8.  The first applicant, the political party Herri Batasuna, was founded on 5 June 1986. 9.  The second applicant, the political party Batasuna, was founded on 3 May 2001. 10.  On 27 June 2002 the Spanish parliament enacted Institutional Law no. 6/2002 on political parties (Ley Orgánica 6/2002 de Partidos Políticos – “the LOPP”). According to its explanatory memorandum, that Law was intended to develop Articles 1, 6, 22 and 23 of the Spanish Constitution by amending and updating Law no. 54/1978 of 4 December 1978 on political parties, regard being had to the experience acquired over the years, and to establish a complete and coherent framework for political parties, reflecting their role in a consolidated democracy. 11.  The main innovations introduced by the new Law appeared in Chapter II on the organisation, functioning and activities of political parties, and in Chapter III on their dissolution and suspension by the courts of their activities. 12.  Chapter II lays down the basic criteria intended to ensure compliance with the constitutional requirement that the organisation and operation of political parties be democratic and that they may freely engage in their activities in accordance with the Constitution and the law. Section 9 requires parties to respect democratic principles and human rights, describing in detail the type of conduct that would be in breach of the principles in question. According to the explanatory memorandum, the Law is based on the principle that any project or objective is constitutional provided that it is not pursued by means of activities which breach democratic principles or the fundamental rights of citizens. The Law is not intended to prohibit the defence of ideas or doctrines calling into question the constitutional framework. Its aim is rather to reconcile freedom and pluralism with respect for human rights and the protection of democracy. The explanatory memorandum states that a party may be dissolved only in the event of repeated or accumulated acts which unequivocally prove the existence of undemocratic conduct at odds with democracy and in breach of constitutional values, democracy and the rights of citizens. In that connection, sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 2 of section 9 draw a clear distinction between organisations which defend their ideas or programmes, whatever they may be, in strict compliance with democratic methods and principles, and those whose political activity is based on an accommodation with violence, political support for terrorist organisations or violation of the rights of citizens or democratic principles. 13.  Chapter III sets out the grounds on which political parties may be dissolved or their activities suspended by order of the court and describes the applicable procedure in the courts. The Law invests the “special Chamber” of the Supreme Court established by section 61 of the Judicature Act (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial – “the LOPJ”) with jurisdiction for the dissolution of political parties. Furthermore, provision is made for specific priority proceedings, involving a single level of jurisdiction, which may be brought only by the public prosecutor’s office or the government, of their own motion or at the request of the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate. According to the LOPP’s explanatory memorandum, the proceedings in question are intended to reconcile the principle of legal certainty and the rights of the defence with the principle of promptness and a reasonable time-limit. The judgment delivered by the Supreme Court upon completion of those proceedings may be challenged only by way of an amparo appeal to the Constitutional Court. Section 12 details the effects of the court-ordered dissolution of a political party. Once the judgment has been served, the dissolved party must cease all activity. Furthermore, it may not set up a political organisation or use an existing party with a view to pursuing the activities of the party that has been declared illegal and dissolved. In order to rule as to whether or not there is any continuity between an existing party and a party which has been dissolved, the Supreme Court has regard to whether any “substantial similarity” exists between the structure, organisation and operation of the parties in question, or other evidence such as the identity of their members or leaders, their funding or their support for violence or terrorism. The assets of a dissolved political party are liquidated and transferred to the Treasury to be used for social and humanitarian purposes. 14.  The LOPP was published in the Official Gazette of the State on 28 June 2002 and came into force the following day. 15.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 16.  Founded as an electoral coalition, the political organisation Herri Batasuna took part in the general elections of 1 March 1979 (the first elections in Spain following the entry into force of the 1978 Constitution). On 5 June 1986 it was entered into the register of political parties at the Ministry of the Interior. 17.  Following the Supreme Court’s sentencing on 1 December 1997 of twenty-three members of Herri Batasuna’s national directorate to imprisonment for collaboration with an armed organisation, Euskal Herritarrok (“EH”) was set up on 2 September 1998 to stand in the Basque elections of 25 October 1998, initially as an association of voters and then as a political party. 18.  On 3 May 2001 Batasuna filed documents at the register of political parties seeking registration as a political party. 19.  On 27 September 2002 the Basque autonomous government brought an action before the Constitutional Court challenging the constitutionality of the LOPP, criticising in particular sections 1(1), 2(1), 3(2), 4(2) and (3), 5(1), 6 and 9, Chapter III (sections 10 to 12) and paragraph 2 of the sole transitional provision of that Law. 20.  By a judgment of 12 March 2003, the Constitutional Court declared the impugned Law constitutional. As regards the very existence of such a Law making provision for the dissolution of political parties and its purpose which, according to the Basque government, consisted of “establishing a model of militant democracy imposing restrictions on political parties, in particular by imposing on them an obligation, not provided for in the Constitution, to accept a given political regime or system”, the Constitutional Court stated:
“According to the applicant government, the argument set out above is based on references in certain paragraphs of sections 6, 9 and 10 of the LOPP to the ‘constitutional values expressed in constitutional principles and human rights’ (section 9(1)), to ‘democratic principles’ (sections 6 and 9(2)), to the ‘system of liberties’ and to the ‘democratic system’ (sections 9 (2) and 10(2), sub-paragraph (c)), to the ‘constitutional order’ and to ‘public peace’ (section 9(2), sub-paragraph (c)). Despite the fact that the legal significance of those references can be grasped only in the context of each of the provisions containing them and that each of the provisions in question must in turn be interpreted in the light of the law and of the legal system as a whole, the Basque government’s submission that there is no place, in our constitutional order, for a model of ‘militant democracy’ within the meaning given to that expression by the Government, namely, a model in which not only compliance with, but also positive acceptance of, the established order and first and foremost the Constitution is required, must be endorsed ... The impugned Law allows for no such model of democracy. Right at the outset, the explanatory memorandum lays down the principle of a distinction between the ideas and aims proclaimed by political parties, on the one hand, and their activities, on the other, and states that ‘the only aims explicitly vetoed are those which fall within the criminal law’, so that ‘any project or objective is deemed to be constitutional provided that it is not pursued by means of activities which breach democratic principles or the fundamental rights of citizens’. Consequently, and as regards the aspect which is of particular interest here, the Law lists as grounds for illegality ‘conduct’ – that is to say, acts – of political parties which, through their activities, and not through the ultimate aims proclaimed in their manifestos, fail to satisfy the requirements of Article 6 of the Constitution, which the impugned Law merely mentions.
... Secondly, and most importantly, it is clear that the principles and values to which the Law refers can be none other than those proclaimed by the Constitution, and that their content and scope depend on the meaning arising out of the interpretation of the positive constitutional provisions as a whole. Thus, in our system, ‘democratic principles’ can only be principles specific to the democratic order arising out of the institutional and normative fabric woven by the Constitution, the actual functioning of which leads to a system of powers, rights and balances giving form to a variant of the democratic model which is precisely that assumed by the Constitution in establishing Spain as a social and democratic State governed by the rule of law (Article 1 § 1 of the Constitution).” 21.  As regards the applicant parties’ argument that the provisions of the Law, namely some of the cases referred to in section 9(3) (tacit support, for example), established a “militant democracy” in breach of the fundamental rights of freedom of ideology, participation, expression and information, the Constitutional Court stated:
“... the system established by the first three paragraphs of section 9 of the LOPP must firstly be described. The first paragraph refers not to a positive adherence of any kind but to simple respect for constitutional values, which must be demonstrated by political parties when engaging in their activities and which is compatible with the broadest ideological freedom. Paragraph 2 provides that a political party may be declared illegal only ‘when as a result of its activities, it infringes democratic principles, in particular when it seeks thereby to impair or to destroy the system of liberties, to hinder or to put an end to the democratic system by repeatedly and seriously engaging in any of the conduct described below’. Lastly, sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) list the general criteria for a party to be declared illegal on account of its activities ... As regards paragraph 3 of section 9 of the LOPP, the flawed drafting of its introduction might suggest that the instances of behaviour described by that provision are in addition to those specified in the preceding paragraph and that they must therefore be interpreted separately. However, an interpretation of these two provisions taken together and an interpretation of the whole section which contains them show that the instances of behaviour described in paragraph 3 of section 9 have the general features described in paragraph 2 of the same section. The instances of behaviour referred to in section 9(3) of the Law merely specify or clarify the principal causes of illegality set out in general terms in section 9(2) of the Law. A separate interpretation and application of such conduct can be done only on the basis of the cases provided for in section 9(2).
That having been said, while it is not for the Constitutional Court to determine whether or not mere failure to condemn [terrorist acts] can be construed as implicit support for terrorism, it is clear that symbolic actions can be used, in certain circumstances, to legitimise terrorist acts or excuse or minimise their anti-democratic effects and implicit violation of fundamental rights. In such circumstances it is plainly impossible to speak of a violation of the right to freedom of expression.
...
The same can be said, in general, of sub-paragraph (c) of section 10(2) of the LOPP, which provides: ‘where, through its activities, it repeatedly and seriously violates democratic principles or seeks to impair or to destroy the system of liberties or to hinder the democratic system or to put an end to it by means of the conduct referred to in section 9.’ It must also be stated in this regard that that provision concerns only the activities of political parties and in no way extends to their aims or objectives. The wording of that provision shows, therefore, that only those parties which through their activities rather than their ideology effectively and proactively seek to ‘impair or to destroy the system of liberties’ are liable to be dissolved.” 22.  As regards the Basque government’s complaint that the dissolution measure prescribed by law was disproportionate, the Constitutional Court stated:
“... taken separately, none of the conduct described in section 9 of the LOPP can entail a party’s dissolution. In order for that measure to be pronounced, as stated in section 9(2), the conduct in question must be engaged in ‘repeatedly and seriously’. Secondly, it must be pointed out that the existence of a party which, through its activities, collaborates with or supports terrorist violence, jeopardises the survival of the pluralist order proclaimed by the Constitution and that, faced with that danger, dissolution would appear to be the only sanction capable of repairing the damage done to the legal order. Lastly, it must be stressed that Article 6 of the Constitution contains a definition of a party. According to the Constitution, a party may only be considered a party if it is the expression of political pluralism. Consequently, it is quite acceptable, constitutionally, for a party whose activities undermine pluralism and to a greater or lesser extent destabilise the democratic order, to be dissolved. Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights has considered that even though the margin of appreciation left to States must be a narrow one where the dissolution of political parties is concerned, where the pluralism of ideas and parties inherent in democracy is in danger, a State may forestall the execution of a policy at the root of that danger [Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey, nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98, 31 July 2001].
... it is not sufficient to establish the existence of just one of the acts described by the Law. On the contrary, those acts need to be engaged in ‘repeatedly and seriously’ (section 9(2)) or ‘repeatedly or cumulatively’ (section 9(3)). ... To conclude, [the relevant provisions] describe particularly serious conduct and establish as grounds for dissolution only those which are manifestly incompatible with the peaceful and lawful means which are an essential part of the process of political participation to which the Constitution requires political parties to lend their qualified support. ... The criteria established by the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights as regards the dissolution of political parties have therefore been complied with (United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, 30 January 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑I; Socialist Party and Others v. Turkey, 25 May 1998, Reports 1998‑III; Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP) v. Turkey [GC], no. 23885/94, ECHR 1999-VIII; Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey, nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98, 31 July 2001 and [GC], ECHR 2003‑II; Yazar and Others v. Turkey, nos. 22723/93, 22724/93 and 22725/93, ECHR 2002‑II; and Dicle for the Democratic Party (DEP) of Turkey v. Turkey, no. 25141/94, 10 December 2002). That case-law states that in order to comply with the European Convention on Human Rights, the dissolution of a party must satisfy certain criteria, namely: (a) the law must include the circumstances and causes of dissolution (that criterion is clearly satisfied by the rules at issue, since they are set out in a formal law); (b) the aim pursued must be legitimate (which, as indicated above, consists in the instant case of protecting the democratic process of political participation through the exclusion of any associative organisation which could be likened to a party exercising an activity not falling within the constitutional definition of political parties); and (c) the dissolution must be ‘necessary in a democratic society’ (demonstrated in the context of the foregoing analysis of the specific causes of dissolution provided for by law).
... The fact that convicted terrorists are regularly appointed to positions of leadership or entered on lists of candidates for election may appear to constitute an expression of support for terrorist methods which goes against the obligations imposed by the Constitution on all political parties. Furthermore, the fact that such a practice can be taken into account only if the convicted terrorists have not ‘publicly rejected terrorist aims and methods’ cannot be interpreted as an obligation to disavow earlier activities. The provision in question [section 9(3)(c)] is of prospective effect only and applies only to political parties which are led by convicted terrorists or whose candidates are convicted terrorists. It lays down as a cause of dissolution the regular use of people who may legitimately be assumed to sympathise with terrorist methods rather than with any ideas and programmes that terrorist organisations might seek to implement.
...” 23.  Lastly, as regards the Basque government’s complaint that the principle of non-retrospectivity in relation to section 9(4) of the LOPP and paragraph 2 of the sole transitional provision had been violated, the Constitutional Court held:
“For the purposes of applying section 9(4) of the LOPP, which lists the factors that can be taken into account in assessing and characterising activities that may give rise to the dissolution of a political party, the aforementioned paragraph characterises as unlawful ‘the establishment, on a date immediately preceding or following the date of entry into force, of a political party which pursues the activities of another party or succeeds that party with a view to evading application of the provisions of this Law in respect of it’. Worded as it is, that provision cannot be held to be unconstitutional as it is quite clear that its sole purpose is to enable section 9(4) of the LOPP to be applied ‘to activities pursued after the entry into force of this Institutional Law’, as stated therein. In no circumstances does it make provision for the judging of activities and acts prior to the LOPP, since only those subsequent to the entry into force of the Law are deemed to be relevant.
In other words, the Law specifically states that the various causes that may lead to dissolution of a party may be taken into account only after its entry into force. The activities considered separately and ‘the continuing nature or repetition’ of the activities mentioned in section 9(4), to which the transitional provision refers, are subsequent to the entry into force of the LOPP. That said, for the purposes of determining the significance of those activities and assessing their relevance to the overall conduct of the party concerned (and for that purpose only, since to take account of conduct pre-dating the effective date of the Law in order to justify a declaration of unlawfulness would be unconstitutional because it would constitute a breach of the principle of non-retrospectivity enshrined in Article 9 § 3 of the Constitution), it is perfectly possible to take into consideration what the Law refers to as the ‘trajectory’ (section 9(4)) of the party in question, which trajectory could encompass acts prior to the entry into force of the Law, but that cannot in any way be considered as a retrospective effect under the Constitution.” 24.  The Constitutional Court also rejected the complaints based on the principle of non bis in idem, the lack of foreseeability and the exceptional nature of the Law, the specific features of the judicial proceedings and the allegations concerning the system for founding and registering political parties. Accordingly, it dismissed the applicant parties’ claims, stating in paragraph 23 of its reasoning that sections 3(1), 5(1), 9(2) and (3) and paragraph 2 of the sole transitional provision of the LOPP were constitutional only if “interpreted in accordance with the terms set out in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 20 and 21” of the reasoning of its judgment. 25.  The government of the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country subsequently lodged an application with the Court (no. 29134/03), which was declared inadmissible on the ground of incompatibility ratione personae on 3 February 2004. 26.  Meanwhile, by a decision of 26 August 2002 delivered in the context of criminal proceedings for illegal association (Article 515 of the Spanish Criminal Code), central investigating judge no. 5 at the Audiencia Nacional had ordered the suspension of Batasuna’s activities and the closure, for three years, of any headquarters and offices that could be used by Herri Batasuna and Batasuna. The same measure was applied to EH, which is not an applicant before the Court. 27.  On 2 September 2002, implementing an agreement adopted by the Council of Ministers on 30 August 2002, the Attorney-General (Abogado del Estado) lodged an application with the Supreme Court on behalf of the Spanish government for the dissolution of the political parties Herri Batasuna, EH and Batasuna on the ground that they had breached the new LOPP on account of various acts which conclusively demonstrated conduct inconsistent with democracy, constitutional values, democratic practice and the rights of citizens. 28.  On the same day, State Counsel (Procurador General) also filed an application with the Supreme Court with a view to the dissolution of the political parties Herri Batasuna, EH and Batasuna in accordance with sections 10 et seq. of the LOPP. In his application, he asked the Supreme Court to find that the parties in question were illegal, and order that they be removed from the register of political parties, that they immediately cease their activities and that the effects of the Law be extended to any party newly created in breach of the Law or succeeding any of the parties concerned, that their assets be liquidated and that they be dissolved in accordance with section 12(1) of the LOPP. 29.  On 10 March 2003 Batasuna sought the referral of a preliminary question to the Constitutional Court concerning the constitutionality of the LOPP as it was of the view that the Law as a whole, and several of the sections thereof taken separately, violated the rights to freedom of association, freedom of expression and freedom of thought, and the principles of lawfulness, legal certainty, non-retrospectivity of less favourable criminal laws, proportionality and non bis in idem, as well as the right to take part in public affairs. 30.  By a unanimous judgment of 27 March 2003, the Supreme Court refused to refer Batasuna’s question to the Constitutional Court, pointing out that that organisation’s challenges to the constitutionality of the LOPP had already been examined and rejected in the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 12 March 2003. It declared Herri Batasuna, EH and Batasuna illegal and pronounced their dissolution under sections 9(2) and (3) of the LOPP on the ground that they were part of “a terrorist strategy of ‘tactical separation’”. It considered that significant similarities between the three parties at issue, and between them and the terrorist organisation ETA – “three organisations having substantially the same ideology ... and, moreover, tightly controlled by that terrorist organisation” – had been established. It concluded that in reality there existed a “single entity, namely, the terrorist organisation ETA, hidden behind an apparent plurality of legal entities created at different times according to an ‘operational succession’ devised in advance by that organisation”. It also liquidated the assets of the parties at issue, in accordance with section 12(1)(c) of the same Law. 31.  The Supreme Court noted in its judgment that, while political parties constituted the essential foundations of political pluralism, they had to engage in their activities and pursue their aims and objectives in accordance with the law and democratic processes, stating that activities involving the use of violence or restricting the fundamental rights of others could not be tolerated. The Supreme Court referred to the Spanish constitutional system, which, in its view, unlike other legal systems, did not constitute a model of “militant democracy”, since the only condition imposed on the expression of differences was respect for the rights of others. It pointed out that the LOPP recognised that any project or objective was constitutional provided that it was not “pursued by means of activities which breach[ed] democratic principles or the fundamental rights of citizens”. In that regard, it pointed out that, by law, political parties were liable to be declared illegal only on the basis of “activities” consisting of serious and repeated conduct. In the instant case, according to the Supreme Court, the calls to violence justifying the restriction of the freedoms of the parties at issue stemmed from a deliberate apportionment of tasks between terrorism and politics, ETA devising “justification of the need for terrorism as one of the functions” entrusted to Herri Batasuna. 32.  Bearing in mind the historical and social context of the fight against terrorism in Spain, the Supreme Court held that the terrorist organisation ETA and its satellite organisation, Koordinadora Abertzale Sozialista (“KAS”), had been directing Herri Batasuna since its creation. To reach that conclusion, it relied on evidence demonstrating the existence of hierarchical links between the three organisations and revealing, in particular, that KAS, as ETA’s delegate, had controlled the process of appointing the most senior members of Herri Batasuna and its successors (EH and Batasuna) and had participated in it. The Supreme Court held that Herri Batasuna had been created in response to ETA’s wish to split armed activity and mass activity “organically and structurally”, which resulted in “clear hierarchical submission” of the parties at issue to the terrorist organisation ETA. In that connection, it referred to a KAS internal document which read as follows:
“KAS ... considers that armed struggle in association with mass struggle and institutional struggle – the latter serving the former – is the key to the advance and triumph of the revolution; mass struggle likewise requires an historical alliance of Popular Unity, the physical manifestation of which is Herri Batasuna.” 33.  As regards the “operational succession” held to exist between the three political parties that had been declared illegal, the Supreme Court relied on the fact that the people occupying posts of responsibility within the three organisations – notably their spokesperson, A.O. – and belonging to different parliamentary groups, were the same. It also took account of the existence of premises used by all the parties at issue. As regards links between the applicant parties and the terrorist organisation ETA, it noted that several of their members, in particular their spokesperson, A.O., had been convicted of terrorism-related offences. 34.  The Supreme Court held that the evidence set out below, subsequent to the date of entry into force of the LOPP, showed that the applicant political parties were instruments of ETA’s terrorist strategy.
–  On 3 July 2002 Batasuna had refused to appoint representatives to the Basque parliamentary committee responsible for the situation and needs of victims of terrorism, as it considered it to be “political, manipulated and biased”.
–  On 3 July 2002, reacting to the decision of central investigating judge no. 5 at the Audiencia Nacional by which Batasuna had been declared civilly liable for damage caused by street violence (kale borroka), A.O., the spokesperson for that organisation, had exhorted the Basque people to respond “energetically to this new attack” and had criticised the decision for having provoked a “serious and anti-democratic situation”.
–  On 7 July 2002, during a commemoration of the 1936 battle of Monte Albertia, A.O. had made the following statement:
“We must continue to work and to struggle, either within or outside the law. The reality is that we will not falter because we are at a point in history where the process we have undertaken must be rendered irreversible.”
–  On 13 July 2002 the mayor and a Batasuna councillor of the municipality of Lezo had taken part in a demonstration in support of ETA terrorists living in Venezuela.
–  On 16 July 2002, at a gathering outside the San Sebastian navy command, a Batasuna municipal spokesperson, referred to as J.L., had explained that the purpose of that demonstration was to let the State authorities know “that they could not move around with impunity in Euskal Herria”.
–  On 19 July 2002 J.E.B., Batsuna’s spokesperson in the municipality of Vitoria, had stated that Batasuna “didn’t want ETA to stop killing, but did not want Euskal Herria to have recourse to any kind of violence and wanted those who engaged in it to cease to exist”.
–  At a plenary session of the municipal council on 30 July 2002 Batasuna had refused to condemn the campaign of threats against councillors of the Basque Socialist Party (PSE-EE) in the municipality of Amorebieta.
–  At a press conference on 2 August 2002 concerning the potential handover to Spain of K.B., an ETA member convicted in France, the mayor and the chairman of the Human Rights Committee of the municipality of Ondarroa, L.A. and A.A., Batasuna members, had declared that they supported K.B. and “all those who [were] in the same situation”.
–  Batasuna and its leaders had refused to condemn the Santa Pola attack of 4 August 2002 in which two people had died. In that regard, during a press conference in Pamplona A.O. had described that event as a “painful consequence” of the failure to solve the “political conflict” in the Basque Country and had accused the Spanish Prime Minister [then J.M. Aznar] “of bearing the greatest responsibility” for “what [had happened] [at] that time and what [might] happen in future”.
–  Municipalities run by Batasuna and that party’s website had used an anagram of “Gestoras Pro-Amnistía”, an organisation that had been declared illegal by central investigating judge no. 5 at the Audiencia Nacional and was on the European list of terrorist organisations (Council Common Position 2001/931/PESC).
–  At a demonstration organised by Batasuna in San Sebastian on 11 August 2002 and run by Batasuna’s leaders A.O., J.P. and J.A., slogans supporting ETA prisoners and threatening expressions such as “borroka da bide bakarra” (the struggle is the only way), “zuek faxistak zarete terroristak” (you, the Fascists, are the real terrorists) or “gora ETA militarra” (long live ETA military) had been used.
–  On 12 and 14 August 2002, Batasuna-run town halls had put up placards on their facades supporting terrorism or those engaging in terrorism, alluding to the transfer of “Basque prisoners to the Basque Country” and showing photographs of several terrorists.
–  At a Batasuna press conference held in Bilbao on 21 August 2002, A.O. had criticised the “Spanish State’s genocide strategy” and proclaimed that the Basque people were going to “organise themselves” and “fight” so that some “little Spanish Fascist” could never again tell Basques what their institutions should be. He had also warned the government of the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country (nationalist government coalition) that if it took part in closing down Batasuna headquarters, the result would be “an unwanted scenario”, expressions which had been interpreted the following day by the media as “a threat against the Basque executive”.
–  During an interview with the newspaper Egunkaria on 23 August 2002, J.U., Batasuna’s representative in the Basque parliament, had stated that “ETA [did] not support armed struggle for the fun of it, but that [it was] an organisation conscious of the need to use every means possible to confront the State”.
–  On 23 August 2002 at a Batasuna meeting held in Bilbao following the demonstration organised by that party against its dissolution, J.P. had criticised the leaders of the Basque Nationalist Party for abiding by Spanish law, accusing them of lacking “national dignity”. He had also encouraged the participants to “go out into the street and respond vigorously”.
–  Municipalities governed by the parties in question had advocated terrorist activities, as evidenced by the fact that two ETA terrorists had been made honorary citizens (hijo predilecto) by the municipalities of Legazpia and Zaldibia.
–  Since 29 June 2002 Batasuna council representatives in Vitoria and Lasarte-Oria had been committing acts of harassment against the representatives of non-nationalist parties, thus contributing to a climate of civil confrontation.
–  Municipalities governed by Batasuna had displayed sketches and placards calling for a struggle against the State, against representatives of State power, against other political parties or members of those parties, notably the Prime Minister of the Spanish government and the leaders of the Partido Popular and the Spanish Socialist Party.
–  After the entry into force of the LOPP, the three parties at issue had continued to pursue the same strategy of complementing, on a political level, the actions of the terrorist organisation ETA in the context of a jointly organised “operational succession”. 35.  Relying on the above evidence, the Supreme Court held that the activity of the applicant political parties, as manifested through conduct in line with a strategy predefined by the terrorist organisation ETA, consisted of “providing assistance and political support to the actions of terrorist organisations with the aim of overthrowing the constitutional order or seriously disturbing the public peace”, within the meaning of section 9(2)(c) of the LOPP. It concluded that the conduct of which the applicant parties had been accused corresponded to the cases referred to in sub-paragraphs (a), (b), (d), (f) and (h) of paragraph 3 of section 9 of that Law. It stated firstly that some of the conduct described, such as Batasuna’s demonstration in San Sebastian, where pro-ETA slogans had been heard, could be characterised as explicit political support for terrorism, while other conduct, such as the refusal of Batasuna and its leaders to condemn the Santa Pola attack of 4 August 2002, sought to “justify terrorist actions and minimise their importance and the violation of the fundamental rights arising therefrom”. In that connection, the Supreme Court stated:
“In the constitutional context, the existence of political parties which, from an intellectual point of view, fail to take a clear and unequivocal stance against terrorist activities or which, with calculated ambiguity, systematically seek to conceal the fact that they do not disavow criminal acts by officially deploring the consequences thereof without, however, censuring in any way the barbaric behaviour of those who cause such acts through the use of violence to achieve their objectives, cannot be tolerated.
...
For the purposes of these proceedings, the repeated strategic and systematic silence of a political party concerning terrorist activities can only be interpreted, from a political and constitutional viewpoint, as a clear sign of their ‘acceptance by omission’ or ‘implicit acceptance’, that is, as their alignment with the arguments of the perpetrators of those criminal actions and the tacit acceptance of violence as a means of achieving set objectives which, in our constitutional system, can only be achieved by peaceful means.” 36.  The court held, secondly, that other conduct of which the applicant parties had been accused, such as the harassment of representatives of non-nationalist parties in the municipalities of Vitoria and Lasarte-Oria, had contributed to the emergence of a climate of civil confrontation intended to intimidate opponents of terrorism and deprive them of their freedom of opinion. 37.  It observed, thirdly, that conduct such as publicly describing ETA prisoners as political prisoners or using the anagram of “Gestoras Pro-Amnistía” proved that the parties at issue were using symbols reflecting terrorism or violence. It noted, lastly, that the applicant parties had also taken part in activities in praise of terrorist activities. 38.  Turning to the need for and the proportionality of the dissolution of the applicant parties, the Supreme Court pointed out that it was taking account of the text of the Convention and of the Court’s case-law, which would serve as a guide in the interpretation of fundamental constitutional rights, in accordance with Article 10 § 2 of the Spanish Constitution. It considered that, in view of the applicant parties’ frequent calls to violence, as established by the above-mentioned evidence, the measure to dissolve the applicant parties had been justified for the purposes of protecting the fundamental rights of others, “a necessary element of democracy”. The Supreme Court referred in particular to the Court’s judgment in Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey ([GC], nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98, ECHR 2003‑II), considering that that judgment imposed on parties claiming to exercise functions in a democratic society a real legal duty to distance themselves from any ambiguous or unclear messages as to the use of violence (ibid., § 131). It pointed out furthermore that the calls to violence at issue in the case before it appeared to be more explicit than those at issue in the case submitted to the Court. 39.  Batasuna and Herri Batasuna lodged two amparo appeals with the Constitutional Court against the judgment of the Supreme Court. 40.  In their appeals, they complained firstly of the lack of impartiality of the President of the Supreme Court, who had been the reporting judge in the proceedings leading to their dissolution even though he was the president of the Judicial Council, the body which had issued a favourable report on the bill resulting in the Law at issue. They submitted that the conflation of jurisdictional and consultative functions in one person had resulted in a loss of objective impartiality. Batasuna relied in that regard on Article 24 § 2 of the Constitution (right to a fair hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal). 41.  Secondly, the applicant parties alleged that the guarantees of a fair trial had not been rigorously observed in so far as the dissolution of Batasuna had been based, inter alia, on the conduct attributed to certain Zaldibia and Legazpia municipal councillors, who had made an alleged member of ETA and an ETA member who had been convicted and had served his sentence honorary citizens (hijo predilecto), facts which had been established ex parte, after completion of the phase of the proceedings during which new evidence could be introduced and without the applicant parties having been able to defend themselves against such allegations. 42.  They complained, thirdly, of a violation of the presumption of innocence, submitting that the facts deemed to have been proven in the judgment of the Supreme Court had been based on a single press release and that Batasuna and its members had been deemed to have carried out acts attributable to another political organisation, namely EH. Moreover, they criticised the judgment of 27 March 2003 for having considered as established fact that Batasuna had been created on the basis of an agreement between the leaders of Herri Batasuna and ETA, and that Herri Batasuna, EH and Batasuna were in fact one and the same organisation which had been assigned certain functions by ETA and which acted under the instructions of the latter, while those allegations had actually been based on documents having no probative value and on the statements of expert witnesses working for the Spanish government. 43.  Fourthly, and lastly, the applicant parties considered that their right to freedom of expression, thought and association had been breached as a result of their dissolution. 44.  By two unanimous judgments of 16 January 2004 the Constitutional Court dismissed the appeals. 45.  In the judgment on Batasuna’s amparo appeal, the Constitutional Court repeated the arguments contradicting the applicant parties’ submissions concerning “militant democracy” set out in its judgment of 12 March 2003. It pointed out that “any project or objective [was] constitutional provided that it [was] not pursued by means of activities which breach[ed] democratic principles or the fundamental rights of citizens”. It also pointed out that “the constitutionality of section 9 of the LOPP ha[d] been recognised by judgment 48/2003” and that “the answers to the objections raised by Batasuna as to the constitutionality [of the conduct described by the provisions of the Law at issue] could be found in the legal bases of that Law”. 46.  The Constitutional Court stated:
“The refusal of a political party to condemn terrorist attacks can be seen, in certain cases, as ‘[...] tacit political support for terrorism’ [section 9(3)(a) LOPP], or ‘legitimising terrorist actions for political ends’ [section 9(3)(a) LOPP], in so far as it may excuse terrorism or minimise the significance thereof ... The failure to condemn terrorist actions also constitutes a tacit or implicit manifestation of a certain attitude towards terror. ... Against a backdrop of terrorism that has been in place for over thirty years, with those responsible always legitimising terror by claiming equality between the types of forces fighting each other and by presenting it as the only possible solution to an allegedly historical conflict, the refusal of a party to condemn a specific terrorist attack, which undeniably reflects that party’s wish to disassociate itself from the condemnatory stance taken by other parties in relation to such acts, is all the more significant since it reflects the position of a party which has sought to pass off the terrorist phenomenon as an inevitable reaction to the past and unjust aggression of a terrorised State. ... Furthermore, ... the refusal to condemn [terrorist acts], combined with serious and repeated acts and conduct, indicates an accommodation with terror which runs counter to organised coexistence in the context of a democratic State. ... It must therefore be concluded that it would not appear to be unreasonable or erroneous to take account of facts judicially established in proceedings having observed all the guarantees covering the grounds for dissolution laid down by the LOPP – whose unconstitutionality in abstracto was ruled out by Constitutional Court judgment no. 48/2003 – thus ruling out any possibility of a breach of Article 24 of the Constitution, and that no substantive fundamental right, such as the right of political association (Articles 22 and 6 of the Constitution), the right to freedom of conscience (Article 16 § 1 of the Constitution) and the right to freedom of expression (Article 20 § 1 (a) of the Constitution) has been breached.” 47.  Lastly, in the reasoning of its judgment the Constitutional Court pointed out that in its appeal, Batasuna had literally alleged that the effect of the LOPP “had been to deprive ideologies linked to terrorism and violence of any possibility of developing lawfully, in breach of the procedural definition of democracy”, and had argued that the Law at issue declared unlawful “the mere fact of providing political and ideological support to the actions of terrorist organisations with the aim of overthrowing the constitutional order”. It held that this “link with terrorism and violence” ... “fell outside the constitutionally legitimate scope of the exercise of freedom of association and freedom of expression and could therefore be prohibited by the democratic legislature”. 48.  As regards Herri Batasuna’s amparo appeal, the Constitutional Court again referred to its judgment of 12 March 2003, in which it had indicated that the various causes of dissolution of parties could only be taken into account as of the entry into force of the Law, stating, however, that “for the purpose of determining the significance [of the activities listed by the Law] and assessing their importance having regard to the overall conduct of the party at issue (and for such purposes only, since to take account of conduct prior to the entry into force of the Law in order to justify a declaration of illegality [would have been] unconstitutional in that it [would have] breached the principle of non-retrospectivity enshrined in Article 9 § 3 of the Constitution), it [was] perfectly possible to take into consideration what the Law called the ‘trajectory’ (section 9(4)) of the party at issue which could encompass conduct prior to the entry into force of the Law, without it being possible in any circumstances to consider that to be a case of retrospective application prohibited by the Constitution”. The Constitutional Court pointed out that the applicant party had not been dissolved because of acts pre-dating the entry into force of the Law or conduct attributable to other parties, but because it had been held that Batasuna, Herri Batasuna and EH “constituted ‘successive units’ of a single reality – namely a political organisation used as a tool by a terrorist group for unlawful purposes –, that the successive forms assumed by a single political party had de facto been dissolved, and that the dissolution pronounced by the Supreme Court had been based on subsequent facts stated as being entirely attributable to the applicant party on account of the fact that the Supreme Court had found the three dissolved parties to be materially identical”. 49.  Lastly, the Supreme Court dismissed the complaints of lack of impartiality and failure to comply with the principle of adversarial proceedings as lacking any constitutional basis. 50.  On 6 June 2007 ETA ended the ceasefire that it had declared on 24 March 2006. Since that date, several fatal attacks have been carried out in Spain.


5.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in the city of Kaliningrad, in the Kaliningrad Region. 6.  On 15 August 2002 the applicant and two other persons were arrested in Moscow on suspicion of drug trafficking during an undercover police operation. 7.  According to the applicant, the police officers allegedly ill-treated him during the arrest, planted a sachet of drugs into his pocket, and took his money and car documents. 8.  On 17 August 2002 the Ostankinskiy District Court of Moscow authorised the applicant's placement in custody. On 19 August 2002 the applicant lodged an appeal against that detention order but it was never examined. 9.  On an unspecified date the investigating authorities allegedly seized the applicant's car. 10.  On an unspecified date the applicant was charged with drug trafficking and the case was transferred to the Ostankinskiy District Court of Moscow for trial. 11.  On 28 March 2003 the Ostankinskiy District Court found the applicant guilty of having acquired, transported and sold drugs in an organised criminal group on a particularly large scale. The court established that the applicant, his two co-accused and several other persons had organised a criminal group with a view to drug trafficking. The applicant had transported the drugs and had surveyed the sales. Before the court, he claimed that he had never sold drugs and that the undercover agents had planted them on him. The court dismissed the applicant's submissions, relying on the testimonies of his co-accused and the police officers, including anonymous witness A., and other physical evidence. It sentenced the applicant to nine years' imprisonment and a confiscation of property. 12.  On 22 July 2003 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment. 13.  From 17 August 2002 to 2 April 2003 the applicant had been held in remand centre IZ-77/2 in Moscow. 14.  For the first ten days the applicant was held in cell no. 157 where the conditions of detention were satisfactory. 15.  On 28 August 2002 the applicant was transferred to cell no. 283 which was designed for six persons and had five or six bunks but accommodated eight inmates. The applicant was afforded less than one square metre of cell space. For six months he did not have daily walks. He was not provided with bedding. The lavatory was not separated from the living area and was two metres away from the dining table and one metre away from the bunks. The windows were covered with bars and metal shutters which limited access to natural light. In December 2002, while the outside temperature dropped to between -20º and -28ºC, the cell was not heated; the walls were covered with frost and the applicant had to sleep in his jacket. In November and December 2002 he did not have access to shower. The cell was full of smoke because all inmates smoked, the applicant being a non-smoker. The cell was infested with lice and cockroaches. The applicant's complaints to the administration were left without reply. 16.  On an unspecified date after the trial the applicant was transferred to a cell for convicts where four to five detainees had to share one bunk and slept in shifts.
(b)  Remand centre IZ-77/3 in Moscow 17.  From 2 April to 16 August 2003 the applicant was held in remand centre IZ-77/3 in Moscow, firstly in cell no. 213 and later in cell no. 714. 18.  Cell no. 213 was designed for 30 persons but housed over one hundred inmates. The detainees had to sleep in shifts. The applicant was not provided with bedding. The cell swarmed with lice, bugs and cockroaches but the administration did not provide disinfectants. The lights and the TV were always on. The cell had no ventilation and was filled with smoke. The applicant constantly suffered from hypertension and nose bleeding, developed dermatitis and lost over twenty kilograms in weight. As a result of the inflammation of his sciatic nerve and aggravation of radiculitis, his legs became numb, limiting his ability to move. 19.  On an unspecified date the applicant was transferred to cell no. 714 in the medical wing of the remand centre where he was given anti‑hypertensive medications and received anaesthetic injections to relieve him from pain.
(c)  Remand centre IZ-67/1 in Smolensk 20.  From 17 to 28 August 2003 the applicant was detained in remand centre IZ-67/1 in Smolensk. 21.  The cell where the applicant was detained had three-tier bunks, two detainees sharing one bunk. No bedding was provided. The cell was smoky and infested with insects. The lavatory was not separated from the living area.
(d)  Hospital no. 1 of prison IK-8 in Kaliningrad 22.  From 27 October 2004 to 16 February 2005 the applicant stayed in hospital no. 1 of prison IK-8 in Kaliningrad. He was not provided with bedding or any hygiene items. His cells swarmed with lice, bugs and cockroaches and the applicant developed dermatitis. The applicant was held together with Sh., suffering from schizophrenia and advanced tuberculosis and a HIV-positive detainee who had bleeding wounds on his body and used common tableware. He was also kept together with inmates having infectious hepatitis. The food and water were of bad quality and the applicant was deprived of a daily walk. 23.  Referring to certificates issued by the head of remand centre IZ-77/2 and dated 21 and 29 July 2008, the Government stated that in 2002-2003 the maximum capacity of remand centre IZ-77/2 had been 2,110 persons. At the material time the remand centre had accommodated 3,194 detainees. The applicant had been detained in cell no. 150 measuring 57.9 square metres and cell no. 283 measuring 10.5 square metres. 24.  With reference to the above certificates, the Government submitted that the applicant had at all times been provided with at least 4 square metres of cell space, a personal sleeping place and bedding. His cells had been sufficiently lit and ventilated and properly heated in winter. The metal shutters in all of them had been removed pursuant to an instruction of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation of 26 November 2002. The cells had been permanently disinfected and the cell windows had been glazed in winter. The applicant had had weekly access to a shower and his bedding had been replaced accordingly. 25.  The Government stated that it had been impossible to indicate the exact number of persons who had been held together with the applicant in his cells owing to the destruction of the logbook containing the headcount of detainees held in the remand centre (книга количественной проверки лиц, содержащихся в следственном изоляторе). 26.  The Government also provided a barely legible copy of the applicant's cell record card (камерная карточка), according to which he had been provided with bedding and cutlery.
(b)  Remand centre IZ-77/3 in Moscow 27.  At the time of the applicant's detention in remand centre IZ-77/3 in Moscow, the centre's maximum capacity had been 1,250 inmates. The applicant had been held there in cells nos. 202, 213 and 704, measuring, respectively, 32.7 square metres, 28.5 square metres and 36.2 square metres. 28.  With reference to certificates issued by the head of remand centre IZ-77/3 dated 22 and 31 July 2008 and the applicant's cell record card, the Government submitted that the applicant had been at all times provided with at least 4 square metres of cell space, a personal sleeping place and bedding. His cells had been sufficiently lit and ventilated and properly heated in winter. The metal shutters in all of them had been removed pursuant to an instruction of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation of 26 November 2002. The cells had been permanently disinfected and the cell windows had been glazed in winter. The applicant had had weekly access to a shower and his bedding had been replaced accordingly. 29.  The Government stated that it had been impossible to indicate the exact number of persons who had been held together with the applicant in his cells owing to destruction of the logbook containing the detainee headcount. 30.  The Government enclosed copies of records of the destruction of documents from IZ-77/3 dated 20 September 2005 and 10 April 2006. According to the first record, on 20 September 2005 an official commission of remand prison IZ-77/3 had destroyed the following documents: lists of prisoners participating in the detention facility's household activities (списки осужденных, используемых на хозяйственных работах), daily orders concerning security and control (суточные приказы по охране и надзору), guard reports (постовые ведомости), check lists (проверочные списки), regulations on the structural subdivisions of certain internal affairs entities (положения о структурных подразделениях органов внутренних дел), and correspondence with various organisations. According to the report of 10 April 2006, on that date a commission consisting of officials of IZ-77/3 had destroyed the following documents: documentation concerning the facility's personnel drills (документы учебных тренировок с личным составом), records of planned and control searches (акты плановых и контрольных обысков), lists of prisoners participating in the detention facility's household activities, a plan of supervision of IZ-77/3 (план надзора ИЗ-77/3), correspondence with various organisations, and copies of orders given by the head of IZ-77/3.
(c)  Remand centre IZ-67/1 in Smolensk 31.  While the applicant had been detained in remand centre IZ-67/1 in Smolensk, the capacity of that detention facility had been 945 detainees and it had accommodated 894 inmates throughout 2003. In remand centre IZ‑67/1 the applicant had been detained in cell no.171 measuring 17.5 square metres. 32.  The Government made further submissions concerning the material conditions of the applicant's detention in IZ-67/1 similar to their statements concerning remand centres IZ-77/2 and IZ-77/3 summarised above.
(d)  Hospital no.1 of IK-8 in Kaliningrad 33.  The Government made no submissions concerning hospital no. 1 of IK-8 in Kaliningrad. 34.  In August 2004 the applicant allegedly asked for dental treatment and paid for it. After several consultations the head of the colony's hospital allegedly refused to continue the treatment, which caused the applicant physical and mental suffering because he was unable to eat. 35.  On 11 August 2004 the applicant complained to the colony hospital about the rapid deterioration of his eyesight but was refused any treatment. 36.  One month later, when the applicant was practically unable to move by himself, the administration authorised an ophthalmologist paid by the applicant's wife to examine the applicant. He was diagnosed with retinal detachment in both eyes and urgent surgery was recommended. 37.  In October 2004 the applicant was transferred to hospital no. 1 of IK-8 in Kaliningrad. 38.  It appears that despite the applicant's repeated requests he was not examined by any specialist until December 2004. 39.  On 20 December 2004 an ophthalmologist examined the applicant and diagnosed him with total retinal detachment in both eyes. 40.  On 22 December 2004 a medical panel established that the applicant's illness was incompatible with his continued detention. He was discharged from the hospital on 16 February 2005. 41.  On 18 April 2005 the applicant was granted disability status in connection with his loss of sight. 42.  By a decision of 13 May 2005, the Tsentralny District Court of Kaliningrad ordered the applicant's release from custody owing to health reasons. It appears that he was released on the same day. 43.  In March 2006 the applicant issued proceedings against colony IK-9, colony IK-8 and the Ministry of Finance, claiming compensation in the amount of 50,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage sustained as a result of the refusal to provide him with medical treatment, which had in turn caused him to lose his eyesight. It transpires that throughout the proceedings the applicant was represented by a lawyer that he had appointed. 44.  By a judgment of 26 March 2007 the Tsentralny District Court of Kaliningrad granted the applicant's claims in part. The judgment, in so far as relevant, reads:
“... It follows from the reply of the head of the medical unit of the Kaliningrad regional department of the Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences... dated 4 April 2005, [the applicant] had been under medical supervision in the medical unit of colony OM-216/9 from 10 September 2003. Upon admission he was examined by a medical panel which concluded that his state of health was satisfactory. Since autumn 2004 [the applicant] had started noticing a rapid deterioration of his eyesight. On 20 October 2004 he was examined by an ophthalmologist. The preliminary diagnosis was: “secondary retinal detachment in both eyes?” To confirm the diagnosis [the applicant] was admitted to hospital no.1 where he stayed from 1 December 2004 to 16 February 2005 and received an in-patient clinical and X-ray examination. The diagnosis was confirmed: “total retinal detachment in both eyes”.
...
Witness S. interviewed by the court submitted that she had examined [the applicant] on his wife's request in colony IK-9 on 20 October 2004 when she had diagnosed him with [retinal detachment in both eyes]. She had indicated that he needed an additional examination in a hospital.
...
The medical expert panel in its report no. 98 established the following.
The materials available [to the medical panel] do not enable it to establish the exact period of time when [the applicant] acquired the illness which had entailed declaring him disabled.
However it is reasonable to assume that the illness (total retinal detachment in both eyes, in respect of which disability status was granted [to the applicant]) started developing on 15 June 2004 when [the applicant] first complained of periodic blinking of dark spots in his eyes and deterioration of his eyesight.
After examining the case materials and the medical documents, the panel discovered grave defects in the diagnostics and medical treatment during [the applicant's] stay in hospital no.1:
- in spite of the applicant's complaints of deterioration of his eyesight and the ophthalmologist's request for his additional examination in connection with the diagnosis of secondary retinal detachment in both eyes made on 27 October 2004, [the applicant] was not examined in due time. He was only examined on 20 December 2004 – that is, two months after his admission to the hospital, which had major implications and negative consequences for his eyesight.
- At the examination in hospital after the diagnosis of “total retinal detachment in both eyes”, [the applicant] did not undergo the ultrasound eye scanning ordered on 20 December 2004. The scanning was indispensable for establishing the origin of his illness, which could have been caused by a trauma, a tumour, myopia, or excessive physical effort.
According to the conclusion of the special medical panel, [the applicant] suffers from total retinal detachment in both eyes which has caused total blindness. It is impossible to establish the exact reason of this condition owing, in particular, to the defects in [the applicant's] examination and treatment in hospital no.1.
...
According to the clinical data available in [the applicant's] medical file, in 2000 he suffered from slight myopia in both eyes – 0.2 in the right eye and 0.1 in the left eye, corrigible to 1.0.
Moreover, the development of the applicant's eye problems permits the expert panel to conclude that heightened tension was not the reason for him developing total two-sided retinal detachment.
The [applicant's] illness, which entailed his disability, has a clear causal connection with the defects in his medical treatment.
Despite the fact that the exact reason for [the applicant's illness] could not be identified, grave defects of examination and treatment took place. During the first examination by an ophthalmologist on 20 October 2004 the latter diagnosed [the applicant] with two-sided retinal detachment with a retained pink reflex of the pupil, which indicates that at that moment [the applicant] did not suffer from total retinal detachment and, if treated in due time, a positive outcome including partial preservation of eyesight could not have been excluded. At the examination on 20 December 2004 [the applicant] was already diagnosed with total two-sided retinal detachment.
Hence, the delays in providing [the applicant] with qualified ophthalmologic surgery played a crucial rule in his becoming blind.
Bearing in mind the above mentioned circumstances of the case, the court considers that grave defects in the applicant's examination and treatment while in detention, which had caused his blindness, caused him physical and mental suffering.
Under those circumstances the court, taking into account the character of the mental and physical suffering sustained by [the applicant] as a result of his inadequate medical treatment during the service of his prison sentence, which had caused his blindness, considers it appropriate to award him 300,000 Roubles in respect of non-pecuniary damage against the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation.” 45.  By a special decision (частное определение) taken on the same date as the above-mentioned judgment, the Tsentralny District Court called on the head of Federal Service for the Execution of Sentences (“the FSES”) and the head of the Kaliningrad regional department of the FSES to pay attention to the fact that the examination of the applicant's case had revealed the lack of proper organisation of medical treatment for convicts in the colonies of the Kalningrad Region, which seriously endangered their life and health. Both officials were requested to inform the court of the measures taken in that respect within the time-limits provided by the relevant national legislation. 46.  The outcome of that request remains unclear. 47.  On 30 May 2007 the Kaliningrad Regional Court dismissed the prosecutor's appeal against the judgment of 26 March 2007. In particular, it rejected the prosecutor's argument that the amount of the award was excessive and found that it was reasonable and adequate. 48.  The judgment of 26 March 2007 and the appeal decision of 30 May 2007 referred to the applicant's family name as “Romakhov” instead of “Romokhov”. 49.  On 30 May 2007 the judgment of the Tsentralny District Court of Kaliningrad became final and enforceable. 50.  On 24 August 2007 the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation received unspecified “enforcement documents” from the applicant in respect of the above judgment. 51.  On 17 October 2007 the Ministry of Finance received further unspecified “enforcement documents” from the applicant. 52.  By a letter of 21 November 2007 the Ministry of Finance returned the first set of documents to the applicant because he had failed to enclose a duly certified copy of the judgment and his bank details. 53.  By a letter of 5 December 2007 the Ministry returned the second set of documents to the applicant because he had again failed to submit a duly certified copy of the judgment and his bank details. 54.  On 13 February 2008 the Ministry of Finance received the required documents. 55.  On 29 May 2008 the amount of 300,000 Russian roubles (RUB) was transferred to the applicant's bank account. 56.  In support of their submissions the Government furnished a copy of the payment order of 29 May 2008, according to which the amount of RUB 300,000 had been transferred to the applicant's account on that date. 57.  According to the applicant, the delay in the execution of the judgment of 26 March 2007 had been caused by the fact that the first-instance court had misspelled his family name as “Romakhov” instead of “Romokhov”, both in the first-instance judgment and the related writ of enforcement.


4.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Thessaloniki. 5.  On 6 March 2000 he lodged an action (no. 2145/2000) with the civil courts seeking the annulment of his late uncle’s will, according to which certain property had been bequeathed to A.A. The applicant alleged that his late uncle had made A.A. his heir after being deceived and blackmailed by her. 6.  On 25 April 2000 A.A. brought criminal complaints against the applicant for malicious defamation, claiming that he had maliciously made false statements in action no. 2145/2000 causing damage to her reputation. 7.  On 29 January 2001 the applicant was prosecuted by the Athens First Instance Prosecutor and the case was remitted to the Athens First Instance Criminal Court. 8.  On 27 June 2005 the Athens First Instance Criminal Court convicted the applicant and sentenced him to a suspended prison sentence of eight months (judgment no. 46411/2005). 9.  On the same day the applicant lodged an appeal with the Athens Criminal Court of Appeal challenging the First Instance court’s findings and its evaluation of the evidence. 10.  By judgment dated 18 September 2006 the Court of Appeal reduced the applicant’s sentence to a suspended prison sentence of five months (judgment no. 6800/2006). 11. On 27 October 2006 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Court of Cassation. On 29 March 2007 he lodged additional grounds of appeal. The appeal on points of law was heard on 16 October 2007. 12.  By judgment dated 28 May 2008 the Court of Cassation rejected the applicant’s appeal (judgment no. 1396/2008). This judgment was finalised on 23 July 2008.


4.  The applicants were born in 1940, 1944 and 1933 respectively and live in Istanbul. 5.  In 1995 Kocaeli Provincial Private Administration Office (Kocaeli İl Özel İdare Müdürlüğü) expropriated a plot of land belonging to the applicants in order to expand the Kocaeli organised industrial zone. A committee of experts assessed the value of the plot of land and the relevant amount was paid to the applicants following the expropriation. 6.  On 23 October 1996 the applicants brought an action in the Gebze Civil Court of First Instance requesting additional compensation. The applicants argued that the plot of land in question should have been considered as urbanised land (arsa) instead of rural land. Three on-site inspections were conducted and three separate expert reports were received by the court. The applicants requested the court to dismiss two experts who took part in the preparation of a report, alleging that these experts were not impartial since they were civil servants. During the hearing on 22 December 1997, the applicants stated that they agreed to base the additional compensation on the lowest amount submitted in the expert reports. On 29 December 1997 the First Instance Court decided that the plot of land in question should be classified as urbanised land and awarded the applicants a certain amount of additional compensation. When deciding on the amount of additional compensation, the court relied on the outcome of another action which qualified the same plot of land as urbanised land. 7.  On 16 June 1998 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment on the ground that the expert reports were not sufficient basis for a judgment. 8.  On 4 November 1998 the Gebze Civil Court of First Instance challenged the decision of the Court of Cassation (direnme kararı). The case file was transferred to the Grand Chamber of the Court of Cassation for Civil Law Matters (Hukuk Genel Kurulu). 9.  On 23 December 1998 the Grand Chamber of the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of 4 November 1998. 10.  On 9 May 2000 the Gebze Civil Court of First Instance decided that the plot of land was of rural nature. In reaching this decision, the court conducted four more on-site inspections and relied on four additional expert reports, where the experts observed that the plot was not reserved for habitation under any urban plan (imar planı) of the Municipality or the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement; it was not situated within residential areas; and there was no annotation in the land registry that this plot was to be used for tourism purposes. Instead, the plot was classified as “field” in the Land Registry. Following the on‑site inspections, the experts decided that the plot should be classified as rural land. Against this background, the court awarded the applicants an additional compensation of 22,568,437,760 Turkish liras (TRL) (approximately 13,080 euros (EUR)) plus interest at the statutory rate, running from 15 October 1996 for Mr Ali Erdem and from 22 October 1996 for the other applicants. 11.  On 19 September 2000 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment. 12.  On 26 January 2001 the Court of Cassation dismissed the request for rectification. 13.  On 20 February 2001 the Kocaeli Provincial Private Administration Office paid the applicants the total sum of TRL 72,198,960,506 (approximately EUR 41,850) interest included.


5.  The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Maribor. 6.  On the evening of 3 November 1983, the applicant, who was eight months pregnant and was returning home from work, was attacked by three men, A.M., T.D. and N.T. They pulled her into a car, drove to a remote location and raped her one after the other. 7.  Immediately after the incident, the applicant went to the Maribor Police. The police arrested the three men at around midnight. They remained in custody following an investigating judge’s order. They were released from custody on 24 November 1983. The applicant was taken to the Maribor Hospital to be medically examined. 8.  On 5 November 1983 the police lodged a criminal complaint against A.M., T.D. and N.T. accusing them of rape. Three days later, the Maribor District Public Prosecutor asked the investigating judge of the Maribor Basic Court to open an investigation. 9.  During the investigation, three reports concerning the examination of the crime scene were prepared, and the three accused men and witnesses were heard by the investigating judge. T.D. and N.T. admitted to having had sex with the applicant, but denied that any force had been used. A.M. denied having had sex with the applicant. 10.  On 13 March 1984 A.M., T.D. and N.T. were charged with aggravated rape under section 100 § 2 of the Penal Code of the Republic of Slovenia. The proceedings that followed were conducted in secrecy in order to protect the private lives of those involved. 11.  The first trial hearing was scheduled for August 1988. However, it was adjourned due to the absence of A.M. and N.T. Another hearing to be held on 24 February 1989 was adjourned because it had proved impossible to serve a court order on N.T. In this connection, the Government pointed out that all three men had been born outside the territory of Slovenia and were Roma. At the time of the incident, two of them (A.M. and T.D.) resided in Slovenia, while the third (N.T.) resided in another part of what was then Yugoslavia. 12.  On 14 December 1989, an order for detention pending trial was issued against N.T. because he was considered to pose a flight risk. However, he could not be found and went missing. Therefore, an arrest warrant was issued against him on 25 April 1990, which could not, however, be executed. In May 1995, the court conducted inquiries as to the whereabouts of all three defendants and established the places of residence of A.M. and T.D., but not that of N.T. A hearing on 13 October 1995 was adjourned due to the absence of A.M.’s defence counsel. As his whereabouts could not be established, on 26 October 1995 the charges against N.T. were severed into a separate case. 13.  N.T. could not be found and brought to trial in the following years, so an international arrest warrant was issued against him in 2004. However, his whereabouts remained unknown and the charges against him were dropped on 1 October 2008. The international arrest warrant was revoked on 29 September 2010. 14.  The main hearing in the case against A.M. and T.D. began on 18 November 1996 and continued on 27 and 30 March 1998, 29 April 1998 and 5 June 1999. Thirty-one other hearings were scheduled between 29 November 1995 and 4 March 2002, though they were all postponed, mainly due to the absence of the defendants or of their counsel. From 2000 onwards, a number of steps were taken in order to ensure the presence at trial of T.D., who had apparently been absent from Slovenia for some time. At the end of 2000, the presiding judge proposed that he be placed in detention to prevent him failing to appear at court for hearings, but the extrajudicial panel rejected this proposal, ordering that less severe measures, such as bringing him to hearings by force, should be envisaged first. 15.  On 7 July 2003 T.D., who was then fifty years old, died. On 16 January 2004 the part of the case concerning the charges against him was severed from the ongoing proceedings. 16.  The Maribor District Court held hearings on 26 May 2004 and on 3 November 2004. The court, amongst other things, heard A.M., the applicant, her husband and five other witnesses, read out the statements given by T.D. and N.T. earlier in the proceedings, and looked into the applicant’s medical reports, the record of the examination of the scene of the crime, the record of the examination of A.M.’s car and a variety of other documents. 17.  On 3 November 2004 the court issued a judgment finding A.M. guilty of the criminal offence of aggravated rape. He was sentenced to two-and-a-half years in prison. When setting the sentence, which was below the minimum three-year sentence prescribed by law, the court referred to the significant lapse of time from the commission of the crime. It noted that the reasons for the delays in the proceedings had been predominantly caused by the behaviour of T.D. and N.T. 18.  Following an appeal by A.M., on 10 November 2006 the Maribor Higher Court quashed the judgment and remitted the case for re-examination. It instructed the Maribor District Court to examine whether A.M. had committed the criminal offence in question or had only attempted to commit it, and whether he had previously known the applicant, which might have raised doubts as to her credibility. 19.  On 24 April, 15 June, 14 September, 19 October and 6 November 2007, the court held hearings at which it heard the applicant and a number of witnesses. On the last of those dates, the Maribor District Court issued a judgment finding A.M. guilty of aggravated rape under section 100 § 2 of the Penal Code of the Republic of Slovenia. It sentenced him to two-and-a-half years in prison, referring to the extreme amount of time that had passed since the commission of the offence. 20.  Following a further appeal by A.M., on 10 July 2008 the Maribor Higher Court further reduced his sentence to one year in prison, referring to the passage of time, A.M.’s young age (namely 21) at the time of the event, the fact that he had not been later convicted of any other criminal offence, his deteriorating health and the fact that he had a minor child. It upheld the reminder of the Maribor District Court’s judgment. 21.  A.M. submitted an appeal on points of law (a request for the protection of legality), which was rejected by the Supreme Court on 3 September 2009. 22.  Meanwhile, on 28 July 2009 the applicant had instituted civil proceedings against A.M. seeking damages in the amount of 50,000 euros (EUR) for non-pecuniary damage suffered as result of the rape which had been established by the final criminal judgment. 23.  On 31 March 2010 the court issued a default judgment. On 18 May 2010 A.M. appealed, arguing that he had not been duly summoned to appear. A hearing was held on 6 September 2010. On 23 December 2010 the court granted reinstatement and summoned the parties to appear at a hearing on 31 March 2011. However, this hearing was adjourned until 24 May 2011 at the request of the defendant’s counsel. On that date the parties reached a court settlement by which A.M. was to pay EUR 15,000 (by means of a number of instalments) to the applicant. The civil case was consequently concluded. The applicant alleged that she has not received any compensation to date.


5.  The applicant was born in 1946. 6.  On 6 December 1995 L.T. who had been wounded by a gunshot, requested that a criminal investigation be instituted. Consequently, an investigation in rem was instituted. On 17 January 1996 the applicant was arrested in connection with the investigation. On 18 January 1996 the Łódź Regional Prosecutor imposed pre-trial detention on him and three other suspects on charges of acting in an organised criminal gang and aggravated assault. The prosecutor considered that the evidence had justified the charges against the applicant, who was also suspected of being a leader of the criminal gang. It was further noted that other members of the gang had not yet been arrested. There was therefore a serious risk of collusion and suppression of evidence. Furthermore, there were grounds for believing that the applicant had ordered someone to murder L.T. The applicant appealed. 7.  On 22 January 1996 the prosecutor served the applicant with a written statement of the charges against him. This document referred to the investigation concerning the attempted murder of L.T. The prosecutor observed that the evidence gathered in this investigation had given rise to a suspicion that the attempt on L.T.’s life had been made by an organised criminal gang engaged in assaults and racketeering. Evidence given by certain witnesses, who were to remain anonymous pursuant to Article 164 (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1969, had unequivocally demonstrated that the applicant was a member of that gang. Hence, charges in respect of criminal offences punishable under Article 276 § 1 of the Criminal Code had to be laid against him. 8.  On 2 February 1996 the Łódź Regional Court upheld the applicant’s detention order of 18 January 1996. It noted that the evidence gathered sufficiently supported the charges against him. It indicated that it was likely that the applicant was a member of an organised criminal gang, committing aggravated assaults with the use of firearms. Having regard to the evidence given by anonymous witness no. 2, and in particular in the light of the statements given by other witnesses, including anonymous witnesses, and having also regard to various documents and the results of the inspection of a car, the court concluded that the charges against the applicant were justified. The character of those charges, involving violent crimes, also justified the decisions to impose and maintain detention, the more so as other members of the gang still remained at liberty. The applicant’s release would endanger the purpose of the ongoing investigation. 9.  On 29 February 1996 the Łódź Regional Prosecutor ordered that an expert opinion be prepared for the purposes of the further investigation. Altogether, fifteen expert opinions were prepared during the investigation. 10.  On 2 March 1996 the Łódź Regional Prosecutor refused the applicant’s new application for release, considering that the evidence gathered in the case, in particular the statements made by the anonymous witnesses, indicated that it was necessary to keep him in custody. 11.  On 12 April 1996 the Łódź Regional Court extended the applicant’s detention until 28 June 1996, having regard, in particular, to the evidence given by anonymous witnesses nos. 1 to 9. It observed that new developments were to be expected regarding new offences which had come to light, including a crime of manslaughter which appeared to have been committed with the applicant’s involvement. Moreover, new witnesses were to be questioned and further expert evidence had to be gathered, having regard to sixteen expert reports which had been prepared for the purposes of the investigation.
The court referred to the evidence gathered in the case and considered that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences concerned. The court also took into account that the applicant had been charged with serious crimes committed by an organised criminal gang. It further referred to the need to continue the process of gathering evidence. 12.  On an unspecified later date in June the applicant’s detention was further extended. Subsequently, on 24 September 1996, the Łódź Court of Appeal held a session during which it extended the applicant’s pre‑trial detention until 29 December 1996. 13.  On 21 October 1996 the applicant was granted full access to the file and arrangements were made for him to study it. He examined the file daily from 21 to 31 October and subsequently from 4 until 25 November 1996. Later on, the applicant read the file on 28 and 29 November and from 2 to 8 December 1996. 14.  On 26 November 1996 the Łódź Court of Appeal extended the applicant’s detention until 17 January 1997. It observed that the investigation was coming to an end and that the prosecuting authorities had begun to acquaint the suspects with the files. However, it seemed that the suspects, while availing themselves of their procedural rights in this respect, were at the same time trying to prolong the proceedings by various delaying tactics. Thus, it was necessary to extend their detention. 15.  On 20 December 1996 a bill of indictment against the applicant and his ten co‑defendants was lodged with the Łódź Regional Court. The applicant was charged with eleven criminal offences. The bill of indictment concerned fifty different crimes. The case file numbered thirty‑one volumes. 16.  On 17 January 1997 the Supreme Court refused to entertain an appeal by the applicant against the decision of 26 November 1996, finding that, in any event, the time-limits for detention as specified in Article 222 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had ceased to apply after the bill of indictment had been lodged with the court. 17.  The first hearing in the case was held on 24 February 1997. From February 1997 until February 1999 the court held seventy-nine hearings. On 25 January 1999 the first-instance court sentenced the applicant to eight years’ imprisonment on various charges. 18.  The applicant appealed. On 4 April 2000 the Łódź Court of Appeal quashed the judgment in part and remitted this part of the case to the first‑instance court. It upheld it in so far as it related to the charge of intimidating witnesses by recourse to physical violence. It upheld the applicant’s conviction in respect of that charge and imposed on him a sentence of four years’ imprisonment. It ordered that the period of detention pending trial be counted towards the sentence. Accordingly, the applicant’s sentence had expired on 18 January 2000. 19.  From 4 April 2000 the applicant was again detained pending trial. The applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court against the judgment of 4 April 2000 in so far as the latter court had upheld the judgment of 25 January 1999. On 3 December 2002 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. 20.  On 21 November 2000 the Łódź Regional Court started to hold hearings in the part of the case which had been remitted for re‑examination. Between November 2000 and March 2001 it held fourteen hearings. 21.  On 12 April 2002 the Łódź Regional Court convicted the applicant of various criminal charges and sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment.


5.  The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Nüziders, Austria. 6.  On 16 July 1994 the applicant damaged his car in a car accident. He had taken out insurance with the insurance company IVA. The perpetrator of the accident had taken out insurance with the insurance company ZT. 7.  On 28 July 1995 the applicant and IVA instituted civil proceedings against ZT in the Ljubljana Local Court (Okrajno sodišče v Ljubljani) seeking damages in the amount of 205,012 tolars (approximately 850 euros) for the car damage.
On 5 July 1996 the applicant lodged preliminary written submissions and adduced evidence.
On 5 July and 8 October 1996 he requested that a date be set for a hearing.
On 17 January 1997 the court held a hearing. Since the defendant did not appear before the court and failed to reply to the applicant’s claim, the applicant requested the court to issue a default judgment.
On 12 February 1998 the court decided to recommence the hearing in the present case. 8.  On 17 March 1998 the applicant appealed.
On 5 October 2000 the Ljubljana Local Court dismissed the appeal.
On 19 October 2000 the applicant appealed.
On 9 August 2001 the Ljubljana Higher Court (Višje sodišče v Ljubljani) dismissed the appeal. 9.  In the meanwhile the first-instance court continued the proceedings concerning the applicant’s claim.
On 20 April 1998 the applicant requested that the defendant’s reply to the claim be served on him.
Between 12 May 1998 and 17 December 2003 the applicant lodged six preliminary written submissions and/or adduced evidence.
Between 16 October 1998 and 7 May 1999 he made three requests that a date be set for a hearing.
Of the four hearings held between 26 May 1998 and 16 January 2004, one was adjourned at the request of the applicant.
During the proceedings, the case was transferred twice to a new judge for an undetermined reason.
At the last hearing the court decided to deliver a written judgment. The judgment, rejecting the applicant’s claim, was served on the applicant on 16 February 2004. 10.  On 18 February 2004 the applicant appealed to the Ljubljana Higher Court (Višje sodišče v Ljubljani).
On 11 January 2005 the court allowed the applicant’s appeal and remitted the case to the first-instance court for re-examination.
The decision was served on the applicant on 7 March 2005. 11.  On 6 May and 13 July 2005 the applicant lodged preliminary written observations with the Ljubljana Local Court.
The proceedings are still pending.


4.  The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Irkutsk. 5.  In 1989 the applicant's husband received a fatal work-related injury. In 1990 the applicant was granted compensation by her husband's former employer, a private company (“the company”). 6.  On 10 March 1997 the applicant brought court proceedings against the company, following numerous re-calculations of the amount to be paid and regular failures of the company to effectuate the payments. In particular, she sought compensation of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, penalties for the belated payments and indexation of such payments and re-calculation of monthly payments with subsequent indexation. 7.  On 11 February 1998 the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Irkutsk (“the District Court”) granted the applicant's claims in part. The judgment was set aside on appeal on 26 June 1998 by the Irkutsk Regional Court (“the Regional Court”) which required a new hearing of the case. The appeal court also issued a special statement reprimanding the judge in charge of the applicant's case for erroneous application of the law that resulted in the quashing of the judgment and delays in the proceedings. 8.  Once back at the trial court, the case was assigned to judge V., and on 7 December 1998 it was transferred for unspecified reasons to judge T. 9.  On 16 December 1998 the hearing did not take place as the respondent failed to appear. 10.  On 24 March 1999 the hearing again did not take place due to the judge's illness. 11.  On 13 August 1999 the respondent's representative requested to adjourn the proceedings as he was ill. The proceedings were adjourned to 18 October 1999 with account of the judge's vacation. The parties were requested to provide some additional evidence. 12.  On 18 October 1999 the proceedings again were adjourned at the respondent's representative's request. The respondent was notified that in the event of a default in appearance on 30 November 1999 the case would be examined in its absence. 13.  On 30 November 1999 the court invited the applicant to provide some additional evidence and adjourned the hearing to 7 February 2000. 14.  On 7 February 2000 at the applicant's request the hearing was adjourned to 21 April 2000. On the latter date the hearing did not take place as the judge was away for training. 15.  The hearing of 7 June 2000 did not take place due to the judge's illness. 16.  On 28 October 2000 the case was transmitted back to judge V. 17.  On 27 December 2000 the hearing was adjourned to 14 February 2001 at the respondent's representative's request. 18.  On 22 February 2001 the applicant submitted the amended claims and calculations. 19.  On 27 June 2001 the hearing was adjourned as the respondent's representative requested the court to obtain certain evidence. 20.  From 31 July to 10 December 2001 no hearings were scheduled due to the judge's illness and subsequent vacation. 21.  On 25 January 2002 the hearing did not take place as the applicant's representative failed to appear. 22.  The hearing of 4 March 2002 was adjourned on account of a need to obtain certain evidence. 23.  On 10 April 2002 the case was transferred to judge P., again for unspecified reasons. A hearing was scheduled for 29 August 2002. 24.  Between 29 August and 15 October 2002 three hearings did not take place due to the applicant's failure to appear. 25.  On 13 November 2002 the District Court granted the applicant's claims in part awarding her a lump sum of 7,311 Russian roubles (RUB), RUB 3,600 in penalties and RUB 3,600 in legal expenses. 26.  On 3 April 2003 the Regional Court upheld the judgment. 27.  On 17 November 2003 the proceedings were deemed enforced in the part concerning the amount of RUB 7,311. 28.  On 13 December 2005 the District Court discontinued the enforcement proceedings against the company in the part concerning the remainder of the award due to the fact that the company had been liquidated in October 2005 and had no assets to cover the applicant's claims. 29.  It appears that the applicant did not appeal against this decision.