8.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in the town of Shakhty in the Rostov-on-Don Region. 9.  In 1994 the applicant deposited his savings with “Hermes-Finance”, a Russian investment company. In 1995, when the applicant came to Moscow to recover his deposit, he found the company’s offices closed. 10.  On 12 August 1995 the applicant lodged a civil action against the company in the Taganskiy District Court of Moscow. The court disallowed the applicant’s action for lack of territorial jurisdiction. 11.  On 31 October 1995 the applicant brought an action against the company before the Khoroshevskiy District Court of Moscow. Citing lack of territorial jurisdiction, on 17 November 1995 the Khoroshevskiy District Court transferred the case to the Tushinskiy District Court of Moscow. The Government submitted that there was no indication in the case-file of the receipt of the claim by the Tushinskiy District Court. The applicant challenged this statement, referring to the “forwarding note” of 17 November 1995, from the Khoroshevskiy District Court to the Tushinskiy District Court, which had been copied to him. 12.  On 14 February 1996 the applicant sent a letter to the Tushinskiy District Court with a request to explain the delay in examination of his case. No answer was given. 13.  In April 1996 the applicant lodged yet another action against the company with the Moscow City Court. It was not accepted for lack of hierarchical jurisdiction. 14.  On 27 June 1996 the applicant brought an action against the company before the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. On 9 August 1996 the Supreme Court forwarded the applicant’s statement of claim to the Moscow City Court, which, in turn, sent the claim on 22 August 1996 to the Tushinskiy District Court of Moscow. 15.  On 5 May 1998 the Convention entered into force in respect of the Russian Federation. 16.  The parties offered different versions of further proceedings. 17.  On 8 June 1998 the applicant received a summons to appear before the Tushinskiy District Court of Moscow on the same day at 2.10 p.m. The summons was delivered by regular mail and put in his letter box. 18.  On 29 September 1998 the applicant found in his letter box a summons to appear before the Tushinskiy District Court of Moscow on 21 September 1998. 19.  On 25 November 1998, on coming home from the office, the applicant found in his letter box a summons to appear before the Tushinskiy District Court of Moscow on 26 November 1998 at 2 p.m. 20.  The applicant submitted to the Court copies of the above summonses certified by a notary public. 21.  The applicant did not receive any further summonses or communications from the Tushinskiy District Court. 22.  On 29 March 2000 the applicant sent a letter to the Tushinskiy District Court, requesting it to account for the delay in the proceedings. On 13 April 2000 the applicant’s letter was returned to him with a handwritten request to specify the date when the action had been lodged. The applicant wrote the date on the same letter and sent it back on 20 April 2000. No answer was received. 23.  The Government denied the applicant’s submission that the hearings had been listed for 8 June and 29 [sic] September 1998 as not supported with the case-file materials. 24.  According to them, the first hearing on the applicant’s claim was fixed for 22 October 1998. As the parties failed to appear, the hearing was adjourned until 26 November 1998. The applicant was advised of the new date and he received the summons on 30 November 1998. 25.  On 26 November 1998 the hearing was adjourned until 24 December 1998, as both parties were absent. The applicant received the notice about the adjournment on 21 December 1998. 26.  On 24 December 1998 the Tushinskiy District Court of Moscow left the applicant’s claim “without examination”, finding as follows:
“The parties failed to appear twice, on 26 November and 24 December 1998; they were notified of the hearing date; the plaintiff does not ask for a default judgment, he did not produce the original documents and receipts, the copies submitted are not properly certified; the court does not consider it possible to examine the case on the basis of the materials in the file.” 27.  The decision indicated that an appeal lay to the city court against it within ten days. 28.  At the Court’s request, the Government enclosed a copy of the decision of 24 December 1998 with their additional observations of 19 April 2004. 29.  In support of their statements the Government produced the front and back pages of the case-file. 30.  The front page contains the name of the court, the names of the parties and the following handwritten notes:
“Received:21 September 1998.Examined:22 October 1998 at 2.15 p.m.26 November 1998 at 2 p.m.24 December 1998 at 9.10 a.m.filed on 19 February 1999.” 31.  The back page contains the following handwritten notes:
“Summons for 26 November 1998Summons for 24 December 1998[Copy of the decision sent] to the plaintiff on 19 February 199924 February 1999 – Archive.”


5.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Chişinău. 6.  He worked as Manager-in-Chief of the State company “Inspectorate for the Transport of Freight and Passengers”, a subdivision of the Ministry of Transportation (“the employer”). 7.  In October 2001 the applicant was dismissed from his job. He brought a court action against the Ministry challenging the lawfulness of his dismissal. 8.  On 7 November 2001 the Centru District Court ordered the applicant's reinstatement. He was reinstated but was dismissed again on the following day. 9.  He brought another action against the Ministry, asking for his reinstatement and payment of his salary for the entire period of his involuntary absence from work. 10.  On 21 December 2001 the Centru District Court found for the applicant and ordered the Ministry to reinstate him. It also awarded the applicant 3,800 Moldovan lei (MDL) (the equivalent of 323 euros (EUR) at the time). 11.  That judgment was upheld by the Chişinău Regional Court on 13 February 2002 and by the Appellate Court on 23 May 2002. 12.  On 22 December 2001 the Centru District Court issued an enforcement warrant which it sent to the Ministry for enforcement. Since the Ministry failed to comply with the warrant within the time-limit set by the court, it was warned and twice given additional time to comply. 13.  On 5 February 2002 the applicant asked the Prosecutor General's Office to initiate criminal proceedings in respect of the refusal of the Minister of Transport, as head of the Ministry, to comply with a final court judgment. In the reply sent to the applicant on 18 February 2002 he was informed that there was no reason for the prosecution to intervene since it was the court's function to supervise the enforcement. The applicant also complained to other authorities (the prosecution service, the President), to no avail. 14.  On 8 February 2002 the Centru District imposed a fine of MDL 900 on the Minister of Transport for failing to comply with its judgment. The court also awarded the applicant his salary for the period of his involuntary absence from work between 21 December 2001 and 8 February 2002, amounting to MDL 2,219 (EUR 195). 15.  On 27 February 2002 a bailiff confirmed the Ministry's non-compliance with the judgment of 21 December 2001. 16.  On 28 February 2002 the applicant complained to the Ministry of Justice about the non-enforcement of the judgment. On 22 March 2002 the Ministry of Justice informed him of the previous attempts to enforce the judgment and of a new request by the bailiff to have the Minister of Transport fined. 17.  On 9 April 2002 the Centru District Court imposed a fine of MDL 1,350 on the Minister of Transport at the bailiff's request. The court also awarded the applicant his salary for the period of his involuntary absence from work after 8 February 2002, amounting to MDL 3,360 (EUR 195). According to the applicant, the Minister never paid any of the fines imposed by the court. 18.  On 12 September 2002 the applicant was reinstated and on 18 September 2002 he received MDL 9,925, representing his salary arrears. On 1 October 2002 he was reimbursed for the legal expenses incurred during the trial and on 31 October 2002 he received the last sum due to him.


6.  The applicants were born in 1970 and 1967 respectively and live in Rajamäki. They have a son, born on 2 May 1999. 7.  The parents chose the name “Axl Mick” for their son. On 8 July 1999 the Hyvinkää Population Registration Authority (maistraatti, magistraten) refused the applicants' application to register this forename under section 32b, subsections 2(1) and 3(2), of the Names Act (nimilaki, namnlagen – see paragraph 16 below) as this form of spelling did not comply with Finnish naming practice. 8.  The applicants appealed to the then Uusimaa County Administrative Court (lääninoikeus, länsrätten, later replaced by the Helsinki Administrative Court (hallinto-oikeus, förvaltningsdomstolen)). They argued that the name “Axl” was common in Denmark and Norway, and it was also used in Australia and the United States. It was pronounceable in the Finnish language and was not incompatible with Finnish naming practice. There were at least three persons with that name registered in the Population Information System (väestötietojärjestelmä, befolkningsdatasystemet) of Finland. Furthermore, they might move abroad later. 9.  The State representative appointed by the State Provincial Office (lääninhallituksen määräämä asiamies, ombudsman förordnad av länssyrelsen) was invited to submit an opinion to the County Administrative Court. In his opinion, the name should have been accepted for registration since owing to increasing international contacts and cooperation, registration of a name could not be refused on the sole basis that it was contrary to domestic naming practice. 10.  In its submissions to the court the Advisory Committee on Names (nimilautakunta, nämnden för namnärenden) considered that the proposed name was incompatible with Finnish naming practice and that the applicants had not adduced adequate reasons for choosing it. 11.  In response to these observations, the applicants maintained that they should be allowed to name their son “Axl” as the Population Registration Authority had registered various other forenames, such as “Minja”, “Tertta”, “Jonina” and “Dersim”, which, in the applicants' view, were modified forenames and contrary to Finnish naming practice in these forms. 12.  The Helsinki Administrative Court dismissed their appeal on 3 October 2000. The court referred to the Names Act, by which a name could be accepted, even if incompatible with domestic naming practice, where a person had a connection with a foreign State on the basis of nationality, family relations or some other special circumstance and the proposed forename accorded with the naming practice of that State. The name could also be accepted for other valid reasons (see paragraph 16 below). The court concluded that the arguments submitted by the applicants were insufficient to allow the forename to be registered. 13.  In their application to the Supreme Administrative Court (korkein hallinto-oikeus, högsta förvaltningsdomstolen) the applicants claimed that it was open to interpretation whether the name “Axl” was contrary to the Names Act. They contended that some priests and population registration authorities would have accepted the name. Furthermore, at least three Finnish persons already had that name. In their view the name “Axl” should have been accepted for their son because it had been accepted for other persons. The name fulfilled the criteria of the Names Act in that it was clearly a male name and could not cause any harm to their son. Further, they had used the name in family circles. 14.  On 20 September 2001 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the decision.


8.  The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Wolverhampton. In March 1995 he was a soldier in the British Army. 9.  On 3 March 1995 the Special Investigations Branch of the military police (“SIB”) began investigating charges against him in relation to the fraudulent misuse of travel warrants. He was due to be interviewed on 28 March 1995 but went missing from his unit. On 20 April 1995 he was arrested by the civilian police and returned to his unit. His commanding officer dealt with the charge of absence without leave summarily and sentenced him to, inter alia, 28 days' imprisonment. The applicant served 23 days. 10.  On 27 May 1995 the applicant was due for release, but his detention was continued because of the SIB investigation. On 1 and 2 June 1995 he was interviewed by the SIB. On 15 June 1995 he instructed his current legal representative. 11.  On 16 June 1995 he was brought before his commanding officer and a charge sheet was read out to him. It recorded one charge of obtaining property by deception (fraudulently claiming motor mileage allowance – “MMA”) contrary to section 15(1) of the Theft Act 1968. An offence contrary to section 15(1) carries a maximum penalty of ten years' imprisonment. 12.  On 4 July 1995 the SIB submitted its final report on its investigation into allegations concerning the fraudulent misuse of MMA and of railway warrants (“RW”). 13.  On 29 August 1995 a further charge sheet was read to him. It recorded eight additional charges of obtaining property by deception contrary to section 15(1) of the Theft Act 1968, charges also relating to MMA. The applicant was remanded in custody for trial by court-martial. 14.  On 15 September 1995 he applied for legal aid under the army legal aid scheme. The legal aid certificate was sent by the Director of Army Legal Services to the applicant's unit on 6 October 1995 and the legal aid certificate was received by the applicant on 6 November 1995. 15.  On 16 October 1995 the applicant requested his military medical records. The records were delivered in four batches between mid-November and 1 December 1995. The applicant's purpose in obtaining these records was the preparation of medical reports supporting his claim that he suffered from epilepsy. 16.  On 11 December 1995, the applicant was released to open arrest. The court-martial hearing, fixed for 20 November 1995, was adjourned in light of the delay in receiving the medical records. The hearing was then fixed for 5 February 1996 as the applicant indicated that he would not be ready before that date. 17.  On 5 February 1996 the hearing was adjourned at the applicant's request to allow him to undergo a brain scan. Hearing dates of 18 and 25 March 1996 were proposed but neither party could make the first date and the applicant could not make the second date. The applicant referred on both occasions to his continuing medical tests for epilepsy. 18.  Given the applicant's allegations of epilepsy, in or around mid-1996 the prosecution decided to have the applicant attend its own medical experts. The applicant did not dispute that he was uncooperative in arranging appointments and that he left certain appointments prior to the examination being completed, even when he had been escorted by colleagues to the consulting rooms. He explained that he was not told that the prosecution had wished to enquire about the existence of his epilepsy. He had also been advised by his legal representative not to attend appointments that had not first been negotiated and certain initial appointments had not been notified to that representative. His appointment of 2 September was postponed by him to 30 September 1996 and that of 25 November was postponed by him to 11 December 1996. 19.  In December 1996 the prosecution received its medical report. It found that there was sufficient doubt about the applicant's epilepsy to allow it to proceed with further charges against him. Accordingly, on 27 March 1997 the applicant was charged with 18 additional offences of obtaining property by deception contrary to section 15(1) of the Theft Act 1968 (concerning the misuse of RW). 20.  However, since the new court-martial system was coming into force on 1 April 1997 (pursuant to the Armed Forces Act 1996), it was decided to proceed against the applicant afresh under that new system. 21.  On 30 July 1997 the applicant's representative was notified that the new Army Prosecuting Authority (“APA”) was ready for trial. By 31 July 1997 the APA had referred all the charges for trial by court-martial. 22.  On 19 August 1997 the Army Criminal Legal Aid Authority (“ACLAA”) wrote to the applicant's representative referring to his letter of April 1996, confirming that legal aid on the MMA charges - which had been initially granted to the applicant's first representatives – had been transferred to the applicant's present representatives and apologising for the delay in that respect. That letter also referred to the additional RW charges and indicated that the ACLAA was currently organising legal aid for those matters also. 23.  On 12 September 1997 the applicant's unit completed the legal aid form for the RW charges, the form was signed by the applicant (by which he certified that all the information was true) and his unit submitted the form to the ACLAA. 24.  On 6 October 1997 the ACLAA requested him to submit certain information omitted from the legal aid form including his capital, his savings, details of the award of damages in his favour in October 1996 (see below) and copies of his bank statements for the last 12 months. He was asked to respond quickly in order to allow the processing of the legal aid application with the minimum of delay. The applicant maintained that he replied by letter dated 8 October 1997. In the copy of that letter submitted to the Court, the applicant stated that his application had been correct, that he had not kept his bank statements and that if they were required it would take a week or so to obtain duplicates from the bank. The ACLAA contended that it had no record of having received that letter and it was not until 21 November 1997 that it became aware that the applicant claimed to have sent a letter. 25.  On 24 November 1997 the applicant wrote to the ACLAA repeating what he had said in his letter of 8 October 1997 but still not enclosing his bank statements. On 26 November 1997 the applicant's commanding officer wrote to ACLAA enclosing the applicant's letters of 8 October and 24 November 1997 and copies of his bank statements which the applicant had collected from his bank under military escort. It was also noted that the applicant had declined to give details of the damages awarded to him in October 1996 but that he had confirmed that he had bought a house for 50,000 pounds sterling (GBP) in January 1997. 26.  On 27 November 1997 the applicant was formally referred for trial by general court-martial. A hearing had been already fixed for 1 December 1997, a date found to be suitable for the parties, including the 56 witnesses the applicant envisaged calling. However, on 1 December 1997 the applicant obtained an adjournment of the hearing because legal aid for the RW charges had been granted on that day. 27.  On 12 January 1998 the applicant wrote to the APA arguing that that his referral for court-martial was invalid as it was not in accordance with the relevant regulating provisions and that it was an abuse of process given the delay to date. A preparatory hearing fixed for 27 March 1998 was adjourned because the applicant did not appear and because the Court-Martial Administration Officer (“CMAO”) had not summoned the military witnesses. 28.  The applicant's claim that the proceedings were invalid was heard by the Judge Advocate on 22-26 June 1998 who rejected the claim. In finding that the delay did not amount to an abuse of process, the Judge Advocate stated that:
“... there has been ... considerable delay in this matter. This has been delay which is just not acceptable. ... In my view much of this delay was caused by an unsuitable bureaucratic pre-trial process. With the benefit of hindsight, some of those responsible for working that process could have made things better by applying a greater degree of urgency whilst operating those procedures; ... One has in this situation a great deal of sympathy with the defence, although I am bound to say that the fault lies principally with the system rather than with the individuals responsible for working that slow bureaucratic process. ... there has been no significant contribution by the defence to this long and unjustifiable delay.” 29.  The CMAO then offered a court-martial hearing date in September 1998 but the applicant applied to the High Court on 14 July 1998 for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Judge Advocate. He challenged the decision (of 27 November 1997) to refer him for trial by court-martial. He further submitted that the court-martial should be stayed as an abuse of process on two grounds: that those responsible for the course of the proceedings had defaulted in their duties and because of delay. 30.  On 4 November 1998 the High Court directed that the judicial review application be made on notice to the respondent party and it was listed for hearing (for a maximum of two hours) on 26 March 1999. On that date the applicant's solicitor indicated for the first time that the judicial review hearing would probably take two days and the hearing was adjourned. It was re-fixed for 27 July 1999. Prior to the hearing of 27 July 1999 the applicant abandoned his challenge to the decision to refer him for trial by court-martial. At the hearing on that date the Court rejected both grounds for the claim of abuse of process. 31.  The court-martial hearing was then re-fixed for 15 November 1999 but the applicant did not appear. 32.  The court-martial was rescheduled for 22 November 1999 and the court-martial proceeded on that date. The applicant pleaded guilty to obtaining property by deception to the value of GBP 15,000. He was sentenced to 14 months' imprisonment, of which he was to serve a further 7 months. The Judge Advocate commented that the delay in the case had been inordinate. He noted that, while the early delays had been avoidable, the delays since 1998 were attributable to the applicant who had used every delaying tactic. 33.  The applicant did not, prior to or during the court-martial, disclose his medical reports. 34.  By letter dated 17 December 1999, the applicant was informed of the reviewing authority's decision to reduce his sentence to three months' imprisonment. On 15 January 2000 a single judge of the Courts-Martial Appeal Court rejected his application for leave to appeal to that court. 35.  In November 1995 the applicant commenced habeas corpus proceedings in the High Court requesting his release on the grounds, inter alia, that he had not been given a formal hearing at which he was informed of the case against him and afforded an opportunity to present his own case for release. In their pleadings, the army authorities admitted that due to an “administrative oversight” the applicant had not been charged until 16 June 1995. Although the army authorities initially accepted that his detention between 27 May and 16 June 1995 was therefore unlawful, they argued later in the pleadings that that detention was, despite the oversight, lawful. On 11 December 1995, further to the army authorities' undertaking to the High Court, the applicant was released to open arrest. In mid-1996 he was released from open arrest and sent on leave. 36.  On 12 February 1996 the applicant instituted further proceedings in the High Court for compensation for, inter alia, unlawful detention between 27 May and 11 December 1995. The Ministry of Defence accepted that his detention between 27 May and 16 June 1995 had been unlawful. Various other admissions were made by the army authorities as regards the failure properly to complete certain reports regarding his ongoing detention but it was denied that such omissions rendered his detention unlawful. The case was settled on 21 October 1996 when the applicant was paid a sum of money and his costs.


5.  The applicant was born in 1977. He is serving a life sentence in prison. 6.  According to an extract from the register of convictions provided by the Government, the applicant had nine criminal convictions and one misdemeanour punishment on record. He was serving a life sentence on the basis of his conviction in 2001 for the murder of two people and attempted manslaughter of another person. Furthermore, he had several convictions for attacking prison officers and other prisoners. In addition, a large number of disciplinary punishments had been imposed on him in prison, including for disobeying orders of and threatening prison officers. In the individual action plans (kinnipeetava individuaalne täitmiskava) drawn up in Tartu Prison and in Viru Prison, the applicant was characterised as a dangerous person lacking in self-control and capable of physically attacking others. 7.  On 3 July 2009 the applicant was informed by prison guard KA that he would be transferred to a punishment cell in the evening in order to serve a disciplinary punishment. The applicant was dissatisfied, as he had been led to understand that he would not have to serve the punishment in question until the resolution by the Chancellor of Justice (Õiguskantsler) of his complaint related to the matter. He said that he would not gather his belongings until he could clarify the situation with a security officer. KA told him that if he continued to object to going to the punishment cell, he would be taken there by force. The applicant replied that he would defend himself if unlawfully attacked. 8.  At 5.45 p.m. KA, together with two further guards, MN and JT, went to the applicant’s cell. KA had a plastic shield and MN and JT wore flak jackets and helmets. KA moved towards the applicant, keeping the shield in front of him. MN and JT followed him. 9.  According to the applicant, KA came up to him and pressed the shield into his chest while the two other guards added pressure from behind. The applicant tried to push back against the shield, while MN and JT tried to grab his hands. Then KA let the shield fall and tried to grab the applicant’s neck. The guards twisted his arms behind his back and ordered him to lie down on the floor. The applicant was brought down and KA pressed his neck so strongly that he lost his breath. According to the applicant, KA pinched his nose with his fingers, covered his mouth with his palm, pressed his knee into his neck and poked him in the eyes with two fingers. While on the floor, the applicant was handcuffed and kicked in the ribs so hard that he felt his left rib cracking. He was then raised up and escorted to the punishment cell. In the corridor the applicant lost his breath, cried that he could not breathe and asked for permission to straighten up but the guards pressed him down and continued on their way. 10.  According to the prison guards, the applicant attempted to hit them and had a scuffle with KA, in the course of which the latter sustained minor injuries. They denied having kicked or strangled the applicant and submitted that he had subsequently threatened to kill them one by one. 11.  In the punishment cell, two nurses came to examine the applicant. They suspected a broken rib and told him to lie still until an X-ray image was taken (for the medical evidence in the case, see paragraphs 21 to 27 below). A guard told them that a medical certificate was required to keep a mattress in the punishment cell around the clock. According to the applicant a nurse confirmed that such a certificate would be drawn up. 12.  At 6.45 a.m. guard OV entered the applicant’s cell and told him to hand in the mattress. The applicant explained that the nurses had drawn up a certificate stating that he needed the mattress around the clock because his rib was broken. The guard left. 13.  At around 8.00 a.m. guards AR, VG, RT and OV came to the applicant’s cell and told him to hand in the mattress. They had a discussion of some length, in the course of which the applicant requested that senior duty officer ML be called. Guard AR warned the applicant that force would be used if necessary. According to the statements of VG given in the subsequent criminal proceedings, the applicant threatened to kill them. The guards left and returned after about fifteen minutes. According to the Government the guards had in the meantime checked with the medical service that the applicant had not in fact been authorised to keep the mattress in the punishment cell. 14.  At around 8.30 a.m. six guards arrived at the applicant’s cell. AR and VG entered, four further guards remained in the corridor or stood at the door to the cell. 15.  According to the applicant, AR came up to him, grabbed his left hand and told him that they were going to take the mattress from him. The applicant pulled his hand away and VG – unexpectedly and without any notice – sprayed pepper spray in his face while AR was attempting to twist his arm. The applicant ran out of the cell into the corridor, covering his face with his hands. Several guards attacked him from behind and he was forced down on the floor. He was repeatedly hit on the back after handcuffs had been put on him. After the applicant shouted that he could not breathe VG struck him a couple more times. He was then raised up off the floor, bent down and guided to the security room. According to the applicant, he fainted several times on the way because his injured rib caused him serious pain when being bent down. 16.  The Government relied on the statements of the prison guards given in the subsequent criminal proceedings. All six prison guards present were interviewed in the criminal proceedings, either as suspects or witnesses. According to AR and VG, the applicant pushed AR when he attempted to take the mattress. Then VG used pepper spray. According to the statements of the guards, the applicant resisted strongly and was forced down on the floor in the corridor. According to VG, he struck the applicant, who was on all fours, three times with a telescopic baton in order to overcome his resistance and handcuff him. AR and RT were unable to give details about the blows inflicted by VG. Nor was OV initially able to provide such details, but at a second interview he stated that by the time he closed the handcuffs, the applicant had not yet been hit with the telescopic baton. AJ thought that the applicant had probably been handcuffed while he was being hit by VG. According to AT, the applicant had been handcuffed but had forcefully struggled and pushed VG with his shoulder, after which the latter had struck him one or two times without much force. 17.  The applicant was then strapped to a restraint bed in accordance with the orders of duty officer ML, as he was still behaving aggressively and offering physical resistance to the officers. 18.  According to the applicant he was suffocating from the pepper spray in his throat but the guards pressed him to the bed, strangled him and did not let him spit. Finally he was allowed to spit and given the water he had asked for. 19.  According to a report on the use of the restraint bed, the applicant was strapped to the bed from 8.40 a.m. to 12.20 p.m. His condition was monitored once an hour, when the necessity of the continued use of the means of restraint was assessed on the basis of his behaviour. 20.  The report contains the following entries. At 8.40 a.m., 9.35 a.m., 10.30 a.m. and 11.25 a.m.: “[use of the restraint measures] to be continued, [the applicant is] aggressive”. At 12.20 p.m.: “[use of the restraint measures] to be discontinued, [the applicant is] calm.” The report also contains an entry according to which medical staff checked on the applicant; the time of the medical check-up recorded on the copy of the report on file is illegible. 21.  According to a medical certificate dated 3 July 2009 medical staff had been asked to establish the applicant’s injuries in the punishment cell. It was stated in the certificate that the applicant had no visible injuries but there was crepitation in the area of the seventh rib on the left side. A rib fracture was suspected. 22.  According to two medical certificates dated 4 July 2009 the applicant was examined by nurse RK at 8.50 a.m. and at 12.20 p.m. after his release from the restraint bed. It is stated in the certificates that the applicant had no visible injuries and did not need medical assistance. According to the applicant these certificates were “fabricated” in order to cover up his beating and were in contradiction with other medical evidence. 23.  On 4 July 2009 the applicant underwent an X-ray examination which revealed no clear traumatic changes. Photographs were taken of the haematomas (described below) on the applicant’s body. He gave a urine sample. Urine test results, dated 6 July 2009, showed red blood cells in the urine. 24.  According to a medical certificate dated 6 July 2009 the applicant had three haematomas measuring 20 by 1.5 cm on his back, a haematoma with a diameter of 8 cm on his right upper arm, a haematoma with a diameter of 3 cm on the right shin, swelling to the left wrist, crepitation in the region of the eighth and the ninth ribs on the left side. The applicant complained that he had been beaten on the back by the guards, complained of pain in his back and said that his urine had been red. The doctor considered that providing the applicant with a mattress was justified. 25.  An ultrasound scan of the applicant’s kidneys performed on 7 July 2009 revealed no signs of disease. 26.  According to a medical certificate concerning the applicant’s examination in a punishment cell on 9 July 2009, there were haematomas on the applicant’s back and ribs. The applicant did not allow the doctor to touch him, was aggressive and demanded a mattress. However, the doctor considered that the applicant’s chronic lower back pain did not serve as a reason for him to have a mattress. She made a recommendation “for further referral to a psychiatrist”. 27.  In a written explanation to the prison director by nurse RK, dated 21 July 2009, she submitted that she had been asked to examine the applicant, who had been strapped to the restraint bed on 4 July 2009. The applicant had complained, as he had already done on the day before, of pain in the chest under the ribs. The nurse and guards, as well as the applicant himself, had wiped his eyes with wet napkins. The nurse had issued a medical certificate stating that she had discovered no injuries on the applicant. At 12.20 p.m. on 4 July 2009, upon the applicant’s release from the restraint bed, she had again been asked to examine him. He had no complaints, save for the previously known complaint of pain in the lower part of his chest. The nurse had issued a certificate stating that she had not discovered any injuries and that the applicant had not needed medical treatment. On both occasions the examination had been carried out visually and the nurse had asked the applicant about his complaints. She had only noticed the haematomas on the evening of 4 July 2009. She had not noticed them before and had not carried out a more detailed examination because this had not been requested by the applicant. Based on her earlier experience with the applicant, the nurse had known that he was very demanding in respect of medical treatment. Thus, she had assumed that the applicant was not suffering from any serious conditions. 28.  On 7 July 2009 the Prisons Department of the Ministry of Justice started a criminal investigation into the applicant’s allegations of abuse of authority by prison guards. The investigation was carried out by Ida Police Headquarters. 29.  On 8 July 2009 the applicant was interviewed as a victim. Between 7 and 28 July 2009 four guards (KA, MN, VG and JT) were interviewed as suspects. Six further prison officers (including OV), a prison doctor and a prisoner were interviewed as witnesses. Reports on the use of the special equipment and means of restraint (shield, helmets, flak jackets and handcuffs on 3 July 2009 and handcuffs and restraint bed on 4 July 2009), and written explanations to the prison director from prison officers involved in the incidents were also included in the criminal case file. 30.  On 23 September 2009 prison guard OV was interviewed for the second time. 31.  On 26 November 2009 the police requested additional information from the prison administration, including the applicant’s medical records and information about the telescopic batons used in the prison. 32.  On 15 December 2009 the police ordered a forensic expert examination of the applicant’s injuries. The expert completed his report on 15 February 2010. He relied on the written materials in the criminal case file, including a report of the applicant’s interview, medical documents and photos of the haematomas on the applicant’s body. He was of the opinion that the stripe-shaped haematomas on the applicant’s back had resulted from blows struck with a blunt instrument such as a stick or a baton, possibly on 4 July 2009. The haematomas on the applicant’s upper arm and shin had resulted from blows struck with a blunt instrument or from the applicant’s body being slammed against it. The haematoma and crepitation in the region of the eighth and the ninth ribs may have resulted from a rib fracture, but that diagnosis could not be confirmed without an X-ray examination. The expert concluded that the injuries in question were not life threatening and usually caused short-term health damage lasting from four days to four weeks. 33.  On 5 February 2010 the applicant was interviewed for the second time. 34.  On 10 February 2010 the police ordered a forensic expert examination of video recordings from prison security cameras. The expert completed his report on 13 April 2010. Having obtained forty-eight magnified and processed images from the video recordings, he concluded that it was not possible to establish the exact time at which the applicant was hit. 35.  On 15 June 2010 the police investigator discontinued the criminal proceedings. She considered that the use of force by the prison guards against the applicant on 3 and 4 July 2009 had been lawful, since he had not complied with their orders and had behaved in an aggressive manner. On 3 July 2009 he had refused to gather his belongings for his transfer to the punishment cell and had threatened to resist if force was used. On 4 July 2009 he had refused to comply with the prison’s internal rules and hand in his mattress. The guards had not denied that they had used force but had asserted that this had been the only way to overcome the applicant’s resistance. The applicant had attempted to escape and run out of the cell. Thus, the use of force had had a legal basis. It did not appear that VG had used the telescopic baton to deliberately cause injuries to the applicant. Nor could it be established that the force used by JT, VG, MN and KA had been excessive. They had countered an imminent attack after a more lenient response had not proved effective and the applicant had continued his resistance. 36.  On 17 June 2010 the police investigator’s decision to discontinue the criminal proceedings was approved by a circuit prosecutor. 37.  On 25 August 2010 the State Prosecutor’s Office dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It considered that the use of force, special equipment and means of restraint had been caused by the applicant’s behaviour, that is to say his failure to comply with the orders given to him and his physical and verbal aggressiveness towards the prison officers. It relied on the applicant’s handwritten letter of explanation to the prison director, in which he had confirmed having said on 3 July 2009 that if the prison officers unlawfully attacked him, he would strike back. Furthermore, according to prison guard MN the applicant had threatened to kill them if force was used to transfer him to the punishment cell. Considering the applicant’s extremely aggressive resistance, it had been proportionate to use force to bring him down to the floor and to hold him there. 38.  In respect of the events of 4 July 2009 the State Prosecutor’s Office referred to the statements of the suspects and witnesses, according to which the applicant had threatened the prison officers. It had been established that guard VG had used pepper spray after the applicant had pushed AR. The applicant had been engaged in an unlawful attack and the use of pepper spray against him had been lawful. Although the applicant’s subsequent running into the corridor could not be seen as an attempt to escape, it had still been possible that the situation might have got out of the prison officers’ control and they had had grounds to believe that the applicant would continue attacking them. To prevent such a scenario, the prison officers had legitimately acted in a quick and decisive manner, including through the use of the telescopic baton by VG. The incoherent statements of the witnesses as to the issue of whether the blows with the telescopic baton had been delivered before or after the applicant’s handcuffing did not allow for a firm conclusion to be made on that point. Nevertheless, based on the witness statements, the prosecutor considered it probable that the applicant had been hit before handcuffing. She also referred to the principle that any reasonable doubt should benefit the accused and considered that it had not been established that the prison guards had unlawfully used a weapon, special equipment or force against the applicant. In respect of the applicant’s being strapped to the restraint bed, the State Prosecutor’s Office concluded that the video recordings showed that after being handcuffed the applicant had remained aggressive and had offered physical resistance to the prison officers. 39.  On 21 October 2010 the Tartu Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s complaint against the decision of the State Prosecutor’s Office. It found that it had been established that the applicant had offered resistance to the prison officers and therefore the use of special equipment and means of restraint had been legitimate. The court agreed with the position expressed in the decision of the State Prosecutor’s Office that the special equipment had been used to the extent it had been necessary to overcome the applicant’s resistance. Thus, there were no grounds to continue the criminal proceedings in respect of the prison officers. 40.  On 6 August 2009 the applicant filed a claim for non-pecuniary damage with the prison administration for his inhuman and degrading treatment on 3 and 4 July 2009. The claim was dismissed and the applicant filed a complaint with the Tartu Administrative Court. 41.  In a judgment of 8 March 2010 the Tartu Administrative Court found for the applicant. It declared the use of the means of restraint, special equipment and service weapons in respect of the applicant unlawful. The court found that although the applicant’s failure to comply with the orders given to him had undeniably constituted a threat to the general security of the prison, the use of handcuffs and his immobilisation had nevertheless not been justified, as there was no evidence and it had not been argued that the applicant had been armed or equipped with a dangerous item or that he had intended to escape or attack anyone. However, the court dismissed the applicant’s claim for compensation, considering that the use of means of restraint and special equipment had been caused, to a large extent, by the applicant’s own behaviour. He had disputed the officers’ orders, engaged in an argument with them, voiced threats and offered physical resistance. In these circumstances the finding of the unlawfulness of the prison’s actions constituted sufficient just satisfaction. 42.  Both parties appealed against the Administrative Court’s judgment. The applicant claimed monetary compensation and the prison administration contended that the prison officers had not acted unlawfully. 43.  At the hearing of the Tartu Court of Appeal on 22 September 2010 the applicant submitted, inter alia, that on 3 July 2009 he had been kicked in ribs once and that on 4 July 2009 he had been hit with a telescopic baton after he had already been handcuffed. Video recordings concerning both 3 and 4 July 2009 were played at the hearing. 44.  By a judgment of 14 October 2010 the Court of Appeal quashed the Administrative Court’s judgment and dismissed the applicant’s complaint. It found that the use of the means of restraint, special equipment, physical force and service weapons had been lawful. The court considered that the prison had been authorised to use preventive measures in case of a probable threat. It noted that the applicant was serving a life sentence and had two further convictions for attacking prison officers. In January 2009 he had also threatened to kill a prison officer. 45.  In respect of the events of 3 July 2009 the Court of Appeal noted that there was no dispute that the applicant had repeatedly refused to comply with the prison officers’ order to go to a punishment cell. Furthermore, he had offered physical resistance and caused minor injuries to KA. Therefore, physical force and handcuffs had been used. Considering the applicant’s unlawful and aggressive behaviour, threats to the prison officers and to the general security in the prison, as well as the short duration (fifteen minutes) of the use of the handcuffs, the Court of Appeal found that the use of handcuffs had not been unlawful. In respect of the use of force, the court found that there was no evidence to prove that the applicant had been kicked, strangled or poked in the eyes with fingers. According to the medical evidence there had been crepitation but no fractures of the ribs. The court considered that pain in the applicant’s chest that he had complained of could have resulted from his resistance, which had led to a scuffle and his being forced on the floor for handcuffing. 46.  In respect of the events of 4 July 2009 the Court of Appeal considered it established that the applicant had displayed disobedience and threatened the prison officers. He had offered physical resistance against the guard who had attempted to take the mattress. Thus, the use of pepper spray had not been disproportionate or unlawful. Since the subsequent use of physical force had proved not effective, it had also been justified to use the telescopic baton in order to have the applicant handcuffed. The fact that the applicant had been aggressive at the time he was strapped to the restraint bed had also been proven by the video recording shown at the court hearing. 47.  On 17 February 2011 the Supreme Court declined to hear the applicant’s appeal.


6.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Amsterdam. 7.  In 1967 her parents built a holiday home without planning permission on land situated in Zutendaal (Belgium). According to the applicant, however, the house was built in 1962. 8.  Following her mother’s death, a deed of partition was drawn up on 6 January 1986 between the applicant (who, inheriting from her mother, became the remainderman of half of the property) and her father. That deed, which specifically mentions the existence of the building, was registered with the Mortgage Registrar at the Ministry of Finance and a registration fee was paid. 9.  The applicant’s father died on 21 August 1993 and she became the full and sole owner of the entire property. On inheriting the property, the applicant specifically declared in the notarised deed of distribution that the plot was a holiday home. The deeds were registered with the local authorities and the applicant paid the inheritance tax. From then on, the applicant paid an annual property tax (précompte immobilier) and second‑residence tax on the holiday home. According to the applicant, it went without saying that her father had also paid the relevant taxes on the house. 10.  The applicant carried out renovations on the house costing 50,000 euros (EUR) and had the trees on the adjoining land felled. 11.  In 1994 the partly government-controlled Flemish water-supply company carried out works to connect the house to the drainage and water-supply systems. There was no reaction from the local authorities at that time. 12.  On 27 January 1994 a report was drawn up by a police officer who noted that trees had been felled on the property in breach of Article 81, paragraph 3, of the Flemish forestry decree of 13 June 1990. 13.  On 22 February 1994 a report was drawn up by a police officer who noted that the holiday home had been erected in 1967 without planning permission and that it was located in a forested area in which no such permission could be issued. The report also noted that the exterior and roof of the house had been renovated. 14.  On 8 August 1994 the applicant voluntarily reported to the police to make a statement, which was placed on record. 15.  By a decision of 11 October 1994, the municipal council (collège des bourgmestre et échevins) asked the planning inspector to issue an opinion on any remedial action to be taken. By a letter of 19 June 1995, the planning inspector applied to the public prosecutor for the site to be restored to its original condition. 16.   Two reports dated 26 March 1996 and 8 January 1997 mention that the police had sought to question the applicant again but had found it difficult to contact her and that she was temporarily unable to travel for health reasons. 17.  At the request of the Tongeren public prosecutor, the applicant was questioned in Amsterdam on 25 March 1997 by a Dutch police officer. A report was drawn up on that occasion. 18.  On 18 May 1998 the public prosecutor asked the local police to confirm whether or not the building in issue still existed. 19.  A report of 16 June 1998 established that the situation had not changed. 20.  The Tongeren public prosecutor issued the applicant with a summons to appear in court on 12 May 1999, firstly, for having maintained a holiday home, erected without planning permission, between 27 January 1994 and 28 April 1999 and, secondly, for having felled approximately fifty pine trees in breach of the above-mentioned Flemish forestry decree. According to the applicant, there were at least four other houses built without permission in the same forested areas, which had neither been the subject of reports establishing that an offence had been committed nor of prosecution. 21.  On 25 June 1999 the Tongeren Criminal Court issued an interlocutory judgment in absentia, since the applicant had not been duly summoned. 22.  On 6 January 2000 she was once again summoned to appear before the Tongeren Criminal Court. 23.  On 26 May 2000 that court acquitted the applicant of the above-mentioned charges. It held in particular that after twenty-seven years the applicant could legitimately assume, as could any reasonably prudent citizen, that maintaining the building in issue would no longer constitute an offence. The court further held that it did not have jurisdiction to deal with the planning inspector’s application to have the land restored to its original condition. The prosecutor appealed. 24.  By a judgment of 6 February 2002, the Antwerp Court of Appeal upheld the judgment in so far as the applicant was acquitted of the charge of felling the trees. However, it found her guilty of maintaining a building erected without planning permission, pursuant to Article 146 of the town and country planning decree of 18 May 1999, and changed the impugned period to between 22 August 1993 and 28 April 1999, having regard to the date on which the applicant’s father had died. 25.  In her submissions the applicant had alleged a violation of the reasonable-time requirement under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, considering that the criminal proceedings had been conducted beyond that time-limit and that after such a long period there had been an interference with her rights of defence, in particular since it had been impossible for her to prove that the house had been built before 1962. She had also criticised the failure of the authorities to act, pointing out that her parents had paid the second-residence tax, that a notarised deed mentioning the building had been registered by the authorities, that she had paid inheritance tax on property that included the building, that extensive infrastructure works had been carried out by a partly government-controlled company with no reaction on the part of the local authorities and that for many years no legal action had been taken. She had also alleged a violation of the principle of protection of the legitimate expectations of citizens and complained of discrimination in comparison with neighbouring property owners. 26.  The Court of Appeal found that a deed of partition drawn up in 1986 and signed by the applicant established that the holiday home had been built in 1967 and concurred furthermore with the findings contained in the report drawn up on 22 February 1994. The Court of Appeal considered that the applicant knew or should have known that the building had been erected without planning permission. As a reasonable and prudent citizen, and even taking account of the attitude of the authorities as she had described it, the applicant could not have inferred that the situation was totally legal and that no proceedings would be brought against her. The Court of Appeal found that the applicant had acted most imprudently by proceeding to renovate the premises after the death of her father. It also found that the fact that four other dwellings had also been erected in the same forested area without planning permission and without their owners being prosecuted did not amount to discrimination. 27.  With regard, more particularly, to compliance with the reasonable-time requirement, the Court of Appeal found that the length of the criminal proceedings had been unreasonable but that this did not alter the fact that the offence had been established and that the applicant had, since 1994, been liable to prosecution. Considering, firstly, that overrunning the reasonable time did not cause the proceedings to become time-barred and, secondly, that account should be taken of the specific circumstances of the case, and in particular of the fact that the applicant had no criminal record, the Court of Appeal merely pronounced a finding of guilt against the applicant. 28.  Referring to the planning inspector’s application lodged pursuant to Articles 149 et seq. of the above-mentioned decree of 18 May 1999, which it deemed to be reasonable, the Court of Appeal ordered the applicant to restore the site to its former condition and to demolish the building within one year of the judgment becoming final, with a fine of EUR 125 per day’s delay. It also authorised the municipal council or the planning inspector to enforce the order at the expense of the applicant in the event of non-compliance with the demolition order. The applicant was also ordered to pay the costs and expenses of the proceedings. 29.  The applicant appealed on points of law. 30.  By a judgment of 7 January 2003, the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal. 31.  On grounds based on a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicant claimed that the length of the criminal proceedings had been unreasonable and it could therefore be concluded that they were time-barred. 32.  The Court of Cassation held that exceeding a reasonable time did not cause criminal proceedings to become time-barred and that, consequently, the Court of Appeal had not been bound to base its decision on that point. 33.  The applicant also submitted that, bearing in mind that the Court of Appeal had merely pronounced a finding of guilt against her, she could not be bound to restore the site to its original condition or to pay the costs of the proceedings. 34.  The Court of Cassation responded that restoration of the site to its original condition did not constitute a penalty but a civil measure, in the same way as the payment of the full costs of the proceedings at the fixed rate, and that consequently these measures were not inconsistent with a simple finding of guilt. 35.  The court also dismissed the ground based on Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 whereby the applicant alleged that after a thirty-year period during which they had tolerated the situation, thus creating an apparently lawful situation, the authorities could no longer rely on the public interest to justify interference with the peaceful enjoyment of her property rights and respect for her private life. 36.  The Court of Cassation found that the Court of Appeal had held, in its unfettered discretion, that the applicant had been most imprudent in maintaining the house without planning permission, that the measure sought by the planning inspector was reasonable and that, consequently, that ground of appeal was inadmissible. 37.  The house was demolished in July 2004 pursuant to an enforcement order. According to an expert, the value of the house at the material time was EUR 62,635. The demolition costs amounted to EUR 3,025.


4.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in the Lviv Region. 5.  In 1991 Mr A. (the applicant’s relative) lodged a claim with the Staryy Sambir Court against the applicant challenging her title to a house which she had inherited under her aunt’s will. In 1993, following the request of Mr A., the court discontinued the proceedings. 6.  On 24 July 1997, following the request of the widow of Mr A. (who had died in the meantime), the same court re-opened the case under the newly-discovered circumstances procedure. 7.  On 6 September 2000 the Galytskyy District Court of Lviv delivered a judgment in the case. On 18 December 2000 the Lviv Regional Court of Appeal quashed it and remitted the case for fresh consideration. 8.  On 18 March 2003 the Galytskyy Court invalidated a part of the will. 9.  On 23 June 2003 and 15 November 2004 respectively the Lviv Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court upheld the above judgment. The applicant received the decision of 15 November 2004 on 29 January 2005. 10.  Subsequently, the applicant unsuccessfully sought review of the case under the newly-discovered circumstances procedure. 11.  According to the Government, in the course of the proceedings two hearings were adjourned upon the applicant’s requests, three hearings due to her failure to appear and three other hearings due to both parties’ failure to appear. The applicant disagreed. According to her, between 3 and 30 June 2000 she underwent in-patient treatment and thus could not attend one of the hearings referred to by the Government. Three hearings were adjourned due to the absence of the judge or upon the other party’s request.


5.  The applicant was born in 1983. His address is unknown. 6.  The applicant and his wife came to Austria in August 2008 and applied for asylum on 19 August 2008. They had travelled from Afghanistan via Iran to Greece. When the applicant and his wife first arrived in Greece they lived in a camp. They subsequently lived with people traffickers for approximately three months, and then in public parks. The applicant claimed that he had queued to apply for asylum in Greece, but had been beaten by the police and driven away. He and his wife had no access to financial support and had had to live in the parks after their money had run out. After four failed attempts, the traffickers managed to take the applicant and his wife to Austria. 7.  In his request for asylum in Austria the applicant claimed in substance to have had problems with the Taliban in Afghanistan. He submitted inter alia that eight years earlier the Taliban had kidnapped two of his brothers. 8.  On 14 October 2008, the Federal Asylum Office East (Bundesasylamt Erstaufnahmestelle Ost) rejected the applicant’s asylum application on the grounds that Greece was responsible for examining it, pursuant to section 5 of the 2005 Asylum Act (Asylgesetz 2005) in connection with Article 10 § 1 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 343/2003 (“Dublin II Regulation”, hereinafter “the Dublin Regulation”), and ordered his expulsion to Greece. It found that the applicant was not facing any real risk of ill‑treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention upon his return to Greece. The authority referred to a number of country reports, in particular those of the UNHCR of April 2008 and of the Swedish Migration Board. It acknowledged the ongoing criticism with regard to proceedings and treatment of asylum-seekers in Greece, but did not consider the applicant’s story of his experiences in Greece credible. The Asylum Office noted the UNHCR’s concern about the difficulties with which many asylum-seekers in Greece were confronted. This applied particularly to the facilities for asylum-seekers, access to asylum proceedings and the quality of the proceedings. On the other hand, the Asylum Office noted that Norway was the only country to have declared that it would no longer transfer asylum-seekers to Greece under the Dublin Regulation. The Asylum Office also mentioned a recent decision by the Aliens Litigation Council, according to which there was no reason to suspend further transfers to Greece. The Asylum Office quoted the UNHCR position paper, which welcomed Greece’s reform attempts aimed at strengthening its asylum system. It further noted that a working group had been established, including members of the Greek authorities and the UNHCR, to tackle the “most burning” problems with the asylum system. Furthermore, the Asylum Office held that the relevant European directives were binding for Greece. Lastly, the Asylum Office referred to a fact-finding mission conducted by the Swedish Migration Board in April 2008 reacting to the harsh criticism voiced by various NGOs. The final report of that mission had concluded that there were no humanitarian or other reasons to refrain from returning asylum-seekers to Greece under the Dublin Regulation. In view of the fact that the asylum authorities of the other EU countries had not stopped transferring asylum-seekers back to Greece, the Asylum Office concluded that it was not necessary to make use of the sovereignty clause in the present case. It further noted that people who had never before lodged an asylum application in Greece and had been transferred to Greece under the Dublin Regulation had full access to asylum proceedings. 9.  The applicant lodged a complaint against that decision, referring again to the deficiencies of the Greek asylum system, the danger of refoulement to Afghanistan and the lack of subsistence for asylum-seekers. 10.  On 11 November 2008, the Asylum Court (Asylgerichtshof) dismissed the applicant’s complaint as unfounded. It found that an accumulation of proceedings under the sovereignty clause would endanger the “effet utile” principle of Community law. Furthermore, the Dublin Regulation was based on the assumption that all member States were safe countries and that a deportation to one of them could not constitute a human-rights violation. Therefore, arguments against such a deportation would need to be especially substantiated. Referring to the report of a mission of the Swedish Migration Board to Greece in April 2008 that showed that all twenty-six monitored cases had had access to Greek asylum proceedings, it found that there were no deficiencies in the conditions of access to asylum proceedings in Greece. With regard to the present case, the Greek authorities had already stated that the applicant would have access to asylum proceedings once he returned to Greece. Again referring to the mission report of the Swedish Migration Board, it found that the support of asylum-seekers in Greece was acceptable. Asylum-seekers were allowed to work in Greece. Lastly, there would be no risk of refoulement. In conclusion, the applicant would not be at real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 on being returned to Greece. 11.  On 30 January 2009, the Constitutional Court refused to deal with the applicant’s complaint for lack of prospects of success. 12.  That decision was served on the applicant’s counsel on 11 February 2009. 13.  The applicant’s wife was expelled to Greece on 25 November 2008. 14.  The applicant was expelled to Greece on 8 April 2009. 15.  At the Court’s request, on 4 August 2011 the applicant’s representative informed the Court of the exact date of the applicant’s transfer to Greece, namely 8 April 2009. He stated that despite being his counsel, he had not received any further information about his client since then. In later submissions he stated that he could establish contact with the applicant, if necessary, via trustworthy persons the applicant still knew in Vienna. He did not, however, provide the applicant’s current address to the Court.


4.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in the town of Taganrog, the Rostov Region. 5.  In the 1980s the applicant took part in a rescue operation on the site of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. As of the late 1990s the applicant has been in receipt of social benefits in this connection. 6.  On 1 December 1998 the Taganrog Town Court (“the Town Court”) granted the applicant's claim for unpaid social benefits and ordered the pension authority to make him monthly payments of 1,850.55 Russian roubles (RUR  approximately 69 euros (EUR)) and a one-time payment of RUR 32,457 (approximately EUR 1,210). This judgment came into force on 17 April 1999. The sums due pursuant to the judgment of 1 December 1998 were paid in full on 8 May 2002. 7.  By a judgment of 4 October 1999 the Town Court granted the applicant's claim for other unpaid social benefits and ordered the authority to pay him RUR 1,850.55 (approximately EUR 69) monthly and also to make him a one-time payment of RUR 85,650 (approximately EUR 3,172). 8.  It appears that the judgment was not appealed against by the parties and came into force on 14 October 1999. The respective award was paid in full on 8 May 2002. 9.  On 29 August 2000 the Town Court examined and granted the applicant's claim to index-link the social benefits in line with the minimum monthly wage using coefficient “1,581”. It does not appear that the parties challenged the judgment on appeal and on 8 September 2000 it came into force. It appears that the authority disagreed with the judgment and refused to enforce it. 10.  On 6 March 2003 the Regional Court, acting by way of supervisory review upon the application of the President of the Rostov Regional Court under the old Code of Civil Procedure which, in its relevant part, remained in force until 30 June 2003, set aside the judgment of 29 August 2000 and remitted it to the first instance court for a fresh examination on the ground of a serious breach of substantive law. 11.  It appears that on 5 May 2003 the domestic courts re-examined and eventually rejected the applicant's claim. The respective judgment came into force on 30 June 2003. 12.  By a judgment of 5 December 2002 the Town Court examined and granted the applicant's claim for damages in respect of delays in the enforcement of the judgment of 29 August 2000. 13.  The court ordered the authority to make him a one-time payment of RUR 39,446.93 (approximately EUR 1,240) and monthly payments of RUR 8,007.74 (approximately EUR 251) starting from 1 January 2003. This judgment was rectified by the Town Court decision of 29 January 2003 and later approved by the Rostov Regional Court on 19 February 2003. 14.  It appears that eventually the authority was ordered to pay the applicant RUR 43,102.62 (approximately EUR 1,353) one-time and RUR 8,086.95 (approximately EUR 253) on a monthly basis. 15.  It appears that the judgment was re-opened and quashed on the ground of new circumstances by the Town Court on 10 October 2003. The court considered that the quashing of the judgment of 29 August 2000 constituted a new relevant fact and quashed the judgment of 5 December 2002 accordingly. Subsequently, the court decided to reject the applicant's claims.


8.  The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Harjumaa. 9.  In April and May 1997 the Tartu Police instituted six criminal investigations relating to several offences of burglary, the forgery of a passport and the unlawful keeping of a firearm. The applicant, one of the suspects, could not be found. On 26 May 1997 the police declared him to be a wanted person. On 7 July 1997 a judge of the Tallinn City Court (Tallinna Linnakohus) authorised the police to take the applicant into custody for two months when he was located. On 27 October 1997 the applicant was caught and taken into custody. On 23 December 1997 the City Court authorised the applicant’s detention until 20 January 1998. However, on 29 December 1997 the City Court granted his request for release on bail. The amount of the bail was set at 42,000 kroons (€ 2,684). 10.  On 12 September 1998 the applicant was taken into police custody on suspicion of having on the same day committed a burglary with three other persons. 11.  The next day the applicant’s arrest was approved by a judge of the Tallinn City Court who authorised the applicant’s detention for 10 days, i.e. until 22 September 1998. The court noted that the applicant had a prior criminal conviction and that he was suspected of having committed a new crime at a time when he had been released on bail in another criminal case (see paragraph 9 above) against him, which was pending before it. 12.  On 22 September 1998 the applicant was formally charged with burglary. On the same day the City Court prolonged his detention until 22 November 1998 on the ground that he had a prior criminal conviction and could re-offend, if released. 13.  In his appeal against the decision the applicant argued that the reasons referred to by the court were inadequate to justify his detention. He had a fixed place of residence and there was no reason to believe that he could commit new offences. Moreover, the reference to his prior conviction was irrelevant, since it was no longer on his criminal record. 14.  On 13 October 1998 the Tallinn Court of Appeal (Tallinna Ringkonnakohus) dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It considered that, although the applicant’s criminal record had been expunged, the fact of his conviction of theft in 1995 was still a factor relevant to his character. It also found it significant that the applicant had allegedly committed a new offence while he had been released on bail in other charges. 15.  On 19 November 1998 the City Court extended the applicant’s detention until 22 January 1999 for reasons identical to those contained in its previous prolongation order of 22 September 1998. 16.  Following the completion of the preliminary investigation on 13 January 1999, the City Court, by a decision of 20 January 1999, committed the applicant for trial and left unchanged the preventive custody measure. It joined to this case another criminal case against the applicant which concerned further acts of burglary, committed in a group of persons, as well as falsification of a document and unlawful possession of a firearm. 17.  At a hearing before the City Court on 19 February 1999 the applicant requested his release from custody, arguing that his health had deteriorated and that he had difficulty eating without proper dentures which had been broken by a police officer at the time of his arrest. His request was refused on the ground of the danger of his re-offending if released.
As one of the co-defendant’s had fallen ill, the City Court adjourned the trial hearing. 18.  At a hearing on 12 April 1999 the City Court refused another request by the applicant for release from custody, referring to the applicant’s prior criminal conviction and his continued criminal activity when he had been released on bail in another criminal case against him. There was thus reason to believe that the applicant would commit further offences if released. The court adjourned the trial hearing due to the ill-health of one of the co-defendants which prevented him from attending. 19.  The applicant’s further requests for release were rejected by the City Court on the same grounds by decisions of 26 May 1999, 22 September 1999, 1 December 1999, 2 February 2000, 30 March 2000 and 31 May 2000. On these dates the trial hearing was adjourned due to the absence of victims, witnesses, defence counsel or co-defendants. 20.  On 4 October 2000 the City Court granted the applicant’s request for release, noting that the applicant had already been in custody for over two years, that he had a fixed place of residence and that the parties had not agreed to sever the charges against the applicant from the rest of the case. 21.  From the end of the year 2000 until the end of year 2003 the trial hearing was adjourned on several occasions for various reasons. 22.  On 22 December 2003, in summary proceedings, the City Court convicted the applicant of burglary, unlawful possession of a firearm and falsification of a document and sentenced him to 2 years, 2 months and 27 days’ imprisonment. The sentence was considered as having been served during the two periods the applicant had spent in pre-trial detention.


5.  The applicant was born in 1986 and is currently held in the Kırklareli Foreigners' Admission and Accommodation Centre in Turkey. 6.  In 2003 the applicant left his home country and, via Libya, arrived in Syria, where he received religious training. Six months after his arrival in Syria, the applicant was detained for two months under the Syrian Government's policy of detaining and deporting nationals of North African countries. After his release from detention in Syria, the applicant left that country in March 2005 and arrived in Istanbul. He then went to Hatay, a province in the south of Turkey, where he began working. His identity documents were stolen and subsequently the applicant obtained a false passport. 7.  On 15 August 2006 the applicant was arrested by police officers from the anti-terrorist branch of the Hatay police headquarters on suspicion of membership of an international terrorist organisation, namely Al-Qaeda. The search carried out in the apartment he had shared with another person revealed some materials used for manufacturing bombs. During his questioning by the police, in the presence of an interpreter, the applicant stated that he was not a member of Al-Qaeda but of Ennahda, an illegal organisation in Tunisia. 8.  On 17 August 2006 the applicant made statements before the Adana public prosecutor and subsequently the Adana Magistrate's Court, which remanded the applicant in custody. 9.  On 18 August 2006 the applicant lodged an objection against the detention order, which was dismissed on the same day. 10.  On 14 September 2006 the Adana public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Adana Assize Court charging the applicant with membership of Al-Qaeda under Article 314 of the Criminal Code and section 5 of Law no. 3713. In the indictment the public prosecutor noted, inter alia, that an arrest warrant had been issued in respect of the applicant in Tunisia for membership of Ennahda and that the applicant had left his country for that reason in 2003. 11.  On 25 September 2006 the Adana Assize Court allowed the bill of indictment lodged against the applicant and decided to hold the first hearing on the merits of the case on 9 November 2006. 12.  On 9 November 2006 the applicant made statements before the Assize Court. He contended, inter alia, that he did not have any connection with Al-Qaeda and that the material found in his apartment did not belong to him but to his flatmate. 13.  On 25 January 2007 the applicant's representative requested the first-instance court to order the applicant's continued detention. He submitted in this respect that the applicant had applied to both the Turkish authorities and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to be granted refugee status and that, if he were released, he might be deported to Tunisia. The applicant himself also requested that he be kept in detention until the outcome of his application for refugee status. On the same day, the Assize Court ordered the applicant's continued detention, taking into consideration the nature of the offence and the applicant's request. 14.  On 12 April 2007 the Adana Assize Court ordered the applicant's release pending trial. 15.  On 19 February 2008 the Adana Assize Court acquitted the applicant of the charge of membership of Al-Qaeda. 16.  Appeal proceedings are currently pending before the Court of Cassation. 17.  On 19 January 2007 the applicant applied to the Ministry of the Interior requesting asylum. 18.  On 16 April 2007 the Ministry of the Interior dismissed this request. According to a document addressed to the Adana public prosecutor's office by the Ministry of Justice on 24 April 2007, the applicant's temporary asylum request was dismissed in view of the offences with which he had been charged and the fact that his presence in Turkey constituted a threat to public safety and public order. It was considered that the applicant had not been sincere in his request but had attempted to use the temporary asylum system in order to avoid deportation to Tunisia. 19.  On 25 April 2007 the decision of the Ministry was served on the applicant. In the documents so served, he was told that he could lodge an objection with the Ministry against this decision within two days. 20.  On an unspecified date the applicant objected to the decision of 16 April 2007. On 18 May 2007 he was notified that the Ministry had dismissed his objection. The decisions of 25 April and 18 May 2007 were served by a police officer who spoke Arabic. 21.  In the meantime, on 3 May 2007 the applicant was recognised as a refugee under the UNHCR's mandate. 22.  On 16 October 2007 the applicant was served with a deportation order. 23.  On 17 October 2007 the applicant addressed a petition to the Adana police headquarters. He maintained that his request for temporary asylum had been rejected on 18 May 2007 and that he had learned that he would soon be deported to Tunisia. The applicant requested that his deportation be suspended since his lawyer intended to challenge the deportation order before the administrative courts. 24.  On the same day the applicant's lawyer lodged an application with the Supreme Administrative Court. He requested the setting-aside of the decision rejecting the applicant's asylum request. The applicant's representative further requested the setting-aside of the deportation order. 25.  On 26 October 2007 the applicant's representative filed a petition with the Adana police headquarters and informed the latter of the application he had lodged with the Supreme Administrative Court. He requested the police not to deport the applicant. 26.  On 26 October 2007 the Supreme Administrative Court decided that it did not have jurisdiction over the case and transferred the petition to the Ankara Administrative Court. 27.  On 14 February 2008 the Ankara Administrative Court requested the Ministry of the Interior to submit a copy of all documents relating to the applicant's case. 28.  On 20 March 2008 the Ankara Administrative Court, after receiving the documents concerning the applicant, rejected the application, holding that the applicant had not complied with the time-limit of sixty days stipulated in the Administrative Procedure Act (Law no. 2577). The first-instance court held that the applicant had been notified of the Ministry's decision rejecting his temporary asylum request and ordering his deportation on 18 May 2007, and that the applicant should have challenged this decision by 17 July 2007 at the latest. The court noted that the applicant's petition dated 17 October 2007 to the Adana police headquarters and his application to the Court would not stop the running of the sixty-day time-limit. 29.  On 20 June 2008 the applicant's representative lodged an appeal against the decision of 20 March 2008. In his petition, the representative noted that the Ministry's decision rejecting the applicant's objection had not been served on his lawyer, who had found the document dated 25 April 2007 in the criminal case file by chance. 30.  On 3 July 2008 the applicant's representative was informed by the president of the Ankara Administrative Court that he had failed to pay the court fees and that he had to pay a total of 161.80 Turkish liras (TRY) by postal order within fifteen days. The representative was warned that if he failed to pay this sum, the applicant would be deemed to have waived his right of appeal. 31.  On 11 August 2008 the applicant's representative effected the postal order and paid TRY 162. 32.  On 24 October 2008 the Ankara Administrative Court decided that the applicant had waived his right of appeal since his representative had failed to pay the Court fees despite the warning. 33.  On 12 January 2009 the applicant' representative appealed against the decision of 24 October 2008, claiming that he had paid the fees. He submitted a copy of the postal order in support of his petition. 34.  On 2 February 2009 the Ankara Administrative Court informed the applicant that his representative had failed to pay the Court fees in relation to his appeal dated 12 January 2009. 35.  On 4 March 2009 the applicant's lawyer paid TRY 175 in court fees by way of a postal order. 36.  Following the decision of the Adana Assize Court of 12 April 2007 to release the applicant pending trial, the applicant was not released but was taken to the foreigners' department at the Adana police headquarters. 37.  On 12 April 2007 the applicant was transferred to the Fatih police station in Adana. 38.  On 12 December 2007 the applicant's representative sent a request to the General Police Headquarters for the applicant to be released from detention. In his request he noted that the applicant was being detained in a small cell and that on 26 October 2007 the European Court of Human Rights had indicated to the Turkish Government that the applicant should not be deported to Tunisia until further notice. 39.  The applicant's representative received no reply to his request. 40.  Subsequently, on 12 March 2008 he filed a complaint with the Adana public prosecutor's office against the Minister of the Interior, the Adana Governor, the Adana police director, the director of the foreigners' department at the Adana police headquarters and the director of the Fatih police station. He requested the public prosecutor's office to initiate an investigation into the persons concerned, alleging that they had unlawfully deprived the applicant of his liberty and that his detention in a small cell for ten months constituted ill-treatment. The representative noted in his request that there was no legal basis on which to detain the applicant, since asylum seekers were normally given temporary residence permits in Turkey. He further submitted that the ventilation was inadequate in the cell. The applicant was completely isolated and there was no provision for outdoor exercise. Moreover, the applicant did not have access to a doctor. In particular, when he had had a toothache he was denied access to a dentist and had to take the medication that was given to him by police officers. 41.  On 16 April 2008 the Adana public prosecutor decided not to bring criminal proceedings against the Minister of the Interior, holding that he had not committed any offence as the applicant was being detained by the police with a view to his deportation. 42.  On 23 September 2008 the public prosecutor at the Court of Cassation decided not to process the request from the applicant's lawyer to bring proceedings against the Adana governor. 43.  On the same day the applicant's representative wrote to the department responsible for aliens, borders and asylum attached to the General Police Headquarters, to the Adana police headquarters and to the Human Rights Commission of the Turkish Parliament, requesting that his client be released from the Fatih police station. 44.  In the meantime, between 1 October 2007 and 3 November 2008 the applicant was examined and prescribed treatment at the Adana hospital on seven occasions. He was examined by an ophthalmologist, a dentist and a general practitioner in relation to his respiratory problems. 45.  On 7 November 2008 the applicant was transferred to the Kırklareli Aliens' Admission and Accommodation Centre. 46.  On 12 January 2009 the President of the Human Rights Commission of the Turkish Parliament sent a reply to the applicant's representative informing him that the applicant was being detained pending the deportation procedure and that he had been transferred to the Kırklareli Foreigners' Admission and Accommodation Centre. 47.  On an unspecified date criminal proceedings were brought against the applicant and twelve other persons in Tunisia on charges of membership of a terrorist organisation, aiding and abetting the organisation and providing financial support to that organisation. According to a document translated from Arabic into Turkish by the applicant, on 12 January 2008 a Tunisian criminal court convicted him of membership of an illegal organisation and sentenced him to five years' imprisonment.