him to be suffering from pyelonephritis and advised him to go to hospital. At the hospital Mr Korogodin underwent a medical examination including an ECG of his kidneys and liver and an X‑ray of his lungs. The doctors who examined him confirmed the diagnosis of intercostal neuralgia. Mr Korogodin was discharged from hospital. 8.  On 23 October 2000 the general practitioner examined Mr Korogodin again and diagnosed him with osteochondrosis. Subsequently, M., a doctor whom the applicant's family knew, examined Mr Korogodin, diagnosed him with pneumonia and urged him to go to hospital. Upon arrival at the Zheleznodorozhniy Hospital in Orel, Mr Korogodin was taken to an intensive care unit. 9.  On 27 October 2000 Mr Korogodin died in hospital. According to the autopsy, the cause of his death was cardiovascular deficiency provoked by pneumonia and purulent pleurisy. 10.  On 24 November 2000 and 10 January 2001 the applicant asked the local prosecutor's office to open a criminal investigation into the matter, alleging that the doctors' negligent failure to diagnose her son correctly at the onset of his disease had caused his death. 11.  In response to the applicant's complaints, the assistant prosecutor of the town of Orel, conducted an inquiry. Within its framework, the regional department of public health formed a commission which comprised specialists from the medical institutions where the applicant's son had undergone treatment. The commission questioned the doctors who had treated Mr Korogodin and concluded that the doctors had provided competent medical service. 12.  On 21 January 2001 the applicant submitted Mr Korogodin's medical history file and X-ray examination results. An additional inquiry ensued. On 24 January 2001 the applicant lodged another complaint with the prosecutor's office. 13.  On 6 March 2001 the assistant prosecutor refused to open a criminal investigation against the doctors for lack of corpus delicti. He noted that the death of the applicant's son had resulted from the rapid development of pneumonia coupled with weakened immunity. The assistant prosecutor referred to the findings made by the commission set up by the regional department of public health. The applicant appealed to a superior prosecutor. 14.  On 16 April 2001 the regional prosecutor in charge of the investigation quashed the decision of 6 March 2001 and ordered a criminal investigation into the matter. The prosecutor noted, in substance, that the commission had not been impartial. He referred to the commission's findings as inconclusive and contradictory. 15.  On 7 May 2001 the applicant was recognised as a victim of the crime under investigation. She was advised of her rights, including the right to submit a civil claim against the hospital. 16.  On 19 June 2001 the investigator commissioned a forensic medical expert report to determine whether Mr Korogodin had received proper medical treatment. 17.  On 16 July 2001 the investigator found it impossible to identify those responsible and suspended the investigation into the matter. On 4 February 2002 the district prosecutor declared the decision of 16 July unlawful and quashed it. 18.  On an unspecified date the forensic medical experts completed the report and submitted their findings to the prosecutor's office. The experts discerned no causal link between Mr Korogodin's death and the treatment administered. 19.  On 11 March 2002 the investigator discontinued the criminal proceedings for lack of corpus delicti. He based his findings on the medical expert report and statements made by the doctors who had treated Mr Korogodin. The applicant appealed to a superior prosecutor. 20.  On 29 March 2002 the town deputy prosecutor quashed the decision of 11 March 2002. The deputy prosecutor found that the experts had failed to examine the issue of whether the medical treatment that Mr Korogodin had undergone had been adequate. He referred to the experts' statement that a prompt diagnosis at an early stage of a severe disease could prevent a patient's death. He further noted that the medical expert, P., opined that the X-ray examination had not been properly conducted. Finally, the prosecutor indicated which steps the investigator should now take, including, but not limited to, examining the circumstances of the X-ray examination that Mr Korogodin had undergone. 21.  On 7 May 2002 the investigator yet again discontinued the criminal proceedings for lack of corpus delicti. 22.  On 19 June 2002 the regional prosecutor in charge of the investigation quashed the decision of 7 May 2002 owing to the investigator's failure to fully determine the circumstances of Mr Korogodin's death. In particular, the prosecutor noted that the investigator had failed to comply with the earlier instructions to examine the circumstances of the X-ray examination. The prosecutor opined that a new comprehensive medical expert evaluation was necessary to elucidate the circumstances of the case. 23.  On 7 August 2002 a new report was prepared by a forensic medical expert bureau in Kursk. The experts noted certain errors committed by the doctors prior to Mr Korogodin's committal to hospital. They further opined that he had received adequate treatment in hospital albeit that certain additional measures could have been taken by the hospital's personnel. 24.  On 14 January 2003 the investigator found it impossible to identify those responsible and suspended the investigation into the matter. 25.  On 21 April 2003 the inter-district prosecutor quashed the decision of 14 January 2003 as unsubstantiated. The investigation was resumed the next day. 26.  On 21 May 2003 the inter-district prosecutor discontinued the criminal proceedings for lack of corpus delicti. His findings were based on witnesses' testimonies, including those provided by the applicant and the doctors who had treated Mr Korogodin, and the results of the medical expert reports. The prosecutor concluded that Mr Korogodin had not recovered from previous illnesses which had negatively affected his immune system and the rapid development of pneumonia could not have been prevented in the circumstances. 27.  On 31 October 2003 the General Prosecutor's Office of Russia sent a letter to the Orel Regional Prosecutor noting that the investigation into Mr Korogodin's death had not been complete. It was further recommended that a new forensic medical evaluation be commissioned in order to reconcile the differences in the opinions contained in two earlier medical forensic expert reports. 28.  On 18 November 2003 the regional deputy prosecutor quashed the decision of 21 May 2003. 29.  On 24 December 2003 the investigator commissioned a new forensic medical expert report. 30.  On 25 April 2005 the Russian Centre for Forensic Medical Expert Evaluations of the Federal Agency for Public Health and Social Development completed a comprehensive forensic medical expert report. The experts noted that Mr Korogodin had been wrongly diagnosed prior to his committal to hospital. They opined, nevertheless, that the errors in question had not been the cause of his death. Mr Korogodin had died as a result of the “severity, aggressiveness and rapid development of the disease”. Lastly, they did not discern that the doctors and paramedics at the medical institutions providing treatment to Mr Korogodin had failed to duly perform their professional duties. 31.  On 6 July 2005 the investigator discontinued the criminal proceedings for lack of corpus delicti on the basis of the witnesses' testimonies and medical expert reports. The applicant appealed. 32.  On 2 December 2005 the General Prosecutor's Office of Russia allowed the applicant's complaint and ordered the local prosecutor's office to resume the investigation into the matter. 33.  On 12 December 2005 the regional deputy prosecutor found the investigation to be incomplete and quashed the decision of 6 July 2005. 34.  On 11 January 2006 the investigator discontinued the proceedings for lack of corpus delicti. The investigator based his findings on statements made by twelve witnesses, including the applicant, the doctors who had treated Mr Korogodin, their superiors and the medical experts, and on medical documents, including three forensic medical expert reports. The applicant appealed. 35.  Her complaints were dismissed by the Orel Regional Prosecutor's Office and the General Prosecutor's Office of Russia on 20 January and 11 October 2006 respectively. 36.  On 4 March 2004 the applicant brought a civil claim for damages against the medical institutions where her son had undergone medical treatment. She alleged, inter alia, that her son had died due to the doctors' failure to diagnose him correctly. 37.  On 21 September 2004 the court commissioned a forensic medical expert report. The report was completed on 28 June 2006. The experts concluded that there was no causal link between the deficiencies in the medical treatment Mr Korogodin had received and his death. They further opined that the medical treatment had not caused any harm to Mr Korogodin's condition. His death had resulted from the pathological development of pneumonia. 38.  On 17 April 2006 the Sovetskiy District Court of Orel dismissed the applicant's claims. The court found that the doctors' failure to diagnose Mr Korogodin correctly on 22 October 2000 and a delay in his committal to hospital had not had an adverse impact on his condition. The diagnostics methods and treatment employed by the doctors had been correct but could not have prevented Mr Korogodin's death. The court based its findings on the testimonies given by the applicant, the medical professionals involved in her son's treatment, the four forensic medical expert reports and the materials of the criminal investigation. 39.  On 14 June 2006 the Orel Regional Court upheld the judgment of 17 April 2006 on appeal. 40.  On 27 January 2004 the applicant sued the Orel Regional Prosecutor's Office for damage caused allegedly by the inadequate and lengthy investigation into her son's death. 41.  On 20 May 2004 the Sovetskiy District Court of Orel dismissed the applicant's claims. 42.  On 7 July 2004 the Orel Regional Court upheld the judgment of 20 May 2004 on appeal.


5.  The applicant was born in 1935 and lives in Maribor. 6.  On 27 February 1988 the applicant, who was a private entrepreneur, was hired by the institution called Dom upokojencev Danice Vogrinec, a retirement home (“the retirement home”), to paint its premises. 7.  On 20 February 1990 the applicant instituted civil proceedings in the Maribor Basic Court, Maribor Unit (Temeljno sodišče v Mariboru, Enota Maribor) against the retirement home seeking payment for the work he had carried out.
On 15 January 1991, after the court had held four hearings, the applicant's claim was upheld in part. 8.  On 6 March 1991 the applicant appealed to the Maribor Higher Court (Višje sodišče v Mariboru).
On 18 July 1991 the court allowed the applicant's appeal, annulled the first-instance court's judgment and remitted the case to the first-instance court for re-examination. 9.  On 15 October 1991, after a hearing was held, the first-instance court again upheld the applicant's claim in part. Upon the applicant's request a supplementary judgment was issued on 13 December 1991. 10.  The applicant and the retirement home appealed against both judgments to the Maribor Higher Court.
On 4 May 1993 the court allowed the appeals of the applicant and his adversary, annulled the first-instance court's judgment and remitted the case to the first-instance court for re-examination. 11.  Until 28 June 1994, the day the Convention entered into force with respect to Slovenia, the first-instance court held two hearings. Another hearing was scheduled but did not take place because the applicant's lawyer failed to appear before the court.
On 14 October 1994 the court held a hearing.
The hearing scheduled for 6 December 1994 was cancelled for an unknown reason.
On 1 January 1995 the Maribor Local Court (Okrajno sodišče v Mariboru) gained jurisdiction in the present case due to the reform of the Slovenian judicial system.
On 10 October 1995 the applicant requested that a date be set for a hearing.
On 16 October 1995 the applicant lodged a request for supervision against the judge presiding over the case, but apparently to no avail.
On 17 October 1995 the court declared the case out of its jurisdiction and transferred it to the Maribor District Court (Okrožno sodišče v Mariboru).
On 9 January 1996 the applicant lodged preliminary written submissions.
There was apparently a dispute between the Maribor Local Court and the Maribor District Court concerning the jurisdiction. In this respect, the Maribor Higher Court decided on 12 January 1996 that the case fell within the jurisdiction of the Maribor District Court.
On 16 May and 20 September 1996 the court held hearings.
On 6 and 11 November 1996 the applicant lodged preliminary written submissions.
On 22 November 1996 and 10 January 1997 the court held hearings.
The judgment of 11 February 1997, dismissing the applicant's claim, was served on the applicant on 14 February 1997. 12.  On 24 February 1997 the applicant appealed to the Maribor Higher Court and the following day he amended his appeal. The retirement home cross-appealed.
On 4 June 1998 the Maribor Higher Court allowed both appeals, annulled the first-instance court's judgment and remitted the case to the first-instance court for re-examination. The decision was served on the applicant on 27 June 1998. 13.  On 1 October 1998 the Maribor District Court held a hearing.
On 10 November 1998 the applicant lodged preliminary written submissions.
The hearing scheduled for 19 November 1998 was cancelled for an unknown reason.
On 5 February, 25 March, 6 May and 26 August 1999 the court held hearings. At the last hearing the court upheld the applicant's request to appoint an expert in construction engineering. The applicant paid the required deposit for the costs of the expert on 3 September 1999.
On 12 January 2000 the court appointed an expert in construction engineering to determine the value of the applicant's work. The expert opinion was delivered on 29 March 2000.
On 16 February 2000 the applicant filed a rush notice.
On 12 May, 7 September and 10 November 2000 the court held hearings.
At the last hearing the court delivered an oral judgment, upholding in part the applicant's claim. On 20 November 2000 the parties to the proceedings informed the court that they would appeal against this judgment, once they receive a written copy.
In a letter of 5 March 2001 the applicant requested the court not to deliver a written judgment yet, since he attempted to settle the case with the retirement home. On 9 April 2001 the latter informed the court that a friendly settlement was in progress.
On 16 May 2001 the applicant requested the court to issue a written judgment. The written judgment was served on the applicant on 28 May 2001. 14.  On 4 June 2001 the applicant appealed. He amended his appeal on 19 July 2001.
On 8 April and 22 May 2002 the applicant filed rush notices.
On 30 May 2002 the Maribor Higher Court allowed the appeal in part and amended the judgment in the part referring to costs and expenses. The decision was served on the applicant at an undetermined time, but after 5 June 2006. The applicant did not appeal. 15.  On 24 July 2002 the applicant asked the Public Prosecutor's Office to lodge a request for protection of legality (zahteva za varstvo zakonitosti) with regard to his case. The request was dismissed on 4 September 2002. 16.  On 20 January 2003 the applicant lodged a request for reopening of proceedings with the Maribor District Court. On 12 June 2003 the request was rejected. The decision was served on the applicant on 18 June 2003. 17.  On 23 June 2003 the applicant appealed to the Maribor Higher Court, which dismissed his appeal on 1 December 2003. 18.  On 12 December 2004 the applicant requested a leave for an appeal on points of law, which the Maribor District Court rejected on 21 January 2004 as not allowed. 19.  On 27 January 2005 the applicant appealed to the Maribor Higher Court against this decision.
On 16 December 2004 the court dismissed the appeal. 20.  On 5 January 2005 the applicant lodged submissions which were considered as an appeal on points of law and the case was transferred to the Supreme Court on 18 April 2005.
The proceedings are still pending.


5.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Timişoara. 6.  In the evening of 12 May 2001, after 9 p.m., seven masked police officers, who were members of the special intervention forces, stopped a car in which the applicant was a passenger. The police were searching for a group of suspected criminals. 7.  According to the applicant, the police violently dragged the five people out of the car, held them on the ground and handcuffed them. He also claimed that one of the masked police officers hit him with his fist, from the back, on the left side of his thorax. At that point, he recognised his aggressor as being B.F., with whom he had had an altercation two years earlier. 8.  The police realised the persons they had stopped were not the suspects they were looking for and they released them soon after they arrived at the police headquarters. The applicant claimed that B.F. had said: “We didn’t have you down for today, that’s just how it turned out. The tables have turned, loser” (“nu erai programat pentru astăzi, dar aşa s-a nimerit; vezi, măi fraiere, ca s-a întors roata?”).
While in custody, the applicant complained of stomach pains. 9.  At 1.05 a.m. the next day the applicant went to hospital complaining of stomach pains. The doctor on duty noted a post-traumatic diffused swelling in the abdominal area, but considered that no surgical intervention was required at that time. 10.  As his condition deteriorated, on 15 May 2001 at 0.50 a.m. he returned to the hospital. He was immediately operated on for a ruptured spleen and the organ was removed. He remained in hospital until 22 May 2001.
On 23 May 2001 the forensic doctor examined the applicant and issued a report stating that he had suffered a ruptured spleen. He estimated that the applicant needed 25 days to recover. He considered that the injury had posed a danger to the applicant’s life, that it could have dated from 12 May and possibly resulted from the applicant having been hit with a hard object. 11.   The applicant lodged a criminal complaint against B.F., whom he accused of having seriously endangered his physical integrity. He sought damages. 12.  The Military Prosecutor’s Office of the Timişoara Military Court started an investigation. It took evidence from the applicant, B.F. and the other persons who had been present on 12 May 2001. Two passengers from the car and one police officer stated that they had heard B.F. saying to the applicant: “We didn’t have you down for today, that’s just how it turned out”. The same police officer said that he had also heard B.F. saying: “The tables have turned, loser”. One of the passengers said that he had seen B.F. hit the applicant and two other passengers said they had heard the applicant shouting with pain. The other police officers denied that they had seen B.F. hit the applicant. 13.  On 17 May 2002 the Timişoara Forensic Institute, consulted by the prosecutor, confirmed that the ruptured spleen could have been caused by a blow to the abdomen. 14.  On 24 September 2002 the Prosecutor’s Office committed B.F. for trial on charges of seriously endangering the applicant’s physical integrity and of abusive behaviour. 15.  The applicant joined the proceedings as a civil party. 16.  On 30 October 2002 the Timişoara Military Court transferred the case to the Timiş County Court, in accordance with Law on the demilitarisation of the police.
The County Court heard statements from the applicant and five witnesses, of whom three were police officers. Several documents were adduced as evidence in the case. 17.  On 28 May 2003 the County Court considered that the evidence in the file proved that the attack had taken place and that there had been a causal link between the attack and the applicant’s health problems. It therefore found B.F. guilty as charged and sentenced him to two years and six months’ imprisonment. B.F. was also ordered to pay the applicant 100,000,000 Romanian lei for non-pecuniary damage. 18.  B.F. appealed against the County Court’s decision. 19.  On 20 October 2003 the Timişoara Court of Appeal reversed the decision on the ground that there was not enough evidence in the file to prove that B.F. had injured the applicant or to establish the cause of the applicant’s injury.
The court noted that the incident had occurred in circumstances which made it impossible for the applicant to recognise his alleged attacker: it had happened very quickly, visibility had been bad and the police officers had been wearing intervention suits and masks. It considered that the applicant could have injured himself when he had been pulled out of the car – and B.F. had not taken part in that operation – or even before the incident with the police. It considered that the evidence in the file indicated that B.F. had been the driver of one of the two police cars involved in the incident and that, according to his remit, he was responsible for ensuring his colleagues’ protection; in that capacity he had not been involved in removing the applicant and the others from their car.
The court also considered that the investigation had not been properly conducted, that the prosecutor had failed to identify other witnesses, notably passers-by who had been reported as being in the area where the incident had taken place. 20.  The applicant appealed on points of law. In a final decision of 24 March 2004 the High Court of Cassation and Justice, sitting in a three‑judge panel, quashed the Court of Appeal’s decision and upheld the County Court’s judgment.
It considered that the witness testimonies, including the one given by a police officer, concurred to prove B.F.’s guilt. The High Court concluded that B.F. had hit the applicant in revenge for their previous dispute and that nothing in the events of 12 May 2001 had justified such a violent attack. 21.  B.F. sought the Procurator’s General intervention to have the final decision annulled (recurs în anulare). The Procurator General lodged the extraordinary appeal sought by B.F., as he considered that the High Court and the County Court had committed serious errors in assessing the evidence. 22.  On 15 November 2004 the High Court, in a nine-judge bench, examined the extraordinary appeal, quashed the final decision and returned the case to the Prosecutor’s Office of the Timiş County Court to continue the investigation.
The High Court noted that B.F.’s conviction was based mostly on the passengers’ statements, to the detriment of the police’s version of the incident which had shown that there had been no physical contact between B.F. and the applicant. It considered that the prosecutor should have pursued the investigation further in order to establish beyond doubt who had injured the applicant. The prosecutor should have also questioned the passers-by, who could have provided an unbiased account of the incident.
Its decision was final. 23.  The prosecutor started a new investigation. He re-examined the events of 12 May, took statements from and organised confrontations between the applicant and the police officers who had participated in the incident, including B.F. They all maintained their previous positions. B.F. took a polygraph test, the result of which was: absence of simulated behaviour. The applicant refused to take the test, arguing that it was not reliable evidence. 24.  At the prosecutor’s request, the Timişoara Forensic Institute re‑examined the medical evidence. On 27 July 2005 it concluded that there had been a causal link between the incident of 12 May and the applicant’s ruptured spleen. However, the expert report did not exclude the existence of other traumas that could have caused the spleen to rupture. 25.  On 19 October 2005 the Prosecutor’s Office decided to end the investigation against B.F. and continue to try identifying the real attacker. It considered that the evidence gathered was not sufficiently strong to reverse the presumption of innocence in B.F.’s favour. It noted, in particular, the absence of direct proof of a violent attack, the applicant’s hesitations during the investigation, as well as the conclusion of the expert medical report which did not exclude the existence of other traumas that could have caused the spleen to rupture. 26.  The applicant complained against the prosecutor’s decision. On 28 November 2005 the chief prosecutor dismissed his objection. 27.  The applicant further complained before the Timiş County Court. He claimed that the evidence against B.F., including the conclusions of the medical report, had been ignored or misinterpreted and that the prosecutor had overlooked the fact that it was difficult to accurately recall what had happened four years after the incident, which explained his hesitations. He also pointed out that the polygraph test was not recognised as evidence by the Code of Criminal Procedure and that he had refused that test because it would have been carried out by B.F.’s colleagues.
On 5 June 2006 the applicant reiterated those arguments before the County Court. 28.  On 25 September 2006 the County Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint. It considered that there was no evidence in the file to support the allegations of guilt. The court did not reply to the applicant’s arguments. 29.  The applicant appealed against the County Court’s decision, reiterating the evidence in the file that supported his version of events. He also complained that he had not been re-examined by the Forensic Institute.
On 5 March 2007 the Timişoara Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. It considered that the doubts as to B.F.’s guilt justified the prosecutor’s decision and that B.F. enjoyed the presumption of innocence. The Court of Appeal did not give specific responses to the applicant’s arguments.


5.  The applicant was born in 1937. 6.  He was the owner of a flat in Livorno, which he had let to M.S. 7.  In a registered letter of 4 March 1983, the applicant informed the tenant that he intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1983 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date. 8.  On 9 October 1984, he served a notice to quit on the tenant, but he refused to leave. 9.  In a writ served on the tenant on 7 January 1986, the applicant reiterated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Livorno Magistrate. 10.  By a decision of 20 January 1986, which was made enforceable on 21 January 1986, the Livorno Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 20 December 1986. 11.  On 2 April 1987 the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 12.  On 21 April 1987 he served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 24 May 1987. 13.  Between 24 May 1987 and 27 November 1998 the bailiff made eighteen attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as, the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 14.  On 15 December 1998, the applicant recovered possession of the flat.


5.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Zabrze. 6.  From 2000 until 2004 the applicant ran a business, a shoe shop, with his wife. 7.  In October 2004 he started serving a prison sentence. 8.  On 4 September 2006 he lodged a civil action against his wife with the Łuków District Court, claiming that she should transfer the lease of the shop to him, together with the merchandise which had been left there at the time of his arrest. He also claimed compensation for damage which he had allegedly sustained as a result of her having unlawfully taken over the business after his arrest, in the amount of 2,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) per month since October 2004. 9.  He further requested exemption from court fees. In the statement of claim he informed the court that his opportunity to represent himself properly had been curtailed by the fact that he was serving a prison sentence. 10.  The proceedings were conducted under the procedural provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure pertaining to commercial disputes, providing, in particular, for certain restrictions as regards time-limits for proposing evidence to be examined by the first-instance court (prekluzja dowodowa). 11.  On 20 December 2006 the Lublin Regional Court exempted the applicant from the obligation to pay court fees in the amount of PLN 5,850 but maintained his obligation to pay other court fees as they arose in the future. The court noted that the applicant was poor and did not have any savings which would secure his procedural interests in the proceedings. 12.  On 22 February 2007 the applicant requested that witness C.O., the owner of the shop, be heard by the court to testify on the lease. 13.  On 7 May 2007 the court issued a decision dismissing the applicant’s request for the witness C.O. to be heard. The court reiterated that according to Article 47912 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure the applicant’s request had to be refused, as he had failed to submit it with his statement of claim. The court further noted that the requested evidence was of no importance for the case. The decision was sent to the applicant. It was served on him on 30 May 2007. 14.  A date for the hearing was scheduled for 11 June 2007. 15.  By a letter of 31 May 2007 the applicant requested the court to arrange for him to be brought to the hearing from Biała Podlaska Prison, where he was detained at that time. He also reiterated that witness C.O. should be questioned and requested that K.M. and A.M. also be heard by the court as witnesses.  The applicant failed to submit copies of his request to the court as required by Article 128 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (see paragraph 28 below). 16.  On 11 June 2007 the court requested the applicant to complete his request by submitting copies of it with a view to having them served on the defendant. The applicant failed to comply with the court’s request. 17.  A hearing in the case was held on the same day. It lasted five minutes. The defendant stated only that she did not accept the applicant’s claim. The applicant was neither present nor represented. 18.  The court gave a judgment on 25 June 2007. It dismissed the applicant’s claim, finding no grounds on which to accept that he had suffered any damage or that the defendant had been acting unlawfully. 19.  In the written reasons for that judgment the court referred to Article 47912 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (see paragraph 27 below) and held that the applicant’s request for C.O. to be heard as a witness had been submitted too late. It should have been submitted with the statement of claim. The court did not refer to the applicant’s request to be brought to the hearing held on 11 June 2007. 20.  The applicant appealed. He argued that the first-instance court had assessed the evidence wrongly and reached untenable conclusions. He further submitted that he was serving a prison sentence and that it was therefore very difficult for him to effectively defend his interests in the proceedings. He requested exemption from all court fees and for a legal‑aid lawyer to be assigned to represent him before the appellate court. 21.  By a decision of 1 October 2007 the Lublin Regional Court refused to grant legal aid to the applicant, finding that he was able to present his own case to the court. The court was of the view that the fact that his claim had been dismissed was not tantamount to a finding that the applicant was unable to argue his case. The court exempted him from the obligation to pay court fees in the amount of PLN 6,750 and dismissed the remainder of his request. It noted that the applicant remained in prison and that his financial situation had not improved since the previous decision on court fees had been given (see paragraph 10 above). 22.  The applicant appealed against this decision in so far as it related to the refusal of legal aid. He submitted that the fact that he was relatively articulate did not suffice for a finding that he was able to prepare and present legal arguments to the appellate court in a sufficiently competent manner. He reiterated that he was serving a prison sentence, which made it difficult for him to act effectively in defence of his interests in the proceedings. 23.  On 30 October 2007 the Lublin Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal against the refusal to grant legal aid, essentially sharing the views of the first‑instance court. It further noted that the fact that the applicant was serving a prison sentence did not of itself justify assigning a lawyer to the case, because it was not necessary for the applicant to appear in person before the court. 24.  On 18 December 2007 the Lublin Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the first-instance judgment, essentially sharing the conclusions of the first‑instance court. The court accepted that the case concerned a commercial dispute and was therefore governed by the more strict regulations of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the written grounds for the judgment the court relied on the parties’ statements of claims and on the defendant’s statements made before the court. 25.  This judgment was served on the applicant on 29 January 2008. 26.  On 6 February 2008 the Lublin Court of Appeal granted the applicant legal aid for the purposes of preparing a cassation appeal. On 11 February 2008 the Lublin Bar Association assigned M. K. to the case. 27.  By a written legal opinion dated 25 February 2008 the lawyer informed the applicant that he was refusing to prepare a cassation appeal in the case. He was of the view that there were no legal grounds on which such an appeal could be prepared. This opinion was served on the applicant shortly afterwards.