6.  The first applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Chelyabinsk. The second applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Moscow. 7.  On 10 January 1995 the first applicant was arrested on suspicion of having committed a criminal offence and remanded in custody. 8.  By a judgment of 23 June 1998 the applicant was convicted at first instance on a charge of murder and several counts of theft and fraud and sentenced to death. On 20 December 1999 his conviction was upheld on appeal, but the death sentence was commuted to fifteen years’ imprisonment. 9.  On the date of his latest correspondence with the Court, the first applicant was serving a sentence of imprisonment in penitentiary facility YuK-25/1 in Orenburg. 10.  On 20 January 1995 the second applicant was arrested on suspicion of having committed a criminal offence and remanded in custody. 11.  On 27 November 1995 the second applicant was convicted at first instance and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. The sentence was upheld on appeal on 19 June 1996. 12.  In another set of criminal proceedings, on 13 November 1998 the second applicant was convicted of murder, aggravated robbery, participation in an organised criminal group and resistance to police officers and sentenced to death. On 15 February 2000 his conviction was upheld on appeal, but the death sentence was commuted to fifteen years’ imprisonment, of which fourteen were to be served in prison and the last year in a correctional facility. 13.  On 23 April 2008 the second applicant was released from prison on parole. 14.  The first and second applicants were kept in pre-trial detention centres from 10 January 1995 to 20 December 1999 and from 20 January 1995 to 22 March 2000 respectively. During those periods the first applicant voted twice in parliamentary elections and the second applicant voted several times in parliamentary and presidential elections and in regional elections of an executive official. 15.  On an unspecified date the first applicant was transferred to a penitentiary facility to serve his prison sentence. Since that date he has been debarred, as a convicted prisoner, from participating in any elections pursuant to Article 32 § 3 of the Russian Constitution (“the Constitution”). 16.  On 22 March 2000 the second applicant was transferred to a prison to continue serving his sentence. From that date, and until his release from prison on 23 April 2008, the second applicant was debarred from voting in elections under the provisions of the aforementioned Article. 17.  In particular, the applicants were ineligible to vote in the elections of members of the State Duma – the lower chamber of the Russian parliament – held on 7 December 2003 and 2 December 2007 and in the presidential elections of 26 March 2000, 14 March 2004 and 2 March 2008. The second applicant was also unable to vote in additional parliamentary elections held in the electoral constituency of his home address on 5 December 2004. 18.  Both applicants challenged, at various times, the aforementioned constitutional provision before the Russian Constitutional Court (“the Constitutional Court”) stating that it violated a number of their constitutional rights. 19.  In letters of 15 March and 6 April 2004, sent to the first and second applicants respectively, the Secretariat of the Constitutional Court replied that the applicants’ complaints fell outside the Constitutional Court’s competence and therefore had no prospects of success. 20.  The second applicant appealed against that decision to the President of the Constitutional Court. 21.  By a decision of 27 May 2004 the Constitutional Court declined to accept the second applicant’s complaint for examination, stating that it had no jurisdiction to check whether certain constitutional provisions were compatible with others. 22.  On 19 July 2004 the Secretariat of the Constitutional Court forwarded the court’s decision to the second applicant. In a letter of 5 August 2004 a regional office of the Department of Execution of Sentences sent the Secretariat’s letter of 19 July 2004 to the second applicant’s prison. According to the second applicant, this correspondence, including the decision of 19 July 2004, was delivered to him on 1 September 2004. 23.  The second applicant then repeatedly brought court proceedings against election commissions at various levels complaining of their refusals to allow him to vote in parliamentary and presidential elections. His complaints were rejected either on formal grounds or on the merits. Final decisions were taken by the appellate courts on 1 December 2007 and 3 April, 5 May, 4 June and 29 September 2008. The domestic courts mainly referred to Article 32 § 3 of the Constitution and the fact that the second applicant was a convicted prisoner, and stated that the domestic law debarred him from voting in elections. In its decision of 1 December 2007 the Lipetsk Regional Court also held as follows:
“In the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights dated 6 October 2005 in the case of Hirst v. the United Kingdom the applicant’s disenfranchisement on account of his serving a sentence of imprisonment was found to be in breach of Article 3 of Protocol No 1 to the Convention.
The European Court noted in that judgment that prisoners in general continued to enjoy all the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed under the Convention save for the right to liberty, where lawfully imposed detention expressly falls within the scope of Article 5 of the Convention.
It was also pointed out that a blanket statutory disenfranchisement of all convicted prisoners in prisons (of the United Kingdom) applies automatically to such prisoners, irrespective of the length of their sentence and irrespective of the nature or gravity of their offence and their individual circumstances. Such a general, automatic and indiscriminate restriction on a vitally important Convention right must be seen as falling outside any acceptable margin of appreciation, however wide that margin might be, and as being incompatible with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.
... The Russian Federation accepts ... as binding the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights regarding questions of interpretation and application of the Convention and its Protocols in situations of alleged violations of those legal instruments by the Russian Federation where the alleged violation has taken place after their entry into force in respect of the Russian Federation.
However, the aforementioned judgment of the European Court does not allow a conclusion to be reached as to the unreasonableness of restrictions on electoral rights established in the legislation of the Russian Federation in respect of individuals serving a sentence of imprisonment after their conviction by a court.
Apart from the foregoing, the said judgment of the European Court provides that any restrictions on other rights of prisoners (save for the right to liberty) must be justified, although such justification may well be found in considerations of security, in particular the prevention of crime and disorder, which inevitably flow from the circumstances of imprisonment.
Also, it is noted that Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, which enshrines the individual’s capacity to influence the composition of the law-making power, does not therefore exclude that restrictions on electoral rights could be imposed on an individual who has, for example, seriously abused a public position or whose conduct threatened to undermine the rule of law or democratic foundations. The severe measure of disenfranchisement must not, however, be resorted to lightly and the principle of proportionality requires a discernible and sufficient link between the sanction and the conduct and circumstances of the individual concerned.
Therefore, without ruling out the very possibility of restricting electoral rights of convicted prisoners, the European Court attaches decisive weight to the proportionality and reasonableness of establishing this measure in law.
The criteria which the European Court has considered as decisive when determining a question of proportionality of, and justification for, limiting electoral rights of convicted prisoners – the nature and seriousness of their offence and their individual circumstances – were taken into account when [the second applicant’s] punishment was chosen, in accordance with provisions of the [Russian] legislation which were not analysed in the aforementioned judgment.
According to [a relevant provision] of the Russian Penitentiary Code, it is individuals convicted of particularly serious offences, or of particularly serious repeat offences, and sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding five years ... who serve their sentence in prison.
It should also be noted that, in accordance with Article 10 § 3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 December 1966, the penitentiary system must comprise treatment of prisoners the essential aim of which must be their reformation and social rehabilitation.
[A relevant provision] of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure also lists the reform of a convicted prisoner as one of the aims of punishment, together with the prevention of further crimes.
Therefore, taking into account the aforementioned criteria, [it can be concluded that] the temporary (for the period of imprisonment) restriction of the electoral rights established in the legislation of the Russian Federation in respect of individuals serving a sentence of imprisonment is, from its inception, reasonable, justified and in the public interest, being a preventive measure aimed at reforming convicted prisoners and deterring them from committing crimes and breaching public order in the future, including in the period when elections are held.
The same [reasoning] applies to the restriction of [the second applicant’s] electoral rights.” 24.  The second applicant also attempted to bring proceedings complaining of the refusal of the head of a local election commission to give him copies of certain documents. 25.  On 27 December 2007 the Lipetsk Regional Court returned the second applicant’s claim, stating that it should be lodged with a lower court. 26.  On 4 June 2008 the Supreme Court upheld the above decision on appeal. 27.  In his first letter to the Court dated 16 February 2004, and dispatched, as is clear from the postmark, on 17 February 2004, the first applicant described the circumstances of his case and complained about his disenfranchisement and inability to vote in a number of elections held in Russia. He later reproduced this in an application form of 30 April 2004, which was received by the Court on 23 June 2004. 28.  The second applicant complained about his disenfranchisement and inability to vote in elections in an application form which he dated 29 December 2004 and which, as is clear from the postmark, he sent on 27 February 2005. The Court received the application form on 30 March 2005. 29.  Subsequently, the applicants updated their applications referring to new elections in which they were still ineligible to vote.


6.  The first two applicants, Urszula and Czesław Grzelak, were born in 1969 and 1965 respectively. They are married and live in Sobótka. They are the parents of Mateusz Grzelak (“the third applicant”), who was born in 1991. The first two applicants are declared agnostics. 7.  The third applicant began his schooling in primary school no. 3 in Ostrów Wielkopolski in 1998 (at the age of seven). In conformity with the wishes of his parents he did not attend religious instruction. It appears that he was the only pupil in his class who opted out of that subject. Religious instruction was scheduled in the middle of the school day, between various compulsory courses. The school, despite the wish expressed by the first two applicants, did not offer their son an alternative class in ethics. It appears that when other pupils in his class were following religious instruction the applicants' son was either left without any supervision in the corridor or spent his time in the school library or in the school club. 8.  The Government, for their part, maintained that appropriate supervision had been provided for Mateusz Grzelak while religious instruction classes were in progress. The school had a general obligation of care and supervision towards all pupils who were on its premises at any time. 9.  According to the first two applicants, their son was subjected to discrimination and physical and psychological harassment by other pupils on account of the fact that he did not follow religious instruction. For that reason, in the course of the third year of primary school the applicants moved their son to primary school no. 9 and subsequently to primary school no. 11 in the same town. 10.  On 11 April 2001, when their son was in the third year of primary school, the applicants sent a letter to the headmistress of primary school no. 9 in Ostrów Wielkopolski. They drew her attention to the fact that their son had been ridiculed and harassed by other pupils in the class. They stated that their son was being discriminated against by the majority of his classmates because he did not attend religious education classes. The applicants requested the assistance of the school in resolving the issue. 11.  According to the Government, the applicants did not wait for a reply to their letter of 11 April 2001 and moved their son to primary school no. 11. In a letter of 26 June 2001 the headmistress of primary school no. 9 explained that Mateusz Grzelak had attended that school from 23 October 2000 to 19 April 2001. She noted that he had frequently provoked his colleagues by mocking religious symbols and children who attended religious instruction. The class tutor had informed Mr and Mrs Grzelak about their son's behaviour but they had not responded. The headmistress explained further that the school did not ask for a written declaration as to children's attendance at religious instruction. It sufficed for a parent who did not wish for his or her child to attend religious instruction to report that fact to the class tutor. 12.  The Government further maintained that Mr and Mrs Grzelak had requested primary school no. 11 to provide their son with a course in ethics. According to the Government, the headmistress of that school had contacted the Poznań Education Authority (kuratorium oświaty) to establish whether it was possible to provide such a course for an inter-school group. Since that was not possible owing to the lack of sufficient numbers of interested pupils and parents, the school proposed to the third applicant that he participate in alternative classes in the school club or school library. It appears that the applicants did not report any problems to the school concerning their son's education. 13.  On 1 May 2001 the applicants sent a letter to the Minister of Education, stating that since the beginning of their son's education they had encountered religious intolerance and that the school authorities had failed to react. They put a number of questions to the Minister concerning the Ordinance on the organisation of religious instruction in State schools (see relevant domestic law and practice below). In particular, the applicants raised the following matters in their letter: 3.  Why should children like the applicants' son pass their time unproductively in the school club while other children were attending religious instruction or when the schools were closed for Lent retreat? 4.  Did the fact that a child had a straight line instead of a mark for “religion/ethics” on a school report indicate that the Ordinance of 14 April 1992 of the Minister of Education on the organisation of religious instruction in State schools (“the Ordinance”) infringed the Education Act and human rights instruments? 14.  On 29 May 2001 the Ministry of Education replied to the applicants. In respect of the issues raised by the applicants it informed them as follows:
Re question 1: Religious instruction and courses in ethics were organised at the parents' request, and where a declaration to that effect was asked for, it was for organisational reasons only.
Re question 2: If only one pupil was interested in following a course in ethics, then the school authorities should enquire whether it would be possible to follow that course in an inter-school group. If in a given municipality there was no such group, then the school had to arrange for supervision of the pupil during the religious education class.
Re question 3: In the case referred to above the school should organise other activities for pupils not following religious instruction or supervise them adequately by allowing them to do their homework or to use the library, etc.
Re question 4: Paragraph 9 of the Ordinance regulated the manner in which marks for “religion/ethics” were entered in school reports. That provision had been interpreted by the Constitutional Court in its judgment of 20 April 1993 (see relevant domestic law and practice below). The Constitutional Court had noted that the inclusion of marks for “religion/ethics” in a school report was a consequence of providing courses in those subjects in State schools. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court observed that this rule did not breach the right to freedom of conscience and religion.
Re question 5: Discrimination against pupils on the ground of their not having attended religious instruction amounted to a breach of the Ordinance and should be reported to the relevant education authorities. 15.  The applicants also applied to the Ombudsman on 14 June 2001, alleging that in their son's case Articles 53 § 7 and 31 § 2 of the Constitution, Articles 9 and 14 of the Convention and various other provisions had been breached. The Ombudsman replied that he could not challenge the Ordinance again following the judgment of the Constitutional Court of 20 April 1993. The problems raised in their letter had more to do with the inappropriate behaviour of some teachers and pupils than the law itself. 16.  On 17 October 2001 the applicants sent a letter to the President of the Republic. They requested him to amend the Ordinance with a view to providing guarantees for non-religious children. On 6 November 2001 the President's Office requested the Ministry of Education to reply to the applicants' letter. 17.  On 10 December 2001 the Ministry of Education confirmed its position as set out in the letter of 29 May 2001. In addition to the issues already addressed, the Ministry replied to the applicants' complaint concerning the obligation to make a declaration as to whether the child would follow religious instruction. The Ministry informed the applicants that the school authorities could not require parents to make a “negative declaration”, that is, a declaration that their child would not follow religious instruction. Such a practice would contravene the provisions of the Ordinance and should be reported to the education authorities. The Ministry further informed the applicants that the parents' declaration could not be understood as a declaration concerning their beliefs. 18.  The applicants submitted that they had made repeated requests to the school authorities, asking for their son to be allowed to follow a course in ethics instead of religious instruction. However, none of the primary schools attended by their son had provided a course in ethics. The refusals had been based on the lack of suitable teachers, financial reasons and insufficient numbers of pupils interested in following a course in ethics. 19.  In September 2004 the third applicant began his secondary education. 20.  On 16 July 2009 Mr and Mrs Grzelak complained to the Poznań Education Authority (kuratorium oświaty) that their son had not been offered a course in ethics at Ostrów Wielkopolski secondary school no. 2. Their petition (skarga) was referred to the Ostrów District (powiat) which, as the authority responsible for the school, was competent in the matter. On 27 August 2009 the Council of the Ostrów District dismissed the petition as unfounded. It found that Mateusz Grzelak was the only student in all the schools run by the Ostrów District whose parents wished him to follow a class in ethics. Accordingly, the conditions for the provision of such a class, as set out in the Ordinance, had not been met.
School reports of the third applicant 21.  The school report of the third applicant for the first three years of primary school contained three subjects: behaviour (zachowanie), religion/ethics and general education. In the place reserved for a mark for “religion/ethics” the school report had a straight line. 22.  The school report for the fourth year contained a list of courses that the third applicant had followed, including “religion/ethics”. Once again, there was a straight line against the subject “religion/ethics”. 23.  In the school report for the fifth year in respect of the subject “religion/ethics” there was a straight line and the word ethics was crossed out. A similar situation applied to the primary school leaving certificate which the third applicant obtained in June 2004. 24.  In September 2004 the third applicant began his secondary education in lower secondary school (gimnazjum) no. 4 in Ostrów Wielkopolski. His school reports for the first two years at that school and the leaving certificate of June 2007 had a straight line in the space for “religion/ethics”. 25.  In September 2007 the third applicant began studying at Ostrów Wielkopolski secondary school no. 2 (liceum). On 4 September 2007 his parents requested the school to allow him to take a class in ethics, but it appears that no such class was organised. The school reports for the first and second year in that school had a straight line in the space for the subject “religion/ethics”. The third applicant failed German language in the second year of the liceum and from the school year 2009/2010 he moved to the Ostrów Wielkopolski vocational secondary school.


5.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Baku. 6.  The applicant stood for the elections to the Milli Majlis (Parliament) of 6 November 2005 as a candidate of the opposition bloc Azadliq, a coalition formed for electoral purposes by the Popular Front Party of Azerbaijan, with which the applicant was affiliated, together with a number of other opposition parties. He was registered as a candidate by the Constituency Electoral Commission (“the ConEC”) for the single-mandate Barda City Electoral Constituency no. 93. 7.  The constituency was divided into forty-two electoral precincts, with one polling station in each precinct. There were a total of eighteen candidates running for election in this constituency. The applicant was the only candidate nominated by Azadliq in that constituency. 8.  According to the ConEC protocol drawn up after election day, one of the applicant's opponents, Z.O., a member of the Motherland Party, obtained the highest number of votes cast in the constituency. Specifically, according to the ConEC protocol, Z.O. received 5,816 votes (41.25%), the applicant received 2,001 votes (14.19%), and a third candidate received 1,821 votes (12.92%). The total number of votes cast for each of the remaining candidates was substantially lower. 9.  On 7 and 8 November 2005 the applicant submitted identical complaints to the ConEC and the Central Electoral Commission (“the CEC”), in which he claimed, inter alia, that:
(i)  the local executive and municipal authorities, as well as heads of state‑funded institutions and organisations, interfered in the election process in favour of Z.O. prior to and during election day (in the form of openly campaigning in his favour and coercing voters to vote for him);
(ii)  Z.O.'s supporters (mostly State officials of various sorts) intimidated voters and otherwise attempted to influence voter choice in polling stations;
(iii)  in several polling stations, observers were harassed or excluded from the voting area by the police;
(iv)  some citizens residing in relevant election precincts were unable to exercise their right to vote due to the authorities' failure to include them in relevant voters lists; and
(v)  there were instances of multiple voting and ballot-box stuffing in different polling stations. 10.  In support of his claims, the applicant submitted to the CEC originals of more than 30 affidavits (akt) of election observers, audio tapes and other evidence documenting specific instances of irregularities complained of. Some examples of the evidence presented are summarised below. 11.  The ten-minute audio recording contained interviews with a number of unidentified voters, who stated, inter alia, that prior to election day directors of governmental institutions and public organisations (such as public schools and libraries) located on the territory of the constituency had held staff meetings with the specific purpose of instructing their staff to vote for Z.O., threatening them with salary cuts if Z.O. did not win the election. 12.  In an affidavit signed by them, seven observers in Polling Station no. 1 stated, inter alia, that twenty-five voters had voted twice, however the chairman of the Precinct Electoral Commission (“the PEC”) for this polling station had taken no action when this matter was brought to his attention. 13.  Seven observers in Polling Station no. 11 noted, inter alia, that the director of a public school where the polling station was located had openly intervened in the election process and interfered with the functions of the PEC without any objection by PEC members. Also, the same school director instructed a police officer to forcibly exclude one of the observers from the polling station. 14.  Three observers in Polling Station no. 14 noted, inter alia, that a certain named State official had actively interfered in the election process by openly campaigning in favour of Z.O. on the premises of the polling station, asked voters to vote for him and brought groups of unregistered voters to the polling station to vote for Z.O. 15.  Eight observers in Polling Station no. 16 witnessed one incident of ballot-box stuffing by a PEC member. 16.  An affidavit signed by six observers and candidates' representatives in Polling Station no. 31 stated that, at 7 p.m., when the vote-counting began, all of the observers had been forced out of the polling station premises by the police on the instruction of the PEC chairman. In the absence of the observers, a few hundred false ballots were illegally added into Z.O.'s total vote count in the polling station. According to a separate affidavit signed by observers from the same polling station, the PEC chairman and representatives of the executive and municipal authorities interfered in the election process and instructed voters to vote for Z.O. According to another affidavit, there were also several irregularities in the voter lists in this polling station. 17.  Three observers in Polling Station no. 41 noted, inter alia, that commission members had illegally added several additional ballots during the vote-counting. 18.  In their affidavits, observers from Polling Stations nos. 7, 12, 13, 15, 29, 30 and 37 documented similar incidents of alleged illegal campaigning in favour of Z.O., ballot-box stuffing and other forms of tampering with ballots, and irregularities with voter lists. A number of observers also noted that voting booths in some polling stations were of inadequate standard. 19.  According to the applicant, neither the ConEC nor the CEC replied to his complaints. 20.  According to the Government, the applicant's complaint was examined by the ConEC. As it appears from the documents submitted by the Government, following receipt of the applicant's complaint, the ConEC demanded explanations from the chairmen and members of the relevant PECs in connection with the applicant's allegations. In reply, about twenty PEC chairmen and members submitted brief handwritten statements (some of them as short as one or two sentences), or “explanatory notes” (“izahat”), all signed on 21 November 2005. All these notes stated in general terms that the election process in their respective polling stations had gone smoothly and without any irregularities, undue pressure on voters or any other breaches of the electoral law, and that any allegations by the applicant to the contrary were false. 21.  On 23 November 2005 the ConEC rejected the applicant's complaint. Without any elaboration on details of the applicant's specific allegations, it decided that they were unsubstantiated. At the same time, however, the ConEC confirmed that the condition of the voting booths in Polling Station no. 37 and “some other” (unidentified) polling stations had been poor. This finding did not entail any consequences for the official election results in those polling stations or in the constituency as a whole. 22.  On the same day, 23 November 2005, the CEC issued its final protocol approving the overall election results in the country (with the exception of a few electoral constituencies) and submitted it, together with relevant documents, to the Constitutional Court for review and approval of the election results. The election results for Barda City Electoral Constituency no. 93 were among those approved by the CEC, confirming Z.O. as the winner in this constituency. 23.  According to the country-wide results, the ruling Yeni Azerbaijan Party again won the majority of seats in the Milli Majlis. 24.  On 25 November 2005 the applicant lodged an action with the Court of Appeal, asking the court to invalidate the CEC's final protocol in the part relating to the election results in Barda City Electoral Constituency no. 93. In addition to restating all of his complaints made previously to the electoral commissions, he also complained of specific instances of discrepancies and inconsistencies in the PEC protocols which served as a basis for compiling the election results in the constituency as a whole. In particular, he noted a significant discrepancy in the PEC protocol for Polling Station no. 11, in which certain numbers did not add up correctly. As a result, more than 700 blank ballots out of more than 1,000 blank ballots originally issued to the PEC appeared to be “missing” (the protocol indicated that 313 persons had voted in that polling station, but only eleven of the remaining blank ballots were indicated as “unused” and formally “cancelled”, with no explanation as to what happened to the remaining more than 700 blank ballots). The same was the case with the PEC protocol for Polling Station no. 13, where more than 600 blank ballots were unaccounted for. Similar discrepancies were also allegedly found in PEC protocols for five other polling stations. The applicant claimed that these “missing” blank ballots had been sneaked out and illegally used for ballot-box stuffing in favour of Z.O. in various other polling stations. 25.  The applicant argued that, due to all these irregularities, it was not possible to determine the true opinion of the voters in his constituency. He also complained that the CEC had failed to examine his complaint of 7 November 2005. In support of his claims, the applicant submitted copies of the same evidence previously submitted to the CEC, including photocopies of the observers' affidavits and copies of audio material. 26.  On 28 November 2005 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's claims as unsubstantiated. The court did not consider the photocopies of the affidavits as admissible evidence, noting that in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure (“the CCP”) either the originals or notarised copies of those affidavits should have been submitted. Specifically, most of the reasoning contained in the Court of Appeal's judgment was limited to the following:
“According to Article 14.2 of the CCP ..., the court shall examine and rely on only the evidence submitted by the parties.
According to Article 77.1 of the same Code, each party must prove any allegations which it makes in support of its claims and objections.
Based on the material in the case file and the parties' submissions, [the applicant's] claim against [the CEC] ... cannot be upheld. The alleged incidents concerning Barda City Electoral Constituency no. 93, as described in the claim, did not take place. Documents attached to the claim are photocopies and no originals or notarised copies of documents have been submitted. [As such,] affidavits attached to the claim cannot be admitted as evidence. On the other hand, the alleged omission of a significant number of voters from voting lists has not been proved by the material in the case file.
In such circumstances, the court considers that [the applicant's] claim against [the CEC] ... must be dismissed.” 27.  On 30 November 2005 the applicant lodged a further appeal with the Supreme Court, reiterating his claims. He also noted that he had submitted the originals of the documentary evidence to the CEC on 7 November 2005 and argued that the Court of Appeal had failed to take this fact into account. 28.  On 1 December 2005 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's appeal on the same grounds as the Court of Appeal's judgment of 28 November 2005. As to the originals of the documentary evidence allegedly submitted to the CEC, the Supreme Court noted that the applicant had failed to submit any evidence proving that he had ever applied to the CEC with a complaint. The reasoning in the Supreme Court's decision was as follows:
“According to Article 77.1 of the CCP ..., each party must prove any allegations which it makes in support of its claims and objections.
[The applicant] has not presented any convincing evidence capable of proving the allegations forming the basis of his claim. The photocopies of affidavits attached to his claim were not admitted as convincing evidence by the Court of Appeal in a lawful and justified manner, as they had not been notarised.
Moreover, the case materials contain no documents confirming that the applicant had applied to the electoral commissions under the procedure specified in Article 112 of the Electoral Code.
Although at the oral hearing the applicant claimed that he had submitted the originals of the affidavits to the CEC, he has not submitted to the court any evidence showing that he had [actually] applied to the CEC.
However, according to Articles 89 and 90 of the CCP ..., originals or duly certified copies of evidence should be submitted to courts. The applicant has not complied with this rule.
According to Article 416 of the CCP ..., the court of cassation instance verifies whether the court of appellate instance has correctly applied substantive and procedural law.
The court considers that the Court of Appeal has correctly applied the relevant law and correctly reached the conclusion that the claim was unsubstantiated. There is no ground for quashing the [Court of Appeal's] judgment.” 29.  On the same day, 1 December 2005, the Constitutional Court confirmed the election results in the majority of the electoral constituencies, including Barda City Electoral Constituency no. 93.


5.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Cardiff. 6.  The applicant is a gypsy. In 1999 she moved to the Cae Garw caravan site in Port Talbot, Wales, with her two children. The site was owned by Neath Port Talbot County Borough Council. 7.  On 12 June 2000 Neath Port Talbot County Borough Council entered into a licence agreement with the Gypsy Council which provided that the latter would manage the site. 8.  On 29 March 2004 the applicant entered into a licence agreement with the Gypsy Council to occupy pitch 16 on the site. It was a condition of the licence that:
“The Licensee or his/her resident family ... must not create a nuisance on the sites or to neighbouring properties. The Licensee shall be held responsible if any ... person living with ... her contravenes any of these Site Rules or Conditions.” 9.  On 30 December 2004 the Gypsy Council issued a notice of termination of licence to the applicant which expired on 6 February 2005. The notice referred to a clause of her licence agreement which provided:
“The Gypsy Council or the Licensee may terminate this licence by giving the other not less than 28 days written notice to expire on a Sunday in any week.” 10.  No further reasons justifying the termination were given. 11.  Notices to quit were also given to her parents, who occupied a different pitch on the site. 12.  On 18 January 2005 amendments to section 4 of the Caravan Sites Act 1968 (“the 1968 Act”) entered into force which introduced the possibility for possession orders to be suspended by a court on the application of the occupier for up to twelve months at a time (see paragraph 36 below). 13.  On 2 August 2005 the Gypsy Council issued a claim for possession against the applicant and five members of her extended family, including her parents, in Neath Port Talbot County Court. In its particulars of claim, the Gypsy Council alleged that all six defendants were guilty of causing very substantial nuisance to the site to the detriment of other occupiers. 14.  The applicant’s parents did not apply for suspension or postponement of the orders. On 1 June 2006, possession orders were made against them by consent. 15.  An oral hearing took place between 24 and 26 July 2006 in Swansea County Court and 28 July 2006 in Neath County Court in respect of the claim for possession against the applicant. In a witness statement lodged prior to the hearing, the applicant indicated that she intended to leave the site when her parents left. 16.  On 25 July 2006 Judge Bidder QC gave a judgment on the preliminary issue of whether the applicant could challenge the making of a possession order in her case. He considered himself bound by the decision of the House of Lords in Kay and Price (see paragraph 42 below), which had examined the effect of this Court’s judgment in Connors v. the United Kingdom, no. 66746/01, 27 May 2004. Thus, he concluded, the only options open to the applicant were to challenge the domestic law itself or to commence judicial review proceedings based on conventional grounds. He concluded:
“58. ... I do not consider it to be arguable that the decision of the claimants to seek possession against her was unreasonable or that their decision to invoke their domestic law rights could be castigated as unreasonable ... 59. Moreover, the fact that parliament has amended the applicable domestic legislation to afford the gypsy occupier the opportunity to contend that any possession order should be suspended for 12 months at a time distinguishes that case from Connors, and given that that amendment was considered in Kay and Price I find it impossible to say ... that there is a seriously arguable point raised that the law which enables the court to make the possession order is incompatible with article 8 ...” 17.  He invited submissions from the applicant as to the possible temporary suspension of any possession order. He added:
“71. I should say that on the issue of suspension of the ... order against the [applicant] of possession I would invite the parties to consider the date of 4th November 2006 being the date on which the [applicant’s] parents are required to leave and on which she indicates that she would leave anyway ...” 18.  On 28 July 2006, following the applicant’s submissions that any possession order against her should be suspended, the judge handed down his judgment on the remaining issues. Having reviewed the allegations made against the applicant by the claimant, the judge concluded:
“27. ... I am not satisfied that Maria Buckland has herself been guilty of any offensive behaviour on site, or of any breach of licence, apart from the relatively minor failure to pay the water charges.” 19.  He was, however, satisfied that her son, who resided part of the time with her, had been involved in an incident on site in which he threatened someone with a gun, although it was not clear whether the gun had been real or merely an imitation; and had dumped garden refuse on the site. 20.  Turning to consider whether the applicant’s personal circumstances, and those of her son, justified a suspension of the possession order which he would be making in her case the judge noted:
“32. In relation to Maria Buckland, while I am obliged to make a possession order, I find her only breach of site conditions has been recent and is a very modest failure to pay water charges. She has indicated in a recent statement that she intends to move from the site when [her parents] leave, that is on or before 4pm on 24th November. I do consider it appropriate to suspend enforcement of the possession order against her until the same time and date. However, I am clear that the behaviour of [her son] on this site and his attitude towards the Farrows [the family of the site manager] is such that I have to impose conditions on her continued possession, as sought in the draft order – [her son] lives half his time with his father, and I have no doubt that if he cannot live with his mother, he will be able to live with his father ...” 21.  He made an order for possession against the applicant, which he suspended until 24 November 2006 upon the condition that her son leave the site and that she discharge the GBP 95 arrears of water charges at the rate of GBP 5 per week. 22.  On 18 April 2007 the applicant, who was still resident at the site, was granted permission to appeal the possession order to the Court of Appeal. A stay of execution of the order of 28 July 2006 was also ordered. 23.  In November 2007 a bill which would amend the Mobile Homes Act 1983 (“the 1983 Act”) was introduced to Parliament. The effect of the proposed amendment was to allow a defendant in possession proceedings such as the applicant to challenge before the County Court the reasonableness of making a possession order. 24.  On 12 December 2007 the applicant’s appeal was dismissed. Considering the impact of the amendment to the 1968 Act to allow suspension of a possession order on whether the applicant could succeed in a conventional public law challenge to the decision to seek a possession order, Lord Justice Dyson noted:
“42. The significance of the amendment is that a claimant’s decision to seek possession does not involve summary eviction without judicial scrutiny of the justification of the claim to possession. By issuing proceedings, the claimant submits to the jurisdiction of the court, which has power to investigate all the circumstances of the case, including the claimant’s complaints about the defendant’s behaviour.” 25.  He continued:
“43. ... It may be that, for the reasons given by Lord Brown [in Kay], a public law defence could have been raised successfully in Connors. I would suggest that this is not so much because the family had been in occupation for a great length of time, but rather because it was unreasonable and grossly unfair for the local authority to seek a possession order and obtain the eviction of the occupier merely on the basis of a termination of the licence ‘without the need to make good any underlying reason for taking such precipitate action’. The real difference between the present case and Connors is not that the appellant had been in occupation for a shorter period than was the family in Connors ... On any view, the site was her home and had been for a substantial period of time. The fact that she had not been in occupation for as long as the family in Connors is not, in my judgment, of much significance. The real difference between the two cases is that in Connors, once the licence had been terminated, the authority was entitled to an order for possession whose enforcement could not be suspended by the court.” 26.  He concluded that since the amendment to the 1968 Act, it was difficult to conceive of a case in which a public law defence would succeed. Referring also to the fact that Judge Bidder had made a finding of misconduct on the site by the applicant’s son, for whose behaviour she was responsible under the terms of the licence, Dyson LJ considered that the judge was right to hold that the public law defence was not seriously arguable. 27.  Dyson LJ further noted that the factual situation of Connors was not materially different from the present case in that in both cases the defendant had occupied a site as a home for a number of years. Further, in both cases the claimant had validly and properly terminated the defendant’s licence to occupy so that the defendant had become a trespasser; the claimant was entitled to an order for possession as the owner of the land; and no further justification was required to seek an order for possession. However, it was agreed by the parties that it was not necessary to decide whether the present case could be distinguished from Connors as the distinction was only relevant for any appeal before the House of Lords. 28.  Finally, in respect of the applicant’s argument that the amendment to section 4 of the 1968 Act did not remedy the incompatibility with Article 8, Dyson LJ emphasised that, in principle, a wide margin of appreciation was left to the national authorities in such matters. However, he accepted that the vulnerable position of gypsies as a minority meant that “some special consideration should be given to their needs and different lifestyle both in the relevant regulatory framework and in reaching decisions in particular cases” (citing Connors, § 83). He found that the main reason for the narrowing of the margin of appreciation in Connors itself was that the complete absence of any procedural safeguards was a serious interference with the applicant’s Article 8 rights in that case, which called for particularly weighty reasons of public interest in justification. However, the precise scope of these safeguards was in his view, a matter for the national authorities to determine. He considered that provided that a reasonable degree of protection was afforded by the domestic law, the Strasbourg Court would not interfere, even if a greater degree of protection could have been afforded. He accordingly rejected the applicant’s submissions, noting:
“60. The objectionable feature of the legal regime in place before the amendment was that the court was bound not merely to make an order for possession, but to order the eviction of an occupant such as the appellant provided that the 4 weeks’ notice was given. Absent a public law challenge, the occupant had no opportunity to challenge the reasons given by the local authority for seeking possession and the court had no jurisdiction to take the reasons into account in deciding whether to order the occupant’s eviction. The local authority’s reasons were irrelevant as were the occupant’s personal circumstances. Nor did the court have power to suspend an order for possession even in circumstances of extreme hardship which indicated that eviction would not be justified under article 8(2). In short, there was no opportunity for the court to make any assessment of the justification for eviction in order to determine whether the interference with an occupier’s rights under article 8(1) was justified on an application of article 8(2). Provided that the relevant formal requirements had been satisfied, the role of the court was purely mechanistic. 61. The amendment has introduced procedural protections which ensure that the role of the court is no longer a mechanistic one even when a local authority seeks to evict a licensee from a caravan site. Summary eviction has been replaced by judicial examination. Section 4(1) now provides that the enforcement of a possession order may be suspended for such period up to 12 months ‘as the court thinks reasonable’. The court has a wide discretion under subsection (2) to impose conditions when making an order for suspension. By subsection (3), the court may extend the suspension of the possession order for up to 12 months at a time. Subsection (4) requires the court to have regard to ‘all the circumstances’ in deciding whether to exercise its power to suspend. The court is, therefore, required to conduct an examination of all the circumstances of the case ...” 29.  He concluded:
“63. In my judgment, the decision to provide the procedural safeguards introduced by the amendment of section 4 of the 1968 Act was within the margin of appreciation available to the United Kingdom. More generous safeguards could have been introduced (and they will be when the 1983 Act is amended). But the amendment goes far enough to meet the real thrust of the criticisms made in Connors.” 30.  As to the applicant’s argument that the legislation discriminated against gypsies, Dyson LJ found that although the discrimination point was one of the features of the Court’s reasoning in Connors, it was not the main reason for the decision. Even if that was wrong, Dyson LJ considered that by addressing the lack of procedural safeguards for gypsies of local authority sites, the amendment had also gone a long way to meeting the discrimination point. While discrimination would not be cured completely until the 1983 Act was amended, it had been much mitigated. Thus to the extent that the discrimination persisted, the decision not to eliminate it altogether fell within the margin of appreciation accorded to the contracting States. 31.  On 18 February 2008 the House of Lords refused the applicant’s request for permission to appeal. 32.  In May 2008 the applicant left Cae Garw caravan site for alternative accommodation on land owned by her brother. She claims that her departure was the result of the refusal of leave to appeal and in the face of further threats of eviction The land owned by her brother has no planning permission for residential use and its occupants, which include the applicant’s brother, his six children and the applicants’ parents, share minimal facilities, namely one toilet and one sink with cold running water in a shed with no lighting.


4.  The applicants were born in 1944 and 1932 respectively and live in Bjelovar. 5.  On 1 March 1992 the applicants’ house in Bjelovar was blown up by unknown perpetrators. 6.  On 1 March 1994 the applicants brought a civil action against the State in the Zagreb Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zagrebu) seeking damages. They relied on section 180 of the Civil Obligations Act. 7.  On 3 February 1996 the Amendment to the Civil Obligations Act (“the 1996 Amendment”) entered into force. It provided that all proceedings concerning actions for damages resulting from terrorist acts or acts of violence were to be stayed pending the enactment of new legislation on the subject. 8.  On 7 June 1999 the Zagreb Municipal Court stayed the proceedings pursuant to the 1996 Amendment. 9.  On 31 July 2003 the Act on Liability for Damage Resulting from Terrorist Acts and Public Demonstrations (“the 2003 Liability Act”) entered into force. 10.  Pursuant to the 2003 Liability Act, on 14 January 2004 the Municipal Court resumed the proceedings. 11.  Meanwhile, on 21 May 2002 the applicants lodged a constitutional complaint about the length of proceedings under section 63 of the Constitutional Court Act. On 7 July 2004 the Constitutional Court accepted the applicants’ complaint. Relying on the Court’s case law (Kutić v. Croatia, no. 48778/99, ECHR 2002‑II), it found violations of their constitutional rights to a hearing within a reasonable time and of access to a court. It ordered the Zagreb Municipal Court to give a decision in the applicants’ case within a year and awarded them compensation in the amount of 4,400 Croatian kunas (HRK) each. 12.  On 11 March 2004 the Zagreb Municipal Court declared the applicants’ action inadmissible finding that it no longer had jurisdiction in the matter. 13.  The applicants appealed to the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu). It would appear that the proceedings are currently pending before that court.


4.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Yerevan. 5.  On 23 September 2005, at 5.50 p.m., the applicant was taken into custody on suspicion of attempted murder. 6.  On 26 September 2005 formal charges were brought against the applicant. 7.  On the same date the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan (Երևան քաղաքի Կենտրոն և Նորք-Մարաշ համայնքների աոաջին ատյանի դատարան) granted the investigator’s relevant motion and ordered the applicant’s detention on remand for a period of two months, to be calculated from 23 September 2005. 8.  On 14 November 2005 the investigator filed a motion with the District Court, seeking to have the applicant’s detention on remand prolonged for another two months. 9.  On 22 November 2005 the District Court examined and dismissed this motion. This decision was subject to appeal. 10.  On 23 November 2005 at around 11 a.m. a copy of this decision was presented by the applicant’s lawyer to the Chief of the Yerevan-Kentron Detention Facility («Երևան-Կենտրոն» քրեակատարողական հիմնարկի պետ) where the applicant was held. 11.  On the same date the prosecutor lodged an appeal against the above decision. 12.  Later that day at 5.30 p.m. the Criminal and Military Court of Appeal (ՀՀ քրեական և զինվորական գործերով վերաքննիչ դատարան) commenced the examination of the prosecutor’s appeal. The applicant was escorted to the hearing by four national security officers in an official car. 13.  At 5.45 p.m. the applicant’s lawyer arrived and requested a ten-minute recess to be able to consult with the applicant. The Government alleged that the lawyer was deliberately late for the hearing, while the applicant claimed that her lawyer was informed by telephone about this hearing only at 5.30 p.m. 14.  At 5.50 p.m. the applicant’s detention period authorised by the decision of 26 September 2005 expired. 15.  Following the recess, the lawyer challenged the impartiality of the bench. He first alleged that the court had not given the applicant sufficient time to prepare her defence and also failed to ensure equality of arms. Furthermore, there were four national security officers in the court building who prevented the applicant, who was formally already at liberty, from going out of the building. Thus, the fact that such things were happening in the building of the Court of Appeal suggested that the outcome of the proceedings was already pre-determined. 16.  The court departed to the deliberation room to examine this challenge, after which it returned and announced its decision dismissing it. 17.  Thereafter another twenty-minute recess was announced by the court for the defence to be able to familiarise itself with the prosecutor’s appeal and the materials of the case. During the recess an ambulance was called because the applicant felt unwell. Her blood pressure rose to 180/100 but no injections could be administered as she was allergic, so the doctor recommended adjourning the hearing. 18.  The hearing resumed at 8.03 p.m. The applicant’s lawyer requested the adjournment of the hearing in view of the deterioration of the applicant’s health and in order for him to be able to familiarise himself with the prosecutor’s appeal in adequate conditions. The court granted this request and adjourned the hearing until 1 p.m. on 24 November 2005. 19.  The court hearing was over at around 8.30 p.m. 20.  The applicant alleged and the Government did not dispute that during the entire court hearing she was monitored by four national security officers and was not allowed to move freely, to leave the courtroom during the breaks or to go home. After the court hearing was over, she was forcibly taken by these officers and pushed into the same car and taken back to the Yerevan-Kentron Detention Facility. This was done after one of the officers had a private consultation and received instructions from the presiding judge in the deliberation room. 21.  On 24 November 2005 at 1 p.m. the Court of Appeal resumed the examination of the prosecutor’s appeal. The applicant was not present at this hearing. 22.  The applicant’s lawyers again challenged the impartiality of the bench, alleging that the court had manifested a biased attitude. In particular, the court summoned a hearing on the prosecutor’s appeal immediately before the expiry of the applicant’s detention period. Furthermore, the court did not release the applicant despite the fact that her detention had not been prolonged. Finally, after the hearing was over, the presiding judge departed to the deliberation room where he had a consultation with a national security officer, as a result of which it was decided to keep the applicant in detention. Thereafter she was transported to a national security isolation cell. The lawyers claimed that all the above suggested that the Court of Appeal was not impartial. 23.  The court examined and dismissed this challenge. 24.  Thereafter, one of the applicant’s lawyers made a declaration stating that, following the court hearing of 23 November 2005, the applicant had been taken away by national security officers in an unknown direction, despite the fact that she was already free by virtue of the law. The lawyers refused to participate in the hearing in such circumstances and left the courtroom. 25.  The Court of Appeal examined the prosecutor’s appeal in their absence and decided to quash the decision of the District Court of 22 November 2005 and to prolong the applicant’s detention on remand for another two months. 26.  On 28 November 2005 one of the applicant’s lawyers addressed a letter to the Chief of the Yerevan-Kentron Detention Facility, complaining:
“... You ..., as the chief of administration of the detention facility where [the applicant] is kept, at 5.45 p.m. on 23 November 2005 not only did not release her, but had her escorted to court by four officers in an official car having State licence no. 150 SS 02, during the entire [court hearing] you monitored her actions until 8.30 p.m. on [that date], forbidding her to move freely, and at around 8.30-8.45, with the assistance of the same officers, you forcibly (holding her arms, pushing her) placed her in the above car and transported her to the Yerevan-Kentron Detention Facility where you received her, according to the information at our disposal, without a relevant court decision. In that period (between 9 p.m. and 11 p.m.) the defence called you on numerous occasions and you stated that you would keep [the applicant] until the court hearing scheduled for 1 p.m. on the next day was over...” 27.  On 5 December 2005 the applicant’s lawyers lodged an appeal on points of law against the Court of Appeal’s decision. In their appeal, they again complained about the fact that the applicant had not been released from custody on 23 November 2005. 28.  On 8 December 2005 the applicant’s lawyers made a similar declaration addressed to the Prosecutor General. 29.  By a letter of 9 December 2005 the Court of Cassation (ՀՀ վճռաբեկ դատարան) returned the appeal since it was no longer competent to examine it following the constitutional amendments.


5.  The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Willstät, Germany. 6.  The applicant was a minority shareholder in Sokolovská uhelná, a.s. (“the company”), a joint-stock company incorporated under Czech law. 7.  On 4 May 2005 the general meeting of the company adopted, by a vote of the main shareholder, a resolution on the winding up of the company and the transfer of all its assets to the main shareholder. 8.  On 25 June 2005 the applicant lodged with the Plzeň Regional Court (krajský soud) an action to have the resolution set aside, asserting that it had been adopted contrary to applicable law, bilateral investment treaties and her property rights. She also asserted that the law on which the resolution had been based was itself unconstitutional. At the same time, she informed the court administering the Companies Register (obchodní rejstřík) about her action and asked it not to allow the entry in the register of the winding up of the company and the transfer of all its assets to the main shareholder until the legality of the resolution had been decided by the Regional Court. These set-aside proceedings are still pending. 9.  The applicant received cash compensation based on the value of her shares as at 31 December 2001. The amount of compensation was based on an evaluation made by an expert appointed by a court on the proposal of the main shareholder. 10.  On 30 June 2005 the court in charge of the Companies Register approved the registration of the transfer and the deletion of the company from the Companies Register. No hearing was held prior to that decision, which was not served on the applicant as she did not have standing to participate in the proceedings. 11.  On 11 July 2005 the Prague High Court (vrchní soud) rejected the applicant's appeal contesting the above-mentioned decision. It ruled that since the applicant did not have standing to take part in the impugned proceedings, she was not entitled to appeal their outcome. 12.  On 11 May 2006 the Constitutional Court (Ústavní soud) rejected the applicant's constitutional appeal, in which she claimed an impairment of her right to a fair trial and the right to property in relation to the companies register proceedings on the basis that (i) she had not been allowed to be a party to those proceedings as a result of the application of Article 220h(4) of the Commercial Code and (ii) that this had created an irreversible situation. The Constitutional Court rejected the appeal as manifestly ill-founded, holding that the Commercial Code had not impaired her right of access to court because, apart from the companies register proceedings, there were other proceedings available to the applicant in which she could have asserted her rights. It further held that the applicant's claims that such other proceedings would not guarantee adequate protection of her rights could not be reviewed, because the present appeal had been directed only against the decisions in the companies register proceedings.


6.  The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Gdańsk. 7.  On 16 May 2005 the applicant was arrested. 8.  On 17 May 2005 he was charged with having assisted in counterfeiting a secondary education diploma (udzielenie pomocy w podrobieniu świadectwa maturalnego). The applicant was released on the same day, after having paid a bail of 6,000 Polish zlotys (PLN). 9.  On 30 August 2005 a bill of indictment against the applicant and two other persons was lodged with the Gdańsk District Court (Sąd Rejonowy). 10. On an unspecified date, one of the co-accused, A.D., requested the court to sentence her without carrying out the whole proceedings and her case was severed for separate examination. A judgment against A.D. was given on 5 October 2005. 11. A first hearing, scheduled on 30 November 2005, was adjourned. No reasons for this decision were provided. 12.  The trial started on 22 December 2005. 13.  On one occasion a hearing was adjourned, as the applicant’s co‑accused failed to appear. 14.  Two hearings were adjourned, as the applicant and his co-accused have not been transferred to the court from prison. 15.  On five occasions the applicant’s lawyer failed to attend the hearings. It appears that on two of those occasions he has not been properly summoned. 16.  Two hearings, scheduled on 9 October and 6 November 2007, were adjourned, as the case-file concerning another set of criminal proceedings has not been delivered to the trial court. 17.  Two hearings, scheduled on 11 December 2007 and 18 January 2008, were adjourned, without any reasons being provided. 18.  A hearing scheduled on 27 February 2008 was cancelled due to the judge-rapporteur’s illness. 19.  On 11 April 2008 the District Prosecutor (Prokurator Prokuratury Rejonowej) requested the trial court to exclude judge J.M., to whom the applicant’s case was assigned, from the proceedings. The prosecutor relied on the fact that J.M. had given a judgment against A.D. and that, according to the recent case-law of the Supreme Court, in circumstances like those of the present case, the same judge could not examine a case against several co-accused on the basis of the same evidentiary material. 20.  On 21 April 2008 the Gdańsk District Court granted the prosecutor’s request and excluded J.M. from the proceedings. The trial has recommenced. 21.  On 9 October 2008 the Gdańs Distirct Court quashed the preventive measure imposed on the applicant (see paragraph 8 above). The amount paid as bail was returned to the applicant. 22.  The proceedings are still pending before the first-instance court. 23.  On 10 April 2008 the applicant lodged a complaint about a breach of his right to a trial within a reasonable time with respect to the first set of criminal proceedings against him. He relied on the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaints about a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time (Ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki) (“the 2004 Act”). The applicant sought PLN 10,000 in just-satisfaction. 24.  On 1 July 2008 the Gdańsk Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) acknowledged that the proceedings have indeed been lengthy and awarded PLN 1,000 to the applicant. It underlined that the trial court has failed to ensure that the hearings were adequately prepared and organised. It also noted that the applicant’s lawyer has partly contributed to the overall length of the proceedings. In that respect the trial court was criticised for not having taken disciplinary measures against the applicant’s lawyer at an earlier stage of the proceedings, by informing the Gdańsk Regional Bar about the advocate’s failure to perform his duties. 25.  On 21 November 2006 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of drug trafficking. 26.  On 22 November 2006 the Gdańsk Distirct Court remanded him in custody, relying on the reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offence in question. It also considered that keeping the applicant in detention was necessary to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings, given the risk that if released, the applicant might tamper with evidence. In that respect the court underlined the fact that the applicant has not admitted to having committed the offence he had been charged with. The court also stressed the severity of the anticipated sentence. 27.  The applicant’s appeal against the detention order, likewise his further appeals against decisions prolonging his detention and all his subsequent applications for release were unsuccessful. 28.  On 12 January 2007 a bill of indictment was lodged with the Gdańsk District Court. It comprised forty-seven charges of drug trafficking brought against six defendants. 29.  On an unspecified date charges against four of the co-accused, A.S., M.S., D.G. and M.K., were severed, as they requested the court to sentence them without carrying out the whole proceedings. A judgment in their case was delivered on 4 July 2007. 30.  On 11 April 2007 the trial court held its first hearing. 31.  During the court proceedings, the applicant’s detention was further prolonged on 17 January, 21 May, 10 August and 16 November 2007 and on 16 February and 16 May 2008.
In all their detention decisions the authorities repeatedly relied on a strong suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence in question, which was supported by evidence from witnesses. They attached importance to the grave nature of that offence and the likelihood of a severe sentence of imprisonment being imposed on the applicant. They further considered that the need to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings, especially the need to obtain evidence from witnesses, justified holding him in custody. 32.  On 16 May 2008 the applicant requested the trial court to exclude judge J.M. from the proceedings. He relied on the fact that J.M. had given a judgment against A.S., M.S., D.G. and M.K. and that consequently, he could not examine a case against him, on the basis of the same evidentiary material (see also paragraph 19 above). 33.  On 2 June 2008 the judge was excluded from the proceedings. The trial had to restart. 34.  On 25 July 2008 the Gdańsk District Court lifted the applicant’s detention. The court found that the applicant’s detention was already approaching a two-year period and that, taking into consideration that the trial had to be repeated, he could no longer be held in detention. According to the court, the risk that the applicant would obstruct the proceedings has no longer been a relevant factor, in view of the lapse of time. 35.  From 20 November 2007 to 23 September 2008 the applicant served a prison sentence ordered in another set of criminal proceedings against him. 36.  The proceedings are still pending before the District Court. 37.  On 14 April 2008 the applicant received a letter from his lawyer. In that respect the applicant presented a copy of an envelope which bears a stamp “censored (“ocenzurowano”). The stamp is crossed out. The envelope also contains a handwritten note which says “censorship abandoned” (“odstąpiono od cenzury”), date and illegible signature.


7.  The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Lipetsk. In 1994 he retired from military service. 8.  In 2002 he sued the Military Service Commission of the Lipetsk Region (“the Military Commission”), seeking to recover the unpaid pension for the period from February 1994 to November 1998. 9.  On 15 July 2002 the Pravoberezhniy District Court of Lipetsk granted him claim in full and awarded him 32,947.11 Russian roubles (“RUR”) in respect of the unpaid pension. In November 2002 the Military Commission paid him the amount awarded. 10.  The applicant lodged a new claim against the Military Commission, seeking to recover damages incurred through belated payment of the pension. 11.  On 27 January 2003 the Pravoberezhniy District Court granted his claim and awarded him RUR 145,835.69 in damages. 12.  The Military Commission did not lodge an ordinary appeal against the judgment and it became binding and enforceable on 6 February 2003. 13.  On 23 February 2003 the bailiffs’ service of the Pravoberezhniy District instituted enforcement proceedings. 14.  On 20 May 2003 the Military Commission filed an application for supervisory review of the judgment, claiming that the civil-law provisions relating to compensation for damages were not applicable to pensions. 15.  On 25 September 2003 the Presidium of the Lipetsk Regional Court held a supervisory-review hearing. It held that the first-instance court had correctly established the facts but erroneously applied the substantive law because the damages could only be recovered for the three years immediately preceding the judicial decision. On that ground it quashed the judgment of 27 January 2003 and rejected the applicant’s claim in full.


9.  The applicants were born in 1938, 1942, 1948 and 1962 respectively. They are farmers living in Stumm (Austria). 10.  On 7 July 1966 the Tirol Regional Government as the Agricultural Authority of First Instance (Landesregierung als Agrarbehörde erster Instanz - “the Agricultural Authority”) instituted land consolidation proceedings (Zusammenlegungsverfahren) involving property belonging to the first applicant, the second applicant’s mother, the third applicant and the fourth applicant’s father. 11.  On 18 December 1974 the Agricultural Authority ordered the provisional transfer (vorläufige Übernahme) of compensatory parcels (Grundabfindung). 12.  On 28 December 1980 the municipal council amended the area zoning plan (Flächenwidmungsplan) re-designating agricultural land which had, before 1974, belonged to the first applicant, the second applicant’s mother and to the fourth applicant’s father, as building land. 13.  In February 1988 the second applicant took over his mother’s farm. 14.  On 28 July 1988 the consolidation scheme (Zusammenlegungsplan) was issued by the Agricultural Authority confirming the situation created by the provisional transfer. 15.  On 16 September 1988 the third applicant appealed against the consolidation scheme. The first and second applicants as well as the fourth applicant’s father did so on 19 September 1988. 16.  In May, June and October 1989, the Provincial Land Reform Board (Landesagrarsenat - “the Provincial Board”), sitting in camera, held hearings on these appeals. Subsequently, the fourth applicant took over his father’s farm. 17.  On 26 November 1990 all four applicants filed a request for transfer of jurisdiction to the Supreme Land Reform Board (Oberster Agrarsenat - “the Supreme Board”), which the latter dismissed on 27 February 1991. 18.  On 18 April 1991 the Provincial Board, after having held a hearing in camera, dismissed the first applicant’s appeal. 19.  On 3 June 1991 the first applicant filed complaints with the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof) and the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof). In the complaint to the Administrative Court he requested that a public oral hearing be held. 20.  On 25 November 1991 the Constitutional Court refused to deal with the case and referred it to the Administrative Court. 21.  On 16 November 1993 the Administrative Court requested the Constitutional Court to review the constitutionality of section 15 § 1 of the Tirol Land Planning Act (Flurverfassungslandesgesetz), which provides that changes in value which occur after the provisional transfer cannot be taken into account in the determination of compensation. 22.  On 13 October 1995 the Constitutional Court found that section 15 § 1 of the Tirol Land Planning Act was in conformity with the Constitution. 23.  On 28 February 1996 the Administrative Court dismissed the first applicant’s complaint rejecting at the same time, in accordance with section 39 § 2 (6) of the Administrative Court Act (Verwaltungs-gerichtshofgesetz), the applicant’s request for a hearing. 24.  The Administrative Court found in particular that the calculation of compensation as regards the plots of land transferred to the municipality for building a street, had been carried out in a detailed and comprehensible manner and confirmed that the said compensation was in accordance with the relevant law. The decision was served on 24 May 1996. 25.  On 18 April 1991 the Provincial Board, after having held a hearing in camera, dismissed the second applicant’s appeal as being unfounded. 26.  On 3 June 1991 the second applicant filed complaints with the Constitutional Court and the Administrative Court. 27.  On 25 November 1991 the Constitutional Court refused to deal with the case and referred it to the Administrative Court. 28.  On 16 November 1993 the Administrative Court requested the Constitutional Court to review the constitutionality of section 15 § 1 of the Tirol Land Planning Act. 29.  On 13 October 1995 the Constitutional Court found that section 15 § 1 of the Tirol Land Planning Act was in conformity with the Constitution. 30.  On 28 February 1996 the Administrative Court quashed the Provincial Board’s decision as far as the second applicant was concerned. It found that the Provincial Board had not given sufficient reasons for calculating the size of a particular part of the applicant’s property involved in the land consolidation proceedings. In this respect, the lawfulness of the compensation could not be assessed. 31.  On 25 July 1996 the Provincial Board, after having held a public hearing, rejected the second applicant’s appeal against the consolidation scheme as being inadmissible. It noted that the second applicant and his mother had concluded a contract of transfer of land on 5 February 1988. However, the request to enter the contract into the land register had only been lodged with the competent court on 19 November 1991. Consequently, the second applicant had not been the legal owner of the land at issue and had not been entitled to file an appeal in 1988. 32.  On 11 September 1996 the applicant filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court arguing in particular that he had been the legal owner of the land already in 1988 and, therefore, had been entitled to file an appeal. 33.  On 9 June 1997 the Constitutional Court refused to deal with the complaint and transferred it to the Administrative Court. On 6 October 1997 and on 20 November 1997, respectively, the applicant and the Provincial Board filed further comments. 34.  On 10 December 1998 the Administrative Court dismissed the second applicant’s complaint, confirming the reasoning of the Provincial Board. The decision was served on 22 January 1999. 35.  On 18 April 1991 in the case of the third applicant and on 20 June 1991 in the case of the fourth applicant, the Provincial Board - in both cases having held a hearing in camera - partly dismissed their appeals. The third applicant appealed in May 1991 and the fourth applicant in July 1991. 36.  On 7 October 1992 the Supreme Board dismissed the applicants’ further appeals. It found that the transfer of property to the municipality for building a street was in accordance with the law and that the applicants had been duly compensated. 37.  On 21 December 1992 the third applicant, and on 21 January 1993 the fourth applicant, filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court which transferred their appeals to the Administrative Court on 15 June 1993. 38.  On 14 December 1995 and on 21 May 1996, respectively, the Administrative Court quashed the Supreme Board’s decision on the ground that the latter had given insufficient reasons for its calculation of compensation. 39.  On 6 November 1996 the Supreme Board, having held a public hearing, partly dismissed the applicants’ appeals. 40.  On 31 January 1997 the applicants complained to the Constitutional Court which, on 16 June 1997, transferred both cases to the Administrative Court. 41.  On 26 February 1998 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicants’ complaints. The Administrative Court found in particular that the Supreme Board had carried out the calculation of compensation in a detailed and comprehensible manner and confirmed its finding that the said compensation was in accordance with the relevant law. The decision was served on 18 March 1998.


10.  On 6 November 1992 the Burgomaster (Burgemeester) of Amsterdam, relying on section 219 of the Municipality Act (Gemeentewet) as in force at the relevant time, imposed a prohibition order (verwijderingsbevel) on the applicant to the effect that the latter would not be allowed to enter a particular area, the so-called emergency area, of the city centre for fourteen days. The following events were referred to in the Burgomaster's decision as having led to this order being issued.
(i)  It transpired from police reports that on 21 July (twice), 29 July, 12 August, 26 August and 10 September 1992 the applicant had either overtly used hard drugs or had had hard drugs in his possession in streets situated in the emergency area and that on each of those occasions he had been ordered to leave the area for eight hours.
(ii)  On 5 November 1992 the applicant had been heard by the police about his conduct and he had been told that he would either have to desist from such acts, which disturbed public order (openbare orde), or stay away from the area. The applicant had further been informed that, if he committed such acts again in the near future, the Burgomaster would be requested to impose a fourteen-day prohibition order on him. The applicant had told the police that, as well as preparing and using drugs in the area concerned, he also met his friends there.
(iii)  On 5 November 1992 the applicant had nevertheless overtly used hard drugs on one of the streets in the emergency area. He had once again been ordered to leave the area for eight hours and the police had subsequently requested the Burgomaster to impose a fourteen-day prohibition order on the applicant. 11.  In the opinion of the Burgomaster, the applicant would again commit acts disturbing public order in the near future. In this context, the Burgomaster took account of the kind of conduct involved, namely acts seriously disturbing public order, the repetition and continuity of this conduct, the statement of the applicant, the short period of time within which the acts concerned had been observed and the fact that the applicant had continued his disruptive behaviour despite the eight-hour prohibition orders imposed on him and the warning given by the police. Finally, the Burgomaster noted that neither the applicant's home nor his place of work were situated in the area concerned. 12.  The applicant lodged an objection (bezwaarschrift) against the Burgomaster's prohibition order. He submitted, inter alia, that the Burgomaster ought only to make use of the emergency powers granted him by section 219 of the Municipality Act in exceptional situations. As the Burgomaster had been issuing eight-hour prohibition orders since 1983 and fourteen-day ones since 1989, it could no longer be argued that an exceptional situation prevailed. Moreover, the Burgomaster had had sufficient time to ensure that the emergency measures were enacted in a general municipal by-law (Algemene Politie Verordening). 13.  The applicant also stated that the prohibition order, which in his opinion constituted a criminal sanction, interfered with his right to liberty of movement and violated the principle of proportionality. In this connection, he argued that he had always complied with the prohibition orders imposed on him for a duration of eight hours and that he therefore failed to understand why a prohibition order for fourteen days had been called for all of a sudden. 14.  On 14 January 1993 a hearing took place before an advisory committee. At this hearing the representative of the Burgomaster stated that, in 1992, 3,300 eight-hour prohibition orders (compared with 2,130 in 1991) and 204 fourteen-day prohibition orders (compared with 111 in 1991) had been issued against people dealing in or using drugs or committing acts related to those activities. The representative further stated that it was intended to enact the power to issue prohibition orders in a general municipal by-law. 15.  On 8 March 1993 the committee advised the Burgomaster to dismiss the objection and to maintain the prohibition order. It considered, inter alia, that the disruption of public order in the area concerned was still such as to constitute an exceptional situation within the meaning of section 219 of the Municipality Act. In view of the seriousness and scale of the problems involved, the committee found it unlikely that public order could be adequately maintained by normal methods and that for that reason the Burgomaster was entitled to use the powers granted him under section 219. 16.  Having regard to the fact that the applicant had, within a short period of time, regularly committed acts which had disturbed public order and that the eight-hour prohibition orders which had been issued had not prevented him from doing so, the committee further found that the imposition of a prohibition order for a duration of fourteen days had not been unreasonable. It did not agree with the applicant that the impugned measure constituted a penalty, as it had been taken in order to maintain public order. The committee finally found that the interference with the applicant's right to liberty of movement had been justified. 17.  By a decision of 11 March 1993 the Burgomaster dismissed the applicant's objection, adopting as his own the reasoning applied by the advisory committee. 18.  The applicant lodged an appeal against the Burgomaster's decision with the Judicial Division (Afdeling rechtspraak) of the Raad van State on 19 March 1993. In his appeal, which he detailed in a letter of 17 May 1993, he raised the same complaints as he had before the Burgomaster. In his written observations of 14 March 1994 the Burgomaster referred to the report drawn up by the advisory committee. A hearing took place before the Administrative Jurisdiction Division (Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak), the successor to the Judicial Division, on 23 January 1996. 19.  On 14 May 1996 the Administrative Jurisdiction Division dismissed the applicant's appeal. Its reasoning included the following:

“Article 12 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence. According to the third paragraph of that provision, this right shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognised in that Covenant. An almost identical provision is contained in Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention.
Section 219, first paragraph, of the Municipality Act confers on the Burgomaster emergency powers which should be used only in exceptional situations. Such exceptional situations include riotous movements, gatherings or other disturbances of public order, serious calamities, and also a serious fear of the development thereof.
Contrary to what the party seeking review has argued, the issuing of orders in the situations set out in section 219 of the Municipality Act does not run counter to the above-mentioned treaty provisions, since the latter provide for the possibility of restricting the rights concerned by 'law' – a term which includes an order issued by the Burgomaster pursuant to the law – for the protection of public order.
Section 219 of the Municipality Act is a legal provision intended for situations where ordinary means are insufficient for restoring and maintaining public order.
In the opinion of the Division these ordinary means may be considered insufficient in the present case and there was, at the time of the decision appealed against, an exceptional situation. It is relevant in this context that at the time of the decision appealed against it was not possible to solve the problem in question through a municipal regulation. There was not at that time – and there is not now – any relevant provision in a municipal by-law, nor is any other sufficient legal means available.
On the basis of the case file and the submissions made at the hearing, in addition to the number of eight-hour and fourteen-day orders that have been issued in the area concerned, the Division finds that the appropriate staff and means available to the defendant were inadequate to counter the difficult situation arising from breaches of public order resulting from the behaviour of drug addicts as described in the decision of 13 November 1989. This leads the Division to hold that it cannot be stated that the defendant could not reasonably make use of the powers granted him by section 219 of the Municipality Act.
The Division would, however, express the following reservations.
It cannot see why, if the situation described above should continue, the possibility of issuing fourteen-day prohibition orders should not be provided for in a by-law enacted by the Local Council. From the point of view of legal certainty and legitimacy of action by public authority, a regulation provided by a municipal by-law seems preferable to a measure based on the defendant's emergency powers. It appears from the case file that the defendant had already prepared the draft of an appropriate provision, which, however, was never incorporated into the General Municipal By-Law because the method used at present, which was decided on in consultation between the defendant, the police and the prosecuting authorities [verweerder, politie en justitie] with regard to the fourteen-day prohibition orders, was considered extraordinarily effective. The Division is, however, of the opinion that the presumed effectiveness of an emergency measure coupled with the prosecuting policy of the prosecution authorities [Openbaar Ministerie] do not constitute a reason not to make appropriate provision at the municipal level. The Division considers that the defendant, in assessing whether there is an exceptional situation within the meaning of section 219 of the Municipality Act (now section 175 of the Municipality Act), may, in principle, no longer rely on the lack of an appropriate provision in a municipal by-law, in view of the length of time this drugs-related nuisance [drugsoverlast] has already prevailed, causing it to display structural aspects, if the possibility of issuing fourteen-day prohibition orders is not now provided for in a by-law enacted by the Local Council within a reasonable time.”
This decision was published, with a learned comment, in Jurisprudentie Bestuursrecht (Administrative Law Jurisprudence) 1996, no. 169. 20.  Apart from the proceedings described above, the applicant was convicted by a single-judge Chamber (politierechter) of the Regional Court (arrondissementsrechtbank) of Amsterdam on 8 December 1992 of having intentionally failed to comply on 20 November 1992 with the prohibition order imposed by the Burgomaster on 6 November 1992. Under Article 184 of the Criminal Code (Wetboek van Strafrecht), this failure constituted a criminal offence. He was sentenced to four weeks' imprisonment. Following an appeal to the Amsterdam Court of Appeal (gerechtshof), which also convicted the applicant, an appeal on points of law was lodged with the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad). The Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's appeal on 8 December 1998. 21.  The criminal proceedings against the applicant do not form part of the case before the Court.


5.  The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Moscow. 6.  On 11 September 1996 he was injured in a traffic accident. He was found to have suffered light bodily injury. 7.  On 24 February 1997 the applicant brought proceedings, in the Tushinskiy District Court of Moscow, for damages against an individual, who had been found guilty of causing the accident and subjected to administrative liability by a decision of the police of 26 September 1996. 8.  In letters dated 9 January and 2 July 1998 the applicant complained to the Ministry of Justice about the lack of any developments in his case. 9.  On 6 July 1999 the District Court ordered the applicant's medical examination to be carried out by the Moscow City Bureau of Forensic Medical Examinations. The decision was not executed. 10.  On 11 January 2001 the District Court again ordered the applicant's medical examination by the Forensic Medical Examination Bureau of the Public Health Committee of the Government of Moscow. Pursuant to this decision, the examination was carried out from 24 January to 9 February 2001. The experts' report of 9 February 2001 no. 8 stated that it would be possible to answer the questions put by the court only after the applicant's in-patient examination with a view to determine the causation between the accident on 11 September 1996 and his present health condition. 11.  On 28 June 2001 the District Court ordered the applicant's in-patient examination. 12.  On 20 January 2003 the District Court ordered the expert assessment of the applicant's state of health and its connection with the accident, to be carried out by the Forensic Medical Examination Bureau of the Public Health Committee of the Government of Moscow. 13.  Following the applicant's requests the District Court demanded various medical institutions to issue the applicant's medical records needed for the expert assessment. 14.  On 14 March 2003 the applicant complained to the Moscow City Court about the delay in the proceedings in his case. 15.  The applicant's expert medical examination ordered by the decision of the District Court of 20 January 2003 was carried out by the Forensic Medical Examination Bureau of the Public Health Committee of the Government of Moscow from 16 March 2005 to 18 March 2005. The experts' report of 18 March 2005 no. 22 confirmed that the applicant had suffered light bodily injury in the accident on 11 September 1996 and that his present health condition had no connection with the accident. 16.  On 18 April 2005 the applicant submitted additional claims and the court adjourned the hearing to 4 May 2005 in order to allow the defendant to get acquainted with the new claims. 17.  On 4 May 2005 the Tushinskiy District Court of Moscow examined the case and delivered a judgment in which it granted the applicant's claims in part. It ordered the defendant to pay the applicant compensation in respect of the health damage, moral harm and costs. 18.  The applicant and the defendant appealed against the judgment. 19.  On 6 June 2005 the Moscow City Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the judgment.


6.  The first applicant was born in 1920. She died on 30 April 2006. The second applicant, her daughter and only heir, expressed her wish to pursue the proceedings in her own name and in the name of her deceased mother. The second applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Sofia. 7.  In 1958, Mr Koprinarov, whose heirs the applicants are, purchased from the State one storey of a three-storey house in Plovdiv. The property’s surface area was 109 square metres. The property had belonged to a private person until the nationalisations carried out by the communist regime in Bulgaria in 1947 and for several years afterwards. 8.  After the adoption of the Restitution Law (ЗВСОНИ) in 1992, the former pre-nationalisation owners brought proceedings under section 7 of that law against the applicants, seeking the nullification of the applicants’ title and the restoration of their property. 9.  The case went twice through the court system and the Supreme Court of Cassation gave final judgment on 26 July 1999. 10.  The courts examined and dismissed a number of allegations made by the plaintiffs in respect of alleged breaches of the housing regulations and other legal provisions as in force in 1958. The courts found, however, that a relevant document in the file concerning the 1958 transaction – approval by the Minister of Public Construction – had been signed by a Head of Department in the Ministry, not by the Minister personally. It followed that the person from whom the applicants had inherited had obtained the property unlawfully. The applicants’ title was therefore null and void and they were ordered to vacate the property. 11.  The applicants were evicted from the property on 17 September 2001. The eviction was conducted in the presence of special counsel for the applicants, appointed by the relevant court on the basis that the applicants had not been found at their address and the summonses sent had been repeatedly returned undelivered. The applicants appealed against the acts of the enforcement judge arguing, inter alia, that they had never changed their address and that their belongings had been damaged. The appeals were unsuccessful. The courts noted that the applicants had not been found at the address they had indicated and that therefore there had not been procedural violations. Also, the applicants had failed to collect their belongings for more than a month and had thus been responsible for the damage complained of. 12.  Following their eviction, the applicants wrote repeatedly to the municipal authorities asking for compensation in the form of a municipal apartment or land but did not receive a reply. 13.  On an unspecified date in 1999 the applicants brought an action against the Plovdiv Municipality and the Ministry of Public Construction and Regional Development seeking compensation for the fact that they had lost their property owing to an administrative error committed by the defendant bodies in 1958. They claimed the current value of the apartment, estimated at 54,000 Bulgarian levs (BGN) (27,000 euros (EUR)). The claim was rejected by final judgment of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 27 June 2006 on the grounds that the relevant legislation – the State Responsibility for Damage Act 1989 – did not apply retrospectively and that the law provided for a special compensation scheme by bonds in cases like that of the applicants. 14.  In 2000, it became possible for the applicants to obtain compensation from the State in the form of bonds which could be used in privatisation tenders or sold to brokers. 15.  The applicants applied for compensation by bonds only in July 2006, when their claim for damage was rejected. On 16 August 2007 the regional governor declared their request inadmissible for having been submitted outside the three-month time-limit of the adoption of that provision in January 2000. The governor pointed that recent amendments of the restitution law (see paragraph 18 below) had not provided for a new time-limit. 16.  Since an unspecified date the applicants have lived in Sofia, in service accommodation provided by the second applicant’s husband’s office.


4.  The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Troyes, France. 5.  On an unspecified date in 2001 the applicant brought an action to recover her property from a third person. On 1 November 2001 the Dzerzhinskiy District Court of Volgograd granted her claim in full and awarded her, inter alia, 5,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in respect of the non-pecuniary damage. 6.  On 11 September 2002 the Volgograd Regional Court upheld the above judgment on appeal. The judgment was enforced in full. 7.  On 9 August 2003 the other party to the proceedings lodged an application for a supervisory review of the judgment of 1 November 2001, as upheld on appeal on 11 September 2002. 8.  On 29 October 2003 a judge of the Volgograd Regional Court examined the above application and decided to remit the case for examination on the merits by the Presidium of the Volgograd Regional Court. He presented the case to the Presidium as the judge rapporteur. 9.  On 13 November 2003 the Presidium of the Volgograd Regional Court held a supervisory-review hearing. It held that the lower courts had erroneously applied the substantive law. On that ground it quashed the judgment of 1 November 2001, as upheld on appeal on 11 September 2002, in the part concerning the award in respect of the non-pecuniary damage. Both the applicant and the defendant attended the hearing and made submissions to the court. The decision was delivered by four judges. The judge rapporteur did not take part in the deliberations or voted on the case. 10.  On 12 January 2004 the Dzerzhinskiy District Court of Volgograd obliged the applicant to repay RUB 5,000 which she had received by virtue of the judgment of 1 November 2001.