4.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Nowogard, Poland. 5.  The applicant co-owned an estate. On 15 January 1988 she filed with the Goleniów District Court (sąd rejonowy) an action against the other co-owners for overdue rent and the recovery of possession of some property located on that estate. 6.  On 30 June 1992 the court gave judgment, in which it dismissed the action. 7.  On 9 March 1993 the Szczecin Regional Court (sąd wojewódzki) dismissed the applicant's appeal against that judgment. 8.  On 12 May 1993 she requested the reopening of the proceedings, submitting that she had not been notified of the appellate hearing. 9.  On 16 September 1993 the Regional Court quashed the judgment of 9 March 1993 and a part of the District Court's judgment. It remitted the part of the case concerning rent for re-examination. 10.  On 24 November 1994 the District Court summoned the applicant to specify her claim. On 16 February 1995 the court, having received the applicant's response, requested her to specify it once more. 11.  On 28 March 1995 the case was transferred to the Szczecin Regional Court, which was competent to examine it as a court of the first-instance. 12.  On 31 October 1995 it held a hearing. The applicant withdrew her claim against one of the co-owners and raised a claim against the Goleniów District Office (Urząd Rejonowy), which also co-owned the disputed property. 13.  On 5 September 1996 the court held a hearing. On the same day it summoned the Goleniów District Office (Urząd Rejonowy) to participate in the procedure as the defendant. 14.  On 18 July 1997 the court stayed the proceedings after the applicant's failure to specify her claim within the set time-limit. The applicant did not appeal against that decision. 15.  On 8 August 1997 she requested that her legal-aid lawyer be replaced with another one. 16.  On 17 May 1999 the applicant's lawyer asked the court to resume the examination of the case. On 26 May 1999 the court summoned the applicant to specify her claim and identify the defendant. The applicant submitted that that order was not served on her. She stated that she had been unable to comply with the court order because of difficulty in assessing the value of the property the possession of which she had sought. 17.  By 28 August 2003 the court had not resumed the proceedings. 18.  On 6 June 1991 the applicant filed with the Goleniów District Court an action in which she requested that the co-ownership of an estate be dissolved. 19.  On 17 December 1993 and 12 January 1994 the court held hearings. 20.  In March 1994 an expert opinion was prepared. 21.  The Government submitted that on 22 March 1994 the applicant challenged that opinion and changed her statement of claim. The applicant stated that she had never challenged that opinion and that the modification of her claim had only followed the conclusions of the expert opinion. 22.  On 19 April 1995, as well as 12 June and 17 July 1996 the court held hearings. In June 1996 the applicant changed her statement of claim. 23.  On 12 November 1996 the court exempted the participants to the proceedings from fees relating to an expert opinion. It also ordered the preparation of an opinion. 24.  In 1997 an expert proposed two projects for the division of the estate. The applicant requested a correction to those projects. The Goleniów District Office, being one of the co-owners of the disputed property, did not accept the correction proposed by applicant. 25.  On 17 November 1997 the court issued a decision on remuneration for an expert. In February 1998 that decision was amended. 26.  On 20 May and 30 November 1998 hearings were held. 27.  On 10 December 1998 an expert opinion was ordered. 28.  On 10 February 1999 the court awarded the expert remuneration for the opinion. The applicant appealed that decision. In reply to the court's enquiry, she stated that in fact she intended to challenge that opinion. 29.  On 30 April and 17 May 1999 the court held hearings. 30.  On 24 May 1999 the applicant challenged the participation of an expert in the proceedings. On 12 July 1999 the court dismissed her challenge. On 19 August 1999 it rejected the applicant's appeal against that decision. 31.  On 9 February and 10 April 2000 the court held hearings. It ordered the preparation of another expert opinion. In September an expert informed the court that due to a heavy workload he was unable to prepare that opinion. 32.  On 30 November 2000 the court ordered another expert to carry on that opinion. The expert submitted the opinion in February 2001 and an annex to it in June 2001. The applicant submitted that she was served with a copy of that opinion on 24 July 2001. Subsequently, she challenged it. 33.  The hearing scheduled for 26 November 2001 was adjourned because of the absence of an expert. 34.  On 17 December 2001 the applicant modified her claim. 35.  On 19 December 2001 and 11 January 2002 the court held hearings. 36.  On 13 February 2002 it gave judgment. The applicant lodged an appeal. 37.  On 21 January 2003 the Szczecin Regional Court dismissed her appeal.


4.  The applicant was born in 1976 and lives in Split. 5.  An investigation was opened against the applicant and twenty other individuals on 24 November 2006 by an investigating judge of the Split County Court (Županijski sud u Splitu) in connection with a suspicion that between 2003 and November 2006 they had organised distribution of heroin in Dubrovnik and on the island of Korčula. 6.  During the investigation, the investigating judge heard evidence from a number of witnesses, ordered searches, seizures and freezing of assets, and commissioned psychiatric, telecommunications and financial expert reports. 7.  Following an order by the investigating judge, on 24 November 2006 the police carried out a search of the applicant’s flat and on 5 February 2007 the psychiatrist submitted his report in respect of the applicant. He found that the applicant had used drugs for a relatively short period of time and had not developed an addiction. 8.  On 15 May, 15 June, 8 August and 5 October 2007 the investigating judge established that all the necessary evidence had not been obtained and asked the president of the Split County Court to extend the investigation. The president of the Split County Court granted the requests and the investigation was extended on each of those occasions. 9.  The State Attorney’s Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organised Crime (Državno odvjetništvo, Ured za suzbijanje korupcije i organiziranog kriminaliteta; hereinafter: “the State Attorney’s Office”) indicted the applicant and sixteen others on 15 November 2007 in the Split County Court on charges of conspiracy to supply heroin in Dubrovnik and on the island of Korčula between 2003 and November 2006. 10.  The applicant lodged an objection against the indictment on 7 December 2007, arguing that it had numerous substantive and procedural flaws. On 7 February 2008 the Split County Court sent the indictment back to the State Attorney’s Office on the ground that it needed further clarification. 11.  The State Attorney’s Office submitted an amended indictment against the applicant and sixteen others before the Split County Court on 22 February 2008, reiterating the same charges of conspiracy to supply heroin. On 5 March 2008 the applicant lodged an objection against the above amended indictment, arguing that it had numerous substantive and procedural flaws. A three-judge panel of the Split County Court dismissed the applicant’s objection on 14 March 2008 as ill-founded. 12.  At a hearing on 13 November 2008 the applicant pleaded not guilty to the charges against him. 13.  At hearings held on 17 and 18 December 2008 the trial court heard evidence from two witnesses. Further hearings scheduled for 11 and 12 February 2009 were adjourned indefinitely as one of the defendants had broken his leg and could not attend. 14.  A hearing scheduled for 29 June 2009 was also adjourned because the first accused had asked for members to be removed from the trial panel. 15.  Further hearings were held on 28 August, 8, 15, 16 and 28 September, 20, 21 and 22 October, 2, 3, 4, 17 and 18 November and 21 December 2009, 27 and 29 January, 15, 17, 18 and 19 February, and 15, 29 and 30 March 2010. 16.  At a hearing on 13 May 2010 the applicant gave oral evidence denying all the charges. At hearings held on 14, 17, 21 and 24 May 2010 the other accused gave oral evidence and the parties made their closing statements. 17.  On 24 May 2010 the Split County Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to three years and six months’ imprisonment. 18.  The applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) against the first-instance judgment on 31 January 2011. 19.  The appeal proceedings are still pending. 20.  On 22 November 2006 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of supplying heroin. 21.  The investigating judge of the Split County Court heard the applicant on 23 November 2006 and remanded him in custody for a further forty-eight hours under Article 98 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The applicant appealed against this decision, arguing, inter alia, that he was permanently employed by company K.-V. and had not been engaging in any criminal activity. To support his arguments he submitted his employment contract with company K.-V. On 24 November 2006 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court dismissed his appeal. 22.  On 24 November 2006 the investigating judge remanded the applicant in custody under Article 102 § 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of reoffending and gravity of charges). The relevant part of the decision reads:
“The pre-trial detention was ordered in respect of the defendants listed under [heading] II of this decision under Article 102 § 1(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, because it is possible to order pre-trial detention on this ground for the offence at issue and because [the charges] concern a large quantity of heroin, which the defendants supplied to a larger number of people and for a longer period of time, therefore probably damaging the health of a significant number of people, which all contributes to the particularly grave circumstances of the offence...
The pre-trial detention was ordered under Article 102 § 1(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of defendants ... Milan Trifković, ... and ... since they have already been convicted of similar or other offences they now have no permanent income, so there is justified fear that they will reoffend.” 23.  The applicant lodged an appeal on 6 December 2006, arguing that the charges against him suggested that he had had only a minor role in the alleged organisation of supply of heroin. As to the risk of reoffending, he argued that it was not true that he had no permanent income, as he was employed by company K.-V. In this connection he indicated his employment contract and submitted further documents as evidence of his income. The applicant also asked that the detention be replaced by another preventive measure that the court deemed appropriate. 24.  The appeal was dismissed on 8 December 2006 by a three-judge panel of the Split County Court. The relevant part of the decision reads:
“In view of the offence [the accused] are charged with, this panel finds that there are particularly grave circumstances justifying their detention under Article 102 § 1(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure given that ..., Milan Trifković and ... have already been convicted of similar or other offences, so that for them the detention under Article 102 § 1(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is also justified.” 25.  The investigating judge extended the applicant’s detention on 20 December 2006, under Article 102 § 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of reoffending and gravity of charges), reiterating the arguments in his decision of 24 November 2006. 26.  The applicant appealed on 29 December 2006, pointing out that according to the charges held against him he had had only a minor role in the alleged organisation of heroin supplying. He also argued that nothing suggested that he might reoffend, since he was not a drug addict and his previous conviction for the possession of a small quantity of drugs could not in any respect be associated with the charges against him in the present case. He again asked that the detention be replaced by another preventive measure that the court deemed appropriate. 27.  That appeal was dismissed on 17 January 2007 by a three-judge panel of the Split County Court. They reiterated their previous arguments. As to the risk of reoffending they added:
“...and since [the defendants] are users of illegal drugs and do not have a permanent income, the investigating judge properly extended their detention under Article 102 § 1(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” 28.  On 19 January 2007 the investigating judge extended the applicant’s detention under Article 102 § 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, reiterating the arguments in his previous decisions. 29.  The applicant appealed on 23 January 2007, again stating that he had had only a minor role in the organisation of the supply of heroin and argued that the finding that he had no permanent income was not true, because he was employed. The applicant again asked for his detention to be replaced with another preventive measure. 30.  The appeal was dismissed on 8 February 2007 by a three-judge panel of the Split County Court which reiterated its previous arguments. 31.  On 20 February and 20 March 2007 the investigating judge extended the applicant’s detention under Article 102 § 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, using the same formulation as before. 32.  The applicant lodged an appeal on 21 March 2007 where he argued, relying on the Court’s case-law, that the investigating judge had failed to provide sufficient reasons for extending his detention and that he had failed to consider the possibility of applying another preventive measure. 33.  The appeal was dismissed on 4 April 2007 by a three-judge panel of the Split County Court which reiterated that the gravity of the charges and the fact that the applicant had already been convicted of similar offences and that he was a drug user, justified his detention under Article 102 § 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 34.  On 20 April 2007 the investigating judge extended the applicant’s detention under Article 102 § 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, using the same formulation as in his previous decisions. 35.  The applicant appealed on 23 April 2007, arguing, inter alia, that the investigating judge had insisted that he had no permanent income, which was not true, because he was employed, and in that respect he had provided sufficient evidence. He also asked that the detention be replaced with another preventive measure. The appeal was dismissed on 4 May 2007 by a three-judge panel of the Split County Court, which endorsed the reasoning of the investigating judge. 36.  On 18 May 2007 the investigating judge extended the applicant’s detention under Article 102 § 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, using the same formulation as in his previous decisions. 37.  The applicant appealed on 21 May 2007, reiterating his arguments that there were no grounds for his continued detention. He again asked for the detention to be replaced with another preventive measure. On 30 May 2007 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal, reiterating its previous arguments. 38.  The investigating judge extended the applicant’s detention on 20 June 2007 again under Article 102 § 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, using identical phrases as in his previous decisions. 39.  The applicant lodged an appeal on 21 June 2007 against the above decision, reiterating his previous arguments and asking for his detention to be replaced with another preventive measure: on 27 June 2007 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court dismissed his appeal, on the same grounds as before. 40.  On 19 July 2007 the investigating judge extended the applicant’s detention under Article 102 § 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, using the same formulation as in his previous decisions. 41.  The applicant lodged an appeal on 25 July 2007, reiterating his previous arguments and asking for his detention to be replaced with another preventive measure, but on 31 July 2007 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal, using identical phrases to those in its previous decision. 42.  On 20 August 2007 the investigating judge extended the applicant’s detention under Article 102 § 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, again using identical reasoning. 43.  The applicant lodged an appeal on 21 August 2007 and on 28 August 2007 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court dismissed it, using the same formulation as in its previous decisions. 44.  The investigating judge extended the applicant’s detention on 20 September 2007 under Article 102 § 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, using identical phrases as in his previous decisions. 45.  The applicant lodged an appeal on 25 September 2007. He again pointed out that the same effect of extending his detention could be achieved by ordering another preventive measure. On 3 October 2007 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court dismissed the appeal, using the same formulation as in its previous decisions. 46.  On 19 October 2007 the investigating judge extended the applicant’s detention under Article 102 § 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, reiterating his previous reasoning. 47.   The applicant lodged an appeal on 23 October 2007, reiterating his previous arguments, but it was dismissed by a three-judge panel of the Split County Court on 26 October 2007. 48.  On 16 November 2007, after the applicant had been indicted in the Split County Court, a three-judge panel of that court extended the applicant’s detention, again under Article 102 § 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of reoffending and gravity of charges). The relevant part of the decision reads:
“The criminal record ... shows that the accused ... Milan Trifković ... [has] already been convicted of a criminal offence of the same type as the one concerned in these proceedings ...
Furthermore, the report drawn up by a neuropsychiatrist ... shows that the defendant... Milan Trifković ... [is a] drug user ...
Therefore since the accused ... Milan Trifković ... [are] drug users ... there is a risk that they might reoffend.
Also, since the accused are charged [with having] organised a group with the aim of trafficking in illegal drugs on the island of Korčula, and were engaged [in that activity for] a long period of time, together with J.C., who was the leader of the group and of all [the criminal] activities, and particularly having in mind the gravity [ of the offences at issue] and the danger to society, as well the prevalence of such offences, this panel considers that in the case at issue there are particularly grave circumstances which significantly differ from the usual manner in which the offence at issue is committed.” 49.  Against that decision the applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court on 28 November 2007. As to his previous conviction, he argued that he had been convicted only of possession of illegal drugs for his personal use, which could not in any respect be associated with the charges against him in the present case. Moreover, the psychiatric report showed that he had no addiction to drugs and that there was no risk that he would reoffend. He also pointed out that he was permanently employed and that he had a regular source of income. As to the gravity of the charges, the applicant argued that the charges against him suggested that he had had only a minor role in the alleged organisation of the supply of heroin. The applicant also asked for the detention to be replaced with any preventive measure that the court deemed appropriate. 50.  On 7 December 2007 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal, endorsing the reasoning of the Split County Court. It made no reference to the applicant’s request that his detention be replaced with another preventive measure. 51.  The applicant’s detention was further extended on 7 February 2008 by a three-judge panel of the Split County Court under Article 102 § 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, reiterating its previous arguments. 52.  On 12 February 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal against the above decision, reiterating his previous arguments and asking for his detention to be replaced with another preventive measure. The Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on 29 February 2008 in the following terms:
 “According to the indictment, the activities with which the accused are charged took place between the beginning of 2003 and mid-2006, and the accused J.C., in the broader area of Dubrovnik and Korčula, organised a criminal group in which he recruited ... Milan Trifković ... all in order to supply heroin.
Since all the accused were engaged in a criminal activity for a longer period of time, between the beginning of 2003 and mid-2006, in the broader area of Dubrovnik and Korčula, and since they showed a high degree of criminal resolve by organising continuous [criminal] activity, which shows a particular degree of persistence and criminal resolve, and taking this together with the fact that the accused ... Milan Trifković ... were on more occasions convicted of, [inter alia], the same or similar offences, and ... since the accused ... Milan Trifković are users of illegal drugs, there is a fear that they might reoffend...
Also, since the subject of the alleged [criminal] activity was distribution of the illegal drug heroin in large quantities, and since it could have been used for a large number of small packages for individual use, which, if sold on the illegal drug market, could endanger a large number of mostly young people, suggests... that there are particularly grave circumstances surrounding the offence ...
The preventive measures under Article 90 of the CCP in respect of the accused Milan Trifković would not have the same effect as detention on the basis of Article 102 § 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” 53.  A three-judge panel of the Split County Court on 29 April 2008 extended the applicant’s detention under Article 102 § 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, on the same grounds as before. 54.  The applicant lodged an appeal on 6 May 2008, reiterating his previous arguments, but on 30 May 2008 the Supreme Court dismissed it. 55.  On 24 July 2008 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court extended the applicant’s detention under Article 102 § 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, reiterating the same reasons as in its previous decisions. 56.  The applicant lodged an appeal against the above decision on 29 July 2008. He argued that the evidence from the case file showed that he had not been a member of the alleged criminal organisation. As to the risk of reoffending, he pointed out that his previous conviction had concerned small amounts of drugs, for his personal use only, and that he was not a drug addict. He also argued that he was employed and had a regular source of income. On 10 September 2008 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, reiterating the same arguments as in its previous decisions. 57.  On 10 November 2008 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court extended the applicant’s detention, again under Article 102 paragraph 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The relevant part of the decision reads:
“The criminal record ... shows that the defendant ... Milan Trifković ... [has] already been convicted of a criminal offence of the same type as the one concerned in these proceedings ...
Furthermore, the report drawn up by a neuropsychiatrist ... shows that the defendant... Milan Trifković ... [is a] drug user ...
Also, the defendants are charged with organising a group with the aim of trafficking in illegal drugs on the island of Korčula, that they had been engaging [in that activity for] a long period of time, together with J.C., who was the leader of the group and of all [the criminal] activities.
The above-mentioned circumstances, together with the fact that the defendants were allegedly members of a group which was continually [and for a long] period of time engaged in trafficking in illegal drugs, namely heroin, one of the hardest drugs, and that they thus put at risk the health of a large number of people, justify the extension of detention in respect of the defendants ... [including] Milan Trifković ... under Article 102 paragraph 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. These circumstances justify the fear of reoffending and also amount to particularly grave circumstances [in which] the offence [is alleged to have taken place].” 58.  The applicant lodged an appeal on 13 November 2008, in which he argued that the evidence thus far obtained had not implicated him in the offences in question, save for a statement given by a witness, Ž.T. However, he claimed that her statement was unreliable because it was both contradictory and hearsay evidence, and also contradicted the evidence given by other witnesses. The transcripts of telephone conversations of his which had been taped did not show that he had discussed details of drug trafficking with anyone. Furthermore, no material evidence which could connect him with trafficking in illegal drugs had been found on him. As regards the risk of reoffending, the applicant argued that, even if he had been a drug addict before being detained, during the period of his detention he would surely stop being one because he would not be able to take any drugs during his detention. As regards the argument that he had already been convicted of the same type of offence, he argued that his previous conviction concerned the possession of a small amount of drugs for his personal use, and that he was permanently employed. Against that background, he argued that there was no need for him to remain in detention and asked that his detention be replaced by another preventive measure. 59.  A three-judge panel of the Split County Court on 13 January 2009 again extended the applicant’s detention, under Article 102 paragraph 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and with the same reasoning as it had previously given. On 19 January 2009 the applicant lodged an appeal against this decision, reiterating his previous arguments. 60.  On 13 February 2009 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of 10 November 2008. The relevant part of the decision reads:
“The circumstances which show that there is a risk of reoffending ... are that the defendants are charged [with having been] ... members of a criminal organisation organised by the defendant J.C. in the period between the beginning of 2003 and November 2006, [operating in] the broader area of Dubrovnik and Korčula, and in which sixteen individuals were involved and mutually connected, among whom [were] the defendants Milan Trifković and ..., all [having the] aim of purchasing, storing, transferring and selling the drug heroin in order to obtain significant material gain. They delivered heroin previously bought by the defendant J.C. in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro for the needs of drug addicts on the island of Korčula, in daily amounts of at least 32 grams.
Furthermore, the defendants Milan Trifković and ... have already been convicted several times of criminal offences of the same type – abuse of illegal drugs ... This shows that their previous life was not in conformity with the law and that their previous conviction has not taught them about the peril of committing criminal offences. Also, the documents in the file show that the defendants Milan Trifković and ... are users of illegal drugs ...
Therefore, the long period of engaging in such criminal activity, which shows their determination, high level of organisation and criminal resolve ..., together with the fact that they are users of illegal drugs, ... and previous conviction, amount in the view of the Supreme Court ... to specific circumstances which justify the fear that the defendants Milan Trifković and..., if at large, would continue to commit new criminal offences of the same type ...
The decision to extend the defendants’ detention on the basis of Article 102 paragraph 1(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is justified and lawful in view of the fact that the... charges concern a significant amount of the illegal drug heroin. The fact that there was such a large amount of this drug, which could be divided into a large number of individual doses and thus put at risk the health of a large number of people, especially youngsters, [together with] the international elements of the offence, surpasses by far the usual gravity of such offences.
The defendants’ arguments pointing to the lack of evidence that they had committed the criminal offences at issue ... have no bearing on the decision [on their detention]. When deciding upon an appeal against a decision on detention, the appeal court has no competence to assess the factual background of the case or the defendants’ criminal responsibility. For detention to be ordered it suffices that the indictment and the documents in the case file indicate that there is reasonable suspicion. Neither has the principle of proportionality been infringed, because the defendant Milan Trifković has so far spent less than two years and three months in pre-trial detention ... When applying that principle, the relevant factors to be taken into account are not only the time already spent in detention but also the gravity of the criminal charges brought against the defendants and the severity of the sentence faced, as well as the need to order and extend detention.
The statement of the defendant Milan Trifković that he is not a drug addict ... is also irrelevant, because drug addiction and drug use are not the decisive motives for committing such criminal offences, and they cannot put into question the importance of all the other above-mentioned points which show at the risk of reoffending ... “ 61.  On the same day, the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the Split County Court’s decision extending his detention of 13 January 2009, using the same arguments. 62.  On 5 March 2009 the applicant lodged two constitutional complaints with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) against the decision of the Supreme Court of 13 February 2009 dismissing his appeal against the Split County Court’s decision of 10 November 2008 and the decision of the Supreme Court of 13 February 2009 dismissing his appeal against the Split County Court’s decision of 13 January 2009. 63.  The applicant’s detention was again extended on 9 April 2009 by a three-judge panel of the Split County Court under Article 102 paragraph 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, using the same reasons as in its previous decisions. 64.  The applicant lodged an appeal against the above decision on 16 April 2009. He argued that for several years his detention had been repeatedly extended, always using the same reasoning as to the gravity of the charges, without any assessment of his individual position in the alleged criminal organisation. He also pointed out that his previous conviction was minor and that he was employed, with a regular source of income. He further argued that the trial had been adjourned indefinitely and that there was a real risk that his detention was becoming a penalty. Finally, he pointed out, relying on the Court’s case-law, that the reasons justifying his detention were no longer relevant and sufficient, and that the domestic courts had never examined the possibility of applying another preventive measure. 65.  On 29 April 2009 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s constitutional complaint against the decision of the Supreme Court dismissing his appeal against the Split County Court’s decision of 10 November 2008 inadmissible on the ground that the impugned decisions were no longer in effect, because in the meantime the Split County Court had adopted a fresh decision on his detention on 13 January 2009. 66.  On 6 May 2009 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision extending his detention of 9 April 2009, reiterating its previous arguments. It also found that the purpose of the detention could not be achieved with any other preventive measure. 67.  On 27 May 2009 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s constitutional complaint against the decision of the Supreme Court dismissing his appeal against the Split County Court’s decision of 13 January 2009 inadmissible on the ground that that the impugned decisions were no longer in effect, because in the meantime the Split County Court had adopted a fresh decision on his detention, on 9 April 2009. 68.  A three-judge panel of the Split County Court on 6 July 2009 again extended the applicant’s detention under Article 102 paragraph 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, using the same formulation as in its previous decisions. 69.  The applicant lodged an appeal against the above decision on 9 July 2009, pointing out that he had no addiction to drugs and that he was employed and therefore had a regular source of income. He also asked that the detention be replaced by another preventive measure. On 4 August 2009 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, reiterating its previous arguments. It added that the fact that the applicant had been detained and therefore had not had any opportunity to obtain drugs was not of a decisive influence on the conclusion that he might reoffend. As to his arguments that he was employed and had a regular source of income, the Supreme Court held that it also had no decisive effect, since the proceeds of the offence at issue were significantly higher than his personal income. 70.  On 1 October 2009 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court again extended the applicant’s detention under Article 102 paragraph 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, using the same formulation as in its previous decision. 71.  The applicant lodged an appeal on 5 October 2009 in which he argued that the principle of proportionality had been infringed with his continuous detention but on 14 October 2009 the Supreme Court dismissed it, reiterating its previous arguments. As to the proportionality of the detention, the Supreme Court held that this principle had not been infringed, since the charges concerned the most serious offences, for which there was also a possibility of extending the detention for an additional six months under section 28 paragraph 3 of the Act on the Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organised Crime (hereinafter “the AOSCOC”). 72.  On 20 November 2009 a three-judge panel of the Split County Court extended the applicant’s detention for a further six months. The relevant part of the decision reads:
“ ... since the maximum limits for detention under Article 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were about to expire, [this panel] has examined whether there are grounds for extending the accused’s detention or for his release.
In the situation at issue, in view of the sentence that the offence at issue carries, the maximum statutory limit under Article 109 § 1(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is three years, and therefore this period would expire in respect of ... the accused Milan Trifković ... on 22 November 2009.
However, under section 28 § 2 of the [AOSCOC] the maximum time-limit of detention during an investigation, if the investigation has been extended, can be twelve months, while paragraph 3 of the same section provides that the maximum period of detention under Article 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall be extended for a further six months if the detention during the investigation has been extended under paragraph 2 of [Section 28 of the AOSCOC].
Since in this particular case the investigation was extended so that it lasted more than the maximum six months, the conditions for extending the maximum period of the pre-trial detention for a further six months under section 28 paragraph 3 of the [AOSCOC] have been met.
Therefore, since all the circumstances on which the detention was extended under Article 102 paragraph 1 (1), (3) and (4) of the CCP have not changed, the detention in respect of the accused ... Milan Trifković and ... had to be extended for a further six months ...“ 73.  The applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court against the above decision on 24 November 2009. He argued that the evidence adduced during the trial did not support the suspicion that he was an important member of the criminal group and that no drugs, objects usually used to sell drugs, or any proceeds of crime had ever been found on or seized from him. The applicant further argued that the Split County Court had been using the same stereotyped formula when extending his detention for three years, and that there were no grounds for extending his detention. He also argued that the proceedings had been unreasonably long and that during that period he had been detained in inhuman and degrading conditions. Finally, he pointed out, relying on the Court’s case-law, that the possibility of replacing his detention with another preventive measure had never been examined. On 27 November 2009 he also submitted to the Supreme Court a statement from company K.-V. confirming that he was permanently employed by that company; he asked again to be released. 74.  The Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on 11 December 2009. It limited its assessment only to the question of whether further extension would exceed the maximum statutory limit. As to the other arguments put forward by the applicant, the Supreme Court noted:
“As to the arguments put forward by all three accused in which they complain about the conditions of their detention and challenge the grounds and purpose of their detention on account of its length, it is to be noted that it does not put in any doubt the impugned decision. Namely, the [Split County Court’s] decision did not address the grounds for their detention, since it only concerned examination of statutory conditions for extending the maximum detention under Article 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in respect of which the arguments in the appeal are irrelevant.” 75.  On an unspecified date in 2010 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the above decision of the Supreme Court, reiterating the same arguments from his appeal. 76.  A three-judge panel of the Split County Court on 12 February 2010 extended the applicant’s detention under Article 102 paragraph 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, reiterating arguments from its previous decisions as to the risk of reoffending and the gravity of the charges. 77.  The applicant lodged an appeal against the above decision on 18 February 2010, reiterating his previous arguments and asking that the detention be replaced by another preventive measure, if one was necessary. 78.  On 25 February 2010 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint against the decision of the Supreme Court of 11 December 2009. The relevant part of the Constitutional Court’s decision reads:
“It appears from the constitutional complaint, which is identical to the appeal lodged with the Supreme Court, that [the applicant] is complaining about the grounds for his detention, which was not the subject of the impugned decisions. The statutory grounds for his detention are under Article 107 paragraph 2 of the CCP, within the competence of the panel from Article 18 paragraph 3 and Article 20 paragraph 2 of [the CCP], which is obliged to examine the grounds for detention every two months ...
However, in the case at issue, the impugned decisions do not examine the grounds for [the applicant’s] detention, but only whether the conditions for extending the detention under Article 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure have been met. ... “ 79.  On 17 March 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the Split County Court’s decision of 12 February 2010 on the ground that the same reasons warranting the applicant’s detention under Article 102 paragraph 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure still existed. It also found that the principle of proportionality had not been infringed and that there were no grounds to replace the detention with another preventive measure. 80.  On an unspecified date in 2010 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court against the above decision of the Supreme Court, again complaining about the extension of his detention and about the conditions in detention. 81.  The applicant’s detention was again extended by a three-judge panel of the Split County Court on 17 May 2010 on the basis of Article 102 paragraph 1(3) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, reiterating its previous arguments. 82.  On 22 May 2010 the maximum statutory time-limit of the applicant’s extended detention expired and the applicant was released.


4.  The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Austria. 5.  On 11 March 1992 the Kärnten Regional Government (Landesregierung) dismissed the applicant’s request for a permit under the Kärnten Environmental Protection Act (Naturschutzgesetz) to build a tool shed on his agricultural and forestal estate. It noted that the project was contrary to the objectives of the area zoning plan (Flächenwidmungsplan) as a tool shed was not necessary in order to cultivate a forestal estate of less than 10 hectares. 6.  Two further requests of the applicant for the granting of a permit were rejected on the ground of res iudicata: On 28 November 1994 the Kärnten Regional Government found that the extension of the applicant’s forestal estate to approximately 6 hectares did not constitute any relevant change of the circumstances. The Administrative Court confirmed this decision on 23 October 1995. On 16 January 1996 the applicant again requested a permit and submitted that he had acquired further 13 hectares of land. On 22 August 1997 the Kärnten Regional Government rejected this request as it found that the purchase contract was not valid and there was, therefore, no change of the relevant circumstances. 7.  On 2 April 1998 the applicant again requested a permit for the tool shed which he had in the meanwhile built. He submitted that the relevant circumstances of his case had changed in that his brother-in-law was disposed to rent him approximately 5 hectares of land. 8.  On 5 October 1998 the applicant filed a request for transfer of jurisdiction (Devolutionsantrag) to the Kärnten Regional Government as the Spittal an der Drau District Administrative Authority (Bezirkshaupt-mannschaft) failed to decide within the statutory six months time-limit. 9.  Upon request of the Regional Government, the building office (Baubezirksamt) at the District Administrative Authority issued an expert opinion on 20 November 1998. This opinion was communicated to the applicant, who, on 26 March and 21 June 1999 respectively, submitted two opinions of the private experts H and M in reply. 10.  Meanwhile, on 26 May 1999, the building office at the District Administrative Authority, upon request of the Regional Government, commented on the private expert opinion of H. On 22 June 1999 the forestry inspection office (Bezirksforstinspektion) at the District Administrative Authority, upon request of the Regional Government, issued a further statement. Neither document was communicated to the applicant. 11.  On 7 July 1999, the Kärnten Regional Government allowed the applicant’s request for transfer of jurisdiction but dismissed his request for the permit under the Environmental Protection Act. It noted that, due to changes in the relevant legislation, the question whether a project was in accordance with the objectives of the area zoning plan was not any longer relevant in the proceedings concerning a permit under the Environmental Protection Act. The permit could, however, not be granted as the tool shed had an adverse effect on the character of the concerned landscape. The Regional Government referred in this regard to the official expert’s opinion of 20 November 1998, who had found that the project led to urban sprawl. The Regional Government further noted that the construction of the tool shed was not a measure of public interest. It referred in this regard to expert opinions submitted in the previous proceedings which had found that the tool shed was not necessary for the cultivation of the applicant’s forest. The Regional Government finally noted that the applicant had only alleged that he would rent another 5 hectares and had not submitted the rent contract. 12.  The applicant filed a complaint with the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof) and requested it to hold a hearing. Referring to the findings of the two private expert opinions he had submitted in the proceedings before the Regional Government, the applicant contested the Regional Government’s conclusions. The applicant further complained that the Regional Government had not given sufficient reasons as to why it preferred the findings of the official expert against those of the private expert opinions. In the view of the divergent findings of the experts the Regional Government should have taken another expert opinion. He finally submitted that the Regional Government should have requested him to submit the rent contract if it considered this relevant for the proceedings at issue. 13.  On 25 October 1999 the Regional Government submitted its comments on the applicant’s complaint. It noted inter alia that the private expert opinions had been examined by the building office at the District Administrative Authority. The findings of the private experts were, however, not suitable to disprove the findings of the official expert. In his further comments of 11 December 1999 the applicant complained that he had not been informed about the examination by the building office of the private experts’ opinions and had, therefore, not been able to comment on it. 14.  On 21 March 2001 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint and the request for a hearing. It confirmed the Regional Government’s conclusions and, giving extensive reasons, found that the findings of the private experts had not been relevant and had not disproved the opinion of the official expert. It referred inter alia to an official expert opinion submitted in previous proceedings and the forestry inspection office’s statement of 22 June 1999 which referred to this opinion.
The Administrative Court’s decision was served on the applicant’s counsel on 9 April 2001. 15.  The applicant subsequently removed the tool shed.


4.  The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Ankara. 5.  On 23 January 1994 the applicant was arrested and placed in police custody by officers from the Anti-Terrorist Branch of the Istanbul Security Headquarters, on suspicion of being involved in the activities of an illegal armed organisation, namely the TKP/ML (Türkiye Komünist Partisi/Marksist Leninist, Turkish Communist Party / Marxist Leninist). 6.  On 7 February 1994 he was brought before the public prosecutor and then the investigating judge at the Istanbul State Security Court. The same day, the investigating judge remanded the applicant in custody. 7.  On 31 March 1994 the public prosecutor filed an indictment charging the applicant and four others with membership of an illegal armed organisation and involvement in activities which undermined the constitutional order of the State. 8.  At the time of the events, a similar case concerning certain activities of the TKP/ML was pending before the third chamber of the Istanbul State Security Court. Following a jurisdictional conflict between two chambers of the court, on 14 March 1995 the Court of Cassation decided to join the applicant's case to the one pending before the third chamber. Consequently, the number of accused was increased to sixteen people. 9.  The applicant did not attend a number of hearings. 10.  In the course of the proceedings, the court held forty-eight hearings. At the end of each hearing the State Security Court rejected the applicant's requests for release pending trial, having regard to the nature of the offence, the state of the evidence and the content of the case file. 11.  On 12 June 2000 the Istanbul State Security Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to life imprisonment. 12.  On 15 May 2001 the Court of Cassation quashed the decision for procedural reasons. The case was remitted to the Istanbul State Security Court for further examination and the applicant remained in detention. The case was resumed with 15 accused, including the applicant. 13.  On 8 February 2002 the applicant's lawyer requested the court to release the applicant pending trial due to his poor health. He submitted a medical report certifying that Mr Solmaz was suffering from Wernicke-Korsakoff syndrome (a brain disorder caused by thiamine deficiency, usually associated with alcoholism). The court dismissed the lawyer's request, maintaining that the applicant could be treated in prison. Moreover, it held that, considering the nature of the offence, the state of the evidence and the content of the file, the applicant should continue to be detained pending trial. 14.  Following an objection by the applicant's lawyer, the court reconsidered its decision of 8 February 2002. On 18 February 2002, relying on a medical report and considering the length of the period which the applicant had already spent in detention, the court ordered his release pending trial. It further held that it was likely that the final decision of the court would be in favour of the applicant. 15.  State Security Courts were abolished by constitutional amendments introduced on 7 May 2004. Subsequently, the applicant's case was resumed before the Istanbul Assize Court. 16.  After holding seventeen hearings, on 31 January 2005 the Istanbul Assize Court convicted the applicant and sentenced him to life imprisonment in accordance with Article 146 of the Criminal Code. 17.  However, on an unknown date the Court of Cassation quashed the decision of the first-instance court once again. The case was resumed before the Istanbul Assize Court, where it is still pending.


3.  The applicant was born in 1981 and lives in Tokat. 4.  While performing his compulsory military service, the applicant was injured. He was subsequently declared medically unfit to serve in the armed forces on account of his injury and was thus discharged. 5.  The applicant subsequently applied to the Social Security Institution (“Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumu”, “SGK”), claiming a special service disability pension. Upon the SGK’s refusal of this claim, he brought an action before the Supreme Military Administrative Court for the annulment of the SGK’s decision denying him a service disability pension. 6.  On 14 April 2005 the Supreme Military Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s claim, holding that no causal link could be established between the applicant’s disability and the functions he performed in the armed forces. The written opinion of the principal public prosecutor submitted to this court prior to the delivery of the decision was not communicated to the applicant. 7.  On 9 June 2005 the Supreme Military Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s request for rectification of its previous decision as the request had been lodged outside the statutory time-limit.


11.  The applicant, born in 1950, was a Turkish national at the time of the events complained of. He subsequently obtained German nationality. 12.  The applicant is the father of G., born out of wedlock on 29 June 1988. In a document dated 15 June 1988, he acknowledged paternity of the unborn child, and in a further document, dated 15 August 1988, he acknowledged paternity and undertook to pay maintenance. 13.  The applicant met the child's mother, Ms D., in 1985 and in December 1987 he moved into her flat, where they lived together until at least July 1989 or, as stated by the applicant, until February 1990. In any event, the applicant continued to visit the child and her mother until February 1990, and between the end of July and October 1990 he regularly fetched G. for visits. From November 1990 onwards, Ms D. prohibited any contact between the applicant and the child. 14.  On 5 December 1990 the applicant applied to the Wiesbaden District Court for a decision granting him a right of access to his daughter on every Sunday from 10 a.m. until 6 p.m. as well as on Boxing Day and Easter Monday. 15.  On 5 September 1991 the District Court, having regard to the statements made by the parties and the Wiesbaden Youth Office and having considered evidence obtained from several witnesses, dismissed the applicant's request. 16.  The court, referring to Article 1711 of the Civil Code, observed that the mother, as the person having custody, determined the father's right of access to the child and that the guardianship court could only grant the father a right of access if this was in the child's best interests. The court found as follows:
“The Court is convinced that the petitioner's wish for [G.] to visit him is motivated by attachment to his child and genuine affection for her. It nonetheless takes the view that personal contact with her father is not in the child's best interests, since her mother dislikes her father so deeply and opposes all contact so fiercely that any visits ordered by the court would take place in a tense, emotionally charged atmosphere which would probably be extremely harmful to the child.
The Court can discern no special circumstances which, given the strong differences between the parents, might make personal contact with her father appear beneficial for [G.] ... The relationship which developed between [G.] and her father in the period from her birth to her father's moving out – that is, approximately one year and nine months – is probably not of such fundamental importance that the risk of seriously upsetting the child by resuming contact opposed by her mother is worth taking. The staff who looked after [G.] at the day nursery, and who were questioned as witnesses, stated that she displayed no – or at least no serious and lasting – behavioural abnormalities when she was parted from her father and contact between them ceased, and that she is a balanced, cheerful and outgoing child. The evidence does not therefore confirm her father's claim that she missed him and frequently asked about him after their contact at the day nursery ceased.
It has not therefore been shown that the conditions laid down in Article 1711 § 2 have been met, and the Court is accordingly obliged to dismiss the father's request.” 17.  On 12 March 1992 the applicant appealed to the Wiesbaden Regional Court. 18.  On 12 May 1992 the Regional Court ordered a psychological expert opinion on the question whether contact with the applicant was in G.'s interests. On 8 July 1992, following a first conversation with the expert, the applicant challenged her for bias. He also requested that another expert be appointed on the ground that the scientific approach adopted did not reflect the latest state of research. On 9 September 1992 the Regional Court refused the applicant's request, finding that, taking into account the expert's explanations of 8 August 1992, there were no reasons to doubt her impartiality or her capabilities. 19.  On 17 December 1992 the applicant requested the Regional Court to progress with the proceedings. He also applied for a provisional order granting him a right of access to G. during one afternoon every week and prohibiting her mother from obstructing such contact. 20.  On 23 December 1992 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant's request for a provisional order granting access. The Regional Court found that there was no urgency and that the applicant could be expected to await the outcome of the main proceedings. Furthermore, such an order would anticipate the possible terms of a final decision. Should a provisional order be issued and the request be eventually dismissed in the main proceedings, the disadvantages for the child would be more serious than those for the applicant in continuing with the prevailing situation. 21.  In her opinion dated 25 February 1993, the expert noted that she had visited the applicant's family in June 1992 and again heard the applicant, the child's mother and the child on several occasions between November 1992 and February 1993. As regards her meetings with G., the expert explained that in the course of various games she had explored her feelings concerning persons and situations and concerning the applicant. They had also looked at a family photo album and G. had avoided looking at the more recent photographs. This reaction showed that G. had repressed the memories of her father. The expert reached the conclusion that a right of access without prior conversations to overcome the conflicts between the parents was not in the child's interests. 22.  By a letter of 8 March 1993, the Regional Court, noting that the District Court had omitted to hear the child, enquired of the expert whether hearing the child in court on the issue of her relationship with her father would place a psychological strain on her. 23.  In her reply of 13 March 1993, the expert indicated that she had not directly asked the child about her father. She had expected that G. would react spontaneously in the course of the meetings and express her feelings towards him. In the expert's view, the fact that G. had not mentioned her father was certainly relevant. The expert further referred to the last meeting, when they had glanced through a family photo album and she had asked G. about whether she still knew her father. On both occasions, she had appeared to repress her memories concerning him. The risk inherent in questioning her about whether she wished to see her father was that, in this conflict between the parents, the child might have the impression that her statements were decisive. Such a situation could provoke serious feelings of guilt. 24.  At a court hearing on 30 April 1993, the applicant and the child's mother entered into an agreement. Under the terms of this agreement, the applicant declared that he would refrain from instituting any court proceedings, making any enquiries about the mother's personal circumstances and exercising his right of custody obtained under Turkish law on condition that they underwent parental therapy. The proceedings were suspended until the termination of this therapy. 25.  On 1 June 1993 the applicant requested that the proceedings be resumed as the child's mother had not approved the two institutions for family therapy proposed by the applicant and had failed to react to his suggestion that she should make a proposal. 26.  On 25 August 1993 the Wiesbaden Regional Court dismissed the applicant's appeal, finding as follows:
“Personal contact with a child born out of wedlock is intended to allow a father to satisfy himself as to the child's welfare and development and preserve the natural ties existing between them. It is not therefore the purpose of granting access, but the legal conditions for doing so, which differ: while a parent who does not have custody of a child born in wedlock is entitled to access under Article 1634 [of the Civil Code], Article 1711 [of the Code] does not grant a right of access to the father of a child born out of wedlock. Rather, the law leaves it up to the person having custody, as a rule the mother, to determine whether, and to what extent, the father should be able to spend time with his child. However, the guardianship court may decide that the father is entitled to access if this is in the child's best interests. The main reason for the weaker legal position of the father of a child born out of wedlock is his different social position. After the Federal Constitutional Court's decisions of 1971 and 1981, the constitutionality of Article 1711 can no longer be seriously doubted. For considerations of legal policy, a reform of the law on children born out of wedlock is even more urgently necessary. In the meantime, the courts are bound by Article 1711.
Under that provision, the guardianship court decides to grant a father access to a child born out of wedlock if this is beneficial for the child's welfare. It is not enough for such contact to be consistent with, or not contrary to, the child's interests, it must serve those interests and promote them. This interpretation justifies the assumption that fathers should generally be granted access to their children because this enables the latter to develop as normally as possible and helps them to form a clear image of themselves and their origin. It is in fact important for children not simply to have a fantasy picture of their fathers, but to be able to form a personal, realistic picture.
Whether contact with the father is conducive to the child's well-being depends initially on the father's motives for seeking it. The Regional Court is convinced that the father in this case is motivated by attachment to [G.] and genuine affection for her. Even when a father acts from responsible motives, however, the court is not necessarily obliged to grant him access if there are serious tensions between the parents, these are communicated to the child, and there is reason to fear that every meeting with the father will interfere with the child's further undisturbed development in the residual family provided by the mother ...
In view of the findings in the [psychological expert] report referred to above, it must be assumed that this would happen in the instant case. If the father were granted access to [G.] in present circumstances, she would have to shuttle between hostile camps, which should not be asked of her.
If – as in this case – there is a danger that differences between parents may affect a child, then special circumstances are needed to justify the assumption that contact with the father will nevertheless have permanently beneficial effects on the child's development or well-being ... However, no such circumstances can be discerned here. It is true that, for the first two years of her life, [G.] grew up with both father and mother, but this period was not conflict-free. The disagreements and sometimes open aggression between her parents – in other words, the family violence she witnessed – have certainly left their mark on her, even if she can no longer recall them spontaneously. As the psychological report indicates, she has also repressed her old ties with her father – a fact reflected in the care she takes to avoid talking about him. In view of all this, the report finds that she does not suffer as a result of the present situation.
The Court can rely fully on the report, which has no apparent defects and is not invalidated by the fact that the father sees the situation differently.
In finding that therapy had not enabled the parents to put their former conflicts behind them, thus making it possible for [G.] to have access to both of them, the Court did not have to decide who was to blame for this ... The decisive factor is always the child's point of view. As already pointed out, however, the situation in this case is such that the parents must first initiate dialogue with each other.” 27.  The Regional Court finally considered that exceptionally it had not been required to hear the child, since questioning her about her relationship with her father would have placed a psychological strain on her. In this connection, the court referred to the expert's supplementary report of 13 March 1993 (see paragraph 23 above). 28.  On 21 September 1993 the applicant filed a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court, complaining that the refusal of access to his daughter infringed his parental rights and amounted to discrimination, and alleging that the taking of expert evidence had been unfair. The Federal Constitutional Court acknowledged receipt on 29 September 1993.
By a letter of 26 April 1994, the applicant asked the Constitutional Court about the state of the proceedings and urged a speedy decision. On 16 May 1994 the Constitutional Court informed him that in a similar case which had been registered at an earlier date a decision was envisaged for the first half of 1995.
On 26 November 1995 the applicant sent a letter to the President of the Federal Constitutional Court complaining that the examination of his constitutional complaint had been postponed until the first half of 1996. In her reply of 15 February 1996 the judge dealing with the applicant's case informed him that, owing to the heavy workload of the Federal Constitutional Court in 1995, it had not been possible to take a decision. A decision was envisaged in 1996. Having regard to the importance of the subject matter, such a decision required careful preparation. 29.  On 1 December 1998 the Federal Constitutional Court, sitting as a panel of three judges, refused to entertain the applicant's constitutional complaint.


5.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Izmir. 6.  On 3 September 2007 at around 8.10 p.m. the applicant was shot by officers from a gendarmerie special operations team immediately after he and his brother left a neighbouring house in the vicinity of their hamlet, Gölek, in the district of Mazgirt, in Tunceli, south-east Turkey. 7.  As a result of the shooting, the applicant was hit with a total of eight bullets and suffered injuries to his arms, his legs, and his left shoulder. According to a medical report issued by the Forensic Medicine Department of Fırat University dated 13 November 2007, the injuries that the applicant sustained were life-threatening. According to the report, the applicant received medical treatment and underwent surgical operations at the cardiac surgery units at the Elazığ Military Hospital and the Fırat University Hospital between 3 and 19 September 2007. He was then transferred to the Ege University Hospital in Izmir upon the request of his family members. A further medical report issued on 27 June 2011 by a board of doctors from the Karşıyaka State Hospital stated that the applicant was experiencing difficulties in walking and using his left shoulder as a result of firearm injuries. In particular, he had suffered a 48% loss of function in his legs and a 10% loss of function in his left shoulder. According to the report, the applicant was permanently disabled and only able to walk with the aid of two crutches. The applicant’s brother was not injured during the shooting. 8.  On 4 September 2007 a crime scene investigation was carried out by gendarmerie officers from the Tunceli Provincial Gendarmerie Command, who then drafted a crime scene report. The report was signed by six gendarmerie officers, including İ.S. and M.K., who had taken part in the operation of 3 September 2007. The report drafted by the officers stated that the special operations team had received information that members of the PKK[1], an illegal organisation, would be going to the house where the applicant and his brother had gone. The information had been given by B.B., the son of M.B., the owner of the house, who had been threatened by members of the PKK. The security forces began search and detection activities in the region at around 3.30 a.m. after the receipt of this information and at 3.30 p.m. the commander of the operation, together with two team commanders, identified four points in the vicinity of M.B.’s house at which the officers could position themselves. At around 7.40 p.m. gendarmerie officers arrived in the vicinity, took up position at the four different points identified earlier by their commanders and waited for PKK members. The applicant and his brother arrived at the house at 8 p.m. and left at 8.10 p.m. When they had left the house, E.Ö. and G.A., officers positioned at point no. 3 who had a thermal camera and a night vision device, informed the commander of the operation, İ.S., who was positioned at point no. 2, that the applicant and his brother might have weapons on them. They also informed the commander that the applicant and his brother were acting suspiciously and that they had checked the area around the house with their torches and then turned them off. The team commander subsequently asked M.A. and Y.S., officers who were positioned at the same point and who had thermal cameras, whether the applicant and his brother were carrying weapons. The officers informed the commander that the applicant and his brother had objects in their hands which looked like weapons. The team commander then ordered the applicant and his brother to stop when they were 60 metres away. As they failed to do so, officers first fired warning shots in the air (3-5 shots) and then opened fire in the direction of the applicant and his brother (13-14 shots) towards their feet. They stopped firing when the applicant and his brother shouted that they were villagers. The report further stated that when the officers approached the applicant and his brother and found that the former was wounded, they gave him first aid straight away and the applicant was transferred to Elazığ Military Hospital by helicopter. According to the report, a total of twenty‑six spent bullet cases were found where the officers had been located and there was a distance of 15 to 30 metres between the officers and the applicant and his brother. 9.  A gendarmerie officer also drew a sketch of the scene, according to which the applicant was 60 metres away from M.B.’s house and 15 and 30 metres away from points no. 2 and 1, respectively, where spent bullet cases had been found. 10.  On an unspecified date the applicant and his brother lodged a complaint against the gendarmerie officers who had been responsible for the applicant’s shooting. The Mazgirt Public Prosecutor subsequently initiated an investigation against six gendarmerie officers on a charge of exceeding the limits of their powers in resorting to force. 11.  On 6 September 2007 the Mazgirt Public Prosecutor took statements from the applicant’s brother, S.T. He submitted that they had gone to M.B.’s house because they had wished to inform his son, B.B., that their mother would not be going to the town centre with him the next day. S.T. further maintained that they had walked with their torches on and that there had been no warning or warning shots before the shooting. He contended that when the shooting had started, he had been 1-2 metres behind his brother. They had both thrown themselves on the ground when the shooting had started. 12.  On 6 and 13 September 2007 the public prosecutor obtained statements from B.B. and M.B., the occupants of the house, respectively. They both maintained that they had informed the security forces of the threats that M.B. had received. B.B. further contended that he had seen the applicant’s mother at around 5 p.m. on the same day and that she had asked him to take her to the town centre the next day. B.B. and M.B. stated that the applicant and his brother had come to their house in order to tell them that their mother would not be going to the town centre with B.B after all and that they had subsequently left. B.B. maintained that he had been surprised when he first saw the applicant and S.T., given that their visit had occurred after sunset. B.B. further noted that he had told the applicant and S.T. to turn their torches on when they left and that they had said “OK”. M.B. maintained that the applicant and his brother had had lit torches in their hands when they had arrived at his house. He also contended that the gunfire had started 2-3 minutes after the applicant and his brother had left; that it had lasted a few minutes; and that at the same time as the gunfire he had heard the applicant and S.T. shouting “We are villagers. Do not fire.” M.B. submitted that his house had also been hit by bullets. 13.  On 11 September 2007 the Mazgirt Public Prosecutor took statements from a number of gendarmerie officers who had been involved in the operation of 3 September 2007.  İ.S., the team commander, maintained before the public prosecutor that they had started the operation upon receipt of information that terrorists would be going to M.B.’s house. He noted that a total of twenty-six gendarmerie officers had taken part in the operation. He further contended that E.Ö. and G.A. had informed him that there had been a flash of light from an object carried on the shoulder of one of the suspects which extended to hip level. He further stated that M.A. and Y.S. had also informed him that one suspect was carrying an object that extended from the shoulder to the hip. The commander maintained that the applicant and his brother had come within 10 metres of the point where they were positioned when he shouted at them to stop. According to the commander, the applicant and his brother had failed to stop despite the warning and had attempted to escape when they heard the warning shots. At that point he instructed the officers to open fire. İ.S. noted that a total of five officers had fired towards their feet and that they had stopped firing when the applicant had been shot and his brother had shouted that they were villagers. İ.S. lastly contended that the applicant’s injuries had been his own fault and that they had not intended to kill the applicant or his brother. According to İ.S., if they had intended to kill them, neither the applicant nor his brother would have survived. 14.  In their statements before the public prosecutor, E.Ö. and G.A. maintained that they had seen the applicant and his brother by using a night vision device and a thermal camera while the suspects were walking towards M.B.’s house. They had observed that the suspects had stopped when they were close to the house and had remained kneeling down for a while before entering into the house. They further maintained that they had seen shiny objects on the suspects’ shoulders. The officers noted that when they had left the house the suspects had lit their torches, had pointed them towards the path that they would take and had then turned them off. The officers had informed İ.S. of the aforementioned observations and had considered that the suspects might have been sending a message to another group in the area with their torches. They had then heard İ.S. ordering the suspects to stop and had subsequently heard firing for around five seconds. 15.  M.A., Y.S., and three other officers, R.E., B.B.A and M.K., in almost identical statements before the Mazgirt Public Prosecutor, maintained that İ.S. had told them that officers from another position had informed him that one of the two suspects was carrying an object on his shoulder which extended to hip level. Y.S. and M.K. further noted that they had also received this information through their radio transmitters. They further stated that the applicant and his brother had attempted to run away when their commander had told them to stop. As the suspects had not complied with the commander’s instruction, they had first fired warning shots and had then opened fire towards the suspects’ feet. They had stopped firing when one of the suspects had shouted that they were villagers a few seconds later. They maintained that it had been dark when the shootings occurred and that the applicant and his brother had not had lit torches with them. They stated that the applicant had been wounded because of his own conduct and that they would not have opened fire if the applicant and his brother had stopped in the first place. According to these five officers, the applicant must have been shot in the shoulder after falling to the ground upon being shot in the legs. They lastly contended that they had not intended to kill the applicant or his brother and that if they had had that intention, neither the applicant nor his brother would have survived. 16.  In their statements before the public prosecutor, Ş.Y. and A.Ş., two officers who had been positioned at the farthest point from the house, stated that they had not heard their commander give the order to stop, as it had been impossible due to the distance between them, and that they had heard gunfire for a few seconds. They had also heard their commander’s instruction to hold fire over the radio transmitter. 17.  On 13 September 2007 the Mazgirt Public Prosecutor held an onsite inspection in Gölek. The public prosecutor observed the area where the applicant had been shot and heard İ.S., M.K. and A.Ş., who reiterated their statements given on 11 September 2007. During the inspection, a gendarmerie officer took photographs of the area under the instructions of the Mazgirt Public Prosecutor. 18.  On 1 February 2008 the Mazgirt Public Prosecutor decided that his office did not have jurisdiction over the prosecution, given that the suspects had allegedly committed the offence of excessive use of force. The Mazgirt Public Prosecutor then sent the investigation file to the Elazığ Military Prosecutor’s Office. 19.  On 31 December 2008 the Elazığ Military Prosecutor decided not to bring criminal proceedings against the six gendarmerie officers. The military prosecutor noted that the applicant had stated that he and his brother had had their torches on when he had been shot and that there had been hundreds of shots. The prosecutor found these claims unfounded, considering that at the time of the shootings night had not entirely fallen and that it would not therefore have been reasonable to have torches switched on. In the light of the statements of the applicant and his brother that they had not at first realised that they were being targeted and had only thrown themselves to the ground after the shooting had started, the prosecutor considered that the accused officers had not fired directly towards the applicant and his brother. The prosecutor further noted that the applicant’s brother, M.B. and B.B. had all stated that the officers had fired because they had considered the applicant and his brother to be terrorists, a statement which was in line with the accused officers’ defence submissions. According to the prosecutor, the manner in which the applicant and his brother had acted (staying in the house only for 5 minutes, leaving the house without the hosts coming out of the house, keeping a distance between them and turning their torches off while walking) had justified the officers’ suspicions that they were terrorists. The prosecutor further noted that, had there been hundreds of shots fired, the applicant’s brother would also have been injured. The prosecutor considered that it had been reasonable for the gendarmerie officers to think that the torches had been weapons as it had been dark and because the torches, whose dimensions were 25 cm x 15 cm, had not been switched on, and that the information given to the security forces had corresponded to the circumstances as they unfolded. The military prosecutor finally found it established that gendarmerie officers had fired towards the ground and towards the feet of the applicant, whom they had considered to be a terrorist, and with a view to effecting his arrest in accordance with the law. He therefore concluded that the officers had not been at fault and had not used excessive force. 20.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an objection against the decision of the military prosecutor. 21.  On 6 April 2009 the Malatya Military Court upheld the Elazığ Military Prosecutor’s reasoning and dismissed the applicant’s objection.


5.  The applicant was born in 1973 and is detained in Drobeta Turnu Severin Prison. 6.  On 28 October 2009 the applicant was convicted of rape and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. He has since been serving his sentence in various Romanian prisons.

... 14.  The medical report drawn up when the applicant was admitted to prison on 28 October 2009 indicates that he was “clinically healthy” (clinic aparent sănătos). 15.  From 26 May to 9 June 2011 the applicant was placed in the hospital wing of Rahova Prison, Bucharest, where he underwent surgery on 3 June 2011 for an inguinal hernia on his right side. 16.  From 2 to 8 October 2012 the applicant was placed in the internal medicine unit of the hospital wing of Jilava Prison, for digestive problems. He was included in a screening programme for digestive and liver conditions. Following a medical test to identify the viral markers of hepatitis, the applicant was found to be suffering from viral hepatitis C (purtator VHC). A biochemical blood analysis was conducted; the results indicated that his ALAT, ASAT and GGT enzyme levels were normal, as was his total bilirubin. 17.  In a note summarising the medical tests conducted during the applicant’s hospitalisation (scrisoare medicală), the doctor who had treated him observed that the applicant’s disease was progressing satisfactorily and that no additional examination was necessary at that stage. He recommended that the applicant adhere to a specific diet and refrain from smoking. He prescribed symptomatic treatment, namely hepatoprotective drugs and vitamin therapy, noting that these were to be administered “if needed” (la nevoie). The applicant’s health was scheduled for re-examination within six months. 18.  The applicant was provided with a special diet for persons suffering from disease (norma 18). During January, February and March 2013 he was treated with hepatoprotective drugs. 19.  On 21 February 2013 the applicant refused to be hospitalised for his health check-up. His medical records do not indicate the reasons for this refusal. However, they indicate that his health was to be re-examined within six months. 20.  From 5 to 8 August 2013 the applicant was placed in the internal medicine unit of the hospital wing of Jilava Prison for re-testing of his liver function. Blood tests showed that the ALAT and ASAT enzymes were slightly above the normal levels. On leaving the hospital wing, the applicant was advised to follow a course of hepatoprotective drugs, vitamin therapy and symptomatic treatment, to be administered if needed. He was also advised to have his condition reassessed within six months. 21.  The applicant continued to be provided with the special diet for persons suffering from disease. In August, October and December 2013 he was treated with hepatoprotective drugs. The list of the applicant’s medical consultations shows that, following a medical examination on 9 December 2013 in Jilava Prison, it was recommended that he attend a medical consultation for hepatitis C in Ion Cantacusino public hospital. 23.  On 14 January 2014 the applicant refused to be hospitalised for re-assessment of his health with regard to the hepatitis C condition. On 19 January 2014 the applicant was examined by an internal medicine specialist, who noted that his general state of health was good. 24.  On 28 January 2014 the applicant was examined by the prison doctor. The latter noted a diagnosis of “liver disease under observation” and indicated that the applicant had complained of vomiting. An anti-spasmodic drug was prescribed and administered to him. 25.  On 13 February 2014 the applicant complained of palpitations. He was examined by the prison doctor, who recommended a cardiology test. 26.  From 18 to 21 February 2014 the applicant was placed in the internal medicine and cardiology unit in the hospital wing of Jilava Prison, on the grounds that he required medical supervision for retro-sternal pain and that, as a smoker, he was an at-risk patient. An electrocardiogram and blood test were carried out. The biochemical blood analysis revealed that the ALAT enzyme was one-and-a-half times over the upper norm, that the ASAT enzyme was slightly over the norm and that the GGT enzyme was at normal levels. 27.  A medical certificate issued at the end of his hospitalisation indicated that the applicant was suffering from unstable angina (angor intricat de novo) and potentially toxic liver disease (hepatopatie posibil toxică). The applicant was prescribed treatment for his heart disease and a course of hepatoprotective treatment, to be followed for one month. 28.  In March 2014 the prison took the necessary steps to purchase the hepatoprotective drug, which was administered to the applicant at the beginning and end of May 2014. The applicant’s medical records indicate that he was treated with hepatoprotective drugs in June and July 2014. 29.  In the meantime, on 2 August 2013 the applicant had applied to the judge delegated by the court to supervise the observance of prisoners’ rights in Jilava Prison (“the delegate judge”), complaining about his physical conditions of detention and a lack of medical treatment for his hepatitis C. 30.  By a decision of 19 August 2013, the delegate judge dismissed his complaint. He confirmed the applicant’s allegations that he was being held in a cell measuring 33.96 m², occupied by twenty-seven inmates and containing four tables and six chairs. He further held that the prison authorities had attempted to improve conditions in the cell, noting that it had recently been renovated. He stated that the toilet block was separated from the cell, and that the cell received natural and artificial light. The fact that the cell was equipped with three-tier bunk beds arose from an objective cause, namely an increase in the number of detainees, and not from a lack of good will on the part of the prison authorities. 31.  With regard to the medical treatment provided to the applicant, the judge noted that he received the special diet for persons suffering from disease and that he had just received vitamin therapy. 32.  Following an appeal by the applicant, on 4 December 2013 the Bucharest Court of First Instance upheld, in a final judgment, the delegate judge’s decision of 19 August 2013.
...


5.  The applicant was born in 1985 and lives in Chişinău. 6.  In April 2008 the applicant was arrested and placed in detention on suspicion of aggravated rape and ill-treatment of a young woman. 7.  On 29 December 2009 the applicant was found guilty as charged and sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment. 8.  In the meantime, between 30 April 2008 and 6 September 2010 the applicant was detained in Prison no. 13 in Chisinau where, according to him, the conditions of detention were very poor. In particular, the applicant alleges that the cells were overcrowded and dirty, that the food was of very poor quality, and that he was not provided with appropriate medical care. 9.  The relevant parts of the report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment concerning his visit to Moldova from 4 to 11 July 2008 (The United Nations Human Rights Council, document A/HRC/10/44/Add.3, 12 February 2009) read as follows:
“B.  Conditions in places of detention
Institutions under the Ministry of Justice 30.  Undoubtedly, progress has been achieved in improving conditions of detention. However, some of the institutions visited by the Special Rapporteur were heavily overcrowded. The authorities themselves pointed out that Institution No. 13 in Chişinău was severely overcrowded - on the day of the visit it held 931 persons with the official capacity being 600 (see also appendix). The Special Rapporteur was informed of Government plans to close down this institution. 31.  Common problems at all pre- and post-trial prisons are the poor hygienic conditions, restricted access to health care and lack of medication as well as risk of contamination with tuberculosis and other diseases. Whereas the Special Rapporteur notes that the minimum norms regarding nutrition of detainees (Government Decision n. 609 of 29 May 2006) are checked on a daily basis and that, according to the financial plan of the Penitentiary Department, the food budget for 2008 had almost doubled in comparison to 2004 and is set to rise further, he also received consistent allegations regarding the poor quality and quantity of food ...” 10.  In its report for 2009 (page 117 -“Conditions of detention”), the Centre for Human Rights in Moldova (“the Human Rights Centre”, which also acts as the Moldovan Ombudsman) found, inter alia, that:
“Regarding personal hygiene, clothing and bedding, despite [the fact that] Government decision no. 609 (29 May 2006) concerning minimum daily food requirements and the issuing of items of personal hygiene provides for the issuing of soap to detainees for bathing and other sanitary-hygienic needs, this has remained unfulfilled during 2009.” 11.  In its report for 2010 (page 142 et seq. - “Conditions of detention”) the Human Rights Centre found, inter alia, that:
“Failure to adhere to the statutory cell size (4 square metres per person) in the living blocks of the institution has become an unpleasant problem which now affects the prison system across the entire country ...
The same situation was confirmed during a visit to Chişinău Prison no. 13 in on 9 September 2010. In some cells the living space was not proportionate to the number of detainees. During the visit, eight detainees were being held in cell no. 38, which measured 24 square metres. This situation has been seen repeatedly during visits by the Centre’s staff to the Chişinău Pre-trial Detention Centre. Similar findings were made during visits to Rusca Prison no. 7 on 19 May 2010, where six detainees were being held in a cell measuring 15.5 square metres and to Cricova Prison no. 4, where (in living block no. 7) over twenty detainees were being held in a cell measuring 65 square metres.
Overcrowding comes directly within the Ombudsman’s remit as part of the National Mechanism for the Prevention of Torture, which on many occasions has recognised overcrowding in the country’s prisons ...
[T]he Prisons Department informed the Ombudsman that meat and fish products are provided [to detainees] whenever possible. At the same time, the authority stated that, owing to the difficult financial situation, during 2010 the detainees in Rezina Prison no. 17 received only 75% and 80% of their normal quotas of meat and fish products respectively. In this connection, the Minister of Justice provided information to the Ombudsman about the expenditure on prisoners’ food in 2010. The cost amounted to MDL 24.05 million, whereas the budgetary need for the same year was, according to the Ministry of Finance’s draft budget, MDL 29.05 million. The daily cost of feeding a detainee in 2010 was MDL 10.24, whilst the daily budgetary need was MDL 12.35. This statistic was often cited by prison authorities to justify why they were unable to provide detainees with meat and fish ...
As regards sanitary conditions, lighting and ventilation problems continue to exist in the majority of living blocks in Moldovan prisons, with the exception of Taraclia Prisons no. 1 and Rusca Prison no. 7.
The Republic of Moldova inherited old gulag-type prisons in dilapidated buildings, corresponding to former Soviet standards. The prisons do not conform to current national and international standards; however, the budget constraints upon the State do not allow for their reconstruction or renovation.
In the prisons, with the exception of Taraclia Prison no. 1, detainees are held in large-capacity cells insufficiently equipped for their daily needs, namely areas for sleeping, for everyday living and for sanitary equipment. Detainees are held in extremely overcrowded, dark, damp and unventilated spaces full of cigarette smoke. In certain prisons the bunk beds essentially prevent daylight from reaching the living space.”