5.  The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Diyarbakır. 6.  In 1994 criminal proceedings were brought against the applicant before the Diyarbakır State Security Court (“the trial court”) for the offence of membership of an illegal organisation[1]. On 15 April 1999 he was acquitted of the charges. When acquitting him, the trial court considered that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the applicant was a member of the illegal organisation. It found, however, that there was sufficient evidence to show that he had aided and abetted the organisation. Nevertheless, considering that the applicant had been coerced to aid and abet the organisation by its members, the trial court concluded that the applicant did not have the requisite mens rea and acquitted him. 7.  Before the appeal lodged by the prosecutor against the applicant's acquittal was examined by the Court of Cassation, the statute of limitations for the offence in question had been reached. Accordingly, on 1 February 2000 the Court of Cassation discontinued the criminal proceedings against the applicant. 8.  On 2 June 2000 the applicant was arrested once more and was examined by a doctor before he was placed in police custody in Diyarbakır. According to the report of the medical examination, there were no injuries on the applicant's body. 9.  According to the applicant, during his time in police custody he was subjected to ill-treatment. 10.  On 5 June 2000 police officers took the applicant to a café and two shops in the nearby town of Ergani, which had been bombed in 1993. According to the statements drawn up pertaining to those visits, the applicant told the police officers that he had carried out the bombings with the assistance of a number of other persons. 11.  In a statement taken from the applicant in police custody the same day, the applicant was reported as having detailed his activities within the PKK. 12.  On 6 June 2000 the applicant was released from police custody and was brought before a prosecutor and then before a judge, who questioned him further. The applicant denied the statements taken from him by police officers the previous day, and added that he had not been involved in any bombing. The applicant told the judge that he had signed the statements in police custody because he had thought that he would be ill-treated by the police officers if he refused to sign them. He added that in 1993 he had collected money by making threats on behalf of the PKK, taken part in demonstrations and distributed leaflets in support of that organisation, but that he had already been tried and spent time in prison for those activities (see paragraphs 6-7 above). The judge remanded the applicant in custody pending the introduction of criminal proceedings against him. The same day the applicant was examined by a doctor, who reported that there were no injuries on the applicant's body. 13.  When questioned by the police officers and subsequently by the prosecutor and the judge, the applicant was not represented by a lawyer. 14.  On 1 August 2000 the prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court filed an indictment with that court, accusing the applicant of activities carried out for the purpose of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory. 15.  In the proceedings before the trial court the applicant was represented by a lawyer. During the trial the applicant repeatedly denied his police custody statements and told the trial court that the statements had been taken from him under “intense pressure”. 16.  On 6 November 2001 the trial court found the applicant guilty of offences of membership of an illegal organisation and planting explosives. He was sentenced to seventeen years, four months and ten days' imprisonment. In convicting the applicant the trial court relied on the statements taken from him in police custody (see paragraph 11 above). In response to the applicant's lawyer's submissions that the applicant was being tried twice for the same offence, the trial court stated in its judgment that the previous trial had not concerned the bombing incidents. 17.  On 13 November 2001 the applicant appealed against his conviction and argued, inter alia, that he had been subjected to ill-treatment in police custody and that he had been forced to sign a number of documents. 18.  In his written observations submitted to the Court of Cassation the prosecutor referred to the applicant's allegations of ill-treatment and drew the Court of Cassation's attention to the trial court's failure to take into account a video recording which had apparently been made at the time when the police officers took the applicant to the café. The prosecutor's observations were not communicated to the applicant. 19.  As requested by the applicant, the Court of Cassation held a hearing before it rendered its decision on the appeal. Nevertheless, neither the applicant nor his lawyer attended the hearing. On 20 June 2002 the Court of Cassation rejected the appeal and upheld the applicant's conviction. The decision was deposited with the registry of the trial court on 16 December 2002.


5.  The first and second applicants were born in 1969, and the third and fourth applicants in 1986 and 1999 respectively. They live in Geneva. 6.  The first and second applicants married on 25 December 1988 in Ecuador and brought up the third and fourth applicants together. The third applicant is the second applicant’s daughter and the first applicant’s stepdaughter; the fourth applicant is the first and second applicants’ daughter. 7.  Between 1995 and 1999 the applicants sought asylum in Switzerland on three occasions. Each time their applications were rejected they returned to Ecuador. 8.   On 1 January 2002 the applicants, having re-entered Swiss territory, filed a fresh request for asylum. The first and second applicants claimed that they had been tortured and had received death threats from the Ecuadorian police after the first applicant had attended two political demonstrations in Quito. 9.  On 4 February 2002 the Swiss Federal Office for Refugees (“the Refugee Office”) rejected the applicants’ request. 10.  On 1 March 2005 the first applicant was convicted of selling stolen goods and was given a three-month suspended prison sentence and fined 2,000 francs (CHF). On 15 October 2007 he was convicted of driving without a valid licence and sentenced to 80 hours of community service. On 9 April 2008 he was convicted of attempting to steal perfumes in a shopping centre and was sentenced to 120 hours of community service. On 14 April 2009 he was convicted of buying stolen goods and given a nine‑month suspended sentence and fined 1,000 CHF. The suspension of his previous sentence having been revoked, he served this sentence as from December 2009. 11.  On 24 October 2007 the Federal Administrative Court quashed the decision of 4 February 2002 and ordered the Refugee Office to review the applicants’ request. It considered that the information contained in medical records regarding the first applicant’s state of mental health drawn up in Ecuador in 2001 might be a reason to grant refugee status to the applicants. According to medical certificates, the first applicant suffered from post‑traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression and schizoaffective disorder. He had been hospitalised on several occasions after attempting to commit suicide. 12.  In May 2009 the first and the second applicants separated. Their young daughter, the fourth applicant, stayed with the second applicant, who obtained full parental authority, while the first applicant was granted extended access, including the right to see her every Wednesday, every second weekend and for half of the school holidays. 13.  On 27 October 2009 the Refugee Office granted the third applicant a residence permit on humanitarian grounds. She then withdrew her asylum request and applied for Swiss citizenship, which was granted on 17 September 2012. 14.  On 20 March 2012 the Refugee Office, following a fresh examination of the facts, rejected the remaining applicants’ request for asylum. On 17 April 2012 they lodged an administrative appeal, arguing, inter alia, that they continued to have a close family relationship even after the first two applicants had separated. 15.  On 7 September 2012 the Federal Administrative Court partially reversed the Refugee Office’s decision. The court specified, at the outset, that the decisions given by the Refugee Office could be contested before the Federal Administrative Court, whose decision was final. 16.  The court also observed that the first and second applicants had separated and ceased living together, and that the fourth applicant usually lived with her mother. Accordingly, the family unit had ceased to exist and the principles established under Article 8 of the Convention no longer applied. As a consequence, each applicant’s residence rights had to be examined separately. The court considered that this approach was even more justified in view of the first applicant’s behaviour and his criminal record. 17.  The court further observed that the fourth applicant was then thirteen years old and had from the age of two grown up in Switzerland, where she had attended school and was completely integrated. It appeared that she did not have any practical knowledge of her country of origin, having never returned after her arrival in Switzerland, and that she hardly spoke Spanish, Ecuador’s main language. Under these circumstances, the court considered that sending her back would amount to an uprooting of excessive rigidity (un déracinement d’une rigueur excessive) and granted her and her mother temporary residence (admission provisoire) in Switzerland for a further year, renewable on a yearly basis thereafter. 18.  Regarding the first applicant, the Federal Administrative Court considered his expulsion to be lawful. The court observed, at the outset, that he had not established that he would be at any risk on his return to Ecuador. The court further considered that his state of health gave reason for concern, since he suffered from PTSD and had made several suicide attempts. However, the court observed that Ecuador had a health system which, even if it could not be compared to the Swiss system, was nevertheless reliable. The court considered that the applicant would have access to specialist care in the main urban centres of the country. 19.  The court further noted that the first applicant’s attending doctors considered that his return to Ecuador was in itself likely to jeopardise his health, irrespective of the medical treatment he received. Furthermore, he would be confronted with serious social problems. However, the Federal Administrative Court considered that, under the pertinent legislation, the applicant’s criminal record excluded him from being granted temporary residence. The court noted in this context that the applicant had, over a longer period of time, acquired a total of 1465 stolen goods (primarily gold jewellery) deriving from various burglaries.


4.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Chelyabinsk. 5.  The applicant receives disability allowance following health damage in his previous work in the mining industry. 6.  On 8 September 1999 the applicant seized the Vorkuta Town Court of the Komi Republic (“the Town Court”) with a claim against the local branch of the Social Security Fund of Russia alleging incorrect calculation of his disability allowance and seeking the unpaid damages. On the same day the Town Court scheduled the first hearing for 8 September 2000. 7.  The hearing scheduled for 8 September 2000 did not take place following the respondent’s representative’s default in appearance. The court adjourned the next hearing of 20 October 2000 after granting the respondent’s motion for obtainment of certain archive documents. 8.  On 19 July 2001 the applicant’s representative motioned for adjournment of examination of the case to 16 September 2001 due to her vacation. 9.  At the hearing of 18 September 2001 the applicant’s representative specified the claims and requested that the court join the Ministry of Energy of Russia to the proceedings as a co-respondent. The request was granted by the court, and the hearing was adjourned. 10.  The hearing scheduled for 5 November 2001 did not take place due to the judge’s illness. 11.  By letter of 28 December 2001 the applicant requested that the case be examined in his absence, with participation of his representative. 12.  On 21 February 2002 the applicant’s representative renounced the claims against the Ministry of Energy. 13.  The hearing scheduled for 22 February 2002 did not take place as the parties did not show. The applicant’s representative requested that the court examine the case in her absence as she was involved in different proceedings. 14.  On 11 April 2002 the applicant again motioned for examination of the claims in his absence. 15.  The court postponed the hearing of 16 April 2002 at its own initiative to obtain the applicant’s trade union membership records. 16.  On 11 May 2002 the applicant’s representative specified the claims in writing. At this date the hearing did not take place due to the respondent’s default in appearance. 17.  On 15 May 2002 both the respondent and the applicant’s representative motioned for examination of the case in their absence. The applicant’s claims were once again specified, and the claims against the Ministry of Energy were resumed. 18.  On 16 May 2002 the court ordered an expert examination and adjourned the proceedings. 19.  On 29 October 2002 the expert examination was completed. The next hearing was scheduled for 24 December 2002. 20.  On 23 and 24 December 2002, respectively, the applicant’s representative and the respondent motioned for examination of the claims in their absence. The former once again specified the claims. 21.  On 8 January 2003 the Town Court gave a judgment awarding the applicant 621,999 Russian roubles (RUB) in damages and legal expenses, and RUB 34,350 as monthly payments with further indexation in accordance with the minimum wage. Both parties appealed. 22.  On 31 March 2003 the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic acting as the appeal court remitted the case to the first instance for clarification of the judgment in the calculation part. On 22 May 2003 the trial court clarified the judgment as ordered. 23.  The appeal hearing of 30 June 2003 was adjourned to obtain the documents referred to in the judgment, which were not included in the case-file. 24.  On 17 July 2003 the appeal court again remitted the case to the first instance for correction of an arithmetical error made in the judgment. The error was corrected on 1 September 2003. 25.  On 4 December 2003 the Supreme Court of the Komi Republic upheld the judgment of 8 January 2003 on appeal.


4.  The applicant was born in 1973. He is currently serving a prison sentence in Vinnytsya. 5.  On 12 January 2001 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of several counts of aggravated murder and robbery. In the course of his arrest force was used against the applicant. 6.  Subsequently, the applicant was taken to a police station, where he was allegedly tortured by unspecified police officers with the aim of extracting a confession of his having committed the crimes of which he was suspected. According to the applicant, during such ill-treatment, which continued for several days thereafter, he received an eye injury which eventually resulted in him suffering a complete loss of eyesight. 7.  Later on the same day he was taken to a temporary detention centre (ізолятор тимчасового тримання – “the ITT”) in Kharkiv. 8.  The next day the applicant was taken to the Kharkiv Emergency Hospital, where he was examined by a trauma specialist, a surgeon and a neurosurgeon. The applicant’s skull was x-rayed and samples of his blood and urine were taken. He was diagnosed with bruising to the chest, lumbar area, kidneys, and soft tissues on the face and the back of his head. The doctors prescribed a further examination of the applicant by an urologist and outpatient supervision by a neurologist. 9.  On 15 January 2001 a prosecutor from the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor’s Office questioned the applicant, in the presence of a lawyer appointed to assist him by the authorities, with a view to taking a decision concerning the applicant’s continued detention. The prosecutor noted a haematoma on the applicant’s face next to his right eye. According to the prosecutor’s report to his superior of the same date, the applicant explained that he had received the injury during his arrest, that he had not been ill‑treated by the police after his arrest and that he had voluntarily given his confession. 10.  On 16 January 2001 the prosecutor was instructed by his superior to carry out an inquiry in order to take a decision in accordance with Article 97 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 45 below). 11.  On the same date several police officers gave written explanations concerning the applicant’s arrest, in which they stated that the applicant had resisted arrest by “applying unarmed combat techniques and trying to escape”. According to them, “measures of physical restraint and special means [of restraint], namely handcuffs” had been used against the applicant and he had been taken to the police station. 12.  On 19 January 2001 the applicant was taken by the police to see a medical expert. The expert examined the applicant and noted that he displayed bleeding into the eyeball, haematomas and abrasions on the left side of his chest, arms and legs, some of which were three to four days old and others were nine to eleven days old. The expert noted that many of the injuries, including the bleeding into the applicant’s eyeball, had been caused by blunt solid objects. According to the expert’s notes, during the examination the applicant stated that some of his injuries had been caused by him falling down the stairs, that his vision had been deteriorating since he was young, and that he had no complaints about the authorities’ actions. The expert concluded that the injuries were of a minor character and that they had not lead to a deterioration of the applicant’s health. 13.  The applicant remained in police custody until 23 January 2001. On that date he was placed in an investigative detention unit (слідчий ізолятор – “SIZO”) in Kharkiv. Upon his arrival at Kharkiv SIZO, the applicant was examined by a paramedic, who noted several bruises on the left shoulder, chest, arm and knee. The applicant did not receive any treatment for his injuries in Kharkiv SIZO. 14.  According to the applicant, on 26 January 2001 he complained to the same prosecutor from the Kharkiv Regional Prosecutor’s Office that had previously questioned him that he had been tortured by the police after his arrest. 15.  On the same date the prosecutor issued a decision rejecting the applicant’s complaints and informed the applicant of it. The relevant parts of the decision read as follows:
“...On 15 January 2001 A. V. Kaverzin was questioned at the regional prosecutor’s office in the course of consideration of the question of ... his placement in Kharkiv [SIZO] No. 27. During his questioning with the participation of [his] defence lawyer, A. V. Kaverzin explained that he had sustained the injuries in the course of his arrest, that he did not have any complaints against the police, [and] that he had made his first statements freely, without psychological or physical pressure on the part of the police officers.
The [police] officers ... who had taken part in the arrest of A. V. Kaverzin [were questioned and] explained that they had been aware that A. V. Kaverzin had used firearms during his attempted arrest by the police in the Khmelnytsk Region, as a result of which two police officers had died. Because of that [fact] they had been particularly cautious and when A. V. Kaverzin had attempted to resist [arrest] ... there had been measures of physical restraint and special means [of restraint], namely handcuffs, applied to him.
According to the records of the forensic examination ... dated 19 January 2001, [the following injuries on the body and face of A. V. Kaverzin] had been discovered: bleeding into the eyeball; a haematoma on the left side of the chest; numerous abrasions on the lower limbs that had been caused by blunt solid objects; abrasions and scratches on the wrists that had been caused by blunt solid objects, which could have been the handcuffs; numerous indurations of various parts of the skin with small wounds caused by insects ... the injuries could have been caused to A. V. Kaverzin in the circumstances described by [both] the police officers and A. V. Kaverzin himself. Therefore, there are no elements of a crime in the actions of the police officers.
On the basis of the foregoing, pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 6 of [the Code of Criminal Procedure] of Ukraine [the prosecutor].
Decided: 1.  To refuse the opening of a criminal case against [the police] officers who took part in the arrest of ... A. V. Kaverzin on the ground there were no elements of a crime in their actions...” 16.  According to the applicant, he was not given a copy of that decision and its details were not explained to him. 17.  The decision was not challenged before the courts under the procedure envisaged by Article 236-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 18.  On 25 February 2001 the applicant was transferred to Khmelnytsk SIZO. On that date he was examined by a doctor, who noted that the applicant suffered from loss of eyesight as a result of a head injury in January 2001 and had several bruises on his body. 19.  On 24 April 2001 the applicant was examined by a medical expert, who noted that the applicant had suffered a head injury and was completely blind. 20.  During his detention in Khmelnytsk SIZO the applicant was examined by doctors and received specialist ophthalmological treatment in September and October 2001 and in August, September and November 2002. On several occasions he was taken to public hospitals for medical examination. The doctors concluded that the applicant did not require eye surgery and could receive the necessary medical treatment in the SIZO. 21.  On 23 September 2002, on the order of the trial court, a medical panel established that the applicant had become completely blind and, accordingly, suffered from the highest officially recognised degree of disability. The applicant was diagnosed with corneal cicatrix and leucoma, a cataract of the right eye resulting from a penetrating wound, and uveitis in the left eye. The doctors concluded that the applicant was in need of outside assistance to manage aspects of daily life. 22.  On 12 August 2003 the applicant was placed in Dnipropetrovsk Colony to serve his sentence. 23.  During his detention in Dnipropetrovsk Colony the applicant was examined by doctors, including an ophthalmologist, at least once every year. In 2004 he was prescribed eye surgery at a specialised hospital. According to the Government, the applicant did not avail himself of the possibility to undergo the surgery pursuant to paragraph 5 Article 116 of the Code on the Execution of Sentences (see paragraph 48 below). 24.  Subsequently, the applicant was prescribed anti-relapse treatment in view of his blindness, which mainly included administering medication. On several occasions the applicant refused to be examined by doctors and in January and February 2006 he refused to be transferred to a hospital within Vinnytsya Colony to receive specialised ophthalmological treatment. 25.  In February 2004 the administration of Dnipropetrovsk Colony did not allow the applicant’s mother to supply him with unspecified medication which he allegedly needed. The authorities explained that the applicant would be given the necessary medication if his doctors so decided. In March 2004 the authorities informed the applicant’s mother that her request for the applicant’s transfer to a specialised prison for persons suffering from the highest degree of disability could not be met as no such a prison existed. The applicant did not provide further details in that respect. 26.  The applicant alleged that in spite of his blindness he had been handcuffed when leaving his cell, including during daily walks and family visits, and had been followed by several wardens with a dog. 27.  He also stated that in Dnipropetrovsk Colony he had been unlawfully refused two-hour daily walks to which he had allegedly been entitled in view of his disability; that his cell had lacked ventilation; and that he had not been allowed to make phone calls. He provided no further details in this respect. 28.  According to the applicant, in April 2004 the prison authorities delayed, for about a month, the dispatch of one of his letters. 29.  By a letter of 16 December 2004 addressed to the applicant’s mother, the Head of the Dnipropetrovsk Penitentiary Service informed her that:
“...
During [daily] walks [the applicant] has been handcuffed with his hands behind his back, as are all other life-sentenced prisoners, in accordance with paragraph 25 of the Internal Regulations of the Penitentiary Institutions.
...
Once the area for [daily] walks is adapted to the requirements of the Internal Regulations ... as amended on 9 November 2004, life-sentenced prisoners will be allowed to stay there without handcuffs.
In accordance with Article 151 of the Code on Execution of Sentences and section 23 of the Internal Regulations of the Penitentiary Institutions, prisoners sentenced for life are entitled to one-hour daily walks.
Prisoners suffering from tuberculosis ... are entitled to two-hour daily walks.
[Mr Kaverzin] does not suffer from tuberculosis, he is being detained under the ordinary regulations, and he is being [taken for] one-hour daily walks.
All [of Mr Kaverzin’s] correspondence is dispatched in accordance with Article 113 of the Code on the Execution of Sentences; it has not been hindered.” 30.  By a letter of 2 March 2005, the Governor of Dnipropetrovsk Colony informed the applicant’s mother that in 2005 one of the dogs accompanying the prison guards had bit the applicant because of his own recklessness. It was also stated that handcuffs were not being applied during daily walks. 31.  The two above-mentioned letters contained a statement that the actions of the penitentiary authorities could be challenged before a prosecutor. 32.  On 3 December 2008 the applicant was moved to Vinnytsya Colony, where he is currently serving his sentence. The applicant has not provided information concerning the medical assistance provided to him in that colony. 33.  In May 2001 the applicant’s mother was informed that the applicant’s complaint of torture had been rejected as unsubstantiated, though no details of the decision were given to her. In November 2003 she requested a copy of the decision, which was sent to her in February 2004. 34.  Subsequently, the applicant’s mother complained to a Member of Parliament of the applicant’s torture by the police and the authorities’ failure to investigate the matter. Upon a request by the Member of Parliament, in 2005 the materials of the previous inquiry were checked by the prosecutor’s superior, who eventually confirmed the accuracy of the decision issued on 26 January 2001. In particular, the supervising prosecutor studied the materials of the 2001 inquiry. 35.  In March 2005 the applicant lodged a compensation claim with the Shevchenkivskyi District Court of Kyiv against the State Department for the Execution of Sentences and the Ministry of Interior, alleging that his disability had been caused by the unlawful actions of the police and the failure of the penitentiary authorities to provide him with adequate medical assistance. The courts at two levels of jurisdiction refused to examine the applicant’s claim for failure to meet the relevant procedural requirements. The applicant challenged the refusal in cassation, the outcome of which is unknown. 36.  The criminal investigation in the applicant’s case was completed in November 2001. Subsequently, the criminal case was referred to the Khmelnytsk Court of Appeal for trial. 37.  In the course of the investigation and trial, the applicant was assisted by a lawyer appointed for him by the authorities. That lawyer took part in the first stages of the proceedings before the first-instance court and was later replaced by another lawyer for unknown reasons. The new lawyer continued defending the applicant until those proceedings were completed. 38.  In the course of the trial the applicant contested the charges against him and alleged that his confession to some of the crimes of which he had been accused had been obtained under physical and psychological pressure from the police. 39.  On 13 November 2002 the court found the applicant guilty of thirteen counts of aggravated murder, infliction of grievous bodily injuries, illegal possession of firearms, banditry, and robbery. In particular, the applicant was held to be responsible for the murder of seven people, including three police officers who had attempted to stop him from committing crimes. He was found to be exceptionally dangerous to society and was sentenced to life imprisonment, together with the confiscation of all his property. 40.  The court mainly based its judgment on the statements of about thirty witnesses and victims of the crimes, the testimony given by the applicant at the trial, and on the conclusions of several forensic, ballistic and other expert examinations. The findings of the court concerning one of the counts of murder were partly based on the confessions obtained from the applicant during his time in police custody. 41.  In the same judgment the court, relying on the decision of the prosecutor of 26 January 2001, dismissed the applicant’s complaints of torture by the police and found that there was no evidence that his confession had been obtained under duress. 42.  On 17 December 2002 the applicant lodged an appeal in cassation, contesting the first-instance court’s factual findings and legal conclusions. He further argued that, in determining his sentence, the court had not taken into account his poor state of health. The applicant also maintained his allegation of torture by the police. 43.  On 13 May 2003 the Supreme Court partly varied the judgment of 13 November 2002, while confirming the first-instance court’s findings concerning the applicant’s guilt and upholding his sentence. The Supreme Court also rejected the applicant’s allegation of torture on the same grounds as the first-instance court.


5.  The applicant, Mr Abdullah Yaşa (“A.Y.”), a Turkish national, was born in 1993 and lives in Diyarbakır. He was thirteen years old at the time of the events to which the present case relates.
 A.  The 29 March 2006 incident 6.  Following the deaths of fourteen members of the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers’ Party) during an armed clash on 24 March 2006, numerous unlawful demonstrations took place in Diyarbakır between 28 and 31 March 2006, during which eleven demonstrators died. In particular, two persons, namely T. Atakkaya and M. Mızrak, were killed by tear-gas grenades in the course of these events. 7.  On 29 March 2006 A.Y., who was at the scene of a demonstration, was injured in the nose by a tear-gas grenade fired by the police while he was allegedly on his way to his aunt’s house. He was taken to the Diyarbakır public hospital the same day. 8.  On 5 April 2006 A.Y. left hospital, where he had undergone an operation for a maxillo-facial trauma on the day of his arrival, according to the discharge report. 9.  On 14 April 2006 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Diyarbakır public prosecutor’s office (the “public prosecutor’s office”) against the police officers of the Diyarbakır security police headquarters, alleging assault and abuse of power. He explained that he had been hit directly on the nose by a tear-gas grenade. 10.  On 2 August 2006 the public prosecutor’s office interviewed the applicant and his father and mother. A.Y.’s father said that he had been at work at the time of the incident and demanded the conviction of the police officers responsible for the assault on his son. 11.  In her depositions the same day, A.Y.’s mother stated that she had been at home at the time of the incident, and she also demanded the conviction of the police officers responsible for her son’s injuries. 12.  In substance, A.Y. himself testified as follows: while on his way to his aunt’s house he had been hit on the nose by an object as he was watching the police officers. At the time of the incident he had seen the helmeted police officers shooting a projectile in his direction by means of a shoulder-borne device. He had been unable to identify his exact position at the time of the incident, nor had he previously seen anyone throwing objects at the police officers. He did not think that the police officers could have shot at him without noticing his presence, since they had seen him when he had been in the street. He did not know the police officer who had shot at him. He requested the identification and punishment of this officer. He had been taken to hospital by a stranger. 13.  His lawyer, having confirmed his statements, requested the formulation of a forensic report and the submission of medical reports from Diyarbakır public hospital. He also requested the identification of the police officers involved on the day of the incident. 14.  On 6 November 2007 the public prosecutor’s office issued the following decision not to prosecute:
“... It emerged from the inquiries launched after the complaint ... that A.Y. had not been injured on his way to his aunt’s house. According to video recordings ... and photographs ... the complainant was injured during a demonstration in which he had been actively participating by chanting slogans in support of the PKK terrorist organisation and its leader Abdullah Öcalan, and throwing stones, sticks and Molotov cocktails at the police officers.
Consequently, the police officers were not criminally liable because they had acted in self-defence within the meaning of Article 25 § 1 of the Criminal Code, and in the exercise of their functions as set out in Article 24 of the same Code. [They] had shot tear-gas grenades in order to disperse the demonstrators who had gathered illegally and were attacking the officers by throwing stones, sticks and Molotov cocktails.
In the light of the foregoing comments ... no action is required against the police officers accused of overstepping the bounds of the use of force ....” 15.  On 13 November 2006 the Diyarbakır Department of Forensic Medicine issued a medical report reading as follows:
“... A.Y. underwent operations on a haemorrhage, a facial oedema, a fractured nose bone and a series of concave incisions.
Conclusion:
The patient cannot be treated by means of a straightforward operation,
His condition is not life-threatening,
The bone fractures constitute moderately severe damage to the applicant’s vital body functions.” 16. On 3 December 2007 the applicant appealed to the Siverek Assize Court (“the Assize Court”) against the decision not to prosecute. He denied his alleged participation in the demonstration in question and argued that the video recordings and photographs on which the decision not to prosecute had been based in no way constituted sufficient evidence of such participation. 17.  By a decision of 31 December 2007, served on the applicant on 10 March 2008, the President of the Assize Court dismissed the appeal. It considered that the police officers’ acts had remained within the framework of the law, since the officers had not acted intentionally but had merely endeavoured to discharge their duties. 18.  It emerges from the case-file that an investigation was automatically launched in respect of the applicant for his alleged participation in an illegal demonstration. On 28 November 2007, as part of this investigation, he was questioned by the public prosecutor’s office. The relevant parts of his statements may be summarised as follows:
“I completely reject the charges levelled against me. [On the day of the incident] I had left home to visit my aunt, who lives in Bağlar, when I saw a group of police officers near the street where the clinic is located. The officers launched a tear-gas grenade, which hit me in the nose. I had eight days of medical treatment in hospital. I had been alone during this incident, I had not thrown any stones, sticks or Molotov cocktails at the police officers, I did not chant slogans supporting the terrorist organisation, and I reject the photographs taken, the video recordings and the police reports. I agree to have a medical check-up.” 19.  On 25 February 2008 criminal proceedings were brought against the applicant on charges of membership of a terrorist organisation, propaganda in support of that organisation and resisting the police. 20.  In his submissions on the merits of the case the public prosecutor sought the applicant’s acquittal for lack of evidence. He stressed in particular that it was not possible, on the basis of the images studied by the Ankara criminal police laboratory, to establish that the applicant had taken part in the demonstration in question. 21.  On 10 July 2008, the Assize Court endorsed the prosecutor’s arguments and acquitted A.Y. According to the case file, in the absence of an appeal on points of law, that judgment became final. 22.  During proceedings before the Court, the Government produced a CD-ROM containing a police video recording. The CD-ROM shows several phases of the demonstrations which took place in Diyarbakır on 29 March 2006, and contains images of the period before and after the launching of the tear-gas grenade which injured the applicant’s head. It also shows that most of the demonstrators were teenagers, some of them with their faces covered, who were throwing stones. Moreover, it is clear that the event took place on a very busy boulevard. Some sequences show the applicant among the demonstrators, although it cannot be clearly ascertained that he was taking part in the demonstration. In the course of the events it can be seen that the applicant has been hit by a tear-gas grenade. Although it is impossible to make out exactly how the police officer fired the tear-gas grenade, it would appear from its impact that it was a direct, flat-trajectory shot (that is, it had been fired horizontally, or else at an angle of under 45o), rather than a high-angle shot (where the launcher is aimed as high as possible so that the tear-gas grenades explode in the air and break up before falling back to earth, thus preventing injuries to demonstrators in the event of an impact).


5.  The applicants were born in 1980 and 1979 and live in Hatay and Urfa respectively. 6.  On 3 May 1998 Kenan Mak, a student at the Abant İzzet Baysal University in Bolu (“the university”), was killed in an attack. Thereafter, on 3 May of every subsequent year students at the university have held a meeting to mark the anniversary of the killing. 7.  On 3 May 2002 the two applicants were studying at the university when they attended the remembrance meeting. The day before the meeting the chancellor of the university had indicated his approval of the meeting taking place in the canteen of the university. 8.  According to a report drawn up by gendarmes who were responsible for the security of the university, seventy to eighty “left wing students” wearing photographs of Kenan Mak gathered in the university’s canteen on 3 May 2002. The students then proceeded to the university’s garden where they were met by the gendarme Captain, F.Y. Captain Y. told the students that their gathering was in breach of the Meetings and Demonstration Marches Act (Law no. 2911) because they were not holding it in the designated place, namely the canteen. He asked the students to disperse, and warned that “otherwise force would be used” to disperse them. Instead, the students displayed a banner stating “down with fascism, Kenan Mak is immortal” and chanted slogans such as “shoulder to shoulder against fascism”. The students then started walking towards the chancellor’s offices. The gendarmes present in the vicinity used force and dispersed the students. The applicants and seven other students were arrested by the gendarmes. During the scuffle Captain Y.’s little finger and a gendarme’s leg were injured by the students. 9.  The applicants were questioned the same day by gendarme officers, and stated that they were aware that prior permission had been sought and granted for the meeting. 10.  The same day the applicants were examined by a doctor. The applicants did not complain about any ill-treatment and the doctor did not observe any injuries on their bodies. They were then sent to the prosecutor’s office where their release was ordered. 11.  The gendarme whose leg was injured during the incident informed the prosecutor on 28 May 2002 that the name of the student who injured him was C.G. 12.  On 5 July 2002 the Bolu prosecutor filed an indictment with the Bolu Criminal Court of First Instance (hereinafter the “trial court”), and accused the applicants and the remaining seven students of “breaching Law no. 2911”. The prosecutor also stated in his indictment that the applicants and C.G. had punched and kicked the gendarme captain and the gendarme. 13.  In the course of the criminal proceedings the applicants rejected the allegations of the use of force by them, but accepted that they had taken part in the demonstration. Captain Y. was not heard by the trial court, but was questioned by a court in another city, pursuant to a letter rogatory sent to that court by the trial court. 14.  On 6 May 2003 the trial court, on the basis of statements given by eyewitnesses, gendarmes, as well as “video footage of the incident”, convicted the applicants of having taken part in an illegal demonstration and of having used force when the gathering was being dispersed by the gendarmes, in breach of section 32 § 3 of Law no. 2911. According to the judgment, in addition to Captain Y. and the gendarme mentioned above, four other gendarmes had also apparently been injured by the applicants and their fellow student C.G. The applicants were sentenced to two years and six months’ imprisonment. 15.  The applicants appealed against the judgment, and argued that there had been insufficient evidence to warrant their conviction and that they had not been given the opportunity to examine the video footage. In their appeals the applicants referred to their constitutional right to take part in, inter alia, peaceful demonstrations. Finally, the applicants drew the Court of Cassation’s attention to the fact that similar gatherings had been organised in the past to commemorate Kenan Mak’s death and that there had never been any problems caused by those gatherings. 16.  On 9 March 2006 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the first-instance court in respect of the applicants. 17.  The applicants asked the prosecutor at the Court of Cassation to apply to that court for rectification of the decision of 9 March 2006. In their letter to the prosecutor the applicants also pointed out that none of the injured gendarmes had accused them of inflicting their injuries. 18.  The prosecutor accepted the applicants’ request and on 31 July 2006 applied to the Court of Cassation’s president for rectification of the decision. In his application the prosecutor noted that none of the injured gendarmes had named the applicants as the persons responsible for their injuries. The prosecutor referred to Article 11 of the Convention and argued that university grounds could not be regarded as public places within the meaning of Law no. 2911 and that the applicants’ and their fellow students’ actions could not therefore be regarded to be in breach of that Law. The students’ failure to hold their meeting in a place other than the one for which permission had been granted could only be regarded as a disciplinary issue and dealt with by the university administration and not by courts of law. 19.  The prosecutor also noted that the disturbance in the demonstration had been caused by the gendarmes’ intervention. Moreover, the reports drawn up by the gendarmes who had taken part in the operation (see paragraph 8 above) had not made any mention of physical resistance by the students. The trial court had not examined the video footage and had not asked the injured gendarmes to identify the persons responsible for their injuries. As such, the trial court’s decision to convict the applicants under section 32 § 3 of the Law no. 2911 had not been in accordance with applicable law and procedure. 20.  In its decision of 10 October 2006 the Grand Chamber of the Court of Cassation’s Criminal Division observed that the transcripts of one of the hearings held by the trial court did not bear the signature of the court’s clerk, and quashed the decision convicting the applicants. It deemed it unnecessary to examine the points raised by the prosecutor. 21.  A retrial began before the trial court, which rendered its decision on 24 October 2007. Having examined the video footage, the trial court observed that eleven and a half minutes had elapsed between the beginning of the gathering and its dispersal by the gendarmes. It also noted that neither the applicants nor any of the other participants in the demonstration had used force against the gendarmes. Nevertheless, the trial court considered that the applicants and the other students had taken part in an unauthorised meeting and had thus acted in breach of section 32 §1 of Law no. 2911. According to the trial court, the gathering had been unlawful because it had not been organised in the canteen but rather had taken place outside. The applicants were sentenced to one year and three months’ imprisonment, but the sentence was suspended. 22.  The applicants appealed. The appeal proceedings are still pending before the Court of Cassation. 23.  In the meantime, on account of his participation in the demonstration, on 9 December 2002 the university imposed a disciplinary sanction on the first applicant Ali Akgöl, and expelled him from the university for two semesters. As the university’s decision was not quashed by the administrative courts until 2004, the decision was enforced and the applicant’s graduation from the university was thus delayed for one year. 24.  Also in the meantime, the first applicant completed his studies and started working as a teacher. Nevertheless, on 22 August 2006 the Ministry of Education dismissed him from his post on account of his attendance at the demonstration. He was reinstated in his post in July 2007, following the quashing of his conviction by the Court of Cassation (see paragraph 20 above).


5.  The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Izmir. 6.  On 8 July 2001 at about 11 a.m., the applicant was arrested in Nusaybin by policemen from the Anti-Terrorism Department of the Nusaybin Security Directorate on suspicion of being a member of the illegal PKK (the Kurdistan Workers’ Party). He was handcuffed and taken to the Security Directorate Building. 7.  The same day, the applicant was taken to the Nusaybin Hospital where he was examined by a doctor. No signs of injury were found on his body. 8.  The applicant was blindfolded and interrogated in the security directorate. During his interrogation, the applicant was allegedly beaten, insulted, hosed with pressurised water, given electric shocks and raped with a truncheon. 9.  On 10 July 2001 the applicant was once again examined by a doctor and no signs of ill-treatment were found on his body. 10.  The same day at about 7 p.m., the applicant was handed over to the Izmir Security Directorate for further investigations. During his detention in Izmir, the applicant was allegedly blindfolded, insulted and threatened with ill-treatment. 11.  On 13 July 2001 the applicant was taken to the Atatürk Hospital, where he was examined by a doctor. In his report, the doctor noted the presence of an old bruise, measuring 1x1 cm, on the front part of the applicant’s left arm and another bruise, measuring 1x1 cm, on the front part of his right arm. 12.  Subsequently, on the same day, the applicant was taken before the investigating judge at the Izmir Magistrate’s Court, who ordered his detention on remand. Before the judge, the applicant complained that he had been ill-treated during his police custody in Nusaybin. 13.  On 17 July 2001 the applicant filed an objection against the remand decision. In his petition, the applicant maintained that he had been ill-treated during his detention. 14.  On 14 August 2001 the Izmir State Security Court Public Prosecutor initiated criminal proceedings against the applicant in the Izmir State Security Court, accusing him of being a member of an illegal organisation. 15.  During the first trial, which was held on 18 October 2001, the applicant repeated his allegations of ill-treatment. Upon the order of the court, the Izmir Public Prosecutor initiated an investigation into the applicant’s allegations. 16.  On 16 November 2001 Mr M.Ç., a police officer from the Anti-Terrorism Department acting as a rapporteur, submitted his report to the Izmir Security Department. He advised that no proceedings be initiated against the accused police officers as the applicant’s allegations were unsubstantiated. The rapporteur further contended that the accusations were deceitful and were part of a scenario used by the terrorist organisation to dishonour the fight against terrorism. 17.  On 27 November 2001 the İzmir Public Prosecutor concluded that the applicant’s allegations concerning his police custody in Nusaybin should be separated from the file. He accordingly transferred this part of the case to the Nusaybin Public Prosecutor for further investigation. On the same day, the prosecutor further decided that no prosecution should be brought against the accused police officers as there was insufficient evidence in support of the applicant’s allegations. 18.  On 12 December 2001 the applicant appealed against this decision. He requested a detailed medical examination to prove that he had been ill-treated in custody. On 19 February 2002 the Karşıyaka Assize Court dismissed his appeal, upholding the reasoning of the Izmir public prosecutor. 19.  On 29 January 2002 the Nusaybin Public Prosecutor took statements from the two doctors who had examined the applicant on the first and last days of his custody in Nusaybin. Mr Ramazan Kaya, who had drafted the first medical report dated 8 July 2001, explained to the prosecutor that there had been no signs of ill-treatment on the applicant’s body. The second doctor, Ms Sevda Mecit, also stated that she had examined the applicant and asked him whether he had any complaints. In the absence of any finding, she had drafted the medical report dated 10 July 2001. 20.  Between 4 February 2001 and 6 March 2002, the eight police officers, who had been involved in the applicant’s arrest and interrogation, gave statements to the public prosecutor. They all refuted the allegations against them and stated that they had not ill-treated the applicant. 21.  On 1 March 2002 the Nusaybin Public Prosecutor delivered a decision of non-prosecution. In his decision, the prosecutor referred to the two medical reports dated 8 July 2001 and 10 July 2001, which indicated that there were no signs of ill-treatment on the applicant’s body. Consequently, the prosecutor found the applicant’s allegations to be unsubstantiated. 22.  On 25 July 2002 the applicant appealed against this decision. He requested a detailed medical examination to prove his allegations. 23.  On 7 August 2002 the Mardin Assize Court rejected the applicant’s appeal.


5.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Warszawa. He is currently detained in the Warsaw Mokotów Remand Centre. 6.  On 14 July 2004 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of drug smuggling. On 15 July 2004 the Gdańsk District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) remanded him in custody for 3 months, relying on the reasonable suspicion – supported by evidence taken from witnesses – that he had committed the offence in question and the need to secure the proper course of the proceedings. The court also attached importance to the likelihood of a severe sentence of imprisonment being imposed on the applicant and the risk that he would attempt to induce witnesses to give false testimony or would otherwise obstruct the proceedings. That risk was justified by the fact that the case involved a large number of accomplices who had not yet been apprehended. 7.  An appeal by the applicant against the detention order, likewise his further appeals against subsequent decisions extending his detention and all his subsequent applications for release and appeals against refusals to release him were unsuccessful. In his applications and appeals, he argued that his lengthy detention violated the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to the imposition of this measure. 8.  In the course of the investigation, the applicant’s detention was extended on several occasions, namely on 21 September 2004 (to 31 December 2004), 21 December 2004 (to 31 March 2005) and 22 March 2005 (to 30 June 2005). In all their decisions the authorities relied on the original grounds given for the applicant’s detention. The courts also stressed the fact that, owing to the complexity of the case, the investigation had still not been completed. 9.  On 16 June 2005 a bill of indictment was lodged with the Gdańsk Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy). The applicant, together with 3 other co‑accused, was indicted on charges of drug smuggling and conspiracy to import drugs committed in an organised criminal group aiming at importing into Poland considerable amounts of drugs. 10.  During the court proceedings the courts further extended the applicant’s detention on several occasions, namely on 23 June 2005 (to 30 September 2005), on an unspecified subsequent date, on 28 June 2006 (to 30 October 2006), 3 October 2006 (to 31 December 2006), 28 December 2006 (to 30 April 2007), 25 April 2007 (31 August 2007), 22 August 2007 (to 31 December 2007), 11 December 2007 (to 31 March 2008), 18 March 2008 (until 30 June 2008), 25 June 2008 (until 30 September 2008) and 18 September 2008 (until 31 December 2008).
The courts repeated the grounds previously given for keeping the applicant in custody. They attached importance to the likelihood of a severe sentence of imprisonment being imposed on him and the risk that he would obstruct the proceedings. 11.  On 19 October 2005 the Regional Court held the first hearing. The trial continued until 30 December 2008.
Throughout that time 98 hearings were scheduled. The hearings took place at last once a month but at certain periods the court held up to 5 hearings per month. On average, they were held at 2 week-intervals and there was no interruption of the trial longer than 5 weeks. 12.  On 30 December 2008 the court convicted the applicant of drug smuggling and conspiracy to import drugs but acquitted him of acting in an organised criminal group. He was sentenced to a cumulative penalty of 12 years’ imprisonment. The Court deducted the period of his detention from 14 July 2004 to 12 June 2005 from his sentence. The applicant appealed. 13.  The applicant did not specify when the proceedings had terminated but it appears that they most likely ended between the end of 2009 and the beginning of 2010. 14.  On an unspecified date in 2005 the Kraków Regional Court convicted the applicant of drug-related offences committed in an armed organised criminal group and sentenced him to 15 years’ imprisonment. The applicant started to serve the sentence on 13 June 2005. 15.  On an unspecified date, apparently on 18 January 2006, the Ostrołęka Regional Prosecutor charged the applicant with, among other things, leading an organised criminal group called “mokotowska” involved in trafficking large amounts of drugs, arms and ammunition, money laundering, bribery of public officials, kidnapping, extortion, armed robbery and other theft-related offences. 16.  On 19 January 2006 the Ostrołęka Distrcit Court remanded the applicant in custody relying on the reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offences with which he had been charged. The court underlined that the suspicion was fully supported by evidence obtained from a crown witness (świadek koronny) and confirmed by other evidence, such as searches, inspections of crime scenes and testimonies of other witnesses. It also referred to the risk that the applicant would try to bring pressure to bear on witnesses, the need to secure the proper course of the investigation and the likelihood that a severe penalty – minimum 8 years’ imprisonment ‑ would be imposed on him. 17.  On an unspecified date, apparently in 2009, the Warsaw Regional Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to 14 years’ imprisonment. 18.  The applicant did not inform the Court of the further course of the proceedings. 19.  On 18 July 2007 the applicant lodged with the Gdańsk Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) a complaint under section 5 of the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaints about a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time (Ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki) (“the 2004 Act”). 20.  The applicant sought a ruling that the length of the proceedings in case no. IV K 200/05 (see paragraphs 6-13 above) had been excessive and an award of just satisfaction in the amount of 10,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) (approx. 2,500 euros (EUR)). 21.  On 25 September 2007 the Gdańsk Court of Appeal dismissed his complaint as unfounded. It held that since the beginning of the trial 61 hearings had been scheduled in the case until 24 August 2007 and only 11 of them had been adjourned due to the absence of counsel or co‑suspects and because of a lay judge’s illness. The court concluded that the proceedings had been conducted with the requisite speed and without undue delay. 22.  After his arrest on 14 July 2004 (see paragraph 6 above) the applicant was detained in the Sztum Prison (Zakład Karny). Shortly afterwards, on an unspecified date, he was transferred to the Gdańsk Remand Centre (Areszt Śledczy). He remained there until 22 January 2009 but in 2008 he was transferred to the Warszawa-Mokotów Remand Centre for a few months. From 22 January 2009 to 9 June 2009 he was detained in the Kraków Remand Centre. Later he was held in the Radom Prison and then transferred to the Warsaw Mokotów Remand Centre. 23.  On 22 July 2004 the Sztum Prison Penitentiary Commission (Komisja Penitencjarna) classified the applicant as a “dangerous detainee” (a so-called ”tymczasowo aresztowany niebezpieczny”; in the relevant legal provisions referred to as ”tymczasowo aresztowany stwarzający poważne zagrożenie społeczne albo poważne zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa aresztu”). It considered that it was necessary to place the applicant in a solitary cell designated for such detainees at a special high-security prison ward because he had been charged with serious offences committed in an organised criminal group. Pursuant to Article 212a § 3 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences (Kodeks karny wykonawczy), this circumstance by itself justified the classification of a detainee as “dangerous”. The commission also referred to the applicant’s serious lack of moral character (wysoki stopień demoralizacji). 24.  Every three months the Gdańsk Remand Centre’s Penitentiary Commission (Komisja Penitencjarna Aresztu Śledczego) reviewed its decision on the classification of the applicant as a “dangerous detainee”. The applicant appealed against many of those decisions. He submitted that the offences with which he had been charged, in particular drug-smuggling, did not justify the imposition of the special regime. He argued that the measure had been extended automatically without any consideration for his health and mental well-being, that it had in fact been imposed for an unlimited duration and was putting an exceptionally severe strain on him and his family. He also complained about being subjected to a strip search every time he left and entered the cell.
All the appeals were dismissed. 25.  On 3 September 2007 the Gdańsk Regional Court – Penitentiary Division examined the applicant’s appeal against the Gdańsk Remand Centre’s Penitentiary Commission’s decision of 10 July 2007 prolonging the application of the “dangerous detainee” regime and continuing to hold him in a solitary cell.
In his appeal, the applicant underlined that the special regime had already been imposed on him for some 3 years and that its continuation had been based solely on the charges laid against him, without any court conviction. In his view, this was in breach of the principle of the presumption of innocence.
The court rejected the applicant’s argument that the nature of the offences with which he had been charged did not justify the continued application of that regime in his case. In that regard, it stressed that the applicant had been charged in three separate sets of criminal proceedings conducted by different courts or prosecutors and those other charges included, among other things, the leading of an organised and armed criminal group, kidnapping, armed robbery and arms trafficking. The nature of the charges and the applicant’s personal circumstances, such as his previous criminal record, leadership qualities and tendency to dominate the others fully supported the view that there existed the “danger [to society and the security of a remand centre]” referred to in Article 212a of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences. In sum, there was no indication that the contested decision was contrary to the law, which was the sole ground on which it could be challenged and possibly quashed. As regards the applicant’s argument that his contacts with his family were severely restricted as a result of his “dangerous detainee” status, the court held that those restrictions were lawful as being applied under the relevant provisions of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences and did not make it impossible for him to maintain such contacts. 26.  On 11 December 2007, 15 February 2008 and 3 June 2008 the Gdańsk Regional Court – Penitentiary Division, relying on the same grounds, rejected further appeals against the Penitentiary Commission’s decisions prolonging the imposition of the “dangerous detainee” regime on the applicant. In his appeals, the applicant submitted that his prolonged solitary confinement was putting an exceptionally severe emotional strain on him, which was compounded by his lack of sufficient contact with the family. He also complained that the routine strip-searches, to which he had been subjected, sometimes several times a day, were intrusive, unnecessary and humiliating. 27.  Further decisions on the prolongation of the “dangerous detainee” regime were based on similar grounds or repeated the initial reasons.
On 19 August 2009 the Radom Regional Court upheld the Penitentiary Commission’s decision to continue the imposition of the regime, given on 23 June 2009, in view of the serious nature of the charges brought against the applicant and his personal circumstances, such as his leadership qualities and tendency to dominate the others and his serious lack of moral character.
On 23 October 2009 the Warsaw Regional Court upheld a similar decision, stressing that since 13 June 2005 the applicant had been serving a sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment, following his conviction for drug‑related offences committed in an organised criminal group. He had also been convicted at first instance by the Gdańsk District Court for other drug‑related offences and sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment. In these circumstances, the special regime had to be continued.
On 14 July 2010 the Warsaw Regional Court upheld another decision of the Penitentiary Commission, relying on the applicant’s criminal convictions and stressing that under the applicable legal provisions no time‑limit was set for the imposition of the regime.
On 30 August 2011 the Warsaw Regional Court upheld the Penitentiary Commission’s decision of 2 August 2011. Noting that the decision was based on the fact that the applicant, in view of his personal circumstances and serious lack of moral character, posed a serious danger to prison security and order, as well as to prison officers’ safety, the court found that this assessment had been objective and fully justified the continuation of the regime. 28.  Throughout his detention the applicant repeatedly requested the authorities to place him with another inmate, complaining that his excessively long solitary confinement had severely affected his emotional and mental well-being. 29.  The regime is still being applied to the applicant and he is still held in a solitary cell.
In all likelihood, pursuant to Article 212a § 3 of the Code of Execution of Criminal Sentences (see paragraph 44 below), the regime will continue until he has finished serving his three consecutive sentences of imprisonment, or at least the sentence following the conviction for leading an organised and armed criminal group, kidnapping, arms and drug trafficking. At present it is estimated that the applicant’s imprisonment would come to an end at the end of 2031. 30.  Since 22 July 2004, when the applicant was placed in a solitary cell for dangerous detainees at the high-security prison ward until present, he has remained under increased supervision. The cells in which he has been held, including their sanitary facilities, have been constantly monitored via close-circuit television. They have also been searched frequently, sometimes on a daily basis.
He has been subjected to a so‑called “personal check” (kontrola osobista), i.e. a thorough body search every time he has left and entered the cell. The applicant has explained that this means that each time he enters or leaves the cell he must strip naked in front of prison guards and carry out deep knee-bends from 6 to 10 times to enable an examination of his anus.
Whenever he is outside his cell and the high-security ward, including his appearances at court hearings, the applicant must be handcuffed or required to wear so-called “joined shackles” (kajdanki zespolone) on his hands and feet (see paragraph 47 below). Those shackles consist of handcuffs and fetters joined together with chains.
The applicant has many times unsuccessfully complained to the authorities that outside his cell his hands were handcuffed behind his back, which caused him considerable pain and difficulty in moving, especially during a daily walk.
The applicant’s movements outside his cell and the special ward must be supervised by 2 prison guards. He is allowed to have a 1-hour long solitary walk per day in a segregated area. 31.  The applicant was entitled to 1 one-hour visit from the family per month. 32.  He supplied a document issued by the Governor of the Gdańsk Remand Centre on 13 February 2008, setting out a list of visits received by him up to that date.
From 23 August 2004 to 20 January 2008, i.e. for 3 years and some 5 months, he was granted permission to have 11 “open visits” (widzenie przy stoliku). He was also granted 21“closed visits” (widzenie przez telefon) (see also paragraph 58 below). 33.  On most occasions only the applicant’s wife visited him. The applicant has 3 daughters M.H., K.H. and S.H. born, respectively, in 1988, 1993 and 1998. Throughout the above period he received visits from his oldest daughter on 2 occasions and from each of the two younger daughters once. 34.  In 2004 the applicant was granted 6 visits, 2 of which were open and 4 closed. They took place on 23 August (this was an open visit from the applicant’s wife), 17 September (this was a closed visit from his wife, E.H., and M.H., his oldest daughter), 15 October, 29 October (on this occasion he received an open visit from his daughter M.H.), 19 November and 17 December respectively. 35.  In 2005 the applicant was granted 10 visits, only 1 of which was open. They took place on 11 February, 11 March, 15 April, 12 May, 5 July, 28 July, 16 August, 30 September (this was a closed visit from his wife and K.H., one of his daughters), 28 October and 9 December 2005. 36.  In 2006 the applicant received 7 visits (including 1 “open”) from his wife only. They took place on 28 February, 5 April, 13 June, 23 August, 20 October, 30 November and 29 December. 37.  In 2007 the applicant was granted 7 visits from his wife, 4 of which were open visits. They took place on 9 February, 29 March, 1 June (on this open visit the applicant could also see S.H., his youngest daughter), 24 July, 6 September, 24 October and 27 November. 38.  In 2008, as of the date of the issuance of the document, the applicant received one “open visit” from his wife – on 20 January 2008. He submitted that throughout the whole of 2008 he had received 5 family visits. 39.  The applicant stated that his very limited contact with his daughters had been caused by the fact that the Gdańsk Remand Centre and the Kraków Remand Centre did not provide satisfactory conditions for visits by children or minor persons. A visit took place in a room where visitors were separated from a detainee by a Perspex window partition and bars, making it impossible for them to have any direct contact. A visitor, including a child, in order to reach the visiting area in the ward for dangerous detainees had to walk through the entire prison, past prison cells situated on both sides of the corridor. This exposed his daughters to the gaze of inmates and their reaction to the girls’ presence constituted an exceptionally traumatic experience for them. During the meeting, they were separated by a window and bars from their father, which was very stressful for them and made it impossible for them to have any normal contact. For that reason, considering that the conditions in which he was allowed to see his family in prison caused too much distress and suffering for his daughters, the applicant had to give up receiving visits from his daughters. 40.  In the Kraków Remand Centre the visits to “dangerous detainees” could take place only on Tuesdays. For that reason, the applicant’s wife was unable to visit him on every occasion he was entitled to have a monthly visit because she worked from Monday to Friday. 41.  The applicant made numerous complaints about poor visiting conditions and the practical impossibility of having contact with his daughters, but they were to no avail. 42.  The applicant’s correspondence with his family was censored. He supplied three envelopes bearing stamps that read respectively: “censored on 12 November 2007”, “censored on 8 January 2008”, “censored on 30 January 2008” and illegible signatures. The first letter was from his daughter, K.H., and two others from a family member, a certain K[a]. H.
The applicant did not inform the Court about the contents of the letters and whether any parts of them had been expunged or otherwise censored.


5.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Tula. 6.  The applicant is a lawyer. In 2003-05 the applicant, together with the lawyer Ms V., represented Ms D. in civil proceedings before the Proletarskiy District Court of Tula. 7.  On 13 April 2005 Judge S. of the District Court sent a complaint to the President of the Tula Bar Association. She alleged that the absence of the applicant and Ms V. without good cause had led to delays in the proceedings. She asked the President to institute disciplinary proceedings against the lawyers and to inform them of the next hearing in Ms D.’s case. In particular, she stated as follows:
“I draw your attention to the conduct of the lawyers Mr Zubarev and Ms V., which is not compatible with the Lawyers’ Code of Ethics. It has encroached on the rights of the person they were representing before the court ... and has led to unjustifiable delays in the examination of the merits of the case. At the same time [they] have systematically written complaints in Ms D.’s name to various authorities and newspapers, attempting in that way to shift the responsibility for their own incompetence and lack of professionalism onto the judicial system, and thereby expressing contempt for the court.” 8.  The parties did not inform the Court whether there was any follow-up to Judge S.’s complaint on the part of the Bar Association. 9.  Being of the opinion that the above-cited paragraph of Judge S.’s complaint tarnished their professional reputation, the applicant and Ms V. brought a defamation action against her in accordance with Article 152 of the Civil Code. They also sought a compensation award in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. 10.  On 3 May 2005 the District Court refused to accept the applicant’s claims for consideration. The court noted that current laws did not define the grounds or procedure for adjudicating that type of claim. In particular, the court noted as follows:
“According to Article 16 of the Law of the Russian Federation on the Status of the Judiciary of the Russian Federation, a judge cannot be held liable for an expression of opinion in the course of the administration of justice or for the judgment handed down [by him or her] unless he or she has been found guilty in criminal proceedings concerning the abuse of power or the adoption of an unlawful verdict, judgment or other judicial act.
Pursuant to Article 1070 § 2 of the [Civil Code] of the Russian Federation, ... [d]amage caused within the framework of the administration of justice shall be compensated, provided that the guilt of the judge has been established in a final criminal conviction.
The claims lodged by [the applicant] and Ms V. cannot be considered in civil proceedings given that the issue of a judge’s liability for actions taken in the course of the administration of justice must be adjudicated purely in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. [However], current legislation does not lay down the grounds or the procedure for compensation by the State for damage caused by a judge’s unlawful actions (inaction) (including the rules governing the jurisdiction of this type of case).” 11.  Further to an appeal by the applicant, on 16 June 2005 the Tula Regional Court upheld that decision. The court noted, in particular:
“Pursuant to Article 134 § 1 (1) of the [Code of Civil Procedure] of the Russian Federation, the judge must dismiss a claim [without consideration on the merits] if it cannot be adjudicated in civil proceedings but should instead be considered and adjudicated by way of another judicial process.
Referring to Article 16 of the Law of the Russian Federation on the Status of the Judiciary of the Russian Federation, the [first-instance] court established that the claims lodged by Ms V. and [the applicant] concerned the judge’s liability and the compensation for damage caused by the judge’s actions (failure to act). [It] correctly indicated in its decision that the judge should be immune from liability for the actions taken in the course of the administration of justice unless she or he had been found guilty of criminal abuse of power in a final criminal conviction.
Being mindful of the fact that the issue of the judge’s liability for actions taken in the course of the administration of justice can be examined only in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, the court has rightly dismissed the claims lodged by [the applicant] and Ms V. [without consideration on the merits], noting correctly that current legislation had not yet laid down the grounds or the procedure for compensation by the State for damage caused by a judge’s unlawful actions (inaction) (including the rules governing the jurisdiction of this type of case).”


6.  The applicant, a Russian national, was born in 1927 and died in 2003. At the relevant time he lived in Rostov-on-Don. 7.  The second applicant is a Russian national and was born in 1949. He is the applicant's son and lives in Rostov-on-Don. 8.  In 1995 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of theft and placed in police custody. In 1996 the court acquitted him. 9.  In September 1996 the applicant brought proceedings against the State claiming damages for his unlawful detention. On 29 December 1997 the Proletarskiy District Court satisfied his claim ordering the State to pay the applicant damages in the amount of RUR 34,000. This decision entered into force. However on 25 may 1998 the decision in the first applicant's favour was quashed by way of supervisory review. The case was remitted to the first instance court. 10.  On 15 March 1999 the Rostov-on-Don Proletarskiy District Court satisfied the applicant's claims in part awarding him 24,917 Russian Roubles (~970 Euros), to be recovered from the regional branch of the Federal Treasure. The decision was not appealed against and, as follows from a copy of this decision provided by the applicant, became final on 17 March 1999. 11.  On 12 May 1999 the local bailiffs' service initiated the enforcement proceedings against the regional branch of the Treasury. The applicant and the bailiff repeatedly contacted the defendant in order to recover the amount awarded by the District Court. However, the payment orders were returned to the bailiff unexecuted. The regional branch of the Treasury explained that since no budget funds had been allocated from the federal budget for these purposes, the judgment debt could not be paid. 12.  In the following months the bailiffs addressed the Federal Treasury in Moscow and the Ministry of Finance with request to make necessary budget appropriations to execute the judgment of 15 March 1999. As follows from the letter of the Legal Department of the Ministry of Finance of 25 August 1999, the information on the judgment debt was included in a special data-base which listed all claims against the Federal Treasury. 13.  In April 2000 the case-file concerning the enforcement proceedings was transmitted to the bailiffs in Moscow. The applicant was informed that henceforth the enforcement proceedings would be carried out by the bailiffs in Moscow, at the address of the central office of the Federal Treasury. 14.  In the meantime the applicant asked the District Court to clarify which State institution was responsible for payment of the judgment debt. On 13 September 2000 the District Court ruled that the debt should be recovered from the central office of the Federal Treasury in Moscow. The court accordingly delivered a new writ of execution which was forwarded to the bailiffs' service in Moscow. 15. On 26 March 2001 the writ of execution was returned to the applicant. The Moscow-based bailiffs' service explained to the applicant that due to changes in the legislation, and, in particular, pursuant to the Law on the Federal Budget for 2001 (see the “Relevant domestic law” below), they ceased to be responsible for the forced execution of the court judgment against the State authorities. The bailiff proposed the applicant to forward the writ of execution together with some additional documents directly to the Ministry of Finance in Moscow. 16.  According to the respondent Government, at present the writ of execution is with the Ministry of Finance. The second applicant indicated that in December 2004 all documents required pursuant to Decree no. 666 had been submitted to the Ministry of Finance. However, it appears that to date the judgment has not been enforced. 17.  The second applicant was born in 1949 in Germany. Since 1950 his family lived in Australia. According to the applicant, in 1957, when they were visiting relatives in the Soviet Union, the Soviet authorities prohibited them from returning to Australia. 18.  The second applicant was also involved in a civil dispute with a private person regarding his father's flat. This dispute ended with the decisions taken by the Rostov Regional Court on 4 December 2002 and by the Proletarskiy District Court on 13 March 2003, which was not appealed against and became final on 25 March 2003.


4.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Shakhtаrsk, the Donetsk region. 5.  On 20 October 2000 the Shakhtаrsk City Court (Шахтарський міський суд Донецької області) awarded the applicant 4,815.28 hryvnyas (UAH)[1] in salary arrears and compensations from his former employer, the Municipal Communal Service Department (“the Company,” Шахтарське міське госпрозрахункове управління комунального господарства). 6.  This judgment was not appealed against, became final and the enforcement proceedings were instituted to collect the judgment debt. 7.  On 7 April 2003 the Company was declared bankrupt and subsequently liquidated. 8.  The applicant unsuccessfully attempted to seek compensation from the Bailiffs for their failure to enforce the judgment. 9.  The judgment remains unenforced to the present date.


4.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Lahti. 5.  On 12 October 2000 the applicant was questioned by the police as a suspect in a number of aggravated narcotics offences which had allegedly been committed on 10 December 1999. The offences had been reported to the police on 5 October 2000. The pre-trial investigation was completed on 21 March 2001. 6.  The case was examined and decided by the District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätten) with regard to some of the defendants in May 2001. The charges against the applicant and one other person were removed from the docket for the time being at the public prosecutor's request because H., a witness, had not been located to appear in court. 7.  On 15 April 2002 the public prosecutor preferred charges against the applicant and the other remaining defendant. 8.  On 15 February 2004 H. was summoned to appear before the court on 12 May 2004. That hearing was cancelled as H. was in prison awaiting trial in Sweden. The hearing eventually took place on 11 August 2004. During the hearing H. refused to elaborate on the matter and his pre-trial records were read out to the court. 9.  On the same date the District Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to six months' imprisonment. In its judgment the court stated, in reply to the complaint made by the applicant's co-defendant, that when assessed as a whole, the proceedings had lasted longer than usual. However, the delay had been attributable to the legal excuse of a witness, which had prevented the case from being finalised earlier. 10.  On 15 May 2006 the Court of Appeal (hovioikeus, hovrätten), having held an oral hearing, upheld the lower court's judgment. As witness H. was again unavailable for the hearing, despite several previous attempts by the court to reach him, the District Court recordings of his statements were played back during the hearing. 11.  In its decision the court noted that there were no reasons in the co-defendant's case to mitigate the punishment based on the long time that had passed since the offences. It further noted that both defendants had previously been sentenced many times to unconditional prison sentences. Taking that into account the court found that the length of the sentence awarded by the District Court struck a fair balance between the act committed, the motives for that act and other aspects of their guilt. 12.  On 10 October 2006 the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen) refused leave to appeal.