4.  The applicant was born in 1925 and lives in Zagreb. 5.  On 11 December 2000 the public utility company V.O., basing its case on unpaid bills for water supply services, instituted enforcement proceedings against the applicant in the Zagreb Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zagrebu) seeking payment of the debt. 6.  On 24 January 2001 the Court issued a writ of execution (rješenje o ovrsi) ordering the applicant to pay the amounts sought. However, since the applicant challenged the writ by objecting to it on 19 March 2001, the court set it aside. As a consequence, the enforcement proceedings were, pursuant to the relevant legislation, transformed into, and resumed as, regular civil proceedings. 7.  The applicant, who has a formal education as a lawyer but is not an advocate, represented himself in the proceedings. 8.  On 15 November 2005 judge J.G.F. of the Zagreb Municipal Court delivered a judgment ruling for the plaintiff. 9.  On 27 December 2005 the applicant appealed against the first‑instance judgment. Section 357 of the Civil Procedure Act provides that an appeal to a second-instance court has to be lodged through a first‑instance court. Under section 358 of the same Act the first-instance court conducts a preliminary examination of the appeal and may declare it inadmissible if it finds that it does not meet certain procedural requirements, for example if it finds that it was lodged outside the statutory time-limit. It is, however, not authorised to decide on the merits of the appeal. Therefore, the applicant submitted his appeal intended for Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu) to Zagreb Municipal Court. In his appeal he wrote, inter alia:
“After twenty months of waiting ... on 15 November 2005 the second hearing was held, at which, in substance and without hearing [the parties] (apart from stating that the parties were present and that they maintained their positions) the impugned judgment was rendered.
It is indicative to mention here that the judge, before dictating the operative provisions of the judgment, asked the defendant whether ‘he would pay this’ to which the defendant replied ‘where did you get that idea?’ [‘što Vam pada na pamet? ‘]and asked whether she had examined the case file.... The judge angrily turned sideways in her chair and dictated the operative provisions of the judgment in the name of the Republic of Croatia to the typist, using a funny expression [navodeći komičan izraz] that the parties were asking for a reasoned judgment – as if in adversarial proceedings judgments without reasons or instruction on remedies available against them existed. Unfortunately, the court did not record these dialogues between the judge and the defendant in the minutes. What judicial professionalism this is! [Kakva li je ovo sudačka profesionalnost!]
It is evident from the above-mentioned that in these proceedings no hearing was held in accordance with the law, which amounts to breaches of section 354 paragraph 2 subparagraphs 6 and 11 of the Civil Procedure Act. Apart from this, from the contested judgment or the transcripts of the hearings it cannot be discerned whether the court took any evidence ... for which reason the judgment could not be satisfactorily reasoned ...
Instead of referring to the evidence taken and assessing its evidentiary value, the court immediately ... states on what basis it arrived at the contested findings, from which it is clear that it accepted all arguments of the plaintiff ...” 10.  After it carried out the preliminary examination of the appeal, Zagreb Municipal Court forwarded it together with the case file to Zagreb County Court. 11.  On 3 April 2007 Judge M.P. at Zagreb County Court delivered a judgment dismissing the applicant’s appeal and upholding the first-instance judgment. 12.  On 24 July 2007 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the second-instance judgment. On 21 January 2010 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) declared his constitutional complaint inadmissible. It found that even though the applicant relied in his constitutional complaint on the relevant Articles of the Constitution guaranteeing the right to a fair hearing and equality before the law, he had not substantiated his complaint by any constitutional law arguments but had merely repeated the arguments raised in the proceedings before the ordinary courts. Therefore, the Constitutional Court had been unable to examine the merits of his constitutional complaint. 13.  After it had completed the preliminary examination of the applicant’s appeal of 27 December 2005 in the above proceedings, on 4 January 2006 Judge J.G.F. at Zagreb Municipal Court issued a decision whereby it fined the applicant 500 Croatian kunas (HRK) for contempt of court. The relevant part of the decision read as follows:
“I.  The defendant Nikola Žugić from Zagreb ... is hereby fined 500 [Croatian] kunas because in his appeal of 27 December 2005 he insulted the court by stating: ‘It is indicative to mention here that the judge, before dictating the operative provisions of the judgment, asked the defendant whether ‘he would pay this’, to which the defendant replied ‘where did you get that idea?’ and asked whether she had examined the case file.... The judge angrily turned sideways in her chair and dictated the operative provisions of the judgment in the name of the Republic of Croatia to the typist, using a funny expression that the parties were asking for a reasoned judgment – as if in adversarial proceedings judgments without reasons or instruction on remedies available against them existed. Unfortunately, the court did not record these dialogues between the judge and the defendant in the minutes. What judicial professionalism this is!’
...
In the appeal of 27 December 2005 the defendant, insulted the court by, inter alia, [using] the words quoted in the operative provisions of this decision.
It would follow from the quoted text that during the main hearing the court communicated with the parties in an improper way, that the judge behaved improperly and that she does not know the law. All this constitutes contempt of court and the statements quoted exceed the limits of necessary respect for the court, even attempting to call into question the knowledge and expertise of the judge at issue, which is an impermissible way for the parties to communicate with the court because it represents a direct insult to the judge as a person, implying that she is ignorant and incompetent to exercise the duty of a judge.
When imposing the fine the court took into account the fact that the defendant insulted not only the court as an institution, but also the judge as a person, on account of which he had to be fined pursuant to section 110 taken in conjunction with section 10 of the [Civil Procedure Act].” 14.  On 16 January 2006 the applicant lodged an appeal against that decision arguing, inter alia, that his statements had been arbitrarily interpreted by the first-instance court, that they had not been insulting, and that he had not had any intention of insulting anyone. 15.  By a decision of 3 April 2007 Judge M.P. at Zagreb County Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the first-instance decision. The relevant part of that decision read as follows:
“In this court’s view, the finding of the first-instance court that in his appeal the defendant insulted the court by making the above statements is correct ... It is to be noted that by the statements made in the appeal the defendant demonstrated disrespect for the court, which undoubtedly represents an improper way for the parties to communicate with the court, and exceeds the limits of a civilised and fair relationship with the court as an institution of a society.” 16.  On 24 July 2007 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the second-instance decision. On 25 October 2007 the Constitutional Court declared his constitutional complaint inadmissible on the ground that the contested decision did not concern the merits of the case and as such was not susceptible to constitutional review. 17.  On 21 May 2008 the Zagreb Municipal Court of its own motion issued a writ of execution by garnishment of a part of the applicant’s pension with a view to collecting the above fine. The applicant appealed and the proceedings are currently pending before the Zagreb County Court.


4.  The applicants were born in 1961, 1974, 1971, 1974, 1967, 1962 and 1967 respectively. The first two applicants live in İzmit. The third applicant lives in Germany and the remainder of the applicants reside in İstanbul. 5.  On 11 January 1998 around 350-400 people gathered at the Ümraniye Sarıgazi Cemevi[1] to commemorate the death of members of the TKP‑ML/TIKKO.[2] The commemoration turned into a violent clash between some of the participants and the security forces. Thirty-five people were arrested, including the applicants. The applicants were first taken to Sarıgazi Gendarmerie. Later on the same day they were transferred to the İstanbul Provincial Gendarmerie Command as there was not enough space at the Sarıgazi Gendarmerie. 6.  On various dates between 11 January and 14 January 1998 two gendarmes at Sarıgazi Gendarmerie, Mr E.G. and Mr Ö. K. took the applicants’ statements with the exception of Ercan Başkan who stated that he wished to give his statement before a prosecutor. 7.  On 15 January 1998 the applicants were released pending trial. 8.  On various occasions between 12 and 15 January 1998 the applicants were medically examined. 9.  On 12 January 1998 the applicant was examined by a doctor, Dr O.A. at Sarıyer State Hospital who noted that he had a slight ecchymosis on his nose and an ecchymosis of 5x4 cm on his right tibia. 10.  On 15 January 1998 the applicant was examined by another doctor, Dr Ç.A. at Sarıyer State Hospital. This doctor noted that he had an ecchymosis on his right tibia and right femoral region and a number of old ecchymoses on various parts of his back. Dr Ç.A. mentioned that the applicant complained of pain in his chest. 11.  On the same day, the Üsküdar Forensic Medicine Department (hereinafter: “FM department”), relying on the aforementioned medical reports, concluded that the injuries rendered the applicant unfit for work for a week. 12.  On 13 January 1998 the applicant was examined by Dr O.A. who noted grazes on the skin of his right knee joint. 13.  On 15 January 1998 the applicant was examined by Dr Ç.A. who found no signs of ill-treatment on his body. 14.  On the same day, the FM department, referring to the aforementioned medical reports, concluded that the injuries rendered the applicant unfit for work for three days. 15.  On 13 January 1998 the applicant was examined by two doctors at Şişli Etfal Hospital. The first doctor noted an ecchymosis of 10x10 cm and 3x3 cm as well as pain and sensitivity on the right and the left of his lower back respectively. The second doctor found widespread ecchymoses on the right side of the back. 16.  On 15 January 1998 the applicant was examined by Dr Ç.A. who found no signs of ill-treatment on his body. 17.  On the same day, the FM department, taking into account the medical reports dated 13 January 1998, concluded that the injuries rendered the applicant unfit for work for a week. 18.  On 13 January 1998 the applicant was examined by Dr O.A. who noted a graze on the skin of the left knee joint. 19.  On 15 January 1998 the applicant was examined by Dr Ç.A. who found no signs of ill-treatment on his body. 20.  On the same day, the FM department, referring to the medical report of 13 January 1998, concluded that the injuries rendered the applicant unfit for work for 3 days. 21.  On 12 January 1998 the applicant was examined by Dr A.T. who noted that he had pain in his right periorbital region (around the eyes) and left leg. The doctor found a slight ecchymosis on the right periorbital region. 22.  On 15 January 1998 the applicant was examined by Dr Ç.A. who found no signs of ill-treatment on his body. 23.  On the same day, the FM department, in view of the medical report of 12 January 1998, concluded that the injuries rendered the applicant unfit for work for a week. 24.  On 13 January 1998 the applicant was examined by Dr O.A. who found a traumatic ecchymosis on her right femoral (thigh) region and left scapula (shoulder blade). He transferred her to Şişli Etfal Hospital where she was examined by two doctors. The first doctor found a traumatic ecchymosis on top of her right femoral region, on top of her left scapula and underneath her right scapula. He noted that the applicant had pain in her neck and right crural region (back of upper legs). The second doctor (an orthopaedist) found an ecchymosis of 7x10 cm on the right lateral side of the femur region as well as subjective pain in this region. No pathology was noted in the X-rays. 25.  On 15 January 1998 the applicant was examined by Dr Ç.A who indicated that the applicant complained of numbness in her right arm and legs. He found that the applicant had ecchymoses on her right femoral region and left scapula region. He further noted a number of ecchymoses on her back. The doctor concluded that these lesions were old. 26.  On the same day, the FM department, as a result of the medical reports of 13 and 15 January 1998, concluded that the injuries rendered the applicant unfit for work for a week. 27.  On 13 January 1998 the applicant was examined by two doctors at Şişli Etfal Hospital. According to the two medical reports issued on the same day the applicant had a superficial graze on the left side of his nose and his left eyebrows. His left cheek was swollen. The applicant’s scalp had multiple hyperaemic areas and he had an ecchymosis of 5x7 cm on his left gluteal region (buttocks) and multiple superficial grazes on the inside of his femoral region. Dr U.D. noted that the applicant complained of pain in his scrotum and penis. However, he found no ecchymoses, laceration or hyperaemia in the anal region. 28.  On 15 January 1998 the applicant was examined by Dr Ç.A. who found no signs of ill-treatment on his body. 29.  On the same day, the FM department, in view of the medical reports dated 13 January 1998, concluded that the injuries rendered the applicant unfit for work for a week. 30.  On 15 January 1998 the applicant, Mr Başkan was bought before the Üsküdar public prosecutor where he denied the accusations against him. In particular, he submitted that he had been subjected to ill-treatment while he was held in custody. He claimed that they had inserted a truncheon in his anus, hit his penis with a stick and squeezed his testicles. In addition, he alleged that they put a plastic bag over his head and that he was blindfolded and threatened. 31.  On the same day, the applicants were brought before the Üsküdar Criminal Court of First Instance where they refuted the accusations that they had taken part in the violent clash on 11 January 1998. In particular, Mr Hazırcı stated that he was coerced to sign the deposition taken by the security forces. Mr İyit[4] and Mr Başkan said that their statements given to the security forces were not true. Ms Uluk stated that her police deposition was not given of her own free will and that they tore up her initial statement and re‑wrote, and made her sign, another one. She also stated that she had been sexually harassed and given electric shocks. The court ordered their release. 32.  On the same day, the representatives of the thirty-five people arrested, including the applicants, submitted a petition to the Üsküdar public prosecutor’s office claiming that their clients had been subjected to ill‑treatment during their interrogation, that they had not been properly medically examined and that they had also been subjected to ill‑treatment after their medical examination. They submitted that their clients had been beaten and deprived of food. They requested an urgent medical examination. 33.  The Üsküdar public prosecutor decided to transfer the applicants to the Haydarpaşa Numune Hospital for a medical examination. According to the report drafted by the prosecutor at the Üsküdar Criminal Court of First Instance on 15 January 1998, the complainants left the court house after the hearing despite his request,and therefore could not be taken to a hospital for a medical examination. 34.  On an unspecified date, the Üsküdar public prosecutor decided that his office lacked competence ratione loci and transferred the case file to the Şişli public prosecutor’s office on 29 January 1998. 35.  On 13 February 1998 Mr T.O., the prosecutor at the Şişli public prosecutor’s office, requested the identities of the gendarmes who had participated in the interrogation of the complainants. 36.  On 11 March 1998 the İstanbul Provincial Gendarmerie Command informed the Şişli public prosecutor’s office that Mr E.G. and Mr Ö.K. were the gendarmes who had interrogated the complainants. 37.  On 8 July 1998 Mr E.G. and Mr Ö.K. were heard by a prosecutor. They denied the accusations against them. 38.  On 15 July 1998 the prosecutor, Mr T.O. gave a decision of non‑prosecution against Mr E.G. and Mr Ö.K. on the ground that there was no evidence that they had ill-treated the complainants during interrogation. The prosecutor considered that the physical findings noted in the medical reports were the result of lawful use of force by the gendarmes during arrest. 39.  The applicants’ objection against this decision was dismissed by the 2nd Chamber of the Beyoğlu Assize Court on 29 September 1999. 40.  On 6 July 1998 the applicants, with the exception of Mr Balçık, filed an official complaint with the Üsküdar public prosecutor’s office against the gendarmes at the İstanbul Provincial Gendarmerie Command. They submitted that, on various dates, they had been tortured by plain clothes officers. 41.  On 21 October 1998 Mr T.E., another prosecutor at the Şişli public prosecutor’s office, decided that there was no need to investigate the applicants’ allegations of ill-treatment since the matter had been investigated and a decision not to prosecute Mr Ö.K. and Mr E. G. had already been given in this respect. 42.  The applicants objected. They submitted that they did not know that an investigation into their allegations had been held, or that a decision of non-prosecution had been rendered, as the decision had never been served on them. They further stated that, in any event, they were subjected to ill-treatment at the İstanbul Provincial Gendarmerie Command and not at the Sarıgazi Gendarmerie where Mr Ö.K. and Mr E. G. were stationed. 43.  On 11 June 1999 the First Chamber of the Beyoğlu Assize Court dismissed the applicants’ objection. 44.  The criminal proceedings instigated against the applicants in respect of their involvement in the violent clashes on 11 January 1998 ended with their acquittal. 45.  According to the report issued by the Human Rights Association of Turkey on 14 November 2003, Mr Başkan applied to them on 7 May 1998 for treatment. He gave a description of the alleged ill-treatment he had been subjected to while held in custody in 1994, 1995, and 1996 and in January 1998 at the İstanbul Provincial Gendarmerie Command. The report indicates that the applicant was diagnosed as suffering from gingivitis, sinusitis and haemorrhoids and was given appropriate treatment.


6.  The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in the town of Artyom, in the Primorye Region. 7.  The applicant is a Kyrgyz national of Uzbek ethnic origin. He originally lived in the town of Osh in Kyrgyzstan. 8.  In June 2010, which was a time of mass disorders and interethnic clashes in the region, the applicant had been the head of the territorial board of a municipal authority in which most residents were ethnic Uzbeks. He was, according to him, considered as a leader of the local Uzbek community. 9.  After the clashes, the applicant had repeatedly been invited by the Kyrgyz investigative bodies for questioning as a witness. 10.  In June 2011 the applicant learned that criminal proceedings had been opened against him (see paragraph 12 below). The applicant submits that law-enforcement officers started to extort money from him, threatening him with imprisonment. Due to this he moved to a different city in Kyrgyzstan, to his sister’s home, where he stayed for several months. 11.  Afterwards, in March 2012, the applicant left Kyrgyzstan for Russia. He settled in the Primorye Region, and after obtaining a work permit, worked as a sports instructor. 12.  On 16 June 2011 the Kyrgyz authorities charged the applicant with the commission of violent crimes in June 2010 (attempted murder, participation in mass disorders and unlawful firearms trafficking) and ordered his arrest. It appears that when the authorities eventually tried to execute the arrest order, the applicant had left the country (see paragraphs 10 and 11 above). The applicant was therefore put on the international wanted list. 13.  On 14 March 2013 the applicant was arrested in Russia and detained in custody pending extradition 14.  On 5 April 2013 the Kyrgyz authorities lodged an extradition request with the Prosecutor General of Russia, asking that the applicant be extradited to Kyrgyzstan for prosecution and trial. 15.  On 16 September 2013 the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office granted the extradition request and ordered the applicant’s extradition. 16.  The applicant appealed, arguing that due to his Uzbek ethnic origin the aforementioned decision would expose him to a serious risk of torture. The applicant supported his appeal through reference, inter alia, to various UN sources, NGOs’ reports and the judgment of the Court in the case of Makhmudzhan Ergashev (see Makhmudzhan Ergashev v. Russia, no. 49747/11, 16 October 2012). 17.  On 1 November 2013 the Primorye Regional Court rejected the applicant’s appeal against the extradition order, giving the following reasoning:
“The charges pressed against [the applicant] [by Kyrgyz authorities] are criminal offences liable to punishment in Russia ... They are not time-barred ...
Pursuant to Article 464 § 1 (1) of the Russian Code of Criminal Procedure, an extradition request lodged by a foreign state in respect of a Russian citizen should be denied ...
It is apparent from the conclusions of the Federal Migration Service (FMS) for the Primorye Region that [the applicant] is not a Russian citizen. ... He holds a Kyrgyz passport ... and is a Kyrgyz national. ...
On 28 June 2013 the FMS for Prymorye Region rejected a request from [the applicant] for refugee status in Russia.
[The applicant’s] allegations of persecution by the Kyrgyz authorities on false criminal charges on the basis of his [Uzbek] ethnic origin were addressed [within the refugee status procedure].
The lawfulness of the refusal [to grant the applicant refugee status in Russia] was confirmed by Russia’s FMS on 24 September 2013 ...
[The applicant’s] argument [that] the decision to extradite him was taken before any judicial review of the refusal to grant him refugee status is groundless.
It is apparent from the evidential material gathered during the extradition check that [the applicant] arrived in Russia ... for employment purposes and that he had not been persecuted in Kyrgyzstan on racial, national or religious grounds ...
It is likewise apparent from the evidential material gathered during the extradition check that [the applicant] lodged his request for refugee status on 16 April 2013, while being held in custody following his arrest in Russia ... , [therefore] his appeal against the decision of the FMS did not prevent the Prosecutor General’s Office from taking a decision concerning extradition, in line with ruling no. 11 of 14 June 2012 of the Plenary Session of the Russian Supreme Court ...
[The applicant] does not have immunity from prosecution [and] there are no grounds preventing his extradition.
The Prosecutor General’s Office of Kyrgyzstan provided assurances that [in the event of extradition] [the applicant] would have the benefit of [legal assistance]; that he would not be extradited to a third State; that he would be prosecuted only for the offence for which he was being extradited; that [he] would not be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; that he was being prosecuted for an ordinary criminal offence devoid of any political character or discrimination on any grounds; that he would be able to freely leave Kyrgyzstan after he had stood trial and served a sentence; and that Russian diplomats would be allowed access to him.
It is apparent from the above guarantees that [the applicant] is being prosecuted for ordinary criminal offences; his prosecution is not politically motivated and is not connected with his [ethnic origin].
[The applicant’s] allegations concerning his persecution on political grounds, lack of fair trial in Kyrgyzstan, and persecution of his family members by law-enforcement bodies in Kyrgyzstan are not supported by any objective data.
The court has established that [the applicant’s] wife and daughter live in Kyrgyzstan, [that there is] no substantiated information concerning their alleged persecution by the Kyrgyz authorities, [and] that they do not travel outside the territory of the Kyrgyz Republic. [The applicant himself] did not apply for refugee status until his arrest.
... The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not have any information that would prevent [the applicant’s] extradition to Kyrgyzstan.
Therefore, there are no grounds ... preventing [the applicant’s] extradition to Kyrgyzstan for criminal prosecution.
The argument of [the applicant’s] lawyer referring to international sources (report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture, report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on technical assistance and cooperation on human rights for Kyrgyzstan, report of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, International Crisis Group Kyrgyzstan report) to the effect that after the interethnic clashes in the south of Kyrgyzstan in June 2010 the law‑enforcement bodies had subjected ethnic Uzbeks to torture and that there are grounds to believe that [the applicant] might be subjected to torture in the event of his extradition, is unsubstantiated. The aforementioned international documents describe the general human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan, are unspecific and unsupported by evidence, and are countered by the guarantees offered by Kyrgyz Republic, which relate directly to the applicant and are sufficient to eliminate the risk of [the applicant’s] being subjected to inhuman treatment.
[As to] the reference by the defence to ... the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Makhmudzhan Ergashev, [the case] has no connection with [the applicant’s] case and cannot be taken into consideration.
...” 18.  The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court of Russia. 19.  In the meantime, on 28 January 2014 the Court indicated to the Government, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, that the applicant should not be extradited or otherwise involuntarily removed from Russia to Kyrgyzstan or another country for the duration of the proceedings before the Court. 20.  On 30 January 2014 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of 1 November 2013 on appeal, endorsing the reasoning of the first-instance court:
“The court has taken into consideration the arguments of the defence and the documents submitted, including the concluding observations of the UN Committee against Torture [dated December 2013] on Kyrgyzstan’s second periodic report, in which the Committee expressed its deep concern with regard to apparent impunity regarding widespread acts of torture and ill-treatment that remained uninvestigated by the authorities of the Kyrgyz Republic ... and the report that the investigations, persecutions, convictions and punishments in connection with the events of June 2010 are mainly directed at persons of Uzbek ethnic origin.
At the same time, these circumstances cannot in themselves be considered to constitute sufficient grounds for refusing to extradite [the applicant] to the Kyrgyz Republic ...
Pursuant to Article 3 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 10 December 1984, no State Party shall expel, return or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be at risk of being subjected to torture. For the purpose of determining whether such grounds exist, the competent authorities must take into account all relevant considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights.
...
The provisions of Article 3 of the Convention against Torture imply that it is necessary not only to verify the existence in the State concerned of gross and mass violations of human rights, but also the existence in that State of the likelihood that the individual concerned would personally be at risk of torture if returned to his or her country. That risk must be real, immediate and foreseeable.
According to the legal position of the UN Committee against Torture as outlined in a number of its decisions (...), the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights in a country does not of itself constitute sufficient grounds for determining whether the person in question would be at risk of being subjected to torture upon return to that country. Additional grounds must be adduced showing that the individual concerned would be personally at risk ...
The Committee ... noted that it is necessary to establish the existence of substantial grounds for believing that the person would be at risk of torture if returned, and that such risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. The risk need not be highly probable, but it must be personal and present. In this regard the Committee has determined, in previous decisions, that the risk of torture must be foreseeable, real and personal.
The evidential material submitted by the Prosecutor General’s Office – on the basis of which the decision to extradite [the applicant] was taken – does not contain any information demonstrating that [the latter] personally would be at risk of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the event of his extradition.
[A long passage on the guarantees provided by the Kyrgyz authorities].
Neither [the applicant] nor his lawyers provided any substantial evidence showing that [the former] was at risk of being subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment by the Kyrgyz authorities, or that he might be persecuted on grounds [such as] race, religion, national or social origin, or political opinion.
... [The applicant] does not belong to any political or other party, organisation or group that opposes [the present government of Kyrgyzstan].
While living in Kyrgyzstan [the applicant] was not subjected to any torture, inhuman or degrading treatment by the authorities; he arrived in Russia in March 2012, that is to say a year and nine months after the crimes of which he stands accused had been committed in June 2010. [The applicant’s] wife and daughter remain in the Kyrgyz Republic.
No evidence has [therefore] been provided showing that [the applicant] or his relatives were persecuted by [the Kyrgyz] authorities.
[The applicant’s] statement to the effect that he is a “leader of Uzbek diaspora” and belongs to the ethnic Uzbeks – which allegedly gives him reason to believe that he would be subjected to repressive criminal prosecution and unfair conviction – is an assumption unsupported by any evidence. It cannot therefore be considered to constitute sufficient grounds for concluding that he is personally at risk of being subjected to torture and other ill-treatment in the event of his extradition to Kyrgyzstan.
...” 21.  On 16 March 2013 the Artyom Town Court in the Primorye Region ordered the applicant’s detention pending extradition until 23 April 2013. 22.  On 22 April 2013 the same court extended the applicant’s detention until 14 September 2013. On the same day the applicant’s lawyer lodged an appeal against this decision. On 12 July 2013 the Primorye Regional Court upheld the extension order on appeal. 23.  On 13 September 2013 the Leninskiy District Court of Vladivostok extended the applicant’s detention until 13 March 2014. On 19 September 2013 the applicant’s lawyer lodged an appeal against this decision. The appeal was dispatched by post on 20 September 2013. The Leninskiy District Court received the applicant’s appeal on 21 October 2013. On 23 October 2013 a copy of the appeal was forwarded to the applicant and the local prosecutor’s office, and the latter was invited to submit comments by 28 October 2013. On 31 October 2013 the Leninskiy District Court forwarded the case file to the Primorye Regional Court for examination. On 6 November 2013 an appeal hearing was scheduled for 7 November 2013 and the parties were informed accordingly. On 7 November 2013 the Primorye Regional Court upheld the extension order of 13 September 2013 on appeal. 24.  On 7 March 2014 the deputy Prosecutor of the Primorye Region decided to release the applicant in the light of the decision of the Court to apply Rule 39 of the Rules of Court to the present case. The applicant was released on the same day. 25.  On 16 April 2013 the applicant lodged a request for refugee status with Russia’s FMS, alleging persecution on the grounds of ethnic origin. 26.  On 28 June 2013 the FMS for the Primorye Region rejected the applicant’s request, having found that the applicant had left his country of nationality for reasons falling outside the scope of section 1(1)(1) of the Refugee Act. 27.  On 24 September 2013 Russia’s FMS upheld the refusal of 28 June 2013. 28.  The applicant lodged an appeal against the above decision before the Basmanniy District Court of Moscow. In his appeal he referred to reports concerning the widespread ill-treatment of Uzbek detainees in Kyrgyzstan, as confirmed by various UN sources, NGOs’ reports and the judgment of the Court in the case of Makhmudzhan Ergashev. 29.  On 22 January 2014 the Basmanniy District Court of Moscow rejected the applicant’s appeal against the FMS’s decisions. The District Court considered that the applicant had failed to substantiate his fears of persecution in Kyrgyzstan and that his allegations that the criminal charges against him were unlawful fell outside the scope of the refugee status proceedings. The District Court pointed out that his application for refugee status contained no indications that he had been previously accused or convicted of a criminal offence, or that he had been a member of any political, religious or military organisations. It also took into account the fact that the applicant had not applied for refugee status until after his placement in detention. 30.  In his appeal against the judgment of 22 January 2014 the applicant requested a rigorous examination of his arguments regarding the risk of ill‑treatment. He again referred to various reports by international organisations and reputable NGOs to support his position. 31.  On 20 May 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld that decision on appeal, reiterating the conclusions of the migration authorities and the first‑instance court. 32.  On 25 April 2014 the FMS for the Primorye Region issued a decision granting the applicant temporary asylum in the Russian Federation until 25 April 2015, referring to the existence of circumstances preventing the applicant’s extradition, namely the application of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court in the applicant’s case before the Court and the impossibility of foreseeing the duration of those proceedings. 33.  On 10 April 2015 the FMS for the Primorye Region extended the term of the temporary asylum granted to the applicant until 25 April 2016, with reference to the same grounds.


4.  The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Strzelce Krajeńskie, Poland. 5.  On 3 March 2000 the applicant was brought before the Radomsko District Court (Sąd Rejonowy). He was charged with having committed burglary. The court ordered that the applicant be remanded in custody until 1 June 2000. 6.  The applicant was placed in the Piotrków Trybunalski Detention Centre (Areszt Śledczy). His detention was subsequently prolonged several times until the end of the proceedings against him. 7.  On 15 November 2000 the Radomsko District Court convicted the applicant of handling stolen goods and sentenced him to 15 months’ imprisonment. 8.  On 2 February 2001 the Piotrków Trybunalski Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) upheld the first-instance judgment. 9.  On 28 May 2001 the applicant’s officially-appointed lawyer, who represented him in the proceedings before both instances, refused to lodge a cassation appeal on his behalf. 10.  The applicant sent numerous letters to the Court, most of which appear to have been opened and read by the domestic authorities. 11.  The applicant’s first letter of 1 May 2000 bears the stamp “Radomsko District Prosecutor (Prokuratura Rejonowa w Radomsku)”, the date 8 May 2000 (stamped), and an illegible signature. 12.  His letter of 27 August 2001 bears the same stamp, a signature “prok. R. Gawęcka (Prosecutor R. Gawęcka)”, and the date 28 August 2001, which is both stamped and hand-written. 13.  The applicant’s letter of 10 September 2001 is marked with the same stamp and the date 12 September 2001 (stamped and hand-written) and bears an illegible signature. 14.  The envelopes of the applicant’s letters of 14 and 22 October, 18 November 2001, 2 April, 3 and 22 July, 13 October, 4 December 2002 bear the stamp “Censored” (ocenzurowano) and the official stamp of the Radomsko District Court. Each of them is marked with a date-stamp and an illegible signature. All envelopes bear traces of opening after being sealed: they were cut open and resealed with adhesive tape. 15.  On 3 January 2003 the applicant sent a letter to the Court. He complained that his correspondence with the Court’s Registry had been censored. He enclosed the envelope of the letter sent to him by the Registry on 22 November 2002. The envelope was marked with the stamp “Censored”, the date 5 December 2002 and an illegible signature. The envelope of the applicant’s letter to the Court also bears the stamp “censored”, the date 10 January 2003 and an illegible signature. They have been covered up with white corrector fluid.


5.  The applicants were born in 1970 and 1966 respectively and live in Kikinda. 6.  The applicants are journalists and were employed by the local weekly newspaper Kikindske. 7.  On 9 April 2004 the first applicant published an article criticising several criminal convictions he and another journalist had incurred for defamation. The article was entitled ‘They have not punished us much for what we are’ (‘Malo su nas kaznili, kakvi smo’) and, in so far as relevant, read as follows:
“Where will our souls go, we wonder. Are we Superhiks [the most prominent villain from the ‘Alan Ford’ comic book] of Kikinda, who take from the poor and give to the rich? Are we arrogant spendthrifts who waste money belonging to all Kikinda citizens, so that poor people have to pay our fines for offensive writing? Has the judge D.K.... punished us too mildly and shouldn’t he have satisfied the request of the lawyer S.K. and deservedly ripped us off to the tune of 150,000 dinars? But couldn’t our prosecutor, who is surely not a blonde, but is being whistled at by workers on strike, have asked for more, since [another column in the K. newspaper] ruined his reputation acquired over decades, and in particular over the past year or two, when he so ‘skilfully’ drafted dismissals to all the [‘]non-workers[‘] and the opposition from [a local factory]? And what should the citizens who finance our public company do and think? Could they also wonder who gave us the right to write insulting texts so that the judges of Kikinda must punish us?... Do we have the right to deny that people are tired of such a behaviour of ours...? Do we have the right to deny our fellow citizens their wish for a quiet life, free of stress and various court proceedings? Do we have a soul, we wonder out loud, and if we do, where will it go after we’ve prepared another scandal? We should be ashamed of ourselves.” 8.  In the same issue, the second applicant was the editor of the page entitled ‘Amusement’, consisting of anagrams, jokes, a crossword and a horoscope. In the top middle section of the page there was a photo of a blonde woman in her underwear, next to which there was a text, which, in its relevant part, read as follows:
“JPICK and the manager were visited by a blonde the other day. For that occasion the blonde was whistled at by the workers who were not on strike. And she wasn’t even a lawyer...”
On the left of the photograph, there was a small box containing three anagrams, the first of which was an anagram of S.K.’s name. 9.  Shortly after publication of the above, S.K. instituted private criminal proceedings for insult against the applicants in the Kikinda Municipal Court. 10.  On 14 February 2005 the court convicted the applicants of insult. The court fined each of them 12,000 dinars (RSD, approximately EUR 150), ordering them jointly to pay S.K. another RSD 16,000 (approximately EUR 200) in respect of the costs of the proceedings. 11.  In its judgment, the first-instance court defined insult as a statement or an action objectively humiliating to a certain individual, constituting an attack on his or her honour. Acknowledging that S.K. was a public figure, the court explained that under domestic law an action done by way of a joke was not a criminal offence as long as that joke did not overstep acceptable boundaries and become insulting. The applicants must have known that S.K. considered their articles insulting, since they had previously been convicted of using identical terms about him. The court took particular note of the fact that the applicants mentioned S.K. directly and indirectly on several different pages of the same newspaper, and concluded that S.K. had proved that those texts had insulted him just by instituting the private criminal proceedings. In particular, the court held as follows:
“Such writing by the defendants demonstrates the intention to demean the private prosecutor [S.K.]. This is so because it is clear that the defendants, in different ways and in different sections [of the newspaper], compared the private prosecutor to a female, which comparison is objectively insulting in society. Namely, in our mentality it is insulting to feminise a man, and jokes about blondes are not in the least flattering, because they portray blondes as stupid people subject to mockery.” 12.  On appeal, on 4 May 2005 the Zrenjanin District Court upheld the first-instance judgment and its reasoning.


4.  The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Sofia. 5.  The applicant’s late father owned a house, a garage and an outhouse with some adjoining land in Sofia. By a mayor’s order of 28 March 1989 the above property was expropriated for the construction of a school. The expropriated property was valued at 16,878.20 old Bulgarian levs (BGL). The order, based on section 98(1) of the 1973 Territorial and Urban Planning Act (“the TUPA” – “Закон за териториалното и селищно устройство”) provided that the applicant was to be compensated with a flat and his father was to be compensated with another flat and a garage. Both flats were to be situated in a building which the municipality intended to construct. 6.  By a supplementary order of 15 June 1990, based on section 100 of the TUPA, the mayor indicated the exact flats and the garage with which the applicant and his father were to be compensated, specifying the building in which they would be located and, in the case of the flats, also their precise surface area. 7.  On an unspecified date the municipal authorities opened blocked housing savings accounts with the State Savings Bank in the name of the applicant and his father. An amount equivalent to the estimated value of the expropriated real estate (BGL 16,878.20) was deposited in the housing savings account of the applicant’s father. The latter transferred BGL 8,878 into the applicant’s housing savings account. As the value of the flats and garage offered in compensation was higher than that of the expropriated property, the applicant and his father had to make top-up payments on unspecified dates in the amount of BGL 92,000. The nominal sum was increased considerably owing to the high inflation rate during the relevant period. 8.  In 1991 the municipal authorities took possession of the expropriated property and the buildings were pulled down. However, the construction of the school never started. 9.  While awaiting the construction of the flats the applicant, his family and parents were settled in a municipal council flat. The flat was much smaller than the total surface area of the flats offered in compensation and was situated in a building owned by the municipality which was in a poor state of repair. 10.  The applicant’s father died in 1992. In December 1999 his mother died, whereupon he became the sole owner of all the “future” real property allocated in compensation for the 1989 expropriation. 11.  The construction of the building in which the flats and the garage were to be located did not start as planned. 12.  The applicant made numerous complaints to the municipal authorities, to no avail. By a letter of 5 July 1999 the municipal company Sofinvest EOOD informed the applicant that the construction had not yet started and that no funding was available. 13.  Meanwhile, on 20 March 1995, the applicant requested the mayor to rescind the expropriation order in accordance with section 102 of the 1951 Property Act. On 9 November 1995 the mayor refused on the ground that the house had been demolished and the expropriated plot had been cleared for groundwork. According to the relevant legislation in force, the expropriation order could only be rescinded if the land had not been cleared for groundwork. The applicant lodged an appeal with the Sofia City Court. In a judgment of 10 June 1998 the Sofia City Court upheld the mayor’s refusal for the same reason. 14.  On 10 November 1998 the applicant filed a request with the local governor seeking restitution of the expropriated plot under the provisions of the 1997 Compensation for Expropriated Property Act. On 20 January 1999 the local governor refused on the ground that the expropriated property did not fall within the ambit of that Act. 15.  On 6 April 2001 the applicant filed another request with the municipality seeking to recover the expropriated plot. On 3 July 2001 the deputy mayor advised the applicant to renounce his claims to compensation for the demolished house in a notarised declaration. Although the applicant submitted the requested declaration, on 20 March 2002 the mayor refused to rescind the expropriation order because the house had been demolished and the plot cleared and occupied by the municipality. The applicant did not lodge an appeal with the courts against this refusal. 16.  On an unspecified date the municipal authorities sold the real property expropriated from the applicant’s family to a private third party who planned to build a block of flats on it. 17.  On a further request from the applicant the mayor of the municipality, in orders of 23 May and 8 June 2006, allocated two flats to him, equivalent to those originally due, in buildings under construction. As the municipality did not have any garages available, the orders did not concern the garage which the applicant was entitled to receive. 18.  On 3 April 2007 two flats apparently equivalent to those originally due were delivered to the applicant. As of March 2008 the garage remained undelivered.


4.  The applicant was born in 1933 and lives in Sesto Fiorentino (Florence). 5.  He is the owner of a flat in Sesto Fiorentino, which he had let to G.C. and G.P. 6.  In a registered letter of 29 November 1990, the applicant informed the tenants that he intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1991 and asked them to vacate the premises by that date. 7.  In a writ served on the tenants on 17 April 1991, the applicant reiterated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenants to appear before the Florence Magistrate. 8.  By a decision of 23 May 1991, which was made enforceable on 31 July 1991, the Florence Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 December 1992. 9.  On 29 April 1993, the applicant made a statutory declaration that he urgently required the premises as accommodation for his son. 10.  On 14 May 1993, the applicant served notice on the tenants requiring them to vacate the premises. 11.  On 2 June 1993, he served notice on the tenants informing them that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 15 July 1993. 12.  Between 15 July 1993 and 15 October 1998, the bailiff made eleven attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession. 13.  Pursuant to section 6 of Law no. 431/98, the enforcement proceedings were suspended until 27 June 1999. 14.  On that date, the tenants asked the Florence Magistrate for a new suspension. On 11 July 2000, the Florence Magistrate decided to fix a new date for the enforcement proceedings, namely 25 January 2001. 15.  On 31 October 2000, the applicant recovered possession of the flat because the tenants spontaneously vacated the premises.


6.  The applicants were born in 1945 and 1951 respectively and live in Heilbronn and Weinheim. 7.  On 8 October 1997 the applicants distributed four-page folded pamphlets to passers-by in front of a Nuremberg medical centre. The front page contained the following text:
“'Killing specialist' for unborn children Dr. F. [is] on the premises of the Northern medical centre, Nuremberg”. 8.  The middle pages contained information on the development of the human foetus and about abortion techniques. It further contained the appeals:
“Please support our struggle against the unpunished killing of unborn children”
and
“Therefore: No to abortion”
The verso read as follows:
“Support our protest and our work. Help to ensure that the Fifth Commandment “Thou shall not kill” and the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany are in future respected by all doctors in Nuremberg!
Stop the murder of children in their mother's womb on the premises of the Northern medical centre.
then: Holocaust
today: Babycaust
(damals: Holocaust heute: Babycaust)
Whoever remains silent becomes guilty too!” 9.  The pamphlet bore the name and address of the second applicant as the person legally responsible for its content. 10.  On behalf of the medical centre and Dr F., the City of Nuremberg brought criminal charges against the applicants for defamation. 11.  On 16 July 1998 the Nuremberg District Court (Amtsgericht) acquitted the applicants on the grounds that their action was justified under section 193 of the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, see Relevant domestic law below). According to the District Court, the dissemination of the pamphlets was covered by the right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 5 of the German Basic Law, since the pamphlet, taken as a whole, was not intended to debase Dr F. or the medical centre, but to express the applicants' general rejection of the performance of abortions. The District Court noted that the applicants considered the number of abortions performed in Germany to be crimes which were as abhorrent as the Holocaust. It was not up to the court to evaluate this statement, which was covered by the right to freedom of expression. 12.  Following an examination of the statements contained in the pamphlet, the District Court considered that the applicant's right to freedom of expression had to prevail over the doctor's interest in the protection of his personal honour. 13.  On 26 May 1999 the Nuremberg-Fürth Regional Court (Landgericht) quashed the District Court's judgment and convicted the applicants of defamation to the detriment of the medical centre and of Dr F. The Regional Court considered that the statement “then: Holocaust / today: Babycaust”, seen in the context of the other statements made in the pamphlet, had to be interpreted as putting the lawful activity performed by Dr F. on a level with the Holocaust, a synonym for the most abhorrent and unjustifiable crimes against humanity. According to the Regional Court, this statement was not covered by the applicants' right to freedom of expression, as it debased the doctor in a way which had not been necessary in order to express the applicants' opinion. While expressions of opinion which related to questions of public interest enjoyed a higher degree of protection than those relating to purely private interests, it had to be taken into account if and to which extent the person addressed had participated in the public debate. Furthermore, it had to be considered if the person expressing his thoughts could be at least expected to replace his statement by a statement which was less detrimental to the other person's honour. Applying these principles, the Regional Court considered that the applicants had failed sufficiently to take into account the doctor's interests. It had to be conceded that the applicants, as anti-abortion activists, had a political aim which they were allowed to pursue even by use of exaggerated and polemic criticism. However, by putting the doctor's legal actions on one level with the arbitrary killings of human beings performed by a regime of injustice, the applicants literally qualified him as a mass murderer. According to the Regional Court, this statement amounted to unjustifiable abusive insult (Schmähkritik). 14.  The Regional Court further considered that the other statements contained in the pamphlet were covered by the applicants' right to freedom of expression and had to be accepted. Having regard to all the factors of the case, the Regional Court considered it appropriate to impose twenty daily fines of 20 German marks (DEM) each on the first applicant and thirty daily fines of 60 DEM each on the second applicant, as the person having assumed legal responsibility for the pamphlet's content. 15.  On 8 December 1999 the Bavarian Court of Appeal (Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht) rejected the applicants' appeal on points of law. 16.  On 7 January 2000 the applicants lodged complaints with the Federal Constitutional Court. 17.  On 24 May 2006 the Federal Constitutional Court, sitting as a panel of three judges, quashed the Regional Court's judgment insofar as the applicants had been convicted of defamation to the detriment of the medical centre and dismissed the remainder of the applicants' complaints. 18.  The Federal Constitutional Court considered, at the outset, that the criminal courts, when interpreting and applying the criminal law, had to respect the limits imposed by the right to freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 5 of the Basic Law. The court further considered that the Regional Court had respected these principles. 19.  According to the Federal Constitutional Court, the applicants had not confined themselves generally to criticising the performance of abortions – which they remained free to do – but had directed their statements directly against Dr F. It was clear from the overall context that the incriminated statement referred to Dr F., who was expressly mentioned on the front page. The Federal Constitutional Court further noted that the lower courts had assumed that the impugned statement put the doctor's professional activities on the same level as the Holocaust. It further observed that the Federal Court of Justice, in separate proceedings referring to the same pamphlet, assumed that the statement was meant to express the opinion that the abortions performed by the doctor amounted to mass homicide. However, this interpretation of the statement, which also contained the Holocaust reference, also contained a serious interference with the doctor's personality rights. 20.  The Federal Constitutional Court further considered that the statement seriously infringed the doctor's personality rights. While the applicants' statement did not qualify as abusive insult, the Regional Court's decision was not objectionable as that court had duly weighed the conflicting interests – that is, the applicants' right to freedom of expression and the doctor's personality rights. In particular, the Regional Court had taken into account that the doctor had practised within the framework of the law and had not actively participated in the public debate on abortion. Furthermore, the applicants could have been reasonably expected to express their general criticism without the serious violation of the doctor's personality rights. This decision was served on the applicants' counsel on 22 June 2006. 21.  On 9 November 2006 the Nuremberg Regional Court, following remittal, re-assessed the fines imposed as a penalty for defamation to the doctor's detriment. On 26 June 2007 the Nuremberg Court of Appeal quashed this judgment and remitted the case to the Nuremberg Regional Court. 22.  On 25 September 2008 the Nuremberg Regional Court re-assessed the sentences and imposed fifteen daily fines of 10 EUR each on the first applicant and ten daily fines of 10 EUR each on the second applicant, thereby taking into account the second applicant's previous convictions. 23.  On 2 April 2009 the Nuremberg Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants' appeal on points of law.


7.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Târgu‑Mureş, Romania. 8.  On 19 October 2001 criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant and other third parties in respect of embezzlement, forgery of accountancy papers and tax evasion offences that had allegedly been committed by him in his capacity as director of the limited liability company R. On the same day he was placed in police custody for twenty‑four hours on the basis of Article 148 (c) and (h) of the Romanian Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”) on the ground that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences with which he had been charged, that he was a danger to public order, that the offences with which he had been charged were punishable by more than two years’ imprisonment, and that he was preparing to abscond. 9.  On 20 October 2001 the Târgu‑Mureş Prosecutor’s Office issued an arrest warrant on the basis of Article 148 (h) of the CCP and the applicant was placed in pre‑trial detention for thirty days on the ground that the offences with which he had been charged were punishable by more than two years’ imprisonment and that he was preparing to abscond. 10.  On 18 February 2002 the applicant and the third parties were indicted to stand trial on the above‑mentioned charges. They continued to remain in pre‑trial detention. 11.  The applicant’s pre‑trial detention was extended repeatedly by final interlocutory judgments of the Târgu‑Mureş County Court. The court confirmed the legality of the detention on the ground that the reasons provided for by Article 148 (h) of the CCP which had justified the applicant’s initial detention remained valid, did not breach his right of presumption of innocence and that the length of proceedings depended on the complexity of the case. Therefore it dismissed the applicant’s repeated arguments that he was not a danger to public order, that his pre‑trial detention could be replaced by alternative measures and that the length of his detention and of the overall proceedings was excessive. The domestic courts did not provide any other explanation for the extension of the applicant’s pre‑trial detention. Moreover, the eight hearings held between March 2002 and April 2003 were repeatedly adjourned, inter alia, in order to allow all the suspects to employ the services of a lawyer, for witnesses to be heard, the summoning of various parties to the proceedings, the submission of technical and medical expert reports and the examination of the transfer of the file to another court as a result of the applicant’s request. 12.  By the interlocutory judgment of 20 May 2003 the Târgu‑Mureş County Court, having regard to the length of the pre‑trial detention, the applicant’s complaint concerning his state of health and his medical condition, the facts of the case and the evidence submitted by the parties, ordered the release of the applicant. The court also ordered the applicant not to leave town without the court’s consent pending the outcome of the criminal investigation. Lastly, the court adjourned the hearing until 17 June 2003 for procedural reasons. The Târgu‑Mureş Prosecutor’s Office appealed against the decision. 13.  By a final interlocutory judgment of 23 May 2003 the Târgu‑Mureş Court of Appeal allowed the appeal of the Prosecutor’s Office on the ground that according to the medical expert reports the applicant’s health problems could be treated in prison hospitals and that the initial reasons justifying his detention were still valid. Consequently, the court ordered the applicant’s pre‑trial detention to be extended from 26 May to 24 June 2003. 14.  By an interlocutory judgment of 17 June 2003 the Târgu‑Mureş County Court, sitting as a two‑judge bench, again extended the applicant’s pre‑trial detention from 25 June to 24 July 2003. The court held that the applicant’s detention was still justified under Article 148 (h) of the CCP. Moreover, the court could not be held responsible for the length of proceedings given the complexity of the case, the large amount of evidence submitted by the parties and the difficulties it faced in summoning the witnesses living in other cities. Lastly, the court adjourned the hearing for procedural reasons and ordered a technical expert report to be drafted. The applicant appealed against the decision. 15.  By a final interlocutory judgement of 2 July 2003 the Târgu‑Mureş Court of Appeal allowed the applicant’s appeal, quashed the interlocutory judgment of 17 June 2003 in part and ordered the lower court to re‑examine the matter of extending the applicant’s pre‑trial detention. The court held that the decision had been taken by two judges despite the applicable procedural rules requiring that this be done by a single judge. The court did not address the issue of the applicant’s release despite this having been requested by the applicant. 16.  By an interlocutory judgment of 4 July 2003 the Târgu‑Mureş County Court extended the applicant’s pre‑trial detention to 23 July 2003 on the ground that the reasons justifying his initial detention were still valid. It also dismissed the applicant’s claim that his pre‑trial detention had ceased to be lawful after the final interlocutory judgment of 2 July 2003. It held that the said interlocutory judgment had mainly concerned the composition of the bench which had examined the merits of the judgment and considered, in terms of the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention, that the conditions set out by Article 160c of the CCP had been met. Moreover, the extension of the applicant’s pre‑trial detention had been lawful since it had been the will of both judges. The applicant appealed against the decision. 17.  By a final interlocutory judgment of 7 July 2003 the Târgu‑Mureş Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the decision of 4 July 2003. 18.  By an interlocutory judgment of 23 July 2003 the Târgu‑Mureş County Court rejected the request of the Prosecutor’s Office for the extension of the applicant’s pre‑trial detention and ordered the applicant’s immediate release. The court held that following the judgment of 2 July 2003 the applicant’s detention from 25 June 2003 had been unlawful in so far as the authorities had not extended the arrest warrant which had expired on 24 June 2003. Moreover, the present decision was not in breach of the res judicata principle in respect of the final decision of 4 July 2003 since the current decision, among others, did not touch on the merits of the case, but only assessed the lawfulness of the detention, and the decision of 4 July had interfered with the applicant’s procedural rights. The Prosecutor’s Office appealed. 19.  By a final interlocutory judgment of 23 July 2003 the Târgu‑Mureş Court of Appeal allowed the appeal of the Prosecutor’s Office. It held that the County Court’s judgment of 23 July 2003 interfered with the legal principle of res judicata. Consequently it quashed the decision and ordered the extension of the applicant’s pre‑trial detention on the general ground that he was a danger to public order and that the reasons justifying his initial detention, including the ground provided for by Article 148 (c) of the CCP, were still valid. 20.  Between 19 August 2003 and 19 April 2004 the applicant’s pre‑trial detention continued to be extended by final interlocutory judgments of the domestic courts generally on the basis of the provisions of Article 148 (h) of the CCP, while his complaints concerning the length of his pre‑trial detention and of the proceedings as a whole were dismissed generally for the reason that the case was complex. Furthermore, no additional reasons or explanations were provided by the courts in respect of the applicant’s personal situation and his repeated claims that his pre‑trial detention following the judgment of 2 July 2003 was illegal were dismissed as res judicata. Finally, the hearings were repeatedly adjourned, inter alia, in order to allow for witnesses and parties to the proceedings to be heard or resummoned and for the submission of technical expert reports. 21.  By an interlocutory judgment of 12 May 2004 the Târgu‑Mureş County Court assessed the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention and ordered his immediate release. The court held that the applicant’s detention between 20 October 2001 and 24 June 2003 had been unlawful in so far as the arrest warrant had been issued by a prosecutor who was not a “magistrate” within the meaning of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and who had not clearly established the charges against the applicant. The prosecutor had also failed to hear the applicant prior to his detention or to provide reasons for his detention and had failed to immediately bring him before a judge following his arrest. At the same time, it considered that the assessment of lawfulness carried out by the domestic courts following the applicant’s arrest could not have remedied the above‑mentioned failures. Furthermore, it held that the applicant’s pre‑trial detention between 25 June and 4 July 2003 had also been unlawful in so far as following the final judgment of 2 July 2003 the applicant’s arrest had not been based on any express or valid court order. It considered that the previous decisions delivered by the domestic courts in respect of the same issue were not res judicata, because the said principle did not apply to issues such as the applicant’s detention which were separate from the merits of the case concerning the existence of the offence and the guilt of the accused. Moreover, it considered that its argument flowed from the provisions of the domestic procedural law which required courts to regularly assess the lawfulness of pre‑trial detention even if other domestic courts had previously delivered final judgments in respect of the same issue and to revoke ex officio the measure if it had been rendered unlawfully. The court further held that the applicant’s detention after 4 July 2003 had also been unlawful on the ground that the judgment of 4 July 2003 could not simply extend his pre‑trial detention which had started on 20 October 2001 since the applicant had not been lawfully detained at the time. In so far as the judgment could be perceived as a new detention order, the court considered that the legal conditions for such an order had not been met: there were no new grounds for the applicant’s detention, the court had not provided any reasons for it, no new detention order had been issued and the transcript of the applicant’s evidence given to the court in respect of his detention had been missing from the file. Finally, the court held that in any event the extension of the applicant’s pre‑trial detention could no longer be justified. There was no evidence that the applicant was a danger to public order or that his release would interfere with the criminal investigation and his continuous pre‑trial detention of two years and seven months was excessive and did not comply with the guarantees set out by Article 5 of the ECHR. The court also adjourned the hearing on procedural grounds and ordered the resummoning of some of the witnesses. The Prosecutor’s Office appealed against the decision. 22.  By an interlocutory judgment of 16 June 2004 the Târgu‑Mureş Court of Appeal adjourned the appeal proceedings against the interlocutory judgment of 12 May 2004 for twenty‑four hours on the ground that the applicant had not been summoned and ordered his summoning. 23.  By an interlocutory judgment of 17 June 2004 the Târgu‑Mureş Court of Appeal, in the absence of the applicant, who had been summoned, but in the presence of his chosen lawyer, suspended the appeal proceedings against the interlocutory judgment of 12 May 2004 pending the referral of an objection of unconstitutionality raised by the applicant’s lawyer to the Constitutional Court in respect of Article 38511 (3) of the CCP. Relying on the provisions of Article 303 (6), 3002 and 160b of the CCP the court reviewed and maintained the applicant’s pre‑trial detention. Consequently, it dismissed the applicant’s request for an end to his detention. He had based his request on the argument that after 16 June 2004 his pre‑trial detention had no longer had a legal basis, since the sixty‑day time‑limit for assessing the lawfulness of detention provided for by the Constitution and the CCP had lapsed. 24.  By a final interlocutory judgment of 13 August 2004 the Târgu‑Mureş Court of Appeal reviewed and maintained the applicant’s pre‑trial detention on the ground that the reasons justifying the applicant’s initial detention were still valid. 25.  By an interlocutory judgment of 27 August 2004 the Târgu‑Mureş County Court ordered the applicant’s immediate release. It held that the argument of the Prosecutor’s Office that the applicant’s pre‑trial detention was justified by the applicant’s preparation to abscond (Article 148 (c)) had already been dismissed by the domestic courts on 7 March 2002 and that there was no new relevant evidence to rebut that finding. Moreover it held that there was no evidence that the applicant was a danger to public order and that two years and ten months was an unreasonable length of time for the proceedings. At the same time the court adjourned the hearing for procedural reasons. The Târgu‑Mureş Prosecutor’s Office appealed. 26.  By a final interlocutory judgment of 30 August 2004 the Târgu‑Mureş Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the judgment of 27 August 2004. The applicant was released the same day. 27.  In October 2004 the Constitutional Court dismissed the objection of unconstitutionality raised by the applicant’s lawyer at the hearing of 17 June 2004 on the ground that the legal provision contested by the applicant was in compliance with the Constitution. 28.  By a final interlocutory judgment of 8 December 2004 the Târgu‑Mureş Court of Appeal dismissed the Prosecutor Office’s appeal against the interlocutory judgment of 12 May 2004 as moot on the ground that the applicant had already been released. 29.  The thirty‑one hearings held by the Târgu‑Mureş County Court between 24 September 2004 and 2 February 2009 were repeatedly adjourned, inter alia, in order to allow for more witnesses to be heard, the summoning of various parties to the proceedings, the resummoning of some of the witnesses, the submission of technical expert reports and the examination of some of the judges’ requests to withdraw from the proceedings. 30.  On an unspecified date in 2008 the applicant was arrested in Italy. He refused to take part via video link in the hearing of 2 February 2009 concerning the criminal proceedings brought against him in Romania and pending before the domestic courts. 31.  By an interlocutory judgment of 6 March 2009 the Târgu‑Mureş County Court decided to separate the proceedings concerning the applicant from the proceedings concerning the other co-accused and ordered the applicant’s temporary transfer from Italy to be arranged. 32.  The proceedings brought against the applicant are still pending before the first‑instance court. 33.  In January 2002, following an episode of depression, the applicant underwent a psychiatric examination. The panel of experts concluded that the applicant’s condition was a “situational reaction” and that he could be treated in detention in Bucharest Prison Hospital which was equipped with a psychiatric unit. 34.  The two psychiatrists on the panel of experts expressed a dissenting opinion. They concluded that the applicant should be treated in a civilian psychiatric hospital because psychotherapy sessions could not be properly provided in detention owing to the “lack of privacy”. 35.  There is no evidence in the applicant’s medical file to show that he spent time in hospital for psychiatric treatment or that he continued to have similar problems afterwards. 36.  The applicant also informed the Court that he had been kept in solitary confinement and that from the end of 2003 he had been under the same detention regime as dangerous detainees, which meant that he had been under constant supervision. His allegations are contradicted by a letter of 13 November 2003 sent by the Târgu‑Mureş Prison authorities to the domestic courts from which it can be seen that the applicant was not classified as a “dangerous detainee”. 37.  According to the applicant’s medical records, he was diagnosed with chronic uveitis in his left eye in May 2002. 38.  A medical expert report drafted in February 2003 concluded that the applicant’s situation required surgery and post‑surgery treatment in a specialised hospital, specifically the Rahova‑Bucharest Prison Hospital. However, his state of health was not incompatible with his detention. 39.  The applicant did not undergo the surgery. However, he did not complain about the lack of medical treatment before the domestic courts under Article 3 of the Government Emergency Ordinance no. 56/2003 (GEO 56/2003) concerning the rights of individuals serving prison sentences. 40.  After his release from prison on 30 August 2004 the applicant underwent cataract surgery in Italy.


8.  The applicant was born in 1941 and lives in Teteven. He was the executive director of Elprom‑EMT, a State‑owned company, against which bankruptcy proceedings were opened in 1997. 9.  On 14 May 1997 the Teteven District Prosecutor’s Office opened criminal proceedings against the applicant and against the deputy director of Elprom‑EMT and a company employee. 10.  On 3 June 1997 the applicant was charged with abuse of office and making false official documents, contrary to Articles 282 § 2 and 311 § 1 of the Criminal Code (“the CC”). It was alleged that, together with the deputy director, he had abused his managerial position during the period April 1996 – March 1997 and had occasioned losses to the company in order to secure a financial benefit for a private limited liability company in which his wife was a member. The alleged loss to Elprom‑EMT amounted to 23,302,275 old Bulgarian levs (BGL). It was also charged that to facilitate that offence the applicant had made false documents and had incited the deputy director and a company employee to make false documents. 11.  On 6 June 1997 a prosecutor of the Lovech Regional Prosecutor’s Office ordered the suspension of the applicant from his position of executive director, on the grounds that the charges against him were for job‑related offences and that there were sufficient grounds to believe that he could jeopardise the investigation if he remained in office. 12.  On 20 June 1997 the investigator in charge of the case ordered an expert financial report, which was assigned to two former employees of Elprom‑EMT. 13.  On 4 August 1997 counsel for the applicant requested to be allowed to consult the case file. The request was granted on 10 August. 14.  A graphological report ordered earlier was ready on 18 September 1997. 15.  On 25 September 1997 the applicant was questioned. Counsel for the applicant requested to be allowed to inspect the case file. The investigator allowed them to consult certain documents but refused access to the whole file. 16.  On 16 October 1997 the expert financial report ordered on 20 June 1997 was ready. 17.  On 20 October and 25 November 1997 the investigator ordered expert reports on the prices of certain items relevant to the investigation. 18.  On 10 December 1997 the applicant was questioned and was allowed, together with his counsel, to consult certain documents in the case file, including the expert reports. 19.  On 29 December 1997 counsel for the applicant requested the disqualification of one of the experts who had prepared the expert financial report. They argued, inter alia, that one of the experts had been chief accountant of Elprom‑EMT and had been dismissed for disciplinary reasons by the applicant, which cast doubt on his objectivity. The request was denied. 20.  It seems that most of the witnesses in the case were questioned on dates between June and December 1997. 21.  On 10 February 1998 the applicant was questioned. His request to be allowed to consult the case file was granted. 22.  On 12 February 1998 counsel for the applicant again requested the disqualification of the experts who had prepared the expert financial report. They repeated their arguments in respect of the first expert and also averred that the other expert had been involved in the bankruptcy proceedings of Elprom‑EMT. 23.  The same day the applicant was presented with the amended charges. These included aggravated embezzlement facilitated by the making of false official documents (Article 202 in conjunction with Article 311 of the CC), embezzlement (Article 201 of the CC), abuse of office (Article 282 of the CC), deliberately entering into contracts disadvantageous to the company he was managing (Article 220 of the CC) and making false official documents (Article 311 of the CC). It was alleged that between March 1996 and February 1997, together with the deputy director of Elprom‑EMT, he had embezzled company assets amounting to BGL 4,833,264.54, for the commission of which offence he had made false official documents, that in June 1995 he had misappropriated a trailer owned by Elprom‑EMT, that between March 1996 and February 1997, together with the deputy director, he had abused his office to secure a financial benefit for a private company, that between August 1996 and January 1997, together with the deputy director, he had deliberately made disadvantageous contracts between Elprom‑EMT and the same private company for which he had secured a financial benefit, and that in December 1994 he had made two false invoices for sums amounting to 365,000 German marks.
After the being charged the applicant was questioned in the presence of counsel. He refused to give explanations. 24.  On 16 February 1998 the applicant and his counsel were allowed to consult the entire case file. The applicant objected to the expert reports and requested the disqualification of the experts. The investigator denied his requests and proposed to the prosecution that the applicant be indicted. 25.  On 16 June 1998 counsel for the applicant requested that the case be remitted for additional investigation, arguing that this was necessary to rectify certain procedural violations. 26.  On 9 July 1998 the Teteven District Prosecutor’s Office granted the request and referred the case back for investigation. It observed that the relevant circumstances about the relations between Elprom‑EMT and the private company which had allegedly benefited from it had not been fully elucidated and that the investigator had erred in the legal qualification of the offences. It gave specific instructions as to the facts which had to be established. It further expressed the view that the applicant’s request for the disqualification of one of the experts who had prepared the expert financial report was well‑founded, since he had been dismissed by the applicant for disciplinary reasons and the applicant had good reasons to fear his lack of objectivity. It was therefore necessary to prepare a new expert report. In addition, it asserted that it was necessary to charge the applicant anew, since the original presentation of the charges against him had not been specific enough. Finally, it noted that the applicant’s counsel had also been Elprom‑EMT’s counsel in the bankruptcy proceedings against the company, which raised certain doubts as to a potential conflict of interests. It was therefore necessary to establish whether the applicant had reason to doubt the loyalty of his counsel, because if that issue was not elucidated, the applicant could use it as an argument that his defence rights had been infringed. 27.  On 4 November 1998 the investigator, complying with the instructions of the prosecution, ordered a new financial report. 28.  On 26 April 1999 the Teteven District Prosecutor’s Office, finding that the investigator in charge of the case had not carried out any of its instructions apart from ordering a new financial report, replaced him with a new one. 29.  On 1 June 1999 the new investigator proposed to discontinue the proceedings, on the ground that the charges against the applicant were not supported by sufficient evidence. 30.  On 7 June 1999 the Teteven District Prosecutor’s Office rejected the proposal and referred the case back for additional investigation. It held that the evidence was not sufficient because the investigation had not been performed thoroughly. 31.  On 9 June 1999 the investigator allowed the applicant to consult the case file. 32.  On 13 June 1999 the financial report ordered on 4 November 1998 was ready. 33.  On 7 January 2000 counsel for the applicant informed the investigator that she would be unavailable until 18 January. 34.  On 19 January 2000 the investigator charged the applicant anew. The charges included, apart from the previous ones, a new charge under Article 219 of the CC (mismanagement resulting in loss for the company). After charging the applicant the investigator questioned him and allowed him and his counsel to consult the case file. 35.  On 31 January 2000 the investigator recommended that the applicant be indicted solely under Article 219 of the CC. 36.  On 14 February 2000 the Teteven District Prosecutor’s Office decided to discontinue the investigation in respect of the charges under Articles 202 (aggravated embezzlement), 282 (abuse of office) and 311 (making false official documents) of the CC. On 23 March 2000 the Lovech Regional Prosecutor’s Office overturned that decision and referred the case back to the investigator. On appeal by the investigator on 6 April 2000 the Veliko Tarnovo Appellate Prosecutor’s Office affirmed the overturning. 37.  On 12 May 2000 the Lovech Regional Prosecutor’s Office decided to drop the charges under Article 219 of the CC. Its decision was overturned by the Veliko Tarnovo Appellate Prosecutor’s Office on 21 July 2000 and the case was referred back to the Lovech Regional Prosecutor’s Office with instructions to carry out certain investigative steps (inter alia, to order an expert report) and elucidate certain facts relating to transactions carried out by Elprom‑EMT during the period 1996‑97. 38.  On 4 August 2000, when the case was back at the investigation stage, the investigator ordered an additional expert report. 39.  On 8 June 2001 the applicant’s counsel informed the investigator that she would be unavailable until 12 June. 40.  On 12 June 2001 the investigator allowed the applicant and his counsel to consult the case file. 41.  On 19 June 2001 the investigator recommended that the applicant be indicted under Articles 219 (mismanagement resulting in loss), and 311 (making false official documents) of the CC. 42.  On 20 July 2001 the Lovech Regional Prosecutor’s Office decided to drop the charges under Article 219 of the CC and to transfer the case to the Teteven District Prosecutor’s Office for continuation of the proceedings under the remaining charges. 43.  On 5 September 2001 the Teteven District Prosecutor’s Office remitted the case for additional investigation, holding that the investigative steps carried out up until then had not established all relevant circumstances. 44.  On 24 September 2001 the investigator ordered a new expert report, assigning it to new experts. 45.  On 26 February 2003 the applicant and the prosecution entered into a plea‑bargain agreement. The criminal proceedings against him were apparently discontinued soon after. 46.  On 3 June 1997 the applicant was put under house arrest by an investigator who saw him in person and questioned him. 47.  On 12 June 1997 the applicant lodged with the Teteven District Prosecutor’s Office a request to be released on bail. On 16 June 1997 the Teteven District Prosecutor’s Office denied the applicant’s request. The applicant appealed to the Lovech Regional Prosecutor’s Office. The appeal was dismissed by an order of 8 July 1997. The applicant appealed to the Chief Prosecutor’s Office. On 3 September 1997 the Chief Prosecutor’s Office dismissed the appeal. The applicant lodged an appeal with the Head of the Investigations Division of the Chief Prosecutor’s Office. On 31 October 1997 the Head of the Investigations Division dismissed the appeal. 48.  In the meantime, on 7 August and 2 September 1997, the Teteven District Prosecutor’s Office had denied two requests by the applicant to be allowed to leave his home for one day. Another request by the applicant to be allowed to leave his home for one day was denied on 29 October 1997. On 12 November 1997 the Teteven District Prosecutor’s Office allowed the applicant to leave his home for one day. 49.  On 19 November 1997 the Teteven District Prosecutor’s Office denied a renewed application for release by the applicant. 50.  On 4 December 1997 the applicant submitted a new request for release on bail. On 16 December 1997 the Teteven District Prosecutor’s Office granted bail, setting the amount at BGL 3,000,000. On an unspecified date in December 1997 the applicant paid the amount of the bail and was released from house arrest.