5.  The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Makiyivka. 6.  At about 6.30 a.m. on 13 November 1995 Mr O.M. was found in a cultivated forest near a railway station, with four gunshot wounds, from which he died the same day in a hospital some two hours later. 7.  On 17 November 1995 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having murdered Mr O.M. In the course of a subsequent search of the applicant’s house 1,500 dollars (USD) were seized. 8.  Between 17 November 1995 and 13 December 1996 the applicant was held in custody in the Donetsk Investigative Isolation Unit (SIZO). According to the applicant, the conditions in which he was held were inhuman and degrading. Furthermore, the police allegedly tortured him to obtain a confession. 9.  The applicant consistently denied any involvement in the murder. He acknowledged that on 12 November 1995 his classmate Mr A.F. had driven him to the site of the incident, as he had wanted to see the place, where he had planned a business meeting for 13 November 1995 with a certain Andrey, whose other details he did not know. The following day Mr A.F again accompanied the applicant to the same place along with his father in their car and waited for him nearby. The applicant met Andrey on the railroad bridge as agreed. Andrey took the applicant’s jacket. When the applicant saw two men fire at a passer-by, he became scared and ran through the forest to Mr A.F.’s car and they drove away. During the trip, the applicant threw away his boots and his gloves, as he had realised that other passers-by could have seen him and implicated him in the incident. 10.  On 18 November 1995 Mr N.L., the applicant’s acquaintance, who was a shareholder and a driver in a company managed by Mrs O.M., the victim’s widow, was questioned by the police concerning the murder. As he was questioned as a witness, Mr N.L. was warned of his obligation to provide all the information known to him on pain of criminal sanctions and was not offered the option to consult with a lawyer. He confessed to having hired the applicant to kill Mr O.M. and to having paid him USD 2,000 in advance and USD 10,000 post factum. He also testified that on the eve of the murder the applicant had shown him the gun he had acquired to kill Mr O.M. Soon afterwards Mr N.L. was indicted for incitement to murder. Following his indictment and purportedly a consultation with a lawyer, he retracted his confession and subsequently consistently denied his or the applicant’s involvement in the events throughout the course of the proceedings. 11.  On 21 November 1995 Mr N.L. complained to the prosecutor’s office that the police officers who had questioned him had put him under severe psychological pressure, including threats to accuse him of a capital offence, to have him beaten and raped and to harm his wife and daughter unless he identified the applicant as the killer of Mr O.M. On an unspecified date Mr N.L. also complained that two unknown individuals had attacked him on the porch of his house and told him to confess to his involvement in the murder if he wanted to spare his family serious trouble. The parties did not provide any information concerning the authorities’ reaction to these complaints. 12.  On an unspecified date the case against the applicant and Mr N.L. was referred for trial to the Donetsk Regional Court. According to the prosecution, the applicant was guilty of murder for profit, unlawful possession of firearms and unlawful transactions in foreign currency. According to the prosecution’s version of events, Mrs O.M., grossly upset about her husband’s inappropriate behaviour towards her, had requested Mr N.L. to find somebody to talk to him, threaten and, if necessary, beat him. She allowed him to take some money from 1.5 billion karbovantsi[1] which she had earlier given him for safekeeping, to hire a suitable person. Mr N.L., who was on bad personal terms with Mr O.M. and was afraid to lose his job in his wife’s company, decided to use the money to have Mr O.M. killed. On an unknown date Mr N.L. gave the applicant USD 2,000 for preparation of the murder, including the purchase of a gun, and informed him of the usual time and route by which Mr O.M. walked to work. On an unknown date the applicant acquired from an unknown source a 7.65-calibre foreign gun of an unknown make, and on 13 November 1995 he fired several shots into the victim. On 15 November 1995 Mr N.L. gave the applicant another USD 10,000 in payment for the murder. 13.  On 29 May 1996 the Donetsk Regional Court referred the case for additional investigation, having found that the facts of the case were insufficiently established and the evidence of the defendants’ involvement in the incriminated offences was insufficient. On an unspecified date the case was referred back to the court for trial. 14.  On 13 December 1996 the Donetsk Regional Court acquitted the defendants, having found, in particular, that the prosecution had failed to account for inconsistencies between the available sources of evidence and to secure sufficient proof of the defendants’ guilt. In particular, a number of facts, such as Mr N.L.’s alleged involvement in the crimes and the sums purportedly received by the applicant to commit the murder were lacking in any evidentiary basis save for Mr N.L.’s initial confessions, which he had subsequently retracted as given under duress. Accordingly, the court found the evidence unreliable and, as no other evidence was available, interpreted all the doubts in favour of the defence. 15.  The applicant was released from custody on the day of his acquittal and soon afterwards left the country and settled in Uzbekistan, allegedly fearing reprisals on the part of the police. On an unspecified date Mr N.L. disappeared. 16.  On 9 June 1997 the Donetsk Regional Court placed the applicant and Mr N.L. on the wanted list. According to the applicant, he was unaware of this fact and was never in hiding. He settled, worked, married, had a child and obtained a driver’s licence in his own name. 17.  On 13 December 1997 the Supreme Court allowed the appeal in cassation by the prosecution and remitted the case for fresh consideration to the Donetsk Regional Court. 18.  In 2002, when the applicant applied to the Ukrainian authorities to renew his expired passport, he was arrested and detained in Ukraine pending trial. 19.  As Mr N.L. was not found, on 9 December 2002 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal (the former Donetsk Regional Court) solicited the applicant’s opinion about holding a trial in his absence, to which the applicant, represented by a lawyer, agreed. In the course of the trial, the prosecution requested the court to read out depositions by Mr N.L., to which the defence did not object. The court granted the request by the prosecution. 20.  On 3 October 2003 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal accepted the prosecution’s version of events as filed in 1996. It convicted the applicant of murder for profit and unlawful possession of firearms and acquitted him of unlawful transactions in foreign currency, which was by then no longer a criminal offence. 21.  The court found that the applicant’s guilt of having committed the murder as charged was apparent, in particular, on the strength of the following evidence:
- Mrs O.M.’s testimony that in October 1995 she had requested Mr N.L. to find a person to threaten her husband and had authorised him to pay that person out of 1.5 billion karbovantsi given to him for safekeeping. After her husband had been murdered, Mr N.L. had advised her to be quiet about the matter;
- Mrs A.L.’s (the applicant’s mother’s) testimony that on 12 November 1995 her son had bought gloves, tennis shoes and a sports bag. On 13 November 1995 her son had told her that he was going to play tennis in the morning, but had subsequently changed his plans and left the town for two days. The 1,500 USD which were seized from the house belonged to the entire family and were long-term savings;
- Mrs V.V.’s and Mrs O.O.’s testimony that on 13 November 1995, at about 6.30 a.m., they had heard several gunshots and then discovered Mr O.M. wounded near the railroad bridge, and that they had not seen any suspicious men around;
- Mr M.F.’s testimony that on 13 November 1995, at about 6.30 a.m., he had heard three gunshots and some 20 seconds later had seen a man running across the bridge. He was unable, however, to provide a description of the man and refused to speculate whether it could have been the applicant;
- Mr A.F.’s testimony that on 12 November 1995 he had driven the applicant to a market in his father’s car, where the applicant had bought a bag, a jacket, tennis shoes and gloves. Subsequently they had gone on to the neighbourhood where the murder would take place the following day, as the applicant had business there. The applicant went into the forest and was absent for some 10 to 12 minutes, after which they returned home and agreed that Mr A.F. would give the applicant a ride the following morning “to meet the boss”. They drove to the place the next day and Mr A.F. and his father waited for the applicant in the car. The applicant returned without his jacket, very agitated, and informed them that he had encountered suspicious individuals. During the trip the applicant threw away his boots and his gloves out of the window. Mr A.F.’s father gave an analogous statement;
- Mrs A.I.’s depositions, given during the pre-trial investigation, that on 13 November 1995 at 6:15 she had seen a man standing on the railroad bridge with a big dark bag near him, his hands in the pockets;
- an expert assessment of the bullets fired at Mr O.M., according to which the bullets could have been shot from a gun of one of some eight foreign models;
- an expert assessment that it was not impossible to fire one of those guns when wearing gloves similar to the ones which the applicant had had on him, as identified by Mr A.F. (his driver);
- two forensic assessments of the circumstances and causes of Mr O.M.’s death, which described his wounds and found that the shots had been fired from various distances;
- the testimony by the applicant’s boss, in charge of a currency exchange business, concerning the applicant’s low income;
- the record of the currency exchange transactions performed by the business in the relevant time, according to which nobody had exchanged any sum higher than USD 500 in a single transaction; and
- the applicant’s psychiatric assessment, according to which he suffered from no disorder and was answerable for his actions. 22.  No reference in the text of the judgment was made to the confessional statements by Mr N.L. or to the applicant’s allegations that they had been given under duress. 23.  Having recited the aforementioned evidence, the court concluded:
“Having assessed the evidence in the case, the court considers it established that [the applicant].... had committed murder for profit, which is to be qualified under Section 93(a) of the Criminal Code. His intentional actions, manifested in acquisition, carrying and storage of firearm and ammunition without a respective permit, which have been fully confirmed, fall under Section 222 paragraph 1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine...” 24.  The applicant appealed in cassation. He maintained, inter alia, that his conviction lacked evidentiary basis and de facto relied to a decisive extent on the initial depositions by Mr N.L., given by him in the absence of a lawyer when interrogated as a witness without privilege against self-incrimination, and which he had subsequently retracted as given under duress. He maintained that without a reference to those depositions all the other evidence was insufficient to establish the facts, in particular concerning the possession of the gun and the payment of money for the murder. 25.  The applicant’s lawyer lodged a separate cassation appeal in which he supported the applicant’s allegations concerning the insufficiency of the inculpating evidence. He noted, in particular, that there was no evidence whatsoever that the applicant had ever had a gun, much less fired it, or that the USD 12,000 allegedly given to the applicant had ever existed, much less been transferred to him as suggested, and submitted that it was not possible to establish exactly where the applicant had been at the time when Mr O.M. had been wounded. 26.  On 11 March 2004 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of 3 October 2003. In the text of its decision it summarised the evidence on which the conviction was based, as well as referring to the confession made by Mr N.L., as follows:
“During the hearing [the trial court] also examined the statement of [Mr N. L.] given during the pre-trial proceedings, in which he confirmed that after having talked with [Mrs O. M.] he informed [the applicant] about that, and the latter said that in order to prepare the murder he needed USD 2,000 and USD 10,000 for its committal. He gave [the applicant] USD 2,000, and the latter showed him a gun he had acquired. After the murder of [Mr O.M.], on 15 November 1995 he paid [the applicant] USD 10,000 and the latter told him that he had disposed of the gun, the jacket, the gloves and the boots.
The arguments of [the applicant] that [Mr N.L.] had falsely accused him and himself under physical pressure by police officers had also been examined and had been found unsubstantiated...” 27.  In concluding its reasoning, the Supreme Court stated:
“Therefore, the [trial] court has examined all the circumstances of the case. Having assessed the evidence in its totality, the [trial] court concluded that [the applicant] had committed the premeditated murder for profit of [Mr O.M.] and correctly qualified it as an offence defined in Article 93 (a) of the 1960 Criminal Code.”


4.  The applicant was born in 1968. From November 1997 to June 2004 he held a post of customs inspector in Feodosiya. 5.  On 13 October 2004 the applicant was arrested and placed in the Temporary Investigative Isolation Unit (“SIZO”) of Simferopol. Later on, he was moved to the Zaporizhzhya SIZO. 6.  On 15 October 2004 the Feodosiya Town Court (“the Town Court”) remanded the applicant in custody in view of the pending criminal investigations against him. The court noted in particular that the applicant was charged with a serious crime for which he was liable to a penalty of over three years’ imprisonment, and that he was unemployed. The court held, without giving any further details, that there were grounds to believe that, if left at liberty, the applicant would seek to evade investigation and trial, and obstruct the establishment of the truth in his criminal case. 7.  By resolutions of the Town Court and the Kyiv Court of Appeal of 8 December 2004, 8 February, 30 March, 8 July and 7 December 2005, the maximum period of the applicant’s detention was extended, respectively, to four months, six months, nine months, thirteen months, and fourteen months and twelve days, in view of the pending criminal investigations against him. The courts put forward similar reasons for the applicant’s continued detention as in the order of 15 October 2004, and held that there were no grounds for altering the preventive measure applied in the applicant’s respect. In the resolutions of 8 July and 7 December 2005 the courts also noted that the applicant had been studying the case file. By the latter resolution, he was given a time-limit, until 20 December 2005, to complete his study of the file. 8.  On 25 December 2005, the applicant requested the Simferopol SIZO administration to be released, stating that there was no formal decision authorising his detention after 25 December 2005. On 27 December 2005 the request was refused on the ground that his continuing detention was governed by Article 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and that his criminal case had been referred to the court for trial on 23 December 2005. 9.  On an unspecified date the Shevchenkivsky District Court of Zaporizhzhya (“the District Court”) received the case. 10.  On 3 March 2006 the applicant lodged with that court a petition alleging, among other things, that his continuing detention was unlawful. 11.  On 20 March 2006 the District Court rejected his petition and ordered him to remain in detention, stating that there were no grounds for changing the preventive measure. The court’s order, containing no further explanations or a time-limit for the applicant’s detention, was not subject to appeal. 12.  On 25 October 2007 the District Court rejected another petition for his release by the applicant relying, in particular, on a letter written by prosecutors according to which there was intelligence gathered suggesting that the applicant prepared documents to leave the country. It also relied on information obtained during the hearings indicating that the applicant intended to change his citizenship. The court did not set a time-limit for the applicant’s detention. According to the applicant, the case file contained no documents or other evidence corroborating his intention to leave the country. As to the issue of citizenship, he stated that he had applied for renunciation of the Ukrainian citizenship. 13.  In a judgment of 8 November 2007 the District Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to nine years and six months’ imprisonment with confiscation of all his property. It also stripped him of his service rank and limited his right to serve in law-enforcement agencies. 14.  On 23 June 2008 the Zaporizhzhya Regional Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) changed the first-instance court’s judgment. While upholding the applicant’s conviction for abuse of office, organised crime, and forgery of official documents, the court discontinued the proceedings concerning the charges of bribery and remitted the case concerning the charges of tax evasion for additional investigation. It also reduced the applicant’s prison sentence to five years. 15.  On 22 October 2009 the Supreme Court quashed the appellate court’s judgment and remitted the case for fresh appellate review. 16.  On 19 April 2010 the Court of Appeal quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case to the District Court. It also ordered further detention of the applicant. According to the latter’s submissions, the case is pending before the District Court.


4.  The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Bucharest. 5.  In 1984 the house, which was the property of the applicant’s mother and was where they had been living was demolished by the State without compensation. Therefore on 18 October 1984 the applicant’s mother was authorised to take on the tenancy of Apartment 18 situated at 2 Valea Călugărească Street in Bucharest. 6.  On 25 March 1991 the applicant’s mother made a request to the O. company, a State-representative company responsible for the management of property belonging to the State, to buy the apartment under Decree-law no. 61/1990 and Law no. 85/1992 regarding the sale to the population of dwellings built with State funds. She died on 9 July 1993, the applicant being her only heir. 7.  On 26 January 1994 V.V. took on the tenancy of Apartment 18. According to the applicant, he was living in the apartment at that time.
On 29 March 1994 the applicant was evicted from that apartment, as he had no tenancy. The goods in the apartment were entrusted to the keeping of V.V., most of them being placed under a seal in one room. At the latest on 7 December 2000 the O. company demanded that the applicant take the goods removed from the apartment, as it had no suitable place to keep them. 8.  On 17 March 1994 the applicant requested the court to oblige both O. and R. companies, as State-representative companies responsible for the management of property belonging to the State, to sell him Apartment 18. 9.  On 11 May 1998 the Bucharest Court of First Instance allowed the applicant’s action, considering that he had inherited his mother’s right to buy that apartment, and ordered the two companies to conclude a sale contract with the applicant for Apartment 18. 10.  On 30 September 1999 the Bucharest Court of Appeal, by a final decision, dismissed as groundless an appeal by the two companies, which sought to declare the apartment governed by Law no. 112/1995, not by Decree-law no. 61/1990 and Law no. 85/1992. 11.  Although there had been judicial recognition of the authorities’ obligation to sell Apartment 18 to the applicant, the latter was not able to buy it, being informed that on 27 January 1997 the former had sold the apartment to V.V., the then tenant, under Law no. 112/1995. 12.  On 12 February 2001 the applicant requested the court to find the sale of Apartment 18 null and void and to oblige the authorities to perform the sale as provided by the judgment of 30 September 1999.
On 5 February 2003 the Bucharest Court of Appeal, by a final decision, dismissed the action, considering that the property was governed by Law no. 112/1995, not by Decree-law no. 61/1990 and Law no. 85/1992, and that V.V. had made the purchase in good faith. 13.  On 27 February 2002 the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against the two managers of the O. company for damaging his personal interest in the course of their duties as civil servants and for giving false information for inclusion in a document. On 5 November 2003 the public prosecutor decided not to initiate criminal proceedings because of the prescription of criminal liability. However, the prosecutor considered that the constitutive elements of both criminal offences had been met because, on the one hand, the apartment had been sold despite being the object of pending proceedings and before a final decision on the matter and, on the other hand, the two representatives had been in bad faith when they had signed the sale contract with V.V.


6.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lived in Moscow. 7.  The applicant engaged in commerce and at some point in the early 1990s became the president of the Russian Afghan War Veterans Fund. 8.  In April 1997 the authorities brought criminal proceedings against the applicant and a few other persons on suspicion of several crimes, including masterminding the murder of the applicant's business rivals. 9.  On 21 January 2000 the Military Court of the Moscow District (Московский окружной военный суд), sitting as a bench composed of one professional judge and two lay assessors, examined the case presented by the prosecution and acquitted the applicant and his co-accused on all charges for lack of evidence of his involvement in the alleged crimes (за недоказанностью участия в совершении преступлений). 10.  On 26 January 2000 the prosecution lodged an appeal against the judgment of 21 January 2000, arguing that the first-instance court had wrongly assessed the evidence in the case and “failed to adopt measures aimed at achieving a comprehensive, full and objective investigation of all the circumstances of the case, to eliminate the inconsistencies in the prosecution case file and to have regard to all possible versions of events, but had pinpointed nonexistent inconsistencies for which the investigative authority allegedly failed to account”. 11.  The prosecution suggested that the first instance court ought to have eliminated the inconsistencies in the prosecution case file of its own motion and requested the appeal court to remit the case for re-trial. 12.  On an unspecified date the parties, including the applicant and alleged victims, filed their own arguments. 13.  By decision of 25 July 2000 the Military Division of the Supreme Court of Russia (Военная коллегия Верховного Суда Российской Федерации), sitting as a bench of three professional judges, examined and rejected the arguments of the prosecution and the alleged victims and upheld the judgment of 21 January 2000 in full. The court noted that:
“... Despite the arguments in the prosecution's appeal about the incomplete and one‑sided nature of examination of the case by the court, the judicial investigation was sufficiently thorough and comprehensive.
All pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution and the defence were examined at the court hearing.
The court ruled on all applications by the parties concerning the examination of the evidence, took all necessary measures to remedy the shortcomings of the investigation and eliminate the inconsistencies in the oral statements of the questioned persons, and as regards the questions requiring specialist knowledge decided to carry out and then carried out appropriate expert examinations.
At the same time, having evaluated the evidence examined in its entirety, the court came to a reasoned conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to convict and that every means of collecting evidence in the court proceedings had been exhausted. In fact, this was confirmed by the prosecutor (государственный обвинитель), who did not make any application for a fresh investigation in court (судебное следствие) with a view to eliminating of the existing or newly discovered inconsistencies, and the prosecutor who took part in the appeal hearing ...
The constitutional principle of adversarial proceedings and equality of arms in the administration of justice presupposes the separation of the function of consideration of cases from the functions of the prosecution and the defence submitting argument before the court. Thus, the task of prosecution before the court pertains to the prosecution bodies, whilst the court has an obligation to formulate conclusions about the established facts, regard being had to the evidence examined in the court hearing, to evaluate objectively the lawfulness and validity of the charges, to decide on the issue of acquittal or conviction, have due regard to the evidence collected by the investigation bodies and the arguments of the defence, thus securing the just and impartial resolution of the case and granting the parties equal opportunities to defend their positions. Hence, the court is empowered to determine the guilt of a person only on condition that it has been proven by the prosecuting bodies and officials. The lower court in the present case has fully complied with this requirement of the Constitution of the RF ...
Having considered the evidence of guilt and innocence presented in court by the parties, the court came to the conclusion that it was insufficient to convict and that [the court] has exhausted all statutory means of collecting additional evidence, which is why it took a well-grounded decision to acquit [the applicant and two co-accused] for lack of evidence of their involvement in the criminal actions in respect of which they had been accused by the investigative bodies, having interpreted, in accordance with the requirements of the legislation and the Constitution of the RF, all doubts about the guilt in their favour.” 14.  On 25 August 2000 the Deputy Prosecutor General applied for supervisory review of the judgments in the case, arguing that the lower courts ought to have reacted to the breaches of the domestic law and various deficiencies in the prosecution case file by remitting the case for an additional investigation instead of acquitting the accused. He referred to, among other things, paragraph 2 of Article 232(1) of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure in this connection. 15.  On 13 December 2000, the Presidium of the Supreme Court, sitting as a bench of nine professional judges, heard the parties, including the applicant and his counsel, and accepted the prosecution's arguments. 16.  The court stated that:
“... the Presidium finds that the prosecution appeal is well-founded and that it should be granted, as the preliminary investigation and the trial, despite the requirements of Article 20 of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure, were conducted in an incomplete and one-sided manner, without proper inquiry into incriminating and exculpatory circumstances. ...” 17.  The court pointed out several breaches of the domestic procedure by the investigating authorities and various inconsistencies in the prosecution case file and gave a number of detailed instructions as to how these deficiencies should be eliminated. The court quashed the judgment of 21 January 2000 and the appeal decision of 25 July 2000 and remitted the case for a fresh investigation 18.  On 31 January 2001 the applicant died in a car accident. 19.  On 2 April 2001 the prosecution discontinued the case in respect of the applicant on account of his death, and pursued the investigation against S., one of the persons who had stood trial and been acquitted together with the applicant. 20.  On 28 May 2003 co-accused S. was found guilty and sentenced to fourteen years' imprisonment.


4.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Skopje. 5.  He was employed by the State Land Bureau (Геодетска Управа/ Државен Зaвод за Геодетски Работи) (“the employer”). On 29 September 1994 he sustained grievous bodily injuries while on duty: trying to jump over a fence, he fell down and broke his spine and elbow. Until June 1997 he was several times hospitalised and underwent four spinal operations. 6. On 21 October 1996 the applicant instituted civil proceedings for damages against the employer before the Skopje Court of First Instance (“the trial court”). 7.  At a hearing of 8 January 1997 the court ordered the examination of two witnesses. As their whereabouts fell within the territorial competence of the Ohrid Court of First Instance, the trial court requested the latter to carry out the examination. 8. On 4 March 1997 the trial court examined one of the witnesses. The hearing was postponed as the Ohrid Court of First Instance had failed to examine the other witness. 9. On 22 April 1997 the trial court heard the applicant and adjourned the hearing because of the failure of the Ohrid Court of First Instance to examine the other witness. A hearing scheduled for 16 June 1997 was adjourned for the same reason. 10. On 18 June 1997 the Ohrid Court of First Instance provided the trial court with a record of the witnesses' examination. Between 13 January and 17 May 1997 the trial court had requested the Ohrid Court of First Instance to carry out the examination on three occasions. 11. On 30 September 1997 the trial court suspended the proceedings because of the applicant's absence. 12. On 25 November 1997 the applicant requested the trial court to resume the proceedings. 13. On 16 February 1998 the trial court ordered the re-examination of one of the witnesses. It further requested the employer to submit the Working Posts' Regulation (Акт за систематизација на работите и работните задачи) (“the Regulation”). 14. On 26 March 1998 the trial court re-examined one of the witnesses and adjourned the hearing, as the employer had not submitted the Regulation. It postponed a hearing fixed for 14 May 1998 as the Regulation had not been provided yet. The trial court further allowed the applicant's request for an expert examination in relation to the non-pecuniary damage and ordered the Psychiatric Hospital “Bardovci” in Skopje (the “Hospital”) to carry out the examination. The Hospital provided its expert report on 28 August 1998. 15. On 22 October 1998 the applicant requested an additional expert examination concerning the anguish suffered which was allegedly omitted in the previous expert report. The trial court granted his request and ordered the employer to provide information as to whether the applicant had been medically insured. 16. A hearing fixed for 24 November 1998 was adjourned as the additional expert report had not been provided. 17. On 16 February 1999 the trial court partly upheld the applicant's claim and awarded him 3,834,960 Macedonian denars (MKD) together with interest. 18. On 4 October 1999 the Deputy Solicitor General appealed before the Skopje Court of Appeal on the basis that the amount of the award had been excessive; that the lower court had erroneously established the facts, in particular that the employer had not issued a special work-instruction for a particular job at the time of the accident; and that the substantive law had been incorrectly applied. 19. On 23 December 1999 the Skopje Court of Appeal dismissed the Deputy Solicitor General's appeal and upheld the trial court's judgment. 20. On 1 March 2000 the Deputy Solicitor General brought before the Supreme Court an appeal on points of law (ревизија). He complained that the applicant had also contributed to the accident by overlooking the possible negative consequences of jumping over the fence. The Deputy Solicitor General further alleged the incorrect application of the national law. On 9 March 2000 the appeal on points of law was communicated to the applicant. The latter did not file submissions in reply. 21. On 21 April 2000 the applicant applied to the trial court to enforce its judgment and to transfer to him the amount due from the employer's account. Judgment award was paid in September 2001. 22. On 24 October 2002 the Supreme Court partly upheld the Deputy Solicitor General's appeal on points of law and overturned the lower courts' judgments. It dismissed his arguments that there had been substantial procedural deficiencies, but it ruled that the lower courts had incorrectly applied the national law. Referring to the facts as established by the lower courts, the Supreme Court held that they had erroneously found that the applicant had not contributed to the accident. Moreover, it found that there had been no instruction by the employer for the undertaking of the relevant action. It ruled therefore, that the applicant shared the responsibility with the employer for the injuries sustained: it consequently reduced the award by 50% together with statutory interest (законска затезна камата). The interest concerning the pecuniary damage was to be calculated from 21 October 1996 and 22 October 1998, respectively, and the interest concerning the non-pecuniary damage – from 18 February 1999, until the final payment. 23. No further actions were taken by either of the parties in respect of the Supreme Court's judgment.


7.  The applicants were born in 1961 and 1962 respectively and live in the village of Kormilovka, Omsk Region. 8.  The applicants, a married couple, used to live in Kargasok of the Tomsk Region where they worked as veterinarians. The first applicant held the position of Head Veterinarian of the Kargasok District. 9.  On 26 September 1996 criminal proceedings for fraud were instituted against the first applicant and an obligation not to leave the place of his residence without permission was imposed on him as a preventive measure.  On 22 October 1996 by an order of the investigator the first applicant was suspended from his employment. 10.  In February 1998 criminal proceedings for fraud were instituted against the second applicant and an obligation not to leave the place of her residence without permission was imposed on her as a preventive measure. 11.  The criminal proceedings against both applicants were joined on 17 August 1998. The applicants were accused of submitting false reports on business trips in order to obtain cash from the veterinary practice where the first applicant worked unlawfully. 12.  On 17 July 2000 the applicants asked for the obligation not to leave their place of residence without permission to be cancelled. It appears that the application was not considered. 13.  Over the course of six years the criminal case was several times remitted by the courts for additional investigation: in May 1997 and on 5 February 1998, 21 September 1999, 31 May 2000 and 31 October 2000. 14.  In 2001 the applicants' minor son was invited to attend an interview for a place at the Omsk State Agrarian University. The applicants submitted that he did not attend the interview since neither of them was allowed to accompany him in the journey to Omsk. On an unspecified date the acting prosecutor of the Kargasok District provided the second applicant with the following letter:
“[The letter] is given to Ms Bevia Andreyevna Fedorova ... in order to confirm that on 10-11 July 2001 she was summoned to the Prosecutor's Office of the Kargasok District, as a result of which she could not leave for Omsk together with her son and be present at ... the interview on 12 July.
[The letter] is to be presented to the examination panel of the Institute of Veterinary Medicine at the Omsk State Agrarian University.”
The applicants' son, having passed general entry exams, was later admitted to the University. 15.  On 13 August 2002 the Parabelskiy District Court of the Tomsk Region acquitted the applicants and cancelled the obligation not to leave their place of residence without permission.  On appeal, on 16 December 2002 the Tomsk Regional Court quashed the judgment and remitted the case for a fresh examination by a different composition of judges. 16.  On 8 May 2003 the Parabelskiy District Court of the Tomsk Region terminated the criminal proceedings against the applicants for lack of indication that a crime had been committed. The ruling was quashed on appeal on 30 June 2003 by the Tomsk Regional Court, which remitted the case for a fresh examination to the Molchanovskiy District Court of the Tomsk Region. 17.  The Molchanovskiy District Court convicted the first applicant of misappropriation of property held in trust and sentenced him to one year's imprisonment on 31 December 2003. He was not required to serve the sentence on account of the statutory time-bar. The second applicant was fully acquitted. The court also lifted the obligation not to leave the place of residence without permission in respect of both applicants, although it had already been cancelled by the Parabelskiy District Court of the Tomsk Region on 13 August 2002. 18.  On appeal, on 15 April 2004 the Tomsk Regional Court reversed the judgment in the part relating to the conviction of the first applicant and remitted the case for a fresh examination. The court decided not to apply any measures of restraint in respect of the applicant. 19.  The case was subsequently transmitted to the Sovetskiy District Court of the Tomsk Region. On 28 February 2005 the Sovetskiy District Court of the Tomsk Region convicted the first applicant of misappropriation of property held in trust and sentenced him conditionally to one year's imprisonment. The court, however, released the applicant from the punishment because of the expiry of the statutory time-limit. 20.  On 25 April 2005 the Tomsk Regional Court reversed the judgment on appeal. It held that the first instance court should not have first convicted the applicant of the offence and then released him from the punishment, but should have terminated the criminal proceedings. Accordingly, the appeal court discontinued the criminal proceedings against the applicant on account of expiry of the statutory time-limit.


9.  The applicant was born in 1929 and lives in Vittoriosa. 10.  The applicant is the brother of Mrs M., who lived in an apartment above Mr F. 11.  On 17 July 1985 Mr F. applied for an injunction to restrain Mrs M. from hanging out clothes to dry over the courtyard of his apartment, thereby allegedly interfering with his property rights. Mr F. relied on the provisions of Article 403 of the Maltese Civil Code in this connection. 12.  On one occasion following a hearing on the injunction, and after Mrs M. and her lawyer, Dr A., had already left the courtroom, the presiding magistrate changed the date of a future hearing, which had already been fixed. As a consequence, Mrs M. was not aware of the new date and was not present at the hearing. In her absence, on 29 November 1985 the presiding magistrate issued the injunction in favour of Mr F. 13.  According to Maltese law as it stood at the time, Mr F. had to institute proceedings in respect of the property claim preserved by the warrant within four days of the issuing of the injunction; otherwise the injunction would cease to have effect. Accordingly, on 5 December 1985, Mr F. lodged a writ of summons to start proceedings. 14.  On 6 March 1992 the relevant court trying the merits of Mr F.’s civil action found against Mrs M. and issued a permanent injunction against her. On 24 March 1992, as no appeal had been lodged, the case became final. 15.  On 6 December 1985 Mrs M. instituted proceedings before the Civil Court (First Hall) in its ordinary jurisdiction, claiming that the injunction had been issued in her absence and without giving her the opportunity to testify (see paragraph 77 below). 16.  By a judgment of 15 October 1990, the Civil Court upheld her claim. It held that the audi alteram partem principle was applicable to the procedure for issuing an injunction. Referring to Article 873 § 2 of the Code of Organisation and Civil Procedure, which stated that an injunction should not be issued unless the court was satisfied that it was necessary in order to preserve any right of the person seeking it (see paragraph 27 below), the Civil Court held that the relevant test was a matter for the court’s discretion. However, if the court found it necessary to hear the parties, they should be duly heard in accordance with the principles of natural justice. In the present case the court held that, through no fault of her own, Mrs M. had been denied her right to be heard and therefore the said warrant was null and void. 17.  Mr F. appealed against the judgment of 15 October 1990. In the first-instance proceedings Mr F. had been assisted by Dr U., while at the appeal stage he had appointed the latter’s son, Dr C. The Court of Appeal was presided over by the Chief Justice, who sat with two other judges. The Chief Justice was Dr U.’s brother and Dr C.’s uncle. 18.  At the appeal hearing of 12 October 1992, the Chief Justice, after asking some questions, alleged that the conduct of Dr A. was unethical, as he had impugned, without justification, the conduct of Mr F’s lawyer. When it was noted that in the first-instance proceedings Mr F. had been represented by the Chief Justice’s brother, the Chief Justice threatened to refer the case to “the competent authorities”. Furthermore, he dictated a note to this effect, which read as follows:
“The court is asking Dr A., who himself is declaring that the date of the hearing at first instance had been changed when he and his client had already left the courtroom, why he insisted that the said change of date occurred consequent to a request by a lawyer. Dr A.’s reply is: ‘I deduce so, as there were two lawyers present: Dr U. and myself.’
... Mrs M.’s lawyer asserts facts and has no problem hypothesising about the behaviour of another lawyer and the judge, after he and his client had walked out of the courtroom.” 19.  Dr A. said a few words in his own defence, but no oral submissions regarding the merits of the appeal were heard. The Chief Justice suspended the hearing and went to his chambers. A few minutes later the lawyers of both parties were called into the Chief Justice’s chambers. Explanations were heard and no further action appears to have been taken. 20.  By a judgment of 5 February 1993, the Court of Appeal found against Mrs M. and reversed the judgment of the Civil Court. It held that principles of natural justice were not mandatory and could not be invoked in preliminary proceedings that were essentially conditional and of a temporary nature. Moreover, the Court of Appeal did not agree with the issue of fact mentioned in the first-instance judgment, in respect of the change in date leading to Mrs M.’s absence at the hearing. In this respect the judgment repeated in part the note which had been dictated during the hearing – “Mrs M.’s lawyer asserts facts and has no problem hypothesising about the behaviour of another lawyer and the judge, after he and his client had walked out of the courtroom”. The Court of Appeal further ordered the removal from the records of the case of a report which supported Mrs M.’s claim, which had been drawn up by the judicial assistant appointed by the Civil Court. 21.  On 25 March 1993 Mrs M. instituted proceedings before the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional jurisdiction. Relying on Article 6 of the Convention, she alleged that the President of the Court of Appeal (the Chief Justice) lacked objective impartiality and that this had been manifest in the incident of 12 October 1992. Observing that the Court of Appeal had denied facts which had already been proved, she further submitted that her right to a fair trial had been violated. 22.  Mrs M. died on 20 January 2002, before her constitutional claim could be determined. On 22 May 2002 the applicant intervened in the proceedings before the Civil Court in his capacity as brother of the plaintiff. 23.  In a judgment of 29 January 2004, the Civil Court dismissed Mrs M.’s claim as frivolous and vexatious. Although it noted that the plaintiff had failed to request the Chief Justice to withdraw from the case before the pronouncement of the final judgment, it rejected the Government’s plea of non-exhaustion of ordinary remedies and decided to exercise its constitutional jurisdiction. As to the merits, it made a thorough analysis of the notions and rights emanating from Article 6 of the Convention, including equality of arms, but placed particular emphasis on the requirement of impartiality of the Civil Court. However, it was unable to find any link between the incident of 12 October 1992 and the content of the judgment of 5 February 1993. As confirmed by Dr A. himself, the incident had been defused; however, this could not have given Mrs M. or her lawyer any expectation that the Court of Appeal would rule in her favour. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal was composed of two other judges, who had not been involved in the incident, and there had been no doubt that the judgment, which appeared to be well-reasoned, had been delivered by the bench as a whole. 24.  The applicant appealed to the Constitutional Court. 25.  By a judgment of 24 October 2005, the Constitutional Court declared the appeal inadmissible. It reiterated that in accordance with Article 46 § 5 of the Constitution, no appeal lay against a decision dismissing an application as frivolous and vexatious.


4.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lived in Vladivostok. 5.  On 17 July 1995 the commanding officer of a military unit appointed the applicant as deputy master of the medium tanker (MT) Argun. On 25 July 1995 the command of the auxiliary fleet service of the Russian Pacific Fleet sent the applicant on a trade mission to Singapore. On 1 September 1995 the commander of the military unit appointed him as master of MT Argun. The applicant remained in this post until 10 April 1999. 6.  Between 28 April 1994 and 5 April 1996 the tanker was leased out by the State Committee for Management of the Property of the Russian Federation (“the State Property Committee”) to a private company Inakva Co. The lease agreement stipulated that the tanker was to be staffed by the auxiliary fleet service of the Pacific Fleet which also paid the staff's wages in the Russian national currency. Inakva Co was obligated to cover the part of the staff's wages that was paid in foreign currency and the tanker maintenance costs. 7.  On 5 April 1996 the State Property Committee signed a new lease agreement with an American company National Pacific Limited. 8.  On an unspecified date the applicant and his crew brought proceedings in the High Court of South Africa for the unpaid wages earned by them in 1995, 1996 and 1999. 9.  On 25 May 1999 the tanker was arrested in Cape Town, South Africa, pending adjudication of the dispute. 10.  By judgment of 25 November 1999 (of 13 August 1999 according to the documents submitted by the Government), the High Court of South Africa declared the Russian Federation to be the lawful owner of the vessel. 11.  On 12 March 2001 the Ministry of State Property of the Russian Federation, the successor of the State Property Committee, signed a new lease agreement with a private company Oil Compact, which was obligated to undertake all possible measures to release the tanker from arrest. 12.  By final judgment of 12 September 2002 the High Court awarded the applicant 79,750.79 United States dollars against the vessel MT Argun and interest at the rate of 15.5% per annum on that amount. The MT Argun was ordered to pay the applicant's costs and travel expenses. It was also decided that the vessel would be sold at an auction to cover the court awards. 13.  On 16 May 2003 the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa heard the parties' appeals and upheld the judgment of 12 September 2002. 14.  On 21 November 2003 the Ministry of State Property and Ministry of Defence signed an agreement with a private agent OAO Sovfrakht seeking release of MT Argun from arrest and its transfer to the Russian Military Fleet. On the same day OAO Sovfrakht signed an agreement with a third party Avangard-2 Shipping Company S.A. which won the auction and bought the vessel. 15.  On 16 January 2004 the MT Argun was handed over to the Russian Military Pacific Fleet. 16.  According to the applicant, in June and July 2006 he received part of the judicial award in the amount of 7,156 USD in respect of the wages and 4,752 USD in respect of the accrued interest. 17.  On 4 May 2006 the applicant brought proceedings against the State complaining of the actions (inaction) of the Federal Agency for Management of State Property in respect of his claims for unpaid wages and seeking to recover the said wages in the amount of 72.547 USD as well as legal expenses and non-pecuniary damage. On 5 May 2006 the Leninskiy District Court of Vladivostok declined jurisdiction in the case. This decision was upheld by the Primorye Regional Court on 28 June 2006. 18.  Thereafter, the applicant brought the same claims before the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow. On 3 October 2006 the District Court declined jurisdiction in favour of a justice of peace. This decision was upheld by the Moscow City Court on 27 February 2007. It appears that the applicant did not bring his claims to any other court. 19.  On 25 November 2002 the authorities initiated criminal proceedings in respect of the applicant in connection with his claims in the South African court. 20.  On 17 March 2003 the applicant was charged with fraudulent acquirement of title to the property of the Russian Federation and other related crimes. On the same day his case was sent for preliminary investigation to the military prosecutor's office of the Pacific Fleet, and the applicant was ordered not to leave town. 21.  On 26 August 2003 the preliminary investigation was stayed pending the applicant's convalescence. On 5 December 2003 the investigation was resumed. 22.  Between 16 January 2004 and 17 June 2005 the applicant and his legal counsel studied the case file. 23.  On 20 June 2005 the case was submitted for trial by the Leninskiy District Court of Vladivostok (“the District Court”) and was assigned to judge I. 24.  On 6 July 2005 the applicant requested that the preparatory hearing be postponed due to his counsel's illness. 25.  On 17 November 2005 the District Court refused to examine the case and ordered the prosecution to redraft the bill of indictment tainted with a number of defects. The case was returned to the court on 29 November 2005. 26.  On 12 January 2006 the hearing did not take place as the judge was involved in different proceedings. 27.  The hearing of 13 January 2006 also did not take place due to the applicant's illness. The proceedings were stayed pending his convalescence. 28.  On 6 July 2006 the proceedings resumed, but the hearing did not take place as the applicant's counsel did not appear. 29.  On 12 July 2006 the applicant was granted leave to study the new bill of indictment until 21 July 2006. 30.  On 24 July 2006 the court granted the applicant's request to send the case back to the prosecutor for re-drafting of the bill of indictment. The case was returned to the court on 18 August 2006 and was assigned to judge P. 31.  The hearings scheduled for September and October 2006 did not take place due to the applicant's illness. 32.  In November 2006 the court began hearing the case on the merits. The court adjourned the proceedings in November 2006, January and June 2007, each time for a week, due to the applicant's or his counsel's illness. 33.  On 25 June 2007 the court adjourned the proceedings for ten days as the judge was away on a study trip. 34.  The hearings of 24 December 2007 and 25 January 2008 did not take place following the applicant's and his counsel's failure to appear. 35.  By judgment of 11 March 2008 the applicant was convicted of fraudulent acquirement of title to property by way of obtaining of the court award of allegedly unpaid wages, and received a suspended sentence of five years' imprisonment. 36.  On 2 June 2009 the applicant died.


4.  The applicant was born in 1939 and lives in Budapest.
Proceedings “A” 5.  On 17 August 1994 Mr E.H. brought an action against the applicant before the Pest Central District Court seeking the vacation of a real property. After several hearings, on 30 November 1999 a judgment was delivered. On 10 November 2000 the Budapest Regional Court quashed this decision and remitted the case. 6.  In the resumed proceedings, hearings were held on 8 January, 28 March, 14 June, 22 October 2002 and 24 January 2003. On 23 May 2003 a judgment was adopted. On 17 September 2004 the Regional Court upheld this decision. 7.  On 31 March 2005 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's petition for review in a reasoned decision, holding that the second-instance judgment had not been unlawful to an extent that had a bearing on the merits of the case. This decision was served on 1 June 2005.
Proceedings “B” 8.  On 3 December 1996 the same plaintiff brought an action against the applicant before the District Court, challenging his disinheritance. On 13 and 27 November 1997, 24 March, 2 July and 26 November 1998 hearings were held. On the latter date an interim judgment was adopted. On appeal, the Regional Court held a hearing on 30 September 1999. On 24 February 2000 it partly upheld the interim ruling and partly remitted the case. 9.  In the resumed proceedings, on 31 October 2000 the District Court held a hearing and appointed a graphology expert. He filed his opinion on 10 January 2001. On 27 March, 13 November 2001 and 23 April 2002 hearings took place. Subsequently, the opinions of two more experts were obtained. Further hearings were held on 28 January, 6 May, 30 September 2003, 11 May 2004, 25 January and 19 April 2005, 8 February, 8 March, 10 April, 24 May, 12 July, 11 September and 6 October 2006. 10.  On 13 October 2006 the District Court gave judgment, partly finding for the plaintiff. On 14 June 2007 the Regional Court dismissed the appeals. On 6 November 2007 the Supreme Court refused to deal with the applicant's petition for review, since the value of the dispute was under the statutory threshold.