4.  The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in Split. 5.  On 1 August 2008 an investigating judge of the Split County Court (Županijski sud u Splitu) opened a criminal investigation in respect of the applicant and seventeen other persons for conspiracy to supply heroin and cocaine in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period between 10 January and 30 July 2008. 6.  At a hearing held on 7 August 2008 before the investigating judge, the applicant stated that he had decided to remain silent. The investigating judge heard evidence from another suspect. 7.  On 11 August 2008 the investigating judge heard evidence from two other suspects. On the same day he asked for the applicant’s criminal record, which was submitted on 12 August 2008 with a note that he had not been previously convicted of any criminal offence. 8.  On 20 August 2008 the investigating judge commissioned a psychiatric report on eleven defendants, including the applicant, in order to assess their mental state at the time the criminal offence was committed and whether they were drug addicts. 9.  On 8 September 2008 a psychiatric report commissioned for the purposes of the investigation was submitted by a psychiatrist of the Split Medical Faculty. As regards the applicant, the report stated that he was a long-term drug addict who had received treatment on two occasions but with no lasting results. He had resumed taking drugs a few months before. Since being detained he had been on Heptanon therapy which helped him to overcome his withdrawal symptoms. It was recommended that he continued with that therapy. 10.  On 16 September 2008 the investigating judge heard evidence from six witnesses, police officers who conducted the police inquiry prior to the institution of the criminal proceedings. 11.  On 24 October 2008 the investigating judge heard evidence from another suspect and on 29 and 31 October 2008 from four further police officers. On 7 November 2008 he heard evidence from another two suspects. 12.  On 21 January 2009 the State Attorney’s Office for the Prevention of Corruption and Organised Crime preferred charges of conspiracy to supply heroin and cocaine in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period between 10 January and 30 July 2008 against the applicant and seventeen other defendants in the Split County Court. 13.  On 29 January 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal against the bill of indictment (prigovor protiv optužnice). By 4 February 2011 all the other defendants had also lodged their objections. 14.  On 4 March 2009 the Supreme Court returned the bill of indictment to the State Attorney’s Office asking it to submit, within three days, a request to take further investigative steps. 15.  On 10 March 2009 the State Attorney’s Office asked the investigating judge to take further steps. 16.  On 13 March 2009 the investigating judge ordered a transcript of all telephone conversations between the defendants, previously tapped by the police. 17.  On 12 June 2009 an expert in telecommunications submitted his report with a transcript of those telephone conversations. The transcript comprises 568 pages. 18.  On 16 June 2009 the State Attorney’s Office submitted the same indictment to the Split County Court. 19.  On 1 July 2009 the applicant reiterated his objection to the indictment. He also requested that the evidence obtained by the police tapping of his telephone be excluded from the case file. The other defendants also lodged their objections. 20.  On 8 September 2009 the Supreme Court dismissed the objections to the indictment and refused the applicant’s request to exclude from the case file all evidence obtained by the police tapping of his telephone. 21.  The first hearing scheduled for 26 April 2010 in the Split County Court was adjourned because two defendants did not appear. One of them had been sent to Zagreb Prison Hospital for treatment and the other was in another medical institution. On the same day the presiding judge ordered psychiatric report in respect of two defendants. The report was submitted on 4 May 2010. 22.  A hearing before the Split County Court was held on 8 June 2010 and all the defendants stated that they would give their defence at end of the trial. 23.  At hearings held on 9, 10 and 11 June 2010 eight witnesses and the expert in psychiatry gave their evidence. 24.  At hearings held on 19 and 20 July 2010 four witnesses gave their evidence. 25.  At a hearing held on 21 July 2010 the County Court refused the request by the defence to exclude from the case file recordings of the defendants’ conversations. 26.  At a hearing held on 14 September 2010 the majority of the defendants, including the applicant, pleaded guilty and two further witnesses gave their evidence. 27.  Further hearings were held on 16 and 20 September 2010 and at the latter hearing a judgment was adopted, finding the applicant guilty and sentencing him to three years’ imprisonment. His detention was lifted. 28.  Some of the defendants lodged appeals against the first-instance judgment and the proceedings are currently pending before the Supreme Court. 29.  On 1 August 2008 an investigating judge of the Split County Court ordered all the suspects to be detained on the grounds under Article 102 § 1 (1), (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, namely the danger of the suspects absconding, the danger of the suspects reoffending and the gravity of the charges. The relevant part of the decision, referring to the grounds for detention, reads:
“In view of the manner in which the criminal offence was committed, the type and quantity of the illegal substances in which the suspects were trafficking, the large number of illegal transactions and the persistence and determination involved in committing the criminal offences, as well as the fact that the suspects are mostly unemployed with no means of support and that the suspects ... and Perica Oreb have previously been convicted of the same criminal offence or of similar criminal offences, there exists a justified fear that if released they might repeat a criminal offence of the same kind ...” 30.  A report drawn up on 4 August 2008 by the Split Police Department expressly notes that the applicant had voluntarily come to that Department that day and that he had then been taken to Split Prison. 31.  In his appeal of 7 August 2008 the applicant argued that the written charges against him alleged that he had had contact with only one of the other suspects, which showed that he could not have been a participant in any organised criminal activity since he did not know about the involvement of the other suspects and they were not even known to him. He supported these assertions with the argument that no illegal substances, money or equipment necessary for trafficking in the said substances on a large scale, such as packaging or scales, had been found on him, and that this showed that he personally had not been involved in such trafficking. 32.  He also claimed that he had never been convicted by a final judgment of trafficking in illegal substances, but only of the criminal offence of using illegal substances and that he was not a drug addict. Lastly, he argued that the possibility of ordering an alternative measure to detention had not been considered. 33.  On 8 August 2008 the investigating judge asked for a copy of the applicant’s criminal record. The report of 12 August 2008 submitted by the Ministry of Justice indicated that the applicant had not been convicted of any criminal offence. 34.  On 22 August 2008 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court examined the appeals lodged by the defendants. It accepted that the ground under Article 102 § 1(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure no longer persisted. In other respects it dismissed the applicant’s appeal on the grounds that: the documents in the case file showed that the applicant had previously been convicted of similar criminal offences (without any further explanations in that respect), and that the persistent criminal activity over a long period with which the suspects were charged taken together with their economic situation justified the fear that they might repeat the same offences. The relevant part of the decision reads:
“In view of the level of criminal activity with which the defendants are charged, namely, that they have been engaged in trafficking in illegal drugs over a long period of time, and in view of the resolve and persistence shown in committing the offence, the fact that the defendants ... Perica Oreb ... have already been convicted of criminal offences, and almost all defendants have no means of subsistence, all these things indicate that there is a danger of the defendants reoffending ...
The manner in which the criminal offences were committed, with the defendants organising themselves into a group, and the quantity of the illegal substances whose sale might put at risk the health of a large number of persons, amount to grave circumstances ...” 35.  On 3 September 2008 the investigating judge extended the applicant’s detention for a further month on the grounds under Article 102 § 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (the danger of reoffending and the gravity of the charges). The relevant part of the decision reads:
“In view of the level of criminal activity with which the defendants have been charged, namely, that they have been engaged in trafficking in illegal drugs over a long period of time, and in view of the resolve to commit criminal offences and the fact that the defendants have previously been convicted of similar criminal offences, there is a danger of the defendants reoffending ...
The offence was committed under grave circumstances as shown by the manner in which it was committed, the fact that the defendants organised a group and the quantity of the illegal substances in circulation, which, through the sale on the illegal market, could put at risk the health of a number of persons.” 36.  In his appeal of 8 September 2008 the applicant argued that he had not previously been convicted of the same offence and that the ordering of his detention under Article 102 § 1 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (danger of reoffending) violated the principle of the presumption of innocence. He also reiterated that the written charges against him alleged that he had had contact with only one of the other suspects, which showed that he could not have been a participant in any organised criminal activity since he did not know about the involvement of the other suspects and did not even know who they were. He argued, in support of those assertions, that no illegal substances, money or materials necessary for trafficking in the said substances on a large scale, such as packaging or scales, had been found on him and that this showed that he had not personally been involved in such trafficking. 37.  On 11 September 2008 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The relevant part of the decision reads:
“... the defendants have been charged with the criminal offence of trafficking in illegal drugs between 10 January and 30 July 2008 ... The documents in the case file show that the defendant ... Perica Oreb has already been convicted of similar criminal offences; the defendant Perica Oreb ... is unemployed, and all three defendants have no assets.
In view of the high level of criminal activity with which they have been charged, namely that they engaged in trafficking in illegal drugs during the above-mentioned period and showed resolve and persistence in committing the offence, as well as their economic situation – all these circumstances taken together indicate a danger of the defendants reoffending ...
Furthermore, the offence was committed under grave circumstances as shown by the manner in which it was committed, the fact that the defendants organised a group and the quantity of the illegal substances, which through their sale on the illegal market could put at risk the health of a number of persons ...” 38.  On 3 October 2008 the investigating judge lifted the applicant’s detention on the ground that the psychiatric report indicated that he had been a drug user and that he had been buying drugs for his own use and not in order to sell it to others. His immediate release was ordered as well. The State Attorney lodged an appeal on 7 October 2008. 39.  On 10 October 2008 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court allowed the appeal and extended the applicant’s detention again on the grounds under Article 102 § 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The reasoning was the same as that in the decision of 11 September 2008. It was stated, inter alia, that the documents in the case file showed that the applicant had previously been convicted of similar criminal offences (without any further explanations in that respect). The applicant was re-detained on 28 October 2008. 40.  On 21 November 2008 the investigating judge extended the detention in respect of all the defendants for a further month again on the grounds under Article 102 § 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This decision was quashed by a three-judge panel of the Split County Court on 11 December 2008 on the ground that the period of further detention had to be specified for each defendant. 41.  On 10 December 2008, in another set of criminal proceedings, the Dubrovnik County Court convicted the applicant of trafficking in heroin and sentenced him to two years’ imprisonment. 42.  On 15 December 2008 the investigating judge extended the applicant’s detention until 28 December 2008, again on the grounds under Article 102 § 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The reasoning relied on the allegations that the accused had been charged with trafficking in substantial quantities of heroin as their primary activity. On 16 December 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal. He argued that no drugs, money or tools typical for the sale of drugs had been found on him and that he had never been convicted of any drug-related crimes. He again argued that the possibility of ordering an alternative measure to detention had not been considered. 43.  On 23 December 2008 the investigating judge issued a fresh decision extending the applicant’s detention until 28 December, again on the grounds under Article 102 § 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He relied on the allegations that the accused had been charged with trafficking in substantial quantities of heroin as their primary activity, on the gravity of the charges and the fact that the defendants had no means of support, without giving further details in this respect. 44.  On 24 December 2008 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court declared the applicant’s appeal of 16 December 2008 inadmissible because a fresh decision on detention had been adopted in the meantime. 45.  On 30 December 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal against the investigating judge’s decision of 23 December 2008. He reiterated the arguments from his previous appeal of 16 December 2008 and added that before his arrest he had been employed at a hotel in Cavtat. 46.  On 14 January 2009 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court dismissed the appeal and reiterated the reasoning from its decision of 11 September 2008. It also stressed that the applicant had been convicted before and that he had no assets. 47.  On 21 January 2009 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the above decision, arguing that the following rights had been violated: his right to personal liberty; right to a fair trial; his right to equality before the law because the grounds for detention had been interpreted in an unusual fashion; and his right to an effective remedy because the examination of his appeal had been inadequate. 48.  On 23 January 2009 the Split County Court extended the applicant’s detention, again on the grounds under Article 102 § 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In addition to the reasoning in the previous decisions, it added that the applicant was a drug addict and stated, inter alia, that he had already been convicted of similar criminal offences, without any further explanations in that respect. 49.  On 27 January 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal. In addition to the arguments put forward in his appeal of 16 and 30 December 2008 he added that his parents had a regular income and that therefore it could not be said that he had no means of subsistence. 50.  On 16 February 2009 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of 27 January 2009, holding that the alleged manner in which the criminal offence had been committed amounted to particularly grave circumstances which justified detention on the ground under Article 102 § 1 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As regards the ground under Article 102 § 1 (3) – danger of reoffending – it was deemed justified since the applicant was a drug addict and two other sets of criminal proceedings concerning drug-related offences were pending against him, one before the Čakovec County Court and the other before the Dubrovnik County Court. 51.  On 19 February 2009 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s constitutional complaint of 22 January 2009 against the decision of 14 January 2009 inadmissible on the ground that a fresh decision on detention had been adopted in the meantime. 52.  On 16 April 2009 the Split County Court extended the applicant’s detention, again on the grounds under Article 102 § 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and with the same reasoning as before, stating, inter alia, that the applicant had already been convicted of similar offences, without any further explanations in that respect. 53.  On 8 May 2009 the Supreme Court quashed the decision of 16 April 2009 on the ground that the three-judge panel which adopted it had no such power and that it was the investigating judge who should have decided whether to extend the detention. 54.  On 15 May 2009 the investigating judge extended the applicant’s detention, again on the grounds under Article 102 § 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The reasoning relied on the allegations that the accused had been charged with trafficking in substantial quantities of heroin as their primary activity and had no other income. In his appeal lodged the same day the applicant reiterated the arguments from his appeal of 30 December 2008. As regards his previous conviction, he argued that the Dubrovnik County Court’s judgment of 10 December 2008 had not yet become final. 55.  On 28 May 2009 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, endorsing the reasons put forward by the investigating judge. 56.  On 10 June 2009 the investigating judge again extended the applicant’s detention, again on the grounds under Article 102 § 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and with the same reasoning as in the decision of 15 May 2009. 57.  On 16 June 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal. He reiterated his previous arguments. 58.  On 18 June 2009 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court extended the applicant’s detention, again on the grounds under Article 102 § 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, reiterating the same reasoning as in the previous decisions concerning the applicant’s detention. It stated, inter alia, that the documents in the case file showed that the applicant had already been convicted of similar offences, without any further explanations in that respect. 59.  On 24 June 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal reiterating his previous arguments. 60.  On 30 June 2009 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court declared the applicant’s appeal of 16 June 2009 inadmissible because a fresh decision on his detention had been adopted in the meantime. 61.  On 13 July 2009 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal of 24 June 2009. As to the applicant’s previous convictions, it stated:
“All appellants, save for ... Perica Oreb ... had already been convicted of similar criminal offences ...
... criminal proceedings are currently pending against the accused Perica Oreb before the Dubrovnik County Court in which he has been convicted, by a judgment that has not yet become final, of a criminal offence under Article 173 § 2 of the Criminal Code and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. Therefore, the fact that the accused had not been finally convicted could not alter conclusion that there is a danger of him reoffending since other criminal proceedings are pending against the accused, which is also relevant in assessing the conformity of their lifestyles with the laws.
...” 62.  On 14 September 2009 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court again extended the applicant’s detention on the grounds under Article 102 § 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, reiterating the same reasoning as in the previous decisions concerning the applicant’s detention and stating, inter alia, that the documents in the case file showed that the applicant had already been convicted of similar offences, without any further explanations in that respect. 63.  On 17 September 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal reiterating his previous arguments. 64.  On 28 September 2009 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. As to the applicant’s previous convictions, it stated:
“All appellants, save for ... Perica Oreb ... had already been convicted of similar criminal offences ...
... criminal proceedings are currently pending against the accused Perica Oreb before the Dubrovnik County Court in which he has been convicted, by a judgment that has not yet become final, of a criminal offence under Article 173 § 2 of the Criminal Code and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment.
The above circumstances taken together justify the fear that they would continue committing the same or similar offences and that therefore [the decision to extend] their detention on the ground under Article 102 § 1 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is correct.
...” 65.  The applicant lodged a constitutional complaint, challenging the grounds for and the duration of his detention. 66.  On 26 November 2009 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court extended the applicant’s detention, again on the grounds under Article 102 § 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, reiterating the same reasoning as in the previous decisions concerning the applicant’s detention and stating that the applicant’s criminal record showed that he had already been convicted of similar offences. 67.  On 1 December 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal reiterating his previous arguments. 68.  On 15 December 2009 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s constitutional complaint against the decision of 28 September 2009 inadmissible on the ground that it was no longer in effect since a fresh decision on the applicant’s detention had meanwhile been adopted. 69.  On 16 December 2009 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. As to the applicant’s previous convictions, it stated:
“All appellants, save for ... Perica Oreb ... had already been convicted of similar criminal offences ...
Even though there is no previous conviction in the criminal record of Perica Oreb, the documents in the case file show that ... criminal proceedings are currently pending against him before the Dubrovnik County Court in which he has been convicted, by a judgment that has not yet become final, of a criminal offence under Article 173 § 2 of the Criminal Code and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. These circumstances, contrary to the submissions of all the appellants, are relevant in assessing the conformity of their lifestyles with the laws.
The above circumstances together with the fact that all of the appellants, save for D.R., are heroin addicts and the accused ... Perica Oreb is unemployed ... justify the fear that, if at large, they would continue to commit the same or similar criminal offences and therefore [the decision to extend] their detention on the ground under Article 102 § 1 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is correct.
...” 70.  The applicant lodged a constitutional complaint, again challenging the grounds for and the duration of his detention. 71.  On 12 February 2010 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court extended the applicant’s detention, again on the grounds under Article 102 § 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The reasoning relied on the indictment, which charged the accused with conspiracy to supply a large quantity of heroin for a longer period of time, the danger of such criminal activity, the fact that they were heroin addicts and had no other income. 72.  On 18 February 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal reiterating his previous arguments. 73.  On 25 February 2010 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s constitutional complaint against the decision of 16 December 2009 inadmissible on the ground that it was no longer in effect since a fresh decision on the applicant’s detention had meanwhile been adopted. 74.  On 12 March 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, endorsing the reasoning of the impugned decision. As regards the applicant, it specifically stated that:
“The accused Perica Oreb is, according to his own statement, unemployed, with no assets and the psychiatric report shows that he is a heroin addict. Furthermore, he has been convicted of the offence under Article 173 § 2 of the Criminal Code by a judgment of the Dubrovnik County Court which has not yet become final” 75.  On 12 May 2010 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court extended the applicant’s detention, again on the grounds under Article 102 § 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, reiterating the same reasoning as in its decision of 12 February 2010. 76.  On 14 May 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal reiterating his previous arguments. 77.  On 23 June 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, endorsing the reasoning of the impugned decision. As regards the applicant, it specifically gave the same reasons as in its decision of 12 March 2010. 78.  On 24 August 2010 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court extended the applicant’s detention, again on the grounds under Article 102 § 1 (3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, reiterating the same reasoning as in the decision of 12 May 2010. 79.  On 30 August 2010 the applicant lodged an appeal reiterating his previous arguments. As indicated above (paragraph 27) the applicant was convicted by the County Court and released on 20 September 2010.


4.  The applicants were born in 1973 and 1974 respectively. The first applicant lives in İzmir. By a letter dated 28 August 2006 the Court was informed that the second applicant was purging his sentence in Bolu prison. 5.  The applicants were arrested and taken into police custody on suspicion of membership of an illegal armed organisation, namely the PKK, on 25 and 26 July 1993 respectively. They were remanded in custody on 5 August 1993. 6.  On 31 August 1993 the public prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court filed an indictment against twenty-one persons, including the applicant. He accused the applicants of membership of an illegal armed organisation and of aiding and abetting that organisation. The charges included, in particular, bombings of various public and private establishments between July 1992 and June 1993. 7.  The first hearing, held before the Diyarbakır State Security Court on 3 September 1993, in the applicants' absence, was taken up with procedural matters such as the measures to be taken for securing the presence of the accused. 8.  Between 3 September 1993 and 23 January 1996, the first-instance court held hearings on a regular basis during which the judges dealt mostly with procedural matters. It also heard the accused and their representatives who were present on the date of the hearings. At the end of each hearing, the court considered releasing the applicants pending trial both ex officio as well as upon their requests. At each hearing, the court, relying on the nature of the offence, the state of the evidence and the content of the case-file, decided to prolong their remand in custody. 9.  During this time the court also heard two witnesses, on 25 November 1993 and 13 January 1994, who stated that they did not know any of the accused or whether they had any organisational link with the armed organisation. On 28 March 1995 the public prosecutor submitted his observations on the merits. On 7 November 1995 the court decided, upon the request of the accused, to hear a witness, Mr O.B. who was being tried before another court. In the hearing held on 19 December 1995, the court heard Mr O.B. who stated, inter alia, that he knew the second applicant from school. He claimed that the applicant used to talk about the PKK but that he did not know anything about him being a member of or participating in the activities of that organisation. Upon this statement the second applicant maintained that he was not a member of the organisation as was confirmed by the witness and that it was normal to talk like that at school. At this hearing the prosecutor reiterated his observations of 28 March 1995. 10.  In a hearing held on 23 January 1996 the first applicant's representative submitted his observations on the merits. The court also heard the accused. On the same day, the Diyarbakır State Security Court convicted the applicants as charged and sentenced them to life imprisonment. 11.  On 14 July 1997 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment in respect of fourteen of the accused, including the applicants. 12.  The case was sent back to the Diyarbakır State Security Court where the proceedings against the applicants commenced on 29 July 1997. 13.  Between 29 July 1997 and 15 May 2001, the first-instance court held hearings on a regular basis during which the judges dealt with procedural matters and adjourned many hearings, since one of the co-accused could not be found and the statements of another one residing in Germany could not be taken. It also heard the accused and their representatives who were present on the date of the hearings and the public prosecutor, both parties relying on previous submissions. The applicants failed to attend some of the hearings. At the end of each hearing, the court also considered releasing the applicants pending trial both ex officio as well as upon their own requests. At each hearing the court, relying on the nature of the offence, the state of the evidence and the content of the case-file, decided to prolong their remand in custody. 14.  During this time in a hearing held on 7 July 1999 the judge who had been appointed to replace the military judge, sat as a member of the trial court for the first time. On 16 November 1999 the public prosecutor read out his observations on the merits. 15.  On 15 May 2001 the Diyarbakır State Security Court decided to disjoin the case of the two co‑accused who could not be found. On the same day the court convicted the applicants as charged and sentenced them to life imprisonment. 16.  On 7 November 2001 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment in respect of the first applicant and upheld it in respect of the second applicant. 17.  On 24 January 2002 the principal public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation dismissed the second applicant's request for a rectification of the Court of Cassation's decision. 18.  On 7 February 2002 the case was sent back to the first-instance court where the first applicant was tried alone. 19.  Between 7 February 2002 and 10 September 2002, the first-instance court held hearings on a regular basis. 20.  During this time on 12 March 2002 the applicant repeated his earlier submissions. The prosecutor requested time to prepare his observations on the merits. In the hearing held on 14 May 2002 the prosecutor submitted his observations on the merits of the case. The applicant was given time to prepare his observations on the merits. The court, taking into account the amount of time the first applicant had spent in remand in custody, ordered his release pending trial. 21.  On 10 September 2002 the Diyarbakır State Security Court convicted the first applicant as charged and sentenced him to twelve years and six months' imprisonment. On 17 March 2003 the Court of Cassation upheld this judgment. 22.  By an additional judgment, the first applicant's sentence was reduced to six years and three months' imprisonment on 22 June 2005.


4.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Rostov-on-Don. 5.  In 1987 he took part in emergency operations at the site of the Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster. As a result the applicant suffered from extensive exposure to radioactive emissions. 6.  On an unspecified date the applicant underwent medical examinations which established the link between the applicant’s poor health and his involvement in the Chernobyl events. In 1994 the applicant was awarded compensation, to be paid monthly. 7.  In 1999 the applicant sued a local pension authority (Муниципальное учреждение социальной защиты населения Первомайского района г. Ростова-на-Дону - “the defendant”) requesting to increase his monthly compensation, backdate the increase and recover the unpaid amount. The applicant considered that the amount of compensation had been determined incorrectly. 8.  On 18 October 1999 the Pervomayskiy District Court of Rostov-on-Don (“the District Court”) granted the applicant’s claim and ruled that since 1 January 1999 his monthly compensation had been wrongly calculated. The court awarded the applicant the arrears of RUR 15,829.25 for the period between 1 January and 1 November 1999 and decided that as of 1 November 1999 the applicant was entitled to a monthly compensation of RUR 2,440.70, to be index-linked in line with changes of the minimum monthly wage. 9.  The judgment of 18 October 1999 was not appealed against by the parties and came into force on 29 October 1999. 10.  On 6 December 1999 the bailiffs instituted enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgment of 18 October 1999. 11.  Some time later the enforcement proceedings were terminated by reference to the lack of funding. On 22 March 2001 the bailiffs returned the writ and documents to the applicant. They referred to Decree No. 143 dated 22 February 2001 (see the relevant domestic law section below) and invited him to submit the documents to a local department of the Ministry of Finance (ОФК по Первомайскому району г. Ростова-на-Дону). 12.  The applicant followed this invitation and on the same day applied to the local department of the Ministry which four days later rejected the application. It appears that the applicant was invited to fetch a renewed writ of execution from the District Court. 13.  Having received the renewed writ from the court, the applicant re-submitted the documents to the Ministry which on 11 April 2001 rejected them, this time by reference to the absence of the defendant’s account at the Ministry. 14.  On 30 May and 1 July 2002 respectively the authorities transferred a total amount of RUR 38.661,22 in the applicant’s favour and informed him that the enforcement of the judgment of 18 October 1999 was thus finalised. 15.  It appears that the applicant disagreed. He informed the authority that they had failed to index-link his monthly compensation in line with the minimum monthly wage, as it was ordered by the judgment of 18 October 1999, and used a less favourable scheme of indexation. 16.  On unspecified date the authority requested the District Court to interpret the judgment of 18 October 1999 and uphold its scheme of indexation. 17.  By a decision of 6 March 2003 the District Court examined and granted the authority’s request. The decision was upheld on appeal by the Regional Court on 16 April 2003. 18.  On 3 June 2003 the bailiffs ruled that the defendant authority had duly enforced the judgment of 18 October 1999 and terminated the enforcement proceedings accordingly. 19.  Thereafter the applicant challenged both decisions by way of supervisory review. 20.  On 3 June 2004 the Regional Court, acting as a supervisory review instance, quashed the decision of 6 March 2003 as unlawful and remitted the request for interpretation for a fresh examination at the first instance. The court noted, in particular, that by accepting the authority’s interpretation of the judgment of 18 October 1999 the District Court had in fact varied its content and thus had acted unlawfully. 21.  On 5 July 2004 the District Court rejected the authority’s request for interpretation as unfounded. 22.  By first instance decision of 2 September 2004 which was upheld on appeal on 13 October 2004 the applicant was issued with a renewed writ of execution. 23.  On 28 November 2004 the bailiffs re-instituted enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgment of 18 October 1999 and requested the authority to enforce it insofar as the judgment had ordered indexation of the applicant’s monthly compensation. 24.  On an unspecified date the applicant brought proceedings against the pension authority claiming indexation for the delay of execution of the judgment of 18 October 1999. 25.  On 11 May 2001 the Justice of the Peace of the Pervomayskiy District examined and granted his claim. It ordered the authority to pay the applicant RUR 3,562.13 in damages for the period between 1 November 1999 and 1 February 2001 and the arrears of RUR 18,556.24. 26.  The judgment of 11 May 2001 was varied on appeal by the District Court on 22 October 2001. In particular, the court ordered the authority to pay the applicant RUR 6,341.73 in damages for the period between 1 November 1999 and 1 September 2001 as well as the arrears for the period from 1 November 1999 and 1 September 2001 of RUR 8,505.47. The decision of 22 October 2001 came into force on the same day. 27.  On 11 November 2001 the bailiffs instituted enforcement proceedings in relation to the decision of 22 October 2001. It appears that the defendant refused to comply with it by reference to the lack of funds and its disagreement with the amount of award. 28.  The decision of 22 October 2001 was enforced by the authorities by a bank transfer of 1 July 2002. 29.  On an unspecified date the applicant brought a fresh claim against the pension authority for an increase of his monthly compensation. 30.  By judgment of 25 December 2002 the District Court rejected the claim as unsubstantiated. On 26 March 2003 the judgment was upheld on appeal by the Rostov Regional Court. 31.  On an unspecified date the applicant brought a fresh claim against the authority in which he requested additional damages for non-enforcement of the judgment of 18 October 1999 and the decision of 22 October 2001. The applicant also referred to the authority’s failure to index-link the award of 18 October 1999 in line with changes of the minimum monthly wage and requested compensation in this respect as well. 32.  By decision of 25 April 2003 the District Court granted the application in part. By reference to the decision of 6 March 2003 (see § 17 above) the court rejected his claim for an increase of the award of 18 October 1999 in line with changes of the minimum monthly wage. In respect of the delay in enforcement of the judgment of 18 October 1999, the court ordered the authority to pay the applicant RUR 3,065.95 in damages for the period between September 2001 and 1 June 2002. As regards the decision of 22 October 2002, the court ordered RUR 2,722.88 in damages in the applicant’s favour for the period from November 2001 to July 2002. 33.  On 23 July 2003 the Regional Court upheld the decision of 25 April 2003 on appeal. 34.  It appears that the decision of 25 April 2003 was enforced in full on 26 April 2004. 35.  On an unspecified date the applicant applied to a court referring to the authority’s failure to abide by the judgment of 18 October 1999 insofar as the latter had ordered to index-link the applicant’s compensation in line with the minimum monthly wage. 36.  Having adopted a different scheme of indexation from the one suggested by the applicant and set out in the judgment of 18 October 1999, on 18 December 2003 the District Court partly granted his claim and ordered the authority to pay the arrears of RUR 28,947.24. 37.  The judgment of 18 December 2003 was upheld on appeal in full on 10 March 2004. The amount due to the applicant in this connection was paid on 13 September 2004.


5.  The applicants, who are a couple, were born in 1934 and 1932 respectively. The second applicant died in 2006. The first applicant lives in Skhodnya, the Moscow Region. 6.  The applicants, both wheelchair-bound and having first‑degree disability status, repeatedly requested social-security services to provide them with a car adapted to their disability. Their numerous complaints in this respect to the General Prosecutor’s Office, Members of the State Duma, and Administration of the President of the Russian Federation proved unsuccessful. As it was mentioned in the authorities’ letters to the applicants, according to the medical expert report ordered by the social-security services, the first applicant was not entitled to a free car and driving was contra-indicated in respect of the second applicant. 7.  On 18 November 2003 the applicants, apparently assisted by counsel, lodged a claim against the Ministry of Labour challenging the refusal to provide them with a car and claiming compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 8.  On 15 March 2004 the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow (“the district court”) fixed the hearing for 14 May 2004 and at some point, apparently on the same date, summoned the applicants to appear at the hearing. 9.  According to the Government, on 30 March 2004 one of the applicants received the respective notification. They submitted a copy of an acknowledgment-of-receipt card containing information on the date and time of the hearing, the name of the court, the date of notification, and signatures of a recipient and a postman. 10.  According to the applicants, they did not receive the summons. 11.  On 14 May 2004 the district court, having heard the defendant’s representatives, rejected their claim because the applicants had lodged it against a wrong defendant. The court established that the social welfare services did not belong to the Ministry of Labour and that the latter did not have power to review their decisions. The applicants were absent from the hearing. The court found, with reference to the acknowledgment-of-receipt card, that they had been duly summoned and examined the case in their absence. The representative of the respondent authority was present. 12.  On 30 June 2004 the applicants’ representative received a copy of the judgment of 14 May 2004. 13.  On 5 July 2004 the applicants appealed against the judgment. They complained, inter alia, that their right to a fair trial had been violated as neither they nor their lawyer had had a chance to attend the hearing due to their having been summoned belatedly. 14.  On 14 July 2004 the district court on the applicants’ request extended the time-limit for lodging the grounds of appeal. 15.  On 6 October 2004 the Moscow City Court adjourned the examination of the applicants’ appeal until 20 October 2004, having found that the parties had not been notified of the date of the hearing in a timely manner. 16.  According to the Government, at some point the district court dispatched summonses to the parties, including the applicants, informing them of the date and time of the appeal hearing. According to the applicants, neither they nor their representative received the summons. 17.  On 20 October 2004 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 14 May 2004 on appeal. The court examined the case in the applicants’ absence, having mentioned that they had been notified of the appeal hearing. As regards the applicants’ complaint about their absence from the hearing at the first instance court, the appeal court found that they had been properly summoned. The court further upheld the lower court’s finding that the civil action was lodged against the wrong defendant. 18.  On 12 December 2008 the application was communicated to the Government. 19.  On 21 January 2009 the Moscow City Court requested the case file from the district court in order to prepare a report on the factual circumstances of the case, to be included in the Government’s observations on the admissibility and merits of the application. 20.  On 27 January 2009 the Moscow City Court received the case file. 21.  On 4 February 2009 Ms Stakhiyeva, the first applicant’s representative before the Court, requested the district court to grant her access to the case file concerning the applicants’ civil proceedings. 22.  On the same date the registry of the district court rejected her request having advised her that she could be granted access to the file not earlier than ten days following the request. 23.  On 5 February 2009 the President of the district court refused to examine the representative’s oral complaint in this respect, apparently having provided no reasons for the decision. It appears that on the same date the lawyer lodged a written complaint about the refusal to allow her to study the file, but the petition remained unanswered. 24.  On 27 February 2009 the registry of the district court again rejected the applicant’s new request for access to the file, and on the same date the President of the district court disallowed her complaint in this respect. 25.  On 10 March 2009 the registry of the Moscow City Court returned the case file to the district court. 26.  On 25 March 2009 the Government advised the Court that the file had been transferred to the district court and was available for study. On 27 March 2009 this letter was forwarded by the Court to the applicant’s representatives. 27.  On 9 April 2009 the Court received the Government’s observations and on 29 April 2009 forwarded them to the applicant’s representatives with a request to provide observations in reply. 28.  On 12 May 2009 the applicant’s lawyer requested to grant her access to the case file. She submits that on the same date the registry disallowed her request, and the President of the court refused to discuss the matter with her. 29.  On 14 May 2009 she was advised by the registry of the district court that the file was available at the registry. 30.  On 18 May 2009 the lawyer studied the case file. 31.  On 9 June 2009 the applicant’s lawyers submitted the observations in reply to the Government’s observations on the applicants’ case.


5.  The first applicant was born in 1968. The second applicant was born in 1973. They are husband and wife and live in the town of Sovetskaya Gavan in the Khabarovsk Region. 6.  In 1994 the first applicant arrived in Russia on the basis of a valid visa and married the second applicant. In 1996 the second applicant gave birth to a daughter. In November 1996, after his visa had expired, the first applicant was deported to China. 7.  In 1999 the second applicant gave birth to a son. 8.  In 2001 the first applicant obtained a work visa valid until 1 August 2002 and resumed his residence in Russia. The visa was later extended until 1 August 2003. 9.  In November 2002 the first applicant went to the Khabarovsk department of internal affairs (hereinafter “the Khabarovsk police department”) to lodge an application for a residence permit. The Khabarovsk police department did not have the necessary forms; therefore, the first applicant could not lodge his application. It was only on 11 July 2003 that the forms became available. 10.  On 24 July 2003 the first applicant applied for a residence permit for a second time. The Khabarovsk police department refused to examine the application and returned the documents to the first applicant. 11.  The first applicant challenged the refusal before a court. On 22 October 2003 the Sovetskaya Gavan Town Court found that the refusal to examine the application had been unlawful. It ordered that the Khabarovsk police department examine the first applicant's application for a residence permit. 12.  On 22 July 2004 the Khabarovsk police department rejected his application by reference to section 7 (1) of the Foreign Nationals Act (see paragraph 33 below). No further reasons were provided. 13.  The applicants challenged the refusal before a court. They complained, in particular, that the Khabarovsk police department had not given any reasons for the refusal. The first applicant had never been charged with any criminal offence or engaged in any subversive activities. The applicants also claimed that the refusal had interfered with their right to respect for their family life and had caused them non-pecuniary damage. 14.  On 4 November 2004 the Tsentralniy District Court of Khabarovsk found that the decision of 22 July 2004 had been lawful and rejected the applicants' claim in respect of non-pecuniary damage. It found that the Khabarovsk police department had received information from the Federal Security Service that the first applicant posed a national security risk. That information was a State secret and could not be made public. There is no indication in the judgment that the information had been made available for judicial scrutiny. 15.  The applicants appealed. On 18 January 2005 the Khabarovsk Regional Court upheld the judgment of 4 November 2004. It reiterated that, according to the information from the Federal Security Service, the first applicant posed a national security risk. That information was a State secret and was not subject to judicial scrutiny. 16.  On 4 March 2005 the Khabarovsk police department rejected a new application for a residence permit. It found that the first applicant was unlawfully residing on Russian territory, that he had taken no steps to make his stay legal, and that he would therefore have to leave Russia. The refusal of a residence permit did not hinder his family life. 17.  It appears that the applicants did not challenge the refusal of 4 March 2005 before a court. Instead they asked the Khabarovsk Regional Court to direct that the Khabarovsk police department issue the first applicant with a residence permit. They claimed that by refusing to provide the first applicant with a residence permit the authorities had showed disrespect for their family life. They asked for compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage. On 9 September 2005 the Khabarovsk Regional Court rejected their claims in the last instance as having no basis in domestic law. It referred to the judgment of 4 November 2004 and held that there were no reasons to depart from its findings. 18.  On several occasions in 2003, 2004 and 2005 the first applicant was administratively fined for living in Russia without a valid residence permit. However, the domestic courts reversed most of those decisions, finding them procedurally defective or time-barred. 19.  It is apparent from a certificate issued by a deputy head of the Sovetskaya Gavan Town prosecutor's office on 15 December 2005 that no criminal proceedings had been brought against the first applicant between 1996 and 2005. 20.  On 18 November 2005 the first applicant was stopped by the police. The police officer drew up a report on the commission of an offence under Article 18.8 of the Administrative Offences Code (see paragraph 34 below). The report was transmitted to a judge. 21.  On 21 November 2005 the Sovetskaya Gavan Town Court held that the first applicant had infringed the residence regulations and ordered his administrative removal and detention pending removal. On the same day he was placed in a detention centre. 22.  On 13 December 2005 the Khabarovsk Regional Court quashed the decision of 21 November 2005 on appeal, remitted the case for a new examination by the Town Court, and ordered the first applicant's release. It held that, in accordance with Article 27.3 § 1 of the Administrative Offences Code, detention with a view to administrative removal could only be ordered if there were sufficient reasons to believe that the person would try to avoid execution of the removal order. The Town Court had not given reasons for the detention order and the case file did not contain any information justifying the first applicant's detention. On the same day the first applicant was released. 23.  On 28 December 2005 the Sovetskaya Gavan Town Court held that the report of 18 November 2005 did not indicate which residence regulations had been infringed by the first applicant. It returned the report to the local police department for correction. 24.  On 3 February 2006 the administrative proceedings against the first applicant were discontinued as time-barred. 25.  In the meantime, on 3 February 2005, the Khabarovsk police department prepared a decision that the first applicant's presence on the Russian territory was undesirable and submitted it to the head of the Federal Migration Service for approval. The draft decision indicated that the first applicant had been unlawfully resident on Russian territory and had been repeatedly fined under Article 18.8 of the Administrative Offences Code for his failure to leave Russia after the expiry of the authorised residence period. On 22 March 2005 the head of the Federal Migration Service confirmed the decision and it became enforceable. The applicants were informed about the decision on 21 April 2005. 26.  On 22 August 2005 the Khabarovsk police department asked the Federal Migration Service to order the first applicant's deportation. On 12 November 2005 the head of the Federal Migration Service ordered the first applicant's deportation by reference to section 25.10 of the Law on the Procedure for Entering and Leaving the Russian Federation (see paragraph 35 below). No further reasons were provided. The applicants were informed of the decision on 12 December 2005. 27.  On 15 May 2006 the Sovetskaya Gavan Town Court ordered the first applicant's placement in a detention centre with a view to deporting him. It held that the first applicant was unlawfully residing on Russian territory, and that on 12 November 2005 the Federal Migration Service had ordered his deportation. Therefore, he had to be held in custody until deportation. The first applicant was not present at the hearing. He was informed of the decision on 5 September 2006. 28.  On 24 November 2006 the Khabarovsk Regional Court quashed the decision of 15 May 2006 on appeal and remitted the case. It found that the decision had been taken in the first applicant's absence, in breach of Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention. 29.  On 25 December 2006 the Sovetskaya Gavan Town Court for a second time ordered the first applicant's placement in a detention centre with a view to deporting him. It referred to the same reasons as in the decision of 15 May 2006. 30.  It appears that the deportation order was not enforced. The applicant is at present living with his family in Russia.


6.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Sapy, Poland. 7.  On 17 July 1992 the applicant lodged with the Skierniewice Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) an action for damages against his neighbours. He claimed that the defendants had caused damage to his barn by improperly storing silage and animal waste. 8.  In 1992 two hearings were adjourned. 9.  On 16 February 1993 the court held a hearing at which it heard the parties and witnesses and ordered an expert opinion. 10.  On 3 August 1993 an expert submitted his opinion to the court. The defendants' lawyer contested the expert's opinion. 11.  A hearing scheduled for 17 September 1993 was adjourned due to the absence of the defendants' lawyer. 12.  On 14 October 1993 the court held a hearing and heard an expert witness. 13.  On an unknown later date, at the applicant's lawyer's request, the court ordered another expert opinion. In January 1994 the opinion was submitted to the court. Subsequently, the defendants' lawyer requested the court to order a supplementary expert opinion. 14.  On 29 March 1994 the court held a hearing. It heard two witnesses and an expert witness. 15.  Subsequently, the defendants' lawyer requested the court to order yet another expert opinion. 16.  In August 1994 the applicant's and the defendants' lawyers requested the court not to schedule any hearings until 30 September 1994 because of their respective holidays. 17.  On 8 December 1994 the court dismissed the defendants' request for exemption from the court fees. They lodged an appeal but on 9 January 1995 the Łódź Court of Appeal dismissed it. 18.  In May 1995 the trial court asked the defendants to indicate an expert who would prepare an opinion. 19.  Two subsequent hearings scheduled for 31 January and 23 February 1996 were adjourned due to the illness of the defendants and their lawyer. 20.  On 10 July 1996 the court, sitting in camera, ordered another expert opinion. 21.  On 6 August 1996 the defendant's lawyer requested the court to appoint two other experts indicated by him. On 15 November 1996 the trial court dismissed this application. 22.  On 17 March 1997 an expert opinion was submitted to the court. 23.  In June 1997 the case was assigned to another judge. 24.  Subsequently, the applicant's lawyer requested the court not to schedule any hearings until 30 August 1997 because of his holidays. 25.  On 8 September 1997 the court stayed the proceedings because one of the defendants had died. Later, his heirs joined the proceedings. 26.  On 21 January 1998 the trial court resumed the proceedings and sent the case‑file to an expert in order to obtain an opinion. 27.  On 20 March 1998 the expert submitted his opinion to the court. 28.  Between 30 March 1994 and 5 May 1998 no hearings were held. 29.  On 6 May 1998 the court held a hearing. 30.  On 15 July 1998 the applicant's lawyer again requested the court not to schedule hearings during his holidays. 31.  A hearing scheduled for 30 October 1998 was adjourned due to the absence of the defendants' lawyer. 32.  In December 1998 the defendants' lawyer requested the court not to schedule any hearings between 1 December and 20 December 1998, and subsequently, until 1 February 1999. 33.  A hearing scheduled for 8 February 1999 was adjourned because of the absence of the defendants' lawyer. 34.  Between 7 May 1998 and 17 March 1999 no hearings were held. 35.  On 18 March 1999 the court held a hearing. 36.  On 31 March 1999 the Regional Court gave judgment in which it dismissed the applicant's claim. 37.  The applicant lodged an appeal against the judgment. 38.  On 21 October 1999 the Łódź Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) dismissed his appeal and upheld the first-instance judgment.


5.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Leipzig. 6.  At the age of three, the applicant was placed in a children’s home and later in the care of foster parents. At the age of seven, he was adopted by his foster parents and was given their family name. After that, he did not have any contact with his family of origin. 7.  In 1984, the applicant’s biological sister, S. K., was born. The applicant was unaware of his sister’s existence until he re-established contact with his family of origin in 2000. Following their mother’s death in December 2000, the relationship between the siblings intensified. As from January 2001, the applicant and his sister had consensual sexual intercourse. They lived together for several years. 8.  In 2001, 2003, 2004 and 2005 four children were born to the couple. Following the birth of the fourth child, the applicant underwent a vasectomy. The three older children were placed in the care of foster families. The youngest daughter lives with her mother. 9.  On 23 April 2002 the Borna District Court (Amtsgericht) convicted the applicant of sixteen counts of incest (Section 173 § 2 (2) of the Criminal Code, see “Relevant domestic law”, below), gave him a suspended sentence of one year’s imprisonment and put him on probation. 10.  On 6 April 2004 the Borna District Court convicted the applicant of another count of the same offence and sentenced him to ten months’ imprisonment. 11.  On 10 November 2005 the Leipzig District Court convicted the applicant of two counts of incest and sentenced him to one year and two months’ imprisonment. Including the sentence of 6 April 2004 and one further previous criminal conviction, the District Court imposed a summary sentence of one year and four months’ imprisonment. The court considered the fact that the applicant had suffered physical abuse by his father during the decisive first three years of his childhood to be a mitigating factor. Furthermore, he had made a confession and had been affected by the media coverage of his case. Lastly, he had previously been attacked during detention. On the other hand, the court considered as aggravating factors the fact that the applicant had reoffended in spite of his previous convictions and that he had had unprotected intercourse with his sister even though he had to have been aware of the risk of further pregnancies. 12.  With regard to the applicant’s sister, S. K., who had been charged with the same offence, the Leipzig District Court, relying on an expert opinion, found as follows:
“The accused, K., has a very timid, withdrawn and dependant personality structure. This personality structure, taken together with [an] unsatisfying family situation, led to her being considerably dependant on the applicant. In particular, after the death of their mother, she experienced this dependency to an extent that she felt that she could not live without him.”
The District Court concluded that this serious personality disorder, seen in conjunction with established mild learning disabilities, had led to her being only partially liable for her actions. Accordingly, the court did not impose a sentence on her. 13.  On 30 January 2007 the Dresden Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal on points of law. The court considered that there were certain doubts as to the constitutionality of the relevant provision. However, it determined that these were not sufficient to call the validity of the law into question. 14.  On 22 February 2007 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint, arguing, in particular, that Section 173 § 2 (2) of the Criminal Code had violated his right to sexual self-determination, had discriminated against him and was disproportionate. In addition, it interfered with the relationship between parents and their children born out of incestuous relationships. 15.  On 26 February 2008 the Federal Constitutional Court, by seven votes to one, rejected the complaint as being unfounded. The decision was based on the following considerations. With the criminal provision of Section 173 § 2 (2) of the Criminal Code, the legislature had restricted the right to sexual self-determination of biological siblings by making sexual intercourse between them a punishable offence. This limited the conduct of one’s private life by penalising certain forms of expressions of sexuality between persons close to one another. However, the provision did not infringe the core area of private life. Sexual intercourse between siblings could have effects on the family and society and carry consequences for children resulting from the relationship. As the criminal law prohibited only a narrowly defined scope of behaviour and only selectively curtailed opportunities for intimate contact, the parties concerned had not been placed in a position which would be incompatible with respect for human dignity. 16.  The legislator had pursued objectives that were not constitutionally objectionable and that, in any event, in their totality legitimised the limitation on the right to sexual self-determination. The primary ground for punishment was the protection of marriage and the family. Empirical studies had showed that the legislature was not overstepping its margin of appreciation when assuming that incestuous relationships between siblings could seriously damage the family and society as a whole. Incestuous relationships resulted in overlapping familial relationships and social roles and, thus, could damage the structural system of family life. The overlapping of roles did not correspond with the image of a family as defined by the Basic Law. It seemed clear, and did not appear to be far‑fetched to assume, that the children of an incestuous relationship might have significant difficulties in finding their place within the family structure and in building a trusting relationship with their closest caregivers. The function of the family, which was of primary importance for the community, would be decisively damaged if the required family structures were shaken by incestuous relationships. 17.  Insofar as the criminal provision was justified by reference to the protection of sexual self-determination, this objective was also relevant between siblings. The objection that this right was sufficiently protected by the specific provisions on offences against sexual self-determination overlooked the fact that Section 173 of the Criminal Code addressed specific situations arising from the interdependence and closeness of family relationships, as well as difficulties in the classification of, and defence against, transgressions of sexual self-determination in that context. 18.  The legislature had additionally based its decision on eugenic grounds and had assumed that the risk of significant damage to children who were the product of an incestuous relationship could not be excluded. In both medical and anthropological literature, which was supported by empirical studies, reference had been made to the particular risk of the occurrence of genetic defects. 19.  The impugned criminal provision was justified by the sum of the above-mentioned objectives against the background of a common conviction that incest should be subject to criminal liability. This conviction was also evident on the international level. As an instrument for protecting self-determination, public health, and especially the family, the criminal provision fulfilled a signalling, norm-reinforcing and, thus, a general preventive function, which illustrated the values set by the legislature and, therefore, contributed to their maintenance. 20.  The impugned provision complied with the principle of proportionality. The criminalisation of sibling incest was suitable for promoting the desired objective. This was not put into question by the exemption of minors from criminal liability (Art. 173 § 3), as the prohibition of acts of sexual intercourse encompassed a central aspect of sexual relations between siblings which contravened the traditional picture of the family and which was further justified by its potential to produce descendants. Neither was this assessment put into question by the fact that acts similar to sexual intercourse and sexual intercourse between same-sex siblings were not subject to criminal liability, while sexual intercourse between natural siblings was punishable even in cases were conception was excluded. The same applied to the objection that the criminal provision was unsuitable for protecting the structure of the family because it first impacted on siblings when they typically left the family circle upon reaching the age of majority. 21.  The provision was also necessary. It was true that in cases of sibling incest guardianship and youth welfare measures came into consideration. However, these measures did not achieve the same objectives, as they were aimed at preventing and redressing violations in specific cases, but did not have any general preventive effect or reinforce societal norms in the manner achieved through the law. 22.  Lastly, the Federal Constitutional Court considered that the criminal sanction had not been disproportionate, as the provision had also allowed the courts to refrain from imposing punishment in cases in which an accused’s share of the guilt was slight. 23.  Judge Hassemer attached a dissenting opinion which was based on the following considerations. Section 173 § 2 (2) of the Criminal Code was incompatible with the principle of proportionality. The provision did not pursue a legitimate aim. From the outset, considerations of eugenic aspects were not a valid objective for a criminal law provision. Likewise, neither the wording of the provision nor the statutory context indicated that the provision was aimed at protecting sexual self-determination. Lastly, the prohibition on sibling incest was not justified by the protection of marriage and the family, as it only prohibited the act of sexual intercourse, but did not prohibit any other sexual acts between siblings or sexual intercourse between siblings of the same sex or between relatives who were not blood‑related. If the criminal provision were actually aimed at protecting the family from sexual acts, it would also extend to these acts that were likewise damaging to the family. The evidence seemed to indicate that the provision as set out did not protect any specific rights, but was solely aimed at moral conceptions. However, it was not a legitimate aim for a criminal provision to build or maintain common moral standards. 24.  Furthermore, the provision was not suited to attain the objectives pursued. As regards the protection of the family from the damaging effects of incestuous sexual acts, it was not far-reaching enough, as it did not encompass similarly damaging behaviour and, moreover, acts committed by non-blood-related siblings. It was too far-reaching because it encompassed behaviour that could not (any longer) have damaging effects on the family because of children having reached the age of majority and being about to leave the family circle. 25.  In addition, there were other measures available that could have similarly or even more effectively guaranteed the protection of the family, such as youth welfare measures and measures taken by the family courts. Finally, the impugned provision was excessive, at it did not provide for a limitation of criminal liability resulting from behaviour which did not endanger any of the possible objects of protection. 26.  This decision was served on the applicant’s counsel on 13 March 2008. On 4 June 2008 the applicant started serving his prison sentence. He was released on probation on 3 June 2009.


3.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Istanbul. 4.  On 20 August 1996 the applicant was arrested and taken into custody on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation, namely the DHKP‑C (Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi; the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front), as well as aiding and abetting the said organisation. 5.  On 3 September 1996 the applicant was remanded in custody. 6.  On 6 December 1996 the public prosecutor at the Istanbul State Security Court filed a bill of indictment against the applicant, along with other persons, charging him with membership of an illegal organisation under Article 168 § 1 of the former Criminal Code. 7.  On 20 May 2002 the Istanbul State Security Court found the applicant guilty of activities carried out for the purpose of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory. The applicant was sentenced to death; his sentence was subsequently commuted to life imprisonment. 8.  On 30 September 2003 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the first-instance court on the ground that the latter had failed to specify the provision of the Criminal Code under which the applicant had been found guilty. The Court of Cassation held that the applicant had been unlawfully held accountable for an event which had not been included in the bill of indictment of 6 December 1996. 9.  By Law no. 5190 of 16 June 2004, published in the Official Gazette on 30 June 2004, State Security Courts were abolished. The case against the applicant was therefore transferred to the Istanbul Assize Court. 10.  On 31 March 2006 the applicant was released pending trial. 11.  According to the information in the case file, the case is still pending before the Istanbul Assize Court.


6.  The applicant was born in 1969 and, before his conviction (described below), he lived in Irtyshskiy, a town in the Omsk Region. 7.  On 16 April 1999 the police arrested and detained the applicant on suspicion of murder. After the investigation, the police accused him, inter alia, of shooting two persons and wounding two others, and submitted the case for trial to the Omsk Regional Court. 8.  The trial began on 17 November 1999. Before the hearing, the court excluded the public from the court room. Once the hearing had begun, the applicant's lawyer protested. He argued that the court had acted unlawfully. 9.  The widow of one of the applicant's purported victims, Ms G., had requested in camera proceedings because she feared “the defendant's friends and their threats”. 10.  The applicant stated that he saw no reason to hold the hearing in private. The public prosecutor supported Ms G.'s request “in order to ensure the objectivity of the proceedings” because, in his opinion, the victims and witnesses were under pressure and feared testifying in public. 11.  The court deliberated on the spot and decided to continue the hearing in camera in order “to ensure a comprehensive and objective examination of the case and to avoid any possibility of pressure on the victims and witnesses”. 12.  On 26 November 1999 the court found the applicant guilty of the premeditated murder of two individuals and the attempted murder of another individual in May 1993. He was also convicted of the intentional infliction of grievous bodily harm in April 1999. The court sentenced the applicant to seventeen years' imprisonment. 13.  On 5 January 2000 the applicant appealed to the Supreme Court. His lawyer argued, inter alia, that hearing the case in private had been unlawful for a number of reasons. First, under the Code of Criminal Procedure the intimidation of witnesses did not justify hearings in private. Secondly, the court had failed to identify any specific instance of intimidation. Thirdly, only bailiffs could effectively ensure the witnesses' security. 14.  On 7 June 2000 the Supreme Court rejected the appeal after the applicant's lawyers and a representative of the prosecution had been heard. However, the appeal judgment disregarded the complaint about the trial court hearing in private. 15.  On 6 December 2000 the Presidium of the Supreme Court reduced the applicant's sentence to twelve years' imprisonment.


4.  The applicant, Ms Tatyana Nikolayevna Kislaya, is a Ukrainian national who was born in 1950 and resides in the city of Lugansk, Ukraine. 5.  On 21 June 2000 the applicant instituted civil proceedings in the Leninsky District Court of Lugansk (Ленінський районний суд м. Луганська) against her former employer, the “Lugansky Verstatobudivny Zavod” State-owned plant («Луганський верстатобудівний завод») “the enterprise”, challenging her dismissal and disciplinary measures against her and claiming various payments. 6.  On 1 March 2001 the court found against the applicant. The applicant appealed in cassation. 7.  On 7 May 2001 the Lugansk Regional Court (Луганський обласний суд)[1] upheld this judgment on appeal in cassation by the applicant and it became final. 8.  On 17 August 2001 the applicant lodged a cassation appeal before the Supreme Court of Ukraine pursuant the newly introduced cassation procedure. 9.  On 13 December 2001 the Supreme Court quashed the above judgments and remitted the case for a fresh consideration to the first-instance court. 10.  On 20 May 2002 the Leninsky Court annulled disciplinary measures imposed on the applicant, ordered her reinstatement and awarded her the total of 2,364 hryvnyas (UAH) in various payments. Both parties appealed. 11.  On 18 November 2002 the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 20 May 2002 to the extent that it concerned the monetary award and remitted this part of the case for a fresh consideration. The part of the judgment concerning the reinstatement of the applicant was upheld, became final and was enforced by the end of May 2003. 12.  On 5 March 2003 the Supreme Court upheld the decision of 18 November 2002. 13.  On 27 February 2004 the Leninsky Court awarded the applicant the total of UAH 11,733.92 in various payments. Both parties appealed. 14.  On 21 June 2004 the Regional Court reduced the monetary award due to the applicant to UAH 4,971.82. This judgment immediately became enforceable. 15.  On 27 November 2006 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s request for leave to appeal in cassation. 16.  In the course of the proceedings, the first-instance court scheduled some thirty hearings. Some fifteen of them were adjourned on account of the defendant’s failures to appear or following its requests for adjournments. Three hearings were adjourned for various other reasons. 17.  On numerous occasions the bailiffs referred to the pending bankruptcy proceedings against the debtor as the reason for a delay in the enforcement of the judgment given in the applicant’s favour. On 24 December 2004 the applicant was paid UAH 364 and on 23 February 2006 received the remainder of the award. 18.  On 22 December 2003 the applicant was dismissed again. On 12 January 2004 she instituted civil proceedings in the Leninsky Court challenging her dismissal and claiming compensation. 19.  On 15 June 2005 the court ordered the applicant’s reinstatement and awarded her UAH 2,517.96 in compensation. The part of the judgment concerning the reinstatement of the applicant immediately became enforceable and was enforced by 8 February 2006. On 29 September 2005 this judgment was upheld by the Regional Court and became enforceable. 20.  On 1 December 2006 the judgment was further upheld by the Supreme Court. 21.  On 12 June 2007 the applicant received the payment due to her by the judgment of 15 June 2005.


5.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 6.  On 9 June 1995 the Vilnius District Court dismissed an action by several private individuals against the applicant company for attribution of ownership rights to two partially built houses, nos. 57-1 and 57-2. The court declared null and void the sale contracts on the basis of which the claimants, including G.G. and M.N., had maintained their title to the houses, and recognised the ownership rights of the applicant company in respect of the houses. 7.  The claimants’ appeal was dismissed by the Vilnius Regional Court on 5 September 1995. The court noted, inter alia, that G.G. and M.N. could request the company to cover their costs for construction of the houses. That decision was final. 8.  On 15 July 1996 the applicant company lodged a civil claim for the eviction of G.G. from the house, no. 57-2, that had previously been attributed to the applicant company in the above-mentioned civil proceedings between G.G. and the applicant company. G.G. had unlawfully occupied the house and continued to live there, thus preventing the applicant company from enjoying its ownership rights. 9.  From 10 January to 11 November 1997 the proceedings were suspended at G.G.’s request, because he had a pending appeal on points of law against the court decision of 9 June 1995. 10.  In December 1998 G.G. lodged a counterclaim against the applicant company, seeking acknowledgement that he was the owner of the house. G.G. also requested that the applicant company be prohibited from disposing of or mortgaging it. 11.  On 21 January 1999 the Vilnius Region District Court (hereinafter “the district court”) imposed a provisional measure and prohibited the applicant company from selling or transferring the disputed property, in order to secure G.G.’s counterclaim. On the same day the proceedings were suspended due to a related civil case which contained material relevant to the proceedings in question. 12.  On 3 February 1999 a letter was sent to G.G. requesting monthly payments from him because he was unlawfully occupying the house. 13.  On 12 May 2000 the district court suspended the enforcement of the court decision of 9 June 1995. 14.  The civil proceedings were resumed on 28 August 2001. 15.  On 23 May 2002 the same court allowed the applicant company’s claim. However, on 18 June 2002 the Vilnius Regional Court remitted the case for re-examination to the first-instance court. On 23 December 2002 the Supreme Court upheld that decision. 16.  Court hearings of 8 April 2003 and 9 February 2004 were adjourned at the request of the parties, as they were involved in friendly settlement negotiations; however, the negotiations failed on both those occasions. 17.  On 18 November 2003 the Vilnius Regional Court ordered the case to be examined by the Vilnius Regional Court as the court of first instance, having found that the district court did not have jurisdiction to examine this kind of case. At the same time the adjournment of the case which had been ordered by the latter court on 2 October 2003 was set aside. 18.  On 7 September 2004 the Vilnius Regional Court, at the request of G.G., issued an order seizing the applicant company’s plot of land on which the house stood, to secure G.G.’s counterclaim. 19.  The case was adjourned from 27 September to 6 December 2004 for a file from a related criminal case against G.G. to be obtained from another court. 20.  On 23 December 2004 the Vilnius Regional Court dismissed the applicant company’s claim but allowed G.G.’s counterclaim. 21.  On 24 May 2005 the Court of Appeal quashed the decision of the lower court and allowed the applicant company’s claim. G.G. appealed to the Supreme Court. 22.  On 19 December 2005 the Supreme Court remitted the case again to the first-instance court for re-examination. 23.  The applicant company lodged a request to lift the seizure of the property, arguing that this measure was not proportionate as it imposed too heavy burden on financial interests of one of the parties to the proceedings. On 2 February 2006 the Vilnius Regional Court rejected that request. 24.  On 26 October 2006 the Vilnius Regional Court adjourned the proceedings until a related civil case, in which the legal status of the applicant company was disputed, was resolved. The applicant company appealed against that adjournment but the higher court upheld it. 25.  On 5 September 2007 the proceedings were recommenced. 26.  The applicant company submitted requests to the court for the seizure of the house occupied by G.G. to be lifted, and argued that the company had been suffering losses because of unpaid rent amounting to 3,200 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 920 euros (EUR)) each month. On 21 November and 2 December 2008 those requests were dismissed. 27.  On 19 February 2009 the Vilnius Regional Court allowed the applicant company’s claim and dismissed G.G.’s counterclaim. The court also ordered the provisional measures to be lifted once the decision became final. 28.  On 22 February 2010 the Court of Appeal upheld that decision. That ruling was final. 29.  According to the applicants, the disputed house was returned by the bailiff to the applicant company on 28 July 2010. 30.  On 20 June 1996 a private individual, M.N., submitted a civil claim asking for acknowledgement of his ownership rights to the house, no. 57-1, which had already been attributed to the applicant company by the court decision of 9 June 1995 (see paragraph 6). The house had been returned by the bailiff to the applicant company on 17 April 1996. Later on, M.N. modified his claim, asking only for reimbursement of construction costs. 31.  At the request of M.N., on 25 June 1996 the court gave a ruling on seizure of the applicant company’s property, which prohibited the house from being sold or ownership transferred until the case had been examined by the courts. 32.  On 16 November 1996 a pre-trial investigation against M.N. was opened: he was accused of forgery of documents and misappropriation of property. 33.  On 17 November 1997 and 3 February 1998 M.N. amended his action, withdrawing the claim for attribution of the title to the house and asking only for reimbursement of costs. 34.  In March 1998 the applicant company submitted a counterclaim for damage allegedly caused by M.N. In May an amended counterclaim was submitted. 35.  On 1 June 1998 the court ordered a forensic assessment of the construction costs claimed by M.N., and the proceedings were stayed until 24 June 1999. 36.  On 16 December 1999 the Vilnius Regional Court dismissed M.N.’s claim for reimbursement of construction costs. At the same time it dismissed the applicant company’s counterclaim concerning damages. On 5 June 2000 the Court of Appeal dismissed as unfounded both appeals submitted by the parties. 37.  Upon an appeal on points of law by M.N., on 18 October 2000 the Supreme Court quashed the decisions of those courts and remitted the case for re-examination to the court of first instance. 38.  The applicant company requested the courts to lift the provisional measure. On 15 February 2001 the Court of Appeal declined to lift it and observed that the proceedings were still ongoing, since the Supreme Court had decided to remit the case for re-examination. 39.  On 8 June 2001 the Vilnius Regional Court suspended the proceedings until a related pre-trial investigation into M.N. actions was complete. 40.  After the proceedings were resumed, on 3 January 2002 the court suspended them again because the pre-trial investigation was still ongoing. 41.  On 17 February 2003 the proceedings were resumed. 42.  On 18 March, 29 April, 10 June, 4 September, and 14 October 2003 the hearings were adjourned, as the case was not ready for examination because the pre-trial investigation was still ongoing; besides, the applicant company’s representative was not present at three of those hearings. M.N. objected to the applicant company’s requests for postponement, considering the criminal proceedings against him irrelevant to the case at hand. 43.  On 17 August 2004 the civil proceedings were recommenced after the decision of the Vilnius Regional Court of 14 July 2004 to discontinue the criminal case against M.N due to prescription. 44.  On 7 October 2004 the Vilnius Regional Court refused the applicant company’s request for the provisional measure to be lifted. 45.  On 8 June 2005 the Vilnius Regional Court dismissed the civil claim by M.N. On 26 January 2006 the Court of Appeal by a final decision rejected an appeal by M.N. against this decision as unfounded. 46.  At the request of the applicant company the Vilnius Regional Court lifted the provisional measure on 3 March 2006; that decision became final on 27 April 2006.


5.  The applicant was born in 1986 and is currently serving a prison sentence in Rustavi no. 1 Prison. 6.  The applicant was arrested on 4 October 2007 on suspicion of unlawful purchase and possession of firearms. 7.  On 19 November 2007 the firearms case was merged with another criminal case which concerned the applicant’s alleged involvement in several incidents of armed robbery. 8.  On 8 December 2007 the applicant was placed in Gldani no. 8 Prison. The applicant alleges that on an unspecified date he was beaten there by prison officers. He did not complain before the law-enforcement authorities about the alleged beating. 9.  On 24 June 2008 the Bolnisi District Court found the applicant guilty of unlawful possession of firearms and two distinct incidents of aggravated armed robbery, and imposed on him a sentence of twenty years and seven months’ imprisonment and a fine. On 6 January 2009 the Tbilisi Court of Appeal slightly modified the classification of the offences committed, maintaining the applicant’s conviction but reducing his sentence, fixing it at seventeen years and seven months’ imprisonment, plus a fine. On 1 June 2009 the Supreme Court rejected an appeal by the applicant on points of law. The applicant failed to submit to the Court copies of the domestic court decisions. 10.  As disclosed by his medical file, the applicant suffers from epilepsy, which condition he had developed prior to his arrest. 11.  On 18 July 2008 the applicant was placed in Rustavi no. 6 Prison. A medical certificate dated 27 November 2008 issued by the head doctor of that prison further diagnosed the applicant with chronic bronchitis and neurocirculatory dystonia. 12.  According to the applicant, at that time he was denied any medical care in prison; his family provided him with the required medication. In support of that assertion he provided two receipts from pharmacies indicating procurement of several drugs. Further, the applicant alleged that the conditions of his detention in Rustavi no. 6 Prison were poor: he was kept in conditions of inadequate sanitation and hygiene, without proper toilet facilities, and denied regular outdoor exercise. 13.  On an unspecified date the applicant’s mother complained to the governor of Rustavi no. 6 Prison about a deterioration in her son’s medical condition and requested his transfer to the medical establishment of the prison authority (“the prison hospital”). The governor replied on 13 August 2009, claiming that the applicant’s medical condition was stable, that he had benefited from medical supervision and drugs in prison, and that no transfer to the prison hospital was envisaged. 14.  On 30 January 2010 the applicant’s lawyer wrote to the Governor and the head doctor of Rustavi no. 6 Prison, drawing their attention to the deterioration in the medical condition of the applicant. The lawyer whilst referring to the applicant’s alleged ill-treatment in Gldani no. 8 Prison claimed that he had sustained a head injury and suffered from epileptic seizures and diminished hearing as a result. She also noted that according to the applicantm, he had not been administered with any medical care in prison and he had severely suffered from, inter alia, mobility and speech problems. The applicant’s lawyer requested the prison governor to arrange for a comprehensive medical examination of her client. She also sought access to his complete medical file. 15.  On 10 and 12 February 2010 bacteriological sputum tests were performed on the applicant. Consequently, on 17 February 2010 the applicant was diagnosed with smear-positive focal pulmonary tuberculosis (“TB”) at the stage of infiltration and was classified as a moderately serious patient. On 23 February 2010 the applicant was placed on the DOTS programme (Directly Observed Treatment, Short-course – the treatment strategy for the detection and cure of TB recommended by the World Health Organisation) and started receiving conventional, first-line anti-tuberculosis agents. In addition, he was provided with vitamins. 16.  On 4 March 2010 the applicant was transferred for the purpose of treatment to Ksani no. 8 Prison, where prisoners with TB were housed. 17.  On 28 April 2010 the applicant’s lawyer requested from the head of the medical department at the Ministry of Prisons a copy of all the medical records concerning the applicant’s state of health from the very first day of his detention. On 19 May 2010 the applicant’s lawyer was provided with a copy of the applicant’s medical file, documenting the treatment administered to her client starting from February 2010. 18.  On 21 May 2010 the applicant underwent another bacteriological sputum test, which was smear-negative, that is, showed no microbacterium tuberculosis. The first phase of the treatment had proved successful. Hence, on 23 July 2010 the applicant was transferred from Ksani no. 8 Prison to the medical unit of Rustavi no. 1 Prison, where the second phase of his anti-TB treatment was initiated. The applicant was continuing to receive the anti-TB drugs. 19.  The latest medical records in the file relating to the applicant’s condition are dated April-May 2011. The results of blood and urine analyses, and also of bacterioscopic phlegm analysis, and various X-ray and other examinations, reveal that the applicant’s TB was then in a non-active phase. As regards the applicant’s other medical disorders, they had not evolved negatively. The applicant was being provided with drug-based treatment on an out-patient basis at Rustavi no. 1 Prison.


6.  The applicant was born in 1950, and lives in Hatay. 7.  On 10 February 1994 the applicant was arrested and placed in police custody by officers from the anti-terrorism branch of the Istanbul Security Directorate on suspicion of involvement in the activities of an illegal armed organisation, namely the TKEP/L (Turkey’s Communist Labour Party/Leninist). 8.  On 24 February 1994 the applicant was brought before the public prosecutor and then the investigating judge at the Istanbul State Security Court. The same day the investigating judge ordered the applicant’s detention on remand. 9.  In an indictment dated 17 May 1994, the public prosecutor initiated criminal proceedings against the applicant and eleven other defendants before the Istanbul State Security Court (“the court”), accusing them, inter alia, of membership of an illegal armed organisation and of involvement in activities that undermine the constitutional order of the State. The prosecution sought the death penalty under Article 146 § 1 of the Criminal Code. 10.  By a letter of 24 February 1995, the court requested from the First and Second Divisions of the State Security Court that the two case files pending before them be transmitted to it for examination, as some of the defendants had been put on trial for similar charges before these courts. 11.  On 22 May 1995 the court decided that the criminal proceedings pending before the Konya State Security Court should also be joined to the present case as the applicant was being prosecuted for similar charges before that court. 12.  At the hearings of 27 July 1995, 8 March, 20 May, 19 July, 23 September and 20 November 1996, the court obtained testimonies from the complainants, who claimed to be the victims of the acts of the defendants and eye witnesses to the events. 13.  On 27 January 1997 the court joined the case with that pending before the First Division of the Istanbul State Security Court. In the other case, the applicant was also accused of being a member of the same organisation and the activities in which he was allegedly involved were similar. 14.  On 11 April 1997 the Court of Cassation set aside the decision to join the two criminal proceedings. 15.  By a letter of 10 September 1997, the court requested that the case files pending before the Fifth and the Second Divisions of the State Security Court be sent to it for examination, as the facts were allegedly the same as in the present case. 16.  At the hearings of 19 November 1997 and 26 January 1998, the complainants of a robbery which had taken place in the Ağaoğlu and Aslantaş Commercial Centres were heard. The court noted that some of the witnesses had already made statements before the Seventh Division of the Istanbul Assize Court in relation to the incident at the Aslantaş Commercial Centre. Accordingly, it issued a letter to the Seventh Division of the Assize Court asking the latter to transfer the case file to it. 17.  During the hearings held on 17 June and 5 August 1998, the court noted that the information requested from the Assize Court had not been received. It therefore repeated the earlier request. 18.  On 7 October 1998 the Assize Court informed the State Security Court that it was unable to provide that information, as no defendant’s name had been mentioned in the letter of request. 19.  On 22 February 1999 the prosecutor submitted his observations on the case, in which he sought the applicant’s conviction and sentence pursuant to Article 146 § 1 of the Criminal Code. 20.  On 25 October 1999 the applicant read out his forty-page written observations and submitted them to the court. At the same hearing the applicant’s lawyer requested an extension to prepare the defence. 21.  At the hearing of 29 May 2000, the court decided to ask the Fourth Division of the Istanbul Assize Court about the outcome of criminal proceedings brought against the police by one of the co-accused, concerning an allegation of ill-treatment. By a letter dated 19 June 2000, the Assize Court stated that the case was still pending before the Court of Cassation. 22.  In the course of the criminal proceedings the applicant made numerous requests for his release pending trial. The State Security Court dismissed these requests at each of the twenty-two hearings held between 17 August 1994 and 16 August 2000. In ordering the applicant’s continued detention each time, it relied on “the nature of the offences charged, the state of evidence and the content of the case file”. 23.  In particular, during the hearing held on 20 November 2000, the applicant’s lawyer reminded the court that his client had been kept in detention for six years and ten months, contrary to the provisions of domestic law as well as the Court’s established case-law. On the same day, due to the change in the representation for the prosecution, the case file was deposited with the new prosecutor for the submission of his observations. 24.  On 27 November 2000 the applicant’s lawyer applied to the Fifth Division of the State Security Court, asking it to set aside the decision on the applicant’s continuing detention. In his petition he stated that his client had been detained for a long period despite the absence of any danger that he would destroy the evidence, which had all been collected in the case file, or that he would abscond. The Fifth Division rejected the request on similar grounds (paragraph 22 in fine above), namely “having regard to the content of the case file and the state of evidence”. 25.  On 28 February 2001 the court noted an unrelated letter sent by the First Division of the Assize Court, when it realised that the latest letter concerning the prosecution of the police officers had been mistakenly addressed to the First Division instead of the Fourth. 26.  On 4 June 2001 the applicant was released pending trial. 27.  Of the eight hearings held between 22 October 2001 and 5 May 2003, five were adjourned at the request of the defence. 28.  On 3 September 2003 the court noted that the Fourth Division of the Assize Court had sent the wrong judgment, instead of the one requested. 29.  On 23 February 2004, due to a further change in the representation of the prosecution, the proceedings were postponed to 3 May 2004. Subsequently, the case file was deposited with the new public prosecutor for the submission of his observations on the case. 30.  On 8 December 2004 the court decided to adjourn its deliberations on the judgment until after 1 April 2005, when the new Criminal Code was due to come into force, having regard to the fact that the latter’s provisions could affect the nature of the offence and the punishment to be imposed on the applicant.