4.  The applicant was born in 1935 and lives in Split. 5.  On 16 January 1961 the Municipal Institute for Social Insurance in Split (which later became the Croatian Pension Fund and is therefore hereinafter referred as such) awarded the applicant, as its employee, the specially protected tenancy (stanarsko pravo) of a socially-owned flat in Gajeva Street in Split, with a surface area of 37 square metres. 6.  On 19 April 1969 the applicant married a certain M.M. and went to live in the flat in respect of which he held a specially protected tenancy. 7.  On 2 October 1972 the Yugoslav People’s Army awarded the applicant’s husband, as a serviceman, a socially-owned flat in Šimićeva Street in Split, with a surface area of 62 square metres, with a view to satisfying the housing needs of him and his family (the applicant and their two sons, who were both less than two years old at the time). 8.  The applicant, her husband and their two sons moved into that flat some time in 1973. Pursuant to the relevant legislation (see paragraph 45 below), the applicant thereby, as her husband’s wife, automatically became a co-holder of the specially protected tenancy of the flat in question. 9.  Once the applicant moved out from the flat in Gajeva Street her brother moved in. He remained living there with his family until 1982, when he moved out. 10.  The applicant stated that in May 1982 she had moved out of the flat in Šimićeva Street and returned to the flat in Gajeva Street to live there with her elderly mother and to take care of her. She stated that she had lived there until her eviction on 16 May 2012 (see paragraph 38 below). 11.  On 22 June 1982 the applicant applied to the Croatian Pension Fund, as the provider of the flat in Gajeva Street, for permission to exchange the flats in Gajeva and Šimićeva Streets for a single, larger flat, a possibility provided for under section 49(3) of the 1974 Housing Act (see paragraph 48 below). 12.  On 30 June 1982 the Croatian Pension Fund refused its consent for the exchange of flats and ordered her to vacate the flat in Gajeva Street. It held that the applicant had been for many years using two socially-owned flats, which was contrary to the law (see paragraph 45 below). 13.  The applicant then instituted administrative proceedings before the relevant first-instance administrative authority charged with housing affairs (hereinafter “the first-instance housing authority”), applying for permission to exchange the two flats for a single, larger one (see paragraph 48 below). The Croatian Pension Fund, for its part, on 13 July 1982 instituted administrative proceedings before the same authority, seeking her eviction from the flat in Gajeva Street. The two administrative proceedings were subsequently joined. 14.  At the hearing held on 16 September 1982, the applicant stated that after her brother had moved out of the flat in Gajeva Street she had moved in with her mother who was, owing to her age, in need of care and no longer able to live alone (see paragraphs 9-10 above). 15.  By a decision of 17 December 1982, the first-instance housing authority dismissed the applicant’s application for an exchange of flats, and ordered her to vacate the flat in Gajeva Street. That authority held:
-  that she had permanently left the flat in in Gajeva Street in 1969, thereby losing her specially protected tenancy of that flat,
-  that once her brother had moved out the applicant had indeed moved back into the flat in May 1982 (see paragraphs 9-10 and 14 above) but had not thereby re-acquired the specially protected tenancy of the flat.
-  that it was therefore not possible to grant her permission for an exchange of flats because she no longer held a specially protected tenancy in respect of one of the two flats involved in the desired exchange. 16.  Following an appeal by the applicant, by a decision of 20 May 1983 the relevant second-instance administrative authority quashed the first‑instance decision and remitted the case. It held that the applicant retained the status of a holder of the specially protected tenancy of the flat in question. Instead of seeking her eviction, the first-instance housing authority should have followed the procedure stipulated for situations where a tenant held a specially protected tenancy in respect of two flats (see paragraph 48 below). That procedure provided for the possibility of exchanging the two flats for a single one if neither flat satisfied the housing needs of the tenant’s household (but would if taken together). It instructed the first-instance housing authority to examine whether the flats in Gajeva and/or Šimićeva Streets satisfied the housing needs of the applicant and her family. 17.  In the resumed proceedings, the first-instance housing authority established that the flat in Šimićeva Street had fully satisfied the applicant’s and her family’s housing needs. It therefore, by a decision of 10 October 1984, again dismissed the applicant’s application for an exchange of flats and ordered her to vacate the flat in Gajeva Street. 18.  By a decision of 1 February 1985 the second-instance administrative authority dismissed an appeal by the applicant and upheld the first-instance decision of 10 October 1984. 19.  The applicant then brought an action for judicial review in the Administrative Court which, by a judgment of 6 June 1985, quashed the second-instance decision of 1 February 1985 for incomplete facts and remitted the case for fresh examination. 20.  In the resumed proceedings, the first-instance housing authority, after collecting relevant evidence and thereby completing its earlier factual findings, again held that the flat in Šimićeva Street had fully satisfied the applicant’s and her family’s housing needs. It therefore, by a decision of 6 November 1987, again dismissed the applicant’s application for an exchange of flats and ordered her to vacate the flat in Gajeva Street. 21.  By a decision of 31 May 1988 the second-instance administrative authority dismissed an appeal by the applicant and upheld the first-instance decision of 6 November 1987. 22.  The applicant then again brought an action for judicial review in the Administrative Court which, by a judgment of 22 December 1988, quashed the second-instance decision of 31 May 1988. The court held that the issue of whether the flat in Šimićeva Street had fully satisfied the applicant’s and her family’s housing needs had to be determined by applying relevant military housing standards and not general housing standards, given that the flat in question had been awarded to her husband as a serviceman (see paragraph 7 above). 23.  In the resumed administrative proceedings, on 25 May 1992 the applicant withdrew her application for an exchange of flats, stating the passage of time and changed family circumstances as the reasons for her withdrawal. In particular, she stated that she had in the meantime divorced (see paragraph 39 below). 24.  By a decision of 1 June 1992 the first-instance housing authority discontinued the proceedings in so far as they concerned the applicant’s application for an exchange of flats. It also ordered the applicant to vacate the flat in Gajeva Street, finding that the flat in Šimićeva Street had satisfied the applicant’s and her family’s housing needs even according to the relevant military housing standards. The applicant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that her specially protected tenancy of the flat in Gajeva Street had never been terminated and that the first-instance housing authority had not taken into account her changed circumstances – that is to say her divorce and the fact that she had not been using two flats. 25.  By a decision of 14 January 1993 the relevant ministry, as the second-instance administrative authority, dismissed an appeal by the applicant against the first-instance decision of 1 June 1992. 26.  The applicant then, for the third time, brought an action for judicial review in the Administrative Court, which dismissed it by a judgment of 26 May 1993. 27.  Following a request for the protection of legality (zahtjev za zaštitu zakonitosti) by the Principal State Attorney, on 12 July 1996 the Supreme Court quashed the Administrative Court’s judgment and remitted the case. The Supreme Court held that the Administrative Court and the administrative authorities had wrongly applied the relevant military housing standards to the facts of the case. The Supreme Court also held that the issue of whether the flat in Šimićeva Street had satisfied the applicant’s and her family’s housing needs had to be determined having regard to the circumstances existing at the time she had moved into that flat in in 1973 and that the subsequent change in circumstances was of no relevance. 28.  In the resumed proceedings, by a decision of 6 December 1999 the first-instance housing authority again ordered the applicant to vacate the flat in Gajeva Street, finding that at the time that she had moved into the flat in Šimićeva Street the latter flat had satisfied her and her family’s housing needs, having regard to the relevant military housing standards. That authority also reiterated that the subsequent changes in her family situation were irrelevant. 29.  On 29 March 2000 the second-instance administrative authority dismissed an appeal by the applicant against the first-instance decision, which thereby became definitive and enforceable. 30.  The applicant then, for the fourth time, brought an action for judicial review in the Administrative Court, which dismissed it by a judgment of 12 June 2003. 31.  The Principal State Attorney then again lodged a request for the protection of legality. 32.  By a judgment of 16 September 2004 the Supreme Court allowed that request, quashed the Administrative Court’s judgment and remitted the case. The Supreme Court held that, because the proceedings concerned the applicant’s eviction from the flat in Gajeva Street, the issue of whether the flat in Šimićeva Street had satisfied her and her family’s housing needs had to be determined in accordance with general and not military housing standards. 33.  In the resumed proceedings, by a judgment of 12 May 2005 the Administrative Court again dismissed the applicant’s action. 34.  The applicant then, on 3 April 2006, lodged a constitutional complaint alleging a violation of her constitutional right to fair procedure. She argued, inter alia, that the administrative and judicial authorities had not taken into account the fact that she had divorced her husband and thus had no longer needed to exchange the flats nor the fact that she had not been using two flats. She also mentioned that she had been living in the flat in Gajeva Street together with her son, D.M., and his family (his wife and daughter), as members of her household. 35.  On 13 December 2006 the Constitutional Court issued an interim measure whereby it temporarily postponed the enforcement of the first‑instance decision of 6 December 1999 (see paragraph 28 above) pending the adoption of its decision on the applicant’s constitutional complaint. 36.  By a decision of 13 July 2011 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint. 37.  Meanwhile, on 14 March 2003 the first-instance housing authority issued an enforcement order with a view to executing its decision of 6 December 1999 and evicting the applicant by force (see paragraph 28 above). 38.  The enforcement was postponed following several judicial decisions. A first attempted eviction took place on 28 November 2006 but it was agreed to postpone it, the applicant being in poor medical condition. On 16 May 2012 the applicant was evicted. The records drawn up by the enforcement officer show that the applicant was present during both the attempted eviction and the actual eviction. 39.  By a judgment of 30 March 1992 the Split Municipal Court dissolved the marriage between the applicant and her husband. 40.  On 8 May 1992 the applicant obtained a declaratory judgment by the same court whereby she was declared the sole holder of the specially protected tenancy of the flat in Gajeva Street. The judgment was rendered in the context of civil proceedings she had instituted against her husband and was based exclusively on her husband’s admission of her claim, that is, without taking any evidence. 41.  On 9 January 1996 the applicant’s former husband M.M. purchased the flat in Šimićeva Street from the State and thereby became its sole owner – a possibility open to all holders of specially protected tenancies of socially-owned flats under the Specially Protected Tenancies (Sale to Occupier) Act of 1991. Beforehand, on 27 November 1995 the applicant and her husband concluded an agreement whereby they both agreed that he was the sole holder of the specially protected tenancy of that flat. 42.  It would appear that before selling the flat in Šimićeva Street to the applicant’s husband, on 13 November 1995 the Ministry of Defence, as the State authority responsible for management of the flat at the time, conducted an on-spot inspection of the flat. Enclosed with the minutes of the inspection was a statement by the tenants’ board that, along with M.M. and his two sons, a wife (that is to say the applicant) was also living in the flat as an unregistered member of the household. 43.  The Government submitted that the applicant was currently living in the flat in Šimićeva Street owned by her former husband M.M. In support of their contention they furnished a certificate of domicile which indicates that since 19 September 2012 the applicant has had her domicile registered at the address of the flat in Šimićeva Street. The certificate also indicates that before that date she had had her registered domicile at the address of the flat in Gajeva Street since 9 August 1962. 44.  The Government furnished evidence that the applicant was the co‑owner of a number of properties in the Split area, including two houses.


5.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Baia Mare. 6.  At the relevant time, the applicant was the chief prosecutor in the prosecutor’s office attached to the Maramureş County Court. He was also the staff member in the prosecutor’s office tasked with providing information to the media in relation to criminal proceedings. 7.  On 21 October 2008 the prosecutor’s office attached to the Maramureş County Court had caught V.F. red-handed being given money by a relative of V.T.V., who was detained in Baia Mare Prison. 8.  According to statements given by the detainee, V.F. had promised to intervene and pass on the money to the prosecutors and judges who were to make the decision concerning his conditional release from prison. 9.  On 22 October 2008 the file was transferred to the National Anticorruption Department (“the NAP”), which by law was competent to continue the investigation. 10.  On the same day, the applicant issued a press release, which received considerable public attention. 11.  The press release read as follows:
“After being informed by police that V.F. seeks and receives money from individuals in exchange for intervening in favour of the conditional release of detainees held in Baia Mare Prison, the prosecutor’s office attached to the Maramureş County Court organised a flagrante delicto operation on 21 October 2009. V.F. was caught red-handed while accepting the sum of 1,650 euros (EUR) from a detainee’s relative...
A criminal investigation into influence peddling was opened and, according to the initial findings in the case, it was found that the suspect had received EUR 9,850 of the EUR 11,000 she had sought for intervening to influence favourably the conditional release of that detainee or the allocation of his work placements.
According to the detainee, the suspect claimed that the intended recipients of the money were prison employees with responsibility for the allocation of work to the detainees or members of the commission for conditional release. Moreover, the suspect told the detainee that part of the money was to go to the magistrates, judges and prosecutors responsible for the conditional release of detainees.
As the object of the offence of influence peddling was a sum of money exceeding EUR 10,000, the file was transferred to the National Anticorruption Department.” 12.  On the same day, at the request of a local television channel, AXA TV, the applicant gave a short statement providing mainly the same information as was contained in the press release. 13.  The newscaster added the following comments to the information provided by the applicant:
“The commission for conditional release, which comprises nine members, is chaired by a delegated judge. We don’t know whether it is purely coincidence that yesterday, the same day on which the flagrante delicto operation was organised and the detainee was conditionally released, that judge’s assignment to the Baia Mare Prison came to an end...” 14.  A few local newspapers wrote articles about the incident. Some of them contained images of the flagrante delicto operation, taken by journalists who had been present at the operation organised by the prosecutors and police. 15.  On 3 November 2008 judge G.E. lodged a complaint with the Superior Council of the Magistracy (“the SCM”) seeking the commencement of a disciplinary investigation against the applicant in connection with the manner in which he had informed the media about the incident of 21 October 2008. She contended that at the time of the incident she had been the judge delegated to Baia Mare Prison and because of the applicant’s press release and interview with AXA TV it was suggested by the media that she might be the alleged recipient of the money. 16.  The disciplinary commission for the prosecutors of the SCM instituted an investigation against the applicant in connection with two disciplinary offences, namely failure to observe the secrecy of deliberations or the confidentiality of documents that are of a secret nature, and adopting a disrespectful attitude towards colleagues in the exercise of his duties under Article 99 letters d) and k) of Law no. 303/2004 on the Statute of Judges and Prosecutors. The SCM also held that the applicant had breached the provisions of Article 12 § 1 let e) of Law no. 544/2001 concerning the restriction of citizens’ access to information in relation to criminal proceedings at the investigation stage. 17.  The applicant was questioned by the SCM’s disciplinary commission for prosecutors on 23 March 2009. According to his statement, he had prepared the press release after receiving additional information about the investigation from the chief prosecutor of the NAP. He had then submitted the press release to two colleagues at the NAP, namely the prosecutor in charge of the case and the chief prosecutor, and had asked for their opinion. The first had had no objections concerning the press release; the other had advised him that he should limit its content to aspects concerning the investigation carried out by his office. 18.  On 27 March 2009 the applicant’s lawyer received a letter from the president of Baia Mare District Court. In that letter the president of the court had stated that he had not considered it necessary to open an investigation into corruption offences allegedly committed by judges from Baia Mare District Court because in his opinion “the press release did not make any reference to the identity of the magistrates involved”. 19.  At a hearing held before the SCM’s disciplinary commission on 31 March 2009 the applicant was assisted by a lawyer of his choice. He proposed as evidence a video recording of the news programme presented by AXA TV concerning the incident of 21 October 2008 so that it could be compared to the press release drafted by the applicant. He also proposed that the news editor of AXA TV be questioned. As documentary evidence he requested copies of the articles published in the local newspapers concerning the incident and the letter addressed by the National Audiovisual Council to judge G.E. in reply to the complaint she had lodged in connection with the comments made by AXA TV about her alleged involvement in the influence peddling. 20.  At the same hearing the SCM’s disciplinary commission heard evidence from the prosecutor who had organised the flagrante delicto operation. He stated that it had taken place in a public space, namely a bar, in the presence of two journalists, one of whom had taken pictures. The pictures accompanied articles published by local newspapers in the days following the events. 21.  The applicant asked the SCM to question the two journalists. This request having been rejected, the journalist who had taken the pictures gave a written statement, which was joined to the case file by the applicant. The journalist maintained that he had been present at the flagrante delicto operation by chance: he had been attending a conference in the building in which it had been staged. Seeing masked police officers entering the bar, he had followed them and had seen suspect V.F. being caught red-handed. 22.  When questioned by the SCM at the hearing of 31 March 2009, the prosecutor in charge of the case at the NAP stated that the press release issued by the applicant had not jeopardised the outcome of the criminal investigation. Moreover, the press release had only referred to “statements at the initial stage of the investigation, while the case was still at the prosecutor’s office attached to the Maramureş County Court”. 23.  The SCM’s disciplinary commission heard evidence from judge G.E. She stated that before lodging her complaint with the SCM she had asked AXA TV to retract its remarks concerning any possible connection between the termination of her mandate as the delegated judge to Maramureş prison and the case of influence peddling. As she had not received any reply she had referred the matter to the National Audiovisual Council but had not been satisfied with its response. 24.  The applicant joined to the case file copies of the complaints lodged with the television channel and the National Audiovisual Council by judge G.E. and the letters she had received in reply.
The relevant part of the letter sent by the National Audiovisual Council read as follows:
“On 11 November 2008 the Council, convened in a public meeting, examined the report prepared by the Inspection Department and watched a recording of the broadcast mentioned in your complaint....
It was noted that the news item had been broadcast on 22 October 2008 at 9.30 p.m. As the information broadcast did not contain any specific reference to you, the item could not infringe your right to a protected public image.
The members of the Council considered that the requirements for granting the right of reply or remedy, as provided for under Articles 52 and 60 of Decision no. 187/2006 concerning the regulation of audio-visual content, were not met.” 25.  On 6 April 2009 the applicant sent a letter to the General Prosecutor’s office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice. He attached a copy of the press release issued by him on 22 October 2008 and asked the opinion of the Prosecutor General about the way in which he had drafted it and especially whether it had been drafted in compliance with Order no. 116 issued by the General Prosecutor on 24 May 2007 regulating activities undertaken in relation to the mass media within the public prosecutor’s office (see paragraph 63 below). 26.  On 10 April 2009 the applicant received a reply to his letter from a prosecutor working at the Office for Public Information and Relations with the Mass Media based in the General Prosecutor’s office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice. 27.  In the prosecutor’s view, the information provided by the applicant in the press release had been “minimal and general, but necessary so that the public could understand the facts of the case”. As regards the fact that the applicant had issued the press release after the case had been transferred to the NAP, the prosecutor concluded that the action had complied with the practice observed by the public prosecutor’s office. Moreover, the press release had contained only information concerning the investigation carried out by the prosecutor’s office attached to the Maramureş County Court. 28.  This letter, accompanied by the General Prosecutor’s Order no. 116/2006, was added by the applicant to the case file to be examined by the SCM on 13 April 2009. 29.  In his oral submissions before the disciplinary commission, the applicant’s lawyer claimed that the applicant had acted in good faith in informing the press about the incident. His references had been general and impersonal and he had made no reference to any specific person. He also submitted that the applicant had merely fulfilled his obligation to inform the press and to protect the image of his institution and of the legal system by informing the public about a pending criminal investigation. The public had already been exposed to information about the incident as the two journalists who had been present at the flagrante delicto operation had published articles about the incident. The lawyer also pointed out that the applicant had observed the confidentiality of the investigation and had referred only to the activity carried out by his office without making statements which could have led to the identification of the magistrate, judge or prosecutor who was the alleged recipient of the money from V.F. The applicant’s reference to “magistrates, judges and prosecutors responsible for the conditional release of detainees” was too general to have resulted in the identification of the magistrate concerned. The lawyer concluded by submitting that the information presented by AXA TV about the incident had been more comprehensive than the information provided by the applicant in the press release and in his interview with the AXA TV channel. 30.  On 5 May 2009 the SCM’s disciplinary commission found the applicant guilty of two disciplinary offences under Article 99 letters d) and k) of Law no. 303/2004 and imposed a disciplinary sanction under Article 100 of Law no. 303/2004 in the form of a reprimand. The disciplinary commission noted that the applicant had issued a press release and given an interview to AXA TV revealing information about the investigation into the offence of influence peddling on 22 October 2008. 31.  It further noted that the applicant had provided information about the alleged recipient of the money from V.F. without checking the accuracy of the detainee’s statements and had done so one day after the case file had been transferred to the NAP. Such information had led to the identification of judge G.E. as one of the alleged recipients of the money. The disciplinary commission concluded that the applicant had therefore breached the provisions of Article 12 § 1 let e) of Law no. 544/2001 concerning the restriction of citizens’ access to information in relation to criminal proceedings at the investigation stage when there was a risk that the result of the investigation would be undermined or confidential sources revealed. From the way in which the press release was drafted, “the circle of magistrates who could have been the recipients of the money was restricted and limited and made possible the identification of the judge delegated to Baia Mare Prison in the person of judge G.E.” As the six-month term of her delegation expired just at the time of the events in question, the mass media made speculative suggestions that the termination was connected with the influence‑peddling case. 32.  Two of the five prosecutors comprising the disciplinary commission were opposed to reprimanding the applicant for the offence of adopting a disrespectful attitude toward colleagues in the exercise of his duties. They expressed their position in a dissenting opinion. 33.  They noted, among other things, that:
(i)  the names of the persons who were allegedly to receive money from the influence peddler were not mentioned in the press release or in the television interview; there was only a general, impersonal reference to the judges and the prosecutors who were involved with the conditional release of detainees;
(ii)  individuals in this sphere included not only the judge delegated to the prison but also the judges who examine requests for conditional release at first instance and on appeal, as well as the prosecutors who attend the hearings concerning these requests. AXA TV’s reference to the judge whose involvement with the prison had just ended was made in an additional comment that was not included in the press release;
(iii)  the reference to the delegated judge made possible the identification of the magistrate, but since this statement was attributable exclusively to the television channel, the latter should bear responsibility for all subsequent comments and speculations;
(iv)  only the additional information concerning the end of the delegated judge’s mandate allowed the identification of judge G.E. Possible damage to her reputation could therefore not be imputed to the press release from the prosecutor’s office;
(v)  the press release from the prosecutor’s office attached to the Maramureş County Court and the interview with the defendant referred to the offence of influence peddling and not to the offence of active bribery. The defendant stated that the allegations concerning the alleged recipients of the money had been made by the detainee. 34.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against the decision of the SCM’s disciplinary commission. 35.  In his appeal the applicant complained about the unfairness of the proceedings before the disciplinary commission. Relying on Article 10 of the Convention the applicant also complained that the imposition of a disciplinary sanction had infringed his right to impart information to the press. 36.  He argued that questioning the two journalists who had been present at the flagrante delicto operation would have proved that he had not supplied any confidential information. They had published articles, accompanied by pictures of the incident, stating that “according to unofficial sources, V.F had connections in prison employees’ and magistrates’ circles”. 37.  Moreover, the main reason for issuing the press release had been to prevent possible speculation in the media about the operation ‒ which was already known to the press ‒ that could have been detrimental to the judiciary. 38.  As regards the accusation that he had shown a disrespectful attitude towards his colleague judge G.E., the applicant submitted that the latter had not contacted him to express any displeasure about the press release before lodging her complaint with the SCM. If he had known that she had felt that her reputation and public image had been damaged by his press release of 22 October 2009, he could have clarified the matter by issuing a new one. 39.  The High Court allowed a request lodged by the Association of Romanian Magistrates to intervene in the proceedings in support of the applicant’s appeal. 40.  The association justified its intervention in the disciplinary proceedings by referring to its role as protector of the magistrates’ status and their public image, pointing out that ‒ in its opinion ‒ the decision delivered by the SCM against the applicant had had a serious negative impact on his professional career. It further argued that in its opinion the press release issued by the applicant had complied with the provisions of Law no. 554/2001, with the guidelines issued by the SCM concerning cooperation between courts and prosecutor’s offices and the media, and with guidelines issued by the General Prosecutor’s office attached to High Court. It also pointed out that the applicant had observed Recommendation Rec(2003) 13 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in so far as he had not disclosed confidential information concerning the criminal investigation to the media and had not in any way undermined the outcome of the criminal proceedings. 41.  On 23 November 2009 a panel of nine judges of the High Court of Cassation and Justice dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law. It held that the applicant should have limited his press release to the minimum of information, which would not have allowed the identification of any magistrate as the alleged recipient of the money obtained by the influence peddler from the detainee’s family. In the High Court’s opinion the applicant should not have added to his press release the reference to “magistrates, judges and prosecutors responsible for the conditional release of detainees”. 42.  One of the judges drafted a dissenting opinion, noting that the press release drafted by the applicant contained only general and impersonal information about the flagrante delicto operation and the pending criminal investigation. The judge noted that the applicant had not mentioned in his press release and interview any magistrates or prison employees involved in the conditional release of detainees in Baia Mare Prison. The applicant could not be held liable for the fact that, after presenting his press release, AXA TV had made express references to the judge delegated to the Baia Mare Prison. The evidence in the file proved that judge G.E. already had a strained relationship with the local media. 43.  On 5 May 2009, the day on which the disciplinary action against the applicant was approved, the SCM’s disciplinary commission for prosecutors issued a decision to remove him from his position as chief prosecutor in the prosecutor’s office attached to the Maramureş County Court. 44.  The applicant challenged this decision before the plenary of the SCM’s members on 8 May 2009. 45.  On 21 May 2009 in a plenary meeting, the SCM dismissed the applicant’s challenge. 46.  The applicant appealed against this decision before the High Court of Cassation and Justice. 47.  By a decision of 8 December 2009 the High Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It held that the applicant’s removal as chief prosecutor had been the direct consequence of imposing on the applicant a disciplinary sanction pursuant to the mandatory provisions of Article 51 § 2 let c) of Law no. 303/2004. The removal of a magistrate from a leading position following imposition of a disciplinary sanction is similarly mandatory according to the law (see paragraph 50 below). 48.  On 19 May 2009 the deputy chief prosecutor in the prosecutor’s office attached to the Maramureş County Court lodged a complaint against the applicant, claiming that the latter had continued to act as chief prosecutor in spite of the SCM’s decision of 5 May 2009 by which he had been removed from that position (see paragraph 43 above). 49.  A fresh set of disciplinary proceedings was instituted against the applicant, who alleged that he had been threatened with exclusion from the profession if he continued to exercise his duties as chief prosecutor. He had therefore decided to give up his position even though the appeal on points of law against the SCM’s decision to remove him from the position of chief prosecutor had had a suspensive effect according to the law.


4.  Between 1986 and 1987 the applicants took part in the clean-up operation at the Chernobyl nuclear disaster site. They were subsequently registered disabled and became entitled to various social benefits and compensation paid on a regular basis. 5.  Considering these benefits insufficient, the applicants together with other 482 people, sued the Russian Ministry of Finance for additional compensation corresponding to non-pecuniary damage suffered as a result of their participation in the operation. 6.  On different dates in January and April 2011 the Nalchik Town Court of Kabardino-Balkaria (“the Town Court”) allowed their claims in part and awarded each claimant, including the applicants, compensation ranging between 1,200,000 Russian roubles (RUB) and RUB 1,600,000 for non‑pecuniary damage. 7.  No appeals were lodged against these judgments within the statutory ten-day time-limit. The judgments became final but have never been executed. 8.  On different dates the Town Court granted the defendant authority’s request to extend the time-limit for appeal on the grounds that the authorities had not received a copy of the judgment in due course. Subsequently the regional Supreme Court quashed the judgments delivered in the applicants’ favour on the grounds that they had been based on retrospective application of the law.


5.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Moscow. 6.  On 29 December 2007 N., the owner of two rooms in flat 10 located at 3‑3, ulitsa Anny Severyanovoy, Moscow, signed a deed of gift in respect of the rooms for Ya. The Moscow City Department of the Federal Registration Service (the “Registration Service”) registered the deed and Ya.’s title to the rooms. 7.  On an unspecified date the investigative committee opened criminal investigation into M.’s actions who was suspected of having tricked N. into signing the deed of gift for Ya.’s benefit. 8.  On 2 June 2008 Ya. sold the rooms to the applicant. According to the sale contract, the applicant paid 300,000 Russian roubles (RUB) for the rooms. 9.  On 11 July 2008 the Preobrazhenskiy District Court of Moscow issued a seizure order in respect of the rooms within the framework of the criminal investigation on the charges of fraud against M. 10.  On 16 July 2008 the Registration Service registered the sale agreement between Ya. and the applicant and the applicant’s title to the rooms. 11.  On 28 September 2009 the District Court found M. guilty of multiple offences, including a fraud in respect of the room later purchased by the applicant, and sentenced him to fourteen years’ imprisonment. The Court established that M. had tricked N. into signing the deed of gift in respect of the two rooms whilst M. had actually sold the rooms to Ya. 12.  On 16 March 2010 N. died. 13.  On 7 February 2014 the Department of Housing of the City of Moscow (the “Housing Department”) brought a civil action seeking restitution of the title to the two rooms to the City of Moscow and the applicant’s eviction. 14.  On 29 December 2014 the Presnenskiy District Court of Moscow granted the Housing Department’s claims. The court found the deed of gift null and void. It further established that N., the lawful owner of the rooms, had died intestate and without heirs. Accordingly the rooms should be considered a bona vacantia and should be transferred to the City of Moscow, even though the applicant had bought the rooms in good faith. The court transferred the title to the rooms to the City of Moscow and ordered the applicant’s eviction. 15.  On 18 June 2015 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 29 December 2014 on appeal. 16.  On 26 October 2015 the City Court refused to grant the applicant leave to a cassation appeal against the judgments of 29 December 2014 and 18 June 2015. 17.  On 9 March 2015 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation issued a similar decision. 18.  The parties did not provide any information as regards the enforcement of the judgments in the City’s favour.


11.  The applicant was born in 1953. He is currently detained in Istanbul. 12.  The applicant is an economics professor and a journalist in Turkey. Prior to the attempted military coup of 15 July 2016, he presented a political discussion programme on Can Erzincan TV, a television channel that was closed down following the adoption of Legislative Decree no. 668, issued on 27 July 2016 in connection with the state of emergency (see paragraphs 14-18 below). 13.  In the years leading up to the attempted coup, the applicant had been known for his critical views on the serving government’s policies. 14.  During the night of 15 to 16 July 2016 a group of members of the Turkish armed forces calling themselves the “Peace at Home Council” attempted to carry out a military coup aimed at overthrowing the democratically elected parliament, government and President of Turkey. 15.  During the attempted coup, soldiers under the instigators’ control bombarded several strategic State buildings, including the parliament building and the presidential compound, attacked the hotel where the President was staying, held the Chief of General Staff hostage, attacked television channels and fired shots at demonstrators. During the night of violence, more than 300 people were killed and more than 2,500 were injured. 16.  The day after the attempted military coup, the national authorities blamed the network linked to Fetullah Gülen, a Turkish citizen living in Pennsylvania (United States of America) and considered to be the leader of a terrorist organisation known as FETÖ/PDY (“Gülenist Terror Organisation/Parallel State Structure”). Several criminal investigations were subsequently initiated by the appropriate prosecuting authorities in relation to suspected members of that organisation. 17.  On 20 July 2016 the government declared a state of emergency for a period of three months as from 21 July 2016; the state of emergency was subsequently extended for further periods of three months by the Council of Ministers, chaired by the President, most recently with effect from 19 January 2018. 18.  On 21 July 2016 the Turkish authorities gave notice to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe of a derogation from the Convention under Article 15. 19.  On an unspecified date, the Istanbul public prosecutor initiated a criminal investigation in respect of suspected members of FETÖ/PDY. In addition, on the basis of Article 3 § 1 (l) of Legislative Decree no. 668, he ordered restrictions on the right of the suspects’ lawyers to inspect the contents of the investigation file or to obtain copies of documents in the file. In the course of the criminal investigation, the applicant was arrested at his home on 10 September 2016 and taken into police custody on suspicion of having links to the media wing of the organisation in question. 20.  On the same day, the applicant’s home was searched by police officers without his lawyers being present, as they had been prevented from attending the search on account of the state of emergency. 21.  Later that day, the applicant lodged an objection challenging his detention in police custody and seeking his release. On 12 September 2016 the Istanbul magistrate’s court dismissed the objection. 22.  The applicant remained in police custody for twelve days at the Istanbul police anti-terrorist branch. During his first five days in custody, he was not permitted to speak to his lawyers. 23.  On 20 September 2016, while at the police station, the applicant stated that he was asserting his right to remain silent. 24.  On 21 September 2016 he was questioned by the Istanbul public prosecutor on suspicion of attempting to overthrow the government or to prevent it from discharging its duties (Article 312 of the Criminal Code – (“the CC”) and of being a member of the FETÖ/PDY terrorist organisation (Article 314 of the CC). 25.  The records of the questioning indicate that the applicant was accused of: (i) attempting to discredit an investigation into an alleged coup (the “Balyoz” case); (ii) making certain statements serving the interests of FETÖ/PDY, in particular during a television programme broadcast on Can Erzincan TV on 14 July 2016, in the course of which, according to the public prosecutor, the terrorist organisation had sought to prepare the public for a military coup; (iii) holding an account with Bank Asya, a bank with alleged links to FETÖ/PDY; (iv) avoiding a criminal investigation through the assistance of members of the national police suspected of belonging to FETÖ/PDY; (v) visiting Fetullah Gülen at his home in Pennsylvania and kissing his hand; and (vi) having in his possession a United States one-dollar bill with an “F” serial number (denoting the initial of the forename Fetullah). In reply, the applicant stated that he did not know any Turkish army officers and had no links to the attempted coup. The comments he had made during the television programme in question had been intended as warnings to prevent future military coups. Regarding the bank account, some years previously he had taught for three months at a private university, which had asked him to open an account at the bank in question for payment of his wages. He added that he had not been aware of having avoided a criminal investigation through the assistance of certain suspected members of an illegal organisation, and that this was a matter to be taken up with the police officers allegedly responsible. Furthermore, he had visited Fetullah Gülen as a member of a group of journalists, for purely professional reasons linked to his role as a journalist, and had never kissed anyone’s hand. Lastly, the one-dollar bill was of no special significance. 26.  On 22 September 2016 the applicant appeared before the Istanbul 10th Magistrate’s Court and was questioned about his alleged acts and the accusations against him. At the end of the hearing, the magistrate ordered the applicant’s pre-trial detention, having taken the following factors into consideration: the strong suspicions against him; the nature of the alleged offences and the fact that they were among the offences listed in Article 100 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”) – the so-called “catalogue offences”, for which a suspect’s pre-trial detention was deemed justified in the event of strong suspicion; the risk of absconding; and the risk that alternative measures to detention might be insufficient to ensure the applicant’s participation in the criminal proceedings. In the reasons for his decision, the magistrate noted the following: during the attempted military coup, members of FETÖ/PDY had used heavy weapons; since February 2012 the organisation in question had been explicitly waging a campaign against the political authorities; the members of FETÖ/PDY had attempted to force the government’s resignation by discrediting it in public opinion, especially through judicial operations carried out between 17 and 25 December 2013; and the organisation had taken control of several media outlets with a view to achieving its aim. The magistrate further noted that during the television broadcast on 14 July 2016, the applicant had said: “Within the State of the Republic of Turkey, there is probably another structure, whose components outside Turkey are closely observing and documenting all these events. It is not clear exactly when [it] will pull its hand out of the bag or how [it] will do so” (“Türkiye Devleti içinde de muhtemelen bütün bu gelişmeleri dış dünyada daha fazla belgeleyen, izleyen bir başka da yapı var. Onun ne zaman torbadan elini çıkaracağı, nasıl elini çıkaracağı belli değil”). The magistrate concluded that there were suspicions that the contents of the applicant’s statements about the political authorities had been intended to prepare the ground for a military coup and were not covered by freedom of the press. 27.  On 28 September 2016 the applicant lodged an objection against the order for his pre-trial detention. In a decision of 10 October 2016 the Istanbul 2nd Magistrate’s Court dismissed the objection. 28.  On 14 October 2016 the applicant lodged a fresh application for his release. In a decision of 26 October 2016 the Istanbul 3rd Magistrate’s Court rejected the application. 29.  On various dates the applicant lodged further applications seeking his release pending trial. According to the documents produced by the parties, the applications were all rejected by the competent magistrates’ courts, for example on 10 and 24 November 2016 and 8 December 2016. 30.  On 14 April 2017 the Istanbul public prosecutor filed a bill of indictment with the Istanbul Assize Court in respect of several individuals, including the applicant, in particular accusing them, under Articles 309, 311 and 312 in conjunction with Article 220 § 6 of the CC, of attempting to overthrow the constitutional order, the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the government by force and violence, and of committing offences on behalf of a terrorist organisation without being members of it. The public prosecutor presented the following items of evidence against the applicant: two articles written by him; his comments during the television broadcast on 14 July 2016; the fact that he had an account with Bank Asya; and the seizure at his home of a United States one-dollar bill with an “F” serial number. He sought the imposition of three aggravated life sentences and a sentence of up to fifteen years’ imprisonment on the applicant. 31.  On an unspecified date, the public prosecutor filed his submissions on the merits (esas hakkında mütalaa). He sought the applicant’s conviction for the offences with which he was charged. Besides the evidence he had already submitted when the bill of indictment had been filed, the public prosecutor also produced messages sent by other suspected members of FETÖ/PDY via ByLock, an encrypted messaging service allegedly used by members of that organisation. 32.  During the criminal proceedings, the applicant denied having committed any criminal offence. 33.  In a summary judgment of 16 February 2018 the Istanbul 26th Assize Court sentenced the applicant to aggravated life imprisonment, in accordance with Article 309 of the CC, for attempting to overthrow the constitutional order. The criminal proceedings are still ongoing in the national courts. 34.  On 8 November 2016 the applicant lodged an individual application with the Constitutional Court. He complained that he had been placed in pre-trial detention on account of his articles and statements and alleged that this infringed his right to liberty and security and his right to freedom of expression and of the press. He also submitted that he had been arrested and detained for reasons other than those provided for by the Constitution. In addition, he complained that his detention in police custody had been unlawful and excessively lengthy, that he had had no access to the investigation file in order to challenge his pre-trial detention, that the magistrates ordering his detention had not been independent or impartial, that no hearings had been held following his applications challenging his continued pre-trial detention, and that the conditions of his detention were incompatible with the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment. 35.  On 11 January 2018 the Constitutional Court gave a judgment (no. 2016/23672) in which it held, by eleven votes to six, that there had been a violation of the right to liberty and security and the right to freedom of expression and of the press. 36.  With regard to the applicant’s complaint that his pre-trial detention was unlawful, the Constitutional Court noted firstly that the evidence forming the basis for his detention had included: (i) an article entitled “The meaning of Sledgehammer” (“Balyoz’un Anlamı”), published in the Star newspaper in 2010; (ii) his statements during the television programme broadcast on Can Erzincan TV on 14 July 2016; and (iii) an article entitled “Turbulence” (“Türbülans”), published on his own website on 20 July 2016. After examining the substance of these items of evidence, the Constitutional Court held that the investigating authorities had been unable to demonstrate any factual basis that might indicate that the applicant had been acting in accordance with the aims of FETÖ/PDY or with the purpose of preparing the ground for a possible military coup. The Constitutional Court observed that, as well as having published the above-mentioned articles and made the statements in question, the applicant was accused of holding an account with Bank Asya, having avoided a criminal investigation through the connivance of members of the national police suspected of belonging to FETÖ/PDY, and having in his possession a United States one-dollar bill with an “F” serial number. Addressing those allegations, the Constitutional Court held, having regard to the applicant’s testimony and line of defence, that no specific facts had been established that could refute his explanations, which were “consistent with the normal course of life”. Similarly, regarding the contents of the messages exchanged by other individuals via ByLock, the Constitutional Court held that the messages could not in themselves be regarded as significant indications that the applicant had committed an offence. Accordingly, it concluded that “strong evidence that an offence had been committed” had not been sufficiently established in the applicant’s case. Next, the Constitutional Court examined whether there had been a violation of the right to liberty and security in the light of Article 15 of the Constitution (providing for the suspension of the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms in the event of war, general mobilisation, a state of siege or a state of emergency). On this point, it noted firstly that in a state of emergency, the Constitution provided for the possibility of taking measures derogating from the guarantees set forth in Article 19, to the extent required by the situation. It observed, however, that if it were accepted that people could be placed in pre-trial detention without any strong evidence that they had committed an offence, the guarantees of the right to liberty and security would be meaningless. Accordingly, it held that the applicant’s pre-trial detention was disproportionate to the strict exigencies of the situation and that his right to liberty and security, as safeguarded by Article 19 § 3 of the Constitution, had been breached. 37.  However, having regard to the length of the applicant’s detention and the documents available to it, the Constitutional Court held that his complaint that he had been detained for political purposes, on grounds other than those provided for by the Constitution, lacked a sufficient basis. 38.  With regard to the complaint concerning freedom of expression and of the press, the Constitutional Court observed that the applicant’s initial and continued pre-trial detention on account of his articles and statements amounted to interference with the exercise of that right. Taking into account his arguments regarding the lawfulness of his pre-trial detention, the Constitutional Court held that such a measure, which had serious consequences since it resulted in deprivation of liberty, could not be regarded as a necessary and proportionate interference in a democratic society. It further noted that it could not be clearly established from the reasons given for ordering and extending the applicant’s pre-trial detention whether the measure met a pressing social need or why it was necessary. Lastly, it found that it was clear that the applicant’s pre-trial detention could have a chilling effect on freedom of expression and of the press, in so far as it had not been based on any concrete evidence other than his articles and statements (see paragraph 235 of the Constitutional Court’s judgment). Regarding the application of Article 15 of the Constitution, it referred to its findings concerning the lawfulness of his pre-trial detention (as set out in paragraphs 155-57 of its judgment – see paragraph 36 above) and held that there had also been a violation of freedom of expression and freedom of the press as enshrined in Articles 26 and 28 of the Constitution. 39.  With regard to the complaints concerning the lawfulness and duration of the applicant’s detention in police custody, the Constitutional Court held that he should have brought an action under Article 141 § 1 (a) of the CCP but had refrained from doing so. Furthermore, it noted that there was no information in the application or the appended material as to whether the applicant had lodged an objection under Article 91 § 5 of the CCP against his detention in police custody. Accordingly, it declared these complaints inadmissible for failure to exhaust the appropriate remedies. 40.  As to the complaint of a lack of independence and impartiality on the part of the magistrates who had ordered the applicant’s pre-trial detention, the Constitutional Court dismissed it as being manifestly ill-founded, on the grounds that the magistrates were appointed by the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors and were entitled to the same constitutional safeguards as other judges. 41.  Concerning the applicant’s complaint that he had had no access to the investigation file, the Constitutional Court held that he had had sufficient means available to prepare his defence to the charges against him and challenge his pre-trial detention, in view of the contents of the detailed questions put to him during questioning by the public prosecutor and the magistrate, and the overall duration of the restriction on access to the case file. Accordingly, it declared this complaint inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded. 42.  With regard to the complaint that no hearing had been held during the examination of the applicant’s applications challenging his pre-trial detention, the Constitutional Court found that there was no obligation to hold a hearing on each and every objection to pre-trial detention orders and their extension, and that where a person had been able to appear before the first-instance court considering the issue of detention, the fact that there was no hearing on a subsequent appeal did not in itself contravene the Constitution since it did not breach the principle of equality of arms. The Constitutional Court noted that the applicant and his lawyer had been present at the hearing on 22 September 2016, following which the applicant had been placed in pre-trial detention. It observed that he had lodged an objection against his detention on 28 September 2016, that the objection had been dismissed on 10 October 2016 and that eighteen days had thus elapsed between his previous appearance in court and the dismissal of his objection. Taking this period into account, the Constitutional Court considered that there had been no obligation to hold a hearing during the examination of his objection, and accordingly declared this complaint likewise inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded. 43.  Lastly, with regard to the applicant’s complaint that the conditions of his detention were incompatible with the prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment, the Constitutional Court observed that he had not raised this issue with the enforcement judge. Accordingly, it declared the complaint inadmissible for failure to exhaust the appropriate remedies. 44.  Having regard to its findings of violations, the Constitutional Court held that the applicant was to be awarded 20,000 Turkish liras (TRY – approximately 4,500 euros (EUR)) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and TRY 2,219.50 (approximately EUR 500) in respect of costs and expenses. 45.  As the applicant was still in pre-trial detention on the date of delivery of its judgment, the Constitutional Court decided to transmit the judgment to the Istanbul 26th Assize Court so that it could take “the necessary action”. 46.  On 11 January 2018 the applicant’s lawyer applied to the Istanbul 26th Assize Court for his client’s release. 47.  On the same day, the Istanbul 26th Assize Court rejected the application by two votes to one, on the grounds that it had not yet received official notification of the Constitutional Court’s judgment. It held in addition that the summary judgment submitted by the applicant’s lawyer did not contain any indication by the Constitutional Court of a measure relating to the applicant’s release. 48.  In his opinion the dissenting judge stated that, in accordance with Article 153 § 6 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court’s judgments were binding on the legislative, executive and judicial organs, the administrative authorities and natural and legal persons. Accordingly, where a violation had been found on account of a judicial decision, the relevant court was required to take the necessary action to redress the effects of the violation, pursuant to section 50(2) of Law no. 6216 on the establishment and rules of procedure of the Constitutional Court (“Law no. 6216”). In his view, the only way of satisfying this requirement in the applicant’s case was to order his release. 49.  On 12 January 2018 the applicant lodged an objection with a view to securing his release, submitting a copy of the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 11 January 2018 as published on the court’s website. 50.  In a decision delivered on 15 January 2018 the Istanbul 27th Assize Court, by two votes to one, dismissed the applicant’s objection and ordered the continuation of his pre-trial detention. In reaching that finding, it observed that the Constitutional Court’s judgment had not been published in the Official Gazette as required by Article 153 § 6 of the Constitution. 51.  In his dissenting opinion, the judge in the minority expressed the view that, since the Constitutional Court’s judgments were binding and not subject to appeal, the applicant should be released pending trial without waiting for the judgment in question to be published in the Official Gazette. 52.  On 19 January 2018 the Constitutional Court’s judgment on the individual application lodged by the applicant was published in Official Gazette no. 20306. 53.  On the same day, the Istanbul 26th Assize Court examined of its own motion the question of the applicant’s continued detention. Noting firstly that the examination of the merits of an individual application to the Constitutional Court against a judicial decision entailed determining whether there had been a violation of fundamental rights and what measures would be appropriate to put an end to the violation, and secondly that grounds of appeal on points of law could not be examined by the Constitutional Court in the context of an individual application, it found that the Constitutional Court did not have jurisdiction to assess the evidence in the case file. On that account, the Constitutional Court’s judgment no. 2016/23672 was not in compliance with the law. The Assize Court added that ordering the applicant’s release as an automatic consequence of the judgment in question would run counter to the general principles of law, the independence of the courts, the principle that no authority could give orders or instructions to the courts, and the “natural judge” principle. Lastly, by two votes to one, it ordered the continuation of the applicant’s pre-trial detention. In so holding, it took the following into account: the evidence before it; the large scale of the attempted military coup; the risk of the applicant’s absconding; the current state of the case file; and the severity of the potential sentence in the event of a conviction. 54.  The judge who had voted in favour of the applicant’s release stated in a dissenting opinion that the Constitutional Court’s judgments were binding and that the Assize Court was thus required to comply with judgment no. 2016/23672. He pointed out that the only possible way for it to do so was to order the applicant’s release. 55.  On 30 January 2018 the applicant lodged a further individual application with the Constitutional Court. Relying on Articles 5, 6 and 18 of the Convention, he complained mainly that he had been kept in pre-trial detention despite the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 11 January 2018.