4.  The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Lublin. 5.  The applicant was arrested on 31 January 2001 on suspicion of fraud. On 2 February 2001 the Warsaw District Court ordered his detention on remand in view of the reasonable suspicion that he had committed aggravated fraud. It relied on the severity of the anticipated penalty and the fact that the applicant had been previously convicted. In addition, the District Court found that there was the risk that the applicant would abscond, given that he had no permanent abode in the country. 6.  On 27 April 2001 the District Court prolonged the applicant’s detention until 30 July 2001, relying on the same grounds as in the first detention order. It observed that the applicant had not registered a permanent residence anywhere in the country. 7.  On 9 May 2001 the applicant was questioned by the prosecutor. On 8 June 2001 the prosecutor ordered that evidence be obtained from psychiatrists to establish whether the applicant had acted in a state of diminished responsibility. The relevant reports were submitted on 18 June and 5 September 2001. 8.  On 20 July 2001 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention. In addition to the grounds previously invoked, it ruled that the prolongation of his detention was justified by the need to obtain further evidence. In its decision of 18 September 2001 prolonging the applicant’s detention until 30 November 2001, the District Court invoked for the first time the risk that the applicant might interfere with the proceedings and attempt to influence witnesses. 9.  On 10 November 2001 the prosecution filed with the Warsaw District Court a bill of indictment against the applicant and one other suspect. The applicant was charged with four counts of fraud. The prosecution requested the court to hear twenty-nine witnesses and two experts. 10.  On 22 November 2001 the District Court ordered that the applicant be held in detention until 30 April 2002. It considered that no other preventive measure could secure the proper conduct of the proceedings, having regard to the severity of the penalty faced by the applicant and the fact that he had no permanent abode in Poland. 11.  On 25 April 2002 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 30 August 2002. In addition to the grounds previously invoked, it held that there was a risk that the applicant might attempt to influence some of the witnesses who had been in close personal or business relations with him. 12.  On 20 June 2002 the trial court held the first hearing and heard evidence from the applicant and his co-accused. 13.  The applicant’s detention was subsequently prolonged on 28 August 2002 (until 31 January 2003). 14.  In the meantime the period of his detention pending trial had exceeded the two-year time-limit set out in Article 263 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Consequently, on 28 January 2003 the Warsaw Court of Appeal ordered that the applicant be kept in custody until 31 July 2003. It found, inter alia, that the nature of the charge against the applicant might prompt him to influence the witnesses. In addition, it observed that the trial could not be concluded on account of the applicant’s conduct, and not for reasons attributable to the trial court. It also stated that the trial court should endeavour to conclude the trial by 31 July 2003. 15.  The applicant’s appeal against that decision was dismissed by a different panel of the Court of Appeal on 4 March 2003. The Court of Appeal found that the applicant had attempted to influence the testimony of his wife as transpired from his letter to her which had been intercepted. Furthermore, it ruled that the applicant’s detention was justified by the fact that he had not lived at the place of his registered permanent residence and that he had been changing addresses and names of his companies without notifying creditors. The Court of Appeal also found that the prolongation was justified by the complexity of the case and the volume of evidence to be heard. 16.  On 7 March 2003 the Warsaw District Court dismissed the applicant’s request for the trial court’s judges to withdraw from examining his case. 17.  From 23 April to 14 May 2003 the applicant underwent medical treatment in the Łódź Detention Centre. Hearings scheduled for 7 and 13 May 2003 were cancelled due to the applicant’s treatment. 18.  On 25 July 2003 the Court of Appeal extended the applicant’s detention until 31 October 2003, invoking the same grounds as previously. 19.  On 24 October 2003 the Court of Appeal prolonged the applicant’s detention until 30 November 2003. It found that a judgment could not be delivered before 31 October 2003 because of the illness of a lay member of the trial court and a problem with securing the presence of an important witness. 20.  The trial court held about 23 hearings. Four hearings (25 April and 23 May 2002; 10 March, 15 April 2003) were adjourned because the applicant had not been brought by the police to court from a detention centre. It appears that seven hearings were adjourned due to the absence of the applicant’s counsel (25 April, 28 August, 2 October, 22 November and 17 December 2002; 20 and 26 March 2003). Three further hearings were adjourned on account of the illness of a lay judge (18 July and 20 November 2002; 25 September 2003). One hearing was adjourned at the applicant’s request (15 January 2003). On 23 April 2003 the trial court adjourned the hearing due to the absence of witnesses. 21.  During the investigation and the trial the applicant filed a number of unsuccessful applications for release and appealed, likewise unsuccessfully, against decisions prolonging his detention. 22.  On 27 October 2003 the Warsaw District Court delivered its judgment. It convicted the applicant of three counts of fraud and sentenced him to six years and six months’ imprisonment and a fine. 23.  The applicant appealed. On 3 August 2004 the Warsaw Regional Court upheld the first-instance judgment. 24.  On 12 January 2006 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s cassation appeal as manifestly ill-founded. 25.  On 29 November 2004 the applicant filed with the President of the Warsaw Regional Court a complaint about a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time and asked for compensation. He relied specifically on section 18 of the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaints about a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time (“the 2004 Act”) which entered into force on 17 September 2004. 26.  However, on 13 January 2005 the Warsaw Regional Court decided not to take cognisance of the applicant’s complaint, pursuant to section 5 of the 2004 Act. It held that the complaint about the unreasonable length of the proceedings had to be lodged during the course of the impugned proceedings. However, in the applicant’s case the complaint could not be examined since the impugned proceedings were terminated by the judgment of the Warsaw Regional Court of 3 August 2004.


4.  The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Prague. She is the co-owner of a building and plot of land in the Strakonice region. 5.  On 21 September 1988 the other owner instituted civil proceedings before the Strakonice District Court, seeking the termination of the co-ownership arrangement and the assignment of entire property to him. On 31 October 1988 the District Court heard the co-owner. Another hearing was scheduled for 16 November 1988 but, as the applicant failed to attend, it was adjourned. On 13 December 1988 the applicant was heard by the Prague 6 District Court at the request of the Strakonice District Court. 6.  On 14 February 1989 the District Court appointed an expert in order to determine the manner in which the property should be divided. The report was submitted on 6 April 1989. 7.  Three other hearings were held by the District Court on 23 and 30 October 1990 and 7 January 1991. 8.  On 18 July 1991 the District Court ordered an on-site visit to the property. 9.  On 16 March and 14 April 1992 the applicant requested the District Court to explain why her case was not progressing. On 4 September 1992 she filed a complaint with the Ministry of Justice alleging unreasonable delays in the proceedings. 10.  On 25 September 1992 the President of the České Budějovice Regional Court (krajský soud) admitted that her complaint was justified, but explained that the District Court had serious staffing problems. 11.  On 17 June 1993 the applicant again complained of delays to the President of the Regional Court. 12.  On 9 July 1993 a geometric plan was submitted upon the District Court's request of 7 May 1992. 13.  On 5 August 1993 the District Court held a hearing at which the applicant presented her proposal for the division of the property. She finalised her proposal on 23 August 1993. Another hearing was held on 30 September 1993, but was adjourned because the professional licence of the expert had to be verified. 14.  On 25 October 1993 the District Court carried out an on-site visit to the property. On the same day, it adjourned the proceedings pending the production of the reports on the division of the property and its value. 15.  On 6 June 1994 the court appointed an expert to assess the value of the property. 16.  The next hearing was held before the District Court on 27 July 1995. At that hearing the parties disagreed on how to divide the property and settle the co-ownership issue. 17.  On an unspecified date in 1994 the case was assigned to another judge. 18.  A hearing held on 1 August 1995 was adjourned because a new expert had to be appointed to determine the manner in which the property should be divided. 19.  On 16 February 1996 the applicant complained of delays in the proceedings to the Regional Court and, on 7 March 1996, to the President of the District Court. On 28 February 1996 she was informed by the latter that the length of the proceedings was due to the complex nature of the case and the judge's inexperience. 20.  On 12 April 1996 the District Court appointed a third expert to determine the manner in which the property should be divided. A hearing held on 23 June 1996 was adjourned because the expert report had not yet been submitted. This report was submitted on 24 July 1996 and sent to the applicant on 14 October 1996. The latter challenged the expert's impartiality on 19 November 1996. On 10 December 1996 the other owner of the property submitted his comments on the evaluation made of the property. 21.  On 30 April and 23 June 1997 two hearings were held by the District Court which, on 28 August 1997, appointed an expert to carry out an on-site examination of the property by 17 October 1997. According to the Government, these hearings were adjourned at the applicant's request. On 23 October 1997 the expert submitted his conclusions. 22.  On 25 February 1998 the court held a hearing at which the expert was heard. The hearing was then adjourned because a new expert had to be appointed to determine the value of the property. The applicant was invited to submit her opinion in this connection. She submitted her opinion on 30 July 1998, after having been urged to so. On 16 October 1998, after the case had been assigned to a third judge, an on-site examination of the property was carried out on 14 October 1998 in the presence of the expert. On 3 November 1998 the court ordered an expert report to evaluate the property. 23.  On an unspecified date in 1999 the case was assigned to a fourth judge. 24.  On 15 February 1999 the expert on property division matters inspected the premises. On 9 March 1999 he presented his report to the court which, on 12 July 1999, held a hearing. On 30 August 1999 it appointed, at the parties' suggestion, an expert to assess the market value of the property and its sale price. On 11 November 1999 the expert submitted his report. According to the Government, the applicant's proposal to commission a new expert report was dismissed. 25.  On 12 January 2000 a hearing was held before the District Court, but the applicant could not attend since he was ill. Another hearing took place on 10 February 2000 and was adjourned until 12 May 2000. 26.  By a judgment of 17 July 2000 the court terminated the co-ownership, assigning the property to the other owner, who was ordered to pay CZK 127,500 (4,060 euros (EUR)) to the applicant in compensation for her share of the property. 27.  On 2 March 2001 the Regional Court upheld the merits of this judgment.


4.  The applicant was born in 1972 and lived in Bolshaya Kivara in the Republic of Udmurtiya before his arrest. 5.  On 13 July 2005 the applicant was arrested and charged with murder. 6.  On 18 April 2006 the Supreme Court of the Republic of Udmurtiya, at final instance, found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to fifteen years and six months’ imprisonment. 7.  During several periods between 13 July 2005 and 19 January 2007, for a total length of sixty-one day, the applicant was held in IVS Votkinsk, a temporary detention facility located in the Udmurtiya Republic. According to the applicant and the statements by his three cellmates, the conditions of detention in that facility were as follows. The applicant’s cell, located on the basement floor, was overcrowded: it measured 8 sq. m and accommodated up to five inmates. There were no individual beds, mattresses or bed linen. The detainees were afforded one meal per day. No outdoor exercise was available to them. 8.  On 14 July 2005 the sanitary-epidemiological service inspected the detention facility. In their report, drafted on the same day, they noted that the IVS held sixty-three detainees which was nearly twice its design capacity, that there was no heating and restricted access to daylight. The general sanitary state of the facility was poor. The service recommended to the management of the facility to bring the conditions in line with the legal requirements. 9.  It appears that the applicant complained about the conditions of his detention to various authorities. In his reply of 27 November 2006 the local prosecutor acknowledged some of his claims and informed the applicant that he had directed the management of the detention facility to upgrade the conditions. 10.  On 23 October 2007 the Votkinsk Town Court of the Republic of Udmurtiya examined the applicant’s civil action in connection with inadequate conditions of detention. It found that a part of the allegations, in particular those concerning an overcrowding of the facility, a lack of bedding and poor sanitary conditions, were substantiated but rejected the claim. 11.  On 19 June 2006 the applicant lodged his first letter to the Court, complaining about violations of Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention in the criminal proceedings against him. 12.  On 17 August 2006 the applicant despatched the completed application form. 13.  In his letter of 3 April 2007 the applicant gave a detailed account of the conditions of his detention in IVS Votkinsk, alleging that they violated Article 3 of the Convention. 14.  By letter of 23 May 2012, the Registry informed the applicant that his complaint had been more than ten pages long and, referring to the provisions of the Rules of Court and the Practice Direction on Institution of Proceedings, requested him to submit a summary application form listing the complaints which he wished to pursue. 15.  Complying with the above request, on 6 August 2012 the applicant lodged the application form. It contained, in particular, the complaint about the conditions of his detention in IVS Votkinsk.


5.  The applicant was born in 1934 and lives in Chmielno. 6.  On an unspecified date the applicant applied to the Polish-German Reconciliation Foundation (“the Foundation”) for compensation on the ground that he and his parents had been deported to Germany with a view to performing forced labour in agriculture. That request was made under the scheme for slave and forced labourers (“the second compensation scheme”) established under the Joint Statement of 17 July 2000, the German Law of 2 August 2000 on the Creation of the “Remembrance, Responsibility and Future” Foundation (“the German Foundation Act”; “the GFA”) and the subsequent Agreement of 16 February 2001 between the Remembrance, Responsibility and Future Foundation (“the German Foundation”) and the Polish-German Reconciliation Foundation. 7.  On 3 September 2003 the Foundation's Verification Commission decided that the applicant was not eligible for compensation. It informed him that under section 11 of the GFA only those forced labourers who had been deported to Germany or to an area occupied by it had been eligible for compensation. In the case of citizens of the Third Reich or persons placed on the List of German Nationals (Deutsche Volksliste; niemiecka grupa narodowościowa) their assignment to work by the German authorities was not considered compulsory. The Verification Commission established on the basis of documentary evidence that the applicant's parents had been placed on the List of German Nationals and that accordingly their assignment to work in Germany had not been compulsory. 8.  On 27 October 2003 the applicant appealed against that decision. He strongly contested the Verification Commission's finding that the assignment to work of the persons who had belonged to the German Nationals' List had not been compulsory. He submitted that the farm of his parents had been sequestered by the German authorities without compensation. Subsequently, the applicant and his parents had been placed in the Jabłonów germanization camp. On account of his internment in the camp as a child the applicant was granted a veteran status by the Polish authorities. The applicant further argued that the seizure of his parents' prosperous farm without payment of compensation had been certainly effected against their will, as had been their transfer to work on a farm in Germany. He submitted that the placement on the German Nationals' List had resulted in most cases from various forms of coercion, in particular in Silesia and Pomerania where his family had been from. He concluded that his and his parents' deportation to perform forced labour in Germany had been compulsory. 9.  On 20 August 2004 the Foundation's Appeal Commission dismissed the applicant's appeal. It reiterated that the applicant had not met the conditions specified in section 11 of the GFA. The Appeal Commission did not reason its decision. 10.  On 29 November 2004 the applicant filed an appeal against that decision with the Appeal Commission for transmission to the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court. Since the appeal had not been transmitted, on 3 October 2005 the applicant made an application to the administrative court to impose a fine on the Appeal Commission. 11.  On 19 October 2005 the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court rejected his application, finding that it did not have jurisdiction to examine appeals against decisions or inactivity of the Foundation. The court relied on the Supreme Administrative Court's Resolution of 3 December 2001 (no. OPS 3/01; see paragraph 37 below). 12.  On 6 January 2006 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's appeal against the Regional Administrative Court's decision. 13.  On 18 April 2006 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint, alleging that the exclusion of the administrative court's jurisdiction in respect of the Foundation's decision had violated Article 45 § 1 of the Constitution, that provision guaranteeing access to court. 14.  On 14 November 2007 the Constitutional Court discontinued the proceedings on procedural grounds (case no. SK 53/06). It found that the claimant had not obtained a “final decision” within the meaning of Article 79 of the Constitution, since he had mistakenly seized the administrative courts and not the civil courts to pursue his appeal against the Foundation's decision. The Constitutional Court relied on the constitutional presumption in favour of jurisdiction of the civil courts and the Supreme Court's Resolution of 27 June 2007 (see paragraph 38 below).


8.  The applicants were born in 1930 and 1933 respectively and live in Bucharest. 9.  The facts of the case specific to each application, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 10.  In 1996 the applicants brought before the Bucharest District Court an action for recovery of possession in respect of property that had been nationalised by Decree no. 92/1950. Situated in Bucharest, at 184-B Calea Griviţei, the property consisted of a house divided into flats and the land on which it was built. At the time, one of the flats was occupied by E.D. under a tenancy agreement entered into with the State in 1986 and extended until 8 April 1999 pursuant to Law no. 17/1994 of 18 April 1994. 11.  In a final judgment of 2 April 1997, the court allowed the applicants’ action on the ground that the nationalisation of the property had been illegal and ordered the competent administrative authorities to return the property to them. On that date the applicants began to pay the rates and land taxes levied on their property.
(b)  Steps taken to enter into a tenancy agreement with the tenant E.D. 12.  On 26 August 1998 the applicants notified E.D. of the judgment of 2 April 1997 through the intermediary of a bailiff and by registered letter with return receipt, in accordance with Law no. 114/1996 of 11 October 1996. In their notice, the applicants requested E.D. to enter into a tenancy agreement with them, as the new owners of the flat that E.D. occupied, and informed her, for the payment of the rent, of the details of a bank account in their names with the Savings Bank. 13.  In May 1999, after the entry into force of Government Emergency Ordinance no. 40/1999 of 8 April 1999, the applicants visited E.D., who had declined to respond to their request, with a view to entering into a tenancy agreement with her; they were faced with a categorical refusal on the part of E.D.
(c)  First set of eviction proceedings against E.D. 14.  On 25 August 1999 the applicants brought proceedings for the eviction of E.D. in the Bucharest District Court. They claimed that E.D. was occupying their property without any right of tenancy and had refused to enter into a tenancy agreement with them or to pay them rent in that connection. They further complained that E.D. had been breeding pigs in the basement of the house, thus damaging it and rendering it insalubrious. 15.  In a judgment of 9 January 2000, the District Court granted their application and ordered the eviction of E.D. from the disputed property. It found that E.D. had not requested an extension of her tenancy of the flat occupied by her and her family, which she had been entitled to do under Article 2 of Government Emergency Ordinance no. 40/1999 and which would have enabled her to enter into an agreement with the new landlords. The court further observed that the applicants had not complied with the obligation under Article 10 § 1 of the Ordinance to notify the tenant, within a period of thirty days from the entry into force of the Ordinance, through the intermediary of a bailiff and by registered letter with return receipt, of the date and place fixed for the signing of a tenancy agreement. 16.  Whilst the court observed that, under Article 11 § 1 of the Ordinance, failure by a landlord to comply with those formalities resulted in the extension of the previous tenancy until the signing of a new agreement, it nevertheless considered that this provision was not applicable in the present case in view of the exception provided for by Article 13 (d) of the Ordinance whereby there was no extension in the event of a dispute arising from a tenant’s refusal to enter into a tenancy agreement with the new landlord. The court thus considered that the applicants had adduced evidence of the refusal by E.D. to enter into such an agreement. Accordingly, it held that that existing tenancy agreement had not been extended and that E.D. was occupying the applicants’ property without any right of tenancy. 17.  In a judgment of 11 May 2000, the Bucharest County Court upheld the merits of that judgment on appeal. It considered that the court below had correctly applied Article 13 (d) of the Ordinance, finding that the existing tenancy agreement had not been extended in view of the refusal by E.D., as proven by the applicants, to enter into a new agreement with them as the new landlords. 18.  In a final judgment of 26 September 2000, the Bucharest Court of Appeal granted an appeal by the defendant and dismissed the applicants’ action. It found that the applicants had failed to comply, when serving their notice on E.D. requesting her to enter into a tenancy agreement, with the conditions and formalities laid down in Article 10 § 1 of the Ordinance, and accordingly held that the existing tenancy agreement between E.D. and the State had been automatically extended pursuant to Article 11 § 1 of the Ordinance. The reasoning in the judgment made no mention of the applicability in the present case of Article 13 (d) of the Ordinance.
(d)  Action for damages against E.D. for deprivation of possession 19.  On 9 August 2001 the applicants brought proceedings against E.D. seeking from her the payment of compensation for having deprived them of the enjoyment of the flat in their house that the defendant had occupied since 1998 without paying them any rent. 20.  In a judgment of 30 November 2001, the Bucharest District Court dismissed their application on the ground that the defendant had a tenancy agreement with the State, which had been extended automatically as the applicants had failed to comply with the formalities provided for in Article 10 § 1 of the Ordinance. That judgment became final on an undetermined date, after being upheld by the Bucharest County Court on an appeal by the applicants.
(e)  Second set of eviction proceedings against E.D. 21.  On 8 August 2001 the applicants brought eviction proceedings against E.D. in the Bucharest District Court on the ground that she had been occupying a flat, of which they were the owners, without paying them any rent, and that her conduct was such that her cohabitation with the other occupants of the building had become impossible. The applicants indicated that, after they had been granted the return of their property by the final judgment of 2 April 1997, they had made a number of attempts to enter into a tenancy agreement with the defendant, who had constantly behaved aggressively towards them, but had been unsuccessful. They referred to a number of complaints that they had filed against E.D. with law-enforcement agencies. They relied on section 24(b) of Law no. 114/1996 taken in conjunction with Article 13 (i) of the Ordinance. 22.  In a judgment of 14 September 2001, the Bucharest District Court dismissed their action as manifestly ill-founded. It considered that, as it concerned the termination of a tenancy agreement, they should have proved that they had entered into such an agreement with the defendant and that there were circumstances which rendered her cohabitation with the other occupants of the building impossible, but that they had failed to adduce such evidence. The reasoning in this judgment made no reference to the applicants’ complaint concerning E.D.’s failure to pay rent. 23.  The applicants appealed against that judgment. In a final judgment of 15 February 2002, the Bucharest County Court granted their application. It held that E.D. had been occupying their property without any right of tenancy, taking into account the fact that the defendant had prevented the connection of the flat to the town gas network and had impeded the use by the other tenants of the common parts of the building, as a result of which her tenancy agreement was not being automatically extended. The court consequently ordered her eviction from the flat that she had been occupying in the applicants’ building. 24.  On 13 September 2002 the applicants lodged an action for eviction against the members of E.D.’s family who had been living with her in the flat. Their application was granted by a final judgment of 11 November 2002, which ordered the eviction from the flat of the members of E.D.’s family. 25.  On 23 September 2003 a bailiff from the Bucharest District Court’s service for the execution of judgments went to the applicants’ flat and restored possession of the premises to them after breaking the locks on the front door to gain access. The bailiff noted in the record drawn up that day that serious damage had been done to the flat, in which several window panes were missing or broken. 26.  The applicants never received any rent for the flat which E.D. had occupied in their building between 2 April 1997 and 23 September 2003.
...


5.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Tirana. 6.  On 15 March 2008 a massive explosion occurred at a demilitarisation facility. The explosion claimed 26 lives. Two hundred and sixty-five other persons were either grievously or lightly wounded and a number of nearby buildings was heavily damaged. The demilitarisation process was carried out by a private commercial company, whose administrator the applicant was. 7.  Following the explosion, the prosecutor started criminal proceedings against the applicant and 28 other persons. 8.  On 17 March 2008 the applicant was remanded in custody. The District Court imposed no time-limits on the length of his detention. It appeared that he was suspected of having committed the criminal offences of murder in aggravating circumstances of more than two persons, destruction of property with explosives and breach of the rules on explosive, flammable or radioactive substances” contrary to Articles 79 (dh) and (ë), 152 and 282 of the Criminal Code. 9.  On 13 March 2009 the prosecutor sent the case against the applicant and the other co-accused for examination to the Supreme Court, since one of the co-accused was a Member of Parliament (MP) as well as a Cabinet Minister. 10.  On 22 May 2009 the Supreme Court decided to sever the proceedings against the MP, who also was a Cabinet Minister, from those against the applicant and the other co-accused. 11.  On 11 June 2009 the case file against all co-accused, including the applicant, was registered with the Tirana District Court (“the District Court”) for examination. 12.  On 19 July 2010 the applicant requested his release on the ground that the time-limits laid down by Articles 262 and 263 § 2 (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CCP”) had expired. He argued that the prescribed time-limit started to run from 13 March 2009, the date on which the case was sent for examination to the Supreme Court. 13.  On 23 July 2010 the Tirana District Court, in an interlocutory decision, rejected the request. It considered that, since the time-limit had started to run from 11 June 2009, the date on which the case file was registered at its registry and, since it had been stayed or prolonged on account of other interlocutory decisions, the time-limit had not yet expired. 14.  On 6 August 2010 the Court of Appeal upheld the decision. 15.  On 3 November 2010 the Supreme Court quashed both decisions. It reasoned that Article 263 of the CCP provided for three time-limits: the first running from the date of an accused’s arrest to the date the file is transferred to the first-instance court (Article 263 § 1 of the CCP); the second running from then to the date of delivery of the decision by that court (Article 263 § 2 of the CCP); and the third running from then to the date of delivery of the appellate court’s decision (Article 263 § 3 of the CCP). According to the Supreme Court, in the applicant’s case, the first time-limit ended on 13 March 2009 when the case was sent to the Supreme Court (Article 263 § 1 of the CCP). On that date, the second time-limit before the first-instance court began to run (Article 263 § 2 of the CCP), since the Supreme Court was hearing the case as a first-instance court, one of the co-accused being an MP and a Cabinet Minister. Even though the proceedings against the MP were disjoined from those against the applicant and other co-accused, the period between 13 March 2009 and 11 June 2009, the date on which the case file against the applicant was registered with the District Court, should be taken into account for the purposes of the time-limit prescribed by Article 263 § 2 of the CCP. The Supreme Court indicated that the time-limit set out in Article 265 of the CPP should be deducted from the running of the time-limit prescribed by Article 263, if the stay was attributed, inter alia, to one of the co-accused or his lawyer. For the above reasons, the Supreme Court remitted the case for re-hearing by a different bench.
Re-hearing proceedings 16.  On 25 November 2010 the applicant’s lawyer, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision of 3 November 2010, requested, in writing, the applicant’s release. He argued that his lawful pre-trial detention period had been exceeded by 81 days. 17.  On 26 November 2010 the District Court rejected the request arguing that it had not been submitted in writing in accordance with the law. The applicant appealed. 18.  On 17 December 2010 the Court of Appeal quashed the decision and remitted the case for a re-hearing by a different bench. It found that the District Court had failed to carry out any of the tasks delegated by the Supreme Court’s decision of 3 November 2010. 19.  The applicant appealed on the ground that the Court of Appeal should have examined the case itself instead of delaying the proceedings. 20.  On 27 January 2011 the Supreme Court rejected the appeal. 21.  On 16 February 2011 the District Court discontinued the proceedings (pushimi i gjykimit) having regard to its decision of 7 February 2011 (see paragraph 25 below). 22.  On 6 December 2010 the applicant’s lawyer lodged a second request for the applicant’s release on the ground that the time-limits laid down by Articles 262 and 263 § 2 (c) of the CCP had expired. 23.  On the same day the District Court, in an interlocutory decision, rejected the request. It ruled that the time-limit had started to run from 11 June 2009, the date on which the case file was registered with it. It had been stayed for a period of 8 months and 12 days. Consequently, the District Court stated that there remained 2 months and 18 days of pre-trial detention until the expiry of the twelve-month time-limit as provided for by Article 263 § 2 (c). As regards the findings of the Supreme Court on 3 November 2010, the District Court stated that they were binding on the bench re-hearing the case and not on a court hearing a separate request for release. 24.  On 7 February 2011 the applicant’s lawyer requested the applicant’s release on the ground that the time-limits laid down by Articles 262 and 263 § 2 (c) of the CCP had expired. 25.  On the same day, in an interlocutory decision, the District Court ordered the applicant’s immediate release and his placement under house arrest in accordance with Article 266 § 1 of the CCP. No further reasons were given. The District Court relied on the Supreme Court decision of 2 February 2011 which had ordered the release of another co-accused who had been detained on the same day as the applicant, because the pre-trial detention time-limits, laid down in Article 263 § 2 (c), had expired (see paragraph 31 below). It accepted that the time-limit had started to run from 13 March 2009 and had exceeded the twelve-month period prescribed by law. The decision did not indicate the expiry date of the time-limit. The prosecutors appealed. 26.  It would appear that the applicant was immediately placed under house arrest. 27.  On 11 March 2011, following the prosecutor’s appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the District Court’s decision. 28.  On 9 May 2011, following the prosecutor’s appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the lower courts’ decision. 29.  On 24 November 2010 the District Court rejected a co-accused’s request for release on the ground that the time-limit for his detention “pending trial” had expired. In interpreting article 263 § 2 (c) of the CCP, the District Court argued that the time-limit had started to run from 11 June 2009, the date when the case file was registered with its registry. It further held that the Supreme Court’s decision of 3 November 2010 was not binding on that bench (see paragraph 15 above). 30.  On 17 December 2010 the Court of Appeal upheld the decision. 31.  On 2 February 2011 the Supreme Court granted the co-accused’s appeal against the lower courts’ decisions. In interpreting Article 263 § 2 (c) of the CCP, the Supreme Court held that the period of detention “pending trial” had started to run on 13 March 2009, when the prosecutor had registered the case for examination with that court, which had examined it as a first-instance court in accordance with Article 75 (b) of the CCP. 32.  The Supreme Court further referred to its decision of 3 November 2010, which had already directed the lower courts to calculate the period of detention “pending trial”, but had been disregarded by the District Court in that set of proceedings. The Supreme Court ordered the co-accused’s placement under house arrest. 33.  On 12 March 2012, in a lengthy decision, the Tirana District Court found the applicant guilty of a “breach of the rules on explosive, flammable or radioactive substances” – contrary to Article 282 of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to 10 years’ imprisonment. All parties appealed. 34.  On 13 February 2013 the Tirana Court of Appeal upheld the decision. However, it reduced the applicant’s sentence by one third on account of the use of the summary procedure. 35.  The applicant’s appeal was rejected by the Supreme Court on 19 July 2013. 36.  On 14 February 2013, in a letter about the execution of the sentence, the prosecutor’s office stated that the applicant’s pre-trial detention period from 17 March 2008 to 7 February 2011 was to be counted as a period of four years and four months’ imprisonment in accordance with the law. To that period, had to be added two years and six days, during which period the applicant had been under house arrest. In total, the applicant had served six years, four months and six days’ imprisonment. Consequently, the remaining sentence to be served by the applicant was three months and twenty-four days’ imprisonment. 37.  On 18 March 2013 the District Court, having regard to the applicant’s good conduct, reduced his sentence by 70 days. 38.  On 19 March 2013 the applicant was released from prison, having served the remainder of his sentence.


7.  The applicant was born in 1935 and lives in Nicosia. 8.  The applicant was born and grew up in Ayios Amvrosios, a village in the District of Kyrenia. In 1973 he moved his residence to Kyrenia. During the military intervention of July 1974, Turkish troops evicted the applicant and his family from their home and forced them to leave Kyrenia and flee to the south. 9.  The applicant claimed that he had real properties in northern Cyprus. He produced affirmations of ownership issued by the Department of Lands and Surveys of the Republic of Cyprus, according to which he was the owner of the following properties:
(a)  Kyrenia, Klepini, Boumbourka, field with trees, sheet/plan 13/33, plot no. 72, area: 2,784 sq. m, share: whole;
(b)  Kyrenia, Ayios Epiktitos, Karamanou Quarter, field with trees, sheet/plan 12/32, plot no. 235, area: 539 sq. m, share: whole;
(c)  Kyrenia, Ayios Amvrosios, Alakati tou Platymati, field with trees, sheet/plan 13/19, plot no. 220/2, area: 7,078 sq. m, share: whole;
(d)  Kyrenia, Ayios Amvrosios, Vasilion, field with trees, sheet/plan 13/20, plot no. 63, area: 3,365 sq. m, share: whole;
(e)  Kyrenia, Ayios Amvrosios, Vasilion, field with trees, sheet/plan 13/20, plot no. 130, area: 3,301 sq. m, share: whole;
(f)  Kyrenia, Ayios Amvrosios, Vasilion, field with trees, sheet/plan 13/20, plot no. 151, area: 365 sq. m, share: whole;
(g)  Kyrenia, Ayios Amvrosios, Platanos, garden and cultivated field, sheet/plan 13/22, plot no. 524, area: 55 sq. m, share: whole;
(h)  Kyrenia, Ayios Amvrosios, Vrysi tou Potamou, freshwater spring, sheet/plan 13/22, plot no. 608/1, share: whole;
(i)  Kyrenia, Ayios Amvrosios, Mangou, field with trees, sheet/plan 13/31, plot no. 34, area: 3,819 sq. m, share: whole;
(j)  Kyrenia, Pano Kyrenia, house with yard (ground level), No. 7, Demosthenous Street, sheet/plan 12/20, plot no. 34, area: 785 sq. m, share: whole. 10.  The applicant alleged that the house described under paragraph 9 (j) above had been his permanent residence. He lived there with his wife Sophia Andreou Ioannou (the applicant in application no. 18360/91), his son Michael Michael (the applicant in application no. 18361/91) and his daughter Christina Michael. 11.  Following the 1974 intervention and the ensuing Turkish military occupation, the applicant was deprived of access to and the use of his property. He participated in various peaceful demonstrations and marches towards his village. On all occasions he was prevented from walking home by the Turkish troops. 12.  On 9 December 1990 the applicant made one further attempt to return to his home and property in Kyrenia and Ayios Amvrosios by participating in a convoy of cars of fellow refugees intending to return home. 13.  The applicant and his fellow refugees, who had informed the Commander of the United Nations (UN) forces in Cyprus of their intentions, arrived at the check point in the "buffer zone", on the main road which links Nicosia with Ayios Amvrosios and Kyrenia. There, they asked the UN officer on duty to be allowed to return to their homes, property and villages. They requested the same officer to forward their demand to the Turkish military authorities. The officer replied that the latter had refused their request.


5.  The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Štip. 6.  On 11 November 1996 the applicant, a farmer who reared cows, concluded an insurance agreement (полиса за осигурување) (“the agreement”) with an insurance company (“the defendant”) against a risk of the cows' death under which the latter would be liable to pay the damage, irrespective of the time of the death, if it was caused by reasons other than illness. On 23 November 1996 one of the applicant's cows died. Since the defendant refused to pay for the loss, on 30 January 1997 the applicant brought a claim against the defendant before the Štip Court of First Instance (“the first-instance court”). 7. On 1 March 1997 the trial judge's wife was employed with the defendant as an assistant to the manager of its branch office. 8. On 30 January 1998 the first-instance court dismissed the applicant's claim. 9. The applicant appealed, arguing, amongst other things, that the first-instance court had arbitrarily given weight to evidence in favour of the defendant and that it had refused to examine witnesses as to the cause of death. 10. On 17 June 1998 the Štip Court of Appeal quashed the court of first instance's decision, instructing it to hear evidence from the vet who had examined the cow in order to determine the cause of the death. 11. On 28 March 2000 the first-instance court dismissed the applicant's claim, reiterating its earlier findings. 12. On 20 June 2000 the applicant appealed, arguing that he had never received a copy of the general terms of the contract, and that the cause of death had not been properly established. He also contended that that judge was biased since his wife had started working with the defendant just after the proceedings had started. He asked for the trial judge to be removed if the Court of Appeal were to quash the lower court's decision and remit the case 13. On 27 November 2000 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal, finding no grounds to depart from the established facts and the reasons given by the lower court. It did not make any comments on the applicant's allegations that the trial judge was biased. 14. The decision was served on the applicant on 24 April 2001.


5.  The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Konotop. 6.  On 8 January 2009 the Konotop Transport Prosecutor’s Office of the Sumy Region instituted proceedings against the applicant, then an officer of the Konotop Transport Police, on suspicion of abuse and exceeding his authority with respect to Mr Z. 7.  On 9 January 2009 the applicant was arrested and taken to the Konotop Temporary Detention Facility (“the ITT”). 8.  On 12 January 2009 the Konotop Court examined the applicant’s complaint against his arrest and the investigator’s request for the applicant’s detention. The court rejected the applicant’s complaint and extended his detention for up to ten days. 9.  On 17 January 2009 the applicant was charged with abuse and exceeding his authority. 10.  On 19 January 2009 the Konotop Court ordered the applicant’s pre-trial detention on the grounds that he was accused of a serious offence related to corruption which had become publicly known, that being at large he could evade investigation, continue his criminal activities and influence persons related to the investigation, and that his state of health was compatible with detention. 11.  The same day, the applicant’s lawyer appealed against the above decision. 12.  On 26 January 2009 the applicant was transferred to the Sumy Pre-Trial Detention Centre (“the SIZO”). 13.  On 3 February 2009 the Sumy Regional Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) upheld the decision of 19 January 2009. 14.  On 5 March 2009 the Zarichnyy District Court of Sumy extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention for up to three months. The court noted that the applicant was accused of a serious offence and if released could evade investigation and trial, obstruct the establishment of the truth in the case, influence witnesses and victims. This decision was upheld by the Sumy Regional Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) on 24 March 2009. 15.  On 3 April 2009 the investigator brought additional charges against the applicant for misappropriation of money and documents. 16.  On 7 April 2009 the Zarichnyy District Court of Sumy extended the applicant’s detention for up to four months on the same grounds as in its decision of 5 March 2009. This decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal on 28 April 2009. 17.  On 6 May 2009 the Court of Appeal extended the applicant’s detention for up to six months on the ground that the applicant was accused of serious offences punishable by up to 10 years’ imprisonment and that being at large he could obstruct investigation and continue his criminal activities. 18.  On 30 June 2009 the Konotop Court (“the trial court”) held a preparatory hearing. The applicant’s lawyer requested the applicant’s release, but this request was rejected. The court stated that there were no reasons to change the preventive measure in respect of the applicant. 19.  On 23 February 2010 the trial court found the applicant guilty of misappropriation of property and abuse of authority sentencing him to five years’ and one month’s imprisonment and confiscation of half of his property other than his residence. It also barred him from occupying positions in law enforcement for three years. 20.  On 18 May 2010 the Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 23 February 2010 and remitted the case for a fresh consideration to the trial court. It also decided that the applicant was to remain in detention pending retrial. 21.  On 17 September 2010 the trial court found the applicant guilty as in its judgment of 23 February 2010, changing the applicant’s sentence of imprisonment to five years and three months. 22.  On 25 November 2010 the Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 17 September 2010 and remitted the case for retrial. It also decided that the applicant was to remain in detention pending retrial. 23.  On 31 January 2011 the applicant lodged a request with the trial court seeking release from custody on an undertaking not to abscond. He argued in particular that there was no reason to believe that he presented a risk of absconding or influencing witnesses, that he had a wife who was ill and in need of hospitalisation. On the same day the trial court rejected the request stating that it was “premature”. 24.  On 21 February 2011 the trial court convicted the applicant as in its judgment of 23 February 2010. 25.  On 17 May 2011 the Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 21 February 2011 and remitted the case for retrial. It also decided that the applicant was to remain in detention pending retrial. 26.  On the same day the Court of Appeal issued a separate ruling pointing out to the president of the trial court that the trial court had repeatedly failed to rectify the errors found by the Court of Appeal in its previous decisions. 27.  On 22 September 2011 the applicant requested release claiming that his state of health was not compatible with detention and that he could not receive appropriate medical treatment in SIZO. The trial court rejected this request the same day without giving any reasons. 28.  On 29 September 2011 the trial court found the applicant guilty of misappropriation of property and documents, and abuse of authority, sentencing him to the same punishment as in the judgment of 23 February 2010. 29.  On 17 January 2012 the Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of 29 September 2011 with certain amendments. 30.  On 31 January 2012 the applicant was transferred to the Mensk Prison to serve his sentence. 31.  On 13 July 2012 the applicant was released on parole in accordance with the ruling of the Mensk Court of 5 July 2012. 32.  On 29 January 2013 the Higher Specialised Civil and Criminal Court quashed the decision of the Court of Appeal of 17 January 2012 and remitted the case for a fresh examination on appeal. 33.  On 16 April 2013 the Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 29 September 2011 and remitted the case for retrial. 34.  As of 31 March 2014 the proceedings in the applicant’s case were pending before the trial court. 35.  From 29 December 2008 to 6 January 2009 the applicant was treated at the Konotop District Hospital where he was diagnosed with hypertension of the first (mildest) degree, hyperlipidemia, myocardial fibrosis, ventricular dilation, obesity, fatty hepatosis, chronic cholecistitis, and chronic pancreatitis. As treatment, the applicant was put on a diet excluding fried, salty, spicy foods, strong tea or coffee and certain other foods. 36.  On 12 January, 15 January and 17 January 2009 the applicant complained to the ITT medical officer of headaches, numbness of limbs, and weakness. He was diagnosed with hypertensive crises and medication was administered. 37.  On 22 January 2009 the applicant was examined at a hospital. It was determined that the applicant did not require hospitalisation. 38.  On 25 January 2009 the ITT medical officer noted that the applicant complained on that day about headache and dizziness. Previous diagnosis was confirmed and medication was administered to the applicant. 39.  On 26 January 2009 the applicant was examined by a medical assistant on his admission to the Sumy Pre-Trial Detention Centre (“the SIZO”). The applicant did not complain about his health. 40.  On 28 January 2009 the applicant was examined by a doctor of the SIZO medical unit. He was diagnosed with gastritis and medication was prescribed. 41.  On 4 February 2009 the applicant was examined by a doctor who diagnosed him with cardioneurosis and prescribed medication. 42.  According to the Government, the applicant was examined by medical specialists at the SIZO on 23 occasions from 9 February 2009 to 16 August 2011, both on his initiative and as part of regular check-ups. He complained about headaches and stomach aches. Previously established diagnoses were confirmed. In addition, on 25 August 2010 the applicant was diagnosed with dermatitis. The applicant was prescribed various medications. 43.  On 17 August 2011 the head of the SIZO medical unit wrote to the applicant saying that the SIZO provided only urgent dental care, including tooth extraction and pain relief, and did not provide implant care or treatment for cavities. 44.  On 25 November 2011 the applicant complained about a headache, was examined by a neuropathologist and ophthalmologist. He was diagnosed with astheno-vegetative syndrome and prescribed certain medicines. 45.  On 13 January 2012 the applicant complained of stomach aches, was diagnosed with chronic gastroduodenitis and prescribed medication. 46.  On 31 January 2012 the applicant was examined by medical staff on his admission to the Mensk Prison. His state of health was found to be satisfactory. 47.  On 15 June 2012 the applicant was diagnosed as having an inguinal hernia. He was prescribed bed rest. On 18 June, 20 June, 25 June, 5 July and 7 July 2012 the diagnosis and the recommendation were confirmed. 48.  On 13 July 2012 the head of the medical unit of the SIZO issued a certificate which stated that the applicant had repeatedly undergone courses of outpatient treatment while at the SIZO. It further stated that at the time the certificate was issued the applicant continued to complain about his state of health, regularly requested consultations in connection with stomach, liver, heart and kidney pains. It went on to state that in this connection the applicant was recommended additional consultation from gastroenterologist, cardiologist, nephrologist and an infrasound examination and that the SIZO had no such specialists on its staff.


5.  The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Skopje. 6.  On 4 February 2003 the applicant was apprehended by the police on a location in Skopje and searched. As indicated in the search record, which the applicant duly signed, the search was carried out without a court warrant and in the absence of witnesses, as provided for in sections 200(4) and 202(2) of the Criminal Proceedings Act (“the Act”, see paragraph 32 below). The police confiscated 13 keys and a mobile phone from him. The search was completed at 2.10 pm. 7.  On that date, an investigating judge of Skopje Court of First Instance (“the trial court”) issued two separate search warrants (Kri.br.34/03 and Kri.br.35/03) concerning two apartments (nos. 8 and 9 in the building in which the applicant lived) and other premises (наредба за претрес на дом и други простории) owned by the applicant’s father. The search warrants were issued on the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had been involved in drug trafficking. 8.  Both apartments and the accompanying cellars were searched that day in the presence of the applicant’s father and two neighbours, who acted as witnesses. Seven packages containing an unknown substance were found. An authorised police officer, the neighbours, as well as the applicant’s father, who was specified in the search records as the occupier of the premises, signed the search records without any objection. The searches were completed at 6 pm. and 7.30 pm. At the request of those attending the search, the following note was included in the search record concerning apartment no. 9:
“The packages were found in the cellar belonging to apartment no. 10 of the same building, which was opened with a key confiscated during the personal search of [the applicant] ....” 9.  As indicated in that search record, a certificate of confiscation of property (“the certificate”) was issued concerning the seven packages found in the cellar. It stated that the packages had been confiscated in relation to a crime punishable under the Criminal Code (drug trafficking). The applicant had not been present in the cellars while those were being searched but was brought to the premises afterwards (see § 16 below). He signed the certificate of confiscation as a person from whom the packages had been confiscated. 10.  On 5 February 2003 the Criminal Investigations Bureau at the Ministry of the Interior (“the Bureau”, Сектор за криминалистичка техника) carried out an expert examination of the padlock which had secured cellar no.10 and 13 keys that had been confiscated from the applicant. According to the expert report of that date (no. 10.2.6-5520/1), the locking system of the padlock had been damaged and it could be opened with any object, including all keys confiscated from the applicant. 11.  In another expert report (X-164/2003) of that date, the Bureau confirmed that five packages found in cellar no.10 contained 2.296 kg of heroin. As to the remaining 0.991 kg found in the two other packages, the report stated that they contained two substances that were often mixed with heroin. That was confirmed by an additional expert report of the Bureau dated 10 February 2003 (no. X-164/2/2003). As indicated in the report X-164/2003, each of six packages found in the cellar contained between 486gr and 527gr. The dimensions of the largest package were 20x10x2.2 mm. 12.  A third expert report of the Bureau (SK-164/2003) of 5 February 2003 that concerned a fingerprint found on one of the packages confiscated in cellar no.10 stated:
"The fingerprints found were entered into the system of automatic search of fingerprints ... it was determined, after verification of the list of suspected candidates, that [the fingerprints] corresponded to (the applicant’s) right middle finger ..." 13.  On the same date, the Ministry of the Interior lodged a criminal complaint with the public prosecutor accusing the applicant of drug trafficking. In support, it submitted the evidence described above (see paragraphs 6-12 above) and a number of photographs. 14.  On 5 February 2003 an investigating judge of the trial court examined the applicant in the presence of his lawyer. The applicant remained silent. He confirmed, however, that he had signed the record of his personal search and two certificates of confiscation of property. The investigating judge opened an investigation against the applicant and ordered his pre-trial detention for thirty days. 15.  On 17 February 2003 the public prosecutor lodged an indictment with the trial court charging the applicant with having been in possession of and offering for sale 5 packages containing 2.396 kg (the weight was specified to 2.296 kg later at the trial) of heroin and 0.991 kg of other prohibited substances, which had been found in the cellar of the building in which he had lived. 16.  At a hearing held on 19 March 2003, the trial court examined the applicant, who denied any connection with the drugs found in the cellar. As to the cellar, he submitted that it belonged to a third party, whom he did not know. He further stated that after he had been arrested, he had been brought with a police car in front of the building in which he had lived. He had waited in the car for an hour or two before the police had brought him to the cellar. He submitted that there had been many people (мешаница) there, including five police inspectors who had asked him to hold the packages in his hands in order to photograph him. The applicant also stated:
“They forced me to touch the drugs; I don’t remember what the packages looked like and how many there were. At that point, maybe I touched (the drugs), I don’t remember. Then they photographed me; I refused [to cooperate] the whole time. My father was also present. Then, they brought me to the police (station) where they again forced me to take the [package of] drugs, to hold it in my hands in order to take photographs... Then, they started beating me and jumping over handcuffs (put) on my hands in order to [make me] touch the drugs. Then, they took my fingerprints. I was again physically ill-treated. They stopped when my lawyer arrived...” 17.  As regards the alleged ill-treatment by the police, he stated that he had neither asked for medical assistance nor had he informed the investigating judge due to fear of further ill-treatment by the police. He had not seen how and what key had been used to open the door of the cellar because he had been, at that time, in the police car. He further stated that he had signed the search records in the presence of a police officer and two witnesses. He had voluntarily signed the confiscation records regarding the keys found in his possession. As regards the certificate of confiscation concerning the drugs he stated:
“... I most probably signed it when they (police officers) gave me five sheets of paper to sign...” 18.  The applicant’s lawyer requested that the court examine the applicant’s father regarding the place where the drugs had been found and title to the apartment. In a statement, the applicant’s father confirmed that the police had shown him two search warrants and that the search had been carried out in his presence and that of two neighbours. He also stated:
“... I use other cellars in the building, namely two small cellars that I have constructed and another one which belongs to... When they did not find anything (in his cellars), a policeman ... entered cellar no.10, which is currently used by the sister of P.G., who owns the apartment and the cellar. After some time, policemen opened the padlock with the keys confiscated from [the applicant]... After half an hour, a policeman called me and said that he had found something in the cellar’s ventilation shaft... I saw a plastic bag. After he had taken the bags out, I noticed that there were seven bags. He put them on a metal sheet. Before doing so, he called the witnesses, namely the two neighbours, who confirmed what they were looking at. They called my son Duško. When he arrived, [the police officer] told him to stand next to the metal sheet in order for him to be photographed. Actually, he pushed him against the metal sheet and then [the applicant], in order not to fall down, touched the metal sheet with his hands. Thus, he touched the packages. They photographed him with the packages and took him away again. Then they brought the dog. Then we went upstairs to the apartment. [The police officer] forced me to sign the record that the packages had been found in cellar no.10, which I did. That meant that they did not find anything in my place, but in the [cellar belonging to] apartment no.10...” 19.  As indicated in the record, the applicant’s father reiterated that cellar no.10 had been opened with a key found in the applicant’s possession, which belonged to another padlock. He also stated:
“I want to say that two keys of ours (the applicant’s and his) fitted in that padlock. [The police officer] actually opened (the padlock) with one of my keys and found out that one of the keys that Duško had fitted in the padlock. [They] were a pair, of which I had one and Duško had the other.” 20.  The applicant’s father also stated that the police officer had not been wearing gloves when he had taken the packages out. He had put gloves on later. 21.  In his concluding remarks made at the trial, the applicant’s lawyer objected that no search warrants had been issued regarding the personal search of the applicant and the search of cellar no.10. In the absence of any eyewitnesses, there had been no direct evidence that would link the applicant with the drugs, which had been hidden in a cellar that had belonged to a third party and could have been opened with any key. He also argued that the applicant’s fingerprint had been secured in the absence of an expert and that the police had sought an expert examination ex post facto. He maintained that expert report SK-164/2003 (see paragraph 12 above) had been unclear and imprecise because it had contained no information as to the manner and circumstances under which that fingerprint had been secured. Furthermore, it would have been impossible for the applicant to manipulate the packages with only one finger. He further argued that no fingerprints had been found on the padlock and the cellar where the drugs had been found. 22.  He also challenged the expert examination of the substance found in the packages, arguing that the latter had been too small to contain compacted material in the quantity indicated in the expert report X-164/2003 (see paragraph 11 above). In this connection he argued that it had not been established the place and person who had determined the quantity of the substance. He also submitted that the expert examinations had been carried out in his absence. Furthermore, he challenged whether the substance found had been pure heroin. In this connection he also stated:
“I think that the problem [arising from] the practice that the prosecuting body also carries out expert examinations means that the evidence [obtained thereby] is not impartial.” 23.  On 20 March 2003 the trial court convicted the applicant, who had a previous criminal record (suspended prison sentence for an act of violence), of drug trafficking and sentenced him to two-and-a-half years’ imprisonment. The court established that he had stored, with the aim of offering for sale, the five packages containing 2.296kg of heroin found in cellar no.10. The court held inter alia:
"Cellar no.10 where the drugs were found had been locked with a padlock that could be open with any keys besides the original ones.
The court established these facts on the basis of admitted written evidence ... The expert examinations of [the Bureau] confirmed that the substance found in the compacted packages was 2.296kg heroin. The expert examination confirmed that the fingerprint, which had been found and secured during the on-site examination, corresponded to the accused’s right middle finger ...
The court examined the arguments presented by the defense ...., but it finds that they are unsubstantiated because the court established ... that the written evidence, notably the record concerning the search of home and other premises had been drawn up in lawful procedure in the presence of two witnesses and on the basis of a search warrant issued earlier. The attending witnesses are neighbours who were present there by accident and whom [the applicant’s father] knew. The court established that the accused had signed the certificate for confiscated property without any qualification. He did not contest his signature.
The court examined the arguments of [the applicant’s lawyer] that there were no witnesses to corroborate that the accused had hidden the drugs in order to offer it for sale and that the accused could not be brought in connection with the drugs hidden in a cellar that did not belong to him, but (the court) dismissed those arguments on the basis of a written evidence, notably the (fingerprint) expert opinion by [the Bureau], which confirmed that the fingerprint corresponded to the [applicant’s] middle finger. Accordingly it is irrelevant that the drugs were found in the cellar belonging to a third person.
The court examined the statement produced by [the applicant’s father] according to which the police officers had pushed his son against the metal sheet where drugs had been put and that, in order not to fall down, he had touched (the packages) but it gave no weight because the responsible police officers acted in compliance with their official duty and after they had found the drugs they photographed him next to (the packages). There was no reason for them to push the accused or to secure evidence with the use of force. The father’s statement was biased because it concerns his son and it is understandable that he wants to help [the applicant] avoid criminal liability ...” 24.  In an appeal of 17 June 2003, the public prosecutor complained that the sentence given to the applicant had been too lenient. 25.  On 24 July 2003 the applicant appealed against the trial court’s judgment, arguing that his conviction had been based on inadmissible evidence, namely there had been no court warrant authorising the search of cellar no.10 and the expert examinations of the substance and the fingerprint found on one of the packages in that cellar. He reiterated his complaints regarding the quality and reliability of the fingerprint expert evidence (see paragraph 21 above). In this connection he complained about the trial court’s failure to examine the police officers who had secured his fingerprint in his absence, as well as the experts who had drawn up report SК-164/2003 and requested that they be examined. He further argued that the trial court could not have validly based its judgment on those expert examinations since they had been carried out by the Bureau, a body that operated within the Ministry, which had set in motion the criminal proceedings against him. Accordingly, the examinations had been biased. He also sought to have alternative expert examinations conducted. That concerned both the fingerprint expert evidence, which according to him, had been the sole evidence linking him with the drugs, as well as the expert examination of the substance. As to the latter examination, he reiterated his complaints raised in the concluding remarks (see paragraph 22 above). 26.  The applicant also requested that the court examines the neighbours (providing their names and addresses) who had attended the search regarding his allegations that his fingerprint found on one of the packages had been the result of an argument which he had had in the cellar with the police after he had refused to comply with their order to touch the packages. 27.  At a public session held on 20 May 2004 in the presence of the applicant and his lawyer, the Skopje Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals and upheld the trial court’s judgment. It held that:
"... the evidence admitted at the trial on which the judgment was based do not contain such deficiencies so as to be regarded unlawful evidence that cannot serve as a legal basis for the judgment, within the meaning of section 15(2) of the Act.
As evident from the case-file, the search of the accused’s home and other accompanying premises ... and the personal search of the accused were carried out in accordance with the (relevant) statutory provisions ...
The search of the home and other premises was carried out by competent officials on the basis of a written warrant by the investigating judge ... in the presence of two adult citizens, as witnesses and the occupier of the premises-[the applicant’s] father. Search records were drawn up and duly signed by the competent official, the occupier and the attending witnesses, in accordance with sections 198, 199 and 200 of the Act. The personal search of the accused was carried out without a court warrant and in the absence of witnesses, but it was done by competent officials on account of a reasonable suspicion ... in accordance with section 202(2) of the Act. Accordingly, the search records are a valid ground on which the court judgment was based.
The court examined the complaint ... concerning the lack of an order by the investigating judge for the expert examinations carried out by [the Bureau] ... regarding the nature and composition of the substance and the origin of the fingerprint evidence; however, the Ministry has competence to request expert examinations ...
... On the basis of admitted evidence, especially that the accused was in possession of the keys from the door of the cellar; [the applicant’s] fingerprint found on one of the packages containing drugs and the certificate for confiscated property signed by the accused, the trial court had undoubtedly established [the applicant’s] identity as the perpetrator of the criminal offence ...
The court examined the complaint regarding the quantity and composition of the drugs, but it dismissed it finding that the trial court had established [the quantity of the drugs], on the basis of the expert opinion by [the Bureau], which applied (it gave a description of the used methodology).
The court dismissed the complaint regarding the objectivity of the expert opinions of [the Bureau], since it was a department that was founded and operated within the Ministry of the Interior, as a State body, which had been authorised to carry out expert examinations, as specified in section 234(2) of the Act ... (furthermore, the expert reports) ... had been based on scientific methods, which enable valid results ... on the basis of the case-file, it can be established that after the competent officials had discovered the criminal offense, (they) secured evidence which had been transmitted to [the Bureau] whose experts had determined [the applicant’s] identity applying the system of automatic search of fingerprints.
The court considered the complaint regarding the examination of [the neighbours] as witnesses ... but it dismissed it because ... [the neighbours] had signed the search records without any objection, which means, for all practical purposes, that they had confirmed [the record’s] veracity regarding the search. Accordingly, it is not necessary for them to be examined ..." 28.  On 6 July 2004 the applicant lodged an application for extraordinary review of a final judgment (барање за вонредно преиспитување на правосилна пресуда), arguing that there had been no direct evidence corroborating his guilt. In this connection he reiterated his complaints that cellar no.10 had been searched without a court order; that the trial court should have summoned the experts and police officers regarding his fingerprint; and that the Court of Appeal had wrongly found that their examination and the examination of the neighbours would have been irrelevant. In this connection, the applicant’s lawyer stated that:
“... the (police) officers present in cellar (no.10) forced [the applicant] to touch the packages in order to confirm whether they [contained] compacted [material]. [The applicant] refused to comply with the officers’ order to touch the packages and due to the mass of people pushing each other (поради настаната мешаница и турканица), he was again taken to the police station. The same method of treating [the applicant] continued in the police station, where he was forced to touch the packages in order to obtain his fingerprint [on them]...” 29.  He further reiterated his concerns regarding the quality and impartiality of the expert examinations carried out by the Bureau (see paragraphs 21, 22 and 25 above) and sought alternative expert examinations of the fingerprint and heroin found. 30.  On 2 November 2004 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s application and confirmed the lower courts’ judgments. The relevant parts of the judgment read as follows:
"... the evidence admitted at the trial on which the judgment was based do not contain such deficiencies so as to be regarded unlawful evidence that cannot serve as a legal basis for the judgment, within the meaning of section 15(2) of the Act. The lower courts correctly established that the search of the accused’s home and other accompanying premises ... and the personal search of the accused had been carried out in accordance with the (relevant) statutory provisions ...The search of the home and other premises, as evident from the admitted written evidence, was carried out, according to this court, by competent officials on the basis of a written warrant by the investigating judge ... in the presence of two adult citizens, as witnesses and the occupier of the premises-[the applicant’s] father. Search records were drawn up and duly signed by the competent official, the occupier and the attending witnesses, which implies that sections 198, 199 and 200 of the Act had been respected.
It is true that the personal search of the accused was carried out without a court warrant and in the absence of witnesses, but the lower courts correctly held that such measures had been taken by competent officials on account of a reasonable suspicion ... in accordance with section 202(2) of the Act. Accordingly, the search records are a valid ground on which the court judgment could be based.
The Supreme Court examined the complaint ... concerning the lack of an order by the investigating judge for the expert examinations carried out by [the Bureau] ... regarding the nature and composition of the substance and the origin of the fingerprint evidence, but it dismissed them as unsubstantiated. The court had decided in compliance with section 234(2) of the Act ... [The court] cannot accept the allegation raised in the extraordinary review request regarding the objectivity of the expert opinions of [the Bureau], since it was a department that was founded and operated within the Ministry of the Interior, as a State body, which could be requested to carry out expert examinations, as specified in section 234(2) of the Act ...
The Supreme Court considers that in the ordinary proceedings the trial court decided in accordance with section 339(2) of the Act. In establishing the facts, it had into consideration and assessed all evidence admitted at the trial, i.e. it assessed the evidence separately and taken together, and on the basis of such assessment, it drew conclusion if certain fact was established ...
In view of the foregoing, it is clear that in the ordinary proceedings all legally relevant facts were correctly established ..." 31.  On 17 February 2005 the public prosecutor informed the applicant that there were no grounds for lodging a request for the protection of legality with the Supreme Court.


6.  The applicant was born in 1979 and is currently serving a term of imprisonment in correctional colony IK-18, Yamalo-Nenetsk Autonomous Region. 7.  On 16 April 2005 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of murder. 8.  On 18 April 2005 the Vsevolozhsk Town Court of the Leningrad Region decided to remand the applicant in custody. 9.  On 23 April 2005 the applicant absconded, and on 25 April 2005 he was apprehended by the police. 10.  On 29 May 2006 a deputy Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation approved the bill of indictment against the applicant, and on 2 June 2006 the case was sent to the Leningrad Regional Court for trial. 11.  On 5 June 2006 the Leningrad Regional Court scheduled the preliminary hearing for 15 June 2006. It was subsequently adjourned until 20 June 2006 following requests filed by the applicant and some of his co‑defendants who had not received a copy of the decision of 5 June 2006. 12.  On 23 June 2006 the criminal case was returned to the public prosecutor for rectification of the bill of indictment. 13.  On 27 September 2006 the Supreme Court of Russia quashed the above-mentioned decision on appeal, and the case was resubmitted to the Leningrad Regional Court. 14.  As a result of the preliminary hearing held on 7 November 2006, on 8 November 2006 the Leningrad Regional Court fixed the opening date of the trial for 6 December 2006. It was subsequently adjourned until 14 December 2006. 15.  On 14 December 2006 the applicant requested the court to let K. represent him. However, on 21 December 2006 the court dismissed his request in view of the fact that K. had no law degree. 16.  On 11 January 2007 the court began the examination of the evidence. However, owing to the non-attendance of certain witnesses, the applicant’s hospitalisation and the non-attendance of an interpreter, the hearing was adjourned until an unspecified date. 17.  On 20 March 2007 the applicant requested leave for A. to represent him, but his request was dismissed because A. was the brother of one of the witnesses. Legal-aid counsel was appointed to represent the applicant. 18.  Following the submission of the pleadings the proceedings were adjourned until 9 July 2007 to permit the parties to prepare their comments as to the substance and the wording of the questions to be put to the jury. 19.  On 6 November 2007 the Leningrad Regional Court, following a jury trial, convicted the applicant of aggravated murder, theft, robbery and escape and sentenced him to life imprisonment. When determining the applicant’s sentence the court refused to take into account the time that the applicant had allegedly overspent in prison while serving his sentence in an unrelated criminal case. 20.  During the trial the applicant requested the court to obtain the attendance of a witness on his behalf. However, the court refused his request in view of the fact that the testimony which the witness in question could have given was irrelevant to the establishment of the factual circumstances of the case by the jurors. 21.  However, the trial court granted the prosecutor’s request to read out the testimony given by one of the applicant’s co-defendants at the stage of the pre-trial investigation. 22.  Later, the presiding judge several times drew the jury’s attention to the fact that the information provided during the trial concerning acts other than those with which the applicant was charged, including the statement by the applicant’s co-defendant, was of no relevance to the applicant’s case and was not to be taken into consideration when answering the questions put to the jury. 23.  The applicant received a copy of the trial record with a one-month delay. 24.  On 15 May 2008 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the judgment on appeal. The applicant was represented by two lawyers of his own choosing. 25.  On 5 July 2008 a copy of the appeal decision was served on the applicant. 26.  On 25 February 2009 the Presidium of the Supreme Court of Russia quashed the appeal decision of 15 May 2008 by way of supervisory review and remitted the case for a new appeal hearing. The reason for the quashing was the fact that the applicant had been denied the opportunity to study the verdict. 27.  On 23 July 2009 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the judgment of 6 November 2007 on appeal. 28.  From 6 May 2005 to 7 September 2008 and from 7 June to 17 September 2009 the applicant was held in detention facility IZ-47/1 in St Petersburg. He was held in cells nos. 29, 66, 74, 86, 360, 395 and 435 before his conviction and subsequently in cells nos. 47, 122, 124, 129, 130, 132 and 135, designed for inmates sentenced to life imprisonment. All the cells measured eight square metres.
(a)  The Government’s account 29.  Each cell was equipped with four sleeping places and accommodated a maximum of three inmates at any given time. The applicant had always had an individual bed and had been provided with the appropriate bedding (a mattress, a pillow, a blanket, two sheets and a pillowcase) and with tableware. 30.  The cell windows, which measured 1 x 1.1 metres, were not covered with metal screens and therefore allowed sufficient daylight to enter so that the inmates could read and write. The cells were equipped with 60 to 75‑watt filament light bulbs which were on from 6 a.m. to 10 p.m. At night the cells were lit by 40-watt security lights. 31.  All the cells were ventilated by means of a ventilation shaft. Natural ventilation via the windows was also available. The cells were equipped with a heating system providing a suitable temperature which was in line with health and safety standards. The average temperature during the summer was maintained at 22 degrees Celsius and during winter at 18 degrees Celsius. 32.  The cells were equipped with toilets separated from the main area by 1.5 metre-high partitions. 33.  The cells were equipped with drinking-water tanks. The inmates were also allowed to use electric water heaters. 34.  The cells were also equipped with dining tables and benches corresponding to the number of detainees, as well as shelves and bedside tables for storage of personal items and foodstuffs. 35.  The applicant could take a shower once a week for at least fifteen minutes. 36.  He was given three hot meals a day on the basis of the established legal norms. The quality of the food was monitored on a regular basis by the medical staff of the detention facility. 37.  The applicant was allowed a daily one-hour outside walk in the facility’s exercise yards, during which he could perform physical exercises. The exercise yards, measuring from 24 to 35 square metres, were equipped with benches, waste bins and sheds providing shelter from rain and snow. Sports equipment was provided to the detainees at their request. 38.  The authorities ensured regular disinfection and pest control in the detention facility. 39.  The applicant was provided with comprehensive medical assistance. The medical service of the facility was fully staffed with qualified personnel, medicines and medical equipment. On his arrival at the facility the applicant was examined by medical specialists; he made no health‑related complaints and denied having tuberculosis, viral hepatitis, venereal or surgical diseases. Subsequently, when he underwent a forensic psychiatric examination, it was revealed that the applicant had viral hepatitis C. Throughout his stay in detention facility IZ-47/1 in St Petersburg the applicant did not show clinical signs of the above‑mentioned disease and therefore did not require any specialised treatment. 40.  In support of their observations the Government provided several certificates issued by the governor of IZ-47/1 on 3 August and 11 August 2009, the results of a laboratory examination of the microclimate of cells nos. 435, 360 and 122 (dated 10 July 2005, 6 June 2006 and 2 December 2007 respectively), statements by wardens (not dated), the schedules for disinfection and pest control in the facility’s premises and a number of certificates concerning the food rations. The Government further provided copies of extracts from the registration log showing the number of detainees on certain days and in certain cells between May and December 2005, April and December 2006, October and November 2007 and February and March 2008. These extracts show that on 1 July and 8 July 2005 and on 2 October 2006, cell no. 435 accommodated four inmates; on 4 August 2005 cell no. 66 accommodated four inmates; on 18 November and 15 December 2005 cell no. 395 accommodated four inmates; and on 5 October and 9 October 2007 and on 10 November 2007 cell no. 86 also accommodated four inmates.
(b)  The applicant’s account 41.  Cells nos. 29, 86, 360, 395 and 435 were equipped with six sleeping places (two three-tier bunks). They housed from four to six inmates at any given time. Cell no. 66 housed three inmates including the applicant and cell no. 74 housed two inmates including the applicant. 42.  After his conviction on 6 November 2007 the applicant was held on his own in cells nos. 47, 122, 124, 129, 130, 132 and 135, which were reserved for inmates sentenced to life imprisonment at first instance pending the examination of their case on appeal (wing 2/1 with restricted access). Until the repairs in April-May 2008 these cells had not been equipped with bunk beds but with two concrete benches in each cell. 43.  The windows in cells nos. 29, 66, 74, 86, 360, 395 and 435 were equipped with a double grid (one on the outside and one on the inside). In cells nos. 122, 124, 129, 130, 132 and 135 the windows were equipped with a triple grid (on the outside and the inside of the cell, as well as inside the window pane). In addition to the triple grid, densely spaced iron netting was fitted in front of the windows, which allowed very little daylight to enter. In cell no. 130 the window glass had been replaced with a layer of veneer, which also prevented daylight from entering the cell. The window in cell no. 132, in which the applicant had been held for two weeks in February 2008, faced a wall, in addition to the above-mentioned arrangements. 44.  Until April-May 2008 the artificial lighting in cells nos. 122, 124, 129, 130, 132 and 135 consisted of one 60-watt filament light bulb per cell. The bulb was covered by a dust-laden lampshade above the entrance door. 45.  Air shafts existed in cells nos. 29, 66, 74, 86, 360, 395 and 435, but did not function as they were clogged with waste. Cells nos. 122, 124, 129, 130, 132 and 135 did not have any air shafts. The heating system did not function in any of the cells where the applicant was detained until the repairs carried out in the facility in April-May 2008. The applicant had to sleep with his clothes on to keep warm in the wintertime. 46.  There were no hot water taps or drinking-water tanks in the cells. 47.  The lavatory was not separated from the living area and did not offer any privacy. 48.  No bedding was provided to the applicant until November 2007 (until then he had used his own bedding). The bedding provided by the facility was very worn, torn and dirty. Inmates had to dry their laundry indoors, creating excessive humidity in the cells. 49.  The shower was available once a week. At times it was only available once every ten days, every two weeks or even every three weeks. 50.  The food was of extremely poor quality and in scarce supply. 51.  None of the cells was equipped with a dining table or benches (because of the limited space). The inmates ate their food sitting on their bunks holding the plate. 52.  The cells swarmed with spiders, worms, flies, cockroaches, bedbugs and mice. The applicant never witnessed any disinfection or pest control. 53.  Outside exercise, which was supposedly available every day, was skipped on shower days and occasionally on other days for no apparent reason. The exercise yards were too small and did not offer sufficient room for any exercise (an average of five detainees being taken outside simultaneously). 54.  The inmates were not provided with adequate medical assistance. 55.  The applicant’s complaints about the conditions of his detention had availed nothing. Neither he nor the witnesses who could confirm his allegations were ever questioned on the circumstances of which he complained. 56.  In support of his position the applicant made reference to the applications made to the European Court by B., T. and Z., in which they also raised an issue concerning compliance of the conditions of their detention in facility IZ-47/1 during the relevant period with the requirements of Article 3 of the Convention. 57.  B., in particular, (see A.B. v. Russia, no. 1439/06, 14 October 2010) provided the following account of the conditions of his detention in wing 2/1 of facility IZ-47/1 of St Petersburg:
“36.  On 29 October 2004 the applicant was placed in solitary cell no. 129 in wing 2/1 with restricted access. The wing was designed for the detention of inmates sentenced to life imprisonment. 37.  On 19 January 2005 the applicant was transferred to solitary cell no. 123 in wing 2/1 with restricted access. According to the applicant, the cell was the equivalent of a disciplinary cell. ... The cell was in the basement where there was no central heating, and the winter temperature there was about 7-10oC.
... 72.  Mr A.M., who had been sentenced to life imprisonment, was kept in cells nos. 120, 122, 126, 128 and 141 of wing 2/1 of the remand prison on various occasions between June 2004 and July 2007. In his submission, wing 2/1 was reserved for inmates sentenced to life imprisonment at first instance pending the examination of their cases on appeal. The conditions of detention in all the cells were nearly identical. There were no chairs or desks in the cells. The beds were made of concrete. The cells were in a deplorable state. The humidity was high. There was no hot water or heating. The temperature in the cells in winter was as low as outside. There was no mandatory ventilation. Lavatory pans were not separated from the rest of the cells. All inmates in wing 2/1 were kept in solitary confinement. ... 73.  Mr N.M. was sentenced to life imprisonment. He was kept in cell no. 121 of wing 2/1 of the remand prison. In his submission, all the cells in the wing were nearly identical. There was no furniture in the cells. The temperature in the cells in winter was as low as 3oC. There was no hot water. The cells were very humid so that the walls were covered with mould. The lavatory pans were not secluded. The food was of poor quality. ...” 58.  Z. provided the following account of the conditions in wing 2/1 of facility IZ-47/1 in St Petersburg:
“From 30 March 2006 to 19 April 2007 and from 4 December 2007 to the present I have been detained in wing 2/1 of St Petersburg IZ-47/1. From December 2007 I was held in cell no. 129, and [the applicant] was held in cell no. 130. The conditions in those cells were horrible. The walls were half-destroyed. The ceiling was crumbling. The floor was made of concrete. The heating did not function; the cells were very cold. There were no hot water taps. Ventilation was non-existent. The cells were very dim since filament bulbs over 60 watts were prohibited; the only lamp in the cell was fitted with a 40-watt filament bulb ... The cells were overrun by rodents (rats, mice).
...
In April 2008 I was transferred to cell no. 134, and [the applicant] was moved to cell no. 135. The conditions in those cells were identical to the conditions described above.
On 12 November 2008 I was transferred to cell no. 121, and in June 2009 I learned that [the applicant] was being held in cell no. 119. The floor and the ceiling in these cells are painted, but they are crumbling; the concrete floor is covered with a piece of linoleum. The remaining conditions are identical to those described above. ...” 59.  According to the applicant, on 28 October 2007 in the afternoon the door of the cell where he was being held (cell no. 74 at the time) burst open and two prison officers entered and ordered the applicant and his inmates to leave the cell. The purpose of the operation was to make the detainees abandon a collective hunger strike. As soon as the detainees left the cell they were attacked by the “Tayfun” special-purpose unit (отдел специального назначения “Тайфун” ГУИН). The officers of the unit wore balaclavas and used rubber truncheons to hit the detainees. The applicant saw that inmates from other cells were also being beaten up. As a result of the blows he received the applicant lost consciousness and regained it only when locked back in the cell. 60.  On the following day the applicant was placed in the punishment cell for ten days for alleged disobedience. Since he could not walk after the beatings he was helped by two wardens.
(b)  The Government’s account 61.  According to the Government, a rubber truncheon was used against the applicant for the purpose of repelling an attack by him on a prison officer. They submitted a report on the use of a rubber truncheon against the applicant dated 28 October 2007, accompanied by a medical certificate drawn up following the examination of the applicant after the incident. The certificate recorded multiple abrasions in the area of the applicant’s back and a haematoma in the region of his right knee.
(c)  Investigation into the events of 28 October 2007 62.  On 1 November and 2 November 2007 the applicant complained about the beatings to the public prosecutor’s office. 63.  In its reply dated 14 December 2007 the St Petersburg public prosecutor’s office informed the applicant as follows:
“In the course of the inquiry [conducted into the applicant’s allegations of ill‑treatment] it was established that on 28 October 2007 the prison officers of SIZO-1 had been carrying out a technical inspection of cell no. 74 where [the applicant] was held at the material time. In the course of the inspection [the applicant] refused to comply with the lawful orders given by the prison officers. In order to put a stop to [the applicant’s] unlawful actions physical force and special means had been used against him in accordance with section 45 of the Federal Law on the detention of persons suspected of and charged with criminal offences.
...
Taking into account the foregoing, at the present time there are no grounds for the prosecutor’s office to intervene.” 64.  Further, on 27 August 2008 an investigator from the Kalininskiy District investigating department of the St Petersburg public prosecutor’s office refused to institute criminal proceedings concerning the use of special means against the applicant. The decision read as follows:
“In the course of the inquiry it was established that on 28 October 2007 on the territory of IZ-47/1 a general search was conducted by prison officers of [the above facility] aimed at finding and seizing prohibited items. During the search certain detainees ... broke the rules by failing to abide by the lawful orders of the [prison officers] and insulting [them], as a result of which physical force and special means were used against them.
Therefore, physical force and special means were lawfully applied to [the applicant] since he had not abided by the lawful orders of the prison officers, a fact confirmed by the medical certificate, the report on the use of a rubber truncheon and the submissions by [four officers involved in the incident] ...” 65.  On 27 July 2009 the acting head of the Kalininskiy District investigating department annulled the above decision, finding as follows:
“In the course of the study of the material in the case file it was established that the inquiry had been incomplete.
Therefore the decision [of 27 August 2008] was made prematurely and must be annulled.
In the course of the additional inquiry it is necessary to question [the applicant], to obtain and examine the [applicant’s] medical documents, to question the head of the “Tayfun” special-purpose unit, and to take other measures required in order to reach a decision.” 66.  The applicant has yet to be informed of the outcome of the additional inquiry. No information was provided by the Government in that regard. 67.  According to the applicant, he was beaten up by prison officers because of his complaints about the conditions of his detention.
(b)  The Government’s account 68.  According to the Government, physical force consisting in bending the applicant’s arm behind his back (загиб руки за спину) was applied to the applicant for the purpose of repelling an attack by him on a prison officer. They submitted a report on the use of physical force against the applicant dated 14 February 2008, accompanied by a medical certificate concerning the examination of the applicant after the incident. The certificate indicated that no visible injuries had been detected on the applicant’s body. The Government further submitted statements by three prison officers, according to which in the course of the search conducted in cell no. 130, where the applicant was detained at the material time, the latter had behaved defiantly, had threatened the prison officers, had not responded to warnings and had prevented the officers from carrying out the search. After a mobile phone had been found in the cell the applicant had pounced on one of the prison officers and the latter had had to use physical force against him. The applicant had displayed active physical resistance and had tried to administer blows and kicks, following which he had been forced to the floor. Since he continued to resist, a painful hold (болевой прием самбо) had been applied to him and he had been put back in the cell.
(c)  Investigation into the events of 14 February 2008 69.  The applicant complained to the public prosecutor’s office about the beatings. 70.  In its reply dated 25 April 2008 the St Petersburg public prosecutor’s office informed the applicant as follows:
“On 14 February 2008 prison officers of SIZO-1 conducted a search in cell no. 130 where you were detained at the material time. During the search you displayed resistance to the lawful orders of the prison officers. In order to put a stop to your unlawful actions physical force was applied in accordance with section 45 of the Federal Law on the detention of persons suspected of and charged with criminal offences.” 71.  Neither party provided any other documents pertaining to the inquiry into the above incident.