5.  The applicant was born in 1973 and lived before his arrest in the town of Khudzhand, Tajikistan. He is currently residing in Moscow. 6.  In 2005 the applicant lost his job at a telephone exchange in Khudzhand and started earning his living by printing various texts for people on his computer, including theses and extracts from the Koran. 7.  In 2005 several persons were arrested in Khudzhand on suspicion of membership of Hizb ut-Tahrir (“HT”), a transnational Islamic organisation, banned in Russia, Germany and some Central Asian republics. Subsequently, the applicant learnt that some of the arrestees had testified before the prosecuting authorities that he was a member of HT and had printed various materials for it from the Internet. The applicant denies being a member of HT. 8.  On 16 February 2006 the prosecutor's office of the Sogdiyskiy Region of Tajikistan (“the Sogdiyskiy prosecutor's office”) instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant on suspicion of membership of an extremist organisation (Article 307 § 2 of the Tajikistani Criminal Code (“TCC”)). In particular, the applicant was suspected of having actively worked with HT by printing out leaflets and religious literature for that organisation with a view to their dissemination. The case was assigned the number 9615. 9.  On 19 February 2006 the Sogdiyskiy prosecutor's office ordered the applicant's placement in custody. Shortly thereafter the applicant was arrested and placed in the basement of the Ministry of National Security (MNS). According to the applicant, he was held there for about three months. He was systematically beaten up and was tortured at least six times with electricity. He was held in premises with nothing to rest on, was refused access to the toilet for lengthy periods of time and received no food. 10.  On 6 May 2006 the prosecutor's office of the Bobodzhon‑Gafurovskiy District (“the Bobodzhon-Gafurovskiy prosecutor's office”) opened a further criminal case against the applicant in connection with his alleged activities within HT. In particular, the applicant was suspected of: having secretly studied extremist literature provided by other members of HT; having worked for the organisation as an IT specialist; having printed out the organisation's leaflets and other literature and secretly distributed it among non-members of the organisation; having paid membership fees to the organisation and trained another member to work with the PC. On the same day the applicant was charged with membership of a criminal organisation banned owing to its extremist activities (Articles 187 § 2 and 307.2-3), incitement to religious and other hatred (Article 189 § 3) and public appeals to overthrow the constitutional order and to engage in extremist activities (Articles 307 and 307.1). The criminal case was joined with case no. 9615 and given the number 9431. 11.  According to the applicant, in May 2006 he and other detainees were taken to a construction site for a recreation zone for officers of the MNS, where they were ordered to dig, working in a bending position. When they tried to straighten up, the guards beat them severely. 12.  On 24 May 2006, fearing further beatings, the applicant escaped. 13.  According to the applicant, his relatives told him that after his escape law enforcement officials had tortured his co-accused to find out where he had gone and whether they had helped him to make good his escape. 14.  On 25 May 2006 the Bobodzhon-Gafurovskiy prosecutor's office instituted criminal proceedings against the applicant for escaping from custody. The decision stated that on 24 May 2006, “while in custody at a summer cottage [дачный участок] belonging to the MNS”, the applicant had fled to an unknown destination. 15.  On an unspecified date the criminal case against the applicant in connection with his alleged activities within HT was transferred for examination to the Bobodzhon-Gafurovskiy District Court of the Sogdiyskiy Region 16.  By a decision of 6 June 2006 the Bobodzhon-Gafurovskiy District Court put the applicant's name on a wanted list and suspended the examination of the criminal case against him pending his arrest. 17.  On 9 June 2006 the Bobodzhon-Gafurovskiy prosecutor's office charged the applicant with escape from custody. 18.  It appears that the applicant was hiding in Tajikistan until December 2006, when he moved to Kyrgyzstan. On an unspecified date in May 2007 the applicant arrived in Russia. 19.  On 5 August 2008 the applicant was arrested in Moscow as a person wanted by the Tajikistani authorities. 20.  On 6 August 2008 the Nagatinskiy deputy prosecutor questioned the applicant about the circumstances of his arrival in Russia. According to the applicant's written explanation [объяснение] of the same date, in 2006 the Tajikistani authorities had opened a criminal case against him on suspicion of membership of an extremist organisation. For about three months in 2006 he had been held in custody. During that period he had been taken on a daily basis to work at a construction site, from where he had escaped. In 2007 the applicant had come to Russia to avoid criminal prosecution and to earn a living. He had not applied for Russian citizenship, refugee status or political asylum. The transcript bore the applicant's signature. In the applicant's submission, the explanation was compiled by the Russian authorities on the basis of material from his criminal case produced by the Tajikistani law enforcement authorities. 21.  On 11 September 2008 the Tajikistani Prosecutor General's Office (“the TPGO“) sent to the Russian Prosecutor General's Office a request for the applicant's extradition to Tajikistan in connection with the charges concerning his membership of HT. The letter stated that the applicant would be tried only on the charges for which his extradition was being sought, and that he would not be extradited to a third country without the consent of the Russian authorities. 22.  On 5 December 2008 the TPGO sent their Russian counterpart an additional request for the applicant's extradition on the charge of escaping from custody. 23.  By a letter of 19 December 2008 the applicant's lawyer informed the Russian Prosecutor General's Office that the applicant intended to challenge before the courts the refusal to grant him refugee status (see below) and requested them to take that fact into account when examining the extradition issue. 24.  On 30 December 2008 the deputy Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation ordered the applicant's extradition to Tajikistan. The decision, in its relevant parts, read as follows:
“... [Mr] Gaforov is charged with having actively participated in 2002-2006 in the activities of a criminal organisation “Hizb-ut-Tahrir al-Islam”, aimed at the violent seizure of state power and the overthrow of the constitutional order and banned on the territory of Tajikistan by a court decision ...
...
The [applicant's] actions are punishable under Russian criminal law and correspond to Article 210 of the Russian Criminal Code (membership of a criminal organisation); Article 278 (acts aimed at violent overthrowing of the constitutional order); Article 280 (public appeals in the media to engage in extremist activities); Article 282 § 2 (c) (incitement to hatred and degrading treatment via the mass media, carried out by an organised group); Article 282 § 2 (membership of an extremist organisation); Article 282 § 2 (membership of an organisation banned by a court decision because of its extremist activities); Article 205 § 1 (financing terrorism). The above-mentioned offences carry penalties of over one year's imprisonment. The time-limits for [the applicant's] prosecution under Russian and Tajikistani legislation have not expired.
...
[The applicant] is charged with having absconded from custody ... on 24 May 2006 ...
The [applicant's] actions are punishable under Article 313 § 1 of the Russian Criminal Code (escape from custody of a person detained on remand) and carry a penalty of over one year's imprisonment. The time-limits for [the applicant's] criminal prosecution under Russian and Tajikistani legislation have not expired.” 25.  Lastly, the decision stated that, according to the Federal Migration Service (“the FMS”), the applicant had not obtained Russian citizenship, and concluded that there were no other grounds for not extraditing him to Tajikistan. 26.  On 21 January 2009 the applicant appealed against the decision of 30 December 2008, alleging that, if extradited, he would be subjected to torture in breach of Article 3 of the Convention. He averred, in particular, that he had described in detail the treatment to which he had been subjected while in custody in Tajikistan and that the Russian Prosecutor General's Office had disregarded those submissions and the relevant materials from international NGOs showing that the Tajikistani law enforcement authorities systematically tortured detainees. The applicant also submitted that the Tajikistani authorities were not able to provide effective guarantees against the risk of ill-treatment and unfair criminal proceedings. Lastly, he stated that the decision to extradite him had been taken despite the fact that his asylum application was pending. 27.  By a letter of 10 February 2009 the TPGO guaranteed to their Russian counterpart that, if extradited, the applicant would not be persecuted on political, ethnic, linguistic, racial or religious grounds and that he would not be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The letter also noted that on 11 March 2008 the Supreme Court of Tajikistan had declared HT a terrorist organisation and had banned its activities on the territory of Tajikistan. 28.  At a hearing on 16 February 2009 the Moscow City Court (“the City Court”) examined the applicant's complaint about the decision to extradite him to Tajikistan. 29.  According to the hearing transcript, the applicant submitted to the court that after his arrest in 2006 in Tajikistan he had been severely beaten and on six occasions tortured with electricity with a view to extracting a confession that he was a member of HT. He had been held in the MNS basement for about three months. During his detention there he had been systematically beaten and insulted and had been allowed access to the toilet only twice a day. While still in detention, he had been taken to a construction site for an MNS recreation zone. There he and other detainees had worked laying the foundation for a sports centre; they had also been ordered to mow grass. The applicant and other detainees had been systematically subjected to beatings. Unable to stand the beatings and the lack of food, the applicant had escaped. The applicant further stressed that he feared returning to Tajikistan because after his escape several MNS officials had threatened his family. They had allegedly told his family members that if the applicant was caught, they would not leave him alive. An MNS officer who had beaten the applicant and who had been on duty on the day of his escape had allegedly told the applicant's sister that if he went to jail because of the applicant, he would kill the applicant's whole family, once released. 30.  At the hearing the applicant's lawyer also stated that his client's detention was unlawful because the authorities had failed to extend it properly, in breach of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CCrP”) and the decisions of the Constitutional Court. 31.  Having heard the applicant and his lawyer and granted their request to include in the case file reports from various NGOs and international organisations on the situation in Tajikistan in relation to torture, the City Court adjourned the examination of the complaint pending the outcome of the asylum proceedings. 32.  By a faxed letter of 25 February 2009 the City Court informed the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (“the MID”) about the applicant's case and his allegations of the risk of torture were he to be extradited to Tajikistan. The City Court asked the MID to present their position and to assist the court in obtaining information from the Tajikistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the issues raised by the applicant. 33.  By a letter of the same date the City Court asked the Tajikistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs to submit its position and any relevant information on the applicant's allegations concerning the risk of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment should he be extradited to Tajikistan, and to verify those allegations via the relevant State authorities. 34.  On 13 March 2009 the MID replied to the City Court that Tajikistan had become party to almost all the international instruments on the protection of human rights and that it had thereby confirmed its intention to build a democratic and secular state based on respect for the rule of law. A post of ombudsman had been created. The MID did not have any information to indicate that “the applicant's civil rights would be violated if he was extradited”. It does not appear that the Tajikistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied to the City Court's request. 35.  On 20 April 2009 the City Court examined the applicant's complaint about the decision of 30 December 2008. The applicant and his lawyer attended the hearing 36.  According to the hearing transcript, the applicant reiterated before the court his submissions concerning his alleged torture while in custody in Tajikistan. He submitted that the fact of his previous torture and the threats to his family members proved that he ran a risk of being subjected to such treatment again, should the extradition decision be upheld. The applicant's lawyer asked the court to release the applicant, stressing that he had been detained for a long period of time and that his detention had not been extended despite clear instructions from the Constitutional Court in that respect. 37.  The City Court dismissed the applicant's complaint. The decision, in so far as relevant, read as follows:
“ [Mr] Gaforov is charged with having, in the period from August 2002 to February 2006 in the Sogdiyskiy Region of the Republic of Tajikistan, been an active member of the criminal organisation “Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami”, founded with the aim of violent seizure of power and overthrowing the constitutional order, which [organisation] had been banned by a court from the territory of the Republic of Tajikistan because of its extremist activities; [the applicant] is also charged with having financed the above organisation. During the relevant time period, being a member of that organised group and using the mass media, [the applicant] disseminated materials containing public appeals for the violent overthrow of the existing state regime to take control of the territory of the Republic of Tajikistan and seize power there. [The applicant] recruited citizens to the extremist organisation with a view to disrupting the constitutional order of the Republic of Tajikistan; made public appeals to engage in extremist activities; disseminated leaflets and other printed materials aimed at incitement to ethnic, racial, ..., religious hatred, degrading treatment, propaganda proclaiming the superiority of certain citizens based on their religious ... convictions, and the founding of an Islamic state “Caliphate” on the territory of the Republic of Tajikistan.
The [applicant's] actions are punishable under Russian criminal law and correspond to Article 210 § 2 [of the Russian Criminal Code] (participation in a criminal organisation); Article 278 (acts aimed at violent overthrow of the constitutional order); Article 280 § 2 (public appeals via the mass media to engage in extremist activities); Article 282 § 2 (c) (incitement to hatred and degrading treatment committed by an organised group through the mass media); Article 282-1 § 2 (membership of an extremist organisation); Article 282-2 § 2 (membership of an organisation banned by a final court decision because of its extremist activities); and Article 205-1 § 1 (financing terrorism). The above-mentioned offences carry penalties of over one year's imprisonment. The time-limits for [the applicant's] prosecution under Russian and Tajikistani law have not expired.
...
Moreover ... [the applicant] is charged with having absconded from custody ... on 24 May 2006 ...
The above-mentioned actions of [the applicant] are punishable under Article 313 § 1 of the Russian Criminal Code (escape from custody of a person detained on remand) and carry a penalty of over one year's imprisonment. The time-limits for [the applicant's] criminal prosecution under Russian and Tajikistani law have not expired ...
The decision of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation of 30 December 2008 is lawful and well-founded.
From the information submitted by the Russian FMS [Federal Migration Service] and its Moscow branch it follows that [the applicant] had not obtained Russian citizenship or applied for it in accordance with the law
At the court hearing [the applicant] explained that he had not applied for Russian citizenship; he had been arrested in Russia as a person whose name had been put on an international wanted list...; [he] had not applied for refugee status before his arrest because he thought that he would not be granted it as a wanted person; he was not a refugee, he had not been and was not being persecuted in the territory of the Republic of Tajikistan on political or any other grounds, except for his criminal prosecution; he had left his place of residence voluntarily, having fled from custody – [a fact] which proves that [the applicant] was deliberately hiding in the territory of the Russian Federation from the Tajikistani law enforcement bodies.
Thus, there are no grounds stipulated in international agreements or the legislation of the Russian Federation to prevent [the applicant's] extradition ...
...
The court has examined and dismissed [the applicant's] arguments, supported by his lawyer ... with reference to the opinion [заключение] of 13 March 2009 by specialist Ms Ryabinina and materials confirming, in their opinion, that he should not be extradited to Tajikistan on account of his possible persecution there. However, having applied to the FMS after his arrest pursuant to an international warrant, [the applicant] himself had explained that he feared extradition to Tajikistan because of the possibility of his conviction leading to a long term of imprisonment.
Hence, the court considers that there is no well-founded fear of [the applicant] becoming a victim of persecution in Tajikistan under Article 1 § 1-1 of the Refugees Act. Consequently, he does not satisfy the criteria to be granted refugee status because only a person who is not a Russian national and who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable to avail himself of the protection of that country as a result of such events, can be recognised as a refugee.
Furthermore, the receiving country furnished an assurance that [the applicant] would be prosecuted only for the crimes with which he had been charged. Moreover, the Republic of Tajikistan is party to almost all international legal instruments on human rights, and has thereby reaffirmed its intention to build a secular democratic state based on the rule of law; a post of Ombudsman had been created there.
The issue of whether [the applicant] is guilty of the crimes in respect of which [the Tajikistani authorities] have requested his extradition can only be assessed by a court in the requesting country examining the merits of the criminal case against him. Hence, [the applicant's] and his lawyer's arguments that he is not guilty and that the charges against him are fabricated are not subject to this court's examination.” 38.  The City Court decision was silent on the issue of the applicant's detention. 39.  On 21 April 2009 the applicant appealed to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (“the Supreme Court”), submitting that the City Court had failed to take into account his arguments, supported by materials from various NGOs, that he would be subjected to torture in the event of extradition. He also averred that the City Court had disregarded that at the time of its examination of the case appeal proceedings against the FMS decision to refuse him refugee status had been pending. 40.  On 8 June 2009 the applicant lodged an additional appeal statement with the Supreme Court submitting that the City Court had failed to assess Ms Ryabinina's opinion and materials from various NGOs attesting to the existence of systematic problems with torture in Tajikistan and had limited its assessment to the MID letter stating merely that “there was no indication that [the applicant's] civil rights would be violated in the event of his extradition”. He stressed that the City Court had confused the risk of torture with the risk of criminal prosecution, although the applicant's position in that respect was unequivocal: he feared his extradition to Tajikistan because he had already been subjected to torture there and he had fled to Russia for that reason. The City Court's conclusion that he had voluntarily left Tajikistan was at odds with the fact that the applicant had fled from custody. Lastly, the City Court had exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that the applicant did not satisfy the criteria to be granted refugee status, as it was for the civil courts to rule on that matter. 41.  On 8 June 2009 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation (“the Supreme Court”) examined the applicant's appeal against the City Court decision. The applicant's lawyer was present at the hearing, but the applicant did not attend. At the hearing the applicant's lawyer filed a written request for release with the Supreme Court. He submitted that his detention in the absence of a judicial decision had exceeded the two-month limit set in Article 109 of the CCrP. In that connection he referred to Article 466 of the CCrP, the Constitutional Court's decisions nos. 101-0 and 333-O-P (see below) and the fact that the latest court decision to place him in custody had been taken on 16 September 2008. He also complained that the Babushkinskiy District Court and the Moscow City Court had refused to examine his complaints about his detention. 42.  By a decision of the same date the Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, reproducing verbatim the text of the decision of 20 April 2009. The Supreme Court decision was silent on the matter of the applicant's detention. 43.  On 23 October 2008 the applicant filed an application for asylum with the Moscow Department of the Federal Migration Service (“the Moscow FMS”), stating that he could not return to Tajikistan, where he had been subjected to ill-treatment. In particular, he submitted that in February 2006 he had been arrested by law enforcement officials who had tortured him with electricity and severely beaten him. Two days later he had been transferred to the MNS, where he had been kept in a damp basement together with eight other persons. He had not been fed and had been allowed access to the toilet only twice a day. The applicant and other detainees were systematically beaten up with a view to extracting confessions about their involvement with HT, to which they had finally had to confess because of the beatings. The MNS officers had forced the applicant and his fellow detainees to work on their construction site and had beaten them if they did not work properly. In May 2006, while at a construction site, he had escaped because he could no longer endure the violence. 44.  In an interview with an official of the Moscow FMS on 28 November 2008, the applicant reiterated and confirmed his earlier submissions 45.  On 15 December 2008 the Moscow FMS refused to grant the applicant asylum, finding that the reason for his request was his fear of being sentenced to a lengthy term of imprisonment if extradited. It further noted that when questioned by FMS officials, the applicant submitted that he had been unlawfully arrested by the Tajikistani law enforcement officials and that he had fled from custody because he had been severely ill-treated. The FMS concluded that the grounds referred to by the applicant did not constitute well-founded fear of being persecuted in his home country. 46.  On 13 January 2009 the applicant appealed to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow (“the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court”) against the decision of 15 December 2008, submitting that the Tajik authorities were persecuting him on religious grounds in connection with his alleged membership of HT, a banned religious organisation. Referring to Article 3 of the Convention, he stressed that the migration authority had disregarded his consistent and convincing submissions in respect of the ill-treatment to which he had been subjected. Knowing that the Code of Civil Procedure made no provision for a detainee's transportation to court hearings concerning their civil claims, the applicant did not request the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court to secure his presence. 47.  On 7 April 2009 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court examined the applicant's complaint in the presence of his lawyer and dismissed it. The applicant was not brought to the hearing. The court found that in examining the applicant's application the Moscow FMS had obtained from the Russian Prosecutor General's Office and their Tajikistani counterpart materials concerning his criminal prosecution in Tajikistan. Those State bodies had not confirmed that the Tajikistani authorities were persecuting Tajikistani nationals because of their religious beliefs, or torturing them or treating them inhumanely in connection with criminal proceedings against them. Although the applicant had arrived in Russia in May 2007, he had applied for asylum only after his arrest with a view to extradition. In sum, the applicant had failed to adduce convincing reasons showing that he had well-founded fears of being persecuted in Tajikistan on political, racial, religious, national or ethnic grounds or because of his membership of a particular social group, and had only applied to the migration authorities because of his criminal prosecution. 48.  On 20 April 2009 the applicant appealed against the decision of 7 April 2009, submitting that the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court had disregarded his detailed and consistent submissions concerning the ill‑treatment to which he had been subjected while in custody in Tajikistan and his persecution on religious grounds. He also averred that the district court had disregarded a number of reports of UN bodies and NGOs attesting to the widespread practice of ill-treatment of detainees by law enforcement authorities in Tajikistan. 49.  On 25 June 2009 the Moscow City Court set aside the decision of 7 April 2009 and remitted the case at first instance for fresh examination. 50.  On 10 September 2009 the Zamoskvoretstkiy District Court upheld the migration authority's refusal to grant the applicant asylum, reproducing almost verbatim the reasoning of its decision of 7 April 2009. The court also noted that as the applicant only feared criminal prosecution and thus did not qualify for asylum it would not attach any weight to his submissions concerning the risk of ill-treatment in Tajikistan in the event of extradition and the general human rights situation in that country. 51.  The applicant appealed against the decision. Referring to reports of various NGOs, he stressed that the problem of ill-treatment of detainees persisted in Tajikistan and that he feared his extradition not only because of the general situation in the country but also because of his own experience of ill-treatment at the hands of the Tajikistani State officials, who were persecuting him on religious grounds. However, the District Court had refused to take that information into account and limited its assessment to the information provided by the Russian State authorities. 52.  On 26 January 2010 officers of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“the UNHCR”) interviewed the applicant in the remand facility in connection with his application for international protection. 53.  On 28 January 2010 the City Court upheld the decision of 10 September 2009 in the presence of the applicant's lawyer. The City Court decision, in its relevant part, stated:
“On 28 November 2008 [Mr] Gaforov, a national of the Republic of Tajikistan, held in IZ-77/4 in Moscow, applied for refugee status.
In his questionnaire [анкета] and report form [опросный лист] [the applicant] stated that there was a real risk of his persecution by law enforcement officials who had arrested him in 2006 in Khudzhand and charged him with being a member of HT. Moreover, [the applicant] stated that he feared criminal prosecution and had been subjected to ill-treatment while in detention [in Tajikistan].
In arriving at its conclusions the [Moscow FMS] examined information submitted by the Russian Prosecutor General's Office and concerning [the applicant's] prosecution by the Tajikistani prosecutor's office on various charges under Articles of the Tajikistani Criminal Code.
There is no indication of [the applicant's] persecution on religious grounds in the Bobodzhon-Gafurovskiy prosecutor's office's decision of 6 May 2006 to charge the applicant [with his activities within HT].
From the impugned decision [of the Moscow FMS] it transpires that in arriving at its conclusions the authority took into account information from the [Russian] Prosecutor General's Office and their Tajikistani counterpart.
In examining [the applicant's] complaint, the [District] court correctly established that the applicant had not referred to any humanitarian reasons to be granted temporary asylum in the Russian Federation, such as precise details of his personal persecution by the Tajikistani authorities, [or stated] that in the event of his return there existed a real risk to his personal safety from the [Tajikistani] authorities. He had not justified his application for temporary asylum by his state of health or the need for medical assistance. He also failed to submit any evidence that there were obstacles to his returning to Tajikistan.” 54.  On 8 February 2010 the applicant applied to the Moscow FMS for temporary asylum. The outcome of those proceedings is unclear. 55.  On 10 March 2010 the UNHCR office informed the applicant's lawyer that it had examined her client's application for international protection. The examination established that the applicant was “outside his country of nationality due to well-founded fear of being persecuted by the authorities of his country for reasons of imputed political opinions”, that he was “unable to return to the Republic of Tajikistan” and thus “eligible for international protection under the UNHCR mandate”. 56.  On 7 August 2008 the Nagatinskiy District Court of Moscow ordered the applicant's placement in custody pending extradition, with reference to Articles 97, 99, 101 and 108 of the Russian CCrP and Article 61 of the Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters (“the Minsk Convention” – see the Relevant Domestic Law below). The court stated, in particular, that the applicant was charged under the Tajikistani Criminal Code with a crime carrying a sentence of imprisonment, that he had fled from custody, did not have a permanent place of residence or registration in Russia and might, consequently, again abscond to avoid prosecution. It further stated that the need to place the applicant in custody was also justified by his eventual extradition to Tajikistan, and that the related proceedings had been instituted following the Tajik authorities' petition under Article 61 of the Minsk Convention. The decision did not specify the term of the applicant's detention and stated that it was open to appeal before the Moscow City Court within three days after its delivery. There is no indication that the applicant challenged the decision on appeal. 57.  On 16 September 2008, the Simonovskiy District Court of Moscow ordered the applicant's placement in custody pending extradition, referring to Article 466 § 1 of the CCrP and Article 60 of the Minsk Convention. The court stated that the Russian Prosecutor General's Office was verifying the materials in respect of the applicant's extradition and that no grounds preventing it had been established. On 7 August 2008 the Nagatinskiy District Court had ordered the applicant's placement in custody pending receipt of the formal request for his extradition under Article 61 of the Minsk Convention. By the time of the examination of the case by the Simonovskiy District Court, that request had been received. The applicant was charged with having escaped from custody which, under the Tajikistani Criminal Code, was punishable with over two years' imprisonment. Furthermore, the applicant had absconded, he did not have a permanent place of residence or a permanent job in Russia and his name was on the international list of wanted persons. Hence, the applicant's requests for application of a non-custodial preventive measure were unfounded and he was to be remanded in custody. The decision did not set a time-limit for the applicant's detention and stated that it was open to appeal before the Moscow City Court within three days after its delivery. There is no indication that the applicant challenged the decision on appeal. 58.  On 21 January 2009 the applicant complained to the Babushkinsky District Court of Moscow that his detention in the absence of a judicial decision had exceeded the two-month term set in Article 109 of the CCrP. He referred to Article 466 of the CCrP, Constitutional Court decisions nos. 101-0 and 333-O-P (see the section on Relevant Domestic Law below) and the fact that the latest court decision to place him in custody had been taken on 16 September 2008. He requested his immediate release. 59.  On 27 January 2009 the Babushkinskiy District Court disallowed the applicant's complaint, finding that he had failed to comply with the formal requirements for lodging a civil claim, laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure. The applicant was invited to rectify the shortcomings and informed of his right to appeal against the decision. 60.  On 14 September 2009 the applicant complained about his detention to the Nagatinskiy District Court. In particular, he averred that the latest detention order authorising his placement in custody was dated 16 September 2008 and that neither that decision nor the previous one dated 7 August 2008 specified the term of his detention. In any event, since 16 September 2008 the Nagatinskiy prosecutor's office had not requested the courts to extend his detention pursuant to Article 109, so it had become unlawful after the expiry of the two initially authorised two-month terms; that is to say that out of the thirteen months the applicant had spent in custody, nine months of that detention had been unlawful. Furthermore, the Babushkinskiy District Court had refused to examine the applicant's complaint about detention and the City Court had likewise disregarded his request for release submitted at the hearing of 20 April 2009. Relying on Articles 5 §§1 and 4 of the Convention, the Court's case-law, Articles 109 and 110 of the CCrP and the practice of the Constitutional Court, the applicant insisted that his detention had been unlawful, that he had not been provided with an effective remedy to complain about it and that the applicable legislation did not meet the requisite standards of quality of the law. Lastly, he argued that the extradition check against him had been finalised on 30 December 2008 and that after that date no action was taken with a view to extraditing him. 61.  On 21 September 2009 the Nagatinskiy District Court refused to examine the applicant's complaint. It held firstly that the applicant had failed to appeal against the decision of 7 August 2008 within the required time-limits. As to the alleged inaction of the prosecutor's office, it was open to the applicant to complain about it under Article 125 of the CCrP to the Simonovskiy District Court, which had territorial jurisdiction over the matter. 62.  On 21 October 2009 the applicant appealed against that decision to the Moscow City Court. 63.  On the same date the applicant complained to the Simonovskiy District Court, reiterating his submissions made in the complaint of 14 September 2009. 64.  By a letter of 29 October 2009 the Simonovskiy District Court returned the applicant's complaint of 21 October 2009, stating that in the Russian Federation criminal proceedings were conducted in accordance with the provisions of the CCrP and that the applicant had failed to refer to any provisions of the CCrP in his submissions. 65.  On 8 December 2009 the applicant complained to the Prosecutor General's Office about his detention, averring that he had been held in custody for sixteen months and that twelve months of that detention had been unlawful because the prosecutor's office had failed to request the courts to extend it. He also stressed that the decision to extradite him had become final in June 2009, after which date no action had been taken with a view to extraditing him. 66.  On 21 December 2009 the Moscow City Court dismissed the applicant's appeal against the decision of 21 September 2009. It held, in particular, that it was open to the applicant to complain about his detention to a court having territorial jurisdiction or to an appeal court. 67.  On 30 December 2009 the Prosecutor General's Office replied to the applicant that his detention had been authorised first by the Nagatinskiy and then by the Simonovskiy District Court, pursuant to Article 466 § 1 of the CCrP. According to Article 109 of the CCrP, the maximum term of detention of persons charged with particularly serious crimes was up to eighteen months. The Prosecutor General's Office had decided on the applicant's extradition on 30 December 2008, that is within the required time-limit. The applicant's ensuing detention was prompted by his appeals to the courts against the extradition order and by the decision of the European Court of Human Rights to apply Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. As to the Supreme Court Ruling of 29 October 2009 (see below), it was applicable only to persons in respect of whom the Russian authorities were carrying out an extradition check, and not to those in respect of whom the Prosecutor General's Office had already issued an extradition order. In the applicant's case the Prosecutor General's Office had decided on 30 December 2008 to extradite him and that decision was to be enforced. 68.  On 22 January 2010 the Ombudsman to the President of the Russian Federation (“the ombudsman”) wrote to the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation stating, in particular, that the European Court of Human Rights had recently found a breach of Article 5 of the Convention on account of the unsatisfying quality of the law in several cases involving persons detained pending extradition. Yet the practice continued, in breach of the applicable Russian legislation, of keeping in custody foreign nationals whose detention on remand had not been extended. The ombudsman opined that the problem lay in the domestic authorities' inconsistent practice in applying the relevant legislation, and had persisted even after the Constitutional Court's Ruling no. 101-O and the Supreme Court's Ruling no. 22 (see Relevant Domestic Law below). The ombudsman referred to the Yuldashev, Isakov, Khaydarov and Sultanov cases, which were pending before the Court, in which the term of the applicants' detention pending extradition had exceeded the eighteen-month maximum term laid down in Article 109 of the CCrP. 69.  The ombudsman further stressed that on 5 February 2010 the eighteen-month maximum detention term was about to expire for the applicant in the present case and that the domestic courts had twice authorised his remand in custody without setting any time-limit for his detention. He also stated that the Government were justifying the detention on remand of the applicants in the above-mentioned cases by the fact that the Strasbourg Court had indicated to them under Rule 39 to suspend their extradition. However, nothing in the Strasbourg Court's Rules provided for the respondent State's obligation to hold detainees whose extradition was suspended in custody in breach of the Russian legislation. Lastly, the ombudsman asked the Prosecutor General to carefully examine the situation of the persons mentioned in his letter, in particular with regard to the extension of their detention for an unlimited period of time, and to further improvement of the legislation and its correct application in order to prevent possible violations of the Convention. 70.  By a letter of 8 February 2010 the Deputy Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation replied to the ombudsman. The letter, in so far as relevant, read as follows:
“...
...the decisions to extradite the applicants in the cases mentioned [in your letter] were taken within the time-limits established by Article 109 of the CCrP, the lawfulness of those decisions was verified by the courts and those decisions are bound to be executed. To release the above-mentioned persons from custody would entail breach by the Russian Federation of its international obligations concerning extradition.
The possibility to apply the provisions of the CCrP in respect of the time-limits for the detention of persons held in custody pending extradition was first mentioned in Constitutional Court Ruling no.  101-O ... In its Ruling... no. 158-O the Constitutional Court stated that in its previous Ruling no. 101-O it had not, and could not have, established what particular provisions of the CCrP were to regulate the procedures and time-limits for the detention of persons in custody pending extradition ... as it had no jurisdiction in the matter ...
The Supreme Court, in its replies of 9 August and 6 October 2008 to the Prosecutor General's requests for clarification, explained that in deciding on procedures and time-limits for the detention of persons detained pending extradition, the authorities were to apply the provisions of the CCrP. However, this issue had never been examined by the Plenary of the Supreme Court and the practice of the domestic authorities in this respect had not been studied or summarised.
Until 29 October 2009 there was no uniform judicial practice on this category of cases in different regions of the Russian Federation. Some judges requested that the time-limits for detention be extended, others refused to extend those time-limits, considering it unnecessary.
On 26 November 2009, following the Supreme Court's Ruling no. 22 ..., the Prosecutor General's office sent out to prosecutors in all regions of the Russian Federation an information letter explaining the order on extending the time-limits for the detention of persons in respect of whom the extradition check was pending and the decision to extradite was not yet final... Further time-limits for the detention of a person pending extradition are regulated by Article 467 of the CCrP.
The lengthy detention of Mr Yuldashev, Mr Isakov, Mr Khaydarov, Mr Sultanov and [the applicant] Mr A.Gaforov ... is at the present moment a consequence of the European Court's application of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court pending the examination of their cases [by the Strasbourg Court].” 71.  On 23 April 2010 the Babushkinskiy district prosecutor ordered the applicant's release from custody, finding that the time-limits for his detention under Article 109 of the CCrP had expired and that there was no reason to extend his detention. 72.  On the same date the Babushkinskiy District Court dismissed the prosecutor's request to confine the applicant to the detention centre for foreign nationals [центр содержания иностранных граждан ГУВД по г. Москве]. The court held that only persons charged with administrative offences could be held in the above-mentioned centre and that, in any event, the maximum time-limits for the applicant's detention had expired pursuant to Articles 107-109 of the CCrP. 73.  It appears that the applicant was released shortly thereafter.


4.  The applicant was born in 1965 and was detained in Diyarbakır prison at the time of his application to the Court. 5.  On 8 November 1993 the applicant was taken into police custody by police officers from the Diyarbakır Security Directorate on suspicion of membership of an illegal organisation, the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party). 6.  On 26 November 1993 he was brought before a judge who ordered his detention on remand. 7.  On 29 November 1993 the applicant filed an objection against the decision of 26 November 1993. 8.  On 7 December 1993 the Diyarbakır State Security Court dismissed the applicant’s objection. 9.  On 23 December 1993 the public prosecutor at the Diyarbakır State Security Court filed a bill of indictment against the applicant and ten other persons. The applicant was charged under Article 125 of the Criminal Code with carrying out activities with the aim of bringing about the secession of part of the national territory. 10.  On 28 December 1993 the Diyarbakır State Security Court held the first hearing in the case against the applicant and the other co-accused (case no. 1993/663). 11.  Between 28 December 1993 and 16 January 1996 the Diyarbakır State Security Court held fourteen hearings, approximately once every two months on the merits of the case. During this time, at each hearing the court heard some of the accused and requested documents from various authorities with a view to completing the case file. 12.  Meanwhile, on 4 October 1994 the first-instance court decided to join another case (case no. 1993/821) to case no. 1993/663. 13.  On 26 March 1996 the public prosecutor submitted his observations on the merits of the case. The first-instance court requested the applicant and some of the other co-accused to make their defence submissions. 14.  Between 26 March 1996 and 16 September 1997 the Diyarbakır State Security Court adjourned the hearings as some of the accused had failed to file their defence submissions. 15.  In the meantime, on 3 July 1996 the Diyarbakır State Security Court decided to join another case (case no. 1994/433) to case no. 1993/633. 16.  On 21 October 1997 the Diyarbakır State Security Court decided to join a third case (case no. 1996/512) to case no. 1993/663. 17.  Between 21 October 1997 and 3 March 1998 the first-instance court heard the accused of the joined case and collected evidence in their respect. 18.  On 3 March 1998 the court requested the public prosecutor to submit his observations on the merits of the case. 19.  On 22 July 1998 the public prosecutor amended the indictment concerning the applicant and charged him under Article 168 § 2 of the Criminal Code with membership of an illegal organisation. 20.  On 15 September 1998 the applicant’s lawyer contended that the applicant had been employed in Alanya at the time of the alleged offence and requested the first-instance court to conduct a further investigation with a view to confirming the veracity of his claim. The court accepted the applicant’s request and ordered the Alanya gendarmerie command to obtain evidence in that respect. 21.  On 29 December 1998 the court adjourned the hearing as it did not receive the requested information from the Alanya gendarmerie command. 22.  On 2 February 1999 the first-instance court withdrew its order of 15 September 1998. 23.  On 2 March 1999 the Diyarbakır State Security Court requested the accused to file their defence submissions. On an unspecified date, the applicant made his submissions. 24.  On 23 March 1999 the Diyarbakır State Security Court concluded the proceedings against twenty accused persons, including the applicant, and convicted the latter of membership of the PKK under Article 168 § 2 of the Criminal Code and Article 5 of Law no. 3713. The first-instance court sentenced the applicant to twelve years and six months’ imprisonment and permanently debarred him from employment in the civil service. 25.  The Diyarbakır State Security Court held forty-one hearings in total. At the end of each hearing the court considered the applicant’s and the other co‑accused’s continued detention, either of its own motion or upon the request of the accused. The court ordered the applicant’s continued detention on every occasion, having regard to the state of the evidence, the nature of the offence and the content of the case file. 26.  On 17 February 2000 the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the Diyarbakır State Security Court in respect of the applicant and some of the other co-accused.


4.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in the village of Vladimirivka, the Donetsk region, Ukraine. 5.  The applicant is an employee of the Pivdennodonbaska State Mine (hereinafter - the SMP Mine). On 24 June 1996 he suffered an industrial injury. 6.  In October 1998 the applicant instituted proceedings in the Volnovakha City Court against the SMP Mine seeking compensation for the injury. On 16 June 2000 the court found in part for the applicant. 7.  On 6 December 2000 the Presidium of the Donetsk Regional Court allowed the protest lodged by the Deputy President of the Donetsk Regional Court and quashed the decision of 16 June 2000. The case was remitted for a fresh consideration to the Vugledar City Court. 8.  On 7 June 2001 the Vugledar City Court found that the applicant had been injured due to the fault of the SMP Mine and ordered it to pay him UAH 37,465.41[1] in compensation and UAH 800[2] of costs and expenses (рішення Вугледарського міського суду Донецької області). The court also awarded the applicant a monthly allowance of UAH 162.57[3] in compensation for loss of earnings for the period of 8 May – 8 September 2001. 9.  On 6 August 2001 the Vugledar City Bailiffs' Service instituted enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgment of 7 June 2001. 10.  According to the Government, the judgment was fully enforced in instalments: during the periods of April – December 2002 and August – December 2003 the applicant received a total of UAH 10,227[4], and in 2004 he received the remaining amount of the judgment debt (UAH 27,238[5]). The last payment took place in May 2004. The applicant was also paid UAH 800 for his legal expenses. 11.  On 1 June 2004 the Bailiffs' Service terminated the enforcement proceedings as the judgment of 7 June 2001 was enforced in full. The applicant never challenged the Bailiffs' decisions of 1 June 2004. Nevertheless, he maintains that the debtor still owes him UAH 515.27[6]. 12.  In July 2004 the applicant lodged a new claim with the Voroshilovskiy District Court of Donetsk against the State Enterprise “Donetsk Coal Energy Company” (Державне підприємство „Донецька вугільна енергетична компанія”), seeking compensation for the substantial delay in the enforcement of the judgment of 7 June 2001. Within the course of the proceedings the court appointed a forensic accounting expertise to calculate the amount of compensation due to the applicant. In their conclusions of 14 July 2005 the experts mentioned, inter alia, that, out of the total amount of the judgment award, UAH 515.27 remained unpaid. 13.  On 1 November 2005 the court partly allowed the applicant's claim as, according to the domestic legislation then in force, untimely paid salary had to be recalculated if a price index had increased for more than 1 % during the relevant period of delay in payment. The court also found that the applicant had sustained moral damage as the result of the lengthy non-enforcement of the judgment in his favour. The court awarded the applicant the total of UAH 8,609.88[7], including UAH 500[8] in compensation for moral damage. 14.  On 28 November 2005 the Voroshilovskiy District Bailiffs' Service of Donetsk instituted enforcement proceedings in respect of the judgment of 1 November 2005. 15.  On 6 December 2005 the enforcement proceedings were terminated in accordance with the Law of Ukraine “On measures to ensure the stable operation of fuel and energy sector enterprises” (Закон України „Про заходи, спрямовані на забезпечення сталого функціонування підприємств паливно-енергетичного комплексу»). 16.  The judgment of 1 November 2005 remained unenforced.


6.  The applicant was born in 1982 and lives in Kaluga. 7.  The applicant submitted two medical documents issued on 18 December 2000 and 27 March 2002 in Kazakhstan, stating that he was suffering from non-osteogenic fibroma of the bones, a condition causing tumours. 8.  On 16 November 2006 the Almaty Department for Economic Crimes and Corruption of the Republic of Kazakhstan launched a criminal case against the applicant for fraud. 9.  By a decision of 7 February 2007 the authorities issued an arrest warrant in respect of the applicant, which was authorised by the prosecutor on 7 March 2007. 10.  On 16 February 2007 the applicant was charged with fraud, and on 4 April 2007 he was placed on the international wanted list. 11.  In April or May 2007 the applicant moved to Russia. 12.  On 9 June 2009 the applicant was detained as a wanted person in Kaluga. 13.  On 10 June 2009 he was questioned by the prosecutor’s office of the Kaluga Region. The applicant stated that he had arrived in Russia in September 2007 as a visitor and had subsequently learned of the criminal proceedings initiated against him in Kazakhstan. He had decided not to return to Kazakhstan to avoid criminal prosecution. According to the Government, the applicant had not indicated any fear of ill-treatment or torture in Kazakhstan and had assumed that he was not a victim of political persecution. The Government did not provide a copy of the record of the interview. 14.  By a decision of 10 June 2009 the Kaluga District Court, Kaluga Region, remanded the applicant in custody pending extradition. Subsequently, the detention period was extended on several occasions. 15.  On 16 July 2009 the Prosecutor General’s office of the Republic of Kazakhstan requested the applicant’s extradition pending criminal charges against him. The request contained assurances that the applicant would not be extradited to a third state without the consent of the Russian Federation, nor would he be held criminally liable for a different crime committed before his extradition, that upon termination of the trial proceedings and completion of any criminal sentence the applicant would be free to leave Kazakhstan and that the charges against the applicant were of a common criminal nature and he would not be discriminated against on any ground. 16.  On 30 December 2009 the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office ordered the applicant’s extradition. 17.  On an unspecified date the prosecutor’s office of the Kaluga Region investigated the applicant’s allegations of lack of proper medical treatment while in detention. In its conclusion issued on 14 January 2010 it stated that during his detention in Russia the applicant had been examined by medical professionals on numerous occasions, including in connection with his tumour condition. There had been no deterioration in his condition during the detention, and the medical documents supplied had served as proof that the necessary medical treatment would be available to the applicant in Kazakhstan. 18.  On 29 January 2010 the applicant’s representative challenged the extradition order. 19.  On 19 February 2010 the Prosecutor General’s office of Kazakhstan submitted an additional letter to the Prosecutor General’s office of the Russian Federation, containing further assurances in respect of the applicant. In particular, it referred to the ratification by Kazakhstan on 24 April 2005 of the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, prohibiting, among other things, torture, inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment. The author of the letter pledged that, irrespective of the fact that Kazakhstan was not a party to the European Convention on Human Rights, it would ensure the rights guaranteed to the applicant by Articles 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 13 and 14 of the Convention. Finally, the letter assured that the applicant would be detained in compliance with the Detention Act of 30 March 1999 and would be provided with medical aid, if necessary. 20.  On 24 February 2010 the Kaluga Regional Court rejected the applicant’s complaint against the extradition order. It noted, inter alia, that the applicant’s extradition would not violate the European Convention, as the applicant was being prosecuted for a common crime and there was nothing to suggest that he would be subject to torture, inhuman treatment or lack of adequate medical treatment in Kazakhstan. It further considered that none of the medical documents provided demonstrated that the applicant had an illness which precluded him from being detained or extradited. It also relied on the assurances given by the Prosecutor General’s Office of Kazakhstan. 21.  By a decision of 22 April 2010 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld that decision on appeal. The appeal decision essentially repeated the reasoning of the lower court. 22.  On 7 April 2010 the President of the Chamber to which the case had been allocated decided, in the interests of the parties and the proper conduct of the proceedings before the Court, to indicate to the Russian Government, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, that the applicant should not be extradited to Kazakhstan for the duration of the proceedings before the Court. The case was also granted priority under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. 23.  On 18 August 2009 the Federal Migration Service office of the Kaluga Region rejected the applicant’s application for refugee status after analysing his arguments in accordance with the Refugees Act and concluding that the applicant did not have any grounds to fear persecution if he returned to Kazakhstan. By a decision of 10 December 2009 the Kaluga Regional Court upheld this decision on appeal in final instance. 24.  On 4 December 2009 the same office refused to accept the applicant’s application for Russian citizenship, referring to the criminal charges against him in Kazakhstan. 25.  Finally, on 18 January 2010 the same office refused the applicant’s request for asylum in Russia. On 1 April 2010 the Kaluga Regional Court upheld the decision on appeal at the final level of jurisdiction. 26.  Everyone has the right to liberty and security (Article 22 § 1). Arrest, remand in custody and custodial detention are permissible only on the basis of a court order. The term during which a person may be detained prior to obtaining such an order cannot exceed forty-eight hours (Article 22 § 2).


6.  The applicant was born in 1927 and lives in Sofia. 7.  In 1968 the applicant and his wife bought from the Sofia municipality a two-room apartment of 49 square metres which had become State property by virtue of the nationalisations carried out by the communist regime in Bulgaria in 1947 and the following years. 8.  In February 1992 the Restitution Law entered into force. 9.  In December 1992 the applicant and his wife conveyed their title to their grandson, retaining for themselves the right to use the apartment. The applicant's wife died in 1995; the applicant and their daughter were her heirs. 10.  On 30 December 1997, following a renewal of the initial one-year time-limit to bring an action under section 7 of the Restitution Law, the heir of the former owner of the apartment brought such an action against the applicant and his daughter, seeking to establish that the title of the applicant and his wife had been null and void. 11.  The ensuing proceedings ended by final judgment of the Supreme Court of Cassation of 14 July 2005. The domestic courts found that the title of the applicant and his wife had been null and void ab initio because the sale of the property in 1968 had been flawed as three of the requisite documents, namely the initial decision to sell the property, its approval, and the sale contract, had not been signed by the mayor or, respectively, the mayor of the region, as required by law, but by their deputies. 12.  In the meantime, on 15 March 2002 the heir of the former owner of the apartment brought a rei vindicatio action and an action for damages against the applicant who was still living in the apartment. In a judgment of 14 March 2006 the Sofia District Court allowed the claims and ordered the applicant to vacate the property. It found also that the applicant was liable for damages as his title had been found to be null and void ab initio and he had thus used the flat without any valid legal ground. 13.  The domestic court noted that the former owner's rights to the apartment at issue had been restored ex lege by virtue of the Restitution Law's entry into force in February 1992. Therefore, the applicant's liability for damages for having used the apartment without any valid ground had arisen on that date. On that basis, the Sofia District Court ordered the applicant to pay to the former owner 1,807.50, Bulgarian levs (BGN), the equivalent of 927 euros (EUR), in damages for the period from February 1992 to March 2002. The applicant's liability was limited to the latter date because this was when the action for damages had been brought. Apparently, the applicant failed to rely on the rules of statutory limitation, which under Bulgarian law was five years and could have led to the restriction of his liability to the period after March 1997. The applicant was also ordered to pay BGN 440, the equivalent of EUR 225, for the other party's expenses. 14.  Upon appeal by the applicant, on 15 October 2007 the Sofia District Court's judgment was upheld by the Sofia City Court. Considering that he stood no chance in cassation, the applicant did not appeal against that judgment. 15.  On 23 August 2006 the applicant and his daughter applied to receive compensation through bonds for the loss of the apartment. At the time of the applicant's latest communication to the Court of May 2010 the regional governor had not yet decided on the application for bonds. 16.  In October 2006 the applicant vacated the apartment and was granted the tenancy of a municipally-owned dwelling. 17.  The relevant background facts, domestic law and practice concerning the effect of the restitution on Bulgaria on third parties have been summarised in the Court's judgment in the case of Velikovi and Others v. Bulgaria (nos. 43278/98, 45437/99, 48014/99, 48380/99, 51362/99, 53367/99, 60036/00, 73465/01, and 194/02, 15 March 2007). 18.  The relevant judicial practice concerning liability for damages of persons who lost their property pursuant to section 7 of the Restitution Law has been summarised in the judgment in the case of Kayriakovi v. Bulgaria (no. 30945/04, § 18, 7 January 2010). 19.  Under Bulgarian law, the right to use a property, provided for in sections 56-62 of the Property Act of 1951, is considered a right in rem.


5.  The applicant was born in 1985 and is currently serving a prison sentence in Kopeysk in the Chelyabinsk Region. 6.  On 5 December 2003 the applicant was taken into custody in connection with criminal proceedings against him and placed in Chelyabinsk remand prison no. IZ-74/1. On the same day he had a medical examination including an X-ray of his lungs, which revealed no signs of tuberculosis. 7.  On various dates between 25 December 2003 and 5 August 2004 the applicant was taken from the remand prison to the temporary detention centre (IVS) located on the premises of the Kopeysk police department. His stays in the centre lasted at least overnight and up to four consecutive days. In total, he spent thirty-six days there. 8.  The building in which the Kopeysk IVS was located had been constructed in 1935. Since it had been designed for short-term detention only, its cells were not equipped with flush toilets or running water. Instead, water tanks and water fountains were put at the inmates' disposal. The toilet was located in the courtyard. 9.  The applicant submitted that all ten cells of the Kopeysk IVS had been overcrowded and had housed up to six persons. The one-hour outdoor exercise was divided between ten cells, with the consequence that each cell was only allowed some six minutes for outdoor exercise and a visit to the toilet. The Government claimed that it was impossible to establish the number of detainees because the documents had been destroyed upon the expiry of the statutory storage period. 10.  The cells were furnished with bunk beds but no mattresses or bed linen were given to inmates. In the absence of dining tables, inmates had to eat while sitting on the beds or on the floor. 11.  According to the applicant, cells were infested with insects and small rodents. The Government denied that allegation and submitted that the IVS had regularly undergone disinfection and rat extermination. 12.  The applicant complained to the prosecutor's office about the conditions of his detention. 13.  On 9 August 2004 the Kopeysk town prosecutor sent a formal representation to the acting head of the Kopeysk IVS, requiring him to remedy “most serious violations of the law and of orders of the Ministry of the Interior” which had been established by an inquiry instituted upon numerous complaints from inmates held in the Kopeysk IVS. The representation read in particular as follows:
“The conditions of detention in the Kopeysk IVS do not meet hygienic and sanitary requirements. Each cell accommodates on average six persons, which is in excess of the maximum population.
Sanitary and hygienic conditions in the Kopeysk IVS have remained unsatisfactory: 14.  On 4 September 2004 the applicant underwent a medical examination in prison hospital no. GLPU-17 and was diagnosed with tuberculosis. 15.  In 2005, the prosecutor's office for the Chelyabinsk Region launched a comprehensive review of the conditions of detention in the IVS facilities of the Chelyabinsk Region. On 16 September 2005 the regional prosecutor sent a formal representation to the head of the regional Department of the Interior. He noted that the conditions of detention in a large majority of regional IVS facilities were in breach of the requirements of the Detention of Suspects Act (see below). In the Kopeysk IVS, among others, the sanitary norm of no less than four sq. metres of personal space per inmate was not respected and detainees were not allowed to go outdoors for exercise. 16.  The Government submitted that a new building of the Kopeysk IVS had been constructed and would become operational in May 2008.


5.  The applicant lives in Białystok. 6.  In 1991 the applicant married Mr S.D. On 21 December 1998 their son J. was born. 7.  In February 2006 the applicant's husband took their son for a winter holiday but afterwards failed to return with him to the family's flat. The applicant's husband rented a new flat and started hindering the applicant's contact with her son. 8.  In February 2006 the applicant filed for divorce. 9.  On 24 May 2006 the Białystok District Court (Sąd Okręgowy) gave an interim order which stipulated that, during the divorce proceedings, the child's place of residence would be with the applicant. The court ordered the applicant's husband to pay child maintenance and granted him access to J. on Thursdays and every other Saturday and Sunday. The interim order became final and enforceable on 25 May 2006. 10.  On 5 July 2006 the District Court ordered the court-appointed guardians to enforce the decision of 24 May 2006 and to remove the child from his father's care. 11.  On 14 July 2006 one of the guardians made a first attempt to enforce the court's order, which failed owing to the attitude of the father who refused to hand J. over to his mother. The guardian refused to call for police assistance or to inform the public prosecutor about the events. 12.  The applicant informed the prosecutor that her child had been kidnapped by her husband. However, on 25 July 2006 the Kolno District Prosecutor refused to institute criminal proceedings, finding that no offence had been committed. This decision was upheld by the Białystok District Court on an unspecified later date. 13.  The applicant was unable to assist the same guardian in her next attempt to remove the child from his father's care, which had been scheduled for 11 August 2006. Consequently, it had to be cancelled. 14.  Given the subsequent inactivity of the guardians, the applicant lodged a complaint with the District Court on 6 December 2006. 15.  In reply, she was informed by the President of the Łomża District Court that the guardians had received an instruction from a family court judge to cease their attempts to remove the child. 16.  Following her second complaint about the court-appointed guardians, on 16 and 17 January and 5 February 2007, the President of the Białystok Regional Court (Prezes Sądu Okręgowego) wrote to the applicant informing her that he agreed that there had been shortcomings in the guardians' attempts to remove the child from his father's care and that new measures would shortly be taken. He noted, in particular, that before ordering a forced removal of the child, the applicant's husband should have been invited to voluntarily hand J. over. This had resulted in the unsuccessful enforcement of the court's order. 17.  On 12 February 2007 the guardians made another attempt to remove the child. However, the applicant's husband had gone with the child to the adjacent flat. Both the guardians and the police refused to enter that flat. 18.  On 20 February 2007 the Białystok District Court ordered the applicant's husband to hand over the child voluntarily to his mother within three days. 19.  Since the father had failed to comply with this order, on 19 March 2007 the Białystok District Court gave a decision in which it authorised the court-appointed guardians to forcibly remove the child. 20.  At a hearing held on 30 March 2007, in the course of the divorce proceedings, the court heard experts who had prepared an expert opinion requested by the court. They testified that the child's father had been manipulating the child with the aim of alienating him from his mother. The father had also made it difficult for the child to rebuild his relationship with his mother by ensuring that there was no private contact between her and the child. During visits the father was always present. In the best interest of the child, the experts recommended that custody be given to the applicant. 21.  On 30 March 2007 the guardians made a fourth attempt to remove the child while he was at school. However, it was unsuccessful because the father had been notified by one of the guardians about the plan and thus did not bring the child to school on that day. 22.  The guardians scheduled the next attempt to remove the child for sometime between 6 and 26 April 2007; however, it did not take place as the applicant did not receive formal notification until 28 April 2007. On 19 July 2007 the Białystok Regional Court considered that the late notification given to the applicant had been in violation of the domestic law. 23.  On 27 August 2007 one of the guardians again attempted to remove the child; however, the child's father refused to open the door to the applicant and the guardian. 24.  In August 2007 the applicant's former husband went into hiding with the child, so the guardians could not notify him of the next planned action. Even so, they did not inform the Kolno District Prosecutor about this fact until 29 November 2007. Subsequently, the Białystok District Court ordered that the applicant's former husband be heard by the Łomża District Court; for an unknown reason this order has never been carried out. 25.  On 10 September 2007 the Białystok Regional Court dissolved the applicant's marriage. The court also decided to award the applicant full parental rights over J. It further found that the best interests of J. required that his place of residence be with his mother. The parental rights of the applicant's former husband were limited to decisions regarding the child's health and education. He was ordered to pay child maintenance and authorised to visit J. according to the arrangements set out in the judgment. The court considered that the applicant's former husband had been manipulating the child and alienating J. from his mother and other members of his family. 26.  The applicant's husband lodged an appeal against the judgment. 27.  Since September 2007 the applicant's child has not been attending school. On 5 December 2007 the applicant was fined for not fulfilling J.'s educational obligations. It appears that the decision was later quashed. 28.  On 15 October 2007 the applicant received a reply from the President of the Białystok Regional Court to another of her complaints about the guardians' inefficiency. The President considered that some delays had been caused by the father's obstructive attitude but also by a lack of co-operation between the applicant and the guardians. Nevertheless, the last action by one of the guardians, which had taken place on 30 August 2007, had shown a lack of diligence, and the guardian had been instructed to make better use of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (Article 598¹¹). 29.  On 28 February 2008 the Białystok Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) upheld the divorce judgment and dismissed the applicant's husband's appeal as manifestly ill-founded. The judgment is final. 30.  On 14 April 2008 the Białystok District Court decided to discontinue the proceedings concerning the enforcement of the court's order of 24 May 2006. It found that the enforcement proceedings had lost their legal basis in the light of the final judgment pronouncing the applicant's divorce. On 17 June 2008 the Białystok Regional Court quashed that decision. The court considered that the enforcement proceedings should be continued since parental rights had been awarded to the applicant and she wished the proceedings aiming at the enforcement of the court's decisions to be continued. Moreover, the child remained in the care of an unauthorised person. 31.  On 14 August 2008 the President of the Bialystok Regional Court again replied to the applicant's complaints that the enforcement proceedings were taking too long. The President informed the applicant that he would be personally overseeing the enforcement proceedings. He also stated that “the enforcement is still not effective and incorrect procedural decisions have again been taken, which have led to the proceedings being unnecessarily protracted”. 32.  On an unspecified later date the applicant's former husband applied to be granted custody of J and to change the decision limiting his parental rights. 33.  On 2 April 2009 the Bialystok District Court, sitting in camera, gave a temporary order in which it decided that, until the matter of custody was re-examined on the merits, the child's place of residence should be with his father. The court pointed to the fact that the child had been living with his father prior to the divorce proceedings and had very few ties with his mother. The court took into consideration that the child, who was eleven years old, had expressed his preference to live with his father. Moreover, the court considered that J. had been having contact with the applicant and that remaining temporarily with his father would be in his best interest. 34.  The applicant appealed against the decision, complaining that she had not been informed of the proceedings to change the custody order instituted by her former husband and that the decision had been issued without holding a hearing. She maintained that the child's father had not been properly caring for J. and had not fulfilled the court's orders. 35.  On 13 May 2009 the Bialystok Regional Court upheld the decision and dismissed the applicant's appeal. The court held that it had been necessary to legalise the existing status quo as J. had been in the care of his father since 2006. 36.  To date J. has not been removed from his father's care. Prior to 2 April 2009, that had been in breach of the interim order of 24 May 2006 and the final divorce judgment of 10 September 2007. During that time, the applicant had only had infrequent contact with J., always in public places and in the presence of the child's father.


4.  The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Belgium. 5.  On 20 March 1998 the applicant was arrested and taken into custody by police officers at the Diyarbakır Security Directorate on suspicion of his involvement in the activities of an illegal organisation. 6.  On 22 March 1998 the applicant was brought before a judge at the Diyarbakır State Security Court who ordered his release pending trial. 7.  On 4 May 1998 the public prosecutor at the İzmir State Security Court filed a bill of indictment accusing the applicant of membership of an illegal organisation, namely the PKK. He requested that the applicant be convicted and sentenced under Article 168 § 2 of the Criminal Code and Article 5 of Law no. 3713. 8.  On 15 September 1998 the İzmir State Security Court joined the trial of the applicant to the ongoing trial of four other accused. Throughout the proceedings the applicant was represented by a lawyer. 9.  On 15 December 1998 the İzmir State Security Court, relying on the applicant's statement to the police, the witness testimonies of other suspects as well as other evidence, convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to twelve years and six months' imprisonment. This judgment was upheld by the Court of Cassation on 1 July 1999. 10.  Following the decision of the Court of Cassation the applicant fled to Belgium where he successfully applied for asylum. 11.  The applicant submitted that on 17 August 2005 he was arrested and taken into custody in Spain on the basis of a Red Notice issued by Turkey via Interpol on the ground of his original indictment in July 1999 and his subsequent case before the Court. He was released the next day since he had been granted asylum by Belgium. The Government denied the existence of any such notice. 12.  The Government further submitted that the applicant's sentence had been reduced to six years and three months' imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of the new Criminal Code.


10.  The applicant company, which conducted business within the textile industry, was not a member of any employers' association. Thus, it was not automatically bound by any collective bargaining agreement (kollektivavtal) negotiated in the industry, and had not signed any such agreement of its own volition. It had about twenty employees two of whom were members of the Industrial Union (Industrifacket; hereinafter “the union”), an affiliated member of the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (Landsorganisationen; hereinafter “the LO”). 11.  In the spring of 1997 the union requested negotiations with the applicant company with a view to concluding a collective agreement. Such negotiations were held on 13 May 1997. The minutes of the negotiations stated, inter alia, that the applicant company was not interested in reaching an agreement at that time but would consider the matter. The minutes also recorded that the parties had concluded that the salaries paid by the applicant company were higher than the minimum wage stipulated in the collective agreement proposed by the union. 12.  In a subsequent written exchange the applicant company stated that it had no intention of concluding a collective agreement with the union. 13.  Soon thereafter the union demanded that the applicant company sign the so-called IG agreement (IG-avtalet), a collective agreement specially conceived by the union for employers who were not members of an employers' association. The applicant company declined, stating that its terms of employment were considerably more favourable to the employees than those stipulated in the IG agreement, that the existing employment contracts were perfectly adequate and that the employees belonging to the union objected to the union intervening on their behalf. However, it offered to sign a collective agreement with the union incorporating its existing terms of employment. The union rejected this proposal and announced that it might take industrial action. 14.  On 3 October 1997 the union gave the applicant company formal notice (varsel) that it would take action by ordering the cessation of all work at the company and by imposing a “blockade” on the company from 13 October onwards unless an agreement had been reached before that date. 15.  On 17 October 1997 the applicant company instituted proceedings against the union in the Stockholm District Court (tingsrätt), claiming that the threatened industrial action was unlawful and that the union should be ordered to withdraw the notice. The applicant company also requested that the District Court make an interim order to that effect. 16.  On 20 October 1997 the union took the industrial action. It lasted only one day. The notice remained effective, however. 17.  Negotiations were thereafter held before the National Conciliation Board (Statens förlikningsmannaexpedition). The union stated that certain parts of the IG agreement were not negotiable. The applicant company indicated that it was considering joining an employers' association, the Swedish Textile and Clothing Industries' Association (Tekoindustrierna), to which the union responded that it would not take any further industrial action against the company. However, the applicant company did not join that association and the negotiations broke down. 18.  On 13 November 1997 the District Court rejected the applicant company's request for an interim order. 19.  In the substantive proceedings, the union claimed that the District Court had no jurisdiction to decide the dispute and that, instead, it should be referred to the Labour Court (Arbetsdomstolen), whose decision should be final. By a decision of 5 December 1997 the District Court, referring to chapter 2, section 1, subsection 4 of the Litigation in Labour Disputes Act (Lagen om rättegången i arbetstvister, 1974:371; hereinafter “the 1974 Act”) and section 41 of the Co-Determination at Work Act (Lagen om medbestämmande i arbetslivet, 1976:580; hereinafter “the 1976 Act”), agreed with the union and transferred the case to the Labour Court. 20.  Before the Labour Court, the applicant company claimed that the composition of the court which would determine the case should be restricted to professional judges – i.e. without members representing employers' and employees' interests – as it would otherwise not meet the requirement of objective impartiality under Article 6 of the Convention. 21.  On 14 January 1998 a bench of the Labour Court composed of members who did not represent labour market interests rejected the applicant company's claim, stating that at the main hearing of a case, the composition of the court had to be in accordance with chapter 3, section 6 of the 1974 Act. 22.  The Labour Court held a hearing in the case on 23 January 1998. 23.  The applicant company maintained that the industrial action taken by the union was aimed at forcing it to join an employers' association or to accept the collective IG agreement drawn up by the union. It stated that only two union members were employed at the company and both of them had declared that they did not want to take part in the industrial action. The applicant company also claimed that its terms of employment were more favourable than those stipulated in the IG agreement. Since the means employed by the union were not reasonably proportional to the aim sought to be achieved, the industrial action had violated the applicant company's right not to join an employers' association and thus its right to negative freedom of association under Article 11 of the Convention. Alternatively, the applicant company asserted that the industrial action conflicted with a general principle of proportionality which it maintained was applicable under Swedish law, as it could entail serious economic consequences for the company. 24.  For its part, the union claimed that, on the whole, the terms of employment provided by the applicant company were not more favourable than those contained in the IG agreement although it accepted that the salaries of its two members were higher than the minimum salary prescribed by that agreement. The union also stated that the IG agreement could be adapted to meet the special requirements of the applicant company. It further argued that the Convention was not applicable to the dispute as it only governed relations between individuals and the State and the 1976 Act was applicable as lex specialis. Alternatively, it asserted that Article 11 of the Convention did not afford any protection to a limited liability company and that, in any event, the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Gustafsson v. Sweden (judgment of 25 April 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-II, p. 637 et seq.) showed that Article 11 did not confer any right not to sign a collective agreement. As regards the industrial action that had been taken, the union stated that it served the legitimate aims of improving the employment situation for union members and protecting them in various ways and could not be considered disproportionate to those aims. The union also claimed that a general principle of proportionality, as invoked by the applicant company, could not be used to limit the constitutional right to take industrial action. In its submission, the right to take such action against employers who were not bound by collective agreements was in principle unlimited under Swedish law. 25.  By a judgment of 11 February 1998 the Labour Court found in favour of the union. Noting at the outset that the parties agreed that the industrial action in question was not unlawful under the 1976 Act, it went on to examine in detail whether it could involve a violation of the applicant company's right to negative freedom of association under Article 11 of the Convention, which had been part of Swedish law since its incorporation into domestic law on 1 January 1995.
First, the Labour Court rejected the union's preliminary objections as to the applicability of the Convention, as such, to the dispute at hand. It noted, inter alia, that the rules on industrial action in the 1976 Act – which were based on the constitutional principle that the right to take such action is unlimited unless otherwise provided by law – prescribed the situations in which such action would be unlawful. Thus, it could not be excluded that further restrictions on the right to take industrial action could follow from other legislation, including the Convention. The provisions of the 1976 Act, therefore, did not prevent Article 11 of the Convention from being applicable.
The Labour Court then went on to examine whether the industrial action had violated Article 11. It noted that the rationale behind the union's action was not to force the applicant company to join an employers' association but to conclude a collective agreement with it which, according to the union, would promote the economic interests of its members. Among other things, the proposed agreement prescribed that compensation be paid for overtime work, which, indisputably, was not the case under the applicant company's terms of employment. Having regard, inter alia, to the aforementioned judgment in the case of Gustafsson v. Sweden, the Labour Court concluded that the industrial action had not violated the applicant company's rights under Article 11. It found also that there was no basis in law for the applicant company's contention that a general principle of proportionality was applicable in labour disputes. 26.  The Labour Court which heard the case and delivered judgment was composed of seven members. In accordance with the 1974 Act, the Labour Court was composed of two legally trained and qualified judges and five lay assessors. One assessor had been appointed because of her special knowledge of the labour market. However, she did not represent any employers' or employees' interests. Of the other four assessors, two had been nominated by employers' associations (a director of the Swedish Employer's Confederation (Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen; hereinafter “the SAF”) and an employee of the Ministry of Finance representing the State employers) and two by employees' associations (ombudsmen in the LO and the joint Central Organisation of Salaried Employees and Central Organisation of Swedish Academics (Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation and Svenska Akademikers Centralorganisation; hereinafter “the TCO/SACO”), respectively). 27.  The member nominated by the SAF disagreed with the Labour Court's judgment and considered that the industrial action in question violated Article 11 of the Convention, as the union had failed to show that the terms of employment stipulated by the IG agreement were more favourable than those provided by the applicant company. 28.  Following the Labour Court's judgment, the union made a further approach to the applicant company with a view to concluding a collective agreement. The applicant company again refused but informed the union that the rules on overtime work set out in the IG agreement had been introduced at the company. 29.  On 23 February 1998 the union applied to the Labour Court for a declaratory judgment establishing the union's right to take immediate industrial action against the applicant company. It also requested the court to take an interim decision on this matter. 30.  The applicant company opposed the union's claims and again objected to the composition of the Labour Court. It also requested an order requiring the union to provide security for any damage the company might sustain. 31.  By a decision of 9 March 1998 the Labour Court, composed of members who did not represent labour market interests, rejected the applicant company's challenge to its impartiality on the same grounds as in its decision of 14 January 1998. 32.  Following a hearing on 12 March 1998, the Labour Court, by a decision of 13 March, granted the union's request for an interim declaration that the proposed industrial action was lawful. It thus rejected the applicant company's claims that the union's application was res judicata on account of its previous judgment and that the requirements under Swedish law for a declaratory decision – whether final or interim – were not met. It also rejected the applicant company's claim that the proposed action should be deemed unlawful as the rules on overtime work set out in the IG agreement had been introduced at the company – an assertion which was not confirmed by the union – and as the two union members had been dismissed owing to scarcity of work at the company. Referring to its established case-law, the Labour Court further found that the union, being an organisation, did not have to provide security. 33.  The composition of the Labour Court which heard and examined the union's claims was the same as for the judgment of 11 February 1998 (see paragraph 25 above), including two assessors nominated by employers' associations (another SAF director and the same employee of the Ministry of Finance) and two by employees' associations (a former vice-president of a trade union affiliated to the LO and a former head lawyer of a trade union affiliated to the TCO/SACO). 34.  The member nominated by the SAF submitted an opinion dissenting from the Labour Court's decision, on the ground that it was not perfectly clear that the proposed industrial action was lawful, for which reason the union's interim request should be rejected. 35.  The applicant company complained to the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen), requesting that the Labour Court's decision of 13 March 1998 be set aside owing to a grave procedural error (domvilla). It argued that the Labour Court could not rule on the union's request unless security had been furnished for the applicant company's potential loss. Alternatively, the applicant company's negative freedom of association had been breached as a consequence of the union having been afforded procedural privileges in its capacity as an organisation. On 26 March 1998 the Supreme Court refused the applicant company's request, finding that it had not established any grounds for quashing the Labour Court's decision. 36.  It would appear that the union proceeded with industrial action on 6 April 1998. Supportive industrial action was also taken by other trade unions. On 8 April the applicant company joined the Swedish Textile and Clothing Industries' Association and thus became bound by a collective agreement. The union's own industrial action was immediately suspended but supportive action by another trade union lasted over the Easter weekend until 13 April. 37.  On 30 April 1998, following a settlement between the applicant company and the union and the latter's withdrawal of the application it had lodged on 23 February 1998, the Labour Court struck the proceedings out of its list. 38.  Due to declining profitability, the applicant company went into voluntary liquidation in June 1998. By a decision of 17 June the District Court of Nacka declared the applicant company insolvent. On 30 March 2001 the winding up was terminated and the applicant company dissolved.


4.  The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Roubaix. 5.  On 21 March 2002 the applicant was arrested by the police on the public highway and taken in the course of the evening to Lommelet de Saint-André Psychiatric Hospital, where she was compulsorily admitted at the request of a third party.
The Government submitted that the applicant had been “picked up” on the public highway by a police officer who had asked for her to be admitted to hospital. They added that her admission had been ordered on the basis of two medical certificates issued by different doctors to the effect that she required hospital treatment.
The applicant disputed that account and stated that she had been arrested while cycling to the shops and taken to the police station, where she had promptly been examined by a doctor who had been requisitioned to draw up a medical certificate for her admission to hospital. 6.  She submitted that after her admission at the hospital she had immediately been undressed and made to lie down with all four limbs attached to the bedposts in a seclusion cell, without being given any explanation. She had not undergone a medical examination on arrival but had been injected with unknown substances. She had remained in that position for five days, and was released only briefly at mealtimes. 7.  She remained in the hospital until 8 April 2002, without being allowed to receive visits or to make or receive telephone calls. 8.  In the meantime, on 23 March 2002, the applicant's mother applied by registered letter to the President of the Lille tribunal de grande instance for her daughter's immediate discharge. The parties have been unable to establish the date on which the letter was received. However, in a letter of 8 April 2002, Lille State Counsel replied that he was not empowered to deal with the subject matter of her correspondence and that her daughter was required to apply directly to him to be discharged.
On 28 March 2002 Afcap in turn applied to the President of the Lille tribunal de grande instance for the applicant's immediate discharge. 9.  On 22 April 2002 State Counsel's Office decided to take no further action on that application as it was devoid of purpose. 10.  Neither the President of the Lille tribunal de grande instance nor the judge responsible for matters relating to personal liberties and detention (juge des libertés et de la détention – “the liberties and detention judge”) ever gave a ruling on the applications.


4.  The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Naples. 5.  He is the owner of a flat in Naples, which she had let to G.M. 6.  In a registered letter of 8 April 1987, the applicant informed the tenant that she intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1987 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date. 7.  In a writ served on the tenant on 23 March 1988, the applicant reiterated her intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Naples Magistrate. 8.  By a decision of 17 June 1988, which was made enforceable on 5 July 1988, the Naples Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 4 May 1992. 9.  On 16 December 1992, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 10.  On 13 January 1993, she informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 21 January 1993. 11.  Between 21 January 1993 and 4 February 2000, the bailiff made fifteen attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 12.  On 30 November 2000, the applicant recovered possession of the flat.