5.  The applicant was born in 1984 and lives in Berehove. 6.  In the early hours of 22 August 2004 M. was robbed and killed in Berehove, where the applicant was also living. On the same date the applicant and two other people, K.A. and St., were arrested on suspicion of robbing and killing M. 7.  According to the applicant, he was apprehended by the police task force at about 10 a.m. on 22 August 2004 in the apartment of his girlfriend and taken to the police station, where he was beaten up and threatened in an attempt to force him to confess to the robbery and murder of M. 8.  The case file contains two arrest warrants – one issued by a police officer and another one by the prosecutor investigating the murder (hereinafter “the investigator”), both indicating that the applicant had been arrested by the above-mentioned officials on 22 August 2004 at 6.30 p.m. at their offices. The arrest warrant issued by the investigator indicates that the applicant acknowledged his guilt, had no observations regarding his arrest and that he wished to be legally represented. It bears the applicant’s signature, with no comments. The lower part of the last page of the record contains a printed statement (“довідка”) that was added later (it was dated 2007); this additional statement is signed by the investigator only and asserts that the applicant’s relatives were informed of his arrest. The applicant alleged that his family had been informed of his arrest on the evening of the following day (that is to say 23 August 2004). 9.  After his arrest, the applicant signed a record, bearing no time, explaining his rights as a suspect, including the right to remain silent and to consult a lawyer before he was first questioned. The relevant entry in the record indicates that the applicant expressed his wish to be represented by S., a lawyer who lived in Uzhhorod, some 70 kilometres from Berehove, and noted the address of the latter. 10.  At about 4 p.m. on 22 August 2004, according to the applicant, and from 9 until 10 a.m. on that day, according to the official record, the applicant was questioned as a suspect by the investigator in the presence of B., a lawyer. The record of the questioning noted that the applicant had been informed of his rights as a suspect from 6.30 until 6.45 p.m. on that day and that a separate procedural document existed in this respect evidencing that he had wished to be legally represented. The handwritten entry in the record furthermore stated that the applicant wanted to have B. as his lawyer and that he acknowledged in full his guilt in respect of the robbery and murder. During the questioning, the applicant provided details regarding the robbery and admitted that he had hit M. in the head with a bat during the robbery but that he had done so instinctively, in self-defence. The applicant did not state what had become of the bat – namely where or in what circumstances he had hidden the bat after the murder. The applicant and B. signed the verbatim record, making no objections as to its contents. B. then left. 11.  Later that day, from 8 until 8.30 p.m., the applicant took part in a videotaped reconstruction of the crime in the presence of a forensic expert, an investigator from the local police, two attesting witnesses and the investigator in the case. According to the Government, B. was apparently busy and was not able to participate in the reconstruction. No other lawyer was instructed to assist the applicant during this investigative step. According to the applicant, he repeated his request for S. to be called, but this was not done and he was forced by means of threats to testify. 12.  During the reconstruction, which commenced near the place where the bat used for the murder had been hidden, the applicant pointed to the exact place where the bat was; the bat was then uncovered and retained as evidence. A copy of the verbatim record of the reconstruction provided to the Court by the applicant indicates that he was informed of his constitutional right not to incriminate himself. The verbatim record bears a handwritten “not” next to the following printed “agreed to testify”. The relevant part of the text is not visible on the copy of the record provided by the Government. The record furthermore contains the applicant’s statement that he had not been forced to testify by means of any psychological or physical violence. The applicant signed the record without indicating any objections as to its contents next to his signature. 13.  At an unspecified time on the same date St. and K.A were questioned as suspects. St., being represented by B. (the same lawyer who represented the applicant), acknowledged his guilt in respect of the robbery. He stated, inter alia, that he had seen the applicant carrying a bat when they had been entering the victim’s house. K.A., having waived his right to legal assistance, admitted that he had taken part in the robbery. He furthermore participated, still unrepresented, in a videotaped reconstruction of the crime during which he stated, inter alia, that he had seen the applicant with a bat in his hands but had not seen who had murdered M. 14.  On 23 August 2004 the investigator appointed B. to represent the applicant, and St., and admitted him to the proceedings. 15.  On the same day the applicant, in the presence of B., participated in another videotaped reconstruction of the crime in the victim’s house. The applicant admitted his guilt and gave further details about the robbery and murder. He reiterated that he had hit M. on the head with the bat and stated that another suspect in the case had helped him to hide the bat afterwards. 16.  On 26 August 2004 the applicant’s mother signed a contract with the lawyer S. concerning her son’s legal representation. On the same date S. contacted the prosecutor, who allowed S. to represent the applicant instead of B. The applicant furthermore made a written statement declaring that he was refusing the services of B. and wanted S. to act as his lawyer. 17.  On 8 October 2004 medical experts examined the applicant following his complaint that he had been ill-treated by the police. No injuries were discovered on the applicant’s body. 18.  On 14 October 2004 the video recording of the reconstruction of the crime of 23 August 2004 was played to the applicant in the presence of S. The applicant retracted his earlier confession and explained that he had only given it because he had been threatened and beaten up by the police on 22 August 2004. 19.  On 2 September 2004, and 20 and 28 January and 17 February 2005 the applicant was questioned in the presence of his defence lawyer but refused to give any evidence. 20.  On 19 January 2005 the prosecutors refused to institute a criminal investigation into the applicant’s allegation that he had been beaten up by the police, having found the police officers’ actions to be lawful. 21.  On 18 February 2005 the pre-trial investigation was completed and the applicant – together with St. and K.A. – was charged with robbery and murder. It was established that another person, I.K., had also participated in the robbery, but as he had absconded, he would have to be tried separately. 22.  During the trial the applicant denied having participated in the robbery and the murder and refused to give any evidence. He stated that his earlier confessions to the crimes should not be admitted as evidence as they had been made under duress and in breach of his defence rights, including his right to be represented by a lawyer of his own choosing. He also argued that the bat which had been retained as evidence and examined by experts during the investigation had not been the same bat as that which he had pointed out during the reconstruction. He supported his allegation by referring to the fact that in the verbatim record, the prosecutor had described the bat as blue, while the experts who had subsequently examined it had described it as grey. 23.  In April 2005 the police detained I.K. In the course of the trial St., A.K. and I.K all pleaded guilty to robbery but denied killing M. 24.  On 29 August 2006 the Zakarpattya Regional Court of Appeal, acting as the first-instance court, convicted the applicant of murder and robbery and sentenced him to fifteen years’ imprisonment. St., A.K. and I.K. were also found guilty of robbery but acquitted of murder. The hearing was held in the presence of the applicant’s new lawyer, D., who had replaced the lawyer S. on an unspecified date. 25.  The court based the applicant’s conviction, among other evidence, on the confessions he had made during his questioning by the investigator on 22 August 2004, the reconstructions of the crime on 22 and 23 August 2004, the statements of his co-defendants that they had seen him with a bat in M.’s house, and physical evidence, including an expert’s report suggesting that the traces of blood found on the bat (the location of which had been pointed out by the applicant during the reconstruction of the crime on 22 August 2004) could have belonged to M. 26.  By the same judgment, the court rejected as unsubstantiated the applicant’s submissions that he had made his self-incriminating statements under duress, referring to the results of the medical examination of 8 October 2004 (see paragraph 17 above) and the prosecutors’ decision of 19 January 2005 (see paragraph 20 above). 27.  The court also found no violation of the applicant’s defence rights. It noted, inter alia, that on 22 August 2004 the prosecutor’s decision to appoint B. as the applicant’s lawyer had been lawful, because at the material time the applicant had not had a contract with S. for legal representation. It also observed that on 22 August 2004 the applicant had raised no objections to the questioning record. The court also suggested, without giving details, that there had been some technical errors in the procedural documents, in particular as regards the time of the applicant’s arrest and questioning, but that they did not affect the fairness of the respective investigative actions. 28.  The court refuted the applicant’s allegation that the bat retained as evidence had been switched with another (see paragraph 22 above), noting that the disparity in the bat’s description by the experts and the prosecutor could have been explained by the fact that the latter was colour blind. 29.  The applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court on points of law, reiterating his complaints. He stated, in particular, that he had not been represented by the lawyer of his choice, S., on 22 and 23 August 2004, but by B., who had been appointed by the investigator against the applicant’s will. He further stated that he had not been assisted by any lawyer when he had been forced to confess during the crime reconstruction of 22 August 2004. He also complained about the fact that B. had represented him and his co-accused St. at the same time (see paragraph 13 above) – a conflict of interest (as there had been important discrepancies in their respective statements) that should have prevented him from being allowed to do so. 30.  On 12 April 2007 the Supreme Court, acting as the second-instance court, upheld the applicant’s conviction and sentence in his presence. The applicant was not represented by a lawyer during the hearing, but he did not provide any further details in this regard. 31.  The Supreme Court found that the applicant’s guilt was proved, inter alia, by the statements he had made during his questioning of 22 August 2004 and during the reconstructions of the crime. It noted in this respect that those statements had been corroborated by other evidence, including the testimony of his co-accused, and concluded that the lower court had correctly admitted the applicant’s self-incriminating statements as evidence. The court also noted that the details of the crime which the applicant had revealed in his statements could not have been known to him unless he had been the direct perpetrator. 32.  Without mentioning the applicant’s arguments regarding the alleged breach of his defence rights, the Supreme Court found no procedural violations during the proceedings serious enough to necessitate it quashing the judgment. 33.  On an unspecified date the applicant was released from prison.


4.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Orhei. 5.  In September 2009 the applicant initiated civil proceedings against a company which was in process of insolvency. 6.  On 18 December 2009 the Drochia District Court found in favour of the applicant and ordered the defendant company to pay him 24,957 Moldovan Lei (MDL) (the equivalent of 1,413 euros (EUR)) for pecuniary damage and MDL 749 (the equivalent of EUR 42) for costs and expenses. The representative of the defendant company was not present at the hearing. 7.  On 28 December 2009 the secretariat of the Drochia District Court sent a copy of the reasoned judgment to the defendant company by ordinary mail. 8.  On 11 January 2010 an enforcement writ was issued to the applicant by the same court in respect of the judgment of 18 December 2009. 9.  On 10 February 2010, in a different set of proceedings concerning the insolvency of the defendant company, the company’s insolvency administrator updated the list of creditors by making express reference to the judgment of 18 December 2009 and to the exact amounts awarded in that judgment. The court which treated the insolvency issued a decision concerning the updated list of creditors on the same date. 10.  On 26 April 2010 the insolvency administrator of the defendant company lodged an appeal against the judgment of 18 December 2009. The applicant objected to the appeal by arguing that it had been time-barred. He indicated that the time-limit for lodging the appeal had expired twenty days after the serving of the impugned judgment and that the insolvency administrator of the defendant company had been aware of the judgment of 18 December 2009 since in February 2010 he had informed the court dealing with the insolvency proceedings about the judgment in question. 11.  On 28 September 2010 the Bălţi Court of Appeal admitted the appeal lodged by the insolvency administrator of the defendant company and quashed the judgment of 18 December 2009. The Court of Appeal did respond to the objection raised by the applicant and, after re-examining the merits of the case, dismissed the applicant’s action against the defendant company. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law raising the same arguments as in his appeal. 12.  On 26 January 2011 the Supreme Court of Justice dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law and upheld the judgment of the lower court. The Supreme Court did not make any comment about the applicant’s objection concerning the late appeal.


5.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Marmarashen village. 6.  In June 2006 the applicant’s son, Gegham Sergoyan, was drafted into the Armenian army. 7.  On 8 November 2006 he was assigned to military unit no. 37673 (the “military unit”) situated in the unrecognised Republic of Nagorno Karabakh (the “NKR”). 8.  On 9 April 2007 Gegham Sergoyan underwent surgery on a toe on his left foot. 9.  On the same date the military unit doctor temporarily discharged Gegham Sergoyan from his duties until 16 April 2007. Because of the surgery, he was allowed to wear slippers instead of army boots. 10.  On 15 April 2007 Gegham Sergoyan was put on duty. On that day lieutenant H.G. was the duty officer in charge of the military unit. 11.  By an order of the Deputy Minister of Defence of Armenia of 29 December 2003, H.G. had been hired to perform military service for a period of five years and assigned to the military unit with the rank of junior lieutenant.
According to the personal report provided by the military unit command, H.G. had been a weak officer from the first day of service. He had been the subject of several disciplinary penalties, including a “strict reprimand” and “not fully fit for service” in September and October 2004 respectively. In July 2006 H.G. was given another reprimand. It was further indicated by his superiors that H.G.’s performance was deficient and his professional training poor. 12.  On 15 April 2007 at 9.40 p.m. H.G., upon seeing Gegham Sergoyan in the duty station room, reproached the latter for having entered without permission and for not wearing uniform, including for being in slippers instead of army boots. Although Gegham Sergoyan admitted his mistake and tried to leave the room, H.G. verbally abused him and violently pushed him against the wall. Then H.G. pointed his gun at Gegham Sergoyan’s head and fired a shot. 13.  On the same date Gegham Sergoyan was taken to Stepanakert Military Hospital in the “NKR” (the SMH) where he underwent surgery. 14.  Upon admission to Stepanakert military hospital, the diagnosis of ballistic trauma of the cervical vertebrae with axis (second cervical vertebra) fracture and mandibular fracture with displacement of the right side was noted in Gegham Sergoyan’s medical records. 15.  On 16 April 2007 at 10 a.m. Gegham Sergoyan was examined by doctors H.E., N.C. and A.G. of the SMH who indicated in the relevant record that Gegham Sergoyan had sustained a ballistic trauma to the cervical vertebrae with axis fracture, and that he had a fracture of the right side of the lower jaw. 16.  On the same day Gegham Sergoyan was transferred to the Central Military Hospital of the Ministry of Defence of Armenia (the CMH) in Yerevan pursuant to the transfer certificate issued by Doctor H.E. The same diagnosis, namely ballistic trauma and fracture of the right side of the jaw, was mentioned in the certificate. 17.  On the same day the Askeran No. 1 Garrison Military Prosecutor’s Office instituted criminal proceedings under Article 34-104 § 1 of the Criminal Code of Armenia (attempted murder). 18.  On 17 April 2007 Gegham Sergoyan was admitted to the CMH in Yerevan. It was indicated in the medical record that, according to the transfer diagnosis, Gegham Sergoyan had suffered ballistic trauma to the cervical vertebrae. Mandibular fracture with displacement on the left side and fracture of the second cervical vertebra was also mentioned, with a question mark. The clinical diagnosis made by the doctors of the CMH stated ballistic trauma to the neck with lesion of the cervical part of the spine (second cervical vertebra) and ballistic fracture of the second and third vertebrae with traumatic spinal cord injury. 19.  During his stay at the CMH, Gegham Sergoyan was examined by forensic medical expert A.D. of the Republican Centre of Forensic Medicine of the Ministry of Health of Armenia (the Republican Centre of Forensic Medicine) who stated in his conclusion, inter alia, that the bullet had penetrated from the left side of the lower jaw and, according to descriptions contained in the medical records, it was directed from left to right and upwards from front to back. 20.  On 18 April 2007 H.G. was officially charged with attempted murder and abuse of power resulting in grave consequences (Articles 34-104 § 1 and 375 § 1 of the Criminal Code). 21.  On the same day H.G. was questioned and fully admitted his guilt. He submitted, in particular, that he had been on duty on 15 April 2007 when at 9.40 p.m. he had seen his assistant, J.G., and Gegham Sergoyan watching television together in the duty room. Given that Gegham Sergoyan was in slippers, he had reprimanded him for violation of the uniform code and for having entered the duty room without permission, and had sworn at him, grabbed him by the chest and pushed him against the wall. Gegham Sergoyan and J.G. had been laughing while watching television and he had thought they were laughing at him. Although Gegham Sergoyan had said that he would leave the room, he became even angrier since the latter had been laughing while speaking to him. At that moment he had taken out his gun, loaded it and, pointing the gun at the left side of Gegham Sergoyan’s face, had sworn at him and shot him in the head. He had shot Gegham Sergoyan with the gun attributed to him. 22.  On 2 May 2007 Gegham Sergoyan died in hospital without having regained consciousness. 23.  On the same day the investigator of the Askeran No. 1 Garrison Military Prosecutor’s Office ordered a post-mortem examination of Gegham Sergoyan’s body to be conducted in Yerevan by forensic medical expert A.L.D. of the Republican Centre of Forensic Medicine. The expert was requested to determine, inter alia, the cause of death, the existence of any injuries on the body, the time and method of their infliction and their possible link with the death. The expert was also asked to determine whether there were any other external injuries on the body apart from the ballistic trauma, the time of their infliction and their gravity. 24.  On 10 May 2007 the Minister of Defence of Armenia issued an order concerning the incident with the applicant’s son and the imposition of disciplinary penalties on persons responsible. The order stated, inter alia, the following:
“... The internal investigation has revealed the following:
- the military unit command had not thoroughly examined [H.G.’s] moral character or his personal and professional preparation, there had been no proper control over the observance of the daily schedule;
- the instructions from the personnel responsible for the daily timeline in the military unit had been of a formal nature;
- there had been an unhealthy moral environment among the officers and draft soldiers...
With a view to penalising the persons liable for the incident I order 1. The imposition [of the following penalties]
a. a “reprimand” in respect of the commander of [the military unit] ... for poor supervision of personnel responsible for the daily timeline;
b. a “strict reprimand” in respect of:
- the deputy commander of [the military unit] ... for failure to organise properly [military] service;
- the deputy commander of [the military unit] responsible for the armoury ... (in charge of the military unit on the day of the incident) ...
- the deputy commander of [the military unit] responsible for working with the personnel ... for the tense moral environment among the officers and draft soldiers. 2. Commanders of military units
- to discuss the incident ... and to undertake concrete measures to prevent the occurrence of such ...” 25.  On an unspecified date in May 2007 the Ministry of Defence of Armenia paid the applicant 2,250,000 Armenian Drams (AMD) (approximately EUR 4,650 at the relevant time), including compensation for Gegham Sergoyan’s funeral expenses and a lump sum insurance payment for the family. 26.  On 15 May 2007 the investigator made a decision to involve the applicant in the proceedings as Gegham Sergoyan’s legal heir. 27.  On 1 June 2007 the post-mortem examination, including an autopsy, was completed. Forensic medical expert A.L.D. concluded that Gegham Sergoyan’s death had been caused by acute penetrating ballistic trauma to the neck. The expert stated, inter alia, that on 17 April 2007 Gegham Sergoyan had been examined by a maxillofacial surgeon who had not detected any jawbone pathology on the basis of X-ray computed tomography and radiography results. 28.  On 9 June 2007 the investigation into Gegham Sergoyan’s death was taken over by the Military Prosecutor’s Office of Armenia. 29.  On 14 September 2007 the charges against H.G. were modified and he was charged with murder motivated by hooliganism and abuse of power resulting in grave consequences (Articles 104 § 2 (10) and 375 § 1 of the Criminal Code). 30.  On 13 February 2008 the case, together with the finalised bill of indictment, was transmitted to the Southern Criminal Court for examination on the merits. Thereafter the case was transmitted to the Syunik Regional Court for reasons of territorial jurisdiction. 31.  On the same date the Military Prosecutor filed a civil claim against H.G. seeking to recover AMD 2,789,153 (approximately EUR 6,200 at the relevant time) from the latter. This amount included the expenses borne from the State budget, including the medical expenses paid by the State and AMD 2,250,000 paid to Gegham Sergoyan’s family for funeral expenses and insurance benefit. 32.  In the course of the proceedings before the Syunik Regional Court the applicant lodged a civil claim against the Republic of Armenia, namely the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Finance of Armenia, seeking compensation in the amount of EUR 300,000 for non-pecuniary damage sustained as a result of the murder of his only son, which had caused him deep sorrow and severe mental suffering: he had lost the normal rhythm of life and his health had deteriorated. The applicant relied, in particular, on Article 18 of the Civil Code of Armenia and Articles 2 and 13 of the Convention. 33.  In the course of the proceedings before the Regional Court H.G. pleaded guilty. 34.  A number of witnesses were questioned during the proceedings, including Gegham Sergoyan’s fellow servicemen. In particular J.G., who had personally witnessed the events of 15 April 2007, testified that he had seen H.G. swear at Gegham Sergoyan and shoot him in the face. 35.  Several officers of the military unit stated that to their knowledge Gegham Sergoyan had never had any problems with lieutenant H.G. before. 36.  On 1 September 2009 the Syunik Regional Court found H.G. guilty as charged and sentenced him to fifteen years’ imprisonment. The Regional Court rejected the applicant’s civil claim by stating that no possibility of compensation for non-pecuniary damage was envisaged under the law. It further stated that, although the accused had committed the crime while in military service, the crime had been committed on a personal level and therefore any damage incurred should be compensated by the person liable for it. 37.  On 1 October 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal. He submitted, inter alia, that lieutenant H.G. had committed the crime during his service while assigned to duty in the military unit on 15 April 2007. Gegham Sergoyan was murdered while performing his army service obligations when he was on duty according to the relevant orders of the military unit command. He further submitted that, although no possibility of compensation for non-pecuniary damage existed under Armenian civil law, such a requirement existed under the Convention: according to Article 6 of the Constitution ratified international treaties were a constituent part of the legal system of Armenia and, in the case of inconsistency with the national law, the norms of the treaty should prevail. 38.  On 2 February 2010 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal and upheld the judgment of the Regional Court. As regards the applicant’s civil claim, the Court of Appeal relied on Article 1087 of the Civil Code to state that, in the event of the victim’s death, only compensation for funeral expenses is envisaged under the civil law. 39.  On 26 February 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. The applicant submitted the same arguments as before and restated his position concerning his claim for non-pecuniary damages as expressed in his initial civil claim with the Regional Court and in his appeal before the Court of Appeal. 40.  On 1 April 2010 the Court of Cassation declared the applicant’s appeal on points of law inadmissible for lack of merit. 41.  Article 34 provides that attempted crime is the action (inaction) committed through direct wilfulness deliberately aimed at committing the crime if the crime was not completed for reasons beyond the person’s control. 42.  Article 104 § 1 provides that murder shall be punishable by imprisonment from six to twelve years. 43.  Article 104 § 2 (10) provides that murder committed out of hooliganism shall be punishable by imprisonment from eight to fifteen years or life imprisonment. 44.  Article 375 § 1 provides that abuse of authority or public position, exceeding public authority, as well as omission by a superior or public official, if such acts were committed for selfish ends, personal interest or the interests of a group and which resulted in grave damage, shall be punishable by imprisonment from two to five years. 45.  Article 154 § 3 provides that the civil claim lodged in criminal proceedings is decided in accordance with the provisions of civil law. 46.  According to Article 17 § 1 the person whose rights have been violated may claim full compensation for the damage suffered, unless the law or contract envisages a lower amount of compensation. 47.  According to Article 17 § 2, damages are the expenses borne or to be borne by the person whose rights have been violated, in connection with restoring the violated rights, loss of his property or damage to it (material damage), including lost income. 48.  Article 18 provides that damage caused to natural or legal persons as a result of unlawful actions (inaction) of state and local self-government bodies or their officials is subject to compensation by the Republic of Armenia or the relevant local community. 49.  Article 1077 § 2 provides that damage caused to the life or the health of a person while performing, inter alia, military service is compensated in accordance with the rules prescribed by the Civil Code, if stricter liability is not provided for by statute or contract. 50.  According to Article 1087, persons responsible for damage linked to the victim’s death shall reimburse the necessary funeral expenses to the person who has incurred such expenses. 51.  Since 1 November 2014 Article 17 § 2 has included non‑pecuniary damage in the list of the types of civil damage for which compensation can be claimed in civil proceedings. The Civil Code was supplemented by new Articles 162.1 and 1087.2 which regulate the procedure for claiming compensation for non-pecuniary damage. Until the introduction of further amendments on 30 December 2015 (in force from 1 January 2016), compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage could be claimed where it had been established by a judicial ruling that a person’s rights guaranteed by Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the Convention had been violated, and also in cases of wrongful conviction. 52.  The Constitutional Court found Article 17 § 2 of the Civil Code incompatible with Articles 3 § 2, 16 § 4, 18 § 1, 19 § 1 and 43 § 2 of the Constitution in so far as it does not envisage non-pecuniary damage as a type of civil damages and does not provide for a possibility to obtain compensation for non-pecuniary damage by impeding the effective exercise of the right of access to court and the right to a fair trial and at the same time hindering due compliance with its international obligations by the Republic of Armenia.
The Constitutional Court stated that Article 17 § 2 of the Civil Code would lose its legal force at the latest on 1 October 2014.


5.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Marusino, Moscow Region. 6.  On 1 August 2000 the Ministry of the Interior of Belarus ordered the applicant’s arrest on suspicion of her having committed several criminal offences. On an unspecified date her name was put on the international wanted persons list. 7.  On 18 February 2014 the applicant was arrested in Lyubertsy, Moscow Region. 8.  On 20 February 2014 the Lyubertsy Town Court of the Moscow Region authorised the applicant’s detention for forty days pending her extradition to Belarus. 9.  On 28 March 2014 the Town Court extended the applicant’s detention until 18 August 2014. 10.  On 18 August 2014 the Town Court extended the applicant’s detention until 18 February 2015. On 18 September 2014 the Moscow Regional Court upheld the decision of 18 August 2014 on appeal. The applicant did not attend the hearing. The applicant’s lawyers were present and made submissions to the court. 11.  On 10 February 2015 the Town Prosecutor ordered the applicant’s release on an undertaking not to leave town. 12.  On 20 August and 21 September 2015 the investigative committee of the Republic of Belarus discontinued the criminal proceedings against the applicant. 13.  On 4 February 2016 the Town Prosecutor discontinued the extradition proceedings against the applicant. 14.  From 21 February 2014 to 10 February 2015 the applicant was detained in remand prison SIZO-6 in the Moscow Region. According to the Government, she was held in the following cells:
Cell no.
Period of detention
Cell size (sq. m)
28
From 21 to 22 February 2014 15.  According to the Government, the personal space afforded to the applicant during her detention in the remand prison was approximately 3.27 sq. m, which was below the statutory minimum standard of 4 sq. m. She was provided with an individual sleeping place, a mattress, a pillow, two bed sheets, a pillowcase, a towel and a blanket. She also received a bowl, a spoon and a mug. The inmates were allowed to take a shower once a week for at least fifteen minutes. The bed sheets were changed on a weekly basis. The applicant was provided with access to a radio, books and board games. The temperature in the cells was 22oC in summer and at least 18oC in winter. The food provided to the inmates was in compliance with the relevant norms and standards. 16.  According to the applicant, the cells in which she was held were overcrowded and dirty. The walls were covered with mould and fungus. The lighting was insufficient during the day and was not turned off at night. The heating was also insufficient. On numerous occasions it was completely turned off. The mattresses, pillows and bed linen were too old and worn-out. The inmates were allowed to take a fifteen-minute shower once a week. The food was of poor quality. No fruit or vegetables were available. The inmates were allowed one hour of exercise a day in a prison yard with no sports facilities. If one of the inmates were sick or refused to take part in the daily exercise, the administration cancelled it for all the inmates held in the same cell. 17.  During her transfers between the remand prison and court, the applicant was placed in a compartment measuring 1 by 0.7 m, often with another inmate. The journey lasted for two and a half to three hours. 18.  Upon her return to the remand prison, the applicant was placed in a holding cell measuring 1 by 1.5 m with three other inmates. Prior to being admitted to their cells, the inmates were required to take off their clothes, do several sit-ups and then remain crouched down. 19.  On 26 February 2014 the Deputy Town Prosecutor carried out an inspection of remand prison SIZO-6. He established, inter alia, that it was overcrowded, noting in particular that the average personal space afforded to inmates varied from 1 to 3 sq. m and that in cells nos. 8, 69 and 97 the inmates were not provided with individual beds. According to the prison administration, the remand prison capacity was 327 inmates. However, at the time of the inspection the prison population exceeded that limit by 62%, holding a total of 530 inmates. 20.  On an unspecified date in 2014 the Regional Prosecutor’s Office carried out an inspection of the conditions of detention in remand prison SIZO-6. On 21 March 2014 the Regional Prosecutor issued a notice to the head of the regional penal service (FSIN), advising that the conditions of detention in the prison be brought in line with the statutory requirements. As to the issue of overcrowding, the prosecutor indicated as follows:
“As regards the number of beds ... in the cells ... the [statutory] requirement of 4 sq. m of personal space per inmate is not being complied with ... The average personal space afforded to detainees is 2.6 sq. m and in cells nos. 10, 14, 16, 25 etc. it varies from 1.6 to 1.55 sq. m per inmate.” 21.  According to the applicant, between February and March 2014 the Town Prosecutor authorised the applicant’s mother to visit her at the remand prison on three occasions. 22.  On 10 October 2014, in response to a request by the applicant to meet with her family, the Prosecutor General’s Office responded that, as stipulated in the Pre-trial Detention Act, suspects and defendants could have no more than two family visits per month, subject to written authorisation from the official or authority in charge of the criminal case, and advised the applicant to apply to the law-enforcement bodies in Belarus for approval of her relatives’ visits. 23.  On 21 January 2015 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow dismissed a complaint by the applicant against the prosecutor’s decision of 10 October 2014, without considering the merits. 24.  On 11 March 2015 the Moscow City Court quashed the decision of 21 January 2015 and remitted the matter to the District Court for fresh consideration. 25.  On 6 May 2015 the District Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint against the decision of 10 October 2014. 26.  On 17 August 2015 the City Court upheld the decision of 6 May 2015 on appeal. 27.  On 24 January 2001 the applicant was issued with a Russian passport by the Russian Embassy in Minsk, Belarus. On an unspecified date she moved to Moscow, Russia. 28.  On 20 August 2004 a district police department in Moscow issued an internal passport in the applicant’s name. 29.  On 16 February 2012 the Moscow City Department of the Federal Migration Service decided, on the basis of an earlier inquiry, that the applicant had been wrongly issued with a Russian passport. They based their findings, inter alia, on information received from the Russian Embassy in Minsk indicating that there was no information in the relevant database confirming the issuance of a Russian passport in the applicant’s name in 2001. 30.  On 5 February 2015 the Lyublinskiy District Court of Moscow dismissed a complaint by the applicant against the decision of 16 February 2012. On 26 June 2015 the City Court upheld the decision of 5 February 2015. 31.  On an unspecified date the applicant, being a Belorussian citizen, applied for a residency permit in Russia. On 17 April 2017 the Federal Migration Service issued a residency permit.


6.  The applicant was born in 1935 and lived in Kalvarija. She died on 8 April 2017. 7.  In December 1993 a large sum of money disappeared from A.G.’s mother’s home in the town of Kalvarija. A.G. suspected the applicant’s son R.A., and R.A.’s friend, Z.V., of having stolen the money. 8.  As later established by the Court of Appeal (see paragraph 40 below), on 19 April 1994 A.G., acting with accomplices, forced R.A. and Z.V. into a car and drove them to a forest in Kalvarija. R.A. and Z.V. were tied to a tree, interrogated, beaten, put in a hole in the ground and, when they tried to escape, shot, stabbed and thus killed. Both victims were then buried in the forest in an attempt to hide the evidence. Their bodies were never found. 9.  On 8 July 1994 the applicant’s daughter reported to the police that her brother R.A. had disappeared.  Having examined the material indicating that on 19 April 1994 R.A. had been placed in a car and had not returned, on 29 August 1994 the police opened a criminal investigation into charges of unlawful deprivation of liberty. 10.  In autumn 1994 the authorities started connecting A.G. to the disappearance of the applicant’s son and Z.V. On 25 October 1994 A.G. was arrested and placed in pre-trial detention. However, as later established by court decisions, when in October 1994 two witnesses gave false testimony that they had seen the two missing persons – R.A. and Z.V. – alive in Klaipėda, on 4 November 1994 A.G. was released from pre‑trial detention. 11.  The criminal investigation into the charges of unlawful deprivation of liberty continued. The authorities questioned a number of witnesses, including A.G., who had also been questioned as a suspect earlier. In order to eliminate contradictions between the witnesses’ testimony, the authorities conducted several formal confrontations (akistata). As noted by the Government, several forensic expert examinations were performed with regard to the seized vehicle allegedly used in the kidnapping, but no traces of blood were found in that vehicle. 12.  On 29 November 1994 the pre-trial investigator took the decision to suspend the criminal proceedings, because R.A. and Z.V. could not be located and there were no objective grounds for establishing who was responsible for their disappearance. The police were instructed to continue searching for R.A. and Z.V., as well as for those who were responsible for their disappearance.
According to the Government, the applicant did not appeal against that decision. 13.  The Government also stated that afterwards R.A. had been considered a missing person (dingęs be žinios). In order to find him, the authorities had entered information into the relevant registers and databases. Various police records had been inspected. R.A. had been sought in medical establishments. Information with regard to unidentified corpses had been checked in order to look for similarities. The media had also been employed to ask the general public for assistance. The search had been closed on 26 May 2004 because of the expiry of the statutory limitation period. Before closing the search, R.A.’s relatives had been questioned once again, and the matter of whether R.A. had crossed the Lithuanian border had been verified. 14.  According to the Government, within the context of another criminal case instituted in April 2004 regarding an attempt to murder A.G., information was received that A.G. could have been involved in R.A.’s and Z.V.’s disappearance. According to the documents before the Court, in June 2004 the Prosecutor General office asked the Criminal Police Bureau to continue investigating the disappearance. 15.  On 24 January 2005 the Criminal Police Bureau found that A.G., acting together with G.S. and G.M., had killed R.A. and Z.V. (see paragraph 8 above). The Criminal Police Bureau thus opened a criminal investigation into the murder of two persons. It appears that the evidence against A.G. consisted of witness testimony, including the testimony of two witnesses who agreed to testify on the condition that they could do so anonymously, as well as the secret surveillance of another witness who had misled the investigators in 1994 (see paragraph 10 above). 16.  On 13 June 2005 the police wished to question A.G., but he could not be found either at his home or at his place of work. Two days later, on 15 June 2005 the authorities issued a decision to charge A.G. with the murder of two persons. The following day an operative search (operatyvinė paieška) in respect of A.G. was announced. By 24 June 2005 the authorities obtained information that A.G. was already abroad, possibly in Latvia, and planned to travel to either the United States of America or Kazakhstan. On 30 June 2005 a court authorised A.G.’s detention, in the event that he was found. 17.  On 18 July 2005 a prosecutor specified (patikslino) charges against A.G. and charged him with the aggravated murder of two persons (compare paragraph 11 above). Noting that the operative search which had been announced earlier had not brought about any results, the prosecutor announced a national and international search in respect of A.G. (vietinė ir tarptautinė paieška). On 16 August 2005 the Prosecutor General’s Office issued a European arrest warrant in respect of A.G. 18.  In December 2005 the Criminal Police Bureau obtained information that A.G. could be in Kazakhstan, and it noted that it intended to contact the Kazakhstan authorities in order to establish A.G.’s exact whereabouts and to seek his arrest and extradition to Lithuania. 19.  A.G was arrested on 17 March 2006, when he came to the Prosecutor General’s Office in Vilnius. He was questioned as a suspect in R.A.’s and Z.V.’s murder. He denied any involvement. By that time, the authorities had questioned a number of witnesses, performed searches, sent a legal aid request to Latvia, asked for information from the Lithuanian embassy in the United States of America, and also had agents travel to Ukraine, where one of A.G.’s accomplices had been apprehended. The documents before the Court also show that between June 2005 and March 2007 the Criminal Police Bureau investigator repeatedly questioned the suspects and organised formal confrontations between them, so that any inconsistent testimony would be clarified. 20.  In response to a request by the applicant of 12 June 2006, on 19 September 2006 a prosecutor granted her civil claimant (civilinis ieškovas) status in the case regarding her son’s murder. 21.  The applicant’s daughter had been granted the status of a victim (nukentėjusioji) on 12 June 2006. For her part, on 19 September 2006 the applicant was recognised as a victim in the criminal case regarding her son’s murder. 22.  In September 2006 the prosecutor also imposed a restriction on A.G.’s real property. 23.  From 17 March to 22 November 2006 A.G. was again detained pending trial, including by a ruling of the Vilnius Regional Court of 20 October 2006. The applicant appealed against that ruling. 24.  As later established by a court decision (see paragraph 40 below), whilst being detained, on 22 March 2006 A.G. had attempted to offer a bribe of 20,000 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 5,800 euros (EUR)) to the Criminal Police Bureau investigator, in an attempt to persuade the latter not to actively pursue leads in the criminal murder case, so that the remand measure which had been imposed on him – pre-trial detention – could be replaced with a less stringent one. 25.  On 22 November 2006 the Court of Appeal ordered A.G.’s release from pre-trial detention. Whilst acknowledging that, at that stage, it was not pronouncing judgment on the question of A.G.’s guilt, the appellate court nevertheless noted that the evidence corroborating his guilt on the charges of murder was very scarce to support his detention pending trial. In particular, although the victims had allegedly been killed as early as 1994, their bodies had still not been found, and A.G. had been charged with their murder only in 2005. The Court of Appeal also pointed out that there was no evidence that A.G. could hide from the investigation, although these had been the grounds relied on by the prosecutor in support of A.G.’s detention. On the contrary, the case material showed that, when summoned in March 2006, A.G. had attended the Prosecutor General’s Office. His wife had also later taken his passport to the prosecutor, which, according to the Court of Appeal, showed that he had not been hiding that document. Moreover, between June 2005 and February 2006 – the period which the prosecutor referred to as the period when A.G. had been hiding from the authorities – in reality, A.G. had been working in Lithuania and receiving a salary. Similarly, although the prosecutor claimed that in the summer of 2005 A.G. had been recognised as a suspect and a national and international search in respect of him had been announced, in reality, the police had not been actively searching for A.G. This was because, during the relevant time, A.G. had taken part in an unrelated court hearing in Lithuania and had also crossed the Lithuanian State border a number of times. It was very plausible that A.G. had not even known that he was being sought by the authorities. For the Court of Appeal, there were also no grounds to hold that A.G. could hide from the authorities abroad, because he had not done so, in spite of his numerous trips to foreign countries. 26.  The Court of Appeal acknowledged that the case was particularly complex and the case file was voluminous, given that the case involved more than one suspect, numerous witnesses had been questioned, and many forensic examinations, including DNA, had had to be performed. Even so, the appellate court pointed to the inconsistency in relation to the arguments for A.G.’s detention. In particular, in October 2006 and in a co-accused’s case, the prosecutor had asserted that all necessary actions in the criminal investigation had already been performed, and that therefore it was unlikely that that co-accused would hide from the authorities and there were no grounds for his pre-trial detention. However, in A.G.’s case, in October 2006 the Vilnius Regional Court had extended A.G.’s detention, considering that many investigative actions had yet to be performed. For the Court of Appeal, this meant that, with regard to the collection of evidence, double standards had been applied to the two co-accused in the case, which raised doubts as to the objectivity of the criminal investigation. The Court of Appeal also considered that such actions could be seen as discrimination under the European Convention on Human Rights. Furthermore, as was apparent from the material presented by A.G.’s lawyer, a DNA examination had already been performed in the case. This fact had also been acknowledged by the prosecutor, who had also confirmed that all the main investigative actions had already been completed. The Court of Appeal thus considered that continuing A.G.’s detention would be unnecessary, and would risk breaching Article 5 of the Convention. 27.  The Court of Appeal lastly observed that A.G. had no prior convictions, and had a family, two minor daughters, a permanent place of residence, and a job. Accordingly, a less stringent remand measure could be imposed on him, and it was for the prosecutor to choose what that measure would be, given that the court could not choose another remand measure by itself. 28.  On 22 November 2006 the prosecutor thus varied the remand measure in respect of A.G. and imposed on him an obligation not to leave his place of residence. A.G. was also ordered to periodically register with the police (įpareigojimas periodiškai registruotis policijos įstaigoje) every other day, and he had his personal documents – identity card and passport – taken off him. 29.  On 1 February 2007 the prosecutor discontinued the criminal investigation into the murder charges in respect of A.G.’s co-accused. The prosecutor established that the co-accused had not wanted R.A. and Z.V. to die, and that it had been only A.G. who had exceeded their initial plan (vykdytojo ekscesas) to kidnap R.A. and Z.V. and had murdered them. 30.  In August 2007 A.G. asked that the criminal proceedings against him be discontinued on the grounds that pre-trial investigation had been going on too long. However, by a ruling of 28 August 2007 the Vilnius City Second District Court dismissed his complaint, noting that even after 22 November 2006 the investigators had continued to question suspects and witnesses, performing expert examinations on handwriting and documents, as well as other investigative actions. The court pointed out that the case file was voluminous, that the crime in question had been committed a long time ago, and that certain actions could not be performed because of A.G.’s illness in 2007. 31.  In January 2008 the applicant asked the Kaunas Regional Court to hear the criminal case without her being present. She submitted that her health was frail and that she could not face seeing her son’s murderer at the court hearing. She asked the court to rely on her earlier testimony given at the stage of the pre-trial investigation. The Government specified that the applicant had later taken part in one hearing before the trial court. 32.  The prosecutor drew up the bill of indictment on 11 October 2007 and transferred the case to the trial court. According to the chronology provided by the Government, afterwards the trial court held eighteen hearings, when witnesses were questioned and evidence was examined. 33.  By a judgment of 2 February 2009 the Kaunas Regional Court acquitted A.G. of R.A.’s and Z.V.’s murder and of the attempted bribery of a police investigator. The applicant and her daughter had participated in some of the hearings before the trial court.
The trial court ordered that the remand measures imposed on A.G. – the obligation not to leave his place of residence, the taking away his identity documents (passport and ID card), and the order to periodically register with the police – should be lifted and his identity documents returned. The trial court also rejected civil claims by the applicant and I.V. (the mother of the other person who had been killed).
Lastly, the trial court lifted the restrictions on A.G.’s real property (see paragraph 22 above). 34.  It transpires from the documents before the Court that A.G.’s identity documents were returned to him on 17 February 2009, after he requested this. 35.  Both the prosecutor and the applicant’s daughter appealed against the trial court’s judgment acquitting A.G. 36.  On 15 December 2010 the Court of Appeal upheld A.G.’s acquittal in relation to the charges of murder and attempted bribery of a police investigator, and left the civil claims by the applicant and I.V. unexamined. 37.  The prosecutor lodged an appeal on points of law, and by a ruling of 5 July 2011 the Supreme Court quashed the Court of Appeal decision of 15 December 2010 and remitted the case to the appellate court for fresh examination. The Supreme Court took note of the appellate court’s conclusion that the case was a complex one because it involved criminal charges for a serious crime that had been committed many years previously. It also found that, although the appellate court had examined the evidence by questioning not only some of those witnesses who had already been questioned before the first-instance court, but also some newly summoned witnesses, it had nevertheless failed to rule on some other evidence and had not questioned an anonymous witness, even though earlier the appellate court had considered that witness’s testimony pertinent to the case. Furthermore, the appellate court had not answered all the questions regarding the evaluation of evidence which had been raised in the appeal against the first-instance court’s judgment. 38.  Once the case was returned to the Court of Appeal, the latter completed the examination of the merits of the case during the hearing of 12 October 2012, announcing that the judgment be pronounced on 27 November 2012 (see paragraph 40 below). 39.  It transpires that no remand measure was imposed on A.G. during the examination of the case by the Supreme Court and by the Court of Appeal. 40.  On 27 November 2012 the Court of Appeal reversed the Kaunas Regional Court’s judgment of 2 February 2009, and on the basis of all the evidence found A.G. guilty of the aggravated murder of two persons – R.A. and Z.V. – under Article 105 § 2 (2 and 5) of the old Criminal Code (see paragraph 49 below). The Court of Appeal established that that crime had been committed against persons in a particularly vulnerable situation (bejėgiškos būklės), since both R.A. and Z.V. had been shot after they had been beaten and placed in a hole in the ground with their hands tied, which was an aggravating circumstance. The Court of Appeal also found A.G. guilty of the attempted bribery of a pre-trial investigation officer, under Article 227 § 2 of the new Criminal Code (see paragraphs 24 above and 50 below). A.G. was sentenced to fourteen years’ imprisonment, to be served in a correctional home (pataisos namuose). The time which he had already spent in pre-trial detention – from 25 October 1994 to 4 November 1994 and from 17 March 2006 to 22 November 2006 – was to count as time served in relation to that sentence. The Court of Appeal noted that A.G. had no prior convictions; he worked, was married and had four children. Moreover, the criminal proceedings had lasted rather a long time, which was a reason to impose a less severe punishment than the maximum sentence of life imprisonment. 41.  By the same judgment, the Court of Appeal also awarded the applicant and I.V. (the mother of the other murdered person), LTL 150,000 (approximately EUR 43,500) each, as compensation for non-pecuniary damage in respect of the loss of their sons. 42.  According to the Government, on 6 December 2012 the Kaunas Regional Court sent the judgment convicting A.G. to the Marijampolė police, so that it could be executed. 43.  As the documents before the Court show, on 11 December 2012 the police established that A.G. had absconded to avoid serving his sentence. The same day, the police announced a national and international search in respect of him. The Government provided the Court with a copy of an authorisation, confirmed by a notary, which A.G. had signed on 28 November 2012 in the Smolensk Region in the Russian Federation, empowering his wife to represent his interests before the Lithuanian institutions. The Government specified that in November 2013 A.G.’s wife had presented that authorisation to a court in Lithuania when she had asked to familiarise herself with the applicant’s criminal file. 44.  On 26 February 2013 the Lithuanian authorities issued a European arrest warrant in respect of A.G. The authorities noted, inter alia, that A.G. had been physically present when the Kaunas Regional Court had acquitted him on 2 February 2009, when the Court of Appeal had delivered a ruling on 15 December 2010, when the Supreme Court had issued a ruling on 5 July 2011, and when the Court of Appeal had heard his case afterwards. He had also been physically present on 12 October 2012, when the hearing on the merits had been completed and the appellate court had adjourned pronouncement of the judgment. It had been A.G.’s lawyer who had been physically present when the Court of Appeal had pronounced the judgment of 27 November 2012. 45.  On 6 December 2012 the Kaunas Regional Court issued a writ of execution, pursuant to which the applicant and I.V. were to get LTL 150,000 each from A.G. On 11 December 2012 the applicant took the writ of execution to the bailiff, who on the following day accepted the execution request and on that same day took a decision to seize A.G.’s property. It transpires from the documents before the Court that in the period April-July 2013 amounts totalling about EUR 400 were recovered to compensate for the execution costs of roughly the same value already paid by the applicant’s daughter. In July 2013 the bailiff decided to suspend the enforcement proceedings until A.G. was found. The applicant was informed about the decision to suspend the enforcement proceedings. 46.  The applicant’s daughter appealed against the Court of Appeal’s judgment convicting A.G. (see paragraphs 40 and 41 above), asking for A.G. to be ordered to serve his sentence not in a correctional home, which was an institution with a less stringent regime, but in a prison. She pointed out that A.G. had killed her brother in a particularly cruel way when he had been particularly vulnerable. A.G., for his part, in his appeal on points of law, asked to be acquitted and for the criminal proceedings to be discontinued. 47.  By a final ruling of 25 June 2013, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals on points of law by the applicant’s daughter and by A.G. The Supreme Court considered that the punishment imposed on A.G. had been just. At the Supreme Court hearing, A.G.’s wife admitted that her husband was abroad, but refused to disclose his whereabouts.
According to the information provided by the Government in 2017, A.G. had been granted refugee status in the Russian Federation (see also paragraph 80 below).


5.  The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Rostov-on-Don, Russia. 6.  In early 2012 Ms B., headmistress of School no. 118 of Rostov‑on‑Don and chairwoman of the local electoral committee, removed the applicant from his position as an electoral committee member. 7.  On 1 September 2012 festive events were taking place at School no. 118 to celebrate “The Day of Knowledge” (День знаний). Around 8.15 a.m. on that day the applicant staged a solo demonstration (одиночный пикет) in front of the school. He distributed leaflets to the parents of the pupils expressing his negative opinion about the professional and personal qualities of the headmistress, Ms. B. The leaflets read as follows:
“Dear parents, you have entrusted your children to the staff of School no. 118, with Ms B. as its headmistress. I, Eduard Nikolayev, have reasons to believe that your child will be taught from Hottentot and Old Testament ethics. See for yourself: on 10 March 2012 I held a demonstration and was handled by the police. I was then sentenced to two days in detention by a justice of the peace, on a fabricated charge of hooliganism. This is now a widespread practice in respect of political matters in Russia. As the judicial reprisals were manifestly unlawful (since I had immunity as a member of an electoral committee), they needed to invent some justification. Such a justification was deliberately faked by Ms B., chairwoman of the local electoral committee ...” 8.  The school staff called police officer O., who was present at the school premises owing to enhanced security measures taken on that day. 9.  According to the applicant, within thirty minutes two additional police officers, T. and M., had arrived. He complied with their order to show his identity documents. At some point, while the police officers were carrying out an identity check through the police database, he decided to leave. However, when the applicant saw police officer T. following him, he changed his mind and returned. Officer T. then took him in a painful armlock and handcuffed him, without giving any valid reason; the applicant was then taken to the police van. 10.  According to the Government, Ms B. had informed police officer O. that the applicant was distributing leaflets. The applicant refused to familiarise officer O. with the contents of the leaflet or to leave the school premises upon her request. At 8.30 a.m. a special group of police officers arrived. They asked the applicant to present his identity documents and to proceed to the police van for an identity check. The applicant tried to escape; the police used force and handcuffs to stop him. Then the applicant was taken to the police station. 11.  At the police station the officer on duty drew up a record of the applicant’s administrative arrest for the purpose of bringing him to court. The record indicated that the applicant had been escorted to the police station at 9.55 a.m. and released at 12.20 p.m. on 1 September 2012. After that the on-duty officer compiled an administrative-offence record, according to which the applicant had used foul language at the premises of School no. 118 and disturbed passers-by in an insulting manner. Moreover, he had resisted arrest by pushing the police officers away and had tried to escape from them. The applicant was accused of minor hooliganism, an offence punishable under Article 20.1 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Offences (hereinafter, “the CAO”) (see paragraph 25 below). 12.  The administrative case file contained a report by police officer M., which stated that at 8.50 a.m. on 1 September 2012 he and officer T. had arrested the applicant at the premises of School no. 118. The applicant had used foul language and had behaved inappropriately; in particular, he had disturbed passers-by. He had not reacted to their multiple requests to calm down and to cease this behaviour, had refused to present his identity documents and had tried to escape. Officer M. also recorded that the police had used physical force and handcuffs. 13.  On 1 September 2012 the administrative case was transferred to the Justice of the Peace of the Voroshilovskiy District of Rostov-on-Don. 14.  Upon his release from the police station on 1 September 2012, the applicant went to Rostov-on-Don City Emergency Hospital. At 4.25 p.m. he was examined by a doctor, who diagnosed him with a sprain to the right shoulder and bruises on both wrists. After being provided with the necessary treatment, at 5.20 p.m. the applicant was released from the hospital. The applicant stayed on sick leave in connection with these injuries from 1 until 24 September 2012. 15.  On 3 September 2012 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint with the Investigative Committee of Rostov-on-Don alleging breaches of his rights to liberty, freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly by the police. It appears that the Rostov regional department of the Ministry of the Interior conducted an internal inquiry into this complaint. As a result, it was determined that police officers T. and M. had acted in accordance with the law and internal requirements and had not breached the applicant’s rights. 16.  On 12 September 2012 police station no. 1 of Rostov-on-Don informed the applicant in a letter that the administrative proceedings against him had been discontinued as his actions lacked the constituent elements of the crime. 17.  In November 2012 the applicant brought civil proceedings (in accordance with Article 254 of the Code of Civil Procedure) challenging the following actions on the part of the public authorities and officials: the police order to stop the demonstration and distribution of leaflets, in breach of his right to impart information; their recourse to physical force and use of handcuffs; taking him to the police station; and his prosecution under the CAO. 18.  By a judgment of 5 April 2013 the Voroshilovskiy District Court of Rostov-on-Don dismissed his claims. The court accepted the applicant’s submission that he had staged a static demonstration (пикетирование), which consisted of distribution of leaflets. It considered that the applicant had attempted to escape during the identity check and had been arrested, and that the use of force and handcuffs had complied with the relevant regulations. Further, the court dismissed the applicant’s allegation that the administrative proceedings against him had been discontinued, on the grounds that no formal decision had been issued. The court also relied on the statements of a representative of the regional department of the Ministry of the Interior in that regard, who had testified that the administrative-offence file against the applicant had been lost. However, the police had been reassembling the file at the time of the trial. 19.  On the basis of several testimonies, the District Court concluded as follows:
“In the present case the police officers intended to put an end to the breach of public order, consisting of [showing] disrespect to society accompanied by the use of foul language in a public place [by the applicant], disturbing citizens in an insulting manner and refusing to obey an order by a public official ... The police officers ... acted within their powers and did not violate the applicant’s rights. Nor did they cause any impediment to the exercise of any such rights ...” 20.  The applicant appealed against the judgment. He contended that the finding of the first-instance court had been based on the pending charge against him and the wording of Article 20.1 of the CAO, and had thus violated his right to be presumed innocent. Furthermore, in the applicant’s view, the court had failed to specify the factual details concerning his showing of “disrespect to society”, the content and the alleged victims of the foul language allegedly used by him, the details of his “disturbing others” and “the order by a public official” and the lawfulness of any such order. 21.  On 17 June 2013 the Rostov Regional Court dismissed the appeal, endorsing the reasoning of the first-instance judgment. The court pointed out that the circumstances concerning the applicant’s guilt in the commission of an administrative offence should be discussed in the context of the administrative offence proceedings.


5.  The applicant was born in 1978 and was at the time of the introduction of the application detained at the Safi detention centre. 6.  On 10 September 2016 the applicant, a refugee from Ivory Coast who claimed to have previously obtained asylum in Armenia, left Russia and arrived in Malta by plane. Upon arrival he presented his documents (including a national passport) to the immigration authorities. 7.  According to the applicant he immediately informed the authorities that he was a refugee from Ivory Coast and that he had fled the war in his country many years before. He claimed that he had reached Malta from Armenia, where he had lived as a refugee prior to his arrival in Malta. He also promptly confirmed his intention to seek asylum in Malta, due to his fear that Armenia would return him to Ivory Coast. 8.  The applicant was found carrying false Italian identification documents and, according to the Government, when questioned, he informed the police that he had obtained the documents from a friend in Italy and that his intention was to travel to Italy by transiting via Malta. The applicant was also found to be in possession of a travel ticket to Italy. 9.  The applicant was denied entry since according to the immigration authorities he was not in possession of the required documentation. On the same day he was taken to police headquarters were he was questioned. During questioning the applicant provided further information concerning his escape from war in Ivory Coast, his life in Armenia and the reasons why he felt he could no longer live there, reasons primarily linked to his skin colour and the lack of physical security. The police confiscated his documents. 10.  On the same day, the police (immigration branch) issued a detention order in terms of the Immigration Act (Chapter 217 of the Laws of Malta) and Subsidiary Legislation 420.06 “Reception of Asylum Seekers Regulations” (hereinafter “the Reception Regulations” – see Relevant domestic law below) on the grounds that the elements on which the applicant’s application for international protection had been based could not be determined in the absence of detention, in particular due to the risk of absconding. He was informed that he had the right to appeal this decision before the Immigration Appeals Board (hereinafter “the Board”) within three days. He was further informed that the Board would automatically review this order within seven days from the date of its issuance, which could be extended by a further seven days; and that if he remained in detention a further review would occur every two months. He was informed that he was entitled to free legal assistance. 11.  The applicant was accompanied to Safi Barracks detention centre, where he was detained. 12.  On 20 September 2016 the applicant applied for international protection and was formally registered as an asylum‑seeker. 13.  According to documentation submitted by the Government, on 30 September 2016, the applicant appeared before the Board accompanied by one of his lawyers (of choice), but the case was put off to the next board meeting to be held on 5 October 2016, since one of the applicant’s representatives (of choice) was abroad. The applicant appears to contest the existence of this hearing and notes that the Government have not provided any proof of notification of such hearing or what went on. He however claims that even if it did occur his legal aid lawyer was not present as required by law. 14.  On 5 October 2016 the Board convened in order to review the legality of the applicant’s detention, in accordance with Regulation 6(3) of the Reception Regulations. The applicant was present with his legal representatives and was provided with an interpreter. 15.  According to the applicant, during the hearing before the Board, in the presence of a representative of the Malta Police Force who explained the circumstances of the applicant’s detention, the Board informed the applicant that it had not been able to comply with the deadline provided by the law for the review of his detention since on the date required by the Reception Regulations (namely seven working days from the issuing of the detention order) a Board member was attending a conference overseas and therefore he could not take part in the hearing. Furthermore, the Board stressed that since its members were merely part-time employees meeting once a week and lacking administrative support while being responsible for a vast array of immigration related appeals, it was simply unable to meets its legal obligation and determine the lawfulness of his detention on time. 16.  During the hearing the applicant’s representative repeatedly requested the Malta Police Force’s representative and the chairperson of the Board to specify the grounds on which he was being detained. Both the Malta Police Force’s representative and the Board’s chairperson orally indicated “fear of absconding” as the primary reason for the applicant’s detention. 17.  The applicant’s representative made written and oral submissions to the Board. He noted, in particular, that from the moment of his first contact with the Maltese authorities the applicant had provided consistent factual information about his identity, nationality, countries of transit, intention to seek asylum in Malta, migration/asylum status in third countries and reasons for flight from Ivory Coast. He had not made any attempt to conceal any information and had acted with honesty, openness and transparency towards the authorities. It followed that he had already presented to the authorities all the elements on which his application for international protection had been based, thus the legal basis on which the authorities had relied in order to justify his detention could not be held applicable to his case and the interference with the applicant’s liberty had not been provided by law. The applicant also claimed that his detention had been neither necessary nor proportionate. In his opinion the immigration police had failed to demonstrate that without the applicant’s detention it would have been impossible for them to determine any elements on the basis of his asylum application. 18.  On the same day the Board dismissed the applicant’s complaints and confirmed the legality of his detention. The Board specified that: (i) the elements in question referred to the application for refugee status, which had not yet been determined; (ii) if the applicant left Malta he would be unable to provide the information (elements) required by the Commissioner for Refugees (REFCOM); (iii) the fact that the applicant had been found in possession of a ticket to go to Italy showed that his intention was not to remain in Malta; (iv) “with the fact that he was inadmissible in the first place because he had forged a document, there is no reason to believe that appellant will not abscond”. 19.  The Board requested the Principal Immigration Office (PIO) to enquire as to whether all elements had been clarified and given to REFCOM, and whether the applicant would have been given refugee status, in order to ensure that detention did not subsist for longer than was needed. If the period of detention continued because of the asylum proceedings, including an appeal, the PIO were to consider alternatives to detention particularly those listed in Regulation 6(8) of the Reception Regulations S.L. 420.06, as such detention would then no longer be reasonable. 20.  On 21 October 2016 the applicant applied to the Court of Magistrates relying on Article 409(A) of the Criminal Code to contest the lawfulness of his detention. He argued that there had been no individual assessment of the applicant’s situation, and that it was not clear what elements were still required. He noted that a risk of absconding could not be examined on its own and that Regulation 1(6) of the Reception Regulations S.L. 420.06 could not be interpreted as meaning that detention could be prolonged throughout the entire proceedings. 21.  It appears that the immigration police argued that the one fundamental element they expected the applicant to provide was a document confirming the statement that he was recognised as a refugee in Armenia. 22.  On the same day the Court of Magistrates upheld the legality of the applicant’s detention. The court found that the applicant was raising the same issues he had raised before the Board, and which had already been decided by it. The court agreed that the risk of absconding under Regulation 6(1) (b) could not be seen on its own but in the light of the whole Regulation. The Reception Regulations, L.S. 420.06, allowed the detention of persons like the applicant ‑ pending a decision on asylum ‑ in order to establish the elements on which such application was based, when it would be difficult to do so in the absence of detention. During the hearing it transpired that further verifications were necessary and that the applicant was at risk of absconding, making the asylum determination impossible. It followed that the applicant’s detention could not be considered unlawful. 23.  The applicant was released from immigrant detention on 8 November 2016, subject to reporting at the police station daily. 24.  By a judgment of 19 January 2017, in accordance with his guilty plea, the applicant was found guilty of using a false passport. Although he was liable to imprisonment for a period of six months to two years, the court, in application of Section 22 of the Probation Act (Chapter 446 of the Laws of Malta) conditionally discharged the applicant for three years. 25.  On an unspecified date in March 2017 the applicant’s asylum application was rejected. The applicant appealed, which appeal reached the Secretary of the Refugee Appeal’s Board on 21 March 2017.


6.  The applicant was born in 1975 and is serving a sentence in Diyarbakır prison. 7.  On 12 September 1994 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation, namely Hizbullah. He was allegedly subjected to torture while held in police custody, which lasted twenty-two days. 8.  The applicant was questioned by the police at the Diyarbakır Security Directorate. Subsequently, the Diyarbakır Public Prosecutor took statements from him in the absence of a lawyer, concerning his involvement in the activities of Hizbullah. In his statements, the applicant admitted his membership of the illegal organisation and mentioned certain activities in which he had participated. 9.  On 20 September 1994 the applicant participated in an on-site inspection (keşif) and a reconstruction of events (yer gösterme), in the course of which he confessed, in the absence of a lawyer, to committing some offences. 10.  On 25 September 1994 the applicant participated in another on-site inspection and reconstruction of events, in the course of which he confessed, again in the absence a lawyer, to other offences. 11.  Twenty-two days after his arrest, namely on 4 October 1994, a doctor at Diyarbakır Public Hospital drew up a collective medical report in respect of the applicant and twenty-seven other suspects. According to the report, there were no traces of ill-treatment on the applicant’s body. 12.  On the same day, the applicant was questioned by the investigating judge in the absence of a lawyer. He retracted the statements he had made to the police and the prosecutor, alleging that he had given them under duress. The investigating judge ordered the applicant’s remand in custody. 13.  Owing to a lack of prison places, the applicant was not put in prison but was kept at the anti-terrorism branch of the Diyarbakır Security Directorate for three more days, during which time he was allegedly subjected to torture again. 14.  On 24 October 1994 the Diyarbakır Public Prosecutor issued an indictment charging the applicant and twenty-one others under Article 125 of the former Turkish Criminal Code with seeking to destroy the unity of the Turkish State and to remove part of the country from the State’s control by killing and injuring numerous individuals. Seven other individuals were charged under Articles 168 and 169 of the same Code. The criminal proceedings commenced before the Diyarbakır State Security Court, the bench of which included a military judge. 15.  On 4 November 1994 the Diyarbakır State Security Court held a preparatory hearing and decided that the first hearing would take place on 18 November 1994. 16.  At the second hearing held on 23 January 1995 the applicant gave evidence in the presence of his lawyer and retracted the statements he had made to the police and the public prosecutor, alleging that they had been obtained through torture. He further stated that he had no relationship with the illegal organisation and that all the acts attributed to him had been a sham orchestrated by the police. 17.  At the hearings of 28 April, 8 December and 28 December 1995, the State Security Court heard evidence from F.E., C.D., H.Y., C.Ö., İ.A. and M.A. as witnesses and from İ.Ç. as a complainant. 18.  At the hearing held on 26 January 1996 the State Security Court informed the applicant that he was entitled to lodge a complaint with the public prosecutor concerning his allegations of torture against the police officers. 19.  At the hearings of 22 August, 4 October and 15 November 1996, the State Security Court heard evidence from H.O., Ş.D. and M.H.B. as witnesses, and from S.Ö. as a complainant. 20.  On 22 August 1996 the applicant maintained his allegation that he had been tortured while in police custody and applied to the court for his release and acquittal. 21.  At the hearings of 5 August and 30 December 1997, the State Security Court heard evidence from A.Y. and M.E. as witnesses. 22.  On 6 November 1997 the applicant stated that he had been coerced by the police into admitting to the acts attributed to him. 23.  At the hearings of 5 March and 3 December 1998, the State Security Court heard evidence from A.Y. and A.Ö. as witnesses. 24.  While the criminal proceedings against the applicant were pending, on 18 June 1999 the Constitution was amended and the military judge sitting on the bench of the Diyarbakır State Security Court was replaced by a civilian judge. 25.  In the first thirty-four hearings that were held until the hearing of 20 July 1999, the composition of the Diyarbakır State Security Court changed seventeen times. Each time the previous reports were read out as a result of the change in the composition of the trial court. 26.  At the hearing of 20 July 1999, the Diyarbakır State Security Court, composed of three civilian judges, read out the previous reports as a result of the change in the composition of the trial court. 27.  On 15 January 2002, 23 October 2003 and 12 May 2005 the public prosecutor filed additional indictments against the applicant, charging him under Article 146 of the former Turkish Criminal Code. In total, the applicant was accused of taking part in the killing of nineteen people and of injuring eight others on behalf of Hizbullah. The Diyarbakır State Security Court joined all the cases owing to the link between them. 28.  By virtue of Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, published in the Official Gazette on 30 June 2004, State Security Courts were abolished. Therefore, the Diyarbakır Assize Court acquired jurisdiction over the case. 29.  At a hearing held on 2 February 2007, the applicant applied to the court for his acquittal. 30.  On 26 February 2007 the Diyarbakır Assize Court convicted the applicant under Article 146 § 1 of the former Criminal Code and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The trial court relied on, inter alia, the statements the applicant had given to the police and the public prosecutor, the reports of the reconstruction of events and the on-site inspection, as well as the statements of some of the co-accused and the witness F.E. It rejected the applicant’s contention that he had been tortured while in police custody on the grounds that according to the medical report dated 4 October 1994, no traces of ill-treatment had been found on him. According to the reasoned judgment, thirty other co-defendants who had given incriminating statements to the police denied the accusations against themselves when giving evidence in person before the trial court. In particular, twenty-eight of them had fully retracted their police statements before the trial court while two of them had partially done so. 31.  The applicant appealed and on 16 April 2009 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment. It appears from the decision of the Court of Cassation that the applicant’s request for a correction of his age had been dismissed by the Diyarbakır Assize Court. 32.  In 2010 the applicant requested a copy of the medical report prepared on 4 October 1994 from the Diyarbakır Public Prosecutor’s Office. On 5 February 2010 he was informed that all the documents prepared in 1994 had been destroyed in 2004.


7.  The applicant was born in 1987 in the Netherlands and arrived in Denmark when he was approximately 9 months old. He remained in Denmark, together with his parents and three brothers. 8.  The applicant has a criminal record. Before he turned 18 years old, he had been convicted four times by a City Court: on 8 May 2003 of, inter alia, drug offences, with a sentence of four months’ imprisonment, suspended; on 1 October 2003 of armed robbery, with a sentence of one year and six months’ imprisonment, of which one year was suspended; on 24 June 2004 of, inter alia, theft and possession of weapons, with a sentence of one year and four months’ imprisonment; and on 12 May 2005 of, inter alia, robbery, and sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment. He was released on 10 July 2006 with two hundred and fifty-five days remaining, suspended for two years. 9.  After having reached the age of majority the applicant was convicted a number of times. 10.  By a City Court judgment of 7 September 2006 he was convicted of handling stolen property and sentenced to eight months’ imprisonment. 11.  By a City Court judgment of 11 June 2008, he was convicted of robbery and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. Moreover, the City Court ordered the applicant’s expulsion, suspended with two years’ probation. He was released on 28 January 2010. 12.  By a City Court judgment of 25 March 2010, he was convicted of theft and sentenced to thirty days’ imprisonment. 13.  By a judgment of the High Court, acting as an appeal instance, on 9 November 2010 he was convicted of robbery and sentenced to one year and three months’ imprisonment. In addition, his expulsion was again ordered, suspended with two years’ probation. 14.  By a City Court judgment of 27 February 2012 the applicant was convicted of attempting to escape from prison. No additional sentence was imposed. 15.  In the meantime, on 12 November 2011 the applicant was arrested and charged with offences under the Penal Code, inter alia two counts of robbery, the first committed in a private home on 4 October 2011, and the second in a bank on 24 October 2011. The applicant was also charged with possession of arms, threatening a witness, drug offences and handling stolen property. 16.  The case was heard by the City Court of Copenhagen (Københavns Byret). Two co-accused from the applicant’s family were also on trial. The applicant was heard and pleaded not guilty to the robberies. He explained that he was 25 years old. Except for eight months spent, as a baby, in the Netherlands, he had lived all his life in Denmark, where all his family lived, including his parents, three brothers and 80 other family members. He had never been to Croatia or the former Yugoslavia. He had no family there and did not speak the language. He had been diagnosed with ADHD and took medication for that. He had had a girlfriend for 2 years and 3 months. They wanted to marry and have children. 17.  For the purpose of the court proceedings, the Aliens Authority (Udlændingestyrelsen) issued a report on the applicant. It noted that since the applicant had turned 15, he had been convicted of similar criminal offences and served sentences totalling 1,755 days, equal to four years and ten months.
The applicant’s mother had been granted a residence permit in 1987 on the grounds of her marriage with the applicant’s father. She had left in June 1988, but returned in November 1988 with the applicant, who was 9 months old at the time, and who was granted a residence permit until March 2005, later extended to April 2012. The length of his legal stay in Denmark was therefore calculated at approximately sixteen years and two months. The conditions for ordering an expulsion were set out in the Aliens Act (Udlændingeloven), section 22 no. 6 or section 24 no. 1, read in conjunction with the former.
The applicant had been to school for seven years, but had no other education, and at the relevant times had received social welfare. He had stated that, for the past two years, he had had a girlfriend, and that his father, three brothers and about 80 family members lived in Denmark. He had also stated that he had been diagnosed with ADHD, that he suffered from emotional stress and that he heard voices when smoking cannabis, to which he had been addicted for ten years. He had suffered three cannabis psychoses during the past four years, and been treated once in hospital for such psychosis.
In conclusion, the Aliens Authority endorsed the prosecution’s recommendation of expulsion. 18.  By a judgment of 12 December 2012, the City Court convicted the applicant inter alia of the two counts of robbery, and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment. It attached special weight to the fact that he was convicted of two robberies and had previously been convicted of similar crimes. 19.  In addition, by virtue of section 22 no. 6 in conjunction with section 26, subsection 2, of the Aliens Act, the City Court ordered the applicant’s expulsion, with a permanent ban on his return. In this respect the City Court stated:
“As regards the issue of expulsion, the Court observes that it depends on an assessment of proportionality as established by the Supreme Court (Højesteret) in a judgment reproduced on page 225 of the Danish Weekly Law Reports for 2012 ((UfR) 2012.225H), whether an offender is to be expelled. The Supreme Court said with reference, inter alia, to § 71 of the judgment delivered by the European Court of Human Rights on 23 June 2008 in Maslov v. Austria ([GC], no. 1638/03, ECHR 2008 application no. 1638/03) that, where the person to be expelled is a young adult who has not yet founded a family of his or her own, the relevant criteria for the assessment of proportionately, see Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, are as follows:
(a) the nature and seriousness of the offence committed by that person,
(b) the length of the person’s stay in the country from which he or she is to be expelled,
(c) the time elapsed since the offence was committed and the person’s conduct during that period, and
(d) the solidity of social, cultural and family ties with the host country and with the country of destination.
According to §§ 72 and 73 of the judgment, the age of the relevant person can play a role when applying the said criteria. For instance, when an assessment is made of the nature and seriousness of an offence committed, it has to be taken into account whether the relevant person committed it as a juvenile or as an adult. When an assessment is made of the length of the person’s stay in the host country and the solidity of the ties with the host country, it evidently makes a difference whether the person concerned had already come to the country during his or her childhood or youth, or was even born there, or whether he or she only came to the host country as an adult. Regard is to be had to the special situation of a person who has spent most, if not all of his or her childhood in the host country, was brought up there and received his or her education there (§ 74). According to § 75 of the judgment, very serious reasons are required to justify expulsion of a settled migrant who has lawfully spent all or the major part of his or her childhood and youth in the host country.
In the case at hand, the defendant has been sentenced to imprisonment for a term of five years for two robberies: a robbery committed at a private home and a bank robbery. Both robberies were committed in October 2011.
[The applicant] is a national of Croatia and entered Denmark a few months after his birth. Accordingly, the defendant has spent all his childhood and youth in Denmark. All his family, including his parents and his three siblings, are Danish residents. He has no ties with Croatia, has no family or friends there and does not speak Croatian according to the information provided, but only Roma in addition to Danish. He has a Croatian passport.
[The applicant] has not yet founded a family of his own as he is neither married nor the father of any children. No significance should be attributed to the circumstance that the defendant has had a Danish girlfriend for about two years as this relationship was started at a time when his girlfriend, who is domiciled in Denmark, was or ought to have been aware of his criminal activities.
[The applicant] dropped out of school in the seventh grade. He has not started any vocational training or education, and he has never had a job, but has lived on social security benefits. He has been addicted to cannabis, and he has suffered a number of cannabis psychoses according to the information provided. Even though he has lived in Denmark all his life, he must be considered very poorly integrated into Danish society.
Considering the fact that he has spent all his childhood and youth in Denmark and has received all his schooling in this country, and since he has no ties with Croatia, strict requirements must be met for the crime to result in expulsion.
[The applicant] has been convicted of robbery on several previous occasions. Two of those sentences were imposed for robberies committed before he attained the age of 18: a sentence for robbery at a post office in 2003 when the defendant was almost 16 years old and a sentence for two street robberies and other offences in 2004/2005 when the defendant was 17 years old. The proceeds of both robberies were of minor value.
[The applicant] has furthermore been convicted of robbery twice after he has attained the age of 18. The first of those sentences was imposed on 11 June 2008 when he was found guilty of a street robbery and a robbery at a shop contrary to section 288, subsection 1 (i) and (ii) of the Criminal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of two years and suspended expulsion from Denmark. The second sentence was imposed on 9 November 2010 in appeal proceedings when he was found guilty of a street robbery and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of one year and three months and suspended expulsion from Denmark subject to a probation period of two years.
Moreover, several sentences have been imposed for other offences against property. Altogether, the defendant, who is 25 years old today, has been sentenced to and has served 1,755 days in prison, corresponding to four years and ten months, since his 15th birthday.
The offences for adjudication in connection with the case at hand were committed during the probation period of the most recent suspended expulsion order. The offence for adjudication in connection with the judgment of 9 November 2010 delivered in appeal proceedings was committed in the probation period of the first suspended expulsion order. The nature and seriousness of the offences in combination with the previous sentences for similar offences and the fact that the defendant has now failed to observe the conditions of two suspended expulsion orders is deemed by the Court to provide weighty reasons why the defendant should now be expelled. The fact that a number of the judgments relate to offences committed after the defendant has come of age also makes expulsion appropriate. Against this background, the Court finds that altogether such very serious reasons exist that the defendant must be expelled and permanently banned from re-entry as set out in section 22, subsection 1(vi), section 26, subsection 2) and section 32, subsection 2 (v) of the Aliens Act, in which connection it is observed that the expulsion order is deemed not to be contrary to Denmark’s international obligations.” 20.  On appeal, by a judgment of 26 August 2013 the High Court of Eastern Denmark (Østre Landsret - henceforth “the High Court”) upheld the conviction, the sentence and the expulsion order. A majority of five judges out of six stated:
“On the grounds given by the City Court, we concur that altogether such very serious reasons exist that [the applicant] must be expelled and permanently banned from re-entering despite his lack of ties with Croatia. We concur that an expulsion order is found not to be contrary to Denmark’s international obligations, including section 38 and 39 of Executive Order no. 474 of 12 May 2011 on Residence in Denmark for Aliens Falling Within the Rules of the European Union (bekendtgørelse om ophold i Danmark for udlændinge, der er omfattet af Dem Europæiske Unions regler) [implementing EU Council Directive 2004/38/EC].”
One judge stated:
“Since [the applicant] has lived his whole life in Denmark and has no ties to Croatia, I find it contrary to Denmark’s international obligations to issue an expulsion order despite the serious crime committed.” 21.  Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court (Højesteret), was refused by the Appeals Permission Board (Procesbevillingsnævnet) on 12 December 2013. 22.  In December 2013, pursuant to Council Framework Decision 2008-909-JHA of 27 November 2008 on the application of the principle of mutual recognition of judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involving deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union, as amended by Council Framework decision 2009-299-JHA of 26 February 2009, the Ministry of Justice requested the Croatian authorities to take over the enforcement of the sentences imposed on the applicant by the High Court judgment of 9 November 2010 and the High Court judgment of 26 August 2013. 23.  By a City Court judgment of 6 September 2016 the applicant was sentenced to imprisonment for three months and expulsion for violence against a fellow inmate. He appealed against the judgment to the High Court. It is unknown whether the appeal proceeding have ended. 24.  It appears that the applicant was expelled from Denmark in December 2017, after having served his sentence, and that he re-entered Denmark shortly after, in breach of the ban.