5.  The applicant was born in 1988 and is currently in the Netherlands. 6.  On 6 July 2012 the applicant left his home in Salouin[1] (Morocco), where he had been living with his parents, for the Netherlands. He went to the Netherlands to visit family but overstayed his tourist visa, which was valid until 24 August 2012. During his stay in the Netherlands he lived with his brother and the latter’s family in Amsterdam. 7.  According to an official report (ambtsbericht) drawn up by the General Intelligence and Security Service (Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst – “the AIVD”) dated 14 September 2014, information provided by a generally reliable source indicated that a certain Moroccan national residing in the Netherlands, had sworn allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the Caliph of the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (“ISIS”), and that he was trying to obtain a firearm with which to attack the Netherlands police. The information also contained two telephone numbers used by that person. The official report further stated that it appeared from the AIVD’s own investigation that the person was the applicant, that he was not registered in the Netherlands and that he did not have a valid residence permit. 8.  On 15 October 2014 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having committed acts in preparation of terrorist offences and placed in police custody. The house where he had been staying was searched by the police, who found and seized notes containing, inter alia, instructions on how to make an improvised explosive device (IED) and a written pledge to ISIS. Furthermore, the police seized a computer and found on the applicant’s Facebook account conversations in which he had made enquiries into how to make IEDs, projecting himself as a supporter of ISIS and expressing his wish to join the jihad in Syria. 9.  On 5 November 2014 the Netherlands investigating authorities sent a request for mutual legal assistance (rechtshulpverzoek) to the competent Moroccan authorities in connection with the criminal investigation against the applicant, requesting, inter alia, the examination of a number of bank accounts and bank cards. The request contained the number of the applicant’s national identity card and specified that the criminal investigation concerned suspicion of (preparation of) murder with a terrorist motive, participation in a criminal organisation with a terrorist aim, preparation of a terrorist offence, and financing of terrorism. On 20 April 2015 a supplementary request was sent to the Moroccan authorities. 10.  The applicant’s remand in custody was extended. Criminal proceedings against him commenced on charges of several preparatory acts of terrorism, including the criminal offence defined in Article 134a of the Criminal Code (Wetboek van Strafrecht), namely the acquisition of information and know-how in preparation of the commission of a terrorist offence. 11.  In April 2015 several articles, written in Dutch, Arabic and English, about the dismantling of a terrorist cell and arrest of its members in Selwane were published on Internet news sites. Those articles also mentioned the arrest in the Netherlands of a Moroccan living there, who was planning attacks in the Netherlands and who had links with that terrorist cell. Some of the articles also stated that information provided by the Moroccan intelligence agency (the General Directorate of Surveillance of the National Territory – “the DGST”) to the AIVD had led to the person’s arrest in the Netherlands. 12.  On 8 September 2015 the Rotterdam Regional Court (rechtbank) acquitted the applicant of all charges. It found that his intent to commit terrorist offences had not been proven in the light of evidence presented by him showing that his chat messages had been meant to impress and show off. His acquittal was reported by various media outlets in the Netherlands. One of those reports stated that, according to his lawyer, the applicant intended to apply for asylum in the Netherlands, as he feared that, in the event of his removal to Morocco, he would be detained in Morocco as a terror suspect. The public prosecutor (officier van justitie) appealed against the acquittal. 13.  On 20 June 2016 the Court of Appeal (gerechtshof) of The Hague quashed the impugned judgment, convicted the applicant of having committed the offence under Article 134a of the Criminal Code, and sentenced him to twelve months’ imprisonment. The applicant’s intent to acquire information and know-how in order to use it in the commission of a terrorist offence was found proven on the basis of numerous chat messages and written notes. Referring to the systematic and radical nature of those messages and given the relatively long period during which the applicant had been engaged in the internet conversations, the Court of Appeal dismissed the argument that he had merely been trying to impress and show off. 14.  The applicant subsequently lodged an appeal in cassation with the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad). On 21 March 2017 the Supreme Court declared the applicant’s appeal inadmissible, providing summary reasoning in application of section 80a of the Judiciary (Organisation) Act (Wet op de rechterlijke organisatie). 15.  On 28 August 2015 the applicant’s remand in custody came to an end and he was placed in immigration detention (vreemdelingenbewaring). On the same day he applied for asylum, claiming that, if removed to Morocco, he would, inter alia, run the risk of being arrested by the Moroccan secret service, detained in inhumane conditions and tortured, as the Moroccan authorities considered him to be a terrorist. 16.  In support of his claim, the applicant referred to various press articles about the criminal proceedings against him in the Netherlands, as well as to several Internet news articles written in Dutch, Moroccan and English about a terrorist cell in Salouin ‒ the town where he had been living before going to the Netherlands ‒ which had been dismantled by the Moroccan authorities in April 2015. Some articles also mentioned that a member of that terrorist cell who was residing in the Netherlands had been arrested. According to the applicant, they had been referring to him (see paragraph 11 above). Although the applicant denied that he had any contacts with this cell, he stated that because of these allegations he will be associated with these Moroccan suspects of terrorism. 17.  The applicant further submitted that he had learned from his family in Morocco that two acquaintances from his place of birth, Driouch named “A.M.” and “B.M.”, had been arrested by the Moroccan security service in March or April 2014. According to the applicant, this was a strong indication that he too was a target of the Moroccan security service. 18.  By a letter of 15 October 2015, the Deputy Minister of Security and Justice (Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie) requested the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken) to conduct an investigation in Morocco in relation to the applicant’s asylum application. In so far as relevant for the instant case, the letter contained the following questions:
“1)  Is [the applicant] known by his stated identity ... at his last known address in Morocco ... in Salouin, region of Nador?
2a)  The report about the dismantling of a terrorist cell appeared in Moroccan and international media on 13 April 2015. When were the members of the Moroccan terrorist cell arrested?
2b)  Are A.M. and B.M. among those who were arrested? If so, are they from [the applicant’s] birth place, namely Driouch?
2c)  Is it known whether [the applicant] and the persons mentioned under 2b) know each other?
3)  Are the persons mentioned under 2a) still detained since their arrest in April 2015? If so, what are the charges? If not, when were they released?
4)  Is [the applicant] known by name in the media in Morocco as the member residing in the Netherlands of the terrorist cell dismantled in Morocco (as referred to in question 2a)?
5a)  Is [the applicant] being searched for by the Moroccan authorities in the context of the criminal investigation of the terrorist cell (as meant in question 2a)?
5b)  Is there a charge against [the applicant]? If so, what is the charge?
5c)  Is [the applicant] being searched for by the Moroccan authorities in relation to offences other than those mentioned under 5a? If so, in relation to what offences is he being searched for? Has he been convicted of those offences and, if so, what is the sentence?” 19.  In reply to the above request, a person-specific official report (individueel ambtsbericht) was released on 3 December 2015 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The relevant part of the report stated as follows:
“Question 1:
The address ... in Salouin, region of Nador, is [the applicant’s] last known address in Morocco.
Question 2:
a)  The members of the Moroccan terrorist cell were all arrested on 13 April 2015.
b)  A.M. and B.M. do not find themselves in the group [of persons] arrested on 13 April 2015.
Additional information: the above-cited names are not necessarily the actual names of the persons. In the group of persons, there is an A. and a B.. However, these persons do not have the surname M.
c)  This question cannot be answered in the light of the above.
Question 3:
At the time of the investigation, the persons referred to in 2a) were still detained. The charge is:
‘the establishment of a criminal organisation which supports jihadist ideology, in particular by planning to assassinate persons with opposing religious convictions’ (‘la constitution d’une bande criminelle adepte de la pensée djihadiste, projetait notamment l’assassinat de personnes aux convictions religieuses contraires’).
Question 4:
[The applicant] is not mentioned by name in the media reports. It was mentioned in the media reports that a Moroccan national residing in the Netherlands had been arrested in cooperation with the local authorities.
Additional information: nor were the other persons who were arrested on 13 April 2015 mentioned by name in the media reports. ...
Question 5:
a)  No, at the time of the investigation [the applicant] was not being searched for by the Moroccan authorities in the context of the criminal investigation as referred to in question 2.
b)  No, at the time of the investigation, there was no charge against [the applicant].
c)  No, at the time of the investigation [the applicant] was not being searched for by the Moroccan authorities in the context of a criminal investigation into offences other than those as referred to by question 5a.” 20.  By letter of 12 January 2016, in reply to a request for further clarification, the Minister of Foreign Affairs stated:
“There are no indications that [the applicant] is being searched for by the Moroccan authorities in the context of the criminal investigation referred to in question 2a of your letter of 15 October 2015. There are also no indications of a charge against [the applicant] or indications that [the applicant] is being searched for by the Moroccan authorities in connection with a criminal investigation of facts other than those referred to in question 2a of your letter of 15 October 2015.” 21.  The asylum application was rejected by the Deputy Minister on 21 July 2016. In addition, an entry ban (inreisverbod) of twenty years was imposed on the applicant, the Deputy Minister holding that he posed a threat to public safety on account of his criminal conviction and information from the Netherlands security service that he posed a danger to national security. Furthermore, and referring to the person-specific official report of 3 December 2015, the Deputy Minister held that the applicant had failed to demonstrate that he faced a real and personal risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention in Morocco. The applicant was not being searched for by the Moroccan authorities, nor had he been charged with any criminal offences there. The Deputy Minister found that the applicant’s fear of being arrested, tortured and detained was based on general reports and assumptions. The Deputy Minister referred to earlier experiences with young Moroccan men who had stood trial in the Netherlands on charges related to Islamic terrorism and who had been removed to Morocco. None of them had encountered any problems from the side of the Moroccan authorities that could be regarded as relevant from an asylum-law perspective. On this point, the Deputy Minister referred to an article published on 10-11 September 2011 in the Netherlands daily newspaper NRC Handelsblad about the experiences of four convicted members of the Islamist terrorist “Hofstad group” (Hofstadgroep) who, after having served their sentence in the Netherlands, had been removed to Morocco. 22.  The applicant lodged an appeal (beroep) with the Regional Court, submitting in addition to his previous submissions, inter alia, a copy of an email from his Moroccan attorney, E.I., and extracts from a Moroccan police report dated 24 April 2015 concerning a criminal investigation in respect of several persons, including one “B.B.” (previously referred to by the applicant as “B.M.”). The police report stated that B.B. was the person behind the radicalisation of his neighbour (the applicant), who was being detained in the Netherlands in connection with terrorism. It further stated that, after the applicant’s departure to the Netherlands, they had remained in contact by telephone and that in their conversations, the applicant had indicated his wish to buy a firearm, and that he intended to learn how to make explosives for use in a terrorist act in the Netherlands. 23.  On 14 February 2017 the Regional Court of The Hague, sitting in Rotterdam, dismissed the appeal and upheld the impugned decision. As regards the applicant’s reliance on Article 3 of the Convention, it held as follows:
“6. [The appellant] argues that on return he will be at a real risk of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. He fears that he will be detained and ill-treated because – due to media reports – he is being linked by the Moroccan authorities to terrorist groups and terrorist activities. On this point [the appellant] refers to various documents. In addition, [the appellant] argues that [the Deputy Minister] was not allowed to base his decision on the person-specific official report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as insufficient due care had been taken in drawing it up and, in addition, as it lacks clarity. 6.1.  The court states at the outset that it is in principle for [the appellant] to make out a plausible case that he is running a real risk of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. [The appellant] has submitted a number of documents in substantiation of his claim. In addition, [the Deputy Minister] has met [the appellant] halfway in the discharge of the burden of proof which rests on the latter by having the Ministry of Foreign Affairs conduct an investigation which has resulted in a person-specific official report. The court will discuss below [the appellant’s] documents and the person-specific official report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 6.2.  [The appellant] has submitted media reports about a terrorist cell that intended to commit attacks in the Netherlands and about a Moroccan man, [name of appellant], who was arrested in October 2014 in the Netherlands on suspicion of terrorism and convicted by the Court of Appeal. [The appellant] also submitted documents about a Moroccan Dutchman who had been interrogated and tortured in Morocco and referred to information from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch about torture and ill-treatment of detainees and unfair proceedings for terrorist suspects in Morocco. In addition, [the appellant] has submitted an email message from his Moroccan lawyer about the negative attention which [the applicant] will attract upon return and a copy of (part of) an official report of the police in Morocco in the terrorism case of B.B. in which [the appellant’s] name is mentioned. In addition, [the appellant] has submitted part of a judgment of the [Tribunal Correctionnel de Paris] concerning G.H., who is suspected of terrorist activities and [the appellant] claims that this person has been convicted again in Morocco for the same set of facts. 6.2.1.  In so far as it appears from the documents submitted by [the appellant] that he is known as a terror suspect or has been convicted of facts relating to terrorism, the court considers that this has already been found credible by [the Deputy Minister]. The circumstance that, because of media reports about this, [the appellant] is known in the Netherlands and Morocco does not mean that therefore he runs a real risk of serious harm when he returns to Morocco. [The appellant] fears that, because of being known [by those authorities], he will upon return be arrested and ill-treated by the Moroccan authorities, but for substantiation purposes has not submitted documents concerning [himself]. [The appellant] has pointed to general information about the treatment of detainees in Morocco and about the proceedings in respect of terrorist suspects, but this information is only relevant if it is plausible that [the appellant] upon return will be arrested or prosecuted for terrorism. In the court’s opinion, [the Deputy Minister] has not unjustly adopted the position that [the appellant] has not made out a plausible case. In the email message from [the appellant’s] Moroccan lawyer submitted by [the appellant], this lawyer reports that [the appellant] will be tried when transferred to Morocco, even though he has already been tried in the Netherlands, and refers to two decisions in which the same person was convicted both in France and in Morocco for the same facts. This means that the email message contains no more than a statement from [the appellant’s] lawyer, without specific further substantiation relating to [the appellant] from which it follows that [the appellant] will be prosecuted in Morocco. Reference is only made to a case of another person convicted in France, but no documents have been submitted showing that this person has been convicted of the same facts in Morocco. Nor have documents been submitted from which it can be deduced that [the appellant] finds himself in the same situation. It can further not be concluded from the copy of (a part of) a report of the Moroccan police, submitted by [the appellant], that [the appellant] is being searched for in Morocco as a suspect of terrorism. As pointed out rightly by [the Deputy Minister], the document only contains information about the activities of the suspect B.B., including the influencing of [the appellant], but it does not appear from the document that [the appellant] is involved in any criminal proceedings. However, triggered by what [the appellant] has presented about the terror cell dismantled in April 2015, of which B.B. was a member, [the Deputy Minister] asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a person-specific official report, which will be discussed below. 6.3.1.  According to the constant case-law of the Administrative Jurisdiction Division (Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak) (including the ruling of 29 July 2016, ECLI:NL:RVS:2016:2171), an official report from the Minister of Foreign Affairs about the situation in a country is an expert opinion for the Deputy Minister for the exercise of the latter’s powers. If it provides information in an impartial, objective and transparent manner with an indication, in so far as this is responsible, of the sources from which this information is derived, the Deputy Minister may, in making a decision, assume the correctness of this information, unless there are concrete reasons for doubting that accuracy. As regards person-specific official reports, the Administrative Jurisdiction Division has considered that, if a person-specific official report contradicts the asylum claim which it concerns, it is for the alien concerned to refute the official report. 6.3.2.  [The appellant’s] argument that [the Deputy Minister] was not allowed to base his decision on the person-specific official report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs because insufficient due care had been taken in drawing it up, fails. On 8 December 2015 the Deputy Minister carried out a REK-check, which entails [the Deputy Minister] assuring himself that the person-specific official report has been drawn up with due care and is comprehensible. The outcome of the REK check was that this could not be concluded. Subsequently, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was asked for further clarification, [in response] to which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs supplemented, by letter of 12 January 2016, the person-specific official report. On 14 January 2016 a fresh REK check was carried out and it was concluded that the person-specific official report was comprehensible but that, procedurally, due care had not been exercised in preparing the report, as the investigation in Morocco had taken place without using a trusted local advisor (vertrouwenspersoon). Although in the case of an asylum application this falls short of due care, the court finds that in this case [the Deputy Minister] did not have to see reason for not taking into account in the decision making the person-specific official report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as [the Deputy Minister] has given sufficient reasons for holding that the interests of [the appellant] were not harmed by this failure to exercise due care. [The Deputy Minister] has indicated that the use of a trusted local advisor is to ensure that the authorities of the country of origin are not informed of the alien’s stay in the Netherlands and of his asylum application, whereas in this case it can be assumed that the Moroccan authorities, due to reports in the media there, are already aware [of this circumstance]. On this point [the Deputy Minister] has referred to a number of media reports. [The appellant] has not argued or further substantiated that that knowledge by the Moroccan authorities will lead to problems. Also for the remainder, [the appellant] has not indicated why his interests would have been harmed by the lack of due care in the preparation of the person-specific official report. 6.3.3.  The person-specific official report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs states, inter alia, that the members of the terrorist cell dismantled on 13 April 2015, which is mentioned in the coverage referred to by [the appellant], were all arrested on that date. This group does not include A.M. or B.M. as mentioned by the applicant, but these names are not necessarily the names of the persons. The group does include an A. and a B., but not with the family name M. In addition, the person-specific official report states that these persons were still in detention at the time of the investigation and that neither [the appellant] nor these persons were mentioned by name in press reports about the dismantled terror cell. It is indeed mentioned in press reports that a Moroccan staying in the Netherlands has been arrested in cooperation with the local authorities. Finally, it has been included in the person-specific official report that at the time of the investigation [the appellant] was not being searched for by the Moroccan authorities in connection with the criminal investigation into the dismantled terror cell, that at the time of the investigation no charge had been brought against [the appellant] and that at the time of the investigation [the appellant] was not being searched for by the Moroccan authorities in connection with a criminal investigation into other facts. 6.3.4.  [The appellant’s] argument that [the Deputy Minister] was not allowed to base his decision on the person-specific official report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs because it contains unclear points, also fails. In the opinion of the court, [the appellant] has not presented any concrete arguments for [the court] to doubt the correctness of the person-specific official report. [The appellant] has argued that it is unclear to what extent the [Moroccan] investigating judge (onderzoeksrechter) is competent to make statements about [the appellant]. In the first place, this mere remark does not comprise a concrete argument as mentioned above. Irrespective of this, the court considers that, on the basis of the underlying materials of the person-specific official report which the court has consulted, it can be assumed that the investigating judge in question is competent and able to provide the information given. Also the mere assertion of [the appellant] that it is odd that the investigating judge, who apparently holds all information on terrorism cases, is not asked whether [the appellant] is being searched for, is not a concrete argument in the above sense. Moreover, it follows from question 5 in the letter from [the Deputy Minister] to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 15 October 2015 that the Ministry has been asked both whether [the appellant] is being searched for by the Moroccan authorities in connection with the criminal investigation into the arrested terror cell and whether [the appellant] is being searched for by the Moroccan authorities in connection with a criminal investigation into other facts. Also, the unclear assertions made by [the appellant] about the names of the persons arrested, mentioned in the person-specific official report and the notion ‘at the time of the investigation’ offer no concrete reasons to doubt the accuracy of the person-specific official report. The term ‘at the time of the investigation’ cannot be read otherwise than that the question has been answered by the investigating judge on the basis of the state of affairs at the time of the investigation. Incidentally, [the appellant] has not argued that the state of affairs would be different at a different (later) point in time. As to the names of the arrested persons, the person-specific official report already states that the names may also be different. Also on this point the court sees no reason for doubting the correctness [of the official report]. As the document from the criminal case file submitted by [the appellant], which possibly refers to him, is of a much earlier date than the person-specific official report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is not plausible that this reference has given the Moroccan authorities cause to open a criminal investigation against [the appellant]. This is [therefore] not a concrete reason for doubting the correctness and completeness of the person-specific official report. 6.4.  In addition to the person-specific report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [the Deputy Minister] has also referred to experiences made with young Moroccan men (including members of the Hofstad group) who had been the subject of a terrorism trial in the Netherlands and/or constituted a danger to Dutch national security in connection with involvement in Islamic terrorism and/or jihad and for that reason [had been] returned to Morocco. According to [the Deputy Minister], no signals to be taken seriously have been received from them that, upon their return, they had encountered problems, relevant from an asylum-law perspective, from the side of the Moroccan authorities. The court notes that [the appellant] has not rebutted this in a substantiated manner and finds that [the Deputy Minister] has correctly taken this into account in his assessment. In this respect, the court refers to the ruling of the [Administrative Jurisdiction] Division of 5 October 2016 (ECLI:NL:RVS:2016:2692). [The appellant] has not established that the Moroccan authorities will act differently in his case. 6.5.  The court concludes that it follows from the person-specific official report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that [the appellant] is not being searched for by the Moroccan authorities in connection with the criminal investigation concerning the dismantled terror cell or other facts and that [the appellant] has not put forward any concrete arguments for [the court] to doubt the correctness of this information. Nor can it be deduced from the documents submitted by [the appellant] that he is being searched for by the Moroccan authorities and/or will be detained and tortured upon return. This can also not be inferred from previous experiences in similar cases. Thus the fear alleged by [the appellant] upon return has not been made plausible. In view of this, [the Deputy Minister] rightly took the view that [the appellant] has not established that, upon return, he will run a real risk of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. ...” 24.  The applicant lodged a further appeal (hoger beroep) against the Regional Court’s decision with the Administrative Jurisdiction Division (Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak) of the Council of State (Raad van State). He also requested a provisional measure (voorlopige voorziening), namely to stay his removal pending the outcome of the further appeal. Neither a further appeal nor a request for a provisional measure has automatic suspensive effect. 25.  On 21 February 2017 the applicant asked the Court to apply an interim measure under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, in order to stay his removal to Morocco. The determination of that request was adjourned by the Court on the same day and the Government were requested to submit factual information. 26.  On 22 February 2017 the Administrative Jurisdiction Division granted the applicant’s request for a provisional measure by revoking the order to expel the applicant to Morocco scheduled for 25 February 2017. In view of that decision, the Court decided on 23 February 2017 to suspend until further notice the determination of his Rule 39 request. 27.  On 28 February 2017 the Administrative Jurisdiction Division rejected the applicant’s further appeal. It held that under section 91 § 2 of the Aliens Act 2000 (Vreemdelingenwet 2000), no further reasoning was called for, as the arguments submitted did not raise any questions requiring determination in the interest of legal unity, legal development or legal protection in the general sense. No further appeal lay against this ruling. On the same day the Administrative Jurisdiction Division rejected the applicant’s request for a provisional measure. 28.  On 2 March 2017 the applicant’s lawyer was informed that the applicant’s removal to Morocco had been scheduled for 4 March 2017. 29.  On 3 March 2017 the Court applied Rule 39 for a period of four weeks and requested further factual information from the Government. The requested information was received on 22 March 2017. 30.  The Government informed the Court that in the context of the criminal proceedings against the applicant information had been exchanged between the Moroccan and the Dutch authorities through a legal assistance request submitted by the Dutch authorities on 5 November 2014 and a supplementary request on 20 April 2015 (see paragraph 9 above). They added that the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst), in establishing that there was no Article 3 risk for the applicant were he to be removed to Morocco, had taken into account that the Moroccan authorities had been apprised of the criminal proceedings and that they were likely to be aware of the outcome thereof. The Government added that the Moroccan authorities had not sought the applicant’s extradition. The Government had not sought specific guarantees from the Moroccan authorities as they took the view that the applicant’s removal would not result in a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. The authentic and valid ID-card held by the applicant was sufficient for him to be accepted onto a flight to Morocco. No special procedure had been put in place for his removal, but during his transfer he would be accompanied by officers of the Royal Netherlands Military Constabulary (Koninklijke Marechaussee) and after arrival he would be handed over to the authorities at the destination airport. The Government lastly informed the Court that they had not been able to obtain further information regarding the criminal proceedings against the members of the terrorist cell which had been dismantled in Morocco in April 2015. 31.  On 29 March 2017 the applicant informed the Court that, through his Moroccan attorney E.I., he had been able to obtain a copy of the judgment by which B.B. and eight others had been convicted of, inter alia, the establishment of a terrorist group loyal to the Islamic State intended to commit terrorist activities against the public order of Morocco. B.B. had been sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. The judgment in Arabic, which runs to twenty-three pages, contains the following passage:
“B.B. has several connections with jihadis. In particular, he recruits young men in his area for his terrorist organisation. In 2015 a befriended policeman in Nador informed B.B. – after receiving secret Government information – that he should break off his contact with people involved with terrorist organisations, including amongst others [the applicant’s name] who lives in the Netherlands.” 32.  On 30 March 2017 the interim measure under Rule 39 staying the applicant’s removal to Morocco was extended for the duration of the proceedings before the Court. 33.  On 15 November 2017 the Government submitted a copy of a judgment given on 21 December 2016 by the criminal division of the Rabat Court of Appeal for Terrorism Cases on an appeal lodged by G.H. (see paragraph 23 above at point 6.2) – assisted by the attorney E.I. – against a judgment given on 10 March 2016 by the criminal division of the Rabat First Instance Court for Terrorism Cases. The appellate court overturned the impugned judgment, finding that pursuant to Article 707 of the Moroccan Criminal Code, which contains the ne bis in idem rule, the appellant could no longer be tried for facts in respect of which he had already been convicted by a criminal court in France and had already served the sentence imposed by that court. Consequently, it acquitted him of the charges of the establishment of a criminal group for the preparation and commission of terrorist offences, illegal use and possession of fire arms and ammunition in the context of a joint project aimed at endangering public order, and inciting and persuading others to commit terrorist offences. It did, however, convict him of complicity in providing support to those who commit a terrorist offence and imposed a conditional one-year prison sentence.


5.  The applicants are all Roma who live in Vâlcele. 6.  At around 5 a.m. on the morning of 15 December 2011 several police officers and gendarmes, together with the local forest ranger – all wearing special intervention clothing – knocked on the applicants’ door, claiming to be their neighbours. As the applicants hesitated, they broke down the unlocked front door and entered by force. Upon entering the applicants’ home, the forest ranger placed a balaclava on his head. The police officers also wore balaclavas. 7.  In the first room the police found the fourth applicant (Ms Elena Lingurar), her daughter (the second applicant, Ms Ana Maria Lingurar) and her daughter-in-law with a seven-month-old baby in her arms. The police dragged the two applicants out of their beds and started hitting them. The fourth applicant was hit on her collar bone with a police truncheon. When the second applicant asked the police why they were beating her mother, she was hit in the mouth and then forced to wash her face to remove the traces of blood. 8.  When the police entered the next room they found the third applicant (Mr Aron Lingurar, born in 1985) with his wife. They dragged him onto the ground, kicked him and shouted abuse. The first applicant (Mr Aron Lingurar, born in 1949) was also taken into that room. He had also been beaten by the police. 9.  Without allowing them to put any clothes on, the police took the first and third applicants out into the yard, pushed them onto the ground and hit them. They then put them in a police car, where the violence continued. The fourth applicant was not allowed to approach them or take them clothes. 10.  The first and third applicants were taken to a police station, where they gave their statements. They were fined and sent back home. 11.  On 12 December 2011 a forest ranger informed the Araci police that on 7 December 2011 the first applicant had taken home timber which had been illegally cut from the forest. When confronted by forest rangers, the first applicant had become aggressive. The forest ranger explained that the first applicant had exhibited a hostile attitude towards the forest rangers ever since his son, the third applicant, had been fined by the police, in spring 2011. He submitted that the first applicant had set a bad example for his community:
“We consider that Mr Lingurar Aron, who sees himself as being the leader of the Roma in Vâlcele, by his attitude, instead of helping us solve the problems connected with the Roma community in Vâlcele – which in fact is more peaceful and hard-working than the community in Araci – creates more problems with the example he sets for the others.” 12.  In this context, and in order to reduce and prevent the criminal activity, to strengthen citizens’ safety, to identify individuals without identity documents, to summon those suspected of having committed several crimes and to recover stolen goods, the police organised the raid of 15 December 2011. 13.  On 14 December 2011 the Covasna Inspectorate of Police (Inspectoratul de Poliție Județean Covasna; hereinafter “the IPJ”) drafted an intervention plan with a view to carrying out a raid in the villages in the municipality of Vâlcele. Describing the population of the applicants’ village, the plan stated that out of 4,311 inhabitants, 826 had been released on parole, 432 had a criminal record, and 600 had been found guilty of violent crimes. The general context was described as follows:
“The Vâlcele municipality consists of the villages Vâlcele, Araci, Hetea, and Ariuşd. Out of a total population of 4,300 inhabitants, 2,902 are of Roma ethnicity. Most of the members of this ethnicity do not have a steady income and make ends meet from social benefits, the sale of timber stolen from the forest, seasonal and occasional work, and from crime – mostly thefts. ...
Of the individuals having committed crimes in 2011, it appears that 80% are of Roma ethnicity, with a variety of offences. ...
As a result of the preventive activity carried out by the [IPJ] in Araci village, six criminal groups have been identified, made up of members of Roma families R., B., C., G., L., and N. [nb: the applicants’ family is not mentioned among them]” 14.  Given the range of issues to be tackled and the goals of the raid, the intervention involved: fifty-three police officers (eleven from the department for public order, four from the department for criminal investigations, eighteen from the Sfântu Gheorghe police department, six from Vâlcele police station, ten from the Rapid Intervention Squad (Serviciul de Intervenție Rapidă; “SIR”), and two from the department for criminal forensics) and thirty gendarmes from the Covasna Gendarmerie Inspectorate (Inspectoratul Județean de Jandarmi Covasna; hereinafter “the IJJ”). They had thirteen cars at their disposal. 15.  According to the police report of 15 December 2011, the police officers performed the following acts during the raid: they searched 140 cars and performed 190 identity checks; they issued eight administrative fines (sancţiuni contravenţionale); they confiscated fifteen cubic metres of timber; they took sixty-four individuals to the police headquarters for further criminal enquiries; they solved six criminal complaints and enforced two orders to appear (mandat de aducere); they identified ten individuals from police operational information; and they took fingerprints from and photographs of fourteen individuals. 16.  The police officers approached the applicants’ home after 6 a.m. and knocked on the door. When two women (the second and fourth applicants) exited the house, the police asked them to call the third applicant, who was wanted for questioning regarding several criminal acts. The third applicant came out of the house, shouted abuse at the police officers and became physically violent. At that point the police immobilised and handcuffed him, and took him to one of the police cars. The first applicant then came out of the house shouting abuse at the police officers. For safety reasons, they handcuffed him and took him to the same police car where the third applicant was waiting. The second and fourth applicants were presumably injured in the process, as they tried to oppose the police actions. They pulled their own hair, slapped themselves on their faces, hit the gate with their fists and shouted, in order to intimidate the police officers. 17.  On 15 and 16 December 2011 the applicants were examined in the emergency ward of the local hospital. Subsequently, they also underwent a forensic examination. 18.  The forensic report delivered on 15 December 2011 states that the second applicant had dried blood on her lips and left cheek, but no bruises or dental pain. The reason for the bleeding could not be established. She refused to undergo further medical examinations. The conclusion of the report was that she did not present any traumatic lesions but that a trauma caused by an act of aggression could not be excluded. 19.  On 20 December 2011 a forensic medical report was drawn up for the first applicant. It stated that he had complained of chest pain and had two bruises on his chest. An X‑ray examination performed on the same day had not revealed any further damage. It was concluded that the trauma could have been caused by being hit with a hard object and that on account of the injuries, the first applicant needed one to two days of medical care. 20.  On 20 December 2011 a forensic medical report was drawn up for the third applicant. The presence of bruises on the right eye, chest and right arm were recorded. The examiner concluded that the injuries could have been caused by a blow with a baseball bat and that the third applicant needed four to five days of medical care. 21.  On 21 December 2011 a forensic medical report was drawn up for the fourth applicant. She complained of abdominal and chest pains and had a bruise on her lower chest. It was concluded that her injuries could have been caused by being hit with a hard object and that she needed one to two days of medical care. 22.  On 20 February 2012 the applicants lodged a criminal complaint against the forest ranger and the police officers on duty on 15 December 2011. They accused the officials of beating them and committing other acts of violence. 23.  The case was investigated by the IPJ under the supervision of the prosecutor’s office attached to the Braşov Court of Appeal. Thirteen police officers and three gendarmes were put under investigation. The prosecutor interviewed the applicants and the police officers and gendarmes, as well as three witnesses. The witnesses were the applicants’ neighbours who had been present during the incidents. The applicants had proposed that they be questioned. 24.  The prosecutor established that the operation had been organised in accordance with the intervention plan drawn up by the IPJ and the IJJ. The assignment had been to take to the Vâlcele police station several individuals needed for questioning concerning several criminal complaints linked to various criminal investigations. 25.  Relying on the statements given by the forest ranger and the police, the prosecutor established that the forest ranger had not participated in the events, and that the raid had started at 7 a.m. and not at 5 a.m. as indicated by the applicants and their neighbours. 26.  The gendarmes denied having committed acts of violence or having seen traces of injuries on the applicants. Police officer P.A. explained that the use of force and the handcuffing had been necessary because of the applicants’ violent behaviour. Concretely, the first applicant had opposed the police intervention, claiming that he was a local counsellor for Roma matters, and had shouted abuse and threats at the police. 27.  On 6 July 2012 the investigators examined the applicants’ front door. They noted that some of its window panels had been broken, the wood had been splintered, and the paint was missing from the bottom of the door; they were unable to establish when the door had been damaged. 28.  On 11 March 2013 the prosecutor concluded that there was not enough evidence to institute proceedings against the police officers. 29.  The applicants objected to the prosecutor’s decision. They argued mainly that the prosecutor, without justification, had given preference to the statements made by the police to the detriment of those made by the applicants. They also averred that the investigation had failed to provide an explanation for the violence perpetrated against them. They stressed that it was the established and frequent practice of the police in the area to attack members of the Roma community without any justification. 30.  On 17 April 2013 the prosecutor-in-chief from the prosecutor’s office attached to the Braşov Court of Appeal dismissed the objection on the following grounds:
- the intervention had been lawful;
- the applicants’ immobilisation and the use of handcuffs had been lawful and made necessary by their aggressive behaviour; they had therefore been taken to the police station, interviewed and fined;
- the investigation had been completed;
- the prosecutor had clarified all aspects of the case and examined the evidence gathered;
- the decision had represented the prosecutor’s own conviction based on the evidence in the file, and the reasons given had been adequate;
- the other assertions made by the applicants had not been substantiated by evidence. 31.  The applicants challenged the prosecutors’ decisions, reiterating the arguments put forward in their objection (see paragraph 29 above). 32.  The Braşov Court of Appeal heard the case and in a decision of 23 May 2013 it sent the case back to the prosecutor’s office for further investigations. It mainly considered that the authorities had to provide justification for the injuries sustained by the applicants. The first and third applicants had been taken to the police station, and had thus been under police control for a few hours. The second and fourth applicants had sustained injuries which the prosecutor had failed to explain. 33.  The court further noted that the prosecutor had not identified the person who had given the order to immobilise the first and third applicants and take them to the police station. Both the gendarmes and the police officers involved had denied having immobilised the applicants. 34.  The court went on to question the lawfulness of the police intervention. It noted that at that time the applicants had not been the subject of any criminal investigation and that no order to appear before the police had been issued in their names. It further noted that the second and fourth applicants had not even been arrested. 35.  The court concluded that the criminal investigation had not been exhaustive. It therefore ordered the prosecutor:
- to hear evidence from witnesses, in particular from other persons who had been targeted by that police intervention and neighbours who could clarify whether the police officers had entered the applicants’ home;
- to hear the police officers involved in the operation and those responsible for mounting the operation, in order to find out who had given the order to immobilise the first and third applicants and who had carried out that order;
- to establish how the immobilisation of the first and third applicants had happened;
- to establish how the second and fourth applicants, who had not been immobilised by the police, had been injured;
- to establish who had participated in the operation on behalf of the authorities, whether police officers, gendarmes or other individuals. 36.  A new investigation was carried out under the supervision of the same prosecutor from the prosecutor’s office attached to the Braşov Court of Appeal. 37.  On 24 July 2013 the IPJ drafted a report on the investigation, confirming the previous findings concerning the use of force and the applicants’ conduct. The injuries sustained by the second and fourth applicants were explained in the report as follows:
“[The two women] had exhibited behaviour specific to Roma in such circumstances: they had started pulling their own hair, slapping themselves on their faces, hitting the gate with their fists and shouting in order to intimidate the police officers.” 38.  On 5 August 2013 the prosecutor’s office decided not to prosecute. It considered that all the indications given by the court had been observed during the new investigation and that further clarifications concerning the case and the general situation in Vâlcele had been provided. 39.  The prosecutor explained, in particular, that because of the problems with the Roma community in Vâlcele, the police and gendarmes had had to combine forces. He recalled that on 27 June 2013 a police officer had been injured and was currently in a critical state in hospital following a police intervention aimed at settling a conflict between two rival Roma clans. Likewise, on 15 July 2013 another police officer had had to open fire in self-defence against an individual who had broken the windscreen of a police car during a police intervention triggered by a distress call. The prosecutor noted that most of the inhabitants of Vâlcele, and in particular those from three villages (Hetea, Vâlcele and Araci), were known for breaking the law and were aggressive towards the police. The applicants’ family members had been subject to investigations for the theft of wood or for disturbing public order. 40.  The prosecutor held that the injuries sustained by the first and third applicants could be explained by the use of force during the immobilisation, which had been made necessary by the applicants’ violent behaviour. The second and fourth applicants had been injured when they had attacked the police officers in order to prevent them from immobilising their family members. The prosecutor reiterated the explanation given in the police report about the behaviour allegedly exhibited by the second and fourth applicants. The identities of the four gendarmes who had executed the immobilisation were known, but had to be kept secret for their own protection. 41.  The applicants objected to that decision, arguing that the prosecutor had failed to investigate whether the use of force had been proportionate and justified. They also complained of the use of stereotypes in respect of Roma in the prosecutor’s decision. 42.  On 20 September 2013 the prosecutor-in-chief from the same prosecutor’s office upheld the decision on similar grounds to those given in the decision of 17 April 2013 (see paragraph 30 above) and, in addition, on the ground that the prosecutor had complied with the orders made by the court (see paragraph 35 above). 43.  The applicants complained about the prosecutors’ decisions, reiterating their previous arguments. 44.  On 16 January 2014 the Braşov Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants’ complaint as unfounded. The decision was final. 45.  The court considered that the prosecutor had respected the requirements set by the previous court decision (see paragraph 35 above). Additional witnesses who did not belong to the police or gendarmerie had been heard. It also considered that the evidence adduced could not prove beyond any reasonable doubt that the police officers had injured the applicants. The applicants’ statements and the medical reports, which remained the only elements supporting that theory, were not sufficient to change the conclusion. According to the Court of Appeal, the explanations offered by the prosecutor as to the cause of injuries were plausible and the police officers had not used excessive force. The court also considered that the applicants had an obligation to identify the alleged perpetrators. Lastly, the court noted that the investigations had not been influenced by the fact that the applicants were Roma.


4.  The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Riga. 5.  On 24 November 2005 a residential building maintenance services provider, Kurzemes Namu Apsaimniekotājs, a limited liability company (“the plaintiff”), brought a claim against the applicant for recovery of a debt for their services in the amount of 320 Latvian lati (LVL – approximately 455 euros (EUR)). The next day civil proceedings were instituted in that connection. The applicant disagreed; she argued that she did not owe any money to the plaintiff – they had not concluded an agreement for maintenance services and she was free to choose another service provider. In those proceedings the applicant was represented by Mr S. Seļezņovs, who was not a lawyer. 6.  On 30 December 2005 a judge of the Riga City Kurzeme District Court (Rīgas pilsētas Kurzemes rajona tiesa – hereinafter “the City Court”) scheduled the first hearing to take place on 21 April 2006. During this hearing the applicant’s representative requested additional time to examine the relevant legal norms and to obtain the relevant documents from the plaintiff. The City Court postponed the hearing to allow both parties to “prepare documents”. The next hearing was scheduled for 9 August 2006. 7.  On 9 August 2006 the plaintiff applied to have the hearing postponed because the applicant’s debt for services had in the meantime increased and the plaintiff had not yet settled the courts fees for the increased claim. The application was granted and the next hearing was scheduled for 17 October 2006. 8.  On 17 October 2006 the plaintiff increased the amount of the claim and submitted the relevant documents. The applicant’s representative applied to have the hearing postponed so as to examine those documents. The application was granted and the next hearing was scheduled for 31 January 2007. 9.  On 31 January 2007 the plaintiff increased the amount of the claim to LVL 426 (approximately EUR 606) and submitted more documents. The applicant’s representative submitted written observations and some documents showing some debts that had been paid. The City Court admitted them to the case file and scheduled the next hearing for 23 March 2007. 10.  On 23 March 2007 the plaintiff increased the amount of the claim and submitted more documents. The applicant’s representative requested that more detailed information be provided in this connection. The City Court ordered the plaintiff to provide observations by 13 August 2007 and scheduled the next hearing for 12 September 2007. 11.  On 11 September 2007 the City Court informed both parties that another judge was taking over the case; the next hearing was scheduled for 17 October 2007. 12.  On 17 October 2007 both parties pleaded their case. The City Court ordered the plaintiff to provide more detailed information and scheduled the next hearing for 13 November 2007. 13.  On 13 November 2007 the applicant’s representative applied to have the hearing postponed as he had only received the relevant documents on the previous day. The application was granted and the next hearing was scheduled for 14 February 2008. 14.  On 14 February 2008 the applicant’s representative pleaded the case. He argued that the service charges which the applicant had been asked to settle had been unclear. The plaintiff did not have all the relevant documents at hand and thus requested time to submit additional information. The City Court ordered the plaintiff to submit the specific documents and scheduled the next hearing for 17 April 2008. 15.  On 17 April 2008 the plaintiff submitted the relevant documents and the applicant’s representative applied to have the hearing postponed to examine them. His application was granted and the next hearing was scheduled for 4 June 2008. 16.  The parties continued to plead their case in the hearing of 4 June 2008. The City Court imposed a monetary fine on the applicant’s representative for disobeying a judge’s order. Following an application by the plaintiff the hearing was postponed because the applicant’s debt for services had in the meantime increased; they had not prepared the documents for the increased amount of the debt. The plaintiff was ordered to submit the relevant documents by an unknown date in September 2008 and the next hearing was scheduled for 28 October 2008. 17.  On 28 October 2008 the City Court held the last hearing in the case; it refused a fresh application by the plaintiff to postpone the hearing once again. On 6 November 2008 the City Court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim against the applicant as unsubstantiated – the plaintiff had not proved that the expenses had actually been incurred and that they had duly reflected the services provided. On 27 November 2008 the plaintiff appealed against the judgment. On 28 November 2008 a judge of the City Court gave the plaintiff additional time to comply with the procedural requirements for lodging an appeal. On 2 December 2008 the plaintiff rectified those deficiencies. On 3 December 2008 the appeal was admitted and sent to the Riga Regional Court (Rīgas apgabaltiesa – hereinafter “the Regional Court”). 18.  The first hearing before the Regional Court was held on 13 September 2010. The plaintiff increased the amount of the claim because the applicant’s debt for services had in the meantime increased to LVL 3,173 (approximately EUR 4,515) and submitted the relevant documents. The applicant’s representative disagreed with the increase of the claim. The Regional Court admitted those documents to the case file and scheduled the next hearing for 8 December 2010. 19.  On 8 December 2010 the Regional Court held the last hearing in the case. The plaintiff did not attend, nor did it inform the court of any reasons for its absence. The Regional Court decided to proceed with the case. On 22 December 2010 the Riga Regional Court partly allowed the plaintiff’s claim and ordered the applicant to settle the debt in the total amount of LVL 2,854 (approximately EUR 4,059). Although the parties had not concluded an agreement for maintenance services, the applicant was obliged to pay for those services in accordance with domestic law. She could contest bills provided by the plaintiff, however she had failed to do so. The applicant had selectively paid some bills, but not all of them. The Regional Court refused the plaintiff’s claim to receive contractual penalty (līgumsods) for late payment but awarded default interest of 6%. On 18 January 2011 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. On 3 February 2012 the Senate of the Supreme Court (Augstākās tiesas Senāts) remitted it to the Regional Court as the applicant had not paid the security deposit for lodging it. Those deficiencies were rectified. 20.  On 3 April 2012 the Senate of the Supreme Court, following a preparatory meeting, refused to institute proceedings on points of law.


5.  The applicant was born in 1983 and lives in Tianchang, the People’s Republic of China. 6.  At the time of the events the applicant was an undergraduate economics student at Kharkiv National University, Ukraine. 7.  On 1 May 2009 a group of about fifteen Chinese students, including the applicant, were having a picnic. When they were about to finish, four Ukrainian men (D., Sa., Su. and M.), who were picnicking nearby, approached them to get some beer. The Ukrainians were clearly drunk. D. took a knife from the Chinese students’ table and threw it in the river on the pretext that it was a weapon and there was no place for it there. M., who appeared less drunk than his friends, was friendlier and the applicant gave him a bottle of beer. All four drank the beer and returned for more. Apparently, they offered the Chinese students a small folding knife instead of the one that had been thrown away, but their offer was declined. D.’s behaviour was particularly insulting and indecent: he undid his trousers and showed his genitals to everyone around him, including girls. The applicant gave the Ukrainians another bottle of beer and the group of Chinese students started packing up. M. filmed the events on his smartphone. The last thing recorded was one of the Chinese students, subsequently identified as W., taking two metal skewers out of a plastic bag. 8.  At some point a fight started between the two groups. They later blamed each other for beginning it. In the course of the fight M. was stabbed in the back with a metal skewer. 9.  Sa. took hold of one of the Chinese students, Ch. When the police arrived, Sa. stated that he had seen Ch. stabbing M. in the back with a folding knife and confirmed his statement in writing the same day. According to the report of the police officer on duty, Su. and D. were so drunk that it was impossible to question them. As for the victim, he was unconscious. 10.  The applicant had been waiting for the police together with the four Ukrainians and some of his companions (several others had run away). None of the Ukrainians expressed any suspicions about the applicant and he eventually left with his friends. 11.  On 2 May 2009 M. was questioned in hospital. He submitted that he had been stabbed unexpectedly in the back and that he had not seen who had done it. When he had fallen down, he had seen three Chinese men stepping over him, including the applicant. M. remembered the applicant because he appeared bigger than the other Chinese men and had spoken some Russian. M. considered that, most probably, it had been the applicant who had injured him. 12.  On the same day Sa. changed his initial statement and submitted that he had seen “one of the Chinese [men], who [had] appeared bigger than the others and called himself Yura [the applicant], jump on [M.’s] back and stab him with a metal skewer”. 13.  On 4 May 2009 M. died of his injury in hospital. 14.  On the same day Su. told the police he had seen one of the Chinese men, who had appeared bigger than the others, stab M. with a metal skewer. 15.  During an identification parade conducted that day Sa. and Su. pointed at the applicant as the one who had injured M. 16.  The applicant was arrested that day on suspicion of M.’s murder. 17.  On 6 May 2009 one of the Chinese students, W., speaking in the presence of a lawyer and with the aid of an interpreter, made a statement of surrender to the police. He stated that he had accidentally injured one of the Ukrainians with a skewer and had run away because he had been scared. He was sorry for what had happened. 18.  On 8 May 2009 W. repeated his confession, adding that the applicant had done everything possible to prevent the conflict. 19.  On an unspecified later date W. retracted his confession and submitted that he had only slightly injured D. and Su. with a metal skewer, but not M. 20.  The investigation established that the Chinese students had initially had six metal skewers. Only four of them, packed in a plastic bag, were discovered. The two skewers taken by W. from the bag shortly before the fight were never found. 21.  In the course of the pre-trial investigation twelve Chinese citizens made witness statements describing the events prior to, during and after the fight. None of them had seen who had injured M. or how it had happened. Nor had anybody seen the applicant holding a metal skewer at any point. To the contrary, some witnesses among the Chinese students submitted that they had been next to the applicant during the fight and that he had not been the one who had injured M. 22.  Furthermore, several of the Chinese witnesses told the police that W. had been particularly nervous after the incident, had destroyed the clothes he had been wearing on 1 May 2009 and had asked his parents for a considerable amount of money. 23.  On an unspecified date the investigation was declared completed and the Kharkiv Kyivskyy District Court (“the Kyivskyy Court”) started the trial. 24.  On 15 January 2010 the Kyivskyy Court ordered an additional pre‑trial investigation. As stated in its ruling, several people had seen metal skewers in W.’s hands, but nobody had seen the applicant holding a skewer, let alone stabbing M. Sa. had eventually retracted his statement of 2 May 2009 about seeing the applicant stab M. and specified that in fact he had not seen the injury being inflicted on M. He explained that when pointing out the applicant he had been “driven by [his] emotions”. Furthermore, while D. and Su. considered the applicant guilty of injuring M., it was established in the court hearing that none of them had seen how that had actually happened. The trial court further found unconvincing the conclusion reached by the pre-trial investigation that W. had inflicted light injuries on D. and Su. with a metal skewer, but that it had been unlikely that he might have also injured M. Next, the court referred to the statement of the police officer who had been on duty on 1 May 2009, that the applicant had been there all the time after the arrival of the police and that he had been calm, clean and without any injuries. The officer further submitted that the Ukrainians had indicated that it was Ch. who had wounded M. and they had handed him over to the police. Ch. did not speak Russian well. After being provided with an interpreter, he had maintained his innocence. The investigator could not explain how suspicion had fallen on the applicant. He submitted that somebody from the criminal investigation department had told him that the applicant was the perpetrator, but he could not remember exactly who. Lastly, it was observed in the court ruling that although some of the Ukrainians’ witness statements had identified the applicant as appearing bigger than his companions, it was clear that there had been several other Chinese students who had appeared bigger and heavier than him. The investigation had failed to make any assessment of that point. 25.  On 25 March 2010 the Kharkiv Regional Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) quashed the above-mentioned ruling, concluding that all the issues it raised could be clarified in the course of the trial and that an additional pre-trial investigation was not necessary. 26.  On 26 September 2011 the Kyivskyy Court found the applicant guilty of murder and sentenced him to twelve years’ imprisonment. It relied on the statements of Sa. and Su., who claimed to have seen the applicant “hanging on [M.’s] back” shortly before the latter had shouted that he had been stabbed. The court also relied on the statements of D., who stated that he had seen the applicant running away from the victim with Ch. The court concluded that two metal skewers had been used in the fight. Given that W. had injured D. and Su. with one of them, he could not also have stabbed M. W. could not be examined in court as he had left Ukraine. The Chinese students gave their account of the fight. However, the court did not consider it credible and expressed the opinion that they had been trying to help the applicant. 27.  The applicant appealed, submitting, in particular, that his conviction lacked any evidential basis apart from the controversial and speculative statements of M.’s friends. The prosecutor also lodged an appeal, considering the sentence to be too lenient. 28.  On 26 March 2012 the Court of Appeal quashed the judgment and remitted the case for additional pre-trial investigation owing to numerous flaws and omissions. It observed in particular that no effort had been made to establish the motive for the murder. It was clear from the evidence in the case file that both the applicant and M. had been friendly and that both of them had tried to avoid the conflict. Furthermore, the appellate court pointed out that the statements of D., Sa. and Su., on which the first‑instance court had based the applicant’s conviction, had been contradictory, inconsistent and speculative. They could not therefore be interpreted as conclusive evidence of the applicant’s guilt. The appellate court also considered the accusation against the applicant to be too vague as it had never been established where exactly M. and the applicant were situated prior to the incident. Nor had the exact mechanism of M.’s injury been established. 29.  Following an additional round of pre-trial investigation measures, the case was sent to the Kyivskyy Court. 30.  On 2 July 2012 the Kyivskyy Court held that the deficiencies pointed out by the Court of Appeal in its ruling of 26 March 2012 had not been rectified and that the additional investigation, like the one carried out earlier, had been incomplete and superficial. The case was therefore remitted once again for further pre-trial investigation. 31.  On 20 September 2012 the Court of Appeal upheld the above‑mentioned ruling. 32.  On 19 November 2012 the new Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP 2012”) came into effect, introducing many major changes in criminal procedure (see paragraph 45 below). 33.  On 19 December 2012 the investigator announced to the applicant a “notice of suspicion”, that being the new procedure of opening criminal proceedings under the CCP 2012. 34.  On the same date the pre-trial investigation was declared completed, and on 24 December 2012 the case was referred to the Kyivskyy Court. 35.  On 24 July 2013 the Kyivskyy Court found the applicant guilty of murder and sentenced him to twelve years’ imprisonment. It relied in particular on the statements made by Sa., Su. and D. at the court hearing, which were identical to those summarised in the judgment of 26 September 2011 (see paragraph 26 above). The court observed that it was impossible to establish with precision the mechanism of the fatal injury to M. on the basis of the evidence of those witnesses. It held, however, that their statements had not been refuted by any forensic medical findings. The court also relied on M.’s testimony during the pre-trial investigation (see paragraph 11 above). At the same time, in spite of requests by the applicant, it refused to admit in evidence any of the statements of the other Chinese students, who had meanwhile left Ukraine and could therefore not be questioned in court. Only one Chinese student had not left the country and was questioned. However, his statement was of little evidential value, given that he had left the scene prior to the beginning of the fight and had not seen any of it. The Kyivskyy Court held as follows:
“... [Pursuant to Articles 85 and 86] and Article 95 § 4 of the CCP [2012], the court may only base its conclusions on statements received directly at the court hearing or in accordance with the procedure [established by] Article 225 of this Code, and is not entitled to base judicial decisions on statements made to the investigator or prosecutor, or to refer to such statements. The court therefore holds that the reference by the applicant and his lawyer to the witness statements documented in the investigation’s reports and made either to the investigator or to the prosecutor outside of court hearings and not in accordance with the procedure [established by] Article 225 of the CCP [2012], cannot be regarded as proper and admissible defence evidence.” 36.  The trial court further held:
“..The court has no doubts regarding the circumstances of the case which it considers established ... The statements of the witnesses [Sa., Su. and D.] are consistent and corroborated by other evidence in these criminal proceedings.” 37.  The applicant appealed. He submitted that the only evidence leading to his conviction had been the victim’s friends’ inconsistent and contradictory statements, which they had drastically changed on at least three occasions. The applicant emphasised that the trial court had not analysed either any of those contradictions or the reasons why the witnesses had changed their statements. Likewise, he complained, no assessment had been given to the contradictions between the above-mentioned witness evidence and the version of events given by the victim himself shortly before his death (see paragraph 11 above). He observed in particular that M. had been clear in his statement that the stabbing in his back had been a complete surprise for him and that he had never submitted that somebody had been “hanging on [his] back” as alleged by the witnesses. 38.  The applicant also complained that the statements of twelve other Chinese people during the pre-trial investigation had been disregarded. He observed that, under Article 5 § 2 of the CCP 2012, the admissibility of evidence was to be assessed in the light of the CCP provisions in force at the time when that evidence was obtained. Furthermore, the applicant referred to Article 8 of Chapter 11 of the Transitional Provisions of the CCP 2012, which stipulated that the issue of the admissibility of evidence obtained prior to the entry into force of the new CCP was to be decided in accordance with the procedure applicable prior to its entry into force (see paragraph 45 below). In his case, he emphasised, all the evidence had been obtained while the old CCP 1960 had still been in force. Accordingly, he considered that the trial court should have been guided by provisions of the CCP 1960 when deciding on the admissibility of the evidence including the witness statements given by the Chinese students. Given that under the CCP 1960 evidence obtained in the course of a pre-trial investigation was admissible in criminal proceedings (see paragraph 44 below), the applicant complained that it had been unlawful and unfair to exclude the witness evidence for the defence and that by doing so the trial court had substantially aggravated his situation and had deprived him of the opportunity to defend himself. 39.  On 27 November 2013 the Court of Appeal upheld the findings and the reasoning of the Kyivskyy Court’s judgment. It held in particular as follows:
“The [first-instance] court’s findings regarding [the applicant’s guilt] are concordant with the factual circumstances of the case. [They] are based on the evidence, which was explored in the court hearing and which is set forth in detail in the judgment. The trial court thoroughly verified [that evidence] and assessed it in an objective manner.” 40.  The Court of Appeal did not comment on the applicant’s argument about the applicability of the CCP 1960 on the assessment of the admissibility of evidence. 41.  The applicant reiterated his arguments in an appeal on points of law. 42.  On 22 July 2014 the Higher Specialised Court for Civil and Criminal Matters found against him and upheld the lower courts’ decisions. It found no reasons to consider the investigation at the trial superficial or otherwise flawed. The Higher Specialised Court was silent on the applicant’s argument on the admissibility of the defence evidence in the light of the CCP 1960. 43.  According to the information provided by the applicant, on 31 March 2016 he was released and he returned to China. The case file before the Court does not contain any further details in that regard.


7.  The applicant organisation is a public notary professional association and has its main office in Bucharest. 8.  According to the applicant organisation, on 13 December 2007 approximately thirty police officers dressed in civilian clothes entered its premises. They informed a receptionist that they were clients. The receptionist asked them to leave the premises and to wait outside, but they refused. 9.  Eventually two of the officers disclosed their identity and the fact that they were police officers and proceeded to seize an original sale contract that had been signed by two private parties and had been notarised by D.O.R. One of the private parties in question was suspected by the police of being part of an organised criminal group involved in immovable property fraud. 10.  The police officers also seized a number of documents, including the sale contract and original documents concerning the aforementioned private parties. Moreover, the police officers seized the fees and taxes that had been paid by the private parties for the services rendered by the applicant organisation. Furthermore, the police officers took statements from the applicant organisation’s employees. 11.  According to the report produced and signed by the two police officers on the same date, they seized 8,943 euros (EUR), the amount paid in income tax by the private party selling the immovable property, and EUR 1,000 and 12,215 Romanian Lei (RON – approximately EUR 3,470), representing public notary fees and the applicable tax for the registration of the sale in the immovable property register. 12.  On 23 April 2008 the applicant organisation, legally represented by D.O.R., brought criminal proceedings against the two police officers (see paragraph 9 above) for unlawful home intrusion and abuse of office against private interests. Furthermore, it asked for the report produced by the police officers on the day of the incident to be annulled and for the original documents and for the relevant fees and taxes seized to be returned. 13.  On 27 March 2009 the Bucharest prosecutor’s office noted that the police officers had seized the relevant documents and sums of money without an express order to do so having been issued by the prosecutor charged with the case because the police officers had at the time been carrying out an operational mission aimed at catching suspects red-handed in the commission of an offence. Moreover, according to the available evidence, an official order from the prosecutor would in any case not have been necessary in this regard because the seized documents and sums of money had been turned over to the officers without any objections. 14.  On 11 August 2009 a prosecutor attached to the Bucharest Prosecutor’s Office discontinued the criminal investigation opened against the two police officers on the grounds that no unlawful act had been committed. She held that the police officers had acted within the context of a criminal investigation initiated against an organised criminal group involved in immovable property fraud. A large number of police officers had been mobilised for an operation aimed at catching the suspects red‑handed. The two police officers had entered the premises of the applicant organisation, disclosed their identity and the fact that they were police officers, and proceeded to seize the relevant documents and fees. Consequently, the police officers had acted in their professional capacity in order to fulfil their professional duties and with the aim of investigating cases they had been working on. Their presence on the applicant organisation’s premises had not amounted to the offence of unlawful home intrusion because the premises of the applicant organisation constituted by their nature a public area and the event in question had occurred during working hours. Moreover, the elements of the offence of abuse of office against private interests had not been met. Consequently, no damage had been caused given that the valuables seized by the officers had concerned the commission of offences. 15.  The applicant organisation challenged the prosecutor’s decision before the superior prosecutor attached to the Bucharest Prosecutor’s Office. 16.  On 31 August 2009 the superior prosecutor dismissed the applicant organisation’s challenge as ill-founded. 17.  On 21 September 2009 the applicant organisation lodged an appeal against the prosecutor office’s decisions with the Bucharest Court of Appeal. It argued, among other things, that the police officers had entered its premises in breach of Article 27 § 2(b) of the Romanian Constitution (see paragraph 32 below). They had not been seeking to protect other people’s property and in any event they could have done that by taking property preservation measures (that is to say take measures to prevent the re-sale or use of the property – indisponibilizarea bunului). Moreover, the two above-mentioned police officers had entered the premises accompanied by their colleagues and had remained there outside the applicant organisation’s working hours. Also, they had unlawfully seized the public notaries’ professional fees and returned them to the private party who had been the victim of the alleged fraud. Furthermore, they had failed to include in the report produced on the day of the incident the applicant organisation’s objections against (i) the police officers’ presence on its premises, (ii) the seizure of fees and (iii) the questioning of its staff members, who had been bound by rules concerning professional secrecy. 18.  On 2 November 2009 the Bucharest Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant organisation’s appeal and upheld the prosecutor office’s decisions. It considered that the two police officers, accompanied by other colleagues, had carried out an operational mission seeking to catch suspects red-handed in the commission of an offence and to gather evidence. In this connection they had surveyed the suspected criminal group and after a sale contract had been signed, they had asked D.O.R. to turn over all the documents and sums of money connected to the sale. D.O.R. had relinquished all the documents connected to the sale contract in question and the relevant public notaries’ professional fees and taxes without any objection. 19.  With regard to the lawfulness of the police officers’ presence on the applicant organisation’s premises, the court held that the said premises did not constitute a home, room, annex or closed area attached to a home or a room and that entering such premises had therefore not constituted the offence of unlawful home intrusion. It considered that in classifying the latter act as an offence, the legislature had been concerned only with entering or refusing to leave areas which were closely connected to a person’s private life and where the person concerned conducted activities away from the eyes of the public which were closely related to his or her personal life. A public notary’s office did not comply with the aforementioned criteria because it was a place for a professional activity, open to the public during working hours and designed for a public activity. Moreover, the relevant domestic legislation concerning public notaries did not impose on interested individuals special rules in respect of entering a public notary’s office. The two police officers’ presence on the applicant organisation’s premises had not constituted any other offences either. They could have protected the victims’ property by taking property preservation measures only after establishing that an offence had been committed. 20.  The court also held that the seizure of the relevant documents and sums of money had been justified and lawful because they amounted to evidence which could be used in criminal proceedings and could clarify the circumstances of a criminal case. In addition, D.O.R.’s statement that the police officers had failed to mention his objections in the report produced on the day of the incident was relatively untrustworthy, given that as a public notary he was aware that he could have asked for any objections voiced by him to be included in the report; otherwise he could have refused to sign the said report. 21.  The court furthermore held that the police officers who had asked the employees of the applicant organisation to give statements had not breached the relevant domestic rules concerning professional secrecy because the information provided by the said employees with regard to the commission of an offence had not amounted to them being formally heard as witnesses in the case. Moreover, the domestic rules concerning professional secrecy applicable to employees of a public notary’s office had not prevented them from providing relevant information or from allowing access to documents to anyone proving a legitimate right or interest, such as police officers exercising their professional duty. 22.  The court concluded that the applicant organisation was mainly unhappy with the fact that the sale contract and the public notaries’ professional fees seized by the police officers had been returned to the alleged victims of the offence and not to the organisation. The court considered, however, that such a measure could not be contested by way of an appeal against the prosecutor office’s decisions but rather by a complaint lodged with the prosecutor’s office against the acts and measures taken by the police officers. 23.  The applicant organisation appealed on points of fact and law (recurs) against the judgment and reiterated in part the arguments raised before the first-instance court. In addition, it argued, inter alia, that according to the Court’s case-law the fact that the police officers had entered its premises and subsequently had refused to leave amounted to a breach of its rights, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. The operation had not concerned the commission of an offence, as the sale contract validated by the applicant organisation had not been a forged one. The statements given by its employees could not be categorised as mere information and had in fact amounted to witness testimony. According to the relevant rules concerning professional secrecy, only specially assigned magistrates could access public notary documents and police officers could therefore not be considered to constitute persons who could legitimately justify such access. Also, the first-instance court’s finding that the applicant organisation could have vented its discontent with the unlawful seizure of its fees by the police officers by means of a complaint against the acts and measures taken by the police officers (rather than by means of a criminal complaint lodged against the perpetrators – see paragraph 22 above) had amounted to a breach of its right of access to court. 24.  By a final judgment of 25 January 2010 the High Court of Cassation and Justice dismissed the applicant organisation’s appeal on points of fact and law and upheld the decisions of the prosecutor’s office and the judgment of the first-instance court. It held, among other things, that the police officers had acted within the context of a criminal investigation and in their professional capacity. According to the relevant criminal procedure rules, police officers were entitled and had a duty to carry out operations seeking to identify and investigate unlawful acts and to gather and seize relevant evidence. Furthermore, any natural and legal person had a duty to turn over impugned evidence. The applicant organisation’s submissions that the police officers had entered its premises outside working hours and had acted unlawfully in seizing the relevant documents, taxes and fees were unsubstantiated. 25.  On 15 January and 11 June 2008 – within the framework of the criminal investigation initiated by the domestic authorities against the organised criminal group allegedly involved in immovable property fraud – the applicant organisation lodged a complaint with the Bucharest Prosecutor’s Office in respect of the acts and measures taken by the police officers. It asked the prosecutor’s office to quash the acts and measures taken by the police officers and to order the return of the original documents produced by the applicant organisation and of the relevant fees and taxes seized by the police officers. In addition, it stated that if the prosecutor’s office refused to order the return of the relevant fees the applicant organisation would join the criminal proceedings opened against the criminal group as a civil party. 26.  On 8 July 2010 the Bucharest Prosecutor’s Office informed the applicant organisation that the criminal case in question had been referred to the domestic courts which had the authority to examine its requests. 27.  On 3 August 2010 the applicant organisation informed the Bucharest County Court that it had joined as a civil party the criminal proceedings opened by the domestic authorities against the organised criminal group allegedly involved in immovable property fraud. It asked the court to order the return of the original documents produced by the applicant organisation and to order the defendants to return the relevant fees and taxes seized by the police officers and to pay compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 28.  On 30 November 2010 the Bucharest County Court convicted the members of the organised criminal group involved in immovable property fraud and annulled the sale contract validated by the applicant organisation. In addition, it dismissed the applicant organisation’s requests for the return of the original documents produced by it and the relevant fees and taxes on the grounds that the documents in question had been annulled and the relevant fees and taxes returned to the private party who had sold the property and who had been the victim of the offences committed by the criminal group. Moreover, the applicant organisation had not proved that it had suffered non-pecuniary damage. 29.  The applicant organisation appealed against the judgment. 30.  On 17 November 2011 the Bucharest Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant organisation’s appeal. It held, inter alia, that if the applicant organisation considered that it had suffered some damage following its validation of the subsequently annulled sale contract, it could initiate proceedings in tort before the civil courts and prove the alleged damage. Given the offences which were the object of the criminal case at hand, the applicant organisation could not be awarded damages within the framework of the criminal proceedings. 31.  There is no evidence in the file that the applicant organisation appealed on points of fact and law against the judgment of the second‑instance court.


4.  The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Juodšiliai in the Vilnius Region. 5.  In 1991 the applicant’s mother applied for restoration of her property rights to land which had been nationalised by the Soviet regime. 6.  On 27 September 2001 the Vilnius County Administration (hereinafter “the VCA”) restored the applicant’s mother’s property rights by giving her a plot of six hectares in Pagiriai, an area in the Vilnius city municipality. As the applicant’s mother had died in 1995, the applicant was issued with a certificate of inheritance in respect of the plot on 13 March 2003. 7.  On 4 December 2008 the prosecutor of the Vilnius Region (hereinafter “the prosecutor”) lodged a claim with the Vilnius Regional Court, seeking to have the applicant’s mother’s property rights to the six hectares given to her annulled. The prosecutor submitted that, according to the data provided by the State Forest Management Service, 5.59 hectares of the plot was covered by forest. Since that forest was situated in a city, it was considered a forest of national importance and could therefore only be owned by the State (see the relevant domestic law cited in Beinarovič and Others v. Lithuania, nos. 70520/10 and 2 others, §§ 86-89, 12 June 2018). In view of the circumstances, the VCA’s decision had to be declared unlawful and its effects annulled. The prosecutor asked that after annulling the applicant’s mother’s property rights to the plot, the applicant’s property rights to it also be annulled. 8.  The applicant and the VCA disputed the prosecutor’s claim. However, on 15 September 2009 the Vilnius Regional Court allowed the prosecutor’s claim and annulled the VCA’s decision to restore the applicant’s mother’s property rights to six hectares of land, as well as the applicant’s property rights to that land. 9.  The applicant and the VCA lodged appeals against that decision, arguing that the restoration of the applicant’s mother’s property rights had complied with the relevant legislation. The applicant also submitted that he was being deprived of his property without any compensation. However, on 1 June 2010 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals and upheld the lower court’s decision in its entirety. 10.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, arguing that the lower courts had incorrectly found that the forest on his land constituted an urban forest, but on 25 January 2011 it was dismissed by the Supreme Court. 11.  On 23 February 2012 the applicant received a letter from the National Land Service (the institution which took over the relevant functions of the VCA after an administrative reform – hereinafter “the NLS”) confirming that his mother had retained the right to have her property rights to six hectares of land restored. It stated that there was no more vacant land in Pagiriai and asked the applicant to inform the authorities of his choice as to one of the forms of restitution provided for by the domestic law (ibid., § 92). It is unclear whether he replied to this letter. 12.  On 24 July 2012 the applicant received another letter from the NLS which stated that there was a possibility for the applicant to receive a plot of land for the construction of an individual home in the Vilnius city area but as there were 4,806 other candidates waiting to receive plots in the area, the restitution process would take a long time. The applicant was asked to consider an alternative form of restitution, such as a plot of land in a rural area, a plot of land for the construction of an individual home in a different city, or monetary compensation (ibid., § 92). He was also informed that there might be some vacant land in Pagiriai, so if he wished to receive a plot in that area, his request would be considered when the land plan was being prepared. 13.  On 21 August 2012 the applicant sent a letter to the NLS. He submitted that the annulment of his property rights to six hectares of land had caused him pecuniary damage in the amount of 251,217 Lithuanian litai (LTL – approximately 72,760 euros (EUR)), according to an assessment of the value of the land carried out in May 2012. In the applicant’s view, being put on the list with 4,806 other candidates and being made to wait for an undetermined period of time for restitution was unacceptable. He asked to be allocated a plot of land for the construction of an individual home in Vilnius in the order of priority, and if that was not possible, to be informed how many plots were available in Vilnius and when he might expect to receive one. If he could not be given such a plot, he wished to receive compensation of LTL 251,217. The applicant also stated that he would only be able to decide whether he wished to receive a plot in Pagiriai after being presented with a plan of a specific plot. He stated that he did not wish to choose any other form of restitution. 14.  On 7 October 2013 the NLS approved the list of candidates to receive plots of land in several areas around Vilnius, including Pagiriai. The applicant’s mother was included in that list as a candidate to receive six hectares of land. On 22 October 2013 the NLS held a meeting in which candidates were offered plots in the relevant areas and the applicant took part in that meeting. According to the minutes of the meeting, which were approved by the NLS, he stated that the question of the restoration of his property rights was pending before the European Court of Human Rights, that he was dissatisfied with the available vacant land and that he refused to choose any plots (žemės sklypų nesirinko). 15.  On 22 April 2016 the NLS held another meeting in which the applicant took part. According to the minutes of the meeting, which were approved by the NLS and signed by the applicant, he asked to be shown the plots which had been offered to him at their location and not just on a plan. He stated that he had lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights and wished to receive its decision  only then would he “decide what to do with his land”. The applicant examined the land plan but did not make any decisions with regard to the available plots (jokių sprendimų nepriėmė), stating that he would “seek solutions from organisations of a higher instance”. 16.  At a subsequent meeting held on 17 May 2016, the applicant stated that he had seen the plots offered to him but that they could not be used according to their purpose because of their uneven surface and the presence of electricity and other installations on them. He therefore “saw no possibility of choosing any plots” (žemės sklypų pasirinkimo galimybių nemato). The applicant further stated that the plot which had been taken away from him had been large and of good quality, and that he preferred to “wait for decisions of a higher instance”. 17.  On 9 October 2017 the NLS approved the list of candidates to receive plots of land in several areas around Vilnius, including Pagiriai. The applicant’s mother was included in that list as a candidate to receive six hectares of land. On 25 October 2017 the NLS held a meeting for candidates in which the applicant took part. According to the minutes of the meeting, which were approved by the NLS and signed by the applicant, he was dissatisfied with the size and location of the plots which had been offered to him. He again stated that he had lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights and wished to receive that Court’s decision  only then would he decide “what to do with the land which had not been returned to him”. He refused to make any decisions during the meeting (susirinkimo metu jokių sprendimų nepriėmė) on the grounds that he was “waiting for a response from a competent institution”. 18.  On 24 November 2017 the NLS held yet another meeting of candidates to receive plots of land in the aforementioned areas and the applicant took part in that meeting. According to the minutes of the meeting, approved by the NLS and signed by the applicant, he again refused to make any decisions (susirinkimo metu jokių sprendimų nepriėmė) and repeated that he was waiting for a response from the European Court of Human Rights. 19.  At the date of the latest information provided to the Court (13 February 2018), the applicant’s property rights to six hectares of land had still not been restored.