5.  The applicant was born in 1975. He is currently serving a prison sentence. 6.  On 31 May 2000 the applicant, a tax police officer, was arrested. He was later remanded in custody on suspicion of banditry, robbery and abuse of power. His detention was subsequently extended on several occasions. 7.  The proceedings against the applicant and co-accused were surrounded by an extensive media campaign. In particular, on 6 June 2000 the Segodnia daily newspaper published an article which contained a detailed description by a journalist of the charges against the applicant and co-accused. According to the applicant’s submissions, similar statements were repeated in other Moscow newspapers («Московский Комсомолец») in June 2000. The applicant asserted that the prosecutor had included these articles in the case file as evidence against him. 8.  In April 2001 the pre-trial investigation was completed and the case was referred to the Moscow City Court. 9.  On 8 May 2002 the Moscow City Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to thirteen years’ imprisonment. The court relied on statements of many witnesses, including co-defendants and victims, and forensic expert reports. 10.  On 1 October 2002 the Supreme Court of Russia, acting on appeal, quashed the judgment due to procedural defects and remitted the case for a fresh examination. 11.  On 19 February 2003 the Moscow City Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to twelve years and six months’ imprisonment. During the trial the defendants, relying on their right to silence, refused to testify. The court based its findings on numerous witnesses’ depositions and submissions by the defendants during the pre-trial investigation. 12.  According to the applicant, on 9 June 2003 another Moscow newspaper («Российский Курьер») published an article discussing the applicant’s criminal case. 13.  On 29 July 2003 the Supreme Court of Russia, acting on appeal, upheld the judgment with minor changes. 14.  From 5 June 2000 to 9 September 2003 the applicant was detained in facilities nos. IZ-77/2 and IZ-77/3 in Moscow. 15.  According to certificates issued on 15 February 2006 by the acting facility director, and produced by the Government, the applicant was kept in eight cells. From 5 June to 27 October 2000 he was detained in cells nos. 314, 501, 146 and 218. According to the Government, the information on the number of inmates during the above period was not available as the documents had been destroyed. 16.   Further, the Government submitted that from 27 October 2000 to 22 January 2002 there had been fifteen detainees on average together with the applicant in cell no. 501, which was designed for thirty-eight persons. From 22 January to 12 February 2002 there were four detainees on average in cell no. 27, which was designed for six persons. From 12 February to 17 April 2002 there were ten detainees on average in cell no. 51, which was designed for eight persons. From 17 April to 17 May 2002 there were twenty-five detainees on average in cell no. 140, which was designed for twenty-two persons. There were fifty-one detainees on average in the same cell from 28 October 2002 to 16 February 2003. From 17 to 30 May 2002 there were two detainees on average in cell no. 37, which was designed for six persons. From 16 February to 28 June 2003 there were twenty-eight detainees on average in cell no. 146, which was designed for twenty persons. Finally, from 28 June to 14 August 2003 there were twenty detainees in cell no. 2, which was designed for twenty-two persons. 17.  The Government supported their assertions with copies of extracts from registration logs showing the number of detainees on 1 December 2001, 12 and 13 February, 1 and 2 April, 14 and 15 April, 18 and 19 May, 30 and 31 October 2002, 12 and 13 June, and 2 and 3 August 2003. The registration logs did not include the detainees’ names. The Government did not provide the Court with information on the cell measurements. 18.  The applicant contested this information in part. He stated that from 9 to 19 July 2000 he had shared cell no. 146, which measured 48 sq. m, with up to seventy detainees. There were thirty-eight detainees in the same cell as the applicant from 15 February to 31 March 2002 and from 15 February 2003 to 16 August 2003, and they had to sleep in shifts. Further, according to the applicant, cell no. 501 measuring 36 sq. m, in which he was kept from 19 July to 24 August 2000 and from 24 September 2000 to 18 January 2001, housed thirty-eight detainees. From 4 October 2002 to 15 February 2003 the applicant was kept in cell no. 140, measuring 48 sq. m, with at least thirty-seven other detainees.
(b)  Facility no. IZ-77/3 19.  From 30 May to 29 October 2002 and from 14 August to 9 September 2003 the applicant was kept in detention facility no. IZ-77/3 in Moscow, in cells nos. 524 and 523 respectively. According to the Government, in cell no. 524 he was kept at different periods with twenty-one to thirty-four other detainees; and in cell no. 523 with twenty-one to twenty-four detainees. 20.  The applicant stated that both cells measured 30 sq. m and there were thirty persons there with him. 21.  The Government, relying on the information provided by the Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences, submitted, with respect to both facilities, that the cells had been ventilated naturally through the windows. Each cell also had a ventilation shaft. The cells had natural light and the metal shutters (“eyelashes”) were removed on 25 November 2002 following a relevant directive of the Ministry of Justice. Furthermore there were twenty-four-hour artificial lights, as well as security lights. The partition around the toilet offered sufficient privacy. 22.  The applicant disagreed with the Government’s description and submitted that the sanitary conditions had been unsatisfactory. The windows of the cells let almost no daylight in as they were covered with “eyelashes”, and due to insufficient daylight the applicant’s eyesight deteriorated significantly during the period of detention. Toilet facilities were not separated from the living area, the cells had no ventilation and the air was always stuffy. Smoking was not restricted in the cells, which exposed the applicant, who is a non-smoker, to heavy tobacco smoke and made him feel sick. The cells were infected with bed-bugs and lice but the administration did not provide any insecticides. 23.  The applicant produced written statements by Mr M., who had been detained in cell no. 501 in detention facility IZ-77/2 in 2000-2002, and Mr V. who had been detained together with the applicant from 17 November 2002 to 15 February 2003 in cell no. 140 and from 15 February to 16 August 2003 in cell no. 146 in detention facility IZ-77/2. They confirmed the applicant’s account of the conditions of detention there, including information on cell measurements, number of detainees and sanitary conditions.


8.  The applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Budapest. His previous applications (nos. 23209/94 and 27313/95) to the European Commission of Human Rights (“the Commission”) were joined and declared inadmissible by the Plenary Commission on 13 January 1997. 9.  On 18 November 1965 the Budapest Regional Court, in the context of criminal proceedings with certain political connotations, convicted the applicant of espionage and sentenced him to six and a half years’ imprisonment. The Court also ordered the confiscation of his property. On 23 February 1966 the Supreme Court, upon the applicant’s appeal, amended the first-instance judgment in that the criminal offence was characterised as attempted sedition and the prison term was reduced to five years. The remainder of the appeal was dismissed. Subsequently the applicant served his sentence. His property, namely his villa and garden as well as his car and money in a bank, was confiscated. 10.  On 25 October 1989 the Attorney General lodged an appeal on legal grounds with the Supreme Court against the judgments of 1965 and 1966, proposing that the applicant’s conviction be quashed as being unlawful and that the applicant be acquitted. On 12 December 1989 the Supreme Court followed this proposal. 11.  On 6 February 1990 the applicant instituted proceedings before the Budapest Regional Court claiming restitution of his property. He further claimed compensation as a victim of a miscarriage of justice. On 19 February 1993 the Regional Court awarded him four million Hungarian forints (HUF) as compensation for damage suffered as a consequence of his imprisonment. 12.  In the restitution proceedings, between September 1990 and February 1992 the Regional Court held several hearings. Moreover, given that both the confiscated car and real estate had been sold and that, therefore, only compensation was feasible, the court took expert evidence as to the value of this property. The Technical Institute of Judicial Experts prepared an opinion on that question. 13.  On 24 February 1992 the Regional Court, following a further hearing, issued an order awarding the applicant HUF 50,000 for the car, plus HUF 6,200,000 in compensation for his losses. The remainder of his claims was dismissed. The applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court sitting as a second instance, claiming higher compensation. 14.  On 10 December 1992 the Supreme Court considered the case by way of a written procedure and dismissed the applicant’s appeal. 15.  On 12 February 1993 the Attorney General, reacting to the applicant’s request to seek review of the Supreme Court’s decision, informed him that restitution proceedings were governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, which excluded such a review. 16.  On 19 February 1993 the applicant nevertheless lodged a petition for review with the Supreme Court, complaining of the Budapest Regional Court’s decision, as well as of the second-instance decision taken by the Supreme Court. 17.  On 22 June 1993 the Supreme Court rejected his petition. 18.  On 5 April 1995 the Constitutional Court decided that the application of procedural rules assigning restitution cases to the criminal courts – and excluding a review by the Supreme Court – amounted to arbitrary discrimination. The Constitutional Court amended the said rules to the effect that the files should be forwarded to the civil courts with a view to conducting the proceedings. Concerning the applicant’s particular case, it decided that he should be entitled to institute civil review proceedings before the Supreme Court. 19.  The applicant’s renewed petition for review dated 8 April 1995 was received at the Supreme Court on 10 April 1995. He filed further submissions on 10 and 13 May 1995. 20.  On 19 October 1995 the Supreme Court rejected the renewed petition. It noted the background to the applicant’s case, including its rejection of the applicant’s previous petition. However, as the Code of Criminal Procedure only envisaged the possibility of one such petition, the Supreme Court had to reject any further petition brought by the same person. 21.  On 12 February 1996 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s further constitutional complaint. It considered that the applicant’s submissions did not raise any questions of constitutionality within the meaning of the relevant provisions of the Constitutional Court Act, but were limited to complaining that the Supreme Court had failed to implement properly the Constitutional Court’s earlier decision. To the extent that the applicant, in his submissions, pursued his petition for review, the Constitutional Court referred the case to the Budapest Regional Court for further action, the latter being the competent court for the civil procedure. 22.  On 7 March 1996 the Budapest Regional Court forwarded the files to the Supreme Court for a decision on the applicant’s petition for review. 23.  On 12 November 1996 the Supreme Court again rejected the applicant’s petition for review. It explained that, according to the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, no review could take place in proceedings of the present kind. Subsequently the applicant brought a further complaint before the Constitutional Court with a view to the annulment of that decision. 24.  On 9 June 1998 the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional the procedural situation governing the examination of criminal restitution claims in civil review proceedings. 25.  Following the ensuing change in legislation, on 15 February 2000 the Supreme Court annulled its decision of 12 November 1996 and ordered a review of the merits of the applicant’s restitution claims. 26.  On 25 June 2001 the Supreme Court’s review bench considered the case by way of a written procedure and dismissed the applicant’s petition on its merits. It held that the lower courts’ procedure, and in particular the manner of taking evidence – although it had been governed by the rules of criminal procedure concerning restitution – had complied with the Code of Civil Procedure. That decision was served on 6 August 2001.


6.  The applicants were born in 1963 and 1959 respectively and live in Vienna. 7.  The applicants live together in a homosexual relationship. The second applicant is a civil servant and, for the purpose of accident and sickness insurance cover, he is insured with the Civil Servants Insurance Corporation (“the CSIC”) (Versicherungsanstalt Öffentlicher Bediensteter). On 1 July 1997 the first applicant asked the CSIC to recognise him as the dependent (Angehöriger) and to extend the second applicant's insurance cover to include him. He submitted that section 56(6) of the Civil Servants Sickness and Accident Insurance Act (“the CSSAIA”) (Beamten-Kranken- und Unfallversicherungsgesetz) only referred to persons of the opposite sex living with the principally insured person and running the common household without receiving any payment. But, because there were no good reasons for excluding persons living in a homosexual relationship from the privilege of extended insurance cover, section 56(6) should be interpreted as also including homosexual partners. 8.  On 2 September 1997 the CSIC dismissed the request, holding that, because the first applicant was of the same sex as the second applicant, his request had to be dismissed. This decision was served on the second applicant who, on 1 October 1997, filed an objection. 9.  On 21 November 1997 the Mayor of Vienna, acting as the Regional Governor, quashed the decision on procedural grounds. He held that the CSIC should have served its decision on the first applicant. 10.  On 13 January 1998 the CSIC dismissed a request by the first applicant and this time served the decision on him. The first applicant filed objections. 11.  The mayor of Vienna confirmed the CSIC's decision on 19 March 1998. Thereupon the first applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court in which he argued that the exclusion, under section 56(6) of the CSSAIA, of homosexual couples from the extension of insurance cover was in breach of Article 14, read in conjunction with Article 8, of the Convention and was therefore unconstitutional. 12.  On 15 June 1998 the Constitutional Court declined to deal with the first applicant's complaint. Referring to its previous case-law, the Constitutional Court found that, in the issue at hand, the legislator had had a very wide margin in which to reach a decision and the decision taken had been within that margin. 13.  On an unspecified date the Constitutional Court granted a request by the first applicant for the case to be transferred to the Administrative Court. On 7 September 1998 the first applicant supplemented his complaint to the Administrative Court. 14.  On 4 October 2001 the Administrative Court dismissed the first applicant's complaint. It found that the authorities had correctly concluded that section 56(6) of the CSSAIA only applied to heterosexual partnerships. There was no issue under Article 14, read in conjunction with Article 8, of the Convention, because Article 8 did not guarantee specific social rights, and the case at issue did not therefore fall within the ambit of that provision. The exclusion of homosexual partnerships from the scope of section 56(6) of the CSSAIA also complied with the principle of equality because that difference in treatment was justified. While it was true that, where persons of different sex living together in a household in which one of them was running that household while not being gainfully employed, it was, as a rule, safe to conclude that they were cohabiting in a partnership, that was not the case if two persons of the same sex were living together in a household. In the absence of any possibility to register a homosexual partnership, it would have been necessary to undertake delicate enquiries into the most intimate sphere of the person concerned. That difference in the factual situation justified different treatment in law. 15.  In proceedings instituted by the Constitutional Court to examine the constitutionality of two similar provisions to section 56(6) of the CSSAIA relating to extending insurance cover to relatives, on 10 October 2005 the Constitutional Court decided to quash section 123(8b) of the General Social Security Act (“the GSSA”) (Allgemeines Sozial-versicherungsgesetz) and section 83(3) of the Social Security Act for Trade and Commerce (“the TCSSA”) (Gewerbliches Sozialversicherungsgesetz). The Constitutional Court explicitly referred to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Karner v. Austria (see Karner v. Austria, no. 40016/98, 24 July 2003) and held that the two provisions in which the extension of insurance cover to unrelated persons living with the insured were discriminatory because they were restricted to persons of the opposite sex. 16.  On 1 August 2006 the Social Rights Amendment Act (“the SRAA”) (Sozialrechts-Änderungsgesetz) entered into force amending in particular the GSSA, the TCSSA and also section 56 of the CSSAIA. A second amendment to section 56 of the CSSAIA entered into force on 1 July 2007.


5.  The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Amsterdam. 6.  On 20 November 2001 the applicant was arrested in Lübeck in Germany. On 21 November 2001 the Lübeck District Court (Amtsgericht) issued a warrant for the applicant's arrest on suspicion of trafficking in and importing narcotic substances. He was subsequently remanded in custody. 7.  Following negotiations with the applicant's legal representatives, the Lübeck Public Prosecutor gave the applicant an assurance that the prosecution service would institute proceedings under Article 11 of the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons (European Treaty Series no. 112, “the Transfer Convention”) if the applicant confessed to the alleged crimes. Furthermore, they would refrain from requesting a sentence exceeding eight years' imprisonment. 8.  On 25 March 2002 the applicant confessed in writing to having committed the crimes specified in the arrest warrant. 9.  On 6 May 2002 the Lübeck Public Prosecutor issued an indictment against the applicant. 10.  Prior to the oral hearing, the applicant's counsel informed the trial court of the agreement reached between the applicant's defence lawyers and the public prosecution service. 11.  During the oral hearing before the Lübeck Regional Court (Landgericht), which took place on 26 August 2002, the applicant gave a full confession. The Public Prosecutor requested a sentence of eight years' imprisonment. According to the transcript of the hearing, the Public Prosecutor moreover declared as follows:
“....the Public Prosecution Office does not see any reason not to proceed in accordance with Article 11 of the Council of Europe's Transfer Convention.” 12.  On 26 August 2002 the Lübeck Regional Court, on the basis of the applicant's confession, convicted him of unlawful trafficking in and importing narcotic substances and sentenced him to eight years' imprisonment. The court accepted the applicant's confession as a mitigating factor. The applicant having waived his right to appeal, the judgment became final on the same day. 13.  On 28 August 2002 the applicant applied to the Schleswig-Holstein Ministry of Justice to institute transfer proceedings under Article 11 of the Transfer Convention. In his pleadings, the applicant's counsel relied upon the agreement between the defence, the criminal chamber at the Lübeck Regional Court and the Public Prosecutor's Office at the Lübeck Regional Court. 14.  On 9 September 2002 the Ministry of Justice acknowledged receipt of the applicant's request and informed him that the Head of the Chief Public Prosecutors (Leitender Oberstaatsanwalt) in Lübeck had been invited to submit comments on it. 15.  On 20 February 2003 the Head of the Chief Public Prosecutors stated that he would only endorse a transfer under Article 10 of the Transfer Convention on condition that the Dutch authorities gave an assurance of continued enforcement and did not release him before two-thirds of the sentence had been served. 16.  By a letter of 5 March 2003 the applicant reminded the Justice Ministry that, during the oral hearing held on 26 August 2002, the Public Prosecutor had given an assurance that he would support the applicant's request to be transferred under Article 11 of that Convention. 17.  On 12 March 2003 the Justice Ministry sent the applicant's submissions to the Head of the Chief Public Prosecutors for comment. They pointed out that it was no longer standard practice in Germany to institute transfer proceedings under Article 11. 18.  On 24 April 2003 the Head of the Chief Public Prosecutors submitted a report containing a statement given by the Public Prosecutor at the hearing. The latter stated that, when giving the assurance, he had not known the difference between Articles 10 and 11 of the Transfer Convention and had expected the applicant to be transferred to the Netherlands to serve the sentence imposed by the German courts. It had been important to him to express his view that the applicant should be allowed to serve his sentence in his home country. 19.  Based on this statement, the Head of Public Prosecution considered that the applicant could not be under the impression that he had been promised a transfer under Article 11 with binding effect on the Ministry of Justice. Subsequently, the Head of the Chief Public Prosecutors refused to endorse a transfer under Article 11 and suggested a transfer under Article 10 of the Transfer Convention. 20.  On 17 March 2003 the applicant asked the Schleswig-Holstein Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) for a judicial determination under section 23 of the Introductory Act to the Courts Act (Einführungsgesetz zum Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz, EGGVG, see Relevant Domestic Law, below) with regard to the Public Prosecutor's decision to pursue the applicant's transfer under Article 10 and not, as he had previously been assured, under Article 11 of the Transfer Convention. He submitted that he had only confessed in the light of the Public Prosecutor's assurance that the prosecution service would support his transfer under Article 11, and that the Public Prosecutor's decision to pursue the transfer under Article 10 violated his right to a fair trial under the Convention. 21.  On 20 May 2003 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant's request as inadmissible. Referring to the Public Prosecutor's submissions, the Court of Appeal considered that the Public Prosecutor's comment on the applicant's transfer request did not constitute a judicial decision within the meaning of section 23 of the Courts Act, as it did not concern the domestic administration of criminal justice, but related to a diplomatic relationship with a foreign State. Furthermore, the Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons did not confer any individual rights on the applicant. 22.  On 26 May 2003 the applicant requested the Ministry of Justice to reconsider its decision, having regard to the principle of fair trial. 23.  On 18 June 2003 the Ministry of Justice informed the applicant of its intention to pursue proceedings under Article 10 of the Transfer Convention, having regard to State practice in relation to the Netherlands. 24.  On 1 October 2003 the applicant gave his consent to his transfer under Article 10 of the Transfer Convention. On 6 October 2003 the Dutch Justice Ministry gave its consent to the applicant's transfer under Article 10 of the Transfer Convention. 25.  On 22 October 2003 the applicant was handed over to the Dutch authorities and subsequently served the remainder of his sentence in a Dutch prison. 26.  On 18 January 2004 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the Ministry's decision of 18 June 2003. 27.  On 14 January 2005 the Federal Constitutional Court, sitting as a panel of three judges, declined to consider the applicant's constitutional complaint. According to the Federal Constitutional Court, the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies. With regard to domestic remedies, the Federal Constitutional Court found as follows:
“The applicant has no right to a judicial review of the exercise of discretion in so far as the decision is based on general, in particular foreign policy, considerations..., the evaluation of which belongs to the core area of Government. However, the judicial review of discretionary powers in respect of law enforcement remains unaffected thereby, in particular with regard to the statement made on the day of the trial by the Lübeck Public Prosecutor's Office... It cannot be denied that uncertainties may remain for the person seeking justice in this connection in view of the previously disputed contestability of decisions by the authorising authority, as well as in regard to the possible legal remedies. Sufficient account is taken of the possible uncertainties in regard to the legal remedy on account of the possibility of a binding referral under section 17a § 2 of the Courts Act. It is reasonable to expect the applicant to have recourse to a disputed legal remedy.” 28.  According to the Federal Constitutional Court, it was for the lower courts to decide which court was competent in the applicant's case. These courts had further to consider whether the impugned act interfered with the applicant's right to a fair trial or with the principle of protection of legitimate confidence. Notwithstanding the possibility of lodging a fresh request, the fact that the relevant time-limits for lodging appeals might in the meantime have expired did not lead to the constitutional complaint being admissible. 29.  This decision was served on the applicant's counsel on 10 February 2005. 30.  On 14 February 2005 the applicant unsuccessfully lodged a fresh request with the Justice Ministry that execution of his sentence be taken over under Article 11 of the Transfer Convention. 31.  On 20 March 2007 the applicant was released from prison, having served two thirds of his sentence.


4.  The applicants were born in 1945 and 1937 respectively and live in Slovyansk, Donetsk region, Ukraine. 5.  At the material time the applicants worked at the Soda State Plant (ВАТ «Содовий завод»). 6.  On 31 October 1997 and 14 May 2003 the Slovyansk Town Court awarded Mrs Len 1,709.25 and 5,513.92 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH)[1] in salary arrears and other payments, to be paid by the above-mentioned company. 7.  On 3 November 1997 and 22 February 2001 the Slovyansk Town Court, and on 22 September 2003 the Labour Disputes Commission, awarded Mr Len the amounts of UAH 2,211.18 (about USD 1,176.47), UAH 9,157.04 (about EUR 1,855.94) and UAH 2,356.92 (about EUR 399.22) in salary arrears, to be paid by the above-mentioned company. 8.  These decisions became final and the State Bailiffs' Service instituted proceedings to enforce them. 9.  On 3 January 2001 the Donetsk Arbitration Court (after June 2001 – the Donetsk Commercial Court) instituted insolvency proceedings against the debtor company. On 4 September 2003 the court, having declared the debtor insolvent, ordered its liquidation, which is still pending. 10.  The decisions given in the applicants' favour have still not been enforced.


7.  The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in the village of Ponyatovka, Odessa region, Ukraine. 8.  The applicant worked as a customs officer at the Rozdilnyanska Customs Office in the Odessa Region, Ukraine. 9.  On 24 July 2000 the applicant was charged with the criminal offences of aiding and abetting in smuggling and tax evasion, abuse of power and fraud. The same day the applicant was arrested. He remained in custody until 6 November 2000. 10.  On 6 November 2000 the Novozavodsky District Court of Chernigiv decided the applicant’s case. The court established, in particular, that the applicant had certified documents confirming that two vans with goods had left the customs territory of Ukraine, and that the applicant had not checked the actual presence of the vehicles at the customs post. The goods were, however, found and seized by the Security Service somewhere else within the customs territory of Ukraine. The court did not find any proof that the applicant had acted deliberately in order to aid the crime: the applicant denied any criminal intent and no other persons involved in the actual smuggling or tax evasion had been established by the investigation. On the basis of these findings, the court sentenced the applicant to three years’ imprisonment for the negligent performance of his professional duties and to a fine of UAH 400[1]. At the same time, the court acquitted the applicant of other charges. By the same decision, the applicant was absolved from this sentence under the Amnesty Law of 11 May 2000. This decision was not appealed and became final on 14 November 2000. 11.  On an unspecified date, the President of the Chernigiv Regional Court lodged a request for a supervisory review of the judgment of 6 November 2000, on the grounds of an erroneous qualification of the applicant’s actions and his unreasonable acquittal on the other criminal charges brought by the prosecution. The President also noted that the sentence was too lenient. 12.  On 25 December 2000 the Presidium of the Chernigiv Regional Court allowed the request of its President, quashed the judgment of 6 November 2000, and remitted the case for a fresh consideration. The court instructed the first instance court to examine more thoroughly the existing evidence in the case and to conduct additional, more comprehensive interrogations of the accused and the witnesses. 13.  On 29 January 2001 the Novozavodsky District Court of Chernigiv considered the case anew and sentenced the applicant to five years’ imprisonment, suspended for two years pending probation, and a fine of UAH 1,000[2]. The court found the applicant guilty of aiding and abetting in smuggling, an abuse of power and fraud. The court acquitted the applicant of aiding and abetting tax evasion, since all the smuggled goods had been seized by the law enforcement bodies and no profit had been made by anyone selling them. 14.  On 1 March 2001 the Criminal Chamber of the Chernigiv Regional Court upheld the decision of the first instance court. The former found that the first instance court had correctly qualified the applicant’s actions. This decision was final. 15.  On an unspecified date, the President of the Chernigiv Regional Court lodged a request for a supervisory review of the judgments of 29 January and 1 March 2001, on the ground that the courts had not followed the instructions given in the previous decision of the Presidium of the Chernigiv Regional Court of 25 December 2000 about the qualification of the applicant’s actions and the severity of the sentence. 16.  On 19 March 2001 the Presidium of the Chernigiv Regional Court chaired by the President allowed the request, quashed the decision of 29 January 2001, and remitted the case for a fresh consideration. The Presidium found that the first instance court had not followed the earlier instructions and that the sentence was too lenient. 17.  On 2 October 2001 the Novozavodsky District Court of Chernigiv considered the case anew, found the applicant guilty of all charges and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment. 18.  On 9 July 2002 the Supreme Court allowed the applicant’s cassation appeal and changed the decision of the first instance court, sentencing the applicant to two years’ imprisonment for the negligent performance of his professional duties. The court noted that no criminal intent in the applicant’s actions could be established and, given the lapse of time, it seemed improbable that any other offenders, who had been directly involved in smuggling, could be found. Therefore, the court acquitted the applicant of the other charges (aiding and abetting in smuggling and tax evasion) for a lack of corpus delicti. By the same decision, the applicant was absolved from his sentence under the Amnesty Law of 11 May 2000.


6.  The applicant, Mr Jerzy Wizerkaniuk, is a Polish national who was born in 1952 and lives in Kościan. At the material time he was a chief editor and a co-owner of the local newspaper “Gazeta Kościańska”, published in Kościan. 7.  On 24 February 2003 two journalists working for the applicant’s newspaper interviewed a local M.P., Mr T. M. The interview, arranged during a chance meeting between one of the journalists and the M.P. several days earlier, at a session of the Kościan Municipal Council, took place in the M.P.’s office in Kościan and lasted about two hours. All questions and answers were tape-recorded. It related to the M.P.’s public and business activities. After the meeting the M.P. requested that the text of the interview be submitted for his authorisation (autoryzacja) before its publication, as provided for by Section 14 of the 1984 Press Act (Prawo Prasowe) (see paragraph 29 below). 8.  The verbatim transcript of the interview, subsequently prepared by the two journalists, ran to forty standard pages. The applicant requested P.S., the editing journalist of the newspaper, to prepare an edited version of the interview, fit for the publication purposes. That version ran to three standard pages. The latter version was subsequently presented to the interviewee, approximately a month after the conversation. He read it and informed an employee of his office, Mr K. P., that he would not give his consent to the publication of the text. He was of the view that the text did not correspond to the conversation he had had with the two journalists and that many important statements he had made were not included. He asked Mr K.P. to inform the applicant of his refusal. Shortly afterwards, the applicant called the M.P. who reiterated his refusal. 9.  In an undated letter to the applicant, served on him on 5 May 2003, the M.P. stated:
“It is true that in February I talked to two representatives of “Gazeta Kościańska”. During that conversation, which was in any event very informal, I replied to a number of questions. However, the text submitted for my authorisation only after a month, failed to include many of my important statements and to reflect the character and contents of my statements, [a state of affairs] which I cannot accept.” 10.  On 29 April 2003 the newspaper published a short text asking the readers whether they would be interested in having an interview with Mr T.M., the local M.P., published. 11.  On 7 May 2003 parts of the verbatim records of the interview, edited by P.S. and accompanied by photos made when the interview was conducted, were published by “Gazeta Kościańska”. The text carried a lead informing the reader that the M.P. had refused to grant his authorisation for the publication of the interview and that the newspaper was publishing parts of the interview as recorded on the tape, including in its original grammatical form. 12.  On 19 May 2003 the M.P. informed the Kościan District Prosecutor that the applicant had committed a criminal offence by publishing parts of the interview without his authorisation and against his will. 13.  On the same day criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant on a charge of publishing an interview with the M.P. in spite of the latter’s refusal to authorise its publication. During the investigation the M.P. submitted that he had talked to the two journalists from the applicant’s newspaper. They had had a casual conversation rather than a formal interview. A month later he had been given the text to be published which, in his view, failed to reflect many of his important assertions. Moreover, he was of the view that the text failed to convey both the character and the substance of his statements. 14.  By a judgment of 30 April 2004 the Poznań District Court found the applicant guilty as charged. The court established the facts of the case as summarised above (see paragraphs 7-11 above). It further found that the applicant had published the interview despite the M.P.’s refusal to authorise its publication. This in itself amounted to a criminal offence punishable under section 14 read together with section 49 of the 1984 Press Act (see paragraph 29 below). The court observed that it was possible for the interviewed person to renounce his or her right to grant authorisation for the text to be published, but such a declaration had to be unequivocal. 15.  The court noted the submission made by P.S., who was heard as a witness. According to P.S., the newspaper had not published the three-page summary which had initially been submitted for the M.P.’s approval. It had published parts of the interview quoted verbatim. The court found his statement credible.
The court further noted that M.P.’s photographs taken during the interview had also been published together with the interview. The applicant had failed to indicate which photographs he intended to publish and to show them to M.P. before the publication. 16.   The court further observed that the applicant had failed to comply with his obligation, under the Press Act, to obtain the authorisation of the interviewed person. It was of the view that the fact that the interview had been published without the required authorisation breached the interviewee’s personal rights. The applicant had acted with intent to break the law, but he had been motivated by his wish to fulfil his journalistic duties by making the interview available to the public. Having regard to the latter factor, the court concluded that the offence concerned could not be regarded as serious.
Consequently, and having regard also to the fact that it was not open to any doubt that the applicant was a law-abiding citizen and that his conduct had always been irreproachable, the court conditionally discontinued the proceedings, obliged the applicant to pay 1,000 zlotys (PLN) to a charity and ordered him to bear the costs of the proceedings. 17.  By a judgment of the Poznań Regional Court of 6 October 2004, served on the applicant on 15 November 2004, the first-instance judgment was upheld. The court noted, inter alia, that the photographs taken during the interview constituted its inherent part. The applicant, by publishing them without the interviewee’s consent, had breached his personal rights within the meaning of Article 23 of the Civil Code. 18.  The applicant subsequently lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court, challenging the compatibility with the Constitution of section 14 in conjunction with section 49 of the Press Act 1984, in so far as they provided for a fine or for restriction of liberty to be imposed on a journalist or publisher for failing to ask an interviewee for his or her authorisation. He relied on Article 54, guaranteeing the right to freedom of expression, and Article 31 of the Constitution, providing for the principle of proportionality in respect of restrictions on constitutional rights. 19.  In the ensuing constitutional proceedings the Constitutional Court sought the opinions of the Ombudsman (Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich), the Prosecutor General (Prokurator Generalny) and the Speaker of the Parliament (Marszałek Sejmu). In their opinions submitted to that court they concluded that section 49, read together with section 14 of the Press Act, was incompatible with the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression. They were of the view, in particular, that the restriction on the exercise of that right by imposition of a criminal penalty was incompatible with Article 31 of the Constitution, which enshrined the principle of proportionality in respect of restrictions imposed on the exercise of civil rights and freedoms (see paragraph 27 below). They further referred to the existing civil law instruments available for the purposes of effective protection of personal rights (see paragraphs 30-32 below). 20.  The Constitutional Court gave a judgment on the merits of his constitutional complaint on 29 September 2008. It held that the contested provisions of the Press Act were compatible with Article 54 of the Constitution read together with its Article 31. 21.  The court noted that it was proposed in a public debate to do away with the obligation to seek and obtain the authorisation provided for by the Press Act. However, the opinions pointing to the potential danger of such a legislative measure could not be overlooked. The Constitutional Court was of the view that abrogating the authorisation requirement would, on the one hand, expose persons interviewed by the press to the risk of having their personal rights breached by having their words distorted and, on the other, be dangerous for the exercise of the freedom of expression. The essence of the authorisation was not only to ensure that statements made by interviewees were rendered literally, but also to protect the integrality of such statements. This, in turn, ensured that the intentions of the speaker were faithfully conveyed.
Therefore, the applicant’s argument that the authorisation requirement gave the interviewee an opportunity to block the publication of a statement indefinitely was incorrect. 22.  The judgment further read:
“Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each individual’s self-fulfilment. It is applicable not only to “information” or “ideas” that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. The press has a duty to impart – in a manner consistent with its obligations and responsibilities – information and ideas on all matters of public interest. This duty is closely intertwined with the right of the public to receive information. (...)
Statements made public by the media could, as they have a great power of persuasion, lead to the infringement of the personal rights of the individuals concerned. In certain cases the post factum remedies available under law are insufficient to provide effective redress for such infringements, and in some cases the damage could indeed be irreparable. However, a publicly made statement not only could be an instrument of an infringement, but could also be unlawfully distorted. This was why the legislature decided to grant additional protection to statements made in the context of interviews by creating the authorisation requirement. Assuming that this requirement amounted to a restriction on freedom of expression as it obliged journalists to obtain authorisation from the author of literally quoted statements, its necessity in a democratic society has to be examined. [The] freedom of expression is not ius infinitum and could therefore be limited. However, it is necessary that restrictions on its exercise are compatible with the principle of proportionality set out in Article 31 of the Constitution. This provision allows for restrictions imposed on individual rights only when they have statutory legal basis and are necessary in a democratic state in the interests of national security or public safety, for the protection of environment, health or morals, for the protection of rights of others. These restrictions cannot not impair the essence of rights and freedoms. (...)
Article 47 of the Constitution provides for everyone’s right to the legal protection of one’s private and family life, of one’s honour and good reputation, and for the right to decide about one’s personal life. No restrictions can be imposed on the exercise of these rights (...). On the contrary, the freedom of expression can be restricted. The obligation to obtain the interviewee’s consent amounted to a restriction. However, such restriction cannot be seen as impairing the essence of the freedom of expression, because it concerns only statements quoted verbatim in press publications. It does not restrict or limit journalists’ right to inform the public of the content of such a statement by summarising it. When a journalist chooses to summarise or otherwise convey the content of a statement made by the interviewee, he or she is not obliged to seek the interviewee’s authorisation or to inform them of the intended publication. Nor, therefore, does it restrict the right of the public to obtain information.
[...] that requirement is also necessary in a democratic society to protect the personal rights of journalists’ sources. Hence, not only it is not in breach of any constitutional right but, on the contrary, it had to be regarded as a guarantee of the effective exercise of constitutional rights.
Furthermore, this requirement is justified not only by the necessity to protect individual rights [...] but it derives its legal foundation from other elements which, taken together, formed the constitutional notion of the public interest. As the authorisation serves to establish with full clarity the authorship of a given statement made public, it contributes to the clarity and transparency of public debate. It makes it possible for the reader to be certain that the speaker identifies himself with the statement’s content and would not try to change it or to distance himself from it. It is therefore in the reader’s interest to maintain it. Without this requirement, readers could not be sure whether statements purportedly made in the context of interviews are really authentic.
In the Constitutional Court’s opinion the authorisation requirement was therefore a means of guaranteeing the reader’s right to obtain reliable, credible, truthful, honest, clear, not misleading and responsible information. This right has not been expressly guaranteed by the Constitution, but it was anchored in it. [...]” 23.  In so far as the criminal sanction for failure to obtain the authorisation was concerned, the Constitutional Court observed that it aimed at ensuring that the citizen’s right to reliable information was respected. Authorisation was the simplest way to ensure the veracity of the message, whereas statements published without authorisation could be distorted, which was clearly undesirable. 24.  The Constitutional Court referred to the legal provisions penalising defamation. It was of the view that while the offence of defamation was directed against an individual’s reputation, in the same way the offence penalised by section 14 read together with section 49 of the Press Act was aimed at obtaining compliance with the obligation to quote and report statements made by interviewees in a fair and accurate manner, in order to protect their personal rights. The penal sanction provided for by these provisions thus respected the principle of proportionality. 25.  A dissenting opinion of Justice Rzepliński was attached to that judgment. He had regard, firstly, to considerations which could be said to have constituted the ratio legis of the Press Act when it had been adopted in 1984. He noted that the 1952 Constitution, in force at that time, guaranteed neither the right to freedom of expression nor the right to respect for family and private life in any form comparable to the current constitutional regulations. At that time all media had been subject to preventive censorship and it was ultimately the State which decided what could be published or broadcast. The opinion further read, inter alia:
“The provisions of the Press Act regarding the authorisation requirement were only, at that time, an additional safeguard against the press publishing any information given to journalists by the communist party or State agents if such information was capable of jeopardising the interests of then political power.
[Given that constitutional background, it is only natural that] the Press Act did not provide for any distinction in respect of the authorisation requirement between the persons exercising public functions and all other persons. Thus, that Act provided for identical protection, by way of the criminal law, of persons holding public offices who were, for that reason, obliged to provide information about their acts to journalists, playing the role of “watchdogs” of the public powers on behalf of public opinion, and all other, “private”, persons. (...)
Moreover, the Press Act failed to indicate any time-limit within which a journalist could reasonably expect that authorisation would be granted or refused. (...)
While it is true that during the last years of the ancien régime, in 1998/89, State censorship became less strict, the origin of the examined provisions of the Press Act and the place they had in the legal order at that time cannot be ignored.” 26.  Justice Rzepliński further disagreed with the Constitutional Court in so far as it had held that the restrictions imposed by the impugned provisions satisfied the test of proportionality, enshrined in Article 31 of the Constitution. In this context, he stated that the freedom of speech standards developed by the European Court of Human Rights in its judgments could not be overlooked. The dissenting opinion further read:
“The impugned provisions [seen in this light] amounted to an unnecessary and excessive interference with the freedom of the press in the interest of the personal rights of persons providing information to the press. These provisions were not necessary for that purpose at the time they were adopted and are still less necessary in a democratic State governed by the rule of law.
Authorisation to publish information quoted verbatim is unknown to the legal systems of other States of the European Union. (...)
The authorisation requirement amounts to censorship which makes it impossible for the reader to know the original statement made by the interviewee. It may dissuade journalist who is wishing to obtain an interview for their newspaper with a politician important in a national or local context from asking uncomfortable, searching questions. (...)
In a democratic state a politician, a public person, has no right to manipulate his or her statements post factum. If he or she resorts to such manipulation, the public opinion is entitled to know this because it is an important element relevant for public image of a politician if he or she tampers with his or her public statements. The requirement of authorisation makes it impossible for the public to acquire such knowledge. Citizens expect politicians to have the courage to make wise decisions in difficult situations. If a politician is unsure of the choice of words to be used when speaking in a public situation it might be a signal to the public that he or she is unable to cope with stressful circumstances. It is something that public opinion is entitled to know. (...)
I do not share the view expressed by the Constitutional Court in the present case that a journalist, when refused authorisation to publish a verbatim quotation, can resort to paraphrasing the statements concerned; that the Press Act therefore does not in any way restrict the journalist’s right to convey the interviewee’s thoughts and the right to inform the public thereof (...). I am of the view that public opinion always has a right to be informed of the interviewee’s statements quoted verbatim always where a journalist deems it necessary to convey information which is interesting for readers. I am also of the opinion that that descriptive technique is manipulative and makes it possible for both a journalist and an interviewee to shirk responsibility for the words they use. Furthermore, the fact that the impugned provisions of the Press Act make it possible to use such “techniques” and “evasions” demonstrates that they do not meet the standards required of a fair-minded legislator. (...)
There is no right in the Constitution or in a democratic society to “true” or “right” information. A journalist is not obliged to provide such information; if only because he or she does not exercise public powers. His or her professional duty is to seek and disseminate information, views and judgments. Only persons receiving information, readers, listeners, TV watchers or internet users are to decide whether information is true or not. (...)
The authorisation requirement is not, as such, wrong. A journalist, when talking to experts, may have, at the editing stage, some doubts whether he or she has properly understood what they said, even where the interview was recorded. In practice, in such situations journalists themselves request the persons interviewed to read the text and to correct or supplement it. A journalist is well aware that errors he committed in gathering specialist information could jeopardise his position on the market. What then is a sword of a criminal sanction needed for? (...)
The mere fact that section 49 of the Press Act has practically never been applied recently by the courts (...) does not mean that it does not play in the Polish legal system a negative role, with a chilling effect on public debate. No one challenges the constitutionality of the provisions of civil law applied by the courts in the context of disagreements arising out of press publications.”


4.  The applicant, a Ukrainian national, was born in 1980 and lives in the village of Pryberezhne, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. 5.  In 1998 the applicant was seriously injured due to the fault of his teacher. As a result, he became an invalid. 6.  On 3 July 2000 the Saky Town Court (the “Saky Court”) ordered the State College of Audit and Economics of Kharkiv (the “College”), to pay the applicant a lump sum of UAH 32,178.02[1] and a monthly payment of UAH 519.75[2] in compensation. On 27 September 2000 the Supreme Court of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea upheld the decision of the first-instance court. The judgment became final and was enforced in full on 6 March 2001. 7.  On 6 December 2001 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the appeal lodged against the above decisions under the new cassation procedure. On 5 March 2004 the panel of three judges of the Supreme Court rejected the request of the College for review of the case in the light of newly discovered circumstances. 8.  On 28 March 2002 the Saky Court ordered the College to pay the applicant a lump sum of UAH 38,575.35[3] and a monthly payment of UAH 750.20[4] in compensation. 9.  On 10 May 2002 the Zhovtneviy District Bailiffs' Service of Kharkiv instituted enforcement proceedings. 10.  In December 2002 the Bailiffs' Service informed the applicant that the judgment could not be enforced due to the lack of State budgetary allocations in respect of the College's expenditure. 11.  On 11 July 2003 the Bailiffs' Service discontinued the enforcement proceedings on the ground that the debtor lacked funds. 12.  In April 2004 the applicant received a total of UAH 2,250[5] in payment of the allowance for three months. 13.  On 4 May 2005 the judgment was enforced in full. 14.  On 3 June 2003 the Saky Court awarded the applicant UAH 20,757.74[6] against the College in compensation. 15.  On 26 November 2003 the Court of Appeal of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea upheld the decision of the first instance court. The enforcement proceedings commenced in June 2004. 16.  On 30 May 2005 the judgment was enforced in full. 17.  In 2004 the applicant instituted proceedings in the same court against the College, seeking compensation for his medical, hygienic, and food expenses, and for loss of income. On 19 May 2004 the court endorsed the friendly settlement agreement between the applicant and the College, according to which the latter was to pay the applicant a lump sum of UAH 1,770[7] and a monthly payment of UAH 1,435[8] in compensation. 18.   On 28 January 2005 the judgment was enforced in full. 19.  In January 2003 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Zhovtneviy District Court of Kharkiv (the “Zhovtneviy Court”) against the Bailiffs' Service for failure to enforce the judgment of 28 March 2002. On 4 April 2003 the court rejected the applicant's complaint, finding no fault on the part of the Bailiffs' Service. It held that the judgment could not be enforced due to the lack of State budgetary allocations in respect of the College's expenditure, for which the Bailiffs' Service was not responsible. 20.  On 17 June 2003 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal quashed the decision of 4 April 2003 and remitted the case for a fresh consideration. 21.  On 3 September 2003 the Zhovtneviy Court found against the applicant on grounds similar to those on which it based its decision of 4 April 2003. 22.  On 3 December 2003 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal upheld the decision of 3 September 2003. 23.  The applicant's appeal in cassation is still pending before the Supreme Court.


5.  The applicant was born in 1936 and lives in Radovljica. 6.  During the works on a nearby motorway, some plots of the applicant’s land were damaged by the investor – the National Road Administration of Ljubljana (“the NRAL”). 7.  On 4 July 1992 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the NRAL in the Kranj Basic Court, Radovljica Unit (Temeljno sodišče v Kranju, Enota v Radovljici), seeking compensation in the amount of 2,487,490 Slovenian tolars (approximately 10,370 euros).
On 22 April 1993 the court held a hearing and decided to appoint an expert to assess the damage sustained by the applicant.
On 28 June 1994 the Convention entered into force with respect to Slovenia.
On 10 October 1994 the applicant appealed against the court’s decision on the expert’s costs. On 9 January 1995 he also appealed against the subsequently issued correcting decision concerning these costs. On 27 February 1996 the Ljubljana Higher Court (Višje sodišče v Ljubljani) rejected the second applicant’s appeal.
In the meantime, the Slovenian judicial system was reorganized and the Kranj District Court (Okrožno sodišče v Kranju), on 1 January 1995, obtained jurisdiction in the present case.
On 6 May 1998 the applicant made a request that a date be set for a hearing.
Of the two hearings held on 11 March and 7 June 1999, neither was adjourned at the request of the applicant.
At the last hearing, the court decided to deliver a written judgment. The judgment, upholding the applicant’s claim in part, was served on the applicant on 4 September 1999. 8.  On 17 September 1999 the applicant appealed to the Ljubljana Higher Court. The NRAL cross-appealed.
On 23 March 2000 the applicant made a request to expedite the proceedings.
On 11 October 2000, the Higher Court upheld both appeals and the case was remitted to the first-instance court for re-examination. The decision was served on the applicant on an unspecified date. 9.  In the re-examination proceedings, between 28 March and 3 December 2001, the applicant filed three written submissions.
The court appointed a new expert to asses the damage.
Of the three hearings held between 28 May 2001 and 18 September 2003, none was adjourned at the request of the applicant. However, one hearing fixed for 3 May 2001 was called off on the applicant’s request.
At the last hearing the court decided to deliver a written judgment. The judgment, upholding the applicant’s claim in part, was served on the applicant on 2 December 2003. 10. On 15 December 2003 the applicant appealed to the Ljubljana Higher Court.
On 2 March 2005 the court upheld the applicant’s appeal regarding the costs of the proceedings and in this part remitted the case to the first instance court. The court rejected the remainder of the appeal.
The judgment was served on the applicant on 5 April 2005. 11. On 30 March 2005 the Kranj District Court issued a new decision on the costs of the proceedings, which was served on the applicant on 6 April 2005. 12.  On 18 April 2005 the applicant appealed also against this decision.
On 23 November 2005, the Ljubljana Higher Court rejected the applicant’s appeal.
The decision was served on the applicant on 13 December 2005.


6.  The applicants are:
(1) Mr Kursolt Bibolovich Dolsayev[1], born in 1949;
(2) Ms Mak (also spelled as Makka) Isayevna Dolsayeva, born in 1953;
(3) Ms Madina Kursoltovna Dolsayeva, born in 1982;
(4) Mr Shamil (also known as Adam) Kursoltovich Dolsayev, born in 1984; and
(5) Mr Baysongur Kursoltovich Dolsayev, born in 1995.
The first, third, fourth and fifth applicants live in the village of Martan-Chu, in the Urus-Martan district of Chechnya. Prior to her death in June 2007 the second applicant also lived there. 7.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 8.  The first and second applicants were married. They were the parents of Beslan Kursoltovich Dolsayev, born in 1974, Mr Rizvan Kursoltovich Dolsayev, born in 1977, Mr Rizavdi Kursoltovich Dolsayev, born in 1978, and Mr Shuddi Kursoltovich Dolsayev, born in 1980, as well as the third, fourth and the fifth applicants. 9.  At the material time Beslan Dolsayev worked as a police officer of the department of the interior of the Zavodskoy district of Grozny (“the Zavodskoy ROVD”) and had a service machine gun. The Dolsayev brothers had positive references from local authorities and were not suspected of participation in illegal armed groups. 10.  From December 1999 Martan-Chu was under the full control of the Russian federal forces. From the end of September 2001 the village was under curfew from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m. The checkpoints of the Russian military forces were located on the roads leading to and from the settlement. Military servicemen conducted regular identity checks in the village; prior to the events in question they had visited the applicants' house for identity checks on eleven occasions. 11. On the night between 20 and 21 October 2002 Beslan, Rizvan, Rizavdi and Shuddi Dolsayev, the applicants and other members of the Dolsayev family were sleeping in their house at 4 Tsentralnaya Street, Martan-Chu, in the Urus-Martan district of Chechnya. At about 4 a.m. around thirty men in camouflage uniform and masks and armed with machine guns entered the Dolsayevs' yard. They were equipped with portable radio transmitters but used gestures to communicate among themselves. The men shouted that they belonged to the Main Intelligence Department of the Ministry of Defence (“the GRU”) and ordered everyone not to move. Ten of them broke into the house. Meanwhile, one or two armoured personnel carriers (“APCs”) and a Ural vehicle arrived at the house; their registration numbers were painted over. 12.  The servicemen ordered the men from the Dolsayev family to stand along the wall, checked everyone's identity papers and took Beslan Dolsayev's service gun. Some of them searched the house without producing any warrant and took away a large knife with a black handle. 13.  The servicemen then instructed Beslan, Rizvan, Rizavdi and Shuddi Dolsayev to go outside; the brothers were not allowed to put on clothing. After that, the four brothers were placed in the APC. The servicemen also intended to take the fourth applicant with them, but the second applicant dissuaded them from doing so as he was sick. 14.  Having locked the women together with the fifth applicant in one room and the first and fourth applicants in another, the intruders left the house and drove away in the APCs and the Ural vehicle. 15.  The applicants' neighbour Ms A.M. submitted in her witness statement that on the night of the abduction of the Dolsayev brothers she had been awoken by the sounds of heavy military vehicles passing by her yard. When she had looked out of the window, she had seen an armoured military vehicle on wheels. She could not identify whether this was a tank or an APC. The vehicle had been parked about 50 metres away, next to the school yard; its headlights were off, but it was clearly visible in the electric light coming from the school's boiler room. Some time later she had seen men in military uniform; the men had got into the vehicle and left without turning the headlights on. They had left in the direction of the military checkpoint located on the road to Urus-Martan. 16.  After the abductors had left, the first and fourth applicants were released from the room by their neighbour, Mr A.S. The first applicant ran outside and saw footprints in the yard and the vegetable garden. The footprints led in the direction of the school, located 40-45 metres away from the applicants' house. The first applicant followed the traces. Next to the school he saw APC tyre marks; they led in the direction of the road from Martan-Chu to Urus-Martan, where a military checkpoint manned by servicemen of the district military commander's office was located. 17.  The applicants have had no news of Beslan, Rizvan, Rizavdi and Shuddi Dolsayev since 21 October 2002.
(b)  Subsequent events 18.  On one of the days between the end of October 2002 and the end of November 2002, in the morning, the second and fourth applicants were together at a market in Urus-Martan. There they saw a Russian soldier holding the knife which had been taken away by the abductors of their relatives. The applicants recognised the knife by its shape and the black handle. They followed the soldier to the town's central square. There they met the first applicant and told him about the soldier. The latter was standing next to a group of parked APCs and military Ural vehicles. At that moment the first applicant saw an acquaintance of his who was a police officer, Captain T.Sh. The first applicant told him about his sons' abduction and asked whether he could arrest the soldier. Mr T.Sh. told the applicant that the police did not have the jurisdiction to arrest military personnel. 19.  According to the second applicant, in August 2003 she provided this information to the authorities investigating her sons' abduction. She did not mention to them that she had been together with her younger son when she had seen the soldier as she feared for her son's safety. The first applicant also provided the investigators with a statement concerning the events in question. 20.  In support of their application the applicants submitted a number of documents, including the following: witness statements provided by the first applicant on 20 May 2003, 13 July 2003 and on an unspecified date; witness statements provided by the second applicant on 20 May 2003 and on an unspecified date; a witness statement by the applicants' neighbour Mr S.A., provided on an unspecified date; a witness statement by the applicants' neighbour Mr A.S., provided on an unspecified date; a witness statement by the applicants' relative Ms Z.G., provided on 20 May 2003; four character references for Beslan Dolsayev, provided by the Zavodskoy ROVD, the Urus-Martan ROVD and the Martan-Chu village administration on 25 July 2002 and on unspecified dates; a copy of the newspaper announcement introducing a curfew in the Urus-Martan district as of 25 September 2001; four statements certifying that Beslan, Rizvan, Rizavdi and Shuddi Dolsayev did not participate in military clashes in Chechnya, all dated 22 May 2003; character references for Rizvan, Rizavdi and Shuddi Dolsayev, all undated; three hand-drawn maps of the premises of the applicants' house; and copies of documents received by the applicants from the investigating authorities. 21.  The Government did not challenge most of the facts as submitted by the applicants. According to the Government, “at about 4 a.m. on 21 October 2002 unidentified persons armed with automatic weapons arrived at the village of Martan-Chu in the Urus-Martan district of Chechnya and took Beslan, Rizvan, Rizavdi and Shuddi Dolsayev away from their house”. 22.  At the same time the Government contended that the applicants' statement of facts was unreliable. In particular, they pointed out that according to the first applicant's witness statement of 2 November 2002, the abductors had locked him in a room with his younger son Adam. However, several years later the applicant changed his testimony. In his witness statement provided on 16 May 2007 the applicant stated that he had been locked by the abductors in a room with his son Shamil and that he had heard one of the intruders saying to the others in Russian: “The commander said to leave Shamil [here] as he is an invalid”. 23.  The Government further pointed out that the applicants had not been sure about the precise number of intruders who had broken into their house on 21 October 2002 as in their statements the number varied from 10 to 25. In addition, the applicants had been inconsistent in their descriptions of the abductors' behaviour: the first applicant had stated that the intruders had initially enquired whether there were any weapons in the house, whereas according to the second applicant, the intruders had not asked any questions. 24.  The Government also expressed their doubts concerning the reliability of the witness statement provided by the applicants' neighbour Ms A.M. In particular, they questioned her inability to distinguish between a tank and an APC and emphasised that she had not witnessed the Dolsayev brothers being placed in the vehicles.
(b)  Subsequent events 25.  The Government did not dispute that the applicants had seen the soldier with the knife which had been taken away by the abductors. However, they contended that the first and second applicants had provided inconsistent accounts of these events: according to the second applicant's witness statement of 14 August 2003, the events in question had taken place about a week after the abduction and the soldier had been walking alone, whereas according to the first applicant's witness statement given at a later date (the Government did not specify the date), the events in question had taken place about a month after the abduction and the soldier had been accompanied by two other servicemen. 26.  The Government further stated that the applicants' failure to submit this information to the authorities in a timely manner had impeded the investigation into the abduction of the Dolsayev brothers. 27.  Since 21 October 2002 the applicants have repeatedly applied in person and in writing to various public bodies. They have been supported in their efforts by the SRJI. In their letters to the authorities the applicants referred to their relatives' abduction and asked for assistance and details of the investigation. Mostly these enquiries have remained unanswered, or purely formal replies have been given in which the applicants' requests have been forwarded to various prosecutors' offices. The applicants submitted to the Court some of their letters to the authorities and their replies. These documents are summarised below. 28.  On 21 October 2002, immediately after the detention of her sons, the second applicant wrote to the prosecutor's office of the Urus-Martan district (“the district prosecutor's office”) describing in detail the circumstances of their abduction and asking for assistance in releasing them. In particular, she pointed out that on the morning after the abduction she and members of her family had discovered APC tyre marks next to their family's vegetable garden. 29.  On 30 October 2002 the district prosecutor's office instituted an investigation into the disappearance of Beslan, Rizvan, Rizavdi and Shuddi Dolsayev under Article 126 § 2 (aggravated kidnapping) of the Russian Criminal Code. The case was assigned no. 61144. No investigative measures, other than the questioning of the first and second applicants on 2 November 2002, were taken following the opening of the criminal proceedings. 30.  On 22 November 2002 the second applicant wrote to the military commander of the Urus-Martan district (“the district military commander”), the Urus-Martan district department of the interior (ROVD) and the district prosecutor's office. She stated that her four sons had been abducted by servicemen of law-enforcement agencies of the Urus-Martan district and requested assistance in establishing her sons' whereabouts. 31.  On 11 December 2002 the military prosecutor's office of the North-Caucasus military circuit informed the second applicant that her complaint had been forwarded to the military prosecutor's office of the United Group Alignment (“the UGA”). 32.  On 30 December 2002 the district prosecutor's office granted the second applicant victim status in criminal proceedings concerning the kidnapping of the Dolsayev brothers (case no. 61144). 33.  On the same date the district prosecutor's office suspended the investigation in case no. 61144 owing to the failure to identify the culprits. On 16 January 2003 the district prosecutor's office informed the second applicant of the suspension of the investigation. 34.  On 24 January 2003 the Chechnya prosecutor's office informed the second applicant that in spite of the suspension of the investigation in criminal case no. 61144, operational-search measures were being taken to solve the crime. 35.  On 1 February 2003 the military prosecutor's office of military unit no. 20102 (“the unit military prosecutor's office”) informed the second applicant that it did not have any information either about the involvement of military personnel, the police or the Federal Security Service (FSB) in the kidnapping of her relatives or about the whereabouts of the Dolsayev brothers. 36.  On 3 March 2003 the Zavodskoy ROVD carried out an internal inquiry into the disappearance of Beslan Dolsayev. It was established that he had been kidnapped by “unidentified persons armed with machine guns and wearing camouflage uniform and masks”. Beslan Dolsayev's service machine gun was declared lost and put on a missing list. 37.  On 17 March 2003 the office of the Prosecutor General sent a report to the Commission of the Russian State Duma for Assistance in Political Settlement and Protection of Human Rights in Chechnya. The report provided data on disappearances in Chechnya and described investigative measures taken by the authorities to solve the kidnappings. The document referred to a specific group of disappearance cases, including the abduction of the Dolsayev brothers, in which the investigation had been opened and then suspended owing to the failure to identify the perpetrators. It noted that in all such cases the investigation had found no evidence implicating federal servicemen and that further steps were being taken to solve these crimes. 38.  On 24 March 2003 the Prosecutor General's office forwarded a letter from a deputy of the Russian State Duma accompanying the second applicant's complaint to the Chechnya prosecutor's office. 39.  On 4 April 2003 the first applicant requested the district prosecutor's office to inform him of the progress in the investigation into his sons' disappearance and to grant him victim status in the criminal case. On 11 April 2003 the district prosecutor's office replied that the investigation had been suspended on 30 December 2002. 40.  On 21 April 2003 the Chechnya prosecutor's office informed the second applicant that the time-limit of the investigation in case no. 61144 had been extended until 20 May 2003 and that it was supervising the criminal proceedings. 41.  On 25 April 2003 the district prosecutor's office informed the first applicant that it was not necessary to grant him victim status in the criminal case since his wife had already been granted such status. 42.  On 8 May 2003 the Main Military Prosecutor's Office forwarded the first applicant's complaint to the military prosecutor's office of the UGA. 43.  On 20 May 2003 the district prosecutor's office suspended the investigation owing to the failure to identify the perpetrators and informed the second applicant of this. 44.  On 13 June 2003 the Chechnya Ministry of the Interior (“the Chechnya MVD”) forwarded the first applicant's complaint to the ROVD. 45.  On 30 June 2003 the district military commander informed the second applicant that he had no information either about the whereabouts of the Dolsayev brothers or about the reasons for their abduction. 46.  On 11 July 2003 the military prosecutor's office of the UGA requested the unit military prosecutor's office to establish whether military personnel had been involved in the Dolsayev brothers' abduction. 47.  On 14 July 2003 the office of the Prosecutor General informed the first applicant that his complaint about the alleged ineffectiveness of the investigation in case no. 61144 had been forwarded to the Chechnya prosecutor's office. 48.  On 23 July 2003 the second applicant requested the Chechnya prosecutor's office to overturn the decision to suspend the investigation into her sons' abduction and to ensure that the investigators took the necessary measures to solve the crime. 49.  On 7 August 2003 the Chechnya MVD informed the first applicant that the identities of the perpetrators of the Dolsayev brothers' abduction had not been established, but that measures to identify the culprits were in progress. 50.  On 14 August 2003 the second applicant was questioned by the investigators. In her statement she pointed out that at some time between the end of October and the end of November 2002, in Urus-Martan, she had seen a soldier with the knife which had been taken away from her house by her sons' abductors. 51.  On 6 September 2003 the district prosecutor's office informed the second applicant that the investigation into her sons' abduction had been suspended on 6 September 2003. 52.  On 17 September 2003 the second applicant complained to the district prosecutor about the suspension of the investigation in the criminal case and requested that it be resumed. She expressed the opinion that her sons had been abducted by State representatives and pointed out that she had provided the investigators with detailed information which could have assisted them in identifying the perpetrators. In particular, she stated that she had told the investigators that the abductors had used military vehicles and had been able to pass through the checkpoints of the Russian military forces at night; that the abductors must have had permission from the military commander's office to drive through the checkpoints; that the investigators had failed to question chief officers of local law-enforcement agencies who could have given such permission; and that the investigators had demonstrated their negligent attitude towards the investigation by failing to preserve and examine the tyre marks found next to the applicants' yard and to question the servicemen who had manned the village checkpoints on the night of the abduction. The second applicant did not receive any response to this complaint. 53.  On 28 April 2004 the district prosecutor's office informed the first applicant that it was taking investigative measures to identify the perpetrators. 54.  On 17 October 2005 the applicants' representative, the SRJI, wrote to the district prosecutor's office requesting information about the progress of the investigation in the criminal case and asking for the applicants to be allowed to study the material in the case file. No response was given to this letter. 55.  On 16 November 2005 the first applicant wrote to the district prosecutor's office. He expressed the opinion that his sons had been abducted by representatives of federal forces. He complained about the ineffectiveness of the investigation and pointed out that the lack of information about the investigation precluded him from appealing against the investigators' decisions. He requested that the investigation into his sons' abduction be resumed and that he be allowed to study the investigation file. No response was given to this request. 56.  On 24 November 2006 the second applicant wrote to the district prosecutor's office. She requested that the investigation be resumed and that she be provided with information concerning its progress. 57.  On 27 November 2006 the district prosecutor's office informed the second applicant that it had rejected her request of 24 November 2006. 58.  On 28 November 2006 the district prosecutor's office informed the second applicant that on the same date it had suspended the investigation owing to the failure to identify the perpetrators. 59.  On 19 March 2007 the first applicant wrote to the district prosecutor's office. He complained about the lack of information concerning the investigation and requested that the investigation be resumed and that he be allowed to study the case file. 60.  On 22 March 2007 the district prosecutor's office informed the first applicant that “as a person who has witness status in the criminal case, [he did] not have the right to lodge the request [to study the case file]...”. 61.  On 10 May 2007 the first applicant complained to the district prosecutor's office about the lack of information concerning the investigation and requested to be granted victim status in the criminal proceedings. 62.  On 10 May 2007 the second applicant complained to the district prosecutor's office about the lack of information concerning the investigation and requested that the investigation be resumed and that she be allowed to study the case file. 63.  On 14 May 2007 the district prosecutor's office partly allowed the second applicant's complaint. Its decision stated that the applicant would receive permission to study the material in the case file “which would not divulge investigative secrets”. 64.  On 16 May 2007 the district prosecutor's office granted the first applicant victim status in criminal case no. 61144. 65.  On 5 July 2007 the district prosecutor's office conducted a crime scene examination at the applicants' household. No evidence was collected from the scene. 66.  On 5 July 2007 and 17 July 2007 the first applicant requested the district prosecutor's office that he be granted the status of a civil plaintiff in the criminal case. No response was given to these requests. 67.  On 20 July 2007 the applicants' lawyer Mr M.A. submitted to the SRJI a written statement concerning his study of the investigation file in case no. 61144. In this letter he described the following:
“... the criminal case file comprises one volume. The case was opened on 30 October 2002 ... Makka Dolsayeva was granted victim status and questioned. Kursolt Dolsayev was also questioned. No other investigative measures were taken. The investigation forwarded information requests to law-enforcement agencies in Chechnya asking whether the latter had apprehended the Dolsayev brothers; according to the responses, the brothers had not been apprehended [by the law-enforcement agencies].
On 30 December 2002 [the prosecutor's office] decided to suspend the investigation owing to the failure to identify the perpetrators; the investigator's decision stated that all possible investigative measures in the absence of anyone to be charged with the crime had been taken.
... the crime scene examination was not conducted. Therefore it is possible to conclude that from the very beginning the investigation in the criminal case led to a dead-end; one could not possibly talk about its effectiveness.
For instance, in their witness statements Kursolt and Makka Dolsayev stated that after the abduction they had seen tyre marks of military vehicles on the ground; however, the investigation did not find that it was necessary to examine the crime scene [although] traces of the criminals or any other evidence left [by the culprits] could have been discovered there ...
The investigation did not question all the witnesses to the crime. [The applicants'] neighbours were questioned only in August 2003.
... on 20 April 2003 the investigation in the criminal case was resumed owing to 'the lack of response to several information requests forwarded to law-enforcement agencies in Chechnya'.
... on 20 May 2003 the decision to suspend the criminal investigation was taken.
On 6 August 2003 the investigation was resumed.
A plan of operational-investigative measures was drawn up on 6 August 2003. According to the prosecutor's office, the investigation's main theory was the abduction of the Dolsayev brothers by servicemen of federal forces. To verify this theory, [the investigation] issued the order 'to conduct by 18 August 2003 an expert evaluation of the objects collected from the crime scene'. However, it should be recalled that the crime scene examination had not been conducted and, consequently, no objects had been collected from the scene. The investigative orders listed in the plan of operational-investigative measures had not been carried out.
The investigation in the criminal case was suspended on 6 September 2003.
On 4 April 2005 the investigation was resumed.
Orders concerning 'verification of the operations conducted by the servicemen of the Urus-Martan FSB and servicemen of the Urus-Martan district military commander's office on the day of abduction' were issued ...
On 4 May 2005 the investigation in the criminal case was suspended.
On 6 June 2005 the investigation was resumed ...
On 6 July 2005 the investigation was suspended.
On 27 November 2006 the investigation was resumed ...
On 28 November 2006 the investigation was suspended.
On 14 May 2007 the investigation was resumed ...
On 18 May 2007 the investigation was suspended again.
On 29 June 2007 the investigation was resumed.
On 5 July 2007 the investigation conducted a crime scene examination, during which photos of the Dolsayev family's household were taken. 'Nothing was collected from the crime scene.'
The investigation file contains the response of military unit no. 6845 to an information request by the prosecutor's office: 'the military commander's office of the Internal Troops [of the Ministry of the Interior] has been stationed in the Urus-Martan district since 2003. At present it is not possible to provide information concerning the military units and their servicemen [stationed in the area in 2002] as in 2002 the military commander's office consisted of units of the Ministry of Defence. [However,] in 2003 the office was discontinued; therefore, it is not possible to provide information as to which units became its successor.'
[In the investigation file] there is also the response of the OG VOGO (operational unit of the temporary operational group – оперативная группировка временной оперативной группы) and PMVD (units of the Ministry of the Interior) (подразделений МВД): 'there is no information concerning the passage of military vehicles through the checkpoints in the Urus-Martan district in the end of 2002 as there is no archive.'
In conclusion, it is possible to say that the investigation of this criminal case has not been carried out. The investigation file contains practically no information other than requests for information and assistance and responses to them; the latter state that none of the law-enforcement agencies in Chechnya apprehended the Dolsayev brothers. The prosecutor's office did not even try to verify whether this was true. The crime scene examination was not conducted until five years after the abduction ...”
(b)  Court proceedings initiated by the applicants 68.  On 31 October 2003 the Urus-Martan District Court of Chechnya (“the District Court”) granted a request by the second applicant and declared Beslan Dolsayev a missing person as of 21 October 2002. 69.  On 17 November 2003 the District Court delivered a similar decision in respect of Rizvan, Rizavdi and Shuddi Dolsayev and declared them missing persons as of 21 October 2002. 70.  On 31 January 2005 the District Court granted a request by the first applicant and declared Beslan Dolsayev deceased as of 21 October 2002. 71.  On 30 October 2002 the district prosecutor's office instituted an investigation into Beslan, Rizvan, Rizavdi and Shuddi Dolsayev's abduction under Article 126 § 2 of the Russian Criminal Code (aggravated kidnapping). The case file was assigned no. 61144. The criminal case was opened within the time-frame prescribed by Articles 143 and 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (decisions taken upon receipt of information about a crime) – that is, within ten days from the receipt of the information about the abduction of the applicants' relatives. 72.  The first applicant was questioned on 2 November 2002; the second applicant was questioned on the same date. The second applicant was granted victim status on 30 December 2002; the first applicant was granted this status on 16 May 2007. 73.  The investigation questioned a number of witnesses. On 2 November 2002 the second applicant testified that at about 4 a.m. on 21 October 2002 she had heard some noise from the street. She looked out from the window and saw a group of 20-25 armed men in camouflage uniform and masks. Some of these men entered her house. One of them told her that they were from the GRU. The men put four of the applicant's sons against the wall and asked who was working in the police. Beslan Dolsayev told them that he worked at the Zavodskoy ROVD. Then the intruders took away his service gun, ammunition, service uniform and identity card. After that the men took the applicant's sons outside. They locked her husband Kursolt Dolsayev and her sick son Shamil in a bedroom; the applicant and her daughter-in-law had been locked in another room. After the intruders left, the applicant saw on the ground tyre marks from a car and an APC. On 2 November 2002 the first applicant provided a similar witness statement. However, he also stated that one of the intruders had had a gun with a telescopic sight, and that he had been locked by the intruders in one of the rooms together with his son Adam. On 16 May 2007 the first applicant changed his previous testimony by stating that he had been locked in one of the bedrooms with his son Shamil. On an unspecified date the investigation questioned the fourth applicant, Shamil Dolsayev, whose description of the events was similar to that of his parents. 74.  According to the Government, the applicants provided contradictory statements concerning the subsequent discovery of the knife: the second applicant testified that she had seen the soldier with the knife about a week after the abduction and that the soldier had been accompanied by other servicemen, whereas the first applicant submitted that he had seen the soldier a month after the abduction and that the soldier had been alone. In addition, the applicants' statements contained discrepancies as to the way the soldier had escaped from the applicants. The applicants had also failed to describe the knife's features to the investigation and to inform the authorities that the abductors had stolen their property. 75.  The investigators questioned the applicants' neighbours Ms Kh.N., Mr A.S. and Mr S.A., who had provided similar statements to the effect that they had discovered about the abduction of the Dolsayev brothers from the applicants. The investigators also questioned officer P.M., the head of the road-patrol unit of the Urus-Martan ROVD. According to his statement, he had been informed about the abduction on 21 October 2002. Another witness, the head of the Martan-Chu village administration, Mr E.M., testified that on 21 October 2002 one of the village residents had told him about the abduction of the Dolsayev brothers by unidentified men. 76.  The investigators also requested information about the disappearance of the Dolsayev brothers from various State authorities. On 15 January 2003 the information centre of the Ministry of the Interior stated that it had no records concerning either the detention of the Dolsayev brothers or the opening of criminal proceedings against them. The investigators also obtained information from the public prosecutors' offices and units of the Ministry of Defence, according to which the bodies of the Dolsayev brothers had not been found among the unidentified corpses discovered in Chechnya. 77.  The Government submitted that although the criminal investigation had failed to establish the whereabouts of Beslan, Rizvan, Rizavdi and Shuddi Dolsayev and the internal investigation conducted by the Zavodskoy ROVD into the circumstances of the disappearance of its officer Beslan Dolsayev had also failed to identify those responsible for his abduction, the investigating authorities had forwarded information requests to competent State agencies and had taken other steps to solve the abduction. The investigation found no evidence to support the theory of the involvement of Russian federal forces in the abduction of the Dolsayev brothers. The law-enforcement agencies in Chechnya had never arrested or detained Beslan, Rizvan, Rizavdi and Shuddi Dolsayev on criminal or administrative charges and had not carried out any criminal investigations in respect of them. No special operations had been carried out in the Urus-Martan district on 21 October 2002. In addition, according to the statement provided by the head of the Martan-Chu village administration, at the material time it had been possible to drive in and from the village without passing through the military checkpoints by countryside roads located near Urus-Martan and the villages Tangi-Chu and Goy-Chu (also known as Komsomolskoye). 78.  The Government further submitted that the description of the perpetrators provided by the witnesses did not demonstrate that the perpetrators were representatives of the State. Although the camouflage uniform used by the perpetrators was similar to the uniform of military servicemen, such uniform was available for purchase everywhere in the Russian Federation. In addition, the masks used by the perpetrators did not have individual features distinguishing criminals from military servicemen. The fact that the perpetrators had spoken Russian did not mean that these men must have been Russian military servicemen; they could have been residents of Chechnya or members of illegal armed groups from other countries who spoke the language. 79.  According to the Government, the investigation had been suspended and resumed on several occasions; in spite of the large volume of operational-search and investigative measures carried out by the authorities, the investigation had failed to identify those responsible for the abduction of the Dolsayev brothers. The Government further submitted that at the material time a counterterrorist operation had been taking place in Chechnya and there had been daily attacks on the federal forces. Therefore, owing to the risk this investigative measure could have represented for law-enforcement officers, the prosecutor's office had not conducted the crime scene examination in the applicants' house and its surroundings. The Government further contended that the applicants had been duly informed of all decisions taken during the investigation, that the first and second applicants had been granted victim status in the criminal case and that the investigators had complied with all the instructions issued by the supervising prosecutors. 80.  Despite specific requests by the Court, the Government did not disclose most of the contents of the investigation file in case no. 61144, providing only copies of the following documents:
(a) the second applicant's witness statements, dated 2 November 2002 and 14 August 2003; and
(b) the first applicant's witness statements, dated 2 November 2002, 6 April 2005, 16 June 2005 and 16 May 2007.
The Government stated that the investigation was in progress and that disclosure of the documents would be in violation of Article 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, since the file contained information of a military nature and personal data concerning the witnesses or other participants in the criminal proceedings.