4.  The applicant was born in 1981 and lives in the Krasnodar region. 5.  According to the applicant, in 1995 he signed a contract with a Russian football club as a football player, obtained a Russian visa and settled in Russia. Later on, he gave up football because of an injury and entered (some time between 1998 and 2002) a higher educational institution in Krasnodar. 6.  It appears that since 2003 or 2004 the applicant has been living in the Krasnodar region with a Russian national, Ms A., as common-law husband and wife.  The applicant has been lawfully resident in Russia at least since 20 October 2004. In April 2005 Ms A. gave birth to a son. The applicant formally acknowledged paternity. The boy was given the applicant’s last name and patronymic. 7.  On 20 June 2006 the applicant was expelled from the University because of his failure to attend classes. It appears that on 9 September 2006 the document authorising his stay in Russia (apparently a student visa) was revoked. 8.  According to the applicant, he applied to a private firm for assistance in obtaining or renewing his visa. It is alleged that an employee of this firm handed over the applicant’s passport to the local Federal Security Office. 9.  On 25 October 2006 Ms A. gave birth to a daughter. Although for unspecified reasons the applicant did not formally register paternity, he never contested it and the girl has his first name as a patronymic. 10.  On 3 November 2006 the applicant was arrested by officers of the Russian Federal Migration Service (“FMS”). On the same day the Oktyabrskiy District Court of Krasnodar found the applicant guilty of the administrative offence of violating the residence regulations for foreign nationals (see paragraph 26 below) and imposed on him a fine of 1,500 Russian roubles (RUB). The applicant was then released. He did not appeal against this court decision and paid the fine. 11.  As the applicant had no valid authorisation to remain in the country he was provided with a transit visa valid from 7 to 16 November 2006, to enable him to leave Russia. However, he did not leave the country, because, as he explained, his wife had recently given birth to their second child and he had to take care of their first child. 12.  The applicant stated that between 1 and 10 January 2007 he could not make any arrangements to regularise his residence status due to the closure of public offices during the public holidays in Russia. 13.  On 11 January 2007 the applicant was subjected to an identity check by FMS officers. As he had no valid document, the officers arrested him and took him to the FMS premises, where they drew up an administrative offence report concerning a violation of residence regulations for foreigners (see paragraphs 26 and 33 below). The report reads as follows:
“[The applicant] was subjected to an identity check and could not provide evidence of his compliance with the requirement of temporary registration for a period longer than three days of residence...
I have been informed of my procedural rights, including the right to have access to the record and other materials, the right to legal assistance...Court proceedings, which may result in an administrative arrest or administrative removal from Russia, should be carried out in the presence of the person concerned...[the applicant’s signature]
The person’s explanations: {in handwriting in the Russian language} I did not have enough time to renew my registration status.” 14.  According to the applicant, after his arrest he asked in vain to see a lawyer and an interpreter. Having drawn up the report, the FMS officers told the applicant where he should sign it, which he did. One of them wrote down the applicant’s oral explanations (see above). In the applicant’s submission, his language skills were at the time limited: although he could speak and understand some Russian, he had no writing skills. 15.  Later the same day the applicant was taken to the Leninskiy District Court of Krasnodar. The court held a hearing, at which, however, no lawyer or interpreter was designated to assist the applicant. According to the applicant, he was unable to make oral submissions to the court concerning his family status. The District Court judgment reads as follows:
“[The applicant] had arrived in Krasnodar in November 2004, for educational purposes. During an identity check on 11 January 2007 at his place of his residence it emerged that he had had no registration since 9 September 2006. Having examined the materials, the circumstances of the case, the administrative offence report, the court considers that [the applicant] violated the residence regulations for foreign nationals and thus committed an offence under Article 18.8 of the Code of Administrative Offences.”
The court sentenced the applicant to a fine in the amount of twenty times the minimum wage (RUB 2,000). The court also ordered the administrative removal of the applicant from Russia, and that he be detained until removal in a special detention facility situated in the village of Kopanskoy. 16.  On 22 January 2007 a lawyer appealed on behalf of the applicant against the first-instance judgment, requesting that the administrative removal be annulled. He argued that the administrative offence report was unlawful, as the applicant had not been provided with an interpreter at the FMS. He also mentioned that the removal would affect his client’s family life, arguing as follows:
“The court failed to examine the entirety of the relevant circumstances...Since 2003 [the applicant] has been living with a Russian national, A., and has two children, born in 2005 and 2006...These circumstances show that he has a family life...The court did not provide reasons for applying a subsidiary penalty of administrative removal in respect of [the applicant] and did not take account of the matters relating to his family life in Russia. Nor did the court assess the fact that administrative removal would prevent [the applicant] for five years from obtaining permission for temporary residence in Russia. The court should have provided reasons for considering that removal was the only way of striking a fair balance between the private and public interests at stake.” 17.  On 24 January 2007 the Krasnodar Regional Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the first-instance judgment. Apparently, no oral hearing had been held. The appeal court stated as follows:
“The argument relating to the existence of a relationship with A. cannot be considered as a ground for residence in Russia without valid permission issued by the competent authority. In addition, [the applicant] had already been fined for a similar offence, whilst no administrative removal had been ordered. Taking account of all circumstances, including [the applicant’s] personality and both mitigating and aggravating circumstances, it should be concluded that the first-instance court issued a lawful decision.”
The appeal court further stated that, according to the administrative report, the applicant had been informed of his rights but had not asked for an interpreter and had made a handwritten note in Russian on the report. 18.  The applicant’s lawyer continued to complain about the measure of administrative removal against his client. On 2 March 2007 the Regional Prosecutor’s Office informed the lawyer that the removal was lawful. On or around 14 March 2007 the applicant lodged an application for supervisory review in respect of the court decisions of 11 and 24 January 2007. On 2 April 2007 the Regional Court informed the lawyer that his complaint had been examined by way of supervisory review and that no violations had been found. 19.  On an unspecified date, the applicant lodged an application for supervisory review before the Supreme Court of Russia. On 4 May 2007 a judge of the Supreme Court rejected it. He stated that the absence of an interpreter could not serve as a reason for quashing the decision, that the applicant had not registered a marriage with Ms A. and that the defence had not provided the district court or the supervisory-review court with evidence confirming that the applicant was the father of the two children. 20.  According to the applicant, the FMS officers repeatedly told him that the State authorities had no funds to pay for his expulsion and told him to return to Cameroon at his own expense. According to the Government, since the applicant’s national passport had expired on 6 June 2007 it was necessary to make arrangements to renew it. 21.  By a letter of 6 July 2007 the Regional Prosecutor’s Office informed Ms A. that the removal order could not be enforced because no funds had been allocated for this purpose in the federal budget and the applicant’s passport had expired. It was noted that arrangements were being made by the Embassy of Cameroon to issue a departure certificate and travel documents to the applicant. On 9 July 2007 the Embassy issued a travel document. Apparently, Ms A. purchased for the applicant a train ticket to Moscow. 22.  The applicant was released on 16 July 2007. In March 2011 the applicant’s lawyer submitted to the Court a letter from the applicant. In that letter the applicant stated that after his release he had been living with his family in the Krasnodar Region; he had to be discreet because he did not want to be arrested and because the order of administrative removal against him remained enforceable; he could no longer regularise his stay in Russia; he could not work or initiate any administrative procedures concerning marriage or paternity. By April 2011 the removal measure had not been enforced in respect of the applicant. 23.  From 11 January to 16 July 2007 the applicant was detained in Kopanskoy detention facility. 24.  According to the applicant, during his detention he was kept in a metal trailer. In winter the temperature in the trailer was at times as low as 5 degrees Celsius, while in summer it was very hot inside. The applicant was provided with food once a day. He was obliged to do unpaid physical work. His state of health deteriorated significantly, to the extent that an ambulance was called for him on several occasions. 25.  According to the Government, in the living quarters of the detention centre each detainee was provided with an individual bed, bedding and bedside table. The living quarters provided access to water and electricity. A shower room was made available to detainees. Each detainee was afforded three square metres of floor space. Each unit had its own heating system. The applicant was provided with the requisite medical assistance. For instance, on 24 April 2007 he was admitted to hospital because of an abdominal contusion. The applicant received visits from his lawyer, Ms A. and other persons, who supplied him with food and clothes. No detainee was required to work in the detention facility.


7.  The individual applicants are mostly travellers (gens du voyage). The movement ATD Quart Monde (the applicant association [known internationally as ATD Fourth World]) is an association established under the laws of France, having its registered office in Paris. Under Article 2 of its constitution, “[t]he Movement ATD Quart Monde brings together individuals, families and population groups who refuse the fatality of the poverty in which they are condemned to live, and, together with them, men and women, of all origins, who share the same refusal ...”. 8.  The département of Val d’Oise has been home to travellers for very many years. A survey carried out in 2001 by the Association Départementale Voyageurs-Gadjé (ADVOG) identified the presence of 2,500 mobile homes, representing a population of about 10,000 individuals, of which 17% belonged to nomadic families, 42% to sedentary families and 41% to semi-sedentary families, also described as “forced itinerant” or “forced sedentary”.
The “forced itinerant” families wish to settle down but are obliged to keep moving as and when they are evicted. The “forced sedentary” families remain nomadic to some extent but are obliged to settle on a particular site when there is no great risk of eviction. These families often remain, when they are evicted, within a specific area covering several municipalities, not straying too far from focal points such as the school attended by their children, the hospital where the elderly are treated or centres of economic activity.
As regards the sedentarised families, they are owners, tenants or occupiers of land (private or municipal) on which they live permanently, and families remaining encamped on a site that is normally reserved for short stays (Source: Plans départementaux d’Aide au Logement des Personnes défavorisées du Val d’Oise (PDALPD) 2004-2007 and 2008-2010). 9. The Val d’Oise has two regulatory arrangements aimed at travellers:
(a)  The “département-level travellers’ reception and accommodation programme” (schéma départemental d’accueil et d’habitat des gens du voyage; under the so-called “Besson Acts” of 31 May 1990 and 5 July 2000 ...), which governs, depending on the needs and existing encampment capacity, the nature, location and capacity of the encampment facilities to be created in municipalities of over 5,000 inhabitants.
(b)  The “département-level accommodation action plan for persons in need” (plan départemental d’action pour le logement des personnes défavorisées, PDALPD) (provided for by the above-mentioned Law of 31 May 1990 and the Law against exclusion of 29 July 1998), which takes into account the problems raised by sedentary and semi-sedentary families. 10.  Pursuant to the above-mentioned Law of 5 July 2000, and after the annulment of the first travellers’ reception and accommodation programme by the administrative courts, a new programme was adopted in November 2004 for the Val d’Oise in respect of 2004-2010. It provided for the creation, by the 53 municipalities of over 5,000 inhabitants in that département, of 1,035 caravan spaces in encampment areas, including 219 already existing spaces, with 70% State financing. 11.  The PDALPD 2004-2007 plan for the Val d’Oise, adopted in June 2004 and following the previous 2000-2003 plan, stipulated that the actions aimed at travellers should take two forms: first, the creation of encampment areas for traveller families and, second, the provision of family rental accommodation, to be used by sedentary or semi-sedentary families, as already provided for by the previous plan. That accommodation took the form of land, with or without individual houses, on which families could place their caravans to be used for permanent residence. The circular of 21 March 2003 (concerning the implementation of the housing policy and the programming of State financing) provides for the State financing of the family rental accommodation under the same conditions as encampment areas (at 70% of the pre-tax cost within the ceiling); actual houses can be financed with the help of the rental housing loan for social integration (prêt locatif aidé d’intégration, PLAI). 12.  More than 2,000 travellers live in the area covered by the municipality of Herblay (approximately 10% of its population), occupying between 400 and 500 caravans, and most of them have been there for many years. According to the Government, around four-fifths of those mobile homes are in breach of the land-use plan. 13.  In 2000 an urban and social study (maîtrise d’œuvre urbaine et sociale, MOUS) was initiated with a view to providing alternative accommodation for the travellers who had settled in the municipality (created by circular no. 3465 of 22 May 1989, the aim of the study is to promote access to housing for individuals and families in difficulty). The study gave rise, after a social diagnosis by the ADVOG, to a memorandum of understanding dated 23 November 2004 between the prefect of the Val d’Oise, the president of the département council and the mayor of Herblay. The project provided for the creation of four sites, representing a total of 26 family plots. In September 2005 the land-use plan in respect of those sites underwent a simplified revision procedure. The first site, containing eight plots, or 24 spaces, was opened in December 2008. 14.  Under the 2004-2010 travellers’ accommodation programme for the département (see paragraph 10 above) the municipality of Herblay was exempted from the requirement to provide a site for nomadic travellers because of the number of settled families living in mobile homes and the study that was underway (see paragraph 13 above). 15. Pursuant to section 9 of the above-cited Law of 5 July 2000, the mayor of Herblay issued in July 2003, and again in January 2005, orders prohibiting the encampment of travellers’ mobile homes throughout the municipality. 16.  The applicants, who are all French nationals, had been living in Herblay, in the locality of “Bois du Trou-Poulet”, for many years and some of them had been born there ... They were part of a group of twenty-six families (42 adults and 53 children, making a total of 95 people) who had settled on the land. Some of the applicants were owners but most were tenants, while others were squatters. According to the land-use plan published in May 2003, the plots of land in question were situated in zone ND, corresponding to a “natural area qualifying for protection on account of the quality of its landscape and its various characteristics”. The plots had also been classified as ND in the earlier land-use plans. In the zone NDc, where the applicants had settled, camping and caravanning were allowed provided the site was suitably equipped and the persons concerned had the requisite authorisation. 17.  On the application of the municipality of Herblay (the “municipality”) and in accordance with a decision of the president of the Pontoise tribunal de grande instance dated 19 November 2003, two bailiffs, accompanied by police officers, visited the site on 12 February 2004 in order to take note of the occupation of the land and establish the identity of the occupiers. The bailiffs drew up an official report in which they recorded, for each part of the land, the identity of the occupiers and their type of accommodation (caravans, bungalows, huts, permanent buildings). The report stated in particular as follows: “the whole of the site in question is cluttered with a large number of pieces of vehicles, engines, spare car parts and various rubbish in the wooded area around the sites where we recorded the occupiers’ identities”.
(b)  Injunction proceedings 18.  On 30 April and 11 May 2004 the municipal authorities brought civil proceedings against forty individuals, including the applicants, before the urgent-applications judge of the Pontoise tribunal de grande instance, seeking a ruling that the land was being unlawfully occupied and that the defendants had “illegal placed mobile homes and constructions thereon”, together with an injunction requiring them to remove all their vehicles and mobile homes together with any constructions from the site, on pain of a penalty of 200 euros (EUR) per day, and stipulating that the municipality would be entitled, after a period of two months from the issuance of the injunction, to carry out the eviction and clearance itself with police assistance. 19.  The hearing took place on 18 June 2004. In a decision of 2 July 2004 the urgent-applications judge dismissed the municipality’s application. After noting that the zone NDc, occupied by the defendants, allowed for camping and caravanning, but that the encampment of caravans for more than three months was subject to authorisation unless the land was specially equipped, which was not the case here, the judge considered it sufficiently established that the defendants had been occupying the land for many years, long before the publication of the land-use plan, that some of them had a regular water or electricity supply and that the long-standing toleration of the situation by the municipality, while not amounting to a right, precluded a finding of urgency or of a manifestly unlawful nuisance, which alone could bring the matter within the jurisdiction of the urgent-applications judge. 20.  The judge further observed that, with the annulment of the travellers’ reception and accommodation programme (see paragraph 10 above), the municipality was required by the Law of 5 July 2000 to provide a site for itinerant travellers. Lastly, having regard to the bailiffs’ official report, the judge ordered the defendants to clear the land of all abandoned vehicles and rubbish within a period of two months, on pain of a fine of EUR 200 per day, and ruled that after that period the municipality would be entitled to have the land cleaned up at the defendants’ expense.
(c)  Proceedings on the merits
(i)  Judgment of the tribunal de grande instance 21.  In September 2004 the municipality brought an action against forty individuals, including the applicants, in the Pontoise tribunal de grande instance, reiterating the requests it had made to the urgent-applications judge. In a judgment of 22 November 2004 the court granted the authorities’ requests. Two other individuals (including one of the applicants) also intervened in the proceedings voluntarily. The defendants and interveners claimed that they had been living on the Bois du Trou-Poulet site for many years, since before the publication of the land-use plan, in a zone where the development of land for camping and caravanning was authorised. They relied on the right to housing, as a constitutional principle, and on the Connors v. the United Kingdom judgment (no. 66746/01, 27 May 2004), and referred to the obligation for the municipality to make land available for travellers. In the alternative, they said that they would agree to judicial mediation. 22.  The hearing took place on 27 September 2004. In a judgment of 22 November 2004 the court upheld the municipality’s claims. It began by finding that the land-use plan, published in May 2003, was automatically enforceable provided it had not been declared null and void, and that the land occupied by the defendants was in the zone NDc, allowing in principle for the land to be equipped for camping and caravanning, but that the land had not been developed in compliance with the rules of the Town and Country Planning Code (see Article L. 443-1 of the Code). The court held that the defendants, in setting up their caravans, mobile homes and cabins on the land in the absence of a permit or a decision by the prefecture in their favour, had breached the land-use plan, and that the supply of electricity by EDF (Électricité de France) did not confer any rights. After stressing the importance of the right to housing and its legislative and constitutional basis, the court took the view that, while the legislature and the public authorities had to use their best endeavours to guarantee this right as far as possible, it could not be granted “without regard for legality or in breach of the applicable rules”. 23.  The court then analysed the above-cited Connors judgment and found that the situation before it was different, since there was no question here of a summary eviction procedure (unlike Connors), or any lack of procedural safeguards, because the defendants had been able to raise all the arguments that they considered necessary for their defence before an “independent tribunal”, ruling on the merits in compliance with all the procedural rules applied in France. The court found that it did not consider that it was breaching Article 8 of the Convention in giving a decision after responding to the defendants’ submissions and that, in a State governed by the rule of law, it would be unthinkable for the enforcement of a court decision to amount to “inhuman and degrading treatment”. It added that there was no doubt that if the decision was not voluntarily enforced by the defendants, the municipal authorities, the officers of the court and the State’s enforcement bodies would ensure that enforcement was carried out in accordance with the principle of human dignity. 24.  As regards the obligation of the municipality, after the annulment of the travellers’ reception and accommodation programme, to make land available for travellers, the court referred to a letter from the prefect of the Val d’Oise to the mayor showing that the municipality was considered to have fulfilled the obligations imposed by the Law of 5 July 2000. The court further observed that the fact that the defendants had been occupying the land for such a long time might call into question their status as “travellers” and that the département-level programmes were aimed at the nomadic population, not sedentary communities which had been settled in the same place for ten or sometimes twenty years. It rejected the request for judicial mediation on the ground that it would have little chance of success, in view of the context and the large number of defendants. 25.  Consequently, the court ordered the defendants and interveners to remove all vehicles and mobile homes from the land they were occupying, and to demolish any erections thereon, within three months from the date of service of the judgment, failing which they would be fined EUR 70 per person for each day of non-compliance, and held that, after that time-limit, the municipality itself would be entitled to carry out the removal and demolition at the defendants’ expense and with police assistance. The court also ordered them to pay EUR 50 to the municipality in respect of irrecoverable expenses. It took the view that, having regard to the context of the dispute and the lack of urgency resulting from a situation that had existed for many years, it was not necessary to order the provisional enforcement of the judgment.
(ii)  Judgment of the Court of Appeal 26. Thirty-six of the defendants, including the applicants, lodged an appeal with the Versailles Court of Appeal. The applicant association filed submissions as a voluntary intervener. 27.  The hearing was held on 8 September 2005. In a judgment of 13 October 2005 the Court of Appeal declared the applicant association’s voluntary intervention admissible and upheld the judgment, except in respect of a couple (who are not applicants), for whom it ordered an expert’s report in order to ascertain the conditions of their accommodation and the conformity thereof with the land-use plan. 28.  The Court of Appeal first found that the defendants’ occupation of the land breached the land-use plan, which was automatically enforceable, and responded as follows to the arguments raised:
“While the right to housing is a constitutional principle, and while Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention ... guarantee respect for each person’s private and family life and protect everyone from inhuman and degrading treatment, these superior principles have not in this particular case been impaired, as the municipality’s action had a legal basis derived from compliance with regulations that are indiscriminately binding on everyone, thus sufficing to establish the public interest that is necessary for the exercise of such action, giving rise to adversarial proceedings at first instance and on appeal, and as the enforcement of a court decision given with due regard for defence rights cannot constitute the alleged degrading and inhuman treatment.
The long duration of the occupation does not create rights, neither does the tolerance, however lengthy, of such occupation in breach of the provisions of the municipality’s land-use plan. It is therefore pointless for certain appellants to rely on the schooling of their children, which is not necessarily undermined, or on the irrelevant fact that they hold relocation record books (carnets de circulation), which do not exempt them from complying with the regulations.
It is equally pointless for the appellants to allege bad faith on the part of the municipality or that is has breached its statutory obligations under the Besson Act.
It transpires from a letter from the prefecture of the Val d’Oise dated 18 May 2004 that the municipality has fulfilled its obligations under the Law of 5 July 2000 concerning travellers, who are considered to be nomadic and not sedentarised, which is not the case for the appellants, who have vigorously asserted their sedentarisation and emphasised the length of their occupation ...” 29.  The Court of Appeal further confirmed the rejection of the judicial mediation that had been sought, on the ground that it did not appear to be the appropriate response “to a resolution of the dispute through which the municipality strives to ensure compliance by and for all its inhabitants with laws and regulations”. Lastly, it dismissed the claim for damages submitted by the municipality and ordered the appellants to pay the sum of EUR 50 each in respect of the costs of the appeal proceedings.
The applicants stated that after that judgment had been delivered they received daily visits from an official of the municipality who, referring to the coercive fine, urged them to leave the site.
(iii)  Proceedings before the Court of Cassation 30.  The applicants, in their own names and on behalf of their minor children, together with the applicant association, applied for legal aid from the legal aid board at the Court of Cassation so that they could lodge an appeal on points of law against the judgment of 13 October 2005. 31.  On 4 and 5 July 2006 the legal aid board issued a series of decisions dismissing their applications on the ground that no ground of appeal on points of law could be raised against the impugned decision within the meaning of section 7 of the Law of 10 July 1991. In a series of identically worded decisions of 23 November 2006, the judge delegated by the President of the Court of Cassation dismissed their appeals against those decisions ... 32.  On 16 January 2007 the applicants filed a declaration with the Court of Cassation’s Registry in which they withdrew their appeals on points of law. A decision of 7 September 2007 took note of their withdrawal. 33.  Following the Court of Appeal’s judgment, the authorities decided, in the context of the département-level accommodation action plan for persons in need (see paragraph 11 above) to undertake an urban and social study (maîtrise d’œuvre urbaine et sociale, “MOUS”) concerning all the families involved in the judicial proceedings, in order to determine their individual situations and assess the options for finding alternative accommodation. 34.  Under an agreement with the prefect of the Val d’Oise dated 20 February 2006, the National Workers’ Housing Association (Société Nationale de Construction de Logements pour les Travailleurs, “SONACOTRA”) was commissioned to carry out a social study concerning all the families in question, in particular to assess their needs in terms of relocation. The study, to be completed within three months, was to provide information for each family on the situation of the land with regard to planning regulations, the current living conditions, the degree of sedentarisation, the family structure and the social situation of the household. The study was also to indicate the relocation arrangements sought by each family (sedentary housing, mobile-home accommodation or a combination), the localities where they wished to be rehoused and their desired status (tenant or owner). The agreement established the composition of the MOUS steering committee and that of the select steering committee, and indicated that this mission would be fully financed by the State. 35.  The findings of the study were presented by the SONACOTRA to the steering committee on 6 June 2006. At a meeting of 17 November 2006 between the select steering committee and the applicant association, held for the presentation to the latter of the results of the social study, the committee agreed that the families who had in the meantime left Bois du Trou-Poulet would be included in the social study. The representatives of those families were received on 16 January 2007 by the select steering committee and it was agreed that they would be interviewed by the SONACOTRA on 30 January, 1, 2 or 5 February 2007. A supplement to the MOUS agreement was drawn up on 29 January 2007 to provide for an additional social study concerning those families, the cost of which was to be covered in full by the State. Lastly, at the request of the applicant association, one last family which had not been interview in the context of the additional social study was included in the MOUS. 36.  The social studies revealed the following information. Out of the thirty-two households interviewed by the SONACOTRA, the wishes for relocation were divided as follows:
- One household had moved outside the département at the end of the 2005-2006 school year.
- One household had been rehoused by the municipality in social housing of the low-rent type.
- Three households (not applicants) had received proposals from the municipality for relocation to family plots on which facilities were being installed (see paragraph 13 above).
- Five households (all applicants) wanted social housing of the low-rent type.
- Twenty-one households (of which fourteen are applicants) wanted to be relocated to a mixed site (buildings and caravans).
- One household occupying social housing in Angers wished to be rehoused in low-rent housing in the Angers area.
- Only one household among the applicants, that of Vanessa Ricono, could not be interviewed during the social study. 37.  On 12 November 2007 a new MOUS agreement was signed for a period of eight months for the relocation of five households which had opted for social housing of the low-rent type. The agreement entrusted the SONACOTRA, which had in the meantime become ADOMA, with the responsibility of providing relocation support for those families (information, assistance with compiling applications, introduction of support mechanisms, and follow-up of relocation in practical terms). The expenses of the MOUS were covered at 100% by the State. 38.  In the meantime, in October 2004, construction work on a dual carriageway (known as the “11th Avenue”) began in close proximity to the applicants’ homes and lasted for over a year. The lawyer for some of the applicants and the applicant association’s representative for the Val d’Oise sent a number of letters between November 2004 and July 2005 to the mayor of Herblay, to the prefect and to the president of the département council, drawing their attention to the risks caused to the applicants and their children by the construction work. In a number of letters, particularly in April and July 2005, the deputy director general for highway management in the département listed the various safety measures that had been taken under the supervision of a coordinating company (signs, fences, barriers, manhole covers, etc.) and stressed that despite those precautions, the site installations and signs had frequently been the target of vandalism and theft. 39.  At the time of the adoption of the present judgment, the municipality has not enforced the judgment of 13 October 2005. However, the coercive fine, for which no settlement date has been fixed, continues to run in respect of the applicants who have remained at Bois du Trou-Poulet. 40. The applicants can be divided into three groups:
(i)  Families rehoused in social housing
Four families were relocated in social housing between March and July 2008 further to the MOUS agreement of 12 November 2007 (see paragraph 37 above): Solange Lefèvre, Catherine Lefèvre and her three children, Sandrine Plumerez and her five children, and Sabrina Lefèvre, her partner (not an applicant) and her three children.
(ii)  Families remaining in Herblay or having returned there
A number of families remained at Bois du Trou-Poulet or have returned there:
- Martine Payen, also concerned by the MOUS, refused two offers of social housing (in particular because of the amount of the rent) and still lives at Bois du Trou-Poulet on land belonging to her.
- Michèle Perioche and Germain Guiton remained on their rented land.
- Laetitia Winterstein remained with her partner (not an applicant) and their five children, on land belonging to her grandmother.
- Steeve Lefèvre and Graziella Avisse and their child have returned to Bois du Trou-Poulet after joining their aunt on an encampment area in Avranches; according to their lawyer, they received an eviction order after their return subject to a coercive fine of 300 EUR per day.
- Rosita Ricono left Bois du Trou-Poulet and went to live in a hotel; she is now living on a friend’s land in Herblay.
(iii)  Families who have left the region
Lastly, a number of families have left the region:
- Pierre Mouche left in May 2005 after undergoing a serious operation (according to his lawyer this was due to dust from the “11th Avenue” construction work). He wandered from place to place with his children, then on his own for four years, between Les Mureaux and Saint Ouen l’Aumône. In 2007 he refused social housing, in particular on account of his inability to live in such housing and his wish to settle on a family plot. He is currently living on a shopping centre carpark in Épône, next to his son Franck Mouche who gives him the assistance required by his state of health.
- Gypsy Debarre and Paul Mouche, another son of Pierre Mouche, also left with him in 2005 and wandered from place to place with their six children, who were thus unable to attend school on a regular basis; they are currently separated. Gypsy Debarre is living on the Buchelay encampment area, near Mantes-la Jolie, with four of her children. In April 2009 she refused social housing that was offered to her, in particular because of her inability to pay the rent.
- Sophie Clairsin and Thierry Lefèvre, who left in January 2006, lived on encampment areas in Avranches and Saint Hilaire. After those areas were closed for work, in August 2008 Sophie Clairsin bought a plot of non-buildable land on which she lives with her three children. According to their lawyer, the municipality of Saints has notified them of their obligation to leave the land and has brought proceedings against Sophie Clairsin in her capacity as owner.
- Patrick Lefèvre and Sylviane Huygue-Bessin and their seven children, together with Catherine Herbrecht and her three children, who also left in January 2006, lived on sites at Avranches and Saint Hilaire until they closed; they then returned to Bois du Trou-Poulet, which the municipality asked them to leave within 48 hours. They are now accommodated on Sophie Clairsin’s land.
- Philippe Lefèvre lives with his partner (who is not an applicant) in Mayenne, with the parents of the latter.
- Mario Guiton and Stella Huet live with their three children near the parents of the latter in Normandy, and they return to Herblay for short stays.
- Jessy Winterstein left Bois du Trou-Poulet with her two children and her current address is unknown.
- Vanessa Ricono and her partner (who is not an applicant) also left with their child and their current address is unknown. 41.  Those of the applicants who have left explained that, as soon as they left Bois du Trou-Poulet, the municipality had had trenches dug on the land to prevent them from returning and had demolished their cabins; they were unable to recover the personal belongings that they had left behind, as they had been destroyed or stolen.
(b)  Applications under the “DALO Act” (Law on the enforceable right to housing) 42.  A number of applicants (Michelle Périoche, Germain Guiton, Mario Guiton and Stella Huet, Laetitia Winterstein, Catherine Herbrecht, Sylviane Huygue-Bessin and Patrick Lefèvre, Gypsy Debarre and Paul Mouche, Graziella Avisse and Steeve Lefèvre, Rosita Ricono) filed applications in 2008 and 2009 (2010 for Rosita Ricono) for social housing pursuant to the Law of 2007 on the enforceable right to housing (the “DALO Act”, ...), stipulating that they wanted family plots. Their applications were denied by the mediation board (except for that of Gypsy Debarre), on the ground that they were “not eligible for relief under the DALO Act”. The Administrative Court dismissed their appeals against those decisions.
(c)  Resolution of the HALDE dated 22 February 2010 43.  On 14 February 2006 the National Association of Catholic Travellers (Association nationale des Gens du Voyage catholiques, ANGVC) complained to the High Authority for the combat against Discriminations and the promotion of Equality (Haute Autorité de Lutte contre les Discriminations et pour l’Ėgalité, the “HALDE”) concerning the ban on travellers’ camps throughout the municipality of Herblay, pursuant to a municipal by-law of 17 January 2005 (see paragraph 15 above). 44.  In a resolution of 22 February 2010, after, in particular, looking at the Court’s case-law (judgments in Chapman v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 27238/95, ECHR 2001‑I, and Connors, cited above), the HALDE took the view that the combined effect of the département-level travellers’ reception programme and the municipal by-law, two texts of secondary legislation, had the effect of totally overriding the application of a statute (the Besson Act of 5 July 2000) whose aim was to protect travellers, and thus interfered with their rights.
The HALDE thus concluded that the exemption granted to the municipality of Herblay by the département-level programme was not compliant with the above-mentioned Law of 5 July 2000 and recommended that the prefect should review its provisions. It further recommended that the mayor of Herblay should rescind the by-law and suspend any eviction measures taken on the sole basis of that instrument, and requested to be informed within three-months of the action taken in accordance with its resolution.
(d)  Resolution of the municipal council of Herblay dated 13 September 2012 45.  In an interview given to the newspaper Le Parisien on 13 December 2010, the mayor of Herblay stated that the travellers’ encampment area prescribed by the département-level programme would be created on the land that had been set aside for family plots, as the municipality could not undertake both actions. 46.  The new département-level travellers’ reception programme for the Val d’Oise, approved on 28 March 2011, provides for the creation in Herblay of an encampment area for 25 nomadic caravans. 47.  In a resolution of 13 September 2012 the municipal council of Herblay unanimously adopted a simplified revision of the local planning plan (plan local d’urbanisme, PLU) for the purpose of creating the encampment area. ...
...


4.  The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Munich. 5.  On 8 November 1993 the applicant brought an action against her brother before the Buda Central District Court claiming her statutory share of the inheritance of her deceased mother’s estate. 6.  On 6 May 1994 the District Court held a hearing. On 20 September 1994 a further hearing took place, which lasted 30 minutes. The defendant failed to appear on both occasions. On the latter date, the defendant’s counsel requested that the applicant’s claim be rejected as it had been submitted outside the statutory time-limit. 7.  On 18 November 1994 the District Court held a hearing, which lasted 30 minutes. It ordered the applicant to submit, within 30 days, any evidence that might prove that the period of the statutory limitation had been interrupted. The applicant complied with the order on 10 January 1995. 8.  Meanwhile, on 21 September 1994 the applicant instituted inheritance proceedings before a public notary. A notarial notice was issued on 18 January 1995, in accordance with the Hungarian law on inheritance, requiring the estate to be divided up equally between the applicant and her brother. 9.  On 25 January 1995 the applicant informed the District Court that her representative had withdrawn from the case.
Hearings scheduled for 31 January and 4 April 1995 were adjourned by the District Court, as the applicant, having been hospitalised, was unable to attend. Meanwhile, on 24 March 1995 the applicant notified the court of the name of her new representative. 10.  At the hearing of 20 June 1995 the applicant raised the amount of her claim and requested legal aid. The court ordered the applicant to submit within 30 days all necessary documents proving that she needed legal aid. The applicant complied with the order on 10 August 1995. At the same time, she extended her claim to include her deceased aunt’s estate. 11.  On 18 August 1995 the District Court rejected the applicant’s request for legal aid and ordered her to pay court fees corresponding to the amount of the increased claim. On 2 November 1995 the Budapest Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against this decision. 12.  The applicant’s renewed request for exemption from court fees was granted by the District Court on 16 January 1996. The court also took measures to obtain the case-file concerning the estate of the applicant’s deceased aunt. 13.  On 28 February 1996 the District Court held a hearing, which lasted for 35 minutes. On 13 March 1996 the applicant elaborated her claims.
At the hearing held on 25 June 1996 the court ordered the defendant, who had repeatedly failed to appear before the court, to submit observations on the merits of the applicant’s claims before 5 September 1996. On 6 September 1996 the District Court imposed a fine on the defendant, who, despite a warning, failed to comply with the court’s order. This decision was later quashed as the defendant’s submissions were proved to have been posted on 5 September 1996. 14.  On 19 November 1996 the District Court heard the defendant’s witnesses and ordered the parties to submit their observations within 30 days. At the hearing the applicant asked that witnesses be heard in support of her evidence and extended the scope of her action by requesting that a real estate contract of sale be nullified. The applicant’s observations were submitted on 22 January 1997. 15.  On 12 March 1997 the District Court heard the defendant and a witness. On 7 April 1997 the applicant informed the court that she had given a power of attorney to a new lawyer.
At the hearing on 24 September 1997 the District Court heard the applicant’s daughter as a witness and ordered the applicant to submit her observations within 15 days. The applicant requested that the time-limit be extended by 30 days as she had been in hospital. Her observations were submitted to the court on 25 February and 12 March 1998. 16.  On 17 June 1998 the District Court held a hearing and requested the applicant to specify her claims in the event of the above-mentioned contract of sale being nullified. 17.  In her submissions to the court of 19 November 1998, the applicant amended her action. She extended the scope of her action by claiming, from the defendant’s wife, her share of the inheritance of her deceased father. 18.  On 20 January 1999 the court suspended the case and requested the parties to institute proceedings before a notary. On 2 March 1999 the Budapest Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s procedural appeal. 19.  On 25 June 1999 the applicant’s representative requested the public notary to undertake inheritance proceedings. 20.  On 28 July 1999 the notary requested the applicant’s representative to submit an authorisation certified by the consulate or a public notary practising in the applicant’s country of residence. 21.  At a hearing on 6 December 1999, the notary set a 30-day time-limit for the parties to submit their claims in respect of any movable property that may have been part of the estate. 22.  On 20 January 2000 the notary discontinued the proceedings as the estate contained no movable property. His decision of 18 January 1995 was therefore declared final. 23.  Subsequently, on 31 March 2000 the applicant requested the court to continue the case, to record in the Land Registry that proceedings concerning the inheritance of her mother’s real estate were pending and to give priority to the next hearing. On 20 April 2000 the District Court ordered that the proceedings be noted in the Land Registry. Following the defendants’ unsuccessful appeal, the Land Registry registered the proceedings on 14 August 2000. 24.  On 27 September 2000 the District Court heard witnesses. It also ordered the defendant to submit his counter-claim within 15 days. 25.  On 17 January 2001 the District Court stated that it lacked jurisdiction as the increased value of the applicant’s amended claim required that the case be heard by the Budapest Regional Court at first instance. The case was therefore discontinued before the District Court and transferred to the Regional Court. 26.  On 24 April 2001 the Budapest Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the order to transfer the case. 27.  On 15 November 2001 and 28 February 2002 the Budapest Regional Court held hearings and ordered the applicant to submit the addresses of certain witnesses living in Germany.
On 24 May 2002 the Regional Court heard witnesses. 28.  At the next hearing held on 17 October 2002, the Regional Court heard several witnesses. On 20 May and 7 October 2003 the court heard the parties. 29.  On 5 November 2003 the court appointed an expert to inspect the real estate in question. The applicant appealed. 30.  The case is still pending at first instance.


5.  The applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Istanbul. She is the widow of Mr Cengiz Aksakal (“C.A.”), who died on 12 November 1980. 6.  On 12 September 1980 martial law was declared in Turkey following military intervention by the army. 7.  On 18 October 1980 C.A., who was a teacher in the village of Veliköy, in the province of Artvin, surrendered to the police during a military operation and was taken into custody. He was suspected of belonging to the illegal organisation Dev-Yol (Revolutionary Way). He spent the first three days in custody at the headquarters of the gendarmerie in Veliköy and the following five at the headquarters of the gendarmerie of the district of Şavşat. C.A., who was in good health at the time of his detention in both locations, was not questioned. 8.  On 26 October 1980 he was transferred to Artvin, where he was interrogated in a sports hall until the following 2 November. On that date, he was imprisoned in the martial law detention facility (sıkıyönetim gözetim evi). 9.  After having been taken ill on 3 November 1980, C.A. was admitted to hospital in a pre-comatose state. On 5 November 1980, he was transferred by ambulance to Trabzon Hospital where he died on 12 November. 10.  According to the autopsy report drawn up on 13 November 1980, the following marks were found on the body of the deceased:
“Abrasions measuring 3 x 3 cm, going from the outside towards the inside of the eighth and ninth ribs, the scabs of which were coming off; on the right wrist and on the inside of the wrist, a purple mark in the form of two parallel bracelets 1.5 cm wide and on the mark, two wounds, the scabs of which were coming off; on the left wrist, the same mark, 1.5 cm wide; on the left side of the penis, a wound without a scab; on the left foot, a wound with a scab measuring 2 x 1 cm, with, underneath, a bruise measuring 3 x 3 cm; four wounds with scabs under the left knee, a wound with a scab measuring 5 x 1 cm inside the left tibia ...; bruising on the top and lateral surface of the right foot.” 11.  Since the cause of death could not be established on the basis of this information, a conventional autopsy was performed. An examination of the skull and ribcage revealed “ecchymosis measuring 3 x 4 cm at the back, a large haematoma inside the cervical cavity; an infection of the lungs ...” A post-mortem examination was deemed necessary. 12.  In her complaint lodged with the public prosecutor on 28 January 1981, the applicant stated:
“Two soldiers, accompanied by the village schoolmaster came to our house on the day before the religious holiday. They took my husband away saying that the lieutenant wanted to talk to him. He was held at the village gendarmerie for approximately four days. During that time, I was able to visit him and he was well. He was then transferred to the gendarmerie in the district of Şavşat; I was no longer able to visit him. I was told that he remained there for six days and was then taken to Artvin .... When they returned his body to me, I noticed abrasions and signs of injuries. His tongue was as big as that of an animal, three of his teeth were broken, ... there were marks of torture all over his body. Before being arrested, he had been in good health.” 13.  According to the administrative investigation report (idari tahkikat raporu) of 15 February 1981 signed by three officers, during the course of a military operation on 18 October 1980 C.A. had been arrested after having obeyed an order to surrender. On the same date he had been placed in custody at the Veliköy gendarmerie, where he remained for three days. He spent the following five days at the gendarmerie of the district of Şavşat. During this period no sign of any health problem was recorded. On 26 October 1980 C.A. was transferred to the police headquarters at Artvin where he was questioned. After having been held at the police headquarters for seven days, he was transferred, on 2 November 1980, to the surveillance facility (Gözetim evi) attached to the martial law command. According to the records of that establishment, no sign of illness had been noted upon his arrival. On the following day, at his request, he was transferred to Artvin Hospital. The head physician at that hospital stated that he had asked C.A. if he had been hit on the head or on the body; C.A. allegedly replied that he had not. According to the report drawn up by the hospital, meningitis and pneumonia were diagnosed. Two days later, the patient was transferred to Trabzon Hospital where he died on 12 November. The report concluded that this was a “natural death” (ecel). 14.  On 15 June 1981 three police officers, S.A., İ.Ü. and H.Ö., were questioned as suspects by the martial law prosecutor. They were the police officers who had taken C.A.’s statement on 21 October 1980 in a room at the sports hall. The police officers stated that they had not subjected C.A. to any mistreatment and had not found any evidence against him during questioning. H.Ö. stated that on 26 October 1980, when the report was being drawn up in the presence of C.A., the latter was groaning. When the police officer asked what the matter was, the applicant replied that he had caught a chill and that he had pains in his chest. The three police officers stated that they had brought C.A. to the gendarmerie on 26 October 1980, that on the same day he was to have been placed in the military prison at Artvin, but was detained in custody by the gendarmerie until the following 1 November, notwithstanding the orders of the martial law commander. 15.  On 11 November 1981, at the request of the Şavşat public prosecutor’s office, the body of C.A. was exhumed in order to examine the deceased’s skull. According to the report dated 21 September 1982 drawn up by the forensic institute, the skull showed no sign of trauma, apart from separation at the right temporo-occipital suture. 16.  According to the report of 3 December 1982 issued by the Istanbul forensic institute upon completion of the post-mortem examination of samples of tissue taken from C.A.’s body, the latter had died of pneumonia with spinal haemorrhaging (subaraknoidal kanama) having lasted seven days, and showed no signs of traumatic injury. 17.  In an indictment dated 19 April 1983 drawn up by the military prosecutor at the martial law command, the three police officers (see paragraph 14 above) on duty at the material time at Artvin police station were accused of having caused the death of C.A. after torturing him. The prosecutor stated that the accused had interrogated C.A. in a sports hall instead of in the customary location and that they had concealed their names at the foot of his statement, in breach of the relevant regulations. He also referred to the statements of several witnesses who had seen C.A. on the premises of Artvin police station, once attached to the wall, his arms outstretched, and another time in a deplorable condition, paralysed and unable to speak. 18.  The applicant joined the criminal proceedings brought before Erzurum Military Court No. 2 attached to the martial law command (“the military court”). 19.  On 31 August 1983, a gendarme, F.I., examined as a witness before the Military Court, stated that he had “maybe seen” C.A.’s interrogation but had not participated in it. He stated that he had not noticed any ill treatment during the interrogation, which had been conducted on the top floor of gendarmerie premises or in the sports hall. He stressed that as commander of the gendarmerie centre (jandarma merkez komutanı), his role was limited to appointing the interrogation team guards. 20.  The report of 17 February 1984, unanimously adopted by the plenary meeting of the forensic institute, reads:
“On 3 November 1980, while in police custody, C.A. was taken to Artvin Hospital in a comatose state. First aid was administered on the basis of the diagnosis of meningitis and pneumonia. On the following 5 November, he was transferred to Trabzon Hospital in a comatose state, with hemiplegia on the left-hand side. He died on 12 November 1980. The ecchymoses noted at the autopsy revealed that violence and assault had been involved and that the party concerned had died of an intracranial haemorrhage. As regards the clinical presentation, a pre-existing underlying condition was noted which prepared the ground for the haemorrhage which was triggered by the trauma. Since a causal link has been established between the cranial trauma and the death, Articles 451 or 452 § 2 of the [Turkish] Criminal Code are applicable in the instant case.” 21.  The accused denied the charges against them throughout the proceedings. They declared that they had never had any contact with C.A. save at the start of the interrogation. Certain witnesses who had initially testified against the accused subsequently retracted their statements. 22.  In a judgment of 15 May 1984, the accused were each sentenced to three years and four months’ imprisonment under Articles 243 and 452 § 2 of the Criminal Code. 23.  The accused, the applicant and the martial law commander appealed on points of law. 24.  In a judgment delivered on 28 December 1984, the Military Court of Cassation quashed the first-instance judgment on the ground that the degree of responsibility of the other persons, notably officers and members of the National Intelligence Organisation (Millî İstihbarat Teşkilatı, hereafter “the MİT”) having taken part in the interrogation of C.A., had not been established and that the defence witnesses had not been heard. 25.  After having conducted a more thorough investigation and having examined further witnesses, in a new judgment of 4 March 1986 the first-instance court acquitted the three police officers on grounds of insufficient evidence. 26.  The applicant again appealed on points of law. 27.  By a judgment of 15 October 1986, the Military Court of Cassation again overturned the judgment at first instance. In its judgment it stated that the records of the Veliköy command contained no entry concerning C.A. and that there was therefore no accurate information on the dates of his arrival or transfer or the identity of the officers in charge of his case. It added that, furthermore, the case file contained no details of the place and conditions of the initial interrogation conducted on 21 October 1980, or the actual conditions of the interrogation of 26 October. It pointed out that even though the accused had stated that the deceased was not “a significant suspect” the fact that agents of the MIT had participated in his interrogation suggested the opposite. In the opinion of the court, the treatment subsequently inflicted on the party concerned confirmed this argument. The Court of Cassation concluded that given that C.A. had been interrogated and tortured during his detention on the gendarmerie premises and up until 2 November by the accused and other persons whose functions had not been ascertained, the omissions in the investigation had to be remedied and, in particular, the gendarmes, the members of the MIT and any other persons present at the material time and place should be questioned. 28.  On 28 January 1987 Turkey’s recognition of the right of individual petition became effective. 29.  The case file was returned to the Military Court, which, after having re-examined it in the light of numerous new witness statements, confirmed its decision of 16 August 1988 acquitting the accused. It concluded that the act of torture had been committed between 26 October and 2 November 1980 by persons other than the accused. It gave notice (ihbar) that a new investigation was to be opened by the Artvin public prosecutor’s office. That decision became final on 21 December 1988. 30.  The investigation and correspondence between the military courts and the Artvin public prosecutor’s office continued. However, a gendarme, M.C., examined as a witness on 3 April 1990 before the Akyazı Criminal Court, following a request for judicial assistance, stated that he had taken leave on 12 October 1980 for a period of one year. 31.  By an indictment of 21 June 1990, the prosecutor at the Artvin Assize Court (“the Assize Court”) charged two new accused, F.I. and M.C., gendarmes at the Artvin gendarmerie, who had been examined as witnesses before the military courts (see paragraphs 19 and 30 above) with the acts of torture having caused the death of C.A. 32.  The applicant sought to intervene in the proceedings before the Assize Court. 33.  Monthly hearings were conducted before this court. Ten or so witnesses were questioned, some following a request for judicial assistance. Some hearings were postponed as a result of problems in ensuring the appearance of witnesses who for the most part had been co-detainees of the deceased and present on the premises on which he had been subjected to the torture. All the witnesses stated that they had seen C.A. being tortured and some stated that they had seen the accused at the scene of the crime. 34.  At the hearing of 8 October 1990 the applicant stated, inter alia, that her husband had been unrecognisable when she saw him at Trabzon Hospital. She filed a complaint against the first doctor who had examined him in Artvin and who had drawn up a certificate, which, according to her, was untruthful, concealing C.A.’s condition. 35.  By a decision of 30 January 1991 the Assize Court sentenced both of the accused to four years and two months’ imprisonment under Articles 243 § 2 and 452 § 2 of the Criminal Code. They were also banned from public office for the same period. 36.  On an appeal by the accused, the Court of Cassation overturned that decision in a judgment of 10 July 1991 on grounds of shortcomings in the investigation. An inconsistency between the leave dates of the accused needed to be resolved and verification was required that the dates on which the witnesses and C.A. had been detained actually did coincide. 37.  After having remedied the shortcomings highlighted by the Court of Cassation, the Assize Court decided, on 16 September 1992, to acquit both of the accused on grounds of insufficient evidence. 38.  The applicant appealed on points of law against that decision. 39.  By a judgment of 6 July 1993, the Court of Cassation overturned the decision on the ground that under Article 253 of the [Turkish] Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused, who were officers at the material time, could not be tried without authorisation from the Ministry of Justice. 40.  By a decision of 19 January 1994, the Assize Court suspended the proceedings for the same reason. 41.  The authorisation in question having been granted by the Ministry of Justice on 24 November 1994, a new indictment was issued on the following 7 December in respect of the same two accused, this time by the Public Prosecutor at the Ardahan Assize Court. 42.  During these proceedings, around twenty hearings were held. As they had done previously, the accused denied any responsibility in the death of C.A., stating that they had never taken part in his interrogation. F.I stated that on the day in question he had been involved in operations in the Şavşat and Ardanuç mountains, and M.C. stated that he had been on leave. The same witnesses (see paragraph 33 above) were examined again, some following a request for judicial assistance, and repeated the statements made at the start of the proceedings. 43.  On 30 December 1997 the Ardahan Assize Court delivered its judgment, referring in particular to the testimony of the co-detainees who had been present at Artvin police station at the same time as C.A. Four of these witnesses stated that they had seen C.A. naked, attached to the radiator, wet and trembling, with injuries to his hands and wrists. Two of them stated that officer F.I. had threatened them, pointing at C.A. and saying “Look at what has happened to him; if you don’t sign, the same thing will happen to you.”  A detainee who had been in the neighbouring cell stated that he had heard C.A. moaning constantly, that in the evenings they would take him away for questioning naked, and that officers M.C. and F.I. and three men in civilian clothing would beat him in the middle of the room as a lesson to the others. Another witness stated that he had seen F.I. and others beat C.A. with truncheons while he was lying on the ground in a pool of water, all the while continuing to spray him with water. He stated that he had heard the sound of a magneto (a magneto-electric machine) and the delirious voice of C.A. uttering the names of his children, unable to walk, his body covered in wounds. These eyewitnesses stated that they had generally had their eyes covered but that sometimes the blindfold had come off, or they had recognized the officers’ voices. Four other detainee witnesses stated that they had seen that the applicant had been tortured, but did not know who had done it. The court considered that the testimony of the co-detainees was only partially credible given their status as detainees and the fact that they would normally have had their eyes covered. In the reasons for the judgment, the court observed that the leave records relating to M.C. kept by the gendarmerie command had been falsified and declared that his statements were not credible. As for F.I., the court pointed out an inconsistency between his statement of 31 August 1983 (see paragraph 19 above) and his subsequent statements. According to the court, the accused were indirectly responsible for the death of C.A. It added that “a team of three civilians” had also taken part in the interrogations, but gave no details of the identity, function or action of these three individuals. It concluded that it had not been definitively established that the accused had themselves tortured the deceased but that they had acted as accomplices to the illegal act by issuing orders (talimat vermek), by procuring the premises (yer tedarik etmek) and by failing to intervene [to prevent the illegal act] (göz yummak). It found that the accused, together with civilians, had participated in the interrogation of C.A. and that the latter had died as a result of his pre-existing condition (önceki hastalığı) and as a result of the torture inflicted by one or more of these civilians whose identity could not be established. The court sentenced M.C. and F.I. to two years and one month’s imprisonment under Articles 243 and 452 § 2 of the Criminal Code. The court accepted two mitigating circumstances to reduce the sentences: the personality of the accused as evidenced by the case file (dosyadaki kişilikleri) and the fact that they were mere accomplices (fer’î fail) rather than the main perpetrators of the crime. 44.  The accused officers and the applicant appealed on points of law. 45.  By a judgment of 22 December 1998, the Court of Cassation upheld the judgment of the Assize Court. 46.  On 28 January 1999 the Court of Cassation rejected an application for “rectification of the judgment” (karar düzeltme) lodged by the convicted officers. 47.  On 6 April 1999 the officers applied to the Assize Court for renewal of the judgment (yargılamanın yenilenmesi), an exceptional review procedure. The result of this application, accepted by the Assize Court for consideration on the basis of various written testimonies submitted by civilians and military personnel and a letter from the General Gendarmerie command, was that execution of the sentences was suspended. 48.  At the request of the accused, the Assize Court gave a decision on 12 January 2001 referring a matter concerning the discriminatory nature of a provision governing the content of an amnesty law to the Constitutional Court. 49.  By a decision of 18 July 2001, the Constitutional Court declared that the provision in question was by no means unconstitutional. 50.  By a judgment of 23 October 2002, after having heard new defence witnesses, notably six officers, the Ardahan Assize Court dismissed the application lodged by the two officers on the ground that the new evidence was not such as to create a favourable situation for the convicted officers. It lifted the stay of execution of their sentences. 51.  The officers finally referred their case to the Minister of Justice for the latter to lodge an appeal with the Court of Cassation (Yazılı emir ile bozma) against their conviction. Having accepted their application, on 8 January 2003 the Minister of Justice ordered the Principal Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation to lodge an appeal in the interests of the law on the ground that the evidence had not been properly assessed by the Assize Court. 52.  By a judgment of 30 January 2003, the Court of Cassation dismissed the officers’ application. 53.  The officers continued to serve in the army throughout the proceedings until their retirement. Their sentences have not been executed to date.


9.  On 11 March 1997 the applicant acquired a car – a Renault 21 Nevada - at an auction organised by the Białystok Tax Office. Having subsequently had certain technical defects of the car repaired, the applicant applied to the Białystok Municipal Office for registration. On an unspecified date the Director of the Office refused to do so on the ground that the car was unfit for use and could therefore be used only as scrap-metal. After numerous entreaties of the applicant, the Director orally agreed to register the car on condition that the applicant replaced the engine and a part of the chassis. On 17 March 1997 the applicant requested the Białystok Tax Office to reimburse the costs involved in the acquisition of the new engine and chassis. On 15 April 1997 the Białystok Tax Office declined the applicant’s request on unspecified grounds. Subsequently, the applicant ordered a new engine and chassis and made an advance payment in the amount of PLN 3000. 10.  On 20 March 1997 the applicant was served with a decision of the Director of the Białystok Municipal Office refusing his request to register the car. The Director referred to the fact that the identification numbers of the engine and chassis had been forged and that that it was therefore impossible to find out who had owned car before its acquisition by the applicant. Therefore, the car could not be considered as a “recovered stolen car” within the meaning of the Annex No. 7 to the ministerial Order of 12 October 1995 (§ 28 below), which was a prerequisite for obtaining new identification numbers. On 23 April 1997 the Białystok Governor upheld the contested decision on the same grounds. 11.  In a letter of 5 May 1997 the Warsaw-Śródmieście District Prosecutor expressed regret for the administrative authority’s refusal to register the applicant’s car and remarked on the lack of consistency in the interpretation of the relevant provisions by the authorities handling the applicant’s case. He also suggested that the applicant request the prosecuting authorities, in their capacity as guardians of legal order, to join administrative proceedings on his behalf.
On 7 May 1997 the Białystok Municipal Office informed the applicant that pursuant to the relevant regulations a car of unknown origin could not be registered. 12.  On 3 July 1997 the Białystok District Prosecutor refused to institute proceedings against the public servants who had issued the administrative decisions in the applicant’s case, finding that they had no case to answer. 13.  In reply to the applicant’s request, on 27 August 1997 the Ombudsman refused to act on his behalf, considering that the law only allowed new identification numbers to be engraved and the registration to be obtained on conditions which were not met in the applicant’s case. 14.  On 8 September 1997 the Warszawa-Śródmieście District Prosecutor informed the applicant that the car in question, being “the subject of a criminal offence”, had been handed over to the Białystok Tax Office on the basis of a decision concerning exhibits, with a view to selling it at an auction under §§ 1 and 4 of the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 6 March 1971 (§ 27 below). 15.  On 2 October 1997 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the decisions of 20 March 1997 and 23 April 1997. It found that the administrative authorities had failed to provide any reasons for their refusal of registration. In respect of the new chassis and engine identification numbers, the court noted that a conclusion as to whether “the stolen car has been recovered” had to be based on the final decision given either in the investigative or in the judicial proceedings. 16.  By a decision of 13 February 1998 the Białystok Municipal Office stayed the proceedings concerning the permit to engrave new car identification numbers until the question whether the car had been “recovered” within the meaning of the applicable law was settled. 17.  By a letter of 17 March 1998 to the Białystok Municipal Office, the Warsaw-Śródmieście District Prosecutor expressed the opinion that, in view of the fact that the Białystok Tax Office had been the legitimate vendor and the applicant, who had purchased the car in good faith, was its legitimate owner, there was no reason for a further delay in registering the car. In reply, the Białystok Municipal Office informed the prosecutor on 31 March 1998 that there was no possibility of registering a vehicle of unknown origin, that is, one lacking original factory numbers. 18.  In a letter to the applicant dated 7 May 1998 the Białystok Appellate Prosecutor considered that there were no grounds on which disciplinary proceedings could be instituted against the Białystok prosecutors. All the same, he acknowledged that the case was “a complex one.” It could not be denied that the applicant was a legitimate owner of the car which he had purchased from a legitimate vendor. In the prosecutor’s view, the difficulty in registering the car stemmed from deficiencies in the legal provisions in specifying the necessary conditions that had to be fulfilled for a car to be registered. These conditions were defined by the Regulation of the Minister of Transport and Maritime Economy of 1 February 1993 (§ 27 below). He further observed that, according to the Supreme Administrative Court’s opinion expressed in the judgment of 2 October 1997, a final decision given either in the investigative or in the judicial proceedings, stating that the car had been stolen, should provide a sufficient basis for its registration (§ 15 above). 19.  On 29 May 1998 the Białystok District Prosecutor informed the applicant that there were no grounds for instituting criminal proceedings against the public servants at the Białystok Municipal Office, because it had not been shown that when acting in the applicant’s case they had abused their powers. As for the charge of lack of diligence, this could not be proceeded with, given that the applicant had not suffered pecuniary damage which was sufficiently serious, that is in an amount exceeding 50 average salaries.
On the same date the Białystok District Court rejected the applicant’s civil claim against the State Treasury for a declaratory judgment. The court considered that the applicant’s ownership was not in dispute. Nonetheless, the claim to establish that the car met the legal requirements for its registration could not be examined by a civil court. This would constitute an unacceptable way of controlling the lawfulness of an administrative decision, and it was only the Supreme Administrative Court which had jurisdiction to do so. 20.  On 15 June 1998 the Białystok Regional Prosecutor requested the Minister of Transport and Maritime Economy to consider the possibility of granting the applicant, by way of exception, a permit for engraving new car identification numbers. It was argued that in all likelihood the car had been stolen by someone in obscure circumstances to the detriment of an unknown person and subsequently handed over to the tax office to be sold. The fact that the applicant could not be granted the permit to have new car identification numbers engraved had adversely affected his property rights in a manner which, given the circumstances of the case, could not be accepted. This request was later refused by a decision of 24 November 1998. 21.  By a decision of 6 August 1998 the Białystok Regional Court quashed the decision of 29 May 1998 given by the Białystok District Court (§ 19 above), considering that since the applicant had not specified his claim, the question whether the civil courts had jurisdiction to entertain his case remained open.
By a decision of 14 October 1998 the Białystok District Court rejected the applicant’s civil claim on the same grounds as those relied on in its first decision of 29 May 1998. 22.  On 17 December 1998 the Białystok District Court dismissed the applicant’s new claim against the State Treasury for a declaratory judgment, considering that a claimant in declaratory civil proceedings could request the court to determine the existence of a right or of a legal relationship, but that it was not open to the claimant to seek findings of fact in such proceedings. 23.  On 23 January 1999 the Warsaw District Prosecutor discontinued the proceedings, instituted at the applicant’s request, concerning the theft of the car and the forging of its identification numbers, on the ground that the perpetrator of the offence was unknown.
By a decision of 8 March 1999 the Białystok Municipal Office refused the Białystok Regional Prosecutor’s request to resume the stayed proceedings concerning the permit for engraving new car identification numbers (§ 16 above), considering that the original factory car numbers had not been conclusively established. On 18 March 1999 the Białystok Regional Prosecutor lodged an appeal against this decision with the Regional Self-government Board of Appeal, submitting that since a preliminary question concerning the theft of the car had already been determined, the administrative authority was obliged to register the car. By a decision of 22 March 1999 the Board allowed the appeal and quashed this decision. 24.  On 15 April 1999 the Białystok Municipal Office again refused to grant the applicant a permit for engraving new identification numbers, concluding that the car could not be considered “recovered by the owner or by an insurance company” since its factory numbers and the original owner had not been established in the course of the investigation. The applicant and the Białystok Regional Prosecutor appealed. The Prosecutor, in his appeal of 5 May 1999, referring to the failure to establish the original owner of the car and its factory numbers, expressed the opinion that the Annex No. 7 to the Order of the Minister of Transport and Maritime Economy of 12 October 1995 did not lay down such a requirement for registration and that therefore the first-instance organ had failed to interpret it correctly. 25.  On 3 July 1999 the Białystok Self-government Board of Appeal quashed the impugned decision and referred the case back to the first-instance organ for re-examination, observing that the request should be examined in the light of a new legal situation which had in the meantime changed as a new Regulation had been enacted (see § 29 below). 26.  By a decision of 19 July 1999 the Białystok Municipal Office consented to the engraving of new car identification numbers and, as a consequence, registered the applicant’s car.


4.  The applicant was born in 1948 and lives in Zlatar. 5.  In July 1991 the applicant had a road traffic accident. Since the insurance company C.O. (“the company”) refused to compensate the resultant damage, on 8 July 1992 she instituted civil proceedings against it in the Zlatar Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zlataru). 6.  On 15 March 1993 the Municipal Court ruled in the applicant's favour ordering the company to pay her the amount of 222,501 Croatian dinars (HRD) together with the statutory default interest accruable from 19 August 1991. The applicant collected the judgment debt on 16 July 1993. 7.  However, in the meantime, on 2 July 1993 the Municipal Court issued a decision rectifying a clerical error in its judgment of 15 March 1993. Instead of ordering the company to pay the statutory default interest accruable from 19 August 1991 on the entire amount of damages awarded, (HRD 222,501), in the rectified judgment the court ordered the company to do so only on the part of that amount, namely HRD 22,501, which was the amount awarded in respect of pecuniary damage. The company was ordered to pay the accrued interest on the remaining amount of HRD 200,000 only with effect from 15 March 1993. 8.  The decision on rectification was served on the applicant's representative on 26 July 1993. 9.  On 10 September 1993 judge M.M., who was at the time the President of the Zlatar Municipal Court, filed a criminal complaint against the applicant with the Zlatar Municipal State Attorney's Office considering that she had committed a criminal offence. M.M. stated in his complaint that at the beginning of July 1993 a certain Z.F.C., a lawyer employed with the insurance company C.O., had come to his office explaining the clerical error in the Municipal Court's judgment of 15 March 1993 and asking him to influence the applicant – who was working at the time as an advocate – with a view to returning the unlawfully obtained amount. After explaining the error and mentioning that it had been rectified by the Municipal Court's decision of 2 July 1993, judge M.M. stated:
“... despite the rectification of the judgment, the advocate Marija Parlov-Tkalčić, to date does not want to return the unlawfully appropriated money to [the company] C.O., Zabok, for which reason the civil proceedings no. P-330/93 were instituted [against her].
Since we consider that the act of the advocate Marija Parlov-Tkalčić also contains elements of criminal liability, we are reporting it to you with a view to investigating it and, possibly, instituting criminal proceedings against her ...” 10.  On 15 September 1993 the Zlatar Municipal State Attorney requested transfer of jurisdiction because he was a friend of the applicant. On 22 September 1993 the case was transferred to the Krapina Municipal State Attorney who, on 24 January 1994 indicted the applicant before the Zlatar Municipal Court charging her with a criminal offence of misappropriation (utaja). 11.  However, on 3 February 1994 the judge assigned to hear the case requested that the case be transferred to another court as its president had actually filed a criminal complaint against the applicant. On 8 March 1994 the Supreme Court (decision no. Kr-103/1994-3) granted the request and decided to transfer the case to the Krapina Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Krapini). The decision in its relevant part read as follows:
The ... judge [assigned to hear the case] of the Zlatar Municipal Court made a request that the criminal proceedings ... against Marija Parlov-Tkalčić ... be conducted before the Krapina Municipal Court.
The request is substantiated by the fact that the accused Marija Parlov-Tkalčić is an advocate with her office in Zlatar and that the criminal complaint against her was filed by the president of the Zlatar Municipal Court, which may objectively cast doubt on the impartial administration of justice if the proceedings are to be conducted before the Zlatar Municipal Court.
The request is well-founded.
The circumstances highlighted in the request of the ... judge [assigned to hear the case] constitute in the present instance important reasons within the meaning of section 31(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act for transferring territorial jurisdiction from the Zlatar Municipal Court to the Krapina Municipal Court ... 12.  On 28 November 1997 the Krapina Municipal Court dismissed the charges against the applicant given that the prosecution for the offence she had been charged with had in the meantime become time-barred (apsolutna zastara). 13.  Meanwhile, on 26 August 1993 the insurance company C.O. brought a civil action for unjust enrichment against the applicant in the Zlatar Municipal Court seeking to recover the overpaid interest. The statement of claim was served on the applicant on 7 September 1993. 14.  On 25 April 1997 the applicant made a counter-claim. 15.  The court held hearings on 29 April and 2 December 1999 and 29 March and 5 July 2000. 16.  At the last-mentioned hearing the Zlatar Municipal Court gave judgment against the applicant, ordering her to pay the plaintiff 12,525 Croatian kunas (HRK) together with the statutory default interest accruable from 26 July 1993, as well as HRK 4,381.25 in costs. It also declared her counter-claim inadmissible in one part while dismissing it in the remaining part. 17.  On 11 January 2001 the applicant appealed to the Zlatar County Court (Županijski sud u Zlataru) asking at the same time for transfer of jurisdiction (svrsishodna delegacija nadležnosti) from both the Zlatar Municipal Court and the Zlatar County Court. She argued, inter alia, that the Zlatar County Court could not be expected to be impartial in the examination of her appeal given that judge M.M. – who had in the meantime become the president of that court – had previously filed a criminal complaint against her. 18.  The Government submitted that judge M.M. had been appointed the president of the Zlatar County Court on 14 June 1996 but that this court had become operational only on 15 March 1999. 19.  On 31 May 2001 the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) dismissed the applicant's request for transfer of jurisdiction. It held that the circumstances relied on by the applicant did not cast doubt on the professional and objective examination of her appeal by the Zlatar County Court. Thus, there was no important reason justifying the requested transfer. 20.  On 16 March 2005 the Zlatar County Court dismissed the applicant's appeal and upheld the first-instance judgment. The decision was served on the applicant on 20 April 2005. 21.  On 20 May 2005 the applicant lodged a regular constitutional complaint under section 62 of the Constitutional Court Act against the second-instance judgment. Relying on Article 29 of the Constitution, she claimed, inter alia, that her constitutional right to an impartial court had been violated because the impugned judgment had been delivered by the court whose president had previously filed a criminal complaint against her relying on the same facts as those relied on by the first- and second-instance courts when giving their decisions. On 3 November 2005 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) dismissed her constitutional complaint. The decision was served on the applicant on 21 December 2005. 22.  Meanwhile, on 27 January 2005 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint under section 63 of the Constitutional Court Act complaining about the length of the above civil proceedings for unjust enrichment. The Constitutional Court examined the length of the proceedings in the period during which they were pending before the ordinary courts thus excluding the period of some seven months while the case was pending before the Constitutional Court itself (see paragraph 21 above). On 15 February 2006 it found a violation of the applicant's constitutional right to a hearing within a reasonable time and awarded her HRK 5,000 in compensation. 23.  According to information provided by the Government in reply to a request made by the Court, the Zlatar County Court has a civil and a criminal division. The civil division has six judges sitting in two different panels. The president of the court sits on one of the panels. The criminal division has three judges, and judges of the civil division sit with them when necessary. The cases are assigned to judges according to Rule 33 of the Court Rules (see paragraph 40 below). Thus, before being allocated to judges, cases are listed in chronological order according to the time when they were received at the court. After that, cases are allocated to judges in the alphabetical order of the panel presidents' last names. However, account is being taken of whether some of the judges participated in the first-instance proceedings in a particular case. If they did, the case is not assigned to them.