6.  The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in Shakhty in the Rostov Region. 7.  On 19 and 23 December 2000 the applicant was examined by two medical commissions and found to be in good health and fully fit for military service. 8.  On the basis of the medical reports, the decision was made to call the applicant up for two years of mandatory military service in the Ministry of Internal Affairs forces. 9.  The applicant was assigned to serve in military unit no. 5464 in Kislovodsk. In the unit he was allegedly harassed and ill-treated by senior conscripts and the unit sergeant on account of his Moldovan ethnic origin. 10.  According to the applicant, in late January 2001 he attended a drivers’ training course. In the car park the commander told the applicant and three other conscripts to take the back axle of a ZIL lorry to another place. The applicant injured his spine and later on the same day he was also severely beaten and kicked by senior conscripts for failing to bring the axle close enough to the lorry. On the course the following morning he asked for medical assistance, but the commander refused his request. The applicant did not complain about these events to a prosecutor or any other official. 11.  On 8 February 2001 the applicant was transferred to military unit no. 6794 in Astrakhan (later renumbered as no. 3025). According to the applicant, a medical officer noted his complaint of pains in his knees, but did not prescribe any treatment. It subsequently transpired during an inquiry that the applicant had complained about recurrent pains in his knees to his superior, Lieutenant D., who had exempted him from physical exercise (see paragraph 20 below). 12.  In March 2001 Junior Sergeant Ch., the platoon commander, made the applicant and other servicemen do 350 knee bends outdoors as punishment for their failure to scrub the barracks spotless. Lieutenant D. was present but did not contradict the order. After several hundred knee bends, the applicant collapsed and other soldiers took him by the armpits and dragged him into the medical unit. 13.  Between 6 and 26 March 2001 the applicant received emergency treatment in military unit no. 52218, and then in unit no. 3057 until 17 April 2001. He could not stand on his own and crawled out of bed propping himself up on the bedposts. 14.  Between 17 April and 23 May 2001 the applicant was treated in the neurosurgery clinic of the Rostov-on-Don State Medical University. When he was discharged he was diagnosed with a “closed injury of the spine combined with an impairment of blood circulation at the level of the lower thoracic part of the spinal cord” and found unfit for work. 15.  On 5 June 2001 the medical commission of military unit no. 3057 examined the applicant at the request of the commander of unit no. 6794 and diagnosed him with “consequences of an acute interruption to the blood flow to the spinal cord in the form of cicatrical-commissural epiduritis, arachnoiditis with a disturbance of the flow of cerebrospinal fluid and minor impairment of sensitivity in the lower extremities”. It also established that the condition had been “acquired during military service” and discharged the applicant as “partially fit for military service”. 16.  On 28 June 2001 the applicant was discharged on account of his disability. 17.  On an unspecified date the applicant’s mother complained to the military prosecutor of Rostov-on-Don of an abuse of power committed by Lieutenant D. and Junior Sergeant Ch. 18.  On 10 May 2001 her complaint was forwarded to the military prosecutor of the Astrakhan garrison who in turn sent it on 21 May 2001 to the military prosecutor of the Caspian Fleet. 19.  In their observations on the admissibility and merits of the case, the Government enclosed copies of statements by Lieutenant D. and Junior Sergeant Ch., as well as by Privates A.L., A.Sh. and V.P., who had started their service on 1 February 2001. 20.  On 22 May 2001 Lieutenant D. stated as follows:
“In February 2001 Private Chember was transferred to our unit ... He was assigned to serve in my sub-unit, that is, in the first platoon of the seventh company. Since his transfer into our unit he has started complaining about recurrent pains in his knees. On that ground I exempted him from physical exercise; he stayed within the premises of the company and did not go anywhere. Some two weeks later Private Chember was sent for treatment to the sanitary unit because of acute pains in his knees; I cannot tell why it happened. Some time later he was transferred to a hospital in another town ... I have never applied any unlawful methods to Private Chember.” 21.  On the same date Junior Sergeant Ch. testified as follows:
“I have known Private Chember since February 2001; he served in the seventh company of military unit 6794, in which I acted as the section commander. I point out that Chember often went to the medical unit. I do not know what he complained about. Every time I acted as the officer-on-duty in the platoon, Chember was usually in for treatment in the medical unit. I think he complained about pains in his legs. I did not know Chember very well because he was not from my platoon ...” 22.  In their similarly worded statements, Privates A.L., A.Sh. and V.P. indicated that the applicant had complained about his “weak legs” since his arrival at military unit no. 6794, that for that reason he had been exempted from physical exercise and squad drill, and that he had often been treated in the medical unit for pains in his legs. 23.  On 31 May 2001 Captain S., a senior investigator with the military prosecutor’s office of the Caspian Fleet, issued a decision not to initiate criminal proceedings. The reasoning read as follows, in full:
“The inquiry established that the fact of abuse of power by Lieutenant D. and Junior Sergeant Ch. had not actually taken place in reality.
It follows from the statement by Lieutenant D. that Private Chember serves under his command. Neither he nor Junior Sergeant Ch. ever abused their power over or used violence against Private Chember or any other military personnel of unit 6794.
It follows from the statement by Junior Sergeant Ch. that neither he nor Lieutenant D. ever abused their power over or used violence against Private Chember or any other military personnel of unit 6794.
All the servicemen of the seventh company of military unit 6794 – where Chember serves – have been questioned. They stated that no one had harassed Private Chember, and that neither Junior Sergeant Ch. nor Lieutenant D. had ever abused their power over him or any other military personnel of unit 6794.
Thus, the inquiry has established that Junior Sergeant Ch. and Lieutenant D. did not abuse their power over Private Chember or any other military personnel of unit 6794, and accordingly no criminal case may be instituted against them because there was no criminal offence.”
The decision indicated that an appeal against it lay to a higher prosecutor or to a court. 24.  On 30 September 2002 the applicant’s mother complained to a higher prosecutor. She wrote, in particular, that her son had never had pains in his knees. She also pointed out that the investigator had not heard the soldiers P., S., C. and Sh., who had been eyewitnesses to the ill-treatment. 25.  On 8 October 2002 Colonel M., the military prosecutor of the Caspian Fleet, replied that her complaint could not be examined because the materials of the inquiry had been forwarded, on 8 August 2002, to the Shakhty Town Court. He indicated that the complaint would be considered upon the return of the materials. The applicant did not receive any further information concerning that complaint. 26.  On 17 March 2002 the applicant lodged a civil action against military units nos. 3025 and 5464 and the North Caucasian Command of the Ministry of Internal Affairs forces for compensation for non-pecuniary damage. He submitted that the injury he had received during his military service caused him physical pain, restricted his day-to-day activities, impaired his career and life plans, and brought feelings of frustration and injustice. 27.  The applicant and his counsel asked the court to appoint a forensic medical examination with a view to determining the origin and nature of his injuries. 28.  On 9 April 2003 the Shakhty Town Court of the Rostov-on-Don Region refused their request by an interim decision:
“Having heard the parties and studied the case materials, the court finds that the request is unsubstantiated ... because the period when the injury was received is stated in the medical record and that is the period of military service. The establishment of the origin and nature of existing diseases will not help to find those responsible or [to elucidate] the circumstances. The case file contains the decision not to initiate criminal proceedings against Sergeant Ch. and Lieutenant D., dated 31 May 2001.” 29.  On the same day the Town Court delivered judgment, by which the applicant’s claim was dismissed. The Town Court examined medical evidence produced by the applicant and interviewed his fellow serviceman P. who confirmed that Junior Sergeant Ch. had forced the applicant and other conscripts to do 350 or more knee bends and that the applicant had collapsed during that exercise. It found as follows:
“Assessing the collected evidence as a whole, the court finds that the claim is unsubstantiated ... because the [applicant] did not show that the damage to his health had been caused by servicemen of the [Ministry of Internal Affairs]; according to his own statements, he fell ill because of excessive (in his opinion) physical activity (physical exercises, carrying the axle of a ZIL lorry in his hands) and because of ill-treatment by senior conscripts and by Sergeant Ch. However, the case materials contain the decision not to initiate criminal proceedings against Sergeant Ch. and Lieutenant D., dated 31 May 2001 ... because there was no indication of a criminal offence. Under the current laws, one of the mandatory conditions for tort liability for non-pecuniary damage is the fault of the tortfeasor ...” 30.  The applicant appealed against the interim decision and judgment of 9 April 2003. 31.  On 25 June 2003 the Rostov Regional Court dismissed his appeal:
“The [first-instance] court dismissed the claim because it established that the defendants’ liability for causing damage to the [applicant’s] health had not been proven. The [regional] court finds this conclusion correct. On 31 May 2001 an investigator ... refused to initiate criminal proceedings ... The causal link between the defendants’ actions and the [applicant’s] disability is not established. Experts may not establish the causal link between the defendants’ actions and consequences thereof, only a court is competent to do so.” 32.  Following the applicant’s discharge, on 29 August 2001 he was diagnosed with a second-category disability and became entitled to a civilian disability pension. 33.  The applicant unsuccessfully attempted to claim a military pension. On 21 May, 11 June, 29 July and 25 December 2002, his mother received negative responses from the Central Military Medical Commission of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The claims were rejected because he had not produced documents showing that he had injured his spine during military service. According to these replies, the report of 5 June 2001 only established that the condition had been diagnosed during his military service and not that it had been acquired during his military service. 34.  In their observations on the admissibility and merits of the case, the Government submitted a report produced by two medical experts (one military and one civilian) on 10 March 2005. The report had been commissioned by the assistant to the Chief Military Prosecutor on 9 March 2005 with a view to determining the nature of the applicant’s disability, its causes and origin. The experts made their findings on the basis of the criminal case file and the applicant’s medical records of 2001. In particular, they found as follows:
“It transpires from the available medical documents that Mr Chember’s conditions were chronic. Having regard to Mr Chember’s young age, his medical history (pains in the legs from the age of ten), and chronic development of the condition, the osteochondrosis of the lumbar spine was contracted in childhood as a result of a metabolic disturbance (dystrophy) ... The existing inflammatory processes in the spine (epiduritis and arachnoiditis) could have appeared ... as a complication of an infectious disease that Mr Chember may have contracted in childhood, such as influenza, tonsillitis, pharyngitis, and so on. These spinal conditions were also of a chronic and continued nature ... which is confirmed by the presence of cicatrical-commissural epiduritis and commissural arachnoiditis, and complaints of pains in the legs from the beginning of military service and before conscription.
No objective confirmation that these conditions had been caused by trauma could be found in the available medical records or case-file materials.
Mr Chember’s diseases were chronic and continuing and could have been caused by hereditary factors (according to the materials, his uncle suffered from a similar condition) ...”


8.  The first applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Amsterdam. The second applicant was born in 1996 and lives in Amsterdam and Uithoorn. 9.  The first applicant came to the Netherlands in June 1994, leaving her two sons from a previous relationship, Jean (born in 1990) and Carlos (born in 1992), with her parents. In the Netherlands she lived with her partner Mr Hoogkamer, who was in paid employment at that time. The first applicant submitted that they had looked into applying for a residence permit allowing her to reside in the Netherlands with her partner, but that, owing to the unavailability of documents concerning Mr Hoogkamer's income, such an application had never actually been made. 10.  In April 1995 the first applicant's son Carlos joined his mother and Mr Hoogkamer. Her other son Jean remained in Brazil with his grandparents. 11.  On 3 February 1996 Rachael, the second applicant, was born to the first applicant and Mr Hoogkamer. The first applicant was invested ipso jure with parental authority (ouderlijk gezag) over Rachael. Rachael was recognised (erkenning) by Mr Hoogkamer on 28 March 1996, as a result of which she obtained Dutch nationality. 12.  The first applicant and Mr Hoogkamer split up in January 1997. Rachael stayed with her father, who subsequently applied to the Amsterdam District Court (kantonrechter) seeking to be awarded parental authority over Rachael. The District Court granted the application on 20 February 1997. The first applicant subsequently appealed to the Amsterdam Regional Court (arrondissementsrechtbank) against that decision. The Regional Court requested the Child Care and Protection Board (Raad voor de Kinderbescherming) to examine which attribution of parental authority would be in Rachael's best interests. 13.  On 12 August 1997 the first applicant applied for a residence permit which would allow her to reside in the Netherlands, either – depending on the outcome of the proceedings concerning parental authority – with her daughter Rachael, or in order to have access to her. She also made an application on behalf of her son Carlos. 14.  The Child Care and Protection Board found, in its report of 26 August 1997, that parental authority should remain with Mr Hoogkamer. In view of the likelihood of the first applicant having to return to Brazil, awarding her parental authority over Rachael could lead to a break-off in contact between Rachael and her father and also between Rachael and her paternal grandparents, who were very important to her. It was felt that this would be a traumatic experience for Rachael, who had her roots in the Netherlands and whose bonding with all the persons concerned had taken place in that country. 15.  In a decision of 26 November 1997, the Amsterdam Regional Court nevertheless quashed the decision of the District Court and awarded the first applicant parental authority over Rachael. Mr Hoogkamer lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad). 16.  On 12 January 1998 the Deputy Minister of Justice (Staatssecretaris van Justitie) rejected the first applicant's application for a residence permit. The first applicant lodged an objection (bezwaar) against this decision. At the hearing on this objection before an official committee (ambtelijke commissie) on 27 May 1998, it was stated on behalf of the first applicant that she worked (illegally, as she was not in possession of a residence permit allowing her to do so) from Monday to Thursday and that on those days Rachael stayed either with her father or with her grandparents. Rachael stayed with her mother on the remaining days of the week. 17.  On 12 June 1998 the Deputy Minister of Justice dismissed the objection, holding that, even if account was taken of Rachael's right to reside in the Netherlands and to be brought up and educated there, the interests of the economic well-being of the country outweighed the interests of the first applicant. Although the first applicant did not claim welfare benefits, she did not pay taxes or social security contributions either, and there were sufficient numbers of nationals of European Union member States or aliens residing lawfully in the Netherlands available to fill the post she was occupying. The general interest also prevailed over Mr Hoogkamer's interest in being able to lead his family life with Rachael in the Netherlands. In this context it was noted that, at the time Mr Hoogkamer started his relationship with the first applicant, the latter had not been entitled to reside in the Netherlands. He had thus accepted that family life with Rachael might have to be enjoyed elsewhere or in a different manner. It was further noted that Mr Hoogkamer did not make a substantial financial contribution to Rachael's care and upbringing since he only took care of those expenses on the days Rachael stayed with him and, as he was in receipt of welfare benefits, those costs were borne by public funds. 18.  The first applicant lodged an appeal against this decision with the Regional Court of The Hague, sitting in Haarlem. 19.  On 30 October 1998 the Supreme Court quashed the Amsterdam Regional Court's decision of 26 November 1997 in the proceedings concerning parental authority and referred the case to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal (gerechtshof). 20.  The Regional Court of The Hague, sitting in Haarlem, dismissed the appeal against the refusal to grant the first applicant a residence permit. In its decision of 12 February 1999, the Regional Court held that Article 8 of the Convention did not oblige national authorities to ensure that Rachael's parents would not have to choose between leaving Rachael with her father in the Netherlands or letting her go to Brazil with her mother. Both these options were considered to be feasible. According to the Regional Court, the fact that Rachael would have to be without either her father or her mother was, strictly speaking, the result of the parents' choice to conceive a child at a time when the first applicant was not allowed to reside in the Netherlands. No further appeal lay against this decision. 21.  On 28 June 1999 a hearing took place before the Amsterdam Court of Appeal in the proceedings concerning parental authority, during which an officer of the Child Care and Protection Board told the court that the Board's report of 26 August 1997 remained pertinent and that it was in Rachael's best interests for the status quo – with Mr Hoogkamer having parental authority over her – to be maintained. In its decision of 15 July 1999 the Amsterdam Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the Amsterdam District Court of 20 February 1997 awarding parental authority over Rachael to Mr Hoogkamer. The Court of Appeal accepted that Mr Hoogkamer, supported by Rachael's grandparents, was sufficiently capable of providing Rachael with the necessary upbringing and care, and that he was indeed doing so in practice. It was of the opinion that the submissions made by the first applicant in support of her argument that Rachael's interests would be better served if parental authority were awarded to her – even if this meant Rachael living in Brazil without contact with her father and grandparents – were of insufficient weight compared to the possibilities the father had to offer and was offering. The first applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against this decision, which was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 27 October 2000. 22.  Despite having received a letter dated 8 July 1999 from the local police informing her that she had to leave the Netherlands within two weeks, the first applicant remains in the Netherlands. She works from Monday to Friday. Rachael stays with her at the weekend and with her paternal grandparents during the week. This arrangement is confirmed in a letter dated 20 March 2002 written by Rachael's grandparents to the applicants' legal representative:
“The access arrangement we have concluded with [the first applicant], the mother of our granddaughter Rachael Hoogkamer, is fully satisfactory for all parties. According to the arrangement, Rachael stays with us during the week. On Friday evening we take her to her mother and collect her again late on Sunday afternoon. No disagreement whatsoever has arisen on this point in the past years. We further confirm that the weekend visits of our granddaughter to her mother pass off in a very pleasant fashion and that she enjoys telling us about them. In other words, the close contact with her mother has a beneficial effect on our granddaughter.” 23.  In January 2002 the first applicant applied for a residence permit allowing her to reside in the Netherlands with her new Dutch partner. In this application the first applicant indicated that Rachael was being brought up partly by her grandparents and partly by her new family. The application was rejected on 18 April 2002 as the first applicant was not in possession of the required temporary residence permit (machtiging tot voorlopig verblijf). The first applicant did not challenge this decision. 24.  The second son of the first applicant, Jean, has been living with his mother in the Netherlands since February 2002.


4.  The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Spišské Podhradie. The applicant introduced his application through the intermediary of an advocate, Mrs Elena Smiková. Subsequently, the applicant corresponded with the Registry himself. 5.  On 4 February 1994 the applicant filed an action with the Spišská Nová Ves District Court. He challenged the lawfulness of his dismissal from his employment. 6.  On 22 December 2005 the district court dismissed the action. The Košice Regional Court upheld the first-instance judgment on 29 January 2007 (final on 14 March 2007). 7.  On 23 August 2005 the Constitutional Court found that the District Court had violated the applicant’s right under Article 48 § 2 of the Constitution to a hearing without unjustified delay and under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention to a hearing within a reasonable time. 8.  The Constitutional Court held that the case was not complex and that the applicant’s conduct had contributed to the length of the proceedings. Delays imputable to the district court totalled 10 years and 8 months. 9.  The Constitutional Court awarded the applicant SKK 90,000 (the equivalent of 2,328 euros at that time) as just satisfaction in respect of non-pecuniary damage. It ordered the Spišská Nová Ves District Court to reimburse the applicant’s legal costs and avoid any further delay in the proceedings.


9.  The first applicant, Roman Berliński, is a Polish national born in 1971. The second applicant, Słavomir Berliński, is a Polish national born in 1974. The applicants are brothers. At present they live in Poland. 10.  On 4 October 1993 the applicants, who practice body-building, were attending an athletics club at a Lublin university. The club manager urged the applicants to exit, as they had been present at the club without the appropriate permission. He warned that he would call the police if they did not leave. The applicants did not agree to leave. The manager called the police, and six uniformed officers arrived soon thereafter. 11.  According to the applicants' account, the officers allegedly “showed a hostile attitude” towards them and “were not interested in checking their [identity documents] but simply to force them out” of the athletics club. The policemen “immediately wanted to handcuff them and pulled their arms backwards”. The applicants state that they “resisted this treatment”. The first applicant “managed to get free for a moment”, while the second applicant was “pushed and pulled” by two police officers. He was treated with tear-gas and struck with a stick. 12.  According to the Government, the applicants resisted and attacked the policemen who were trying to apprehend them. One of the officers was kicked in the face and another in the crotch. 13.  The parties submit that only when one officer drew a gun from his holster did the applicants yield. They were then handcuffed. 14.  The applicants were immediately put in a police vehicle. 15.  The Government state that the applicants still resisted whilst being taken to the vehicle, and force again had to be used against them. 16.  The applicants were taken to a police station situated 4 kilometres from the athletics club. 17.  According to the applicants' account, in the police van they were put on the ground and stayed handcuffed. The van had no separate cell for the arrested. The policemen and the applicants were closed together in the rear part of the van. The applicants “had no chance but to expose their bodies to the treatment of the policemen”. They “suffered heavy blows in their heads, kidneys, backs and spines”. The policemen used their police sticks to beat them up. The first applicant lost consciousness. 18.  The Government deny that any ill-treatment occurred in the van. 19.  At the police station the applicants were briefly questioned. The part of the first applicant's custody interview record concerning his physical condition reads: “before [the arrest the applicant was] well, at present [he complains of] pain in the left eye, the neck, the left kidney, the jaw and the head”. The relevant part of the second applicant's custody interview record reads: “pain in the temples, the hands, the nose, the teeth, the right thumb”. In the late evening of the same day the applicants were examined by doctors. The x-ray photograph of the first applicant's cranium showed no apparent injuries to his head. On the basis of the applicants' physical examination, which disclosed no problems in their circulatory and respiratory systems, a doctor concluded that they could be regarded as fit for detention. 20.  The applicants remained in custody until the afternoon of the next day, 5 October 1993, when they were brought before a district prosecutor. They were released after having been questioned by the prosecutor. 21.  The first applicant was taken to a hospital where he remained for 11 days. The second applicant was taken to the same hospital, was immediately released, and later underwent out-patient treatment. 22.  On 5 October 1993, when being questioned by the prosecutors, the applicants complained that they had been beaten up by the police officers in the athletics club and in the police van. The applicants said that they had doubts as to the officers' identity, and that they had asked the policemen to present documents attesting to their authority. They alleged that the officers had refused to do so and that the policemen had instead attempted to arrest them. The applicants further stated that, in the police van, which lacked a separate cell for the arrested, the officers had started to inflict heavy blows all over their bodies. They had been defenceless and had not been able to lessen the impact of the blows because of their hands being handcuffed behind their backs and themselves being pushed onto the vehicle's floor. They submitted that the officers had beaten them all the way to the police station. 23.  On 15 March 1994 a district prosecutor, on suspicion that offences against the applicants' personal rights had been committed in breach of the Polish Criminal Code and the Police Act, instituted investigations relating to the applicants' complaints against the police officers. The police officers who allegedly ill-treated the applicants were regarded as witnesses, not as accused, in the proceedings. 24.  The applicants were called to appear before the district prosecutor on 25 March 1994, but failed to present themselves on that date. 25.  On 28 March 1994 the prosecutor examined a witness DK (policeman). On 30 March witnesses MK and MS (police officers) were examined. On 6 April witnesses MW (the applicants' acquaintance) and EP (the club manager) were questioned. On 13 April the prosecutor summoned witnesses JS and MB, and on 20 April he summoned a witness PW (all police officers). 26.  The applicants were examined on 5 and 9 May 1994. During the inquiries the applicants maintained that the officers had been very hostile towards them from the very beginning, that they had not asked them to leave the athletics club, and that they had, without any reason, beaten them up. The policemen contended that they had been attacked by the applicants, and that only threatening them with a firearm had permitted their apprehension. 27.  On 23 May 1994 the prosecutor heard witnesses MW, JR and JN (police officers). On 24 May 1994 he summoned witnesses AG and JP (doctors). On 26 May the prosecutor examined a witness DJ, and on 27 May he questioned a witness MH (both doctors). 28.  The investigation into the conduct of the policemen was prolonged by decision of a regional prosecutor of 10 June 1994, with a view to examining further witnesses. 29.  On 14 June 1994 the district prosecutor examined witnesses AW and RM (doctors). 30.  On 16 June 1994 the Forensic Department of the Białystok Academy of Medicine produced an opinion as to the applicants' physical condition following the incident. The opinion was delivered at the request of the Lublin District Court in the proceedings against the applicants (also see § 44 below). 31.  The forensic experts, based on the medical records collected throughout the applicants' treatment from 5 October 1993, found that immediately after the incident the first applicant had a haematoma around the left eye, a bruise of 2 x 2 cm on the back of his head, a bruise with grazed skin of 7 x 7 cm on the left side of his jaw, four band-like bruises of significant size on his chest, and that his abdomen and spine were sensitive. The second applicant had small isolated bruises on his chin and neck, bruises on a grazed upper lip, an inner wound in the mucous membrane of the upper lip, lesions of the front teeth, and an injury to the right knee and wrist. 32.  The forensic experts also stated that several days after the incident the first applicant had been increasingly complaining of pain in his head, vertigo, diminished clarity of sight and hearing, and that the second applicant had been complaining about a weak right hand, diminished sensitivity of his fingers, severe headaches, vertigo, nausea, pain in the spine and a reduced ability to move. The experts noted that the subsequent examinations of the applicants had not confirmed any deviations from the normal state of their heath. The experts stated that on 8 October 1993 the first applicant should have been released from hospital but remained following an intervention by the applicants' father. The experts also stressed that the father, himself a doctor, during his visits at the hospital had been instructing the first applicant of what and how he should complain. The first applicant had been released from hospital on 15 October 1993, although after this date he underwent further out-patient treatment of his jaw, chest and spine. 33.  The forensic experts concluded that the injuries sustained by the applicants might have occurred from the use of a rigid, blunt instrument, e.g. a truncheon, and that the lesions might have occurred in the circumstances alleged by them, e.g. from blows by truncheons and fists. The experts held that the damage caused by these injuries to the applicants' soft tissues did not last more than seven days, but that those injuries were serious enough to warrant application of Article 156 § 2 of the Polish Criminal Code [causing light bodily harm] against the police officers. The experts also emphasised that the applicants' grievances had contained a certain measure of simulation and exaggeration. 34.  On 29 June 1994 the district prosecutor requested experts at the Wrocław Academy of Medicine to produce a medical opinion specifically in the context of the proceedings concerning the applicants' allegations against the police officers. 35.  By decisions of 9 September and 15 November 1994 the regional prosecutor again prolonged the investigation. 36.  The opinion of the experts at the Wrocław Academy of Medicine was produced on 6 December 1994. They found that following the arrest the first applicant had had bruises on his face and a swollen left eye, and that the second applicant had isolated bruises on the face, a grazed lip and lesions of three teeth. The experts also found that the first applicant had not been suffering from concussion. The experts stated that the injuries of the applicants could occur in the circumstances alleged by the police officers, the applicants or in other circumstances. 37.  The applicants requested the district prosecutor to hear additional witnesses, namely their parents, two district prosecutors and an American basketball player who had witnessed the events of 4 October 1993. On 9 September 1994 the prosecutor dismissed the request on the ground that the applicants' parents had not witnessed the incident, that the testimonies of the prosecutors had not been relevant to the determination of the facts, and that the statements of the American basketball player had been recorded in the proceedings against the applicants. On these grounds the prosecutor considered that no examination of further witnesses was necessary. 38.  On 12 December 1994 the prosecutor decided to discontinue the investigation against the policemen. The prosecutor held that there was a lack of evidence in favour of the applicants' allegations that the officers had committed an offence. On the basis of witnesses' evidence, he held that the policemen had been compelled to use force only following the applicants' refusal to leave the sports club. The prosecutor did not establish that any force had been used against the applicants in the police van. By virtue of the medical opinion of the Wrocław Academy of Medicine, the prosecutor stated that the fact of the applicants' hospitalisation for seven days did not necessarily infer that the full period of seven days had been required to complete the treatment of lesions suffered by the applicants. The prosecutor concluded that “the injuries [sustained by the applicants] could occur both in the circumstances alleged by themselves, as well as in the circumstances alleged by the police officers”. Given the principle of benefit of doubt in favour of the accused, the prosecutor decided to discontinue the case against the police officers. 39.  The applicants appealed against the decision. On 16 January 1995 a regional prosecutor dismissed the appeal and finally discontinued the proceedings. The regional prosecutor found no “unequivocal evidence” of the officers' guilt. He held that the district prosecutor had properly assessed the collected material, and that he had adopted a well-motivated decision. 40.  After questioning the applicants on 5 October 1993, a district prosecutor commenced investigations against them on suspicion that they had attacked the police officers, thereby obstructing them in the course of their duties. On the same day the prosecutor ordered the applicants' bail on suspicion of their having committed an offence under Article 234 of the Criminal Code in regard to the events of 4 October 1993. 41.  On 6 October 1993 the applicants appealed against the bail decision, requesting the prosecuting authorities to appoint a free defence lawyer on the ground of their difficult financial situation, referring inter alia to Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention. The applicants received no reply to the requests. 42.  In the course of the investigation the policemen, the applicants and witnesses of the events of 4 October 1993, including witnesses on the applicants' behalf, were summoned. The applicants submitted many applications in which they contended that the allegations against them should have been examined from the angle of their own complaints that the officers had beaten them up. However, by virtue of relevant provisions of domestic criminal procedure, the prosecution decided that the material contained in the case-file relating to the applicants' allegations on their maltreatment by the police officers be separated and that two parallel investigations be conducted in relation to the incident of 4 October 1993. 43.  On 17 February 1994 the applicants were charged with affray, assault and battery on the police officers in the course of the execution of their duties. 44.  On 7 April 1994 the Lublin District Court decided to obtain from the Forensic Department of the Białystok Academy of Medicine an opinion as to the applicants' injuries following the incident. The opinion was produced on 16 June 1994 (also see §§ 30-33 above). 45.  On 17 October 1994 the Lublin District Court decided to obtain an opinion from forensic psychiatrists to establish whether the applicants had been “able to ascertain and measure their actions” to determine their criminal responsibility. The court also decided to appoint a free lawyer to represent the applicants in view of the concern over their state of mind, in accordance with Article 70 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 46.  By a letter of 18 October 1994 the applicants informed the court that they refused to undergo a psychiatric examination. They did not appear for the out-patient psychiatric examination at the Lublin Centre for Mental Health on the date fixed by the court on 10 January 1995. The court ordered compulsory appearance of the applicants on the next date fixed for out-patient psychiatric examination on 2 February 1995. The applicants were brought to the experts on the above date, but refused to be subjected to an examination. The above situation repeated itself on 8 March 1995. In view of the fact that the applicants had refused to undergo out-patient psychiatric examination three times, on 8 March 1995 the forensic psychiatrists requested the court to place the applicants at a mental hospital for a forensic-psychiatric opinion to be produced. 47.  On 23 March 1995 the Lublin District Court ordered the applicants' compulsory placement at the Lublin Centre for Mental Health for a period of no longer than six weeks. The applicants and their counsel appealed against the above decision. In the appeal the applicants' representative declared that he undertook to ensure their voluntary appearance for out-patient psychiatric examination. On 3 April 1995 the Lublin Regional Court, having regard in particular to the above commitment by the applicants' defence counsel, quashed the decision of 23 March 1995. 48.  On the next day fixed for the applicants' out-patient psychiatric examination on 30 May 1995, they again failed to submit to out-patient examination. On 21 June 1995 the experts repeatedly requested the court to order compulsory measures against the applicants in order to produce a forensic-psychiatric opinion. 49.  On 11 July 1995 the Lublin District Court again ordered the applicants' compulsory placement at a mental hospital for a period of no more than six weeks. On the applicants' appeal from this decision, on 24 July 1995 the Lublin Regional Court upheld the decision of the District Court. 50.  On 1 December 1995 the first applicant was placed at the Lublin Centre for Mental Health. Upon the experts' application requesting to prolong the first applicant's stay at the ward in view of his negative attitude obstructing the production of a proper diagnosis, on 11 January 1996, the Lublin District Court extended the term of the first applicant's examination until 23 February 1996. On his appeal against the above decision, on 22 January 1996 the Lublin Regional Court upheld the decision of the District Court. The first applicant was released from the psychiatric ward on 15 February 1996. 51.  On 22 February 1996 the final opinion as to the mental condition of the first applicant was issued. The forensic psychiatrists concluded that at the moment of the incident with the police on 4 October 1993 he was able to comprehend the meaning of his acts and to control his conduct. The first applicant was not found to be of unsound mind. The experts also noted that he had been very suspicious and distrustful of the examination. 52.  As the second applicant expressed his willingness to undergo out-patient psychiatric observation, he was not placed in a mental hospital. The forensic psychiatrists delivered their opinion in regard to the second applicant on 27 February 1996. According to the experts' conclusions, the second applicant was mentally sane. The experts also noted that he had been very stressed throughout the examination, often speaking with a raised voice and not noticing the requests to calm him down. 53.  On 7 August 1996 the Lublin District Court found the applicants guilty under Article 234 of the Criminal Code in that they had resisted and assaulted the officers on 4 October 1993. It held that the manager of the athletics club had been entitled to demand the applicants' removal notwithstanding his motives therefor, and that the police had lawfully enforced this demand. The applicants were sentenced: the first applicant to one year and six months' imprisonment and the second applicant to one year's imprisonment. The court suspended the sentences for three years for each of the applicants. 54.  On 17 December 1996 the Lublin Regional Court, upon the applicants' appeal, upheld the first-instance judgment. The Regional Court concluded that “the fact that the defendants did not comply with the request of the five police officers to leave the sports hall shows a lack, on their part, of a critical judgment of their own conduct - this was also confirmed by the forensic psychiatrists”. That decision was final. The applicants were not imprisoned as a result of the conviction.


5.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Ovchepoltsi. 6.  On the evening of 1 May 1991 the applicant was involved in a fight between several people in the village of Ovchepoltsi. During the fight he was stabbed with a knife in the stomach. Some members of the public came to his aid and took him to hospital. 7.  On the same day the applicant was admitted as an in-patient, and underwent an urgent operation. He was discharged on 13 May 1991 and was given thirty days’ sick leave. 8.  On 1 May 1991 the investigating authorities inspected the site where the fight had taken place. They took photos and seized a wooden stick stained with blood. 9.  On 1 and 2 May 1991 several witnesses were questioned. 10.  On 2 May 1991 criminal proceedings were opened against two of the participants in the fight: T.S. and P.S. They were charged with attempted murder and questioned. 11.  On 12 May 1992 the case investigator commissioned a medical expert report to establish the extent of the victim’s injuries. The report relied on the medical records from the applicant’s stay in hospital and established that he had suffered a 3 cm knife wound in the abdominal cavity which resulted in an injury to the great omentum and to the large intestine. The applicant had also suffered a combination of other injuries: large bruises on the face and on the right leg, and a broken rib. 12.  Between 18 May and 8 June 1992 several witnesses were questioned. 13.  It appears that between 1991 and 1994 the applicant’s mother wrote several times to the prosecuting authorities, complaining of inactivity on the part of the investigator in charge of the case. In response, the supervising prosecutor wrote to the investigator on several occasions requesting that the investigation be completed; for example in a letter of 19 August 1994 the prosecutor requested that the investigation be completed “without delay”. 14.  On 17 June 1996 the attempted murder charge against T.S. was changed to a charge of having caused intermediate bodily harm and he was questioned in this connection. 15.  On 11 September 1996 the attempted murder charge against P.S. was also changed to a charge of having caused intermediate bodily harm and he too was questioned. 16.  Between 25 August 2000 and 1 July 2002 some of the witnesses were recalled for further questioning. 17.  On 18 July 2003, following a complaint by the applicant’s lawyer in relation to the length of the investigation and inactivity on the part of the investigator in charge of the case, the supervising prosecutor removed the investigator and gave instructions to the investigating authorities to commission a new medical expert report and to conclude the investigation within thirty days. The Court has not been informed by either party of what substantive investigative steps, if any, were undertaken after that date. 18.  On 5 June 2006 the public prosecutor terminated the proceedings on the ground that the relevant statutory limitation period for bringing a prosecution had lapsed. 19.  On 13 July 2006 the applicant appealed against the order terminating the proceedings. In a decision of 17 July 2006 the Pazardzhik Regional Court (“the Regional Court”) ruled that the assailants remained charged with attempted murder and therefore the statutory limitation period for prosecution had not lapsed. The court remitted the case to the prosecutor’s office, instructing it to continue with the investigation. 20.  T.S. and P.S. appealed against the decision of the Regional Court. In a final decision of 27 September 2006 the Plovdiv Court of Appeal ruled that the assailants had remained charged only with having caused intermediate bodily harm. The court quashed the Regional Court’s decision and upheld the prosecutor’s order terminating the proceedings.


4.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in the town of Ulan-Ude in the Buryatiya Republic. 5.  The Russian authorities initiated criminal proceedings against the applicant:
-  on 13 June 1999 under Article 198 § 2 of the Criminal Code (tax evasion by a private person); the applicant was charged on 10 August 1999;
-  on 24 June 1999 under Article 201 § 1 of the Code (abuse of power);
-  on 29 August 1999 under Article 199 of the Code (tax evasion by a legal entity);
-  on 13 October 1999 under Article 160 § 3 (b) (misappropriation of private property);
-  on 21 January 2000 under Article 165 (causing pecuniary damage). 6.  The above cases were joined on a number of occasions, most recently on 4 June 2001. According to the Government, the charges under Articles 165 and 199 of the Code were abandoned on 5 January 2000 and 4 June 2001 respectively (see, however, paragraph 9 below). 7.  According to the Government, the proceedings were suspended on 6 January, 4 February and 17 August 2000, 13 June and 21 September 2001, and 20 January 2003, owing to the applicant’s illness. According to the Government, the applicant and his counsel were advised that the proceedings had been suspended on a number of occasions and subsequently resumed. 8.  On 18 August 2004 the applicant sought access to the case file and, in particular, to the above-mentioned decisions to suspend the proceedings. On 27 August 2004 the Prosecutor’s Office of the Buryatiya Republic sent him a letter stating that the case file might be available at the archives of the Tax Authority in Ulan-Ude. On 5 October 2004 the Investigations Department of the Regional Ministry of the Interior informed the applicant that the criminal case against him had been suspended owing to his illness. Upon his renewed request, on 22 December 2004 the applicant received another reply from the Regional Office of the Drugs Control Service stating that the Investigations Department might be able to provide the requested documents. On 8 September 2005 the Drugs Control Service informed the applicant that on 10 July 2003 the criminal case against him had been forwarded to the Prosecutor’s Office of the Buryatiya Republic. 9.  On 20 January 2006 the Investigations Department discontinued the proceedings as regards charges under Articles 160, 165, 198, 199 and 201 of the Criminal Code. 10.  In August 1997 the applicant bought a PAZ-320500 bus. On 5 November 1999 the investigator in the criminal case against the applicant (see above) authorised seizure of the bus as security for eventual civil claims against him or eventual confiscation as a penalty under Article 160 § 3 (b) of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 16 below). On 9 November 1999 the applicant’s bus was seized. It appears that no civil claims were lodged in the criminal case against the applicant. 11.  On an unspecified date the bus was transferred for safekeeping to a Mr Y. 12.  In September 2003 the applicant brought proceedings in which he challenged the investigator’s seizure order as unlawful and requested the court to release the bus. 13.  On 15 September 2003 the Sovetskiy District Court of Ulan-Ude examined the applicant’s claims with reference to Article 125 of the 2002 Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 19 below) and rejected them as unfounded. The court held as follows:
“...under Article 175 § 1 of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure in order to secure civil claims or eventual confiscation of property the investigator shall issue an order of attachment in respect of the accused’s property which had been unlawfully obtained. Article 160 § 3 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation provides for confiscation as a penalty. Besides, the case discloses pecuniary loss [sustained by the victim], and the victim has the right to file a civil claim for damages against the applicant...
The court finds no reasons for leaving the bus with [the applicant] for safekeeping...
The [first instance] court rejected the applicant’s arguments to the effect that his property rights over the bus had been breached by the continuing attachment of property and the criminal case is still pending. The case is being suspended owing to the applicant’s illness...” 14.  On 11 November 2003 the Supreme Court of the Buryatiya Republic upheld the judgment on appeal. The court stated:
“Under Article 115 § 9 the Code of Criminal Procedure, which is now applicable to issues pertaining to attachment of property, the authority dealing with the criminal case has the power to release the property under the order of attachment, if attachment is no longer needed. As shown by the case file, at present the criminal case against the applicant is being dealt with by the investigating authority, the investigation being suspended. Taking into account the earlier submissions and the requirement of the procedure under Article 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the court is not empowered to decide on the issue of lifting the order of attachment...” 15.  On 18 July 2006 the deputy prosecutor of the Buryatiya Republic lifted the order of attachment in respect of the applicant’s bus. The applicant was served with a copy of that decision on 21 March 2007. It appears that the authorities were unable to determine where the bus was kept and thus could not return it to the applicant.


5.  The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Ljubljana. 6.  On 6 January 1992 the applicant and her then husband F.B., who had decided to get divorced, entered into an agreement on the partition of their joint property. The agreement stipulated, inter alia, that F.B. would transfer to her, within one year, the ownership of premises on Zaloška Street, unless they agreed on a different location. The agreement further stipulated that if the stated obligations were not fulfilled, the applicant could terminate the agreement and claim a share of the joint property in accordance with the relevant domestic law. On 24 April 1992 the applicant and F.B. divorced. 7.  Subsequently, F.B. did not transfer the ownership of premises on Zaloška Street to the applicant. However, on 24 September 1992 the applicant accepted the keys of certain premises on Trubarjeva Street. After F.B. had bought the latter premises, on 6 November 1992, he offered the applicant the possibility of signing a supplement to the agreement. According to the supplement, the applicant would receive forty per cent of the premises on Trubarjeva Street as a form of alternative performance of the relevant part of the agreement. The applicant refused to sign the supplement to the agreement. 8.  On 3 May 1993 she instituted proceedings in the Ljubljana Basic Court (Temeljno sodišče v Ljublani) seeking termination of the agreement and partition of the joint property. 9.  On 16 November 1993 F.B. died and his heirs, J.B.J, B.E.B. and M.B., took over his capacity in the proceedings. 10.  On 9 November 1995 the court issued a partial judgment terminating the relevant agreement and rejecting the counter-claim lodged by J.B.J, B.E.B. and M.B (“the heirs”). 11.  On 11 April 1996 the Ljubljana Higher Court (Višje sodišče v Ljubljani) quashed the first-instance court’s judgment and remitted the case for re-examination. The applicant then challenged that decision in an appeal on points of law, but that was rejected by the Supreme Court on 22 May 1997. 12.  In the re-examination proceedings, on 14 September 1998, the (renamed) Ljubljana District Court (Okrožno sodišče v Ljubljani) issued a new judgment rejecting the applicant’s claim. The court considered that the relevant agreement was not a “fixed contract” (fiksna pogodba) which could be terminated without allowing additional time for its performance. Moreover, from F.B.’s conduct it had not been apparent that he was not going to honour his obligation. The applicant should therefore have offered an additional time-limit to F.B. In addition, the court found that F.B. had in large part fulfilled his obligations and that the applicant, by accepting the keys to the premises on Trubarjeva Street, had agreed to an alternative performance of the agreement. 13.  On 31 March 1999 the Ljubljana Higher Court upheld the first-instance court’s judgment. It, however, amended certain parts concerning the payment of costs and expenses. 14.  On 13 May 1999 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court (Vrhovno sodišče). She supplemented the appeal on 25 May 1999. 15.  On 19 April 2000 the Supreme Court upheld the applicant’s appeal to the extent that it concerned the application of law by the lower courts, but dismissed the remainder. The Supreme Court considered that the interpretation of the relevant agreement concerned the application of the law. It then concluded that F.B. had not fulfilled his obligations by offering the applicant only a share of the premises on Trubarjeva Street. In addition, the applicant had not consented to the alternative performance nor had F.B. showed an intention to fulfil his obligations. The Supreme Court consequently varied the lower courts’ judgments and terminated the relevant agreement. As far as the partition of the joint property was concerned, the Supreme Court remitted the case to the first-instance court. 16.  Two of the heirs (J.B.J. and B.E.B.) lodged a constitutional appeal complaining, inter alia, of the arbitrariness of the Supreme Court’s judgment and of a breach of the provision guaranteeing equal protection of rights (Article 22 of the Constitution). On 30 January 2001 the Constitutional Court (Ustavno sodišče) accepted the appeal for consideration, which is equivalent to declaring it admissible. On 10 May 2001 it upheld the appeal by five votes to three, quashed the Supreme Court’s judgment and remitted the case to the Supreme Court for re-examination (decision no. Up-232/00). It would appear that the applicant was informed of that decision (see paragraph 22 below), but there is no document in the case file certifying as to when. 17.  The Constitutional Court found that the Supreme Court’s decision was based on the interpretation of the parties’ motivation and of the content of the agreement. In its view, such interpretation constituted an interference with the facts established by the lower courts. However, according to the domestic legislation, the Supreme Court, when deciding on an appeal on points of law, had jurisdiction only for the determination of legal issues. The Constitutional Court found that the Supreme Court’s decision was obviously erroneous and therefore arbitrary. This, and the fact that the Supreme Court had exceeded its jurisdiction, represented an interference with the appellants’ right to equal protection of rights. 18.  In the re-examination proceedings, the Supreme Court, on 17 December 2001, again varied the lower courts’ judgments by terminating the relevant agreement and remitting the case to the first-instance court to determine the partition of the joint property. 19.  After accepting for consideration the relevant part of the heirs’ further constitutional appeal on 17 June 2002, the Constitutional Court, on 12 December 2002, quashed the Supreme Court’s judgment, dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law and upheld the Ljubljana Higher Court’s judgment of 31 March 1999. The decision was adopted by six votes to two (decision no. Up-140/02). 20.  The Constitutional Court found that the Supreme Court had again dealt with questions of fact – a matter over which it had no jurisdiction; that it had failed to provide reasons for its decision, which was different from previous decisions adopted in other cases concerning the same issue; and that it had disregarded the instructions given by the Constitutional Court. The latter therefore again found a violation of the right to equal protection of rights. Using the special power afforded in section 60 of the Constitutional Court Act and because of the already lengthy duration of the proceedings, the Constitutional Court, in order to secure effective judicial protection, decided on the merits of the case itself and upheld the Higher Court’s judgment of 31 March 1999. 21.  The Constitutional Court’s decisions of 10 May 2001 and 12 December 2002 noted, under paragraph 3, as follows:
“in accordance with the provisions of sections 6 and 56 of the Constitutional Court Act, the Constitutional Court served the constitutional appeal on the Supreme Court, on the opposite party (plaintiff) to the proceedings [the applicant] and on the third defendant in the proceedings. None of them replied to the constitutional appeal.” 22.  According to the applicant, she had not received a copy of the first constitutional appeal. On 4 July 2001, a note was prepared by an official in this connection on the Constitutional Court’s premises. The note, which appeared to be part of the file no. Up 232/00, mentioned that the constitutional appeal and admissibility decision of 30 January 2001 had been handed over to the applicant. 23.  In addition, the applicant submitted to the Court copies of receipts relating to the attempt to serve the process by the Constitutional Court, concerning the file no. Up 140/02. It would appear that this process included a copy of the second constitutional appeal, the admissibility decision and a letter informing the applicant that the constitutional appeal had been accepted for consideration and that that the applicant should submit her comments within eight days. It transpires from the receipts that the process was sent by the Constitutional Court on 21 June 2002 but had not been served on the applicant. The address referred to in the receipts and the letter is different from the applicant’s address as mentioned in her claim and in the decisions issued in the domestic proceedings, including in the last Supreme Court judgment. According to the applicant, the address used to serve the process was actually the address of one of the other parties to the proceedings.


5.  The applicant was born in 1953 and is serving his sentence in correctional colony no. 2 in the Astrakhan Region. 6.  On 9 May 2012 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of murder committed during a fight with the victim. Two days later the Kirovskiy District Court of Astrakhan authorised his remand in custody, having noted the gravity of the charges, his previous convictions, including for violent crimes, his failure to “get on the road to improvement”, the absence of an “official” source of income, and his lack of dependants. 7.  That decision was upheld on appeal by the Astrakhan Regional Court, which fully endorsed the District Court’s reasoning. In addition, the Regional Court took into account that the applicant was suffering from the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) but stated that there was no medical evidence that he could not continue being detained in the conditions of a temporary detention facility. 8.  Another extension of the applicant’s detention followed on 9 July 2012, when the District Court accepted the investigator’s arguments that he was likely to re-offend, abscond and interfere with the investigation. The District Court linked those risks to the gravity of the charges against the applicant, his having received “negative characteristics” at his place of residence, as well as his having already been “the subject of criminal prosecution”. At the same time the court examined medical evidence produced by the applicant in support of his claim that the fact that he was suffering from an advanced stage of HIV precluded his detention. The District Court dismissed the claim, stressing that the applicant regularly received medication prescribed by a prison doctor and that his detention in the temporary detention facility did not pose a risk to his health. 9.  The District Court issued further orders extending the applicant’s pre‑trial detention on 2 August, 6 September and 7 November 2012. Each time, it relied on the gravity of the charges and the risk flowing of the applicant absconding, interfering with the course of justice and reoffending. Neither detention order mentioned that the applicant had a criminal record. The applicant’s arguments about the progress of his HIV infection and the rapid deterioration of his health did not convince the District Court. The order of 7 November 2012 extended the applicant’s detention until 9 December 2012. It was upheld on appeal by the Astrakhan Regional Court on 14 November 2012, with reference to the gravity of the charges and the applicant’s “personality”. The relevant part of the decision reads as follows:
“On 11 May 2012 ... the Kirovskiy District Court of Astrakhan ordered [the applicant’s] detention. Subsequently, the detention was lawfully extended. ...
In extending the detention for up to seven months, the court reasonably took into account that [the applicant] was charged with a particularly serious criminal offence and that, in view of his personality and the circumstances of the case, he was liable to reoffend or destroy the evidence.
The court also correctly held that the case was particularly complex, due to the large number of investigatory activities and complex expert examinations to be conducted. The court also took into account the applicant’s lengthy treatment in the prison hospital.
The court correctly concluded that there were no grounds for changing the measure of restraint.”
The Regional Court did not address the applicant’s arguments, raised in his statement of appeal, that the investigating authorities significantly delayed a number of procedural actions, including the expert examination scheduled as early as June 2012 and not yet performed. 10.  The District Court further extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention on 8 December 2012, summarily referring to his “personality” and “socially dangerous conduct”. The court also pointed out that some unspecified expert examinations had been conducted, which had “objectively influenced the length of the investigation”. 11.  On 30 December 2012 the applicant’s pre-trial detention was again extended on the grounds of the gravity of the charges and the continued risk of his absconding and interfering with the course of justice. The court used similar wording as in the previous detention orders. 12.  On 16 March 2013 the applicant was served with the final version of the bill of indictment. The bill indicated that the applicant had no criminal record. 13.  On 6 August 2013 the District Court convicted the applicant of murder. The court found that he had killed the victim in the course of an altercation caused by the victim’s insults. The District Court sentenced the applicant to seven years of imprisonment, having taken into account the following mitigating circumstances: the applicant had no criminal record, was “positively characterised”, had surrendered himself to the police, had confessed to the killing and felt deep remorse, and the victim had behaved provocatively having initiated the conflict with the applicant. 14.  In January 2004 the applicant was diagnosed with stage 4A HIV. He was taken under the supervision of specialists of the Astrakhan Regional Centre for Protection from AIDS (hereinafter “the AIDS Centre”). 15.  Medical certificates provided by the applicant show that he had started receiving antiretroviral therapy on 22 March 2011 with very positive results. The viral load had significantly decreased and the applicant’s immune status had improved. A CD4 cell-count test carried out on 17 February 2012 showed that the level of CD4 cells was 489 cells/mm3. 16.  On 11 May 2012 the applicant was placed in detention facility no. 1. On the same date he was examined by a doctor, who recorded no complaints and diagnosed him with a stomach ulcer in remission. 17.  On 26 June 2012 doctors from the AIDS Centre recorded a deterioration in the applicant’s condition. They recommended continuation of the antiretroviral therapy and an in-patient examination. 18.  Between 12 July and 12 September 2012 the applicant underwent a check-up in the prison hospital of correctional colony no. 2 (“the hospital”). He was diagnosed with chronic pancreatitis, chronic gastroduodenitis, iron deficiency anaemia, fungal esophagitis, urolithiasis, and hepatic haemangioma. 19.  It appears that on 16 July 2012 an immunological test was performed. It showed that the level of CD4 cells was 649 cells/mm3. 20.  Since August 2012 the doctors have again recorded a deterioration in the applicant’s condition and an increase in his viral load. They linked the deterioration to prior interruptions in the antiretroviral therapy. It is not clear from the documents submitted by the applicant when and why those interruptions occurred. 21.  On 20 September 2012 a doctor from the AIDS Centre diagnosed the applicant with stage 4A HIV and fungal esophagitis, and recommended that antiretroviral therapy be continued. 22.  On 26 September 2012, on a recommendation of the medical staff of the AIDS Centre, the applicant was again admitted to the hospital. He underwent treatment for HIV and fungal esophagitis. On 8 October 2012 he returned to the detention facility. 23.  Throughout his detention the applicant was prescribed a special diet. 24.  According to a typed copy of the applicant’s medical file provided by the Government, on admission to detention facility no. 1 the applicant was examined by a doctor whom he informed that he was suffering from HIV. 25.  On 16 May 2012 medical staff from the AIDS Centre were allowed to see the applicant. The doctors noted that he was suffering from stage 4A HIV and recommended that his antiretroviral therapy be continued. On the same date the applicant received one month’s dose of antiretroviral drugs (Reyataz and Combivir). 26.  The applicant continued being monitored by the medical staff of the AIDS-Centre, who examined him again on 26 June 2012. Following their recommendations, and in response to the applicant’s complaint of fatigue and pain in the epigastrium (upper abdomen), on 12 July 2012 he was transferred to the hospital for an in-depth examination. On the same date it was noted in his medical file that he was receiving antiretroviral drugs. The entries dated 2 and 6 August 2012 indicated that he had been taking those drugs. 27.  While at the hospital, the applicant was monitored by an infectious diseases specialist, who examined him on twenty-four occasions. The applicant also underwent an ultrasound examination and a fibrogastroduodenoscopy. On 27 August 2012 he was examined by an urologist and a gastroenterologist in a civil hospital. He was also observed by an otolaryngologist and a neurologist. The final diagnosis was: HIV infection aggravated by secondary illnesses, chronic pancreatitis, chronic gastroduodenitis, iron deficiency anaemia, oesophageal candidiasis, hepatic hemangioma, chronic prostatitis, chronic cholecystitis, fungal esophagitis, and a duodenal bulb ulcer. The applicant received treatment for those illnesses. 28.  On 12 September 2012, having found that the applicant’s condition had improved, the hospital discharged him. 29.  On 20 September 2012 a doctor from the AIDS Centre examined the applicant at the detention facility. The doctor noted that the applicant was taking the antiretroviral drugs with strict adherence, and recommended virological and immunological testing, as well as another ultrasound examination and a fibrogastroduodenoscopy. 30.  On 26 September 2012 the applicant was admitted to the hospital for additional tests. On 8 October he was transferred back to the detention facility. 31.  On 18 October 2012 the applicant complained of fatigue, coughing and headaches. A doctor diagnosed chronic bronchitis and prescribed him anti-candidiasis and cough medication, as well as vitamins. 32.  On 4 November 2012 an entry made in the applicant’s medical file indicated that the “last” immunological test had shown the level of CD4 cells at 513 cells/mm3. 33.  On 13 November 2012 the applicant complained to a doctor of heaviness in his abdomen, dizziness and heartburn. The doctor noted that those were the effects of his not complying with the special diet and prescribed medication for his ulcer and gastroduodenitis. 34.  On 27 November 2012 the applicant was examined in response to his complaints of fatigue, pain in the abdomen, and pyrosis. The doctor noted that the applicant had been receiving antiretroviral therapy and recommended his transfer to hospital for an examination and another diagnosis. 35.  On the applicant’s admission to the hospital on 3 December 2012, his complaints of fatigue, heartburn and stomach aches were recorded. On the same date it was again noted that he was receiving antiretroviral drugs. At the hospital he was seen by an infections specialist several times a week, examined by a neurologist and an otolaryngologist, and underwent a fibrogastroduodenoscopy. In addition to his previously recorded illnesses, the applicant was diagnosed with a prostate adenoma. He received treatment for his non-communicable diseases, and was prescribed the same antiretroviral drugs as before. 36.  On 18 January 2013 the applicant was dismissed from the hospital “in a satisfactory condition”, with the proviso that he had to be actively supervised by the detention facility medical personnel. On the same date he was examined by a doctor at the detention facility. The doctor noted that the applicant needed “dynamic supervision” and prescribed medication for his pancreatitis and stomach ulcer. 37.  On 23 January 2013, in response to the applicant’s complaint of back pains, he was prescribed anti-inflammatory drugs. 38.  On 12 February 2013 the applicant complained to a psychiatrist of sleeping problems and irritability, and was prescribed antidepressants. 39.  On 20 March 2013 a doctor from the AIDS Centre paid the applicant a visit. Following the doctor’s recommendation, the applicant was yet again admitted to hospital. On arrival he complained of poor appetite, fatigue, heartburn, pains in his chest and stomach ache. He was then seen by an infectious diseases specialist, an ophthalmologist, an otolaryngologist, a cardiologist and a neurologist. They concluded that there was no change in his diagnosis and prescribed him treatment for the non-communicable infections. On 3 April 2013 it was noted that the applicant was regularly taking antiretroviral drugs. A week later, despite the lack of significant improvement in his condition, he was discharged from the hospital since he had to appear at a court hearing. 40.  On 19 June 2013 the applicant was re-admitted to the hospital. Under the supervision of the infectious diseases specialist he received treatment for cholecystitis and gastroduodenitis. He was also examined by a neurologist, an otolaryngologist and an ophthalmologist, and was diagnosed with cerebrovascular disease. An entry in the record of 19 June 2013 showed that the applicant had enough drugs to last until 23 June 2013. The entry dated 25 June 2013 mentioned that he had not complied with the special diet prescribed to him. On 9 July 2013 the applicant was discharged in “satisfactory condition”, having been provided with antiretroviral drugs until 23 July 2013. 41.  On the applicant’s admission to correctional colony no. 2 on 24 October 2013, he was examined by prison doctors, who noted that he was receiving antiretroviral therapy. 42.  On 20 November 2013, in response to the applicant’s complaints of pain in the abdomen, he was examined by a prison doctor. A fibrogastroduodenoscopy was carried out on 22 November 2013, and he was prescribed medication for gastroduodenitis. 43.  On 10 December 2013 the applicant was examined by an infectious diseases specialist from the AIDS Centre. The doctor observed the applicant’s complaints of pain in the oesophagus and the chest, and noted that he was receiving antiretroviral drugs, namely Reyataz and Combivir. The doctor recommended that the applicant continue with the therapy and undergo an immunological test. He also suggested that he be subjected to an in-patient examination. The applicant refused to be admitted to the hospital. 44.  On 12 and 16 November 2012 the applicant’s lawyer wrote to the administration of detention facility no. 1, drawing their attention to the applicant’s state of health and asking for his examination by a medical expert. On 13 November 2012 the facility director informed the lawyer that there was no evidence that the applicant was suffering from an illness preventing detention and that, accordingly, there were no grounds for a medical expert examination. 45.  On 4 February 2013 the applicant’s lawyer reiterated his request. 46.  On 10 December 2012 the applicant’s lawyer requested the investigator in charge of the applicant’s criminal case to order a medical examination of the applicant. On 13 December 2012 the request was refused. However, on 4 February 2014 that decision was revoked, and the applicant’s medical expert examination was authorised. 47.  On 17 January 2013 the applicant’s lawyer complained to the Kirovskiy District Court of Astrakhan of the correctional colony administration’s inaction and asked the court to authorise the applicant’s medical examination. On 1 April 2013 the court dismissed the complaint and refused the examination request.


4.  The applicant was born in 1932 and lives in Bojnice. 5.  The applicant’s mother, Mrs D., owned real property. She died in 1982. Her estate was determined by the State Notary Office (Štátne notárstvo) in Považská Bystrica in a decision of 7 October 1982. The inheritance comprised inter alia a share in a complex of agricultural land which was located in Klobušice and was formally divided into several plots. The share of Mrs D. passed to the applicant’s father, Mr D., who himself already owned an equal share in the land. 6.  In 1983 Mr D. died. His estate was determined by notarial decisions of 18 August 1983 and 4 December 1987. His own share in the above land as well as the share inherited from Mrs D. passed to the applicant and her sister. 7.  On 22 March 1993 the applicant and her sister, who were represented by a lawyer, made a submission to the Považská Bystrica District Court (Okresný súd) described as a “motion for commencement of inheritance proceedings”. They maintained that the above inheritance decisions were flawed by inaccuracies as regards the definition of the parcels, their acreage and the ownership shares to be inherited. The applicant and her sister asserted in particular that in the original decisions no account had been taken of the fact that Mrs D. and Mr D. both had equal shares in the land and that the decisions were wrongfully based on their having only one of these shares. They sought “additional inheritance proceedings” and the “correction of obvious errors” in the original decisions. 8.  On 20 January 1994 the District Court took a formal decision to commence inheritance proceedings and authorised a notary public to carry them out. 9.  On 23 May 1996 the District Court discontinued the proceedings. It interpreted the motion of 22 March 1993 as being formally aimed at determining a “newly discovered inheritance” on the death of Mrs D. It observed that no such new inheritance had in fact been disclosed and concluded that, therefore, there was no case to be determined. 10.  On 31 July 1996, on appeal by the applicant and her sister, the Banská Bystrica Regional Court (Krajský súd) quashed the decision of 23 May 1996 and remitted the matter to the District Court for re‑examination. The Regional Court found that the written version of the decision of 7 October 1982 did not correspond to the oral version as recorded in the minutes of the hearing at which it had been pronounced. The Regional Court instructed the District Court to bring the written version in line with the recorded oral version. The Regional Court observed that even the oral version was not absolutely precise. However, in the Regional Court’s view, once the written version of the decision was so “corrected” and a copy of it was served on the parties, they could appeal against it on the merits. 11.  The case‑file was subsequently transmitted to a notary public who was designated by the District Court to effect certain procedural steps in the matter (súdny komisár). 12.  In September 1998 the notary public obtained a report from the Land Registry explaining changes in definition of the land in issue in the context of the preceding land reforms. 13.  On 20 November 1998 the District Court gave a decision under Article 164 of the Code of Civil Procedure correcting errors in the operative part of the written decision of 7 October 1982 by aligning it with the oral version. 14.  On 1 February 1999 the applicant and her sister appealed against the decision of 7 October 1982, as corrected by the decision of 20 November 1998. They argued that, even after the correction, the ruling as regards the land in question was inoperative as the land was not defined clearly. 15.  On 31 May 1999 the Trenčín Regional Court quashed the decision of 20 November 1998. It found that it was not bound by the views of the Banská Bystrica Regional Court as expressed in its decision of 31 July 1996 and found that it was not right “to correct” the decision of 7 October 1982 by bringing it in line with the recorded oral version which itself was inaccurate. The Trenčín Regional Court remitted the case to the District Court and instructed it to examine the contents of the case file. On the basis of such contents the decision of 7 October 1982 was to be corrected by defining the land properly. 16.  In a letter of 6 October 1999 the Vice President of the District Court acknowledged that there had been unjustified delays in the proceedings, especially in the period prior to 23 May 1996 and between 31 October 1996 and 20 November 1998. 17.  On 8 November 1999 the District Court gave a new decision under Article 164 of the Code of Civil Procedure correcting errors in the decision of 7 October 1982. It defined the parcels belonging to the inheritance and took account of the shares in the ownership of these parcels of both Mrs D. and Mr D. However, the District Court also found that some other parcels to which the applicant and her sister claimed title by way of succession did not belong to the estate of Mrs D. 18.  On 7 December 1999 the applicant and her sister lodged an appeal challenging the decision of 8 November 1999 mainly in so far as it concerned the parcels which had been left out from the estate. They demanded that the decision of 8 November 1999 be quashed and that in the subsequent proceedings a hearing should be held before the District Court in order to clarify the matter and to avoid further confusion. 19.  On 31 May 2000 the Trenčín Regional Court upheld the decision of 8 November 1999. In its summary reasoning the Regional Court referred to and fully endorsed the findings and conclusions of the District Court. The Regional Court’s decision was served on the applicant’s lawyer at some point after 17 August 2000.