5.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lived, prior to his arrest, in Petrozavodsk. He is a practising martial arts instructor specialising in kickboxing and Thai boxing. 6.  On 30 October 2003 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of causing grievous bodily harm to an employee of a tyre shop. According to the prosecution, the crime had been committed on 17 June 2002 by the applicant, Va., Ku. and Pa., with intent to coerce the shop owner into accepting their “security services”. 7.  On the following day the Petrozavodsk Town Court authorised the applicant’s remand in custody, citing the gravity of the charges against him and the risk that he would abscond or obstruct the course of justice. The applicant was placed in a temporary detention centre in Petrozavodsk. He remained in custody pending investigation and trial. 8.  On 12 March 2004 the applicant was transferred to a Petrozavodsk Town Police Department temporary detention centre to study the case file materials. He was placed in cell no. 11 together with eight other inmates. On the same day he had an altercation with officer N. The parties presented differing descriptions of the incident. 9.  According to the applicant, at approximately 11 a.m. officer N. opened the cell door and dragged him out of the cell into the hallway. The applicant did not resist in any way. Several police officers on duty and the head of the duty unit L., as well as the inmates of cell no. 11, witnessed the scene. N. threw the applicant on to the floor, leaned on him and squeezed his neck, applying force to the carotid artery and the Adam’s apple. The policeman accompanied his actions with obscene language and threats. Only the intervention of the head of the duty unit stopped him and allowed the applicant to stand up. The applicant asked for a meeting with a prosecutor and for a medical examination. N. again approached the applicant, threatening him. Afraid for his life and desperately trying to get back into his cell, the applicant raised his leg, apparently in a non-threatening manner. He did not hit anyone. However, the police officers, including N., immediately pinned him to the floor. N. again squeezed the applicant’s neck with both hands. Officer M. stepped over the applicant’s face. The applicant was dragged back to his cell. He again unsuccessfully repeated his requests for a medical examination and a meeting with a prosecutor or a higher‑ranking police officer. The inmates refused to leave the cell and asked the police officers to call a doctor. However, their requests were to no avail. 10.  Half an hour later the applicant and Ga., one of the inmates, were taken to see a deputy head of the Petrozavodsk Town Police Department. The applicant described the incident and showed the injuries on his neck and chest. Ga. corroborated his version of events. They were promised a thorough inquiry into the events in question. 11.  The applicant repeated his allegations of ill-treatment during the subsequent interview with investigator I. After the interview the applicant was taken back to cell no. 11, where an emergency doctor was assisting another inmate. According to the applicant, his request for a medical examination was abruptly dismissed by N., who was present in the cell. In the evening of the same day the applicant was transported back to the remand prison in Petrozavodsk. 12.  The official version of the events of 12 March 2004 was summarised in the judgment of 20 December 2004 (see paragraph 23 below) as follows:
“The [applicant] ... and other inmates held in the same cell asked to be transferred to another cell. He shouted, knocked on the door of the cell and uttered profanities against the [guards] ... . The applicant and other inmates in cell no. 11 ignored numerous orders of the ... officers to stop the disturbance ... officer N. entered cell no. 11 in order to identify the instigator and to take him out of the cell ... the applicant ... put his arms around N. to restrain him. Then N. raised the applicant slightly off the floor and carried him out of the cell into the hallway. The applicant released N. In the hallway the applicant ... threatened N. and kicked him in the head. ... N. blocked the blow with his left arm. In order to stop the applicant’s illegal actions ... , N. used physical force against him and threw him to the floor. While lying on the floor, the applicant continued kicking N. As a result of the applicant’s actions, N. sustained the following injuries: a blunt injury to the head and concussion, a blunt injury to the left hand with a finger fracture coupled with tissue swelling and a bruise ..., as well as bruises on the left hand and the right arm ... . The applicant’s illegal actions were stopped by the officers.” 13.  On 12 March 2004, the applicant was examined by a prison doctor, who made the following entry in the medical record:
“No complaints. Objectively: in the middle and third parts of the right side of the neck surface [there are] three bruises of an unidentifiable form, measuring from 2.5 by 1 centimetres to 5 by 2.5 centimetres ... , [there is] a bruise of a similar colour on the front surface of the right side of the chest situated ... closer to the second rib [and] measuring 3 by 2 centimetres. [There is] a linear abrasion on the back surface of the right hand, measuring 0.8 by 0.1 centimetres ... . According [to the applicant], he had an abrasion on the parietal region of the head; ‘there was a small amount of blood on the abrasion’. No other visual injuries ... have been discovered.” 14.  On the same day N. consulted a neurologist, who diagnosed him with concussion and a closed fracture of the little finger on the left hand. 15.  On 17 March 2004 the applicant’s lawyer asked the town prosecutor’s office to institute criminal proceedings against the police officers who had allegedly beaten up the applicant. 16.  On 26 March 2004 the deputy head of the town police department completed an internal investigation into the incident of 12 March 2004. He concluded that the use of force against the applicant had been lawful. As regards, the events of 12 March 2004, the report stated as follows:
“... On 12 March 2004 at 11 a.m. [the police officers] heard loud knocking ... on the door of cell. [11]. ... When [the police officers] opened the viewing panel, ... inmate Sh. asked to be transferred to the cell ... where [his relative S.] was being held. It was explained to him that it was impossible to satisfy his request and the viewing panel was closed. Some thirty to forty seconds later, [someone] started knocking on the cell door again, uttering profanities.
Warden L. and officers F., N. and M. approached the cell, opened the viewing panel to hear Sh.’s demands for a transfer ... . The warden explained that it was impossible to transfer him. Then Sh. claimed that he was not feeling well, that the panel should remain open, that they should be given tea and that the smell in the cell was bad. In response, warden L. explained patiently that, in accordance with the centre’s schedule and in compliance with sanitary standards the cell was to be cleaned in the evening ... . Then the warden ordered the door to cell 11 to be opened. Sh. was told to take his personal effects and move to another cell ... . [The applicant], who was, for no reason, uttering profanities, demonstrating his martial arts skills and making threats ... , was asked to prepare for a transfer too. The atmosphere in the cell was heated. Other inmates started making similar demands about tea, opening up the viewing panel and complaining about a bad smell in the cell. Sh. and [the applicant] refused to transfer to another cell.
In accordance with [relevant] regulations, ... the police officers informed [the police department] of the situation. When all the inmates, except for Sh., stepped away from the cell door, officer N. entered the cell and approached Sh. to take him out of the cell ... . At that moment [the applicant] assaulted N., trying to drag him further into the cell. N. put his arms around [the applicant] and carried him out into the hallway, put him face to the wall on the left and let go of him. The other inmates, led by Sh., tried to open the cell door while warden L., officers M. and F. were forcing it closed from the other side ... [The applicant], who was standing by the wall, continued making threats to N. and showing his martial arts skills. Then he assaulted N., locked N.’s neck with his left arm and pulled him towards himself, dragging him to the floor. N. got out of the applicant’s lock, pinned [the applicant] to the floor and restrained him by pressing his arms against the applicant’s chest. ... [The applicant] stopped resisting and said that he had calmed down and would behave in the cell. N. let go of him to let [the applicant] stand up, and stood up himself. At that moment ... [the applicant] kicked N. with his right foot ... in the lower jaw. Trying to cover his face, N. raised his arm. [The applicant] kicked him again, hitting the fingers on N.’s left hand ... . N. put his arms around [the applicant] and they both fell to the ground. N. still had his arms around [the applicant] trying to avoid [the latter’s] kicks ... . Officer M. held [the applicant] by the feet. Then [the applicant] again claimed that he would not resist and would bring the cell back into order ... . The officers let go of [the applicant] and he was taken back into the cell.” 17.  On 8 April 2004 forensic medical expert U. completed a report concerning the applicant’s injuries. In particular, he concluded as follows:
“The applicant sustained the following injuries: a bruise on the ... back of the head, bruises on the right side of the neck surface and the front of the rib cage on the right, and an abrasion on the right hand. These injuries could have been caused on 12 March 2004. The bruises on the neck and the rib cage were caused by an impact from solid blunt objects. The bruises on the head and the right hand were caused by the impact of blunt objects.” 18.  On 12 April 2004 a senior investigator from the town prosecutor’s office questioned three of the applicant’s fellow inmates on 12 March 2004. Sh. confirmed the applicant’s version of events. B. alleged that the applicant had not attacked N. in the cell. He further submitted that N. had dragged the applicant out of the cell in response to the inmates’ demands to be transferred. He conceded that he could not see what was going on in the hallway after the applicant had been taken out of the cell. Ga. stated that N. had hit the applicant in the cell and had dragged him out. He could not see the rest as the police officers had tried to close the door to the cell. 19.  On 13 April 2004 an investigator refused to institute criminal proceedings against police officers L., M., N. and F., finding that the use of physical force by the police officers against the applicant had been lawful. He relied on the statements made the police officers, several inmates of cell no. 11, and the forensic report on the applicant’s injuries. The applicant did not appeal. 20.  On 17 March 2004 a senior investigator with the town prosecutor’s office instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant on a charge of assault on a police officer. Two days later the applicant was served with a copy of the relevant decision. 21.  On 3 April 2004 the applicant was placed for fifteen days in a punishment cell. He was registered as “an inmate with violent tendencies and a propensity to abscond”. 22.  On 28 April 2004 the criminal proceedings against the applicant on the charges of causing grievous bodily harm to an employee of a tyre shop (see paragraph 6 above) and assault on the police officer were joined. 23.  On 20 December 2004 the Petrozavodsk Town Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to nine and a half years’ imprisonment. As to the events of 12 March 2004, i.e., the alleged assault on the police officers, the Town Court relied on the statements given in court by N., warden L., and police officer P., who had been on duty at the temporary detention centre; on the reports prepared by police officers N., M. and F., and on the findings of the internal inquiry of 26 March 2004. The court viewed the video recording of the incident of 12 March 2004, which corroborated the police officer’s account of the events. The court also heard inmates Sh. and B. and examined earlier statements made by inmates D., G. and Ga. The court dismissed their statements as untrue, noting in addition that B., D. and G. had admitted that they had not witnessed the altercation between N. and the applicant in the hallway. Lastly, the court assessed the injuries sustained by the applicant on 12 March 2004 and, with reference to the internal inquiry of 26 March 2004, concluded that they had not caused any permanent damage to his health and that the use of force against the applicant had been lawful. 24.  As to the charge of causing grievous bodily harm to an employee of a tyre shop, the Town Court based its findings on the victim’s statement and on the confession of one of the applicant’s co-defendants K., which he made in court, records of identification parades during which the victim had identified the perpetrators of the criminal offence against him, statements by a number of witnesses made in open court, and physical evidence, including expert opinions, records of scene examinations, etc. The Town Court also relied on the statement made by Pa., another co-defendant, admitting that he had committed the criminal offence together with the applicant. Pa. had died before the trial started. According to the minutes of the trial hearing, the applicant and his lawyer did not object to the reading out of Pa.’s statement. 25.  The applicant appealed maintaining his innocence. He claimed that his guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt and that the Town Court’s findings were based on inadmissible, inconclusive and contradictory evidence. 26.  On 21 February 2005 the Supreme Court of the Kareliya Republic upheld the judgment of 20 December 2004 on appeal, endorsing the reasoning given by the Town Court. 27.  On 20 December 2005 judge R. of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation granted the application for the supervisory review of the appeal judgment of 21 February 2005 lodged by the Deputy Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation. The case was remitted to the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Kareliya Republic. 28.  On 25 January 2006 the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Kareliya Republic noted that the applicant had not been provided with an opportunity to study the trial record, and quashed the appeal judgment of 20 December 2005 by way of supervisory review and remitted the matter for fresh consideration to the appeal court. 29.  On 27 March 2006 the Supreme Court of the Kareliya Republic found that the trial court had erred when indicating the applicant’s place of birth in the verdict, quashed the applicant’s conviction and remitted the matter for fresh consideration to the Town Court. 30.  However, on 17 May 2006 the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Kareliya Republic quashed the judgment of 27 March 2006 by way of supervisory review and remitted the matter for fresh examination to the appeal court. The court noted that the trial court’s erroneous indication of the applicant’s place of birth had not affected the substance of the verdict. 31.  In a new set of appeal proceedings, on 3 July 2006 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of 20 December 2004. 32.  On an unspecified date the applicant was charged with manslaughter and aggravated robbery. According to the prosecution, (1) on 6 October 2002 the applicant and several other persons assaulted D. and beat him to death; (2) on 14 July 2002 the applicant and several other persons attacked Zh. and took RUB 126,000 from him. 33.  On 16 November 2007 the Town Court found the applicant guilty of manslaughter and aggravated robbery and sentenced him to nine years’ imprisonment. The Town Court based the conviction on statements by a number of witnesses, the instigator of the offence and one of the applicant’s co-defendants given in court, statements made during the pre-trial investigation by witnesses Kyu., Pe. and Ma., and extensive material evidence. Kyu., Pe. and Ma. had confessed to committing the manslaughter together with the applicant. Kyu. had died during the pre-trial investigation. Pe. and Ma. had absconded and, despite the authorities’ attempts, which included a nationwide search, were never found. Neither the applicant nor his lawyer objected to the reading out of Kyu.’s, Pe.’s and Ma.’s statements. 34.  On 28 November 2007 a local newspaper published an article reporting on the criminal proceedings against the applicant and his co‑defendants and naming the applicant among the perpetrators of the manslaughter and robbery. 35.  On 21 January 2008 the Supreme Court of the Kareliya Republic upheld the judgment on appeal. 36.  Following the applicant’s arrest and placement in custody pending investigation and trial on the charges of causing a grievous bodily harm to an employee of a tyre shop and assault on the police officer, the applicant was found guilty as charged on 20 December 2004 as upheld on 21 February 2005 on appeal. Following the supervisory review of the appeal judgment, on 27 March 2006 the appeal court quashed the verdict and remitted the matter for a new trial (see paragraphs 23-29 above). The appeal court further ordered that the applicant should remain in custody pending trial. 37.  On 31 March 2006 the Town Court received the case file. 38.  On 10 May 2006 the Town Court reviewed the applicant’s pre-trial detention. The applicant argued that he should be released. Relying on the gravity of the charges, the Town Court extended the applicant’s detention until 10 August 2006. His argument regarding the alleged unlawfulness of his detention was dismissed as unsubstantiated. On 22 May 2006 the Supreme Court of the Kareliya Republic upheld the decision of 10 May 2006 on appeal.


4.  The applicant was born in 1956 and resides in the town of Gorlivka, Donetsk region, Ukraine. 5.  According to the applicant, in 1997 he instituted proceedings in the Tsentralno-Miskyy District Court of Gorlivka against his former employer, the Lenin State Mining Company (шахта ім. Леніна м. Горлівки), claiming compensation for damage to his health. On 6 July 2001 the court awarded the applicant a lump sum of 43,241.61[1] Ukrainian hryvnas (UAH) and monthly payments of UAH 834.31[2] (рішення Центрально-міського суду м. Горлівки). This judgment became final on 3 December 2001. 6.  On 23 January 2002 the Tsentralno-Miskyy District Bailiffs’ Service of Gorlivka (відділ Державної виконавчої служби Управління юстиції Центрально-міського району м. Горлівки) initiated the enforcement proceedings. 7.  By letters of 17 April, 14 May, 27 December 2002 and 21 November 2003, the Bailiffs’ Service informed the applicant that it was impossible to sell the debtor’s property because, according to the Law on the Introduction of a Moratorium on the Forced Sale of Property, on 26 December 2001 a ban on the forced sale of assets belonging to undertakings in which the State holds at least 25% of the share capital had been introduced. 8.  On 27 February 2003 the applicant was paid UAH 11,546.43. According to the Government, in 2005 the applicant had been paid UAH 1,475.64 in addition to the aforesaid sum. No document in support of this statement has been submitted. 9.  The applicant disagreed, stating that he had been paid UAH 11,546.43 only. 10.  Both parties agreed that the court judgment remains partly unenforced.


7.  On 1 October 1986 the applicant was called up by the military authorities to take part in emergency operations at the site of the Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster. The applicant was engaged in the operations until 11 January 1987 and, as a result, suffered from extensive exposure to radioactive emissions. 8.  In 1991, following an expert opinion which established the link between the applicant's poor health and his involvement in the Chernobyl events, the applicant was awarded compensation. 9.  In 1997 the applicant brought proceedings against the Shakhty Social Security Service (Управление социальной защиты населения по г. Шахты) as the compensation had not been paid. On 3 March 1997 the Shakhty City Court (Шахтинский городской суд) found in the applicant's favour and awarded him 23,786,567 [The amount is indicated without regard to the denomination in 1998. In accordance with the Presidential Decree “on the Modification of Face Value of Russian Currency and Standards of Value” of 4 August 1997, 1,000 “old” roubles became 1 “new” rouble from 1 January 1998] Russian roubles (RUR) of the outstanding compensation and an equal sum in the form of a penalty. 10.  On 9 April 1999 the Shakhty Bailiff's Service (Служба судебных приставов г. Шахты) instituted enforcement proceedings for recovery of the penalty awarded on 3 March 1997. 11.  In 1999 the applicant brought an action against the Social Security Service to challenge a reduction in the amount of the monthly payment and to recover the unpaid compensation. On 21 May 1999 the Shakhty City Court restored the original amount of the compensation and ordered the Social Security Service to make monthly compensation payments of RUR 3,011.36 with subsequent indexation. The court also ordered the payment of outstanding moneys totalling RUR 8,752.65. 12.  On 30 August 1999 the Shakhty Bailiff's Service instituted proceedings to enforce the judgment of 21 May 1999. 13.  On 16 September 1999 the Shakhty Bailiff's Service notified the applicant that even though the proceedings to enforce the judgment of 3 March 1997 were pending, the payments to the applicant could not be made because the Social Security Service was underfunded. 14.  On 7 October 1999 the Rostov Regional Department of Justice (Главное управление юстиции Ростовской области) notified the applicant that the two judgments could not be complied with because the defendant did not have sufficient funds. 15.  Following a complaint by the applicant about the failure to enforce the judgments, on 12 November 1999 the prosecutor of Shakhty informed the applicant that the Bailiff's Service was following the established enforcement procedure but had been hampered by the defendant's lack of proper funding. 16.  On 22 December 1999 the Rostov Regional Department of Justice informed the applicant that funds to pay the Chernobyl compensation had been allocated from the federal budget and that payment would be made upon receipt of an appropriate transfer from the Ministry of Finance. 17.  On 26 January 2000 the Rostov Regional Prosecutor's Office (Прокуратура Ростовской области) informed the applicant that the non-enforcement could in no way be attributed to the Bailiff's Service, and that the debts would be discharged as soon as proper allocations had been made from the federal budget. 18.  On 22 March 2000 the Rostov Regional Department of Justice notified the applicant that compensation of Chernobyl victims would be financed from the federal budget. 19.  On 11 April 2000 the Shakhty Bailiff's Service informed the applicant that it was impossible to enforce the judgments in his favour because the Rostov Regional Ministry of Labour and Social Development (Министерство труда и социального развития Ростовской области) was underfunded. 20.  On 16 May 2000 the Shakhty prosecutor informed the applicant that even though the Social Security Service had recalculated the amount of compensation due to the applicant in accordance with the judgment of 21 May 1999, the payments had not been made because of lack of funding. 21.  On 9 March 2000 the Shakhty City Court ordered the indexation of the amount of the penalty awarded on 3 March 1997, which had still not been paid to the applicant. An additional writ of execution for the amount of RUR 44,095.37 was issued. 22.  Following a decision taken by the Ministry of Finance, on 5 March 2001 the Shakhty Social Security Service paid the applicant the outstanding debt of RUR 113,040.38. 23.  According to information provided by the social security service on 11 February 2002, the compensation to be paid to the applicant for the period between April 2001 and June 2002 has been assessed at RUR 2,500 per month.


6.  The applicant was born in 1925 and lives in Varna. 7.  In 1968 the applicant and her husband purchased from the State a three-room flat of approximately 76 sq. m in Varna. The flat had become State-owned by virtue of the nationalisations carried out by the communist regime in Bulgaria in 1947 and the following years. 8.  In 1993, shortly after the Restitution Law (ЗВСОНИ) was passed, the former pre-nationalisation owners brought proceedings under section 7 of that law against the applicant and her husband, seeking the nullification of their title and the restoration of the property. 9.  The applicant’s husband passed away in June 1996. She was his sole heir and the proceedings continued against her. 10.  On 29 June 1996 the Varna District Court found that the 1968 transaction had been null and void and allowed the claim. On appeal, on 25 July 1997 the Varna Regional Court upheld the lower court’s judgment. The courts found that the 1968 contract had been signed by a deputy to the mayor instead of the mayor (председател на изпълнителния комитет на районния народен съвет) and that the file did not contain the requisite approval by the Minister of Architecture and Building Planning. The courts also found that the price of the flat, 5,352 levs, had not been determined correctly by the administration (the judicial expert ordered by the court in the 1996 proceedings estimated the price in 1968 at 5,725 levs). 11.  In 1999 the applicant requested the reopening of the proceedings, stating that she had not been duly summoned for the Regional Court’s hearing held on 2 July 1997. In a judgment of 22 July 1999 the Supreme Court of Cassation rejected the request for reopening. 12.  In 2000 it became possible for persons in the applicant’s situation to obtain compensation from the State, in the form of bonds which could be used in privatisation tenders or sold to brokers. The applicant did not avail herself of that opportunity within the relevant three-month time-limit. She applied for bonds in June 2007 but was informed by a letter of 5 July 2007 from the Varna Regional Governor that she was not entitled to compensation in the form of bonds. 13.  The applicant did not leave the property voluntarily. In 1998 the restored owners instituted enforcement proceedings. The applicant was evicted on 16 August 2006. 14.  On 15 November 2006 the applicant was granted the tenancy of a two-room municipal flat in Varna.


4.  The applicant, Mr Barış İnan, is a Turkish national who was born in 1973 and is currently detained in the Kandıra F-type prison, in Kocaeli. 5.  On 8 September 1998 the applicant was arrested during a police operation conducted against the MLKP (the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party). On 14 September 1998 a single judge at the Istanbul State Security Court ordered the applicant's pre-trial detention. 6.  On 18 September 1998 the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court lodged a bill of indictment, charging the applicant with attempting to undermine the constitutional order, an offence proscribed by Article 146 § 1 of the former Criminal Code. 7.  On 4 December 1998 the Istanbul State Security Court held the first hearing on the merits of the case (no. 1998/259). 8.  According to the information in the case file last submitted by the parties, the criminal proceedings against the applicant are still pending at first instance, which is now the Istanbul Assize Court, and the applicant is still detained on remand. During the proceedings, the first-instance courts examined the applicant's continued detention at the end of every hearing, either on their own motion or upon the applicant's request. On each occasion the courts ordered the applicant's continued remand in custody, given the content of the file and the state of evidence. 9.  The applicant, Mrs Muhabbet Kurt, is a Turkish national who was born in 1978 and is currently detained in the Gebze prison, in Kocaeli. 10.  On 8 September 1998 the applicant was arrested during a police operation conducted against the MLKP (Marxist-Leninist Communist Party). During her detention in police custody, the applicant was allegedly subjected to ill-treatment. In particular, she claimed to have been raped by police officers. 11.  On 14 September 1998 the applicant, along with eleven other persons, was examined by a doctor at the Istanbul branch of the Forensic Medicine Institute who noted that none of them had sustained any injuries. 12.  On the same day the applicant made statements to the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court and stated that she had been tortured while in police custody. The applicant was subsequently brought before a single judge at the Istanbul State Security Court who ordered her pre-trial detention. 13.  On 18 September 1998 the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court lodged a bill of indictment, charging the applicant with attempting to undermine the constitutional order, an offence proscribed by Article 146 § 1 of the former Criminal Code. 14.  On 4 December 1998 the Istanbul State Security Court held the first hearing on the merits of the case (no. 1998/259). 15.  During the hearing on 8 December 1999, the applicant alleged before the first-instance court that she had been raped while in police custody. At the end of the hearing, the State Security Court requested the public prosecutor's office to initiate an investigation into this allegation. 16.  On 20 December 1999 the public prosecutor's office at the Istanbul State Security Court issued a decision based on a lack of jurisdiction and passed the investigation to the Fatih public prosecutor's office. 17.  On 3 July 2000 the Fatih public prosecutor issued a decision not to prosecute anyone in relation to the applicant's allegations, holding that there was insufficient evidence to bring criminal proceedings. The public prosecutor noted that the applicant did not apply to the national authorities at the end of her detention in police custody until 8 December 1999. He further noted that the medical reports issued at the end of her police custody period did not indicate any sign of violence on her person. 18.  By Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, published in the Official Gazette on 30 June 2004, State Security Courts were abolished. The case against the applicant and her co-accused was transferred to the Istanbul Assize Court. 19.  During the hearings of 4 July and 24 October 2007, the applicant and her representatives primarily challenged the reliability and admissibility in evidence of the statements taken from her in police custody under duress. In particular, the applicant repeated her allegations of rape and requested the court to order the public prosecutor's office to investigate her allegations of ill‑treatment. The assize court heard four witnesses on behalf of the applicant who testified that, at the end of her detention in police custody in 1998, the applicant had claimed to have been raped and that she had been depressed. On both occasions, noting that there had already been an investigation into the applicant's allegations of ill-treatment, the trial court rejected the applicant's requests. 20.  According to the information in the case file last submitted by the parties, the criminal proceedings against the applicant are still pending before the Istanbul Assize Court and the applicant is still detained on remand. During the proceedings, the first-instance courts examined the applicant's continued detention at the end of every hearing, either on their own motion or upon the applicant's request. The courts ordered the applicant's continued remand in custody, given the content of the file and the state of evidence on each occasion. On one occasion, the applicant filed an objection against the first-instance court's remand decision, which was subsequently dismissed by another assize court on 23 August 2006. 21.  The applicant, Mr Azimet Ceyhan, is a Turkish national who was born in 1970 and is currently detained in the Kandıra F-type prison, in Kocaeli. 22.  On an unspecified date in 2000 criminal proceedings were brought against the applicant before the Istanbul State Security Court on the charge of attempting to undermine the constitutional order, an offence proscribed by Article 146 of the former Criminal Code. The State Security Court ordered the applicant's pre-trial detention. 23.  Subsequently, the case against the applicant (no. 2000/30) was joined to case no. 1998/259 pending before the Istanbul State Security Court. 24.  On 21 February 2000 the applicant was arrested and brought before a single judge at the Istanbul State Security Court, who ordered the applicant's detention pending trial. 25.  According to the information in the case file last submitted by the parties, the criminal proceedings against the applicant are still pending at first instance, which is now the Fourteenth Chamber of the Istanbul Assize Court, and the applicant is still detained despite his numerous requests for release. During the proceedings, the first-instance courts examined the applicant's continued detention at the end of every hearing, either on their own motion or upon the applicant's request. The courts ordered the applicant's continued remand in custody, given the content of the file and the state of evidence on each occasion.


9.  The applicants were born in 1929 and 1923 respectively. The applicant in application no. 43185/98 (“Dr Price”) is a consultant psychiatrist; the applicant in application no. 43186/98 (“Mrs Lowe”) is a medical secretary. They live in Lincoln. 10.  The applicants, together with Dr Price’s wife, were sued by “K”, a former patient of Dr Price, in respect of property in Florida. The writ was issued on 12 February 1986. Before the action came to trial, the plaintiff was adjudicated bankrupt on 9 August 1989 and the trustee in bankruptcy continued the action. 11.  The trial was set down to commence in the High Court in August 1994 but was postponed until the end of September 1994 because the judge was not available for the length of time needed for the hearing. 12.  On the fourth day of trial, while K was being cross-examined, an adjournment was granted because K claimed to feel unwell. In the event, it emerged that no medical justification could be given for his continued non-attendance, but nonetheless he remained absent for the rest of the trial. Because of the delay caused by K’s non-attendance, the trial could not be concluded in September 1994 and had to be adjourned until January 1995. Judgment was given on 27 April 1995. 13.  The judge accepted the argument of the applicants and Mrs Price that it was necessary to disregard K’s evidence because of his failure to remain for cross-examination. However, on the basis of the documentary evidence and that adduced by the applicants and Mrs Price, the judge found that the transfer of the Florida property should be set aside on the ground that the defendants had not been able to rebut the presumption of undue influence created by the discrepancy in the price they paid K for the property and its value at the time of the transfer, together with the doctor-patient relationship between Dr Price and K. 14.  The formal record of the judge’s order was not prepared by the parties until 26 October 1995. The applicants and Mrs Price applied to the Court of Appeal for leave to appeal on 1 November 1995. The appeal bundles were lodged on 4 October 1996. On 15 January 1997 the appeal was listed for hearing, and it was heard on 16 and 17 April 1997, on which last date the Court of Appeal gave judgment dismissing the appeal. 15.  In connection with the moneys paid by Dr Price for the property, the Court of Appeal confirmed the decision of the trial judge that the sum should be repaid, but that no interest should be paid on it. The trial judge had based his decision on the fact that Dr Price “had had possession of the properties and receipt of the rents since the completion of the sale, subject only to the agreement to allow [K] to use number 212 in the early months”. Lord Justice Nourse regarded this as a “rough and ready result”, but one which would “reduce the opportunities for further dispute between the parties”. 16.  On 19 April 1997 the applicants and Mrs Price were refused leave by the Court of Appeal to appeal to the House of Lords. On 30 March 1998 the applicants and Mrs Price were refused leave to appeal by the House of Lords.


6.  The applicant was born in 1973 and is serving a prison sentence in Tomsk. 7.  The applicant was suspected of involvement in a criminal gang. On 1 September 2000 the Prosecutor’s Office of the Republic of Tatarstan (the “Prosecutor’s Office”) opened a criminal investigation into the gang’s activities. On 20 September 2001 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of two counts of murder and placed in custody. 8.  On 21 September 2001 the prosecutor authorised the applicant’s detention pending investigation, referring to the gravity of the charges and the risk of his absconding and obstructing justice. No time-limit for detention was fixed. 9.  The applicant appealed. He claimed that the prosecutor’s decision of 21 September 2001 lacked justification. He also applied for release, arguing that he had no intention of absconding, had family commitments and a permanent place of residence and a job. 10.  On 6 June 2002 the Vakhitovskiy District Court of Kazan rejected the applicant’s appeal and his application for release and upheld the prosecutor’s decision of 21 September 2001. In particular, the court stated the following:
“When deciding to detain [the applicant], [the prosecutor] took into account the gravity of the charges and the fact that [the applicant] might abscond and interfere with the establishment of the truth...
The arguments furnished by [the applicant and his counsel] are not sufficient to refute [the prosecutor’s] finding that [the applicant] might abscond and interfere with establishment of the truth.” 11.  On 5 July 2002 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan upheld the decision of 6 June 2002. 12.  In the meantime, on 28 September 2001 the Prosecutor’s Office indicted the applicant for murder and involvement in a criminal gang. On an unspecified date the applicant was also charged with fraud, extortion and kidnapping. 13.  On 19 November 2001 the Prosecutor’s Office extended the applicant’s detention until 20 March 2002. The detention order was issued in respect of seven defendants, including the applicant. Referring to the gravity of the charges, the prosecutor in charge of the investigation alleged that the defendants might abscond or interfere with the investigation. The detention order further indicated that several witnesses, including two of the defendants, had identified the applicant as one of the perpetrators of the crimes under investigation. The applicant did not appeal. 14.  On 21 March and 14 June 2002 the Deputy Prosecutor of the Russian Federation extended the applicant’s detention until 4 July and 4 October 2002 respectively. The orders were issued in respect of nine and then twelve defendants, including the applicant, and reiterated verbatim the reasoning previously used to justify keeping the accused in custody. As to the evidence collected in the course of the investigation, the prosecutor referred to numerous witnesses who had testified against the applicant. The applicant did not appeal. 15.  On 30 April 2002 the defendants and their lawyers started studying the case file which comprised seventy-two volumes. 16.  On 29 August 2002 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan further extended the applicant’s detention until 4 January 2003. The court reasoned as follows:
“[The applicant] should remain in custody since he is charged with grave offences and might abscond and threaten the witnesses and other parties involved in the proceedings. Besides, [the applicant] is to study a considerable volume of the case-file materials. In view of the above, the court grants the investigator’s request to extend [the applicant’s] detention.” 17.  The applicant appealed, arguing that the investigator had not furnished any evidence to substantiate his allegations that the applicant might abscond or interfere with the administration of justice. He further asked the appeal court to release him and apply any other alternative measure prescribed by law to ensure his presence in court or anticipate his custodial sentence, if any. On 6 November 2002 the Supreme Court of Russia dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the decision of 29 August 2002. 18.  On 20 November 2002 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan further extended the applicant’s detention pending his study of the case file. No time-limit for the detention period was indicated. The court provided the following justification for its decision:
“[The applicant] should remain in custody since he is charged with grave offences and might abscond or interfere with the administration of justice.” 19.  The applicant appealed. Alleging numerous violations of the applicable rules of criminal procedure in the course of his arrest and detention, he asked the appeal court to release him. 20.  On 5 February 2003 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the detention order of 20 November 2002 on appeal. In particular, it noted as follows:
“As [the lower court] indicated, [the applicant] may abscond or interfere with administration of justice and has been charged with grave and serious offences. Accordingly, the [lower] court’s decision to extend the applicant’s detention was justified. As regards [the applicant’s] allegations about violations of rules of criminal procedure... they will be subject to examination in the course of the trial ...” 21.  It appears that in 2004 the defendants, including the applicant, and their counsel, completed their study of the case file. According to the Government, on 27 April 2004 the Deputy Prosecutor of the Republic of Tatarstan approved the bill of indictment in respect of the applicant and fifteen other persons and forwarded the case file to the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan. 22.  On 22 July 2004 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan reviewed the material in the case file in respect of the sixteen defendants, including the applicant, and scheduled the first hearing for 27 September 2004. The court further decided that the case would be tried by a jury and that fourteen defendants, including the applicant, should remain in custody pending trial. No time-limit for their detention was fixed. When dismissing the defendants’ application for release, the court noted as follows:
“The defendants have been charged with numerous grave and serious offences which might entail a custodial sentence exceeding two years. [The court does not] discern any special exceptional circumstances which would render [the defendants’] release possible. The reasons earlier [indicated by the court] to extend the defendants’ detention, i.e., the risk of absconding, threatening the witnesses and other parties involved in the criminal proceedings or interfering with the administration of justice in any other way, have not ceased to exist.” 23.  The applicant appealed. He argued that he had spent over two years and eight months in detention. He asked the court to release him on an undertaking not to leave town or on bail. He further referred to the fact that he had no previous convictions, that he was married and had a minor child and a full-time job. On 7 September 2004 the Supreme Court of Russia dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the decision of 22 July 2004 finding no reason to depart from the lower court’s findings. 24.  On 29 October 2004 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan extended the detention of fourteen defendants, including the applicant, until 29 January 2005. The applicant argued that he should be released pending trial. He claimed that the gravity of the charges alone could not constitute a sufficient reason for extension of his detention; that he had been detained during a lengthy period; that the prosecution had failed to prove that he might abscond or interfere with the administration of justice; that the court had already examined the materials concerning a number of charges against the defendants; and that the criminal proceedings had been too long. The court dismissed the applicant’s arguments, noting as follows:
“[The defendants’] application for release cannot be granted for the following reasons. They have been charged with grave and serious offences which might entail a custodial sentence exceeding two years. [The court does not] discern any special exceptional circumstances which would render [the defendants’] release possible. The reasons earlier [indicated by the court] to extend the defendants’ detention, i.e., the risk of absconding, threatening the witnesses and other parties involved in the criminal proceedings or interfering with the administration of justice in any other way, have not ceased to exist... The fact that the court had already examined several charges against the defendants cannot be regarded as a sufficient reason to justify their release. Nor is the length of the criminal proceedings a factor to be taken into account when deciding the issue of detention.” 25.  On 28 January, 29 April, and 29 July 2005 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan extended the pre-trial detention for the applicant and thirteen other defendants until 29 April, 29 July and 29 October 2005 respectively. Each time the court dismissed the defendants’ applications reproducing verbatim its earlier reasoning as follows:
“[The defendants’] application for release cannot be granted for the following reasons. They have been charged with grave and serious offences which might entail a custodial sentence exceeding two years. [The court does not] discern any special exceptional circumstances which would render [the defendants’] release possible. The reasons earlier [indicated by the court] to extend the defendants’ detention, i.e., the risk of absconding, threatening the witnesses and other parties involved in the criminal proceedings or interfering with the administration of justice in any other way, have not ceased to exist... The fact that the court had already examined several charges against the defendants cannot be regarded as a sufficient reason to justify their release. Nor is the length of the criminal proceedings a factor to be taken into account when deciding the issue of detention.” 26.  It appears that the applicant did not appeal against the above decisions. 27.  On 24 October 2005 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Tatarstan found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to twenty-one years’ imprisonment. On 12 April 2006 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the applicant’s conviction on appeal.


4.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Budapest. 5.  The applicant filed claims with the Budapest Labour Court on 25 August and 7 September 1993, respectively, alleging unlawful dismissal by, and claiming compensation from, his former employer (“proceedings A and B”). 6.  On 30 November 1993 the applicant and 182 other plaintiffs including three trade unions – one of which was represented by the applicant as a member of its legal advice service – filed an action with the same court claiming unlawful legal succession of their former employer (“proceedings C”). 7.  Following a successful motion for bias by the applicant, the Pest County Labour Court was appointed to hear both cases on 13 December 1994. On 22 November and 20 December 1995, respectively, the Labour Court ordered the suspension of the proceedings pending the outcome of proceedings C. 8.  On 12 August 2002 the applicant requested that both cases be resumed, since proceedings B had been discontinued by the appeal court (see paragraph 16 below). 9.  The Labour Court gave judgments dismissing the applicant's actions on 22 January and 22 April 2004, respectively. 10.  On appeal, the Pest County Regional Court delivered judgments, partly accepting the applicant's claims, on 10 June 2005. These decisions were served on the applicant on 3 August and 5 September 2005, respectively. Concerning one of them, a rectification order was issued on 7 September 2005. 11.  On 2 December 1994 the Budapest Labour Court dismissed the action in respect of 123 plaintiffs including the applicant. On 25 August 1995 the Supreme Court appointed the Veszprém County Regional Court to hear the appeal. On 14 February 1996 this court quashed the first-instance decision for formal shortcomings, holding that the applicant had not been authorised to represent some co-plaintiffs. 12.  On 26 February 1997 the Pest County Labour Court was appointed to hear the case. 13.  On 21 April 1998 the applicant requested supplementation of the order of 2 October 1996. On 28 October 1998 the Veszprém County Regional Court dismissed the applicant's request. 14.  The Labour Court held hearings on 18 January, 11 March and 20 May 1999 and delivered a judgment on 27 May 1999. On appeal, on 3 November 1999 the Pest County Regional Court quashed the judgment and remitted the case. On 18 February 2000 the applicant requested the rectification and supplementation of this decision which was done on 19 June 2000. 15.  The Labour Court held further hearings on 21 December 2000 and 18 January 2001. On 26 March 2001 it delivered a judgment dismissing the action in respect of most plaintiffs including the applicant, and discontinuing the proceedings in respect of others. On appeal, the Pest County Regional Court held hearings on 8 October and 26 November 2001. On 15 October 2001 the respondents declared that they would not claim costs from those plaintiffs who withdrew their action and appeal. 16.  On 8 February 2002 the applicant informed the court that, like other plaintiffs, he withdrew his action and appeal. On 18 February 2002 the Regional Court discontinued the proceedings. This decision was served on the applicant on 6 August 2002.


9.  The applicant is a registered association (Verein) in Vienna and the publisher of a periodical called TATblatt. In the 9 December 1992 issue of TATblatt, the following leaflet was published:
“Querformat, a (new) wall-newspaper against the trend towards the right wing ...”
“Racism has a name and address
The FPÖ [Austrian Freedom Party] and its party officials are certainly interested in your opinion! So, let's call them and tell them what we think of them and their policy. Or let's send them small gifts in response to their racist agitation.
We have gathered a small selection of Vienna FPÖ officials, FPÖ offices and of course Jörg Haider in order to facilitate a little the unbureaucratic exchange of opinions.
They will surely enjoy your phone calls, letters and parcels: ...”
The above text was followed by a list of addresses and telephone numbers of members and offices of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ). 10.  Between 25 January and 1 February 1993 an opinion poll (Volksbegehren) under the heading “Austria first” (“Österreich zuerst”) took place which had been initiated by the FPÖ several months before. The opinion poll, on the issue of immigration, consisted of twelve proposals, partly to amend legislation and partly to change administrative practices. It proposed, inter alia, the following:
– to amend the Federal Constitution by a provision stating that Austria was not a country of immigration;
– to stop immigration until a satisfactory solution to illegal immigration was found;
– to oblige all foreign workers to carry an identity card at their place of work, showing that they had a valid work permit;
– to increase the police force and create a separate border police;
– to limit the percentage of pupils whose mother tongue was not German to 30 % and, if the percentage were higher, to create separate classes for foreigners;
– to deny foreigners the right to vote; and
– to require the immediate expulsion of and residence prohibition on foreign offenders. 11.  On 11 February 1993 Mr Jörg Haider, leader of the FPÖ and at that time a member of Parliament, brought civil proceedings for an injunction under Article 1330 of the Austrian Civil Code (Allgemeines bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) against the applicant before the Vienna Commercial Court (Handelsgericht). He requested that the applicant be prohibited from repeating the statement according to which he had incited people to “racist agitation” (“rassistische Hetze”) and any similar statements. He further requested that the applicant be prohibited from inviting people to “send small gifts in response to their racist agitation”, together with the publication of the names, telephone numbers and addresses of members of the plaintiff's political party. 12.  The applicant submitted that it had never identified itself with the leaflet at issue and had merely published it out of journalistic interest and in order to inform the public. Moreover, the words “racist agitation” were not a statement of fact but a value judgment, and were meant as a critical comment of the opinion poll “Austria first” which the plaintiff had initiated and which was directed against “immigration without control”. 13.  On 14 April 1994 the Vienna Commercial Court granted the injunction. It found that the impugned statement about “racist agitation” was not a value judgment, but a statement of fact. Such a statement contained a reproach of a criminal offence, namely “incitement to hatred” (Verhetzung) under Article 283 of the Austrian Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch), and not only damaged the plaintiff's reputation (Rufschädigung) but also amounted to an insult (Ehrenbeleidigung). In order to avoid the injunction, the applicant therefore needed to prove the truth of its statement. However, it had failed to do so. Even accepting that the plaintiff was, more or less, a right-wing politician, there was no evidence that he had attempted to incite hatred (verhetzen) against aliens or had attacked their human dignity. 14.  As regards the invitation to “send small gifts”, the court observed that a part of the applicant's readership was, for political reasons, prepared to use violence and anarchistic methods. In this respect the court noted that in the 9 December 1992 issue of TATblatt a letter to the editor had been published which read as follows:
“... we organised in the night of 29 to 30 November our first action against Haider's referendum and have smashed several windows of the FPÖ headquarters in Salzburg. This was only the beginning. ...” 15.  According to another letter to the editor published in the 20 January 1993 issue of TATblatt, an FPÖ party office in Vienna had been “visited”, the words “racism stinks” had been sprayed on the walls, windows smashed and butter acid thrown into the office. The Commercial Court then quoted further letters of this kind which had appeared in various issues of TATblatt. The court found that against this background the invitation to “send small gifts” constituted an attack on the plaintiff's personality rights (Persönlichkeitsrechte) which had to be respected. Accordingly, the court granted the injunction in this respect also. 16.  On 29 August 1994 the applicant appealed against the injunction. 17.  On 26 January 1995 the Vienna Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) dismissed the appeal. It confirmed the Commercial Court's view that the statement according to which the plaintiff had incited people to “racist agitation” was a statement of fact which the applicant had failed to prove. In this respect the court found as follows:
“But since – as we have already outlined in dealing with the complaint concerning the facts – the meaning of the term 'racist agitation' could be established on the basis of general experience, and since the defendant has failed to submit any concrete allegations to the effect that the plaintiff had shown conduct corresponding to what is generally known as 'racism' and 'agitation', the court of first instance – without there being a mistake of law – rightly concluded that the defendant was unable to prove the truth of its allegations. ...” 18.  As regards the applicant's argument that this statement was covered by its right to freedom of expression, the Court of Appeal found that the interests of the applicant and the plaintiff had to be balanced against each other. However, the applicant's statement could not be justified by referring to freedom of expression, because the statement went beyond the limits of acceptable criticism by reproaching the plaintiff with a criminal offence. Moreover, the impugned statement was untrue and therefore not protected by Article 10 of the Convention. The Court of Appeal confirmed the decision of the Commercial Court in respect of both statements. 19.  On 13 March 1995 the applicant introduced an extraordinary appeal on points of law (außerordentliche Revision) against the Court of Appeal's decision in so far as it concerned the prohibition to repeat the statement that the plaintiff had incited people to “racist agitation”. 20.  On 6 April 1995 the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof) declared the extraordinary appeal inadmissible as it found that the qualification of the statement at issue as a statement of fact was in accordance with its previous case-law.


5.  HADEP was a political party which had been established on 11 May 1994. At the time of its dissolution on 13 March 2003 its general secretary was the second applicant, Mr Ahmet Turan Demir, who had been elected to that post in February 2003. 6.  In the general election held on 24 December 1995 HADEP received 1,171,623 votes, which represented 4.17% of the total number of votes cast. In the general election held on 18 April 1999 HADEP received 1,482,196 votes. However, as HADEP did not succeed in passing the required threshold of 10%, it was unable to be represented in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey following these two general elections (see HADEP and Others v. Turkey (dec.), no. 51292/99, 13 November 2008). In local elections held on 18 April 1999 HADEP won control of 37 municipalities. It had branches in 47 cities and in hundreds of districts. In 2002 HADEP became a member of the Socialist International. 7.  The applicants submitted that, during a National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu) meeting held on 18 December 1996, a decision had been taken to dissolve HADEP. In support of this assertion the applicants submitted to the Court a report which, they claimed, had been adopted by the National Security Council and which had subsequently been leaked to the press. The report, which is classified 'Secret', details a number of recommendations including “the control and pursuit of HADEP by the State in order to quell its activities”. Following this decision HADEP branches had been raided and its administrators had been subjected to physical pressure. In support of this latter argument the applicants submitted to the Court two reports, detailing the physical attacks on and the killings and forced disappearances of dozens of HADEP members, some of which have been examined by the Court (see, inter alia, Tanış and Others v. Turkey, no. 65899/01, ECHR 2005–VIII). 8. On various dates criminal proceedings were brought against a number of members of HADEP who were holding executive positions within the party. Some of the proceedings were suspended while some ended in convictions. Some of them were convicted of spreading “separatist propaganda”, in breach of section 8 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, while others were convicted of “incitement to racial hatred and hostility in society on the basis of a distinction between social classes, races or religions”, in breach of Article 312 of the Criminal Code. A number of others were convicted of lending assistance to the PKK[1] in breach of Article 169 of the Criminal Code, for making speeches, allowing hunger strikers to use HADEP premises and for possessing a number of documents prepared by PKK members in a law-firm owned by one of them[2]. Some served their prison sentences while execution of the sentences of a number of others was stayed. 9.  On 29 January 1999 the chief prosecutor at the Court of Cassation brought proceedings before the Constitutional Court and demanded that HADEP be dissolved. The chief prosecutor argued that HADEP had become a “centre of illegal activities against the integrity of Turkey”. In support of his allegations the chief prosecutor referred to the criminal proceedings pending against members of HADEP and a number of activities of its members. One incident relied on by the chief prosecutor was that during HADEP's annual general meeting in 1996 the Turkish flag had been taken down and replaced with a PKK flag. 10.  On 25 February 1999 the chief prosecutor asked the Constitutional Court to render an interim decision banning HADEP from taking part in the forthcoming April general and local elections. The chief prosecutor's request was refused by the Constitutional Court on 8 March 1999. 11.  On 5 April 1999 lawyers for HADEP submitted a written defence to the Constitutional Court. They alleged that the chief prosecutor's request for the dissolution of HADEP had been made as a result of the National Security Council's above-mentioned decision (see paragraph 7). They further argued, inter alia, that as it was not clear what the accusations against HADEP were, it was not possible for them to make full use of their defence rights. The lawyers relied on Articles 6, 9, 10, 11 and 14 of the Convention and Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, and asked the Constitutional Court to take into account the decisions and judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in cases concerning the dissolution of a number of other political parties in Turkey. 12.  The chief prosecutor maintained in his written submissions of 9 April 1999 that HADEP had close ties with the PKK, and alleged that the former was being controlled by the latter. The chief prosecutor also repeated his request for HADEP to be dissolved before the elections which were to be held on 18 April 1999. This request was not accepted by the Constitutional Court. 13. During the proceedings, in their submissions to the Constitutional Court HADEP's representatives drew attention to the fact that the person who had taken down the flag was not a member of the party. They further stated that, immediately after the incident the HADEP congress had publicly condemned the incident. Since then HADEP had been dissociating itself from the incident and condemning it as an attack on a common symbolic value of the people of Turkey. 14.  In its decision of 13 March 2003 the Constitutional Court decided unanimously to dissolve HADEP. The Constitutional Court based its decision on Articles 68 and 69 of the Constitution and sections 101 and 103 of the Political Parties Act (Law no. 2820). In arriving at its conclusion, the Constitutional Court took account of the activities of certain leaders and members of HADEP and concluded that HADEP had become a centre of illegal activities which included aiding and abetting the PKK. 15.  The Constitutional Court noted, in particular, that during HADEP's annual general meeting in 1996 a non-HADEP member wearing a mask had taken down the Turkish flag and replaced it with a PKK flag and a poster of the then leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan. During the same meeting slogans had also been chanted in support of the PKK and its leader[3]. The then general secretary of HADEP Mr Murat Bozlak, who was present during the meeting on that day, had done nothing to stop the Turkish flag being taken down and had stated during his speech that “the existence of the Kurds in Turkey, who were not allowed to speak their mother tongue, had been denied. The PKK, despite ongoing military operations, massacres and provocations, was holding its ceasefire. Nothing could be resolved with military operations or with occupation.” The Constitutional Court considered the taking down of the Turkish flag as proof of the links between HADEP and the PKK. It further considered that the references made by Mr Bozlak to Turkey's fight against terrorism as an “occupation” and portraying Kurds as a separate nation showed that Mr Bozlak was supporting the PKK[4]. 16.  The Constitutional Court referred to Article 11 of the Convention in its judgment and stated that the rights guaranteed in that provision were not absolute and could be restricted in the circumstances listed in Article 11 § 2 of the Convention. It also referred to Article 17 of the Convention, and reached the following conclusion:
“Carrying out activities, by relying on democratic rights and freedoms, against the indivisible unity of the State with its nation is unacceptable. In such circumstances it is the duty and raison d'être of the State to prevent the abuse of these rights and freedoms. Allowing a political party which supports terrorism and which is supported by terrorism to continue to exist cannot be contemplated.
In statements and speeches made on behalf of the People's Democracy Party and in the course of various meetings, the party's general secretary Murat Bozlak, other party officials and chairmen and members of the party's provincial and district branches have stated that the Kurdish nation was a different nation from the Turkish nation; that the State of the Turkish Republic had been enforcing a policy of pressure and oppression on the Kurdish nation; that there was an ongoing war between the PKK terrorist organisation and the State of the Republic of Turkey; and that the Kurdish nation should take sides with the PKK in this war. Some of these activities have resulted in convictions. These persons have thus aided and harboured the PKK and its leader Abdullah Öcalan, whose aim is to destroy the indivisible unity of the State. The incidents, which are detailed in relevant parts of this judgment and which took place during the Second Congress of the People's Democracy Party on 23 June 1996 in Ankara, as well as the objects and documents found in the party headquarters and in the party's various branches confirm the [above-mentioned conclusion].
Activities by members of the People's Democracy Party and the evidence [in our possession] clearly show the links between the respondent party and the PKK. The following incidents and activities – and many others and judgments rendered by courts – are proof of the connection and support between the People's Democracy Party and the PKK terrorist organisation:
–  organisation of various activities – under instructions from the PKK – such as hunger strikes, demonstrations and issuing press releases with a view to protesting against the attempt to assassinate Öcalan and against the work that had been carried out by the State of the Turkish Republic to apprehend Öcalan, and against his subsequent arrest;
–  work to create, by referring to concepts such as freedom, brotherhood and peace, a sense of a different nation among the people who live in a certain part of the country or who claim to belong to a certain ethnic group;
–  description of the State's struggle against the PKK terrorist organisation as a 'dirty war', as well as taking sides with the PKK in this war by carrying out certain activities and by displaying certain behaviour;
–  provision of training to a number of young people, in line with the PKK ideology but under the disguise of in-party training, with a view to recruiting them to the party first and subsequently to the PKK terrorist organisation in order for them to carry out activities on behalf of the PKK terrorist organisation and then sending them to the PKK's mountain camps as armed militants;
–  the keeping in the Party's headquarters and in its district and provincial branches, of objects, books, banners and photographs of members of the PKK as well as other PKK terrorist organisation propaganda documents for which the courts have issued confiscation orders;
–  the fact of allowing people to watch the organisation's media organ MED TV in these places for propaganda purposes; and
–  speeches and activities during HADEP's Second Congress.
In the light of the above, and in accordance with Articles 68 and 69 of the Constitution and section 101 (b) of the Political Parties Act, it is hereby decided to dissolve HADEP, which has become a centre of illegal activities against the indivisible unity of the State with its nation and which has aided and harboured the PKK terrorist organisation.
...” 17.  As an ancillary measure under Article 69 § 9 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court banned 46 HADEP members and leaders from becoming founder members, ordinary members, leaders or auditors of any other political party for a period of five years[5]. The Constitutional Court also ordered the transfer of HADEP's property to the Treasury. 18.  The decision of the Constitutional Court became final following its publication in the Official Gazette on 19 July 2003.


8.  The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Miskolc, Hungary. He is of Roma ethnic origin. 9.  On 9 August 1995 the applicant, accompanied by Ms B. and Mr S., was selling coal from a truck on a door-to-door basis in Orosháza. After an aborted transaction, some would-be purchasers reported to the local police that the three had left their yard without having returned their fuel vouchers. At about 5.45 p.m. two local police officers halted the applicant’s truck and instructed the applicant and his companions to report to the Orosháza Police Station. The applicant was interrogated there by police officers S. and K. 10.  The applicant stated that during the interrogation one of the police officers repeatedly slapped him across the face and left ear while the other punched him on the shoulder. The officers demanded that he reveal where the stolen vouchers had been hidden. 11.  On being released after two hours of interrogation, the applicant was met on the ground floor of the police station by Ms B. and Mr S., as well as by Mr B. and Mr M., both of whom were acquaintances of the applicant and his companions.
The applicant stated that when he and his companions were leaving the police station, a police officer issued the following warning to them: “Tell the Miskolc gypsies that they had better not set foot in Orosháza”. 12.  Having returned to his home in Miskolc on 11 August 1995, the applicant consulted Dr V., the local doctor, who advised him to report to the Ear, Nose and Throat Department of Diósgyőr Hospital. On 14 August 1995 Dr C. carried out an operation to reconstruct the applicant’s ear drum which had been damaged as a result of a traumatic perforation. On 16 August 1995 Dr C. reported the case to the police. 13.  On 28 August 1995 the applicant was discharged from hospital. His medical report stated, without reference to any precise date, that he had sustained a traumatic perforation of the left tympanic membrane. This conclusion also figured in two further medical reports issued later by Dr C. on 25 August 1995 and by Dr V. on 29 September 1995. The applicant’s injury was described in a follow-up medical report dated 10 September 1997 as “low-to-medium-grade loss of sound perception” in the left ear. 14.  On 25 September 1995 the Szeged Investigation Office informed the applicant that criminal proceedings had been opened against the police officers involved on the basis of information submitted by Dr C. on 16 August. The police officers were charged with the offences of “forced interrogation” and “ill-treatment committed in the course of official proceedings”. 15.  The Investigation Office heard the applicant and several witnesses. Four persons were heard from the applicant’s side.
Mr S. stated as follows:
“[In the building of the police station] I met [the applicant] [...] whose face had a bluish colour in the area under his left ear and was somewhat swollen. I then asked him if they had hurt him. He answered that they had hurt him a little and pointed to the left side of his face saying that it was hurting there. He said that he had no hearing on that side.”
Ms B. stated as follows:
“[When the applicant was escorted down to the ground floor], it struck me that the left side of his face and his left ear were swollen. I thought that he had been beaten. I asked him about it, to which he only answered that he had been beaten a little. [...] I remember well that the left side of his face was red and I even saw the traces of fingers on it.”
Mr M. stated as follows:
“[When at last the applicant came down to the ground floor], it struck me immediately that his skin was reddish-bluish around his left ear and even underneath his neck. I had no doubt that his face was swollen as a result of a blow. I then asked him if they had hurt him, [...], he only answered: ‘A little’.”
Mr B. stated as follows:
[When the applicant was escorted down to the ground floor], it was apparent at once that the left side of his face and his left ear were red. It was obvious that he had been hit. Ms. B. even asked him if he had been hurt. He first answered in the negative. Then I asked him the same question. Then he answered: ‘A little’.”
The Investigation Office also heard Dr V. and four police officers who had been on duty at the police station at the time of the applicant’s interrogation.
The police witnesses denied any knowledge of ill-treatment having been inflicted on the applicant.
The suspected police officers S. and K. consistently denied the applicant’s accusations when questioned on 15 November 1995.
Police officer S. stated, inter alia, as follows:
“I remember [the applicant] having said something of the sort that he was working for those persons as a lorry-driver [...] to set off debts incurred by his wife. [...] He was blaming [his companions] for forcing him to work a lot more than if he had been working for money; and he even mentioned to one of my colleagues that they would either leave him behind or beat him up on the way home because of this.”
Police officer K. stated, inter alia, as follows:
“After the interrogation police officer S. told me that [the persons interrogated] had also quarrelled amongst themselves, maybe they had not properly paid [the applicant], they had a dispute about money or something of the sort [...]” 16.  On 16 November 1995 a medical expert appointed by the Investigation Office expressed the opinion that it could not be excluded that the applicant’s injury had been caused as alleged. However, in the expert’s opinion it could not be determined whether the injury in question had been caused to his ear before, during or after the applicant’s interrogation. 17.  On 30 November 1995 the Investigation Office discontinued the criminal proceedings against police officers K. and S. for lack of any conclusive evidence. On 12 December 1995 the applicant filed a complaint against the discontinuation order. 18.  On 24 January 1996 the Orosháza District Public Prosecutor’s Office ordered the investigation to be resumed and that confrontations be organised between the applicant and the police officers concerned and between various witnesses. It also ordered that further witnesses be heard. 19.  In the framework of the resumed proceedings, the Csongrád County Investigation Office, on 1 March 1996, confronted the applicant with the suspected police officers as well as a third police officer who had been heard as a new witness. 20.  On 6 March 1996 the Investigation Office discontinued the investigation.
Relying on the testimonies given, on the one hand, by the applicant – who had consistently maintained his assertions during the proceedings – and by his companions and, on the other hand, by the police officers concerned, as well as on a confrontation involving all three of them, the Investigation Office found that although the applicant’s injuries might have been inflicted as alleged, it could not be excluded beyond all doubt that the injuries had been sustained before or after his interrogation.
Since there was no direct witness to the alleged incident and the medical opinion in the case was not conclusive as to the time when the applicant’s injury had been inflicted, the Investigation Office was obliged to dismiss the applicant’s accusations as unsubstantiated and to discontinue the proceedings.
The order drew the applicant’s attention to his right to file a complaint with the Public Prosecutor’s Office under section 148 §§ 1 and 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if he wished to challenge the decision to discontinue the case. This order was served on the applicant on 11 March 1996.
The applicant did not file a complaint against this order.
As of 1 August 1996 the applicant’s working capacity was declared to have diminished by 50% on account of asthma bronchiale and impaired hearing; the respective significance of these two factors was not specified. As a consequence, he was unable to have his lorry driver’s licence renewed or to obtain employment as a driver. 21.  On 30 March 1998 the applicant claimed damages from the Ministry of the Interior. In reply, on 16 April 1998 he was informed by the competent Békés County Police Department that he was not eligible for compensation because he had failed to file a complaint against the discontinuation order of 6 March 1996 and thus to avail himself of an ordinary legal remedy, which was a precondition for establishing official liability. 22.  On 22 April 1998 the applicant appointed the NEKI to take his case. A further medical opinion obtained by the NEKI on 19 August 1998 stated that a traumatic perforation of the tympanic membrane was usually caused by a slap on the ear. Although he did not have the earlier medical expert’s opinion at hand, the expert went on to qualify the applicant’s version of how he had sustained his injury as plausible. 23.  Relying on this new evidence, the NEKI lodged on 25 August 1998 a complaint against the decision of 6 March 1996 with the Attorney General’s Office requesting that the criminal proceedings be re-opened in accordance with section 141 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 24.  On 5 October 1998 the Csongrád County Public Prosecutor’s Office finally dismissed this complaint. In its reasoned decision, the Public Prosecutor’s Office stated that:
“[it] had thoroughly examined all the documents in the case file.”
The decision mentioned that in the absence of coherent testimonies or a conclusive medical expert opinion it was impossible to prove either that the applicant’s injury had been caused during his police detention or that it had been inflicted by the suspected police officers. The Public Prosecutor’s Office noted the delay between the applicant’s interrogation on 9 August and his decision to seek medical help only on 11 August 1995. The decision stated that the new expert opinion did not contain any new facts which warranted the continuation of the investigation or the laying of charges against the suspects. The Public Prosecutor’s Office concluded that the case should be discontinued since it was impossible to prove the applicant’s allegations. The decision was served on the NEKI on 14 October 1998.


5.  The first and second applicants were born in 1948 and 1970 respectively and live in Bujanovac Municipality. 6.  Following the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s intervention in Kosovo, on 9 June 1999 the Yugoslav and Serbian Governments agreed to a phased withdrawal of their military and police forces from the territory and a transfer of all effective control to an international security force (“KFOR”). Concerning a number of municipalities, including Suva Reka, the transfer, according to the Military Technical Agreement, was to take place by 15 June 1999. It was further envisaged that it would be up to KFOR to “maintain a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo”. Pursuant to their own phased withdrawal plan, which was to be synchronised with the Yugoslav Army plan, the Serbian police forces envisaged that a transfer of all effective control in Suva Reka Municipality would in fact take place on 13 June 1999. 7.  On 13 June 1999 the first applicant’s husband was kidnapped by the Kosovo Liberation Army (“KLA”) in Suva Reka Municipality. 8.  On 12 March 2002 the Bujanovac Municipal Court declared the first applicant’s husband dead. This ruling became final by 3 April 2002. 9.  On 19 May 2005 the first applicant, together with her children, lodged a civil claim against the Republic of Serbia with the First Municipal Court in Belgrade, seeking compensation for the mental anguish suffered as a consequence of the incident. 10.  On 19 May 2006 the said court ruled against the plaintiffs. 11.  On 21 November 2007 the first-instance judgment was upheld by the Belgrade District Court on appeal. The first applicant was served with the District Court judgment on 23 May 2008. 12.  In their reasoning the First Municipal Court and the District Court opined, inter alia, that while the first applicant’s husband had indeed been kidnapped on 13 June 1999 the Republic of Serbia could not be held liable, within the meaning of Article 180 § 1 of the Obligations Act (see paragraph 26 below), since it was up to KFOR to provide for the safety of all citizens of Kosovo from 9 June 1999 onwards (see paragraph 6 above). The fact that national security forces had been in the process of withdrawing from Suva Reka Municipality on 13 June 1999 was therefore merely a technical issue. 13.  The first applicant could not have lodged a further appeal on points of law (revizija), given that the amount of compensation claimed was below the statutory threshold. 14.  On 13 June 1999 the second applicant’s husband was kidnapped by the KLA in Suva Reka Municipality. 15.  On 24 June 2002 the Bujanovac Municipal Court declared the second applicant’s husband dead. This ruling became final by 16 July 2002. 16.  On 31 May 2005 the second applicant, together with her children and other family members, lodged a civil claim against the Republic of Serbia with the First Municipal Court in Belgrade, seeking compensation for mental anguish suffered as a consequence of the incident. 17.  On 19 May 2006 the said court ruled against the plaintiffs. 18.  On 3 April 2008 the first-instance judgment was upheld by the Belgrade District Court on appeal. 19.  In their reasoning the First Municipal Court and the District Court opined, inter alia, that while the second applicant’s husband had indeed been kidnapped on 13 June 1999 the Republic of Serbia could not be held liable within the meaning of Article 180 § 1 of the Obligations Act, since it was up to KFOR to provide for the safety of all citizens of Kosovo from 9 June 1999 onwards. The fact that national security forces had been in the process of withdrawing from Suva Reka Municipality on 13 June 1999 was therefore merely a technical issue. 20.  The second applicant could not have lodged a further appeal on points of law, given that the amount of compensation claimed was below the statutory threshold. 21.  The applicants maintained that in other judgments, rendered between 2006 and 2010, the Belgrade District Court and subsequently the Belgrade Appeals Court, as well as the Supreme Court at third instance, had ruled in favour of other plaintiffs, notwithstanding the fact that their claims were based on very similar facts and concerned identical legal issues. 22.  Given the case-law provided by the parties, in their reasoning in those judgments where the said courts/different benches of the same court had indeed ruled in favour of the plaintiffs, the Serbian authorities were deemed responsible for the lives and safety of all persons residing in Kosovo up until the actual transfer of effective control to KFOR in respect of each of the municipalities considered separately (see, for example, the judgment of the First Municipal Court in Belgrade P. 431/07 of 24 February 2009, upheld on appeal by the Belgrade District Court; the judgments of the Belgrade District Court Gž. 10832/06, 13799/06, and 11483/08 of 26 December 2006, 5 June 2007 and 14 October 2008 respectively; the judgments of the Belgrade Appeals Court Gž. 2005/10 and 605/10 of 17 March 2010 and 10 June 2010 respectively; and the judgments of the Supreme Court Rev. 1551/07, 1092/08 and 939/08 of 5 September 2007, 24 April 2008 and 7 May 2008 respectively). 23.  On 18 March 2008, according to the Government, the Supreme Court’s Civil Division endorsed this line of reasoning, specifically the reasons given in the same court’s ruling Rev. 1551/07 of 5 September 2007 (cited in paragraph 22 above). 24.  On 10 March 2010, in Rev. 1540/10, the Supreme Court of Cassation ruled against other plaintiffs on the same basis as in the applicants’ case, but in its decision Už. 2786/10 of 28 June 2012 the Constitutional Court quashed this ruling and ordered the re-examination of the matter. On 19 April 2013 the Supreme Court of Cassation apparently ruled in favour of the plaintiffs, this time holding that the Serbian authorities were responsible for the lives and safety of all persons residing in Kosovo until the actual transfer of effective control to KFOR in respect of the municipality in question. 25.  On 1 April 2014 the Supreme Court of Cassation adopted a detailed action plan aimed at ensuring the general harmonisation of case-law throughout the Serbian judicial system. This plan contained a series of measures to be undertaken at various levels of jurisdiction, and, inter alia, included the following: (i) the adoption of guiding legal opinions based on the principles developed in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights; (ii) the dissemination of such opinions; (iii) regular information sharing between the courts; (iv) an increased number of thematic discussions and training programmes; (v) the adoption of specific action plans by the courts at various levels; and (vi) the development of various IT tools and related intranet databases.


4.  The applicant, Leokadia Guzicka, is a Polish national, who was born in 1949 and lives in Kąty Wrocławskie, Poland. 5.  On 19 April 1994 the applicant brought a claim against her former employer, the “Perspektywa” Co-operative, to the Opole District Court (Sąd Rejonowy). She sought the annulment of the Co-operative Board’s resolution depriving her of her membership of the co-operative, and reinstatement. 6.  On 26 February 1997 the District Court found that it was not competent to deal with the claim and referred the case to the Opole Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki). 7.  On 22 June 1998, following the applicant’s complaint, the District Court sent the case-file to the Regional Court. 8.  The first hearing was set down for 18 September 1998. 9.  On 23 October, 23 November and 21 December 1998 the court held hearings. 10.  On 29 January 1999 the court allowed the applicant’s claim.