5.  The applicant was born in 1973. He is currently serving a sentence of life imprisonment without commutation in Lovech Prison. 6.  The applicant has been sentenced eleven times at the end of different sets of criminal proceedings. In 2002 the prosecutor discontinued as time-barred others, in which he had been detained during different periods in 1991, 1992 and 1995. 7.  In August 2007 the applicant brought proceedings seeking compensation for his allegedly unlawful detention during the criminal proceedings against him which had been discontinued as time-barred in 2002 (see paragraph 6 above). His claim was dismissed by two levels of court in 2008. Referring to section 8 of interpretative decision No. 3 of 22 April 2004 of the Supreme Court of Cassation (see paragraph 43 below), the second-instance court held that State responsibility for damage could not be engaged as measures and steps taken before the expiration of the statute of limitations cannot be considered unlawful within the meaning of the SMRDA. 8.  On 13 October 1999 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of robbery and murder and convicted to serve a cumulated punishment of life imprisonment without commutation on 26 October 2000. 9.  The applicant was detained and served this punishment in the Lovech and Varna Prisons. He was in Lovech Prison between 17 January 2000 and 14 June 2002, between 12 August 2005 and 20 December 2006, and again as of 19 February 2009, where he continued to be at the time of the last information which the Court received from the Government in May 2011. He was detained in Varna Prison between 14 June 2002 and 12 August 2005, and again between 20 December 2006 and 19 February 2009. 10.  In both prisons and throughout this period the applicant was placed under the “special regime” and was kept in permanently locked cells with heightened security. 11.  The applicant submitted that occasionally he had had to share his cell in Varna Prison with other inmates. According to the Government he was mostly kept alone in his cell in Lovech Prison; they did not provide information in respect of his cell in Varna Prison. 12.  According to the applicant the cells were not equipped with toilet facilities or taps and wash basins. He was allowed to use the common toilet and to wash his hands three times a day before meals. He had had to use a plastic bucket to relieve himself in his cell at all other times. Apart from the daily hourly walk in the open air, these had been the only times he had been allowed out of his cell. 13.  The Government did not dispute that in respect of the period before the autumn of 2008, when works had been carried out in the special security wing in Lovech Prison and toilets and sinks had been installed in each of the cells of the prisoners serving sentences of life imprisonment. Likewise, the windows had been changed. The Government did not provide details in relation to sanitary facilities in Varna Prison. Referring to section 71(2) of the Execution of Punishments and Pre-Trial Detention Act 2009 according to which persons placed under the special regime had to be kept in constantly locked cells and under heightened supervision, they explained that the “special regime” conditions did not allow unrestricted access to the toilet facilities.
(b)  General hygiene 14.  The applicant complained that he was allowed to shower only once a fortnight in Varna Prison. He further claimed that hygiene in the common areas was poor, with rats in the kitchen and the toilet. 15.  The Government did not comment on conditions in Varna Prison but replied that the cells in Lovech Prison had been cleaned regularly. During the period between 31 May 2004 and 7 June 2004 three checks had been carried out in Lovech Prison by the deputy prison director and medical staff who reported a satisfactory situation. The Government further stressed that the applicant had been provided with 0,2 kg of soap for personal hygiene and 0,25 kg of soap for washing his clothes every month. 16.  The applicant submitted that the food served in the prisons was of poor quality and that the cells were too cold in winter, too hot in summer, damp and lacking in ventilation. 17.  The Government responded that the food was certified for its good quality and was prepared and supervised by a qualified cook. The weekly menu was put together by the prison cook and approved by the prison director, by medical personnel and by a prison administrator. Life prisoners received their food in their cells. When the applicant had refused to eat pork because of his religious convictions, he had been given grilled veal sausages with different side dishes. He had been provided with about 2620 calories a day. 18.  The applicant further claimed that medical services were insufficient. In this regard the Government replied that prisoners serving life sentences were subject to periodical medical checks, which took place in their cells for security reasons. If they needed to be examined by outside medical personnel, they were taken to the prison medical centre. The inmates received any medication they needed from the prison’s pharmacy and could purchase different medicines from external pharmacies once a prescription had been issued. All cases requiring urgent intervention were treated without delay. 19.  The applicant claimed that he had been offered no opportunity for social contact or other occupational activities while serving his sentence of life imprisonment. 20.  Without specifying any particular period of time, frequency or duration, the Government submitted that the applicant had been given the opportunity to take part in cultural and intellectual activities in Lovech Prison. He could order and receive books from the prison library which were taken to his cell. He could read a daily national and two local newspapers. The Government also submitted that the applicant could play chess and participate in essay competitions organised in the prison, to the extent to which the regime of inmates serving life-imprisonment sentences permitted. 21.  On 27 October 2005 the applicant brought proceedings under the SMRDA seeking BGN 25,000 in compensation for the distress and humiliation suffered during the period between 26 October 2000 and 26 October 2005 as a result of the poor conditions of detention in the prisons in Lovech and Varna, as well as of the periods of disciplinary sanctions enforced in cells lacking beds, linen, tables and chairs for a total of 40 days in the same period. 22.  In their decision of 8 May 2006 the court found that the applicant, like the other inmates serving life sentences under the “special regime”, had had to use a bucket in the cell for toilet needs. Life prisoners had only been let out of their cells three times a day when they were allowed to use the communal toilets and wash the buckets; during the rest of the time they had to relieve themselves in the cells in front of other inmates. The court concluded that the humiliation of having to use a bucket for one’s physiological needs could only be justified with security reasons. As the Government had failed to produce evidence that there had been a real and serious risk to security in the applicant’s case, the restrictions applied to his access to a toilet had been excessive and beyond the ones inherent to deprivation of liberty. The court awarded the applicant BGN 200 (approximately EUR 100) in damages suffered as a result of detention in inhuman and degrading material conditions – absence of toilet facilities, bed, linen, table and chair, access of light and fresh air caused by inaction of the respondent party in the period 26 October 2000 – 26 October 2005. The applicant was required to pay court fees at the amount of BGN 992 for the remaining part of his claim. 23.  Upon an appeal by both parties, on 28 December 2006 the Veliko Turnovo Appellate Court quashed the judgment and dismissed the claim. The court found in particular that the applicant’s “special regime” required heightened security arrangements and constantly locked cells, which made it impossible to allow access to the communal toilet at night. However, he had access to the toilet during the day-time slots allowed for that and it had not been established that the prison guards had prevented him from visiting the toilet then. While serving such a punishment was no doubt characterized by negative and unfavourable effects, the circumstances of the case did not attract the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice and the prison authorities under the SMRDA since the enforcement of a punishment could not be considered as exercising administrative activities or as unlawful action or inaction within the meaning of Article 1 of this law. According to the appellate court the responsibility of the State for the alleged suffering could be engaged before other unspecified bodies and proceedings. 24.  In a final decision no. 666/08 of 26 May 2008 issued in case no. 1685/2008, the Supreme Court of Cassation accepted that the Ministry of Justice and the prison authorities were the state bodies responsible for the execution of sentences and were therefore liable under the SMRDA for any damage caused in connection with it. It was notorious that the conditions in the Bulgarian prisons were not up to European standards, but these conditions were the same for all inmates. The execution of sentences was in itself accompanied by considerable restrictions associated with deprivation of liberty and the various regimes, especially by the “special regime” as compared to the others, and even more in placement in isolation cells as a disciplinary sanction for offences. In examining such complaints the courts had to take into account and strike the necessary balance between the prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment as set by the Constitution and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights under Article 3 of the Convention, and the inevitable suffering inherent to deprivation of liberty. The court acknowledged the degrading effect of using buckets in the presence of other prisoners, but also took into account the necessity to ensure security and discipline in accordance with the requirements of the “special regime” served in this department of the prison as well as the personalities and specific conduct of prisoners. In striking this balance in the particular case, the Supreme Court of Cassation found that the applicant’s suffering did not go beyond the level of due respect to his dignity and did not require any compensation. 25.  On an unspecified date in 2006 the applicant brought another set of proceedings under the SMRDA seeking BGN 11,000 in compensation for damages suffered as a result of the application of the “special regime”, which excluded him from labour, educational, cultural and sport activities, during the periods 17 January 2000 – 14 June 2002 and 12 August 2005 – 20 December 2006, when he was in Lovech Prison; as well as 14 June 2002 – 12 August 2005 and after 20 December 2006, when he was in Varna Prison and with the exception of the time between 14 July 2002 and 12 August 2005 when he had been allowed to see a psychologist and take part in educational activities once a week, as well as to play table-tennis for 45 minutes on Fridays. 26.  In a final judgment of 23 February 2009 the Supreme Court of Cassation upheld the appellate court’s findings rejecting the applicant’s claim. In particular it observed that the lower (Veliko Turnovo Appellate) court:
“...established an absence of unlawful conduct by representatives of the prison administration leading to the applicant suffering damage. The applicant is serving his sentence under the ‘special regime’ in accordance with section 127b of the Execution of Punishments Act 1969 [the 1969 Act]. Under section 127d in conjunction with section 127a of the 1969 Act the sentence of life imprisonment without commutation is implemented either in separate prisons or in special sections of the regular prisons. According to section 167g of the regulations for the implementation of the 1969 Act life prisoners are placed in permanently locked cells under heightened security. Only after a decision of the commission under section 17 of the 1969 Act can those prisoners be accommodated in cells together with prisoners serving different sentences and can they take part in joint sport, work, educational or other activities. The lower court concluded on the basis of the legislation referred to above that the administration of Lovech and Varna Prisons cannot be said to have failed to act thus causing the applicant non-pecuniary damage. Admittedly, during the period in question the applicant did not take part in labour, educational or sport activities. However, that is explained with the type of regime under which he is serving his sentence and not with any unlawful conduct by the prison administration. The applicant has been involved in individual correctional activities; he had been allowed to spend an hour a day in the open air in a place furnished with sports equipment. As of February 2007, he has been allowed an additional hour for sport. Moreover, it has not been established that he has suffered non-pecuniary damage as a result of the absence of labour, sport or cultural activities.” 27.  The Supreme Court of Cassation concluded that:
“...the lower court rightly held that no unlawful failure to act by the prison administration had been established, contrary to the applicant’s allegations. In order to engage the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice under section 1 of the SMRDA for the prison administration’s alleged failure to act, it is necessary to establish that the lack of action was unlawful, in other words, that there existed an obligation to act and the administration failed to do so. The prison regime is stipulated in the 1969 Act. According to sections 43 and 127a of the 1969 Act, as well as to section 167g of the regulations for its implementation, inmates placed under the “special regime” are mandatorily kept apart from the rest of the prison population. The evidence in the file does not show that the prison administration has acted in breach of the legislative framework regulating the enforcement of the punishment given to the applicant. Mr Hasan refers to Article 3 of the Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and to other relevant international instruments. However, the evidence gathered in his case does not show that he has been subjected to humiliation. The conditions under which he has been kept in prison are in conformity with the statutory requirements regulating the functioning of the places for deprivation of liberty.” 28.  The applicant submitted that while he was in Varna Prison the entirety of his incoming and outgoing correspondence with his lawyer was subject to inspection in accordance with section 33(1)(c) of the 1969 Act. 29.  He also claimed that the prison administration failed to deliver some of the letters to his mother because they were written in Turkish. He further stated that he could make telephone calls only to members of his family and not to his lawyer. Furthermore, he submitted that the visits by relatives and lawyers to him were held in special premises with a prison officer attending the meeting. 30.  The applicant, a Muslim of Turkish origin, claimed to have frequently been insulted on the basis of his ethnic origin and religious beliefs by the Varna prison authorities and in particular by J.V., one of the prison officers. In particular, the applicant claimed that the authorities had addressed him as “dirty Turk”, “gypsy” and other ethnically-based insults. He submitted declarations made by other prisoners in support of his statements concerning the discriminatory comments. 31.  On an unspecified date the applicant complained to the district prosecutor of abuse of office by J.V. in relation to a search of the inmates’ cells. He also stated that J.V. had made discriminatory comments against him. By a final order of 23 February 2005 a prosecutor from the Supreme Cassation Prosecutor’s Office refused to open criminal proceedings against J.V. for abuse of office. As regards the alleged discriminatory insults, the prosecutor stated that they were not subject to public prosecution and that therefore the applicant should have brought a private criminal complaint before the courts. 32.  Between 2006 and 2008 the applicant complained successfully under the Protection Against Discrimination Act on three occasions, alleging other type of discriminatory treatment in prison. In particular the courts found that he had been discriminated against by not having been given meals free from pork as required by his religious convictions; by having been made to put stamps on his letters to State institutions, when that had not been required from prisoners not serving life sentences; and, by having been shaved and had his hair trimmed in his cell, while prisoners with lighter sentences had access to the barber’s premises in the prison. The courts ordered the relevant authorities to discontinue the above discriminatory practices and, in the context of his claim about a failure to respect his religious convictions, to provide to him pork-free food.


4.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Portorož. 5.  On 4 March 1996 the applicant was taken into custody. 6.  On 3 July 1996 after the investigation had been terminated, an indictment was lodged against the applicant before the Nova Gorica District Court. He was charged with fraud, larceny, forgery and abuse of trust. 7.  On 8 October 1996 the first hearing was held. Between 8 October 1996 and 20 January 1997 the court held twenty-eight hearings. In 1997 the court held fifty hearings, in 1998 forty-one hearings and in 1999 twenty hearings. 8.  On 30 September 1999 the Public Prosecutor modified the indictment. 9.  Between December 1999 and March 2001 the court held eleven hearings. 10.  On 13 March 2001 the Public Prosecutor modified the indictment for the second time. 11.  On 22 October 2001 the case was assigned to a new judge P.G. Under the new judge, the court held twenty hearings. Following several motions for recusal of the judge and an action for damages lodged against him by the applicant, the first judge resigned from the case. 12.  On 8 January 2003 the first-instance court decided to try one count of fraud in a separate set of proceedings (K 3/2003). 13.  On 3 March 2004 the case was assigned to a new judge, G.K. Following a civil action for damages lodged against the judge P.G., he requested to be removed from the case (see paragraph 11 above). In the course of the proceedings the applicant lodged several criminal complaints and actions for damages against the judges, the president of the court and the president of the Koper Higher Court as well as requests for change of venue. 14.  On 27 October 2004 the first hearing under the newly appointed judge was held. 15.  On 8 November 2004 the court held a hearing and the applicant lodged a request for recusal of the judge. He also lodged a criminal complaint against him, an action for damages and a constitutional appeal. 16.  During the hearing, held on 11 November 2004, the applicant again lodged a request for recusal of the judge and the president of the court. 17.  Until the end of 2004 the court held nine more hearings. The applicant, by way of protest, refused to participate at six hearings out of nine. 18.  On 10 January 2005 the Nova Gorica District Court after holding over 200 hearings, examining multiple witnesses and appointing one expert, delivered a judgment. The applicant was found guilty of criminal offences concerning fraud and abuse of trust. He was sentenced to six years of imprisonment. Both parties appealed. 19.  On 25 October 2006 the Koper Higher Court delivered a judgment. In its decision the appeal court modified in part the first-instance judgment and found the applicant guilty of an additional criminal offence. The sentence was increased to six years and six months of imprisonment. 20.  On 22 January 2007 the applicant lodged with the Supreme Court an appeal against the second-instance judgment and a request for protection of legality. 21.  On 5 April 2007 the applicant lodged a request for recusal of the Supreme Court judges. 22.  On 26 April 2007 the Supreme Court rejected the request for protection of legality. The requests for recusal were also rejected. 23.  On 26 June 2007 the Supreme Court decided on the appeal against the second-instance judgment. The appeal was upheld and the second-instance judgment amended. The applicant was sentenced to five years and six months of imprisonment. 24.  On 11 October 2007 the applicant’s representative lodged a request on protection of legality challenging the decision upon appeal (see paragraph 23). 25.  On 7 July 2008 the Supreme Court rejected the request on protection of legality. The applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. 26.  On 5 November 2010 the Constitutional Court rejected his appeal. 27.  On 30 October 2006, following the decision on separation of proceedings (see paragraph 12 above) the Nova Gorica District Court delivered a judgment. The applicant appealed. 28.  On 16 January 2008 the Koper Higher Court rejected the appeal. He lodged an appeal on points of law. 29.  On 16 December 2009 the Supreme Court rejected the appeal. He lodged a constitutional appeal. 30.  On 10 October 2011 the Constitutional Court rejected the appeal.


9.  The applicant, Mr Mohamed Nuri Al Akidi, was born in 1961. 10.  The applicant was arrested on 10 September 1993 on charges that he had used forged documents in order to obtain unlawfully an excise tax refund. The amount at stake, in respect of which the applicant was eventually convicted, was 15,294,000 Bulgarian levs (the equivalent of 558,236 US dollars at the relevant time). The applicant had acted in concert with three other persons all of whom later submitted applications under Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention (see Ilijkov v. Bulgaria, no. 33977/96, 26 July 2001, and the cases of Hristov v. Bulgaria, no. 35346/97, and Mihov v. Bulgaria, no. 35519/97). 11.  The charges preferred against the applicant were based on Article 212 § 4 of the Penal Code, which provided for a sentence of ten to twenty years' imprisonment. The accusations concerned alleged false certification of fictitious exports of consignments of cigarettes which in reality had been sold in the country. 12.  On 5 April 1994 the preliminary investigation was completed and an indictment was submitted to the Plovdiv Regional Court. The prosecution relied on 33 witnesses and voluminous documentary material. 13.  The Plovdiv Regional Court sat as a chamber of three judges: a president who was a professional judge and two lay judges. 14.  The first hearing took place on 12 and 13 May 1994 when the Regional Court heard the four co-accused and several witnesses. Some of the witnesses did not appear. The prosecutor and the defence lawyers requested leave to submit further evidence. The court adjourned the hearing. On 16 May 1994 the court, sitting in private, appointed a graphology expert. 15.  Several times during the proceedings the Regional Court had to wait for the case file to be returned by the Supreme Court in Sofia, where it had been sent for the examination of the appeals submitted by the applicant and his co-accused against the Regional Court's refusals to release them on bail. In practice, whenever such an appeal was submitted, the Plovdiv Regional Court transmitted the case file together with the appeal and a prosecutor's opinion. 16.  The case file was sent to the Supreme Court on 28 May 1994 for one of the co-accused's appeal against detention to be examined and was returned on 30 June 1994. 17.  The Regional Court did not deal with the case until 13 September 1994, when the presiding judge ordered the production of a piece of evidence. 18.  The trial resumed on 6 October 1994. The court heard several witnesses and adjourned the hearing as the prosecutor insisted on the examination of other witnesses who had not appeared and in order to enable the accused persons to submit further evidence. Some of the witnesses who had not appeared were ordered to pay fines. 19.  The next trial hearing took place on 29 and 30 November 1994. The financial expert appointed by the court stated that he had been denied access to certain documents and therefore had not finalised his report. The court ordered a bank and the customs office to provide access to the documents in question. Two additional financial experts were also appointed. Both the prosecution and the defence sought to adduce additional evidence. The hearing was adjourned. 20.  Between 20 January and 21 February 1995 the case file was in Sofia at the Supreme Court for the examination of appeals against detention. 21.  The hearing listed for 19 April 1995 was adjourned as the presiding judge was ill. 22.  The next hearing, scheduled for 9 June 1995, was adjourned as one of the lay judges had been taken ill. 23.  On 12 July 1995 the court sitting in private ordered an expert report. 24.  The hearing listed for 21 September 1995 was adjourned owing to the illness of the applicant's lawyer. The court also observed that several witnesses had not been summoned properly and that others, albeit summoned, had not appeared. 25.  Between 3 October and 6 November 1995 the case file was in Sofia at the Supreme Court, which was examining appeals against detention. 26.  The next hearing, listed for 12 January 1996, had to be adjourned as both lay judges were ill. 27.  After learning that the lay judges were prevented by illness from further participation in the proceedings, on 19 February 1996 the Plovdiv Regional Court recommenced the examination of the case with two new lay judges. On that date the court appointed two additional experts. 28.  The new chamber of the court held a hearing on 26 and 27 March 1996. It heard several witnesses and experts. The hearing was adjourned as some of the witnesses had not been summoned due to an omission on the part of the court's clerk and because the parties sought to adduce further evidence. The court fixed the date for the next hearing to 7 and 8 May 1996. 29.  On 7 and 8 May 1996 the court heard several witnesses and an expert. The hearing was adjourned as further evidence had to be obtained. 30.  Between 9 and 28 May 1996 the case file was at the Supreme Court in Sofia in connection with appeals against detention. 31.  The hearing scheduled for 16 and 17 September 1996 was adjourned to 29 and 30 October 1996 as a lay judge had broken his leg and was unable to attend. 32.  The hearing of 30 October 1996 was further adjourned, because the medical experts considered that one of the co-accused was not in a condition to participate in the hearing as he was on a hunger strike. 33.  Between 19 November and 4 December 1996 the case file was in Sofia at the Supreme Court in connection with appeals against detention. In its cover letter to the Supreme Court, the Regional Court drew attention to the fact that a hearing had been listed for 19 December 1996 and called for the return of the case file before that date. 34.  The hearing resumed on 19 December 1996. One witness and the experts were heard. As other witnesses had not appeared, the court accepted the requests of the defence lawyers and the prosecutor for a further adjournment. 35.  The Regional Court throughout the proceedings sought police assistance to establish the addresses of witnesses and bring them before the court. One of the witnesses was suspected of seeking to evade service of the summonses. 36.  The last hearing before the Plovdiv Regional Court took place on 28‑31 January 1997. The court heard witnesses and the submissions of the parties to the criminal case and examined other evidence. 37.  On 31 January 1997 the applicant was found guilty of having forged tax documents with a view to obtaining an unlawful gain. He was sentenced to eleven years' imprisonment. His accomplices were also convicted and sentenced to terms of imprisonment of between ten and thirteen years. 38.  The court reserved the reasoning of its judgment. It was prepared on an unspecified date at least three months following the delivery of the judgment. 39.  On 7 February 1997 the applicant appealed to the Supreme Court of Cassation against his conviction and sentence. 40.  The case was listed for a hearing on 26 September 1997. On that date the prosecutor appointed to act before the Supreme Court of Cassation declared that he had known one of the convicted persons and that he wished to withdraw. The examination of the case could not proceed and the hearing was adjourned. 41.  The hearing was held on 23 January 1998. 42.  By judgment of 16 March 1998 the court upheld the applicant's conviction and sentence. 43.  On 27 March 1998 date the applicant submitted a petition for review (cassation). 44.  On 10 June 1998 the Supreme Court of Cassation held a hearing in the review (cassation) proceedings. As one of the co-accused joined the proceedings at that moment, the court adjourned the hearing to enable him to make the necessary submissions, which he did on 22 June 1998. 45.  The hearing resumed on 9 December 1998. 46.  On 22 March 1999 the Supreme Court of Cassation dismissed the petitions for review of the applicant and the other accused persons. 47.  At all stages of the proceedings the applicant was legally represented. 48.  On 10 September 1993 the applicant was arrested and detained pending trial. 49.  On 22 September 1993 the applicant's lawyer filed an application for his client's release with the Regional Public Prosecutor. The application was dismissed on 1 October 1993 on the grounds that the charges concerned a crime punishable by more than ten years imprisonment and that there were no circumstances excluding the necessity of the detention. In particular, the applicant was a foreign citizen and, therefore, there was a danger of his absconding. 50.  On 26 October 1993 the applicant appealed to the Regional Court stating that he was a political emigrant and could not return to Iraq and that his passport had been confiscated by the Bulgarian authorities. Furthermore, he had been living in Bulgaria for more than 12 years and his Bulgarian wife was expecting a child. 51.  On 3 November 1993 the Regional Court sitting in private dismissed the appeal holding that the applicant had been charged with a serious wilful offence and that there was a danger of his absconding, committing further offences or obstructing the course of justice. 52.  In March 1994 five persons who had been heard as witnesses in the criminal proceedings against the applicant and his accomplices were charged with perjury. Separate proceedings were brought against them. 53.  At the hearing on 6 October 1994 the applicant requested his release on bail stating that he had been detained for more than one year and that he had a family and a permanent address. On the same day the Regional Court dismissed the applications for release filed by all co-accused stating that the charges carried a penalty of ten or more years imprisonment and that there were “no grounds to consider it established that the defendants would not abscond or commit a crime”. The family situation and health condition of the accused persons did not require their release. 54.  On 30 November 1994 the Regional Court refused the applicant's renewed application for release, stating that there were no new circumstances. 55.  The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court. He stated that the authorities had not provided any evidence as to the existence of a danger of his absconding, re-offending or obstructing the course of justice and that the charges against him had been weak. He also submitted that all relevant evidence had already been collected. 56.  On 4 December 1994 the Plovdiv Regional Court, before transmitting the appeal to the Supreme Court, sitting in private, examined the matter again and refused to reverse its decision of 30 November 1994. The court held, inter alia, that according to the domestic law and the Supreme Court's practice detention pending trial was prima facie necessary when a person had been accused of having committed a serious wilful offence. To substitute this judicial measure by a more lenient one would only be possible if there had been “not even a hypothetical danger that the accused might abscond or commit further offences”, in particular, “if he is ill or elderly”. 57.  On 21 February 1995 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal against the applicant's detention. 58.  The Supreme Court explained its practice in matters of pre-trial detention stating that under Article 152 §§ 1 and 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure remand in custody was mandatory for everyone accused of a crime punishable by ten or more years' imprisonment, the only exception being where it was clear beyond doubt that there was no danger of the accused absconding or re-offending. In the Supreme Court's view such would only be the case where, for example, the accused was seriously ill, elderly or in any other condition which excluded the danger of his or her absconding or re-offending. Since the applicant was charged with a crime punishable by more than ten years' imprisonment and as no special circumstances excluding the danger of his absconding or re-offending had been established, there were no grounds for ordering his release on bail. The Supreme Court referred to its practice on the matter. 59.  The Supreme Court further refused to consider the applicant's contention that the evidence against him was weak. It found that it had no jurisdiction to do so in connection with a bail application. Its only task was to examine whether the conditions for pre-trial detention under Article 152 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been met. 60.  At the hearing on 21 September 1995 before the Plovdiv Regional Court the applicant again appealed against his detention on the grounds that he had not committed an offence, that he had a permanent address and had been fully co-operating with the authorities during the preliminary investigation. 61.  The prosecutor objected, stating, inter alia, that under the relevant law, and regard being had to the increase in the crime rate in the country, the court was not entitled to release the applicant or the other co-accused. 62.  On 21 September 1995 the Regional Court dismissed the application for bail, holding that there were no new circumstances and that the domestic law required pre-trial detention to be imposed in all cases when a person had been accused of having wilfully committed a serious offence. 63.  Another application for release was dismissed on 19 February 1996 at the trial hearing before the Plovdiv Regional Court on the ground that the applicant was charged with a serious wilful crime which automatically required the imposition of pre-trial detention in accordance with Article 152 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 64.  At the hearing on 27 March 1996 the applicant renewed his application for release on bail arguing, inter alia, that since all evidence in his case had already been gathered, there was no danger of his absconding or obstructing the course of justice. He also invoked the Convention. The Regional Court dismissed the application on the same day, holding that there were no new facts which required his release and that the length of pre-trial detention was not limited by statute 65.  On 28 January 1997, at the trial hearing, the applicant applied for release on bail. 66.  On 31 January 1997 the applicant was found guilty and was sentenced to eleven years' imprisonment.


4.  The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Makó. 5.  On 8 October 1993 the applicant’s ex-wife brought an action in trespass against him in the Budapest XVIII/XIX District Court, in the context of a dispute concerning the use of the divorced couple’s flat. 6.  On 21 December 1993 and 5 April 1994 this court held hearings. 7.  On 28 February 1996 the court instructed the plaintiff to submit better particulars of her claims. 8.  On 19 March 1997 the case was transferred to the Makó District Court for reasons of competence. On 9 and 23 September 1997 the court held hearings. After a short stay of the proceedings, a further hearing was held on 16 December 1997, which the plaintiff did not attend. After another stay, hearings took place on 5 May and 25 June 1998. On 7 July 1998 the plaintiff submitted additional particulars of her claims. 9.  The court held hearings on 29 September, 22 October 1998, 15 July, 16 and 23 September 1999. On that day the court gave judgment, partly finding for the plaintiff. It ordered the applicant to pay compensation to the plaintiff in the amount of 67,592 Hungarian forints (HUF) plus accrued interest. The court held that the subject matter of the case was the settlement of scores concerning the division of the matrimonial property. 10.  On appeal, on 26 January 2000 the Csongrád County Regional Court upheld this decision. 11.  On 31 May 2000 the Supreme Court rejected as inadmissible the applicant’s petition for review, without examining it on the merits, since the disputed amount fell below the statutory threshold of HUF 500,000, under which no review lay against second-instance decisions.


5.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Chernigiv. Since childhood the applicant has suffered from the second-highest officially recognised degree of disability. In particular, the applicant’s walking ability is impaired – he can only walk with the aid of crutches. Since August 1977 the applicant has worked as a senior researcher at the Chernigiv Institute of Agricultural Microbiology. 6.  The applicant was married to O.M., with whom he had a daughter – A.M. – who was born on 5 May 2002. They lived together as a family in the applicant’s flat in Chernigiv. Y.L. – another daughter of O.M.’s – who was born on 30 April 1994, and M.M., the applicant’s mother, also lived in the same flat. 7.  In October 2005 O.M. moved to live at her mother’s flat in Chernigiv, as O.M. was suffering from cancer and required external assistance, taking with her A.M., who was then three years old. 8.  On 3 April 2006 a lawyer acting on behalf of O.M. lodged a claim with the Desnyanskyy District Court in Chernigiv against the applicant, seeking maintenance payments. In particular, in the claim it was stated that O.M. and the applicant “had not lived as a married couple” since August 2005, that the applicant “had left the family”, that he was not participating in the upbringing of A.M. and was not contributing to it financially. 9.  The applicant submitted his observations on the claim, in which he stated that it had been O.M. who “had left the family” to live at her mother’s flat and that O.M. had taken A.M. with her. The applicant asserted that he was contributing money towards his daughter’s upbringing and that whenever his daughter had been unwell she had stayed at his home in order to protect O.M. against possible infection, most recently from 31 March to 5 April 2006. The applicant further contended that O.M. was in a poor state of health and taking opioids constantly, and that the claim had been instigated by her relatives, in particular by V.K., O.M.’s mother. The applicant asked the court to order A.M. to return to live at his flat as long as O.M. remained in a poor medical condition. 10.  On 16 May 2006 the Desnyanskyy District Court allowed O.M.’s claim, finding that she and A.M. were living separately from the applicant and that he was not contributing money towards the child’s upbringing. The applicant did not appeal against that judgment, stating that he had only learnt of it after some delay. 11.  On 16 June 2006 O.M. died. V.K. took A.M. away from Chernigiv without informing the applicant of the latter’s whereabouts. 12.  The applicant stated that he had lodged a number of complaints and requests with the police, prosecutors, local child-care authorities and non-governmental organisations seeking assistance in his daughter’s return. In particular, he submitted a copy of his complaint of 19 September 2006 addressed to the police and to the Municipal Centre of Social Services for Family, Children and Youth (Міський центр соціальних служб для сім’ї, дітей та молоді, “the Municipal Family Welfare Centre”) in Chernigiv. 13.  In a letter dated 16 October 2006, the Municipal Family Welfare Centre informed the applicant that his request of 19 September 2006 for his daughter’s return had been examined. The applicant was also informed by V.K.’s neighbours that she had left Chernigiv for Andriyivka, a village in the Chernigiv oblast (about 25 km away from Chernigiv), and had taken A.M. with her. The local authorities in Andriyivka were thus asked to assist the applicant in his request for the return of his daughter. The Chernigiv Municipal Family Welfare Centre also informed the applicant that he should raise the issue of establishing his daughter’s place of residence before the courts. 14.  In October 2006 the police informed the applicant that there were no grounds for opening a criminal case on the basis of his complaint and that he should pursue it directly before the courts in the framework of a private action. 15.  On 11 December 2006 V.K. lodged a request with the Desnyanskyy District Council in Chernigiv asking that she be appointed as A.M.’s tutor, stating that A.M. had been living with her since O.M.’s death, that the applicant suffered from the second-highest officially recognised degree of disability, and that she was not receiving any help from him. 16.  The applicant was not informed about V.K.’s request. 17.  On 22 December 2006, in response to V.K.’s request, the Desnyanskyy District Council adopted a decision appointing her as tutor of A.M. on the grounds that “the child’s mother had died [and] her father, who suffered from the second [highest officially recognised] degree of disability, could not take care of [the child’s] upbringing because of his state of health” (“the tutelage decision”). The decision noted that A.M. was living with V.K. at the latter’s place of residence. 18.  By a letter dated 24 February 2007, the Desnyanskyy District Council informed the applicant about the tutelage decision. 19.  On 31 December 2006 A.M. broke her hip after falling from a cupboard in V.K.’s flat. According to the applicant, this had happened because V.K. had left his daughter without supervision for a long period of time. 20.  In February 2007 the applicant lodged a claim with the Desnyanskyy District Court seeking his daughter’s return. On 8 May 2007 the claim was left undecided as the applicant had failed to appear before the court. According to the applicant, it was his lawyer who had failed to attend the court hearing. 21.  In September 2007 the applicant lodged a new claim with the Desnyanskyy District Court seeking his daughter’s immediate return pursuant to Article 162 of the Family Code. The applicant argued that after his wife’s death, V.K. had retained his daughter unlawfully and without his consent. He also stated that V.K. had hindered his contact with A.M. The applicant invoked Articles 151, 153, 154 and 163 of the Family Code and Article 23 of the Civil Code. 22.   V.K. disputed the applicant’s claim, arguing that she was A.M.’s tutor and that her granddaughter was therefore living lawfully at her home. V.K. stated that in October 2005 O.M. and A.M. had come to live in her flat as O.M. had required assistance for health reasons. After the latter’s death, A.M. had remained with V.K. 23.  V.K. also lodged a counterclaim seeking compensation for non-pecuniary damage in respect of allegedly false information the applicant had submitted to the courts. In her counterclaim, V.K. stated that after the death of O.M. the applicant had, “periodically”, made phone calls asking her to return A.M. to him. V.K. alleged that he had verbally abused her, but provided no further details. 24.  The representatives of the tutelage service (орган опіки та піклування) within the Desnyanskyy District Council submitted that the tutelage decision had been taken because the applicant – due to his disability – had not been able to take care of the child’s upbringing, that the living conditions at the child’s place of residence had been inspected and that the interests of the child had been taken into account. 25.  During a court hearing on 19 December 2007 the applicant stated that he wished his claim to be amended to include a request for cancellation of the tutelage decision. The judge invited the applicant to submit an amended claim in writing. 26.  At a hearing on 8 February 2008 the applicant submitted to the court his amended claim challenging the lawfulness of the tutelage decision and asking the court to order the Desnyanskyy District Council to adopt immediate measures to bring about his daughter’s return. The applicant argued that the contested decision had been taken without his consent and that he had not been informed that the matter had been considered. Referring to the incident on 31 December 2006 as a result of which A.M. had been injured (see paragraph 19 above), the applicant argued that his daughter’s life and health were at risk while she was staying with V.K. The applicant relied inter alia on Articles 152, 153, 157, 160 and 163 of the Family Code, Articles 58, 79, 1167 and 1168 of the Civil Code, and Articles 3 and 9 of the Convention on the Rights of Children of 1989. 27.  The judge sitting in the case refused to include the amended claim in the case file on the grounds that the “amended” claim was in fact a new claim. The judge noted that its inclusion in the case would require the participation of new parties and would complicate consideration of the original claim. 28.  At the hearing on 8 February 2008 the court delivered a judgment rejecting the applicant’s original claim. The court found that the applicant had been informed of the tutelage decision before he had lodged his claim with the court and as he had not challenged that decision, A.M. was staying with V.K. lawfully. 29.  By the same judgment, the court also rejected V.K.’s counterclaim as unsubstantiated. 30.  The applicant appealed, stating that the first-instance court’s refusal to consider his amended claim was groundless and that the judgment was not in accordance with the relevant law. The applicant also stated that the court had not allowed him to question the witnesses who had appeared before the court, but provided no details in that regard. 31.  On 10 April 2008 the Chernigiv Oblast Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal. It noted that A.M. had been living “permanently” at V.K.’s place of residence since October 2005 and that, by the judgment of 16 May 2006, the Desnyanskyy District Court had ordered the applicant to pay maintenance to O.M. in respect of A.M.’s upbringing (see paragraph 10 above). The Court of Appeal held that there were no grounds for returning A.M. to the applicant pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 163 of the Family Code, given that the tutelage decision was in force, that A.M. was staying lawfully with V.K., and that the latter was opposed to the child’s returning to living with the applicant because she believed that it would be contrary to the child’s interests. 32.  Relying on Article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989, the Court of Appeal found that the applicant had not produced evidence showing that it would be in A.M.’s best interests to live with the applicant or that it was contrary to her interests to live with her tutor. 33.  The Court of Appeal refused to deal with the arguments brought by the applicant on the basis of his amended claim, since it had not been examined by the court of first instance. In that context the Court of Appeal held that the first-instance court’s decision not to include the amended claim was in compliance with Article 126 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 34.  The applicant lodged a cassation appeal. He argued that, in dealing with his case, the courts had not acted in accordance with the proper procedure. In particular, the applicant alleged that the courts had unlawfully refused to consider his amended claim, that they had refused to summon witnesses on his behalf without stating the reasons why, that they had not considered the applicant’s request for the inclusion of important documentary evidence, and that they had systematically restricted his procedural rights, in particular the right to study the case file and to put questions to those taking part in the proceedings. 35.  The applicant also argued that the courts’ decisions had not been in accordance with the law. 36.  In his cassation appeal the applicant further alleged that V.K. had systematically hindered his access to the child. 37.  By a decision of 9 September 2008, the Supreme Court rejected the cassation appeal as unsubstantiated, finding that the arguments contained in it did not constitute a basis for concluding that the judgments of the lower courts were wrong or unlawful. No further reasons were given by the Supreme Court. 38.  According to the applicant, some of the court hearings had been held in the absence of his representative, who was unable to attend for health reasons. He provided no further details in that regard. 39.  On 1 April 2008 the applicant lodged a claim with the Desnyanskyy District Court seeking cancellation of the tutelage decision. The claim was based on the same arguments as those supporting the original and amended claims lodged by the applicant in the course of the first set of proceedings (see paragraphs 21 and 26 above). 40.  On 18 August 2008 the Desnyanskyy District Court, relying on paragraph 1 of Article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989, Articles 243-244 of the Family Code and Section 2.2 of the Regulations on Tutelage and Guardianship of 1999, found against the applicant. 41.  The court noted that (i) the applicant had not produced any evidence showing that it would be in A.M.’s best interests to live with the applicant or that it would be contrary to her interests to live with her tutor; (ii) the tutelage service within the Desnyanskyy District Council had not had any concerns about the fulfilment by V.K. of her duties as a tutor; (iii) A.M. had lived at her grandmother’s home for three years before the decision in the case had been taken; (iv) during that period the applicant had not enquired about his child’s situation, had not used any means to communicate with her, and had not visited the child either at her place of residence or at the nursery which she had been attending; and (v) the applicant had participated in his daughter’s upbringing only by making maintenance payments. The court held that the contested decision had been adopted in accordance with the law and that A.M.’s interests had been duly taken into account. 42.  The applicant appealed, stating that the first-instance court had not taken into consideration his submissions that (i) V.K. had unlawfully retained his daughter before the tutelage decision had been adopted; (ii) V.K. had been hindering his communication with the child; (iii) there were witnesses alleging that V.K. had been abusing alcohol and “misbehaving”; (iv) V.K. had been responsible for the incident on 31 December 2006 (see paragraph 19 above); and (v) in addition to paying maintenance, the applicant had been sending money and parcels to A.M. by post, as he had not had the opportunity to deliver them in person. Moreover, V.K. had allegedly refused to let him into her house when he had come to see his daughter and had not answered his phone calls. 43.  The applicant also alleged that the first-instance court had refused to question witnesses on his behalf and that he had not been allowed to put questions to the witnesses who had been questioned by the court. The applicant did not provide further details in respect of those allegations. 44.  On 4 November 2008 the Chernigiv Oblast Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal, finding that (i) A.M. had been living with V.K. at her home since October 2005; (ii) A.M. had been under the medical supervision of the clinic in that location since birth; (iii) after O.M.’s death the applicant had not taken charge of the child’s upbringing; (iv) the applicant had not challenged the lawfulness of his daughter’s living with the grandmother prior to the adoption of the tutelage decision; (v) the applicant suffered from the second-highest degree of disability; and (vi) due to his “impaired moving capacity” the applicant had been sleeping in his office overnight on workdays (from Monday to Friday), returning home only for weekends. Relying on those grounds, the Court of Appeal held that the tutelage decision safeguarded the interests of the child, was in accordance with the law, and did not violate the applicant’s rights to educate and support his child. 45.  The Court of Appeal also held that the applicant’s allegations that the retention of his daughter by V.K. had been unlawful, that his communication with A.M. had been hindered and that V.K. had failed to fulfil her duties as a tutor were not supported by evidence and had been disproved by the information submitted by the Desnyanskyy District Council. 46.  The applicant lodged a cassation appeal. He argued that, in violation of the proper procedure, the first-instance and appeal courts (i) had refused the applicant’s requests to have certain audio recordings examined in court and to check the reliability of the documents provided by the Desnyanskyy District Council; (ii) had not included the documentary evidence on which the applicant had relied; (iii) had not allowed the applicant to put questions to witnesses – in particular Y.L. – or to express his views regarding the way the hearings had been held; and (iv) had not observed the relevant regulations when accepting medical information (which he did not further specify). The applicant also stated that the courts had not taken into account his arguments that he had been unable to take care of A.M. because V.K. had hindered his communication with the child. In particular, she had allegedly “hidden” A.M. from the applicant, had not opened the door of her house when the applicant had tried to visit, and had otherwise blocked any opportunity for the applicant to see A.M. The applicant also argued that the courts had not applied the law pertinent to the case. 47.  On 27 January 2009 the Supreme Court rejected the cassation appeal, finding that it contained no arguments requiring examination of the case material or demonstrating that the lower courts had violated procedural or substantive law. 48.  According to the applicant, V.K. had continued to hinder his communication with A.M. and he had not been able to participate in his daughter’s upbringing. In particular, on occasions when the applicant had come to visit his daughter, V.K. had not opened the door of her house. She had also refused to allow the applicant to take A.M. for medical examination. 49.  The applicant alleged that, despite his repeated requests for assistance in obtaining access to his daughter to enforce his parental rights, the authorities had been reluctant to help him. The applicant submitted copies of letters from the Desnyanskyy District Council and the Andriyivka Council stating inter alia that the living conditions of A.M. were satisfactory and that she was doing well at school. However, the applicant had not contacted the school administration to learn about the child’s everyday life and progress. In a letter dated 6 July 2009, the Desnyanskyy District Council stated that it would no longer deal with further similar requests from the applicant. 50.  The applicant also argued that he could provide adequate living conditions for his daughter, being a physiologist with a teaching qualification; he had sufficient income and owned a flat. The applicant also stated that he had been a tutor to Y. L. 51.  According to the applicant, his daughter’s living conditions at V.K.’s place of residence were worse than the conditions at his home, V.K.’s house in Andriyivka having no sanitary facilities or no natural gas supply. The applicant explained that the school which his daughter attended was about to be closed on the grounds of having too few pupils. The school was two kilometres away from V.K.’s house, whereas the applicant’s house was only about two hundred metres from a school.


5.  The first and fifth applicants were born in 1960. The second applicant was born in 1959. The third applicant was born in 1969. The fourth applicant was born in 1945. The sixth applicant was born in 1965. The applicants are nationals of Ukraine and reside in Beryslav, the Kherson Region. 6.  In April 1998 the applicants initiated proceedings in the Beryslav City Court (the “Beryslav Court”) against the Department of Education of the Beryslav Municipal Council (the “Department”), seeking to recover an additional salary payment allegedly due to them for their time-in-service. 7.  On 13 May 1998 the Beryslav Court allowed the applicants' claims and ordered the Department to pay the applicants the additional salary (time-in-service bonuses). In particular, it ordered that the first applicant be paid UAH 570.85[1] in compensation, the second – UAH 367.52[2], the third – UAH 204.3[3], the fourth – UAH 863.4[4], the fifth – UAH 561.4[5], and the sixth applicant – UAH 292.3[6]. 8.  On 18 May 1998 the Beryslav City Bailiffs' service (the “Bailiffs”) initiated enforcement proceedings for the judgment of 13 May 1998. 9.  On 2 August 1999 the Beryslav Court suspended the execution of the judgment for three months due to the lack of funds in the budget of the Department. 10.  On 7 March 2001 the Bailiffs informed the applicants that the Beryslav Court had suspended the execution of the judgment of 13 May 1998. On 13 August 2002 the Bailiffs informed the applicants that the judgment of 13 May 1998 would be executed when the State had provided the necessary budgetary funding. The judgment remained unenforced due to the Department's lack of funds. 11.  On 31 July 2003 the amounts due to them pursuant to the judgment of 13 May 1998 were transferred to the applicants. They received the following amounts (the initial sums awarded by that judgment having been subjected to taxation): the first applicant – UAH 401.2[7], the second applicant – UAH 276.35[8], the third applicant – UAH 173.18[9], the fourth applicant – UAH 640.46[10], the fifth applicant – UAH 419.94[11], and the sixth applicant – UAH 242.98[12].