5.  Mr Benieamin Manole, the first applicant, was born in 1956 and lives in Priponesti, Galaţi county. 6.  By decision of 15 January 2006 the first applicant, a farmer, and forty-eight other persons meeting in constituent assembly decided to form a trade union entitled “Agricultural trade union Romanian Farmers Direct”. The first applicant was elected President of the new trade union. 7.  On 23 January 2006 the first applicant applied to the Tecuci District Court seeking the registration of the trade union which he represented, with a view to conferring legal personality on it. He enclosed with his request the statutes of the trade union and the relevant authority form presented to him by the Constituent Assembly, as notarised on 27 January 2006. 8.  According to those statutes, the applicant trade union’s main purpose was to defend the interests of its members, that is to say farmers and persons providing services for farmers, including transport facilities. The first applicant described that purpose as follows:
“The Romanian Farmers Direct trade union emerged from the desire to help Romanian farmers move on from subsistence farming to agriculture as practised in the European Union, where the production of rural farms is directed towards the market rather than self-sufficiency, as is currently the case in our country, [in order to] provide farmers with a decent standard of living.
Our trade union has set itself the aim of organising local centres (three or four adjacent municipalities) in all the counties of Romania with a view to providing legal information, accountancy advice and judicial assistance to individual farmers ....
We believe that it would be advantageous if as many farmers as possible could come together to think and act in unison in order to ensure the success of our agricultural activities ....” 9.  By judgment of 27 January 2006 the district court, sitting in single-judge formation (Judge N.M.), declared the request for registration of the trade union inadmissible on the grounds that only employees (persoanele încadrate în muncă) and civil servants could set up trade unions. 10.  On appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant trade union, represented by the first applicant, that judgment was quashed by decision of Galaţi County Court on 21 March 2006. That court held that the action had been wrongly declared inadmissible and that the district court should have examined the merits of the case. 11.  By judgment of 12 April 2006 the Tecuci District Court, sitting in the same single-judge formation, rejected the request as ill-founded on the grounds that under Law No. 54/2003 on trade unions (Legea sindicatelor), farmers could not set up trade unions but could only join pre-existing unions. 12.  The applicant trade union lodged an appeal on points of law, submitting, first of all, that the court which had tried the case after invalidation had been the same which had delivered the invalidated judgment of 27 January 2006, and secondly, that Article 40 of the Constitution guaranteeing trade union rights had been infringed. 13.  By decision of 30 May 2006 the county court accepted the applicant trade union’s appeal on points of law insofar as it concerned the make-up of the first-instance trial court, and, assessing the merits of the case, rejected the trade union’s application for the registration of the trade union. In doing so the court observed that only employees holding a contract of employment and civil servants could set up trade unions, to the exclusion of farmers and other self-employed persons, who could only join pre-existing trade unions. 14.  By a handwritten authority form dated 12 November 2006, the first applicant, acting in his own name and on behalf of the applicant trade union – in his capacity as the latter’s representative – appointed Mrs G. Perin counsel to represent them before the Court. That authority was signed by both the first applicant and Mrs G. Perin.
The authority may be translated as follows:
“I, the undersigned Manole Benieamin, born on 18 March 1956 in the municipality of ..., in my capacity as President of the farmers’ trade union ‘Romanian Farmers Direct’ and as legal representative of that trade union, appoint as counsel to defend our case before the European Court of Human Rights Ms Giulia Perin, a lawyer practising in Padua, Italy.”

II.  RELEVANT DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE
... 22.  The relevant provisions of the (Revised) European Social Charter, the European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights and derived European law are expounded in the judgments in the cases of Sindicatul “Păstorul cel Bun” (no . 2330/09, §§ 58-60) and Demir and Baykara v. Turkey ([GC], no 34503/97, §§ 45-47, ECHR 2008). 2.  International Labour Organisation (ILO) standards
(a)  ILO Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention (No. 87), and supervision of its application 23.  The relevant provisions of ILO Convention No. 87 concerning the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, which was adopted in 1948 and ratified by Romania on 28 May 1957, are set out in the judgments in the cases of Sindicatul “Păstorul cel Bun” (cited above, § 56) and Danilenkov and Others v. Russia (no. 67336/01, § 105, ECHR 2009 (extracts)). 24.  The relevant parts of the observations of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR), adopted in 2012 and published in 2013, concerning the application by Romania of Convention No. 87 concerning the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise read as follows:
“The Committee notes, however, that certain issues previously raised are still pending after the adoption of the Social Dialogue Act .... The Committee also notes a number of additional discrepancies between the provisions of the Social Dialogue Act and the Convention in terms of scope of application (such as self-employed, apprentices, dismissed or retired workers), eligibility conditions for trade union officials, restriction of trade union activities ... etc.
In this respect, the Committee notes that the Government has recently benefitted from ILO technical assistance seeking to ensure the conformity with the Convention of a draft Emergency Ordinance which substantially amends the Social Dialogue Act. The Committee trusts that the Government will take due account of its comments in the context of this legislative review and that the new legislation will be in full conformity with the Convention. The Committee requests the Government to indicate in its next report any developments in this respect.” 25.  The relevant parts of the global report entitled “Freedom of association in practice: Lessons learned. Global Report under the follow-up to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work” read as follows:
“82.  The ILO supervisory bodies have consistently emphasized that all workers, without any distinction, and irrespective of their employment status, including self-employed workers, managerial employees and workers in cooperatives, should enjoy the right to establish and join trade unions of their own choosing, like all other workers. This is all the more important in the case of vulnerable categories of workers for whom the exercise of the right to organize is a way of breaking out of marginalization and poverty. ...
Agriculture and rural employment 158.  Nearly half the world’s workforce is found in rural areas, which remain the largest source of employment in Africa and most of Asia. Nevertheless, in many countries agricultural and rural workers are still denied the right to organize and bargain collectively. This is despite the fact that the need to protect the rights of those working in agriculture was recognized as early as 1921, when the ILO’s member States adopted the Right of Association (Agriculture) Convention (No. 11), according to which agricultural workers should have the same ‘rights of association and combination’ as industrial workers. This Convention has been ratified by 122 member States. 159. At the same time, the practical difficulties of putting into effect the rights to organize and bargain collectively in the sector cannot be minimized. The agricultural sector, and rural employment in general, have distinctive features. In general, agriculture is a sector in which small enterprises with relatively few employees predominate and self-employment is widespread. Much of the wage employment is temporary or seasonal, and farms are spread over wide geographical areas. These factors are a challenge to trade union organization. The number of agricultural trade union members is usually relatively small compared to the total number of workers in the sector. ... 160. In addition to practical difficulties facing agricultural workers who wish to organize, there is also evidence of government interference which restricts the exercise of this basic right. The most common legal obstacle in the sector remains the full or partial exclusion of agricultural workers from legislation guaranteeing the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining. ...”
(b)  ILO Right of Association (Agriculture) Convention (No. 11) 26.  The relevant provisions of ILO Convention No. 11 on the right of association (agriculture), adopted in 1923 and ratified by Romania on 28 May 1930, read as follows:
Article 1
“Each Member of the International Labour Organisation which ratifies this Convention undertakes to secure to all those engaged in agriculture the same rights of association and combination as to industrial workers, and to repeal any statutory or other provisions restricting such rights in the case of those engaged in agriculture.”
(c)  ILO Rural Workers’ Organisations Convention (No. 141) and the relevant recommendations 27.  The relevant provisions of ILO Convention No. 141 on Rural Workers’ Organisations and their role in economic and social development, which was adopted in 1975 and has not been ratified by Romania, read as follows:
Article 2
“1.  For the purposes of this Convention, the term rural workers means any person engaged in agriculture, handicrafts or a related occupation in a rural area, whether as a wage earner or, subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 of this Article, as a self-employed person such as a tenant, sharecropper or small owner-occupier. 2. This Convention applies only to those tenants, sharecroppers or small owner-occupiers who derive their main income from agriculture, who work the land themselves, with the help only of their family or with the help of occasional outside labour and who do not -
(a) permanently employ workers; or
(b) employ a substantial number of seasonal workers; or
(c) have any land cultivated by sharecroppers or tenants.”
Article 3
“1.  All categories of rural workers, whether they are wage earners or self-employed, shall have the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the organisation concerned, to join organisations, of their own choosing without previous authorisation. 2. The principles of freedom of association shall be fully respected; rural workers’ organisations shall be independent and voluntary in character and shall remain free from all interference, coercion or repression. 3. The acquisition of legal personality by organisations of rural workers shall not be made subject to conditions of such a character as to restrict the application of the provisions of the preceding paragraphs of this Article. 4. In exercising the rights provided for in this Article rural workers and their respective organisations, like other persons or organised collectivities, shall respect the law of the land. 5. The law of the land shall not be such as to impair, nor shall it be so applied as to impair, the guarantees provided for in this Article.” 28.  ILO Convention No. 141 has been ratified by 40 States, including nineteen member States of the Council of Europe (Albania, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Malta, Republic of Moldova, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom). 29.  The relevant provisions of Recommendation No. 149 concerning rural workers’ organisations and their role in economic and social development, adopted by the ILO in 1975, read as follows:
II. Role of Organisations of Rural Workers
“4. It should be an objective of national policy concerning rural development to facilitate the establishment and growth, on a voluntary basis, of strong and independent organisations of rural workers as an effective means of ensuring the participation of rural workers, without discrimination ... in economic and social development and in the benefits resulting therefrom. 5. Such organisations should, as appropriate, be able to--
(a) represent, further and defend the interests of rural workers, for instance by undertaking negotiations and consultations at all levels on behalf of such workers collectively;
(b) represent rural workers in connection with the formulation, implementation and evaluation of programmes of rural development and at all stages and levels of national planning; ...
(f) contribute to the improvement of the conditions of work and life of rural workers, including occupational safety and health; ...
III. Means of Encouraging the Growth of Organisations of Rural Workers 6. In order to enable organisations of rural workers to play their role in economic and social development, member States should adopt and carry out a policy of active encouragement to these organisations, particularly with a view to -
(a) eliminating obstacles to their establishment, their growth and the pursuit of their lawful activities, as well as such legislative and administrative discrimination against rural workers’ organisations and their members as may exist; ... 7. (1) The principles of freedom of association should be fully respected; rural workers’ organisations should be independent and voluntary in character and should remain free from all interference, coercion or repression. ... 8. (1) Member States should ensure that national laws or regulations do not, given the special circumstances of the rural sector, inhibit the establishment and growth of rural workers’ organisations. ...”


3.  The applicants were born in 1973 and 1965, respectively, and live in Samsun and Ankara. 4.  On 17 October 2001 the applicant was discharged from his civil service post following his previous criminal conviction by a martial law court. The conviction had been finalised by the Military Court of Cassation's decision of 11 November 1997. 5.  On 4 January 2002 the applicant brought an action before the Samsun Administrative Court to annul the discharge order. 6.  On 5 June 2002 the Samsun Administrative Court rejected the applicant's request. 7.  On 7 February 2005 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the judgment of the Samsun Administrative Court. The written opinions of the public prosecutor and of the judge rapporteur (“tetkik hakimi”) concerning his appeal request were not communicated to the applicant. 8.  On 31 December 2007 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's request for rectification of its previous decision. 9.  On 11 January 2002 the applicant was discharged from his civil service post after a disciplinary decision. Criminal proceedings were also commenced against the applicant on the same grounds as those which had led to his discharge. 10.  On 15 March 2002 the applicant brought an action before the Ankara Administrative Court to annul the discharge order. 11.  On 25 June 2002 the Ankara Assize Court acquitted the applicant of the offences with which he had been charged. On 22 March 2004 the Court of Cassation upheld the applicant's acquittal. 12.  In the meantime, on 31 March 2003 the Ankara Administrative Court refused the applicant's request to annul the discharge order. Relying on Section 131 of the Law on Civil Servants (Law no. 657), the administrative court held that the applicant's acquittal of the criminal charges did not absolve him from the disciplinary sanction. 13.  On 26 April 2005 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the judgment of the Ankara Administrative Court. The written opinions of the public prosecutor and of the judge rapporteur concerning his appeal request were not communicated to the applicant. 14.  On 23 January 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's rectification request. The final decision was served on the applicant on 4 March 2008.


8.  The first applicant, Mr Patrick Benjamin, was sentenced to life imprisonment for rape in 1983. His tariff period (the minimum period of detention satisfying the requirements of retribution and deterrence) was set at six years and expired in April 1989. His time in prison was characterised by periods of thought disorder, delusions and behavioural problems and the Secretary of State decided that he was in need of care and treatment in a secure hospital. In August 1989, he was made the subject of a transfer direction and a restriction order under, respectively, sections 47 and 49 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (the 1983 Act) and transferred to Broadmoor Special Hospital. 9.  In October 1993, the Secretary of State decided, following consultation with the trial judge and the Lord Chief Justice, that the first applicant should be regarded as a “technical lifer” (that is a person who was suffering from a mental disorder which influenced him to a significant extent at the time of the offence although the court had not made a hospital order on sentencing). 10.  In April 1994, the first applicant was transferred to Bracton Clinic Regional Secure Unit. On 1 July 1996, his case for discharge was considered by the Mental Health Review Tribunal which found that it was not satisfied that the first applicant did not any longer require treatment in a hospital for mental illness. 11.  When his case was reviewed most recently, on 9 January 2001, the MHR Tribunal recommended his discharge. The Secretary of State accepted the recommendation and the first applicant was discharged. 12.  The second applicant, Mr Hueth Wilson, was sentenced to life imprisonment for buggery of a young girl in 1977. The court had before it psychiatric evidence to the effect that he suffered from mental illness. Expert psychiatric evidence recommended that he should be made subject to a hospital order coupled with a restriction order without limit of time under sections 37 and 41 of the Mental Health Act 1959. Due to an absence of any beds in hospitals providing the level of security that the trial judge considered necessary, the judge felt unable to make the orders and passed, instead, a discretionary life sentence. The judge commented that the second applicant could later be transferred to hospital if his condition required it. His tariff period was set at eight years and expired in 1984. 13.  In August 1977, the second applicant was transferred to hospital under the Mental Health Act 1959 (later replaced by the 1983 Act). In November 1977, the applicant returned to prison and there were several other transfers to and from hospital in subsequent years. In October 1992, the second applicant was transferred to Rampton Special Hospital under sections 47 and 49 of the 1983 Act. In June 1993, following consultation with the trial judge and the Lord Chief Justice, the Secretary of State decided that the second applicant should be regarded as a “technical lifer”. 14.  On 6 July 1996 the MHR Tribunal considered the second applicant's case for discharge and found that they were not satisfied that he no longer required treatment in hospital for mental illness. His case was reviewed most recently on 13 June 2000 when the Tribunal again did not recommend discharge. 15.  By decisions of the Secretary of State for the Home Department communicated to the applicants in October and November 1992, the Secretary of State refused to certify the applicants as eligible for review by the discretionary lifer panels empowered by section 34 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 to order their release on licence. Leave to apply for judicial review of the decisions was granted on 17 May 1993. 16.  On 22 October 1993 the High Court, granting the application, made a declaration that the Secretary of State's policy not to certify discretionary life prisoners under paragraph 9 of Schedule 12 to the Criminal Justice Act 1991 (“the 1991 Act”) on the ground that they had been transferred to hospital under the 1983 Act was unlawful ([1994] Q.B. 378). 17.  On appeal, on 19 July 1994, the Court of Appeal reversed the High Court's decision in part.  It considered that, although the applicants were existing life prisoners within the meaning of the paragraph 9 of Schedule 12, their discharge nevertheless remained subject to the procedure laid down in section 50 of the 1983 Act. The rights to a hearing under the 1991 Act were conferred only on persons who were solely subject to that Act, and not on those who were mental patients ([1995] Q.B. 43). 18.  The applicants were informed by letter of 18 May 1995 that the House of Lords had refused leave to appeal.


4.  The applicant was born in 1979 and lives in Tychy. 5.  On 13 July 2000 the applicant was arrested by the police on suspicion of having committed burglary. 6.  On 15 July 2000 the Tychy District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) ordered that the applicant be remanded in custody for a period of three months in view of the strong suspicion that he had committed five counts of burglary. It considered that there was a reasonable risk that the applicant would tamper with evidence, given the fact that he had only partly confessed. Further, the court referred to the risk that the applicant might obstruct the proper conduct of the proceedings by going into hiding. In that regard, the court relied on evidence from one of the applicant’s co-suspects, who had stated that, shortly before having been arrested, the applicant had tried to leave for Germany in order to evade serving a sentence of imprisonment which had been previously imposed on him. Finally, the court had regard to the severity of the anticipated penalty. 7.  Subsequently, the applicant was charged with 8 counts of burglary. He confessed to 2 counts. 8.  On 30 January 2001 the District Prosecutor terminated the investigation. On the same day he filed a bill of indictment with the Tychy District Court. The applicant had been indicted on 8 charges of burglary and one charge of assault. There were 6 other defendants in the case. The prosecution asked the court to hear evidence from 42 witnesses. 9.  From 1 June 2001 to 19 December 2002 the trial court listed 10 hearings (for 1 June, 6 July, 9 November and 7 December 2001 and 30 January, 20 March, 17 May, 17 July, 27 September and 19 December 2002). All those hearings were cancelled for various reasons, usually because the police had failed to bring the accused from prison. 10.  The trial began on 17 January 2003. The subsequent hearings were held on 30 January, 21 February and 20 and 21 March 2003. At the hearing held on the latter date the District Court fined 5 witnesses who had failed to appear. 11.  The District Court several times prolonged the applicant’s detention, holding that there was a reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offences in question and that, given his attempt to leave Poland and the resultant risk that he might go into hiding or tamper with evidence, as well as the fact that he had only partly confessed, keeping him in custody was necessary to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings. The court also relied on the serious nature of the charges against the applicant and the severity of the anticipated penalty. Lastly, the court had regard to the fact that the applicant had a previous conviction. 12.  The relevant decisions were given on 12 October 2000 (prolonging his detention until 5 January 2001), on 28 December 2000 (ordering his continued detention until 13 February 2001), on 8 February 2001 (extending his detention until 13 May 2001), on 10 May 2001 (prolonging that period until 13 August 2001), on 10 August 2001 (ordering his continued detention until 13 November 2001), on 5 November 2001 (extending his detention until 13 February 2002), on 13 February 2002 (prolonging his detention until 13 May 2002) and on 13 May 2002 (ordering his continued detention until 7 July 2002). 13.  In its decision of 10 April 2002 dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the prolongation of his detention, the Katowice Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy) instructed the District Court to take determined measures with a view to speedily terminating the trial. 14.  On 14 June 2002 the District Court made an application to the Katowice Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) pursuant to Article 263 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Kodeks postępowania karnego), asking for the applicant’s detention to be prolonged beyond the statutory time-limit of 2 years. The court stressed that, due to the complex nature of the case, it had so far been impossible for it to open the trial and that the applicant should be kept in custody since the grounds originally given for his detention were still valid. 15.  On 26 June 2002 the Court of Appeal prolonged the applicant’s detention until 30 December 2002. It relied on the same grounds as previously invoked by the District Court. It noted that the applicant had attempted to flee the country. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal considered that the trial court had not been responsible for the delays incurred in the proceedings to date. In this respect, it referred, inter alia, to the fact that 7 hearings had been cancelled since the police had failed to bring the accused from prison. On the other hand, it considered that prolongation of the applicant’s detention until 30 December 2002 would give the District Court sufficient time to conclude the proceedings, provided that it accelerated its examination of the case. 16.  On 14 November 2002 the Tychy District Court made yet another application under Article 263 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, asking the Court of Appeal to prolong the applicant’s detention until 30 June 2003. It stressed that it had still been impossible for it to begin the trial and that the grounds previously given for keeping the applicant in custody were still valid. 17.  On 27 November 2002 the Court of Appeal partly granted the application and ordered that the applicant be held in custody until 31 March 2003. It drew the District Court’s attention to the fact that it had not stated any concrete reasons to justify the fact that the proceedings had not been terminated within the time-limit of 2 years specified in Article 263 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the Court of Appeal’s view, the laconic statement of the District Court that the trial had not been concluded for reasons which could not be attributed to it, was not sufficient. The Court of Appeal also criticised the fact that between June 2002 and 30 December 2002 the District Court had listed only two hearings. A hearing scheduled for 17 July 2002 was cancelled because not all of the victims had been properly summoned, while the hearing listed for 27 September 2002 was cancelled due to the holiday of one of the counsel. The Court of Appeal further noted that on 6 November 2002 a new judge had been assigned to the case. However, it noted that the District Court had not taken any significant measures aimed at concluding the proceedings, as had been indicated in the earlier decisions of the Regional Court and the Court of Appeal. It lastly stressed that the case was not particularly complex and suggested that the District Court should properly organise the trial and terminate it by the end of March 2003. 18.  The applicant was released on 21 March 2003. All the applicant’s earlier applications for release and appeals against decisions prolonging his detention had been to no avail.


6.  The applicant was born in 1925 and lives in Chişinău. 7.  In 1941 the Soviet authorities nationalised the house owned by his parents. In the same year his family was deported to Russia and to Uzbekistan. 8.  On 8 December 1992 the Moldovan Parliament enacted Law No. 1225-XII “on the rehabilitation of the victims of the political repression committed by the totalitarian communist occupying regime”. The Law enabled the victims of the Soviet repression to claim restitution of their confiscated or nationalised property. 9.  In 1997 the applicant lodged an action with the Centru District Court (Judecătoria Sectorului Centru) by which he sought the restitution of his parents' house. As the former tenants of the house had purchased it from the State, the applicant sought a judicial ruling declaring the purchase contracts null and void. He also requested the eviction of all the occupants of the house. 10.  On 25 June 1997 the Centru District Court found in favour of the applicant and ordered the restitution of the house. It declared null and void the contracts by which the house had been sold to the tenants. The court further ordered the Municipal Council to evict all the occupants, and indicated that the Municipal Council was to provide them with alternative accommodation. 11.  The Municipal Council, the Ministry of Privatization and the occupants lodged an appeal with the Chişinău Regional Court (Tribunalul Municipiului Chişinău) against the judgment of the Centru District Court. On 5 November 1997 the Chişinău Regional Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the judgment with some textual amendments. Since nobody lodged an appeal in cassation, the judgment of 5 November 1997 became final. 12.  In 1999, 2000 and 2001 the bailiff assigned to the case brought proceedings against the Municipal Council for failure to comply with the judgment of 5 November 1997 along with twenty-six similar judgments.
On 28 December 1999 the Centru District Court issued a decision by which a fine of 18 Moldovan lei (MDL) (the equivalent of EUR 1.53 at the time) was imposed on the Head of the Housing Division of the Municipal Council for failure to comply with the judgments.
On 25 August 2000 the same court issued a decision by which it imposed a fine of MDL 1,800 (the equivalent of EUR 161 at the time) on the Municipal Council. The court found inter alia that the shortage of funds and the lack of available apartments could not be relied upon by the Municipal Council to justify the failure to comply with the above judgments.
The Municipal Council lodged an appeal against that decision and on 24 January 2001 the Chişinău Regional Court quashed it on the ground that the shortage of funds and the lack of available apartments had objectively impeded the Municipal Council from complying with the judgments.
On 23 February 2001 the Centru District Court issued a decision by which it imposed a fine of MDL 1,800 on the Municipal Council. 13.  Between 1997 and 2002 the applicant lodged numerous complaints about the non-enforcement of the judgment of 5 November 1997 with the Municipal Council, Centru District Court and the Ministry of Justice. In their replies, the Municipal Council and the Ministry of Justice informed the applicant that due to the lack of funds for the construction of apartment buildings and due to the lack of available alternative accommodation for the evicted persons, the judgment of 5 November 1997 could not be complied with. 14.  In April 2004 four occupants of the applicant's house lodged with the Chişinău Court of Appeal a request for revision of the judgments of 25 June 1997 and 5 November 1997. Relying on Article 449 of the new Code of Civil Procedure (see paragraph 21 below) they argued in their request that new information have become known to them. They also asked the court to extend the deadline for lodging the request in view of the fact that the new information had been obtained by them from the National Archives in April 2004.
On 26 May 2004 the Court of Appeal found in favour of the occupants, quashed the judgments of 25 June 1997 and 5 November 1997 and ordered the re-opening of the proceedings in the light of the newly discovered facts. The court also decided to extend the time limit for lodging the request.
The new facts relied upon by the Court of Appeal in its judgment were an issue of the Municipal Official Gazette of 1940, and a few certificates from the National Archives and from the Land Register dated April and May 2004. According to these documents, due to a change of numbers of the houses on the street, it was unclear whether the house provided for in the final judgments or another house belonged to the applicant's family. The Court of Appeal did not specify in its judgment whether Article 449 of the new Code of Civil Procedure had a retroactive effect; nor were reasons given for extending the time limit for the lodging of the revision request.


6.  The applicants were born in 1940 and 1946 respectively and live in Limassol, Cyprus. 7.  The applicants were, at the material time, senior officers in the Cypriot Police Force in which they served until retirement. They both served continuously with an interruption of one year and nine months under the conditions set out below. 8.  On an unspecified date in 1992, criminal proceedings were initiated against them in relation to their alleged involvement in the ill-treatment and torture of suspects. The prosecuting authorities failed to prove a prima facie case against them and they were acquitted on 23 July 1993. The court considered that the testimony of the principal prosecution witnesses - the victim and one of his relatives who had been arrested with him- “had been so obviously unreliable that no reasonable court could rely on it and convict the accused”. It also considered that the prosecution had committed a series of improprieties which had tainted the evidence to such an extent that the case against the applicants should be discontinued in the interests of the proper administration of justice. 9.  Subsequently, on 3 September 1993, the Ministerial Council appointed an Independent Investigating Commission (IIC) to examine this matter further. The Commission's findings were delivered on 3 November 1995. It found that the applicants, together with nine other police officers, had engaged in torture practices against certain suspects in order to obtain confessions. On the basis of the Commission's findings, on 7 March 1996, the Ministerial Council terminated the applicants' employment with the Police Force for the protection of public interest. One other police officer was also dismissed by virtue of the same decision, while five junior officers who were also found to have been involved in acts of torture and ill-treatment of prisoners were not dismissed. The applicants' dismissal was widely reported in the national press. 10.  The applicants challenged the legality of the said decision before the Supreme Court, exercising its administrative judicial review jurisdiction. 11.  The Supreme Court delivered its judgment in a plenary session on 26 November 1997. It unanimously annulled the decision of the Ministerial Council which was found to have violated the constitutional rights of the applicants. In particular, it found that their right not to be tried twice for the same offence had been breached and that their right to be presumed innocent, especially in the light of their acquittal, had been prejudiced. It further found that the applicants had effectively been dismissed without trial or disciplinary proceedings and, as such, they had been deprived of any opportunity to defend themselves. Moreover, the decision of the Ministerial Council was found to be ultra vires. 12.  On 28 November 1997, the applicants requested reinstatement to their former posts. On 5 December 1997 they returned to duty. 13.  Subsequently, the applicants brought an action under Article 146.6 of the Constitution before the District Court of Nicosia requesting fair and equitable compensation. 14.  Judgment was delivered on 30 April 2000 by the District Court, which refused the applicants' request for exemplary damages. Concerning their request for payment of the difference in their monthly salaries, corresponding to the period in which their service had been interrupted, the court observed that the applicants had received a higher amount upon their dismissal than the requested difference in salaries. This amount had been held by the first applicant throughout the period following his return to duty and until his retirement and it was still held by the second applicant. As regards the first applicant, the amount he had received upon his dismissal had been deducted from the amount to which he was entitled by virtue of his retirement and the difference had been paid to him. The request was accordingly refused. 15.  However, 7,500 Cypriot pounds (CYP), plus 8 per cent interest as from the date that the action was lodged, was awarded in compensation for moral damage. The court pointed out that, as observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Frangoulides v. The Republic (1982) 1 C.L.R. 462, an award of damages under Article 146.6 of the Constitution was not subject to the common-law rule for quantifying damages aimed at restitutio in integrum, but was governed by the principles of equity. It considered that the applicants had suffered injury to their psychological and moral integrity which was directly caused by the annulled decision. In particular, the following was noted:
“Within this framework of criteria (established in the domestic case-law), I do not see any good reason why the court should rule, in a case similar to the present one, where, by the exclusive behaviour of the administration (Ministerial Council) the plaintiffs have been expelled from their positions with characterisations that have definitely affected them psychologically as they themselves have maintained, that they should not be entitled to certain compensation for that injury to their psychological integrity. I consider such injury as damage emanating directly from the annulled administrative decision”. 16.  Moreover, it was acknowledged that the decision had serious defamatory effects for them. As such, the relevant award was seen as required by equity to redress the unlawful act of the administration. 17.  The applicants lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court and contended that the award of damages was manifestly insufficient. The Attorney-General lodged a cross-appeal requesting the annulment of the first-instance District Court judgment. 18.  The Supreme Court delivered its judgment on 25 April 2005 by which it upheld the first-instance court's decision not to award exemplary damages and reversed the award of moral damages. The court noted that Article 146 (6) of the Constitution entitles a person who sustained injury, as a result of a decision, act or omission by the administration that had been declared null and void , pursuant to Article 146 (4), the right to claim damages or any other remedy from a civil court which may grant fair and equitable compensation. An award of compensation could only be made where the sustained injury had been caused by the annulled act. The administration's duty to comply with the annulment of such an act would require the suppression of all consequences of the annulled act and reinstatement of the status quo ante. Such reinstatement should be complete and address all damaging consequences of the annulled act. The court further noted that “damage” would constitute the loss or injury sustained by a plaintiff as a result of the act on which the cause of action was based. The cause of action provided for in Article 146 (6) of the Constitution was a cause sui generis and was governed by rules of determination of compensation that were different from those provided for in the common law (Frangoulides v. The Republic (1982) 1 C.L.R. 462). The court referred to the case of Egglezakis and others v. The Attorney General of the Republic ((1992) 1 S.C.J. 697), in which the issue as to whether the term “damage” set out in Article 146 (6) was restricted to pecuniary damage or extended to psychological and emotional injury had been left open. The court then stated the following:
“Such moral damage did not constitute a direct consequence of the annulled administrative act and that, therefore, such an award was not covered by the provisions of Article 146 (6) of the Constitution”.


5.  Early in the morning of 13 October 2005 law-enforcement agencies in the town of Nalchik, the Republic of Kabardino-Balkariya, were attacked by a number of heavily armed people, who appear to have been local insurgents. The agencies included the Republican Department of the Ministry of the Interior, Centre T of the Main Department of the Ministry of the Interior, various district departments of the Ministry of the Interior, the Special Purpose Police Unit of the Republican Ministry of the Interior, various checkpoints of the Traffic Police, the Republican Department of the Federal Security Service, the Republican Department of the Federal Service for the Execution of Penalties and the office of the Border Guard Service of the Federal Security Service. Also, a few privately owned weapon shops were attacked. According to the Government, there were over two hundred and fifty participants in the attack. 6.  The ensuing fight between the governmental forces and the insurgents lasted until at least 14 October 2005. 7.  The first, second, third, fifth and seventh applicants submit that they are relatives of the people whose dead bodies were found following the events of 13 and 14 October 2005 (see paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 12 and 14). The fourth applicant claims that his son was killed by State agents in the village of Anzorey in the Leskenskiy District of the Republic of Kabardino‑Balkariya on 6 January 2006 (see paragraph 11). The sixth applicant claims that her son was killed by State agents in the town of Nalchik on 12 November 2005 (see paragraph 13). All of the applicants live in the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria and, unless stated otherwise, are residents of Nalchik. 8.  The first applicant, Mr Khusen Kadirovich Arkhestov, born in 1954, referred to the death of his son Mr Lokman Khusenovich Arkhestov, born on 30 December 1989. 9.  The second applicant, Mrs Kulisum Zhantuganovna Balkizova, born in 1956, referred to the death of her son Mr Kantemir Safudinovich Balkizov, born on 29 March 1982. 10.  The third applicant, Mrs Asiyat Kunakovna Guziyeva, born in 1976, referred to the death of her husband Mr Arsen Gumarovich Margushev, born on 6 January 1979. 11.  The fourth applicant, Mr Askarbi Khamidovich Zhekamukhov, born in 1955, referred to the death of his son Mr Albert Askarbiyevich Zhekamukhov, born on 23 November 1980. 12.  The fifth applicant, Mr Arsen Khazhmastafovich Tukov, born in 1939, referred to the death of his son Mr Anatoliy Arsenovich Tukov, born on 3 August 1974. 13.  The sixth applicant, Mrs Mariya Latifovna Khuranova, who was born in 1955 and lives in the village of Shalushka, referred to the death of her son Mr Azamat Anatolyevich Brayev, born on 29 July 1975. 14.  The seventh applicant, Mrs Lyuda Khazhmuradovna Shogenova, who was born in 1965 and lives in the village of Zalukokoazhe, referred to the death of her brother Mr Aslan Khadzmuratovich Shogenov, born on 26 January 1965. 15.  The Government did not dispute this information. 16.  It appears that on 13 October 2005 the authorities instituted criminal proceedings no. 25/78-05 in connection with the attack in Nalchik. 17.  In the course of the investigation it was established that between 1999 and February 2005 a group of individuals including A. Maskhadov, Sh. Basayev, I. Gorchkhanov, A. Astemirov, Abu-Valid Khattab and Abu‑Dzeit, had formed a terrorist group. It was this group that organised the attack. Thirty-five law-enforcement officers and fifteen civilians were killed, whilst one hundred and thirty-one law-enforcement officers and ninety-two civilians were injured. Massive damage was done to property. 18.  The applicants did not have any procedural status in the criminal proceedings in case no. 25/78-05. 19.  Immediately following the attack, an unspecified number of people (including some of the applicants) signed collective petitions requesting various officials, including the prosecutors, to return the bodies for burial. 20.  Between the end of October 2005 and until at least April 2006 the applicants received replies from the prosecution and other authorities informing them that they would receive definite answers once the investigation into the events had been completed. 21.  Attempts by some of the applicants to challenge these replies in the domestic courts were unsuccessful, as they were rejected as premature both at first instance and on appeal. 22.  On 13 April 2006 the investigation authority terminated the criminal proceedings in respect of the ninety-five deceased on account of their deaths, having taken an individual decision in respect of each deceased person. Each decision described the degree and character of their individual involvement and concluded that these persons had taken part in the attack and died as a result of the ensuing fight. The decisions described the circumstances of death of the persons referred to by the applicants; they are set out below. The respondent Government have submitted the investigation case file in respect of the circumstances of death of each of the deceased persons. 23.  The son of the first applicant, Lokman Khusenovich Arkhestov, was found to have taken part in the attack of 13 October 2005. He died in the exchange of gunfire which followed the collective attempt by the attackers to storm a building of the Federal Service for the Execution of Penalties. 24.  The son of the second applicant, Kantemir Safudinovich Balkizov, was found to have taken part in the attack of 13 October 2005. He died in the exchange of gunfire which followed the collective attempt by the attackers to storm a building of the Ministry of the Interior. 25.  The husband of the third applicant, Arsen Gumarovich Margushev, was found to have taken part in the attack of 13 October 2005. He died in the exchange of gunfire which followed the collective attempt by the attackers to storm a building of the Ministry of the Interior. 26.  The son of the fourth applicant, Albert Askarbiyevich Zhekamukhov, was found to have taken part in the attack of 13 October 2005 and subsequently to have escaped from Nalchik and gone into hiding. He was located in the village of Anzorey in the Leskenskiy District of the Republic of Kabardino-Balkariya on 6 January 2006. After rejecting a call to give himself up, he died as a result of a failed attempt to arrest him. 27.  The son of the fifth applicant, Anatoliy Arsenovich Tukov, was found to have taken part in the attack of 13 October 2005. He died in the exchange of gunfire which followed the collective attempt by the attackers to storm a building of the Ministry of the Interior. 28.  The son of the sixth applicant, Azamat Anatolyevich Brayev, was found to have taken part on 12 October 2005 in an exchange of gunfire with police officers preceding the main attack of 13 October 2005. He belonged to the same group as the attackers, but was detected by police officers by chance one day prior to the attack. 29.  The brother of the seventh applicant, Aslan Khazhmuratovich Shogenov, was found to have taken part in the attack of 13 October 2005. He died in the exchange of gunfire which followed the collective attempt by the attackers to storm a building of the Ministry of the Interior. 30.  The Prosecutor General’s Office notified the applicants of the above decisions on 14 April 2006, but no copies of the decisions in question were attached to the notifications. 31.  In the Strasbourg proceedings the Government submitted copies of the decisions of 13 April 2006 in respect of each of the applicants’ relatives. 32.  The applicants were furnished with death certificates in respect of their relatives:
Names
Dates of Death
Dates of Issue
Cause of Death 4.  Albert Askarbiyevich Zhekamukhov
6/01/2006
9/06/2006
Massive loss of blood, multiple shrapnel wounds to the head, chest and extremities 6.  Azamat Anatolyevich Brayev
12/10/2005
3/07/2007
Massive loss of blood, multiple gunshot wounds to the head, chest and extremities 33.  According to the Government, ninety-five corpses of the presumed terrorists were cremated on 22 June 2006. 34.  The cremation took place pursuant to a decision not to return the bodies of the deceased to their families, dated 15 May 2006. In contrast to the individual decisions of 13 April 2006, the decision of 15 May 2006 referred to the deceased persons collectively. The decision stated, in particular:
“... the head of investigation group ... [official S.], having examined the materials in case file no. 25/78-05, established: ... [that] in the course of the counter-terrorist special operation aimed at tackling the attack, 95 terrorists were eliminated, namely:
[the decision names among the deceased all of the persons referred to by the applicants]
At present all forensic expert examinations, including molecular genetic examinations, involving ... the corpses of the deceased terrorists, have been finalised and their identities have been established by way of proper procedure.
By decisions of 13-14 April 2006 the criminal proceedings in respect of these 95 persons, who had committed ... the attack on various sites and law-enforcement agents of the town of Nalchik ... was discontinued on account of their deaths, under Article 27 part 1 subpart 2 and Article 24 part 1 subpart 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Pursuant to section 14(1) of the Federal Interment and Burial Act (Law no. 8-FZ) ‘the interment of persons against whom a criminal investigation in connection with their terrorist activities has been closed because of their death following interception of the said terrorist act shall take place in accordance with the procedure established by the Government of the Russian Federation. Their bodies shall not be handed over for burial and the place of their burial shall not be revealed.’
Pursuant to part 3 of Decree no. 164, ‘On interment of persons whose death was caused by the interception of terrorist acts carried out by them’, approved by the Government of the Russian Federation on 20 March 2003, ‘the interment of [these] persons shall take place in the locality where death occurred and shall be carried out by agencies specialising in funeral arrangements, set up by organs of the executive branch of the subjects of the Russian Federation or by organs of local government ...’.
[In view of the above, official S. decided to:] 35.  The Government alleged that the authorities had notified the applicants of the decision of 15 May 2006, but acknowledged that no copy of that decision had been provided to them. 36.  It appears that on several occasions the Prosecutor General’s Office informed the applicants, in substance, of the refusal to return the bodies. It does not appear that the applicants were furnished with a copy of the decision of 15 May 2006. 37.  The applicants’ initial attempts to obtain judicial review of the decisions of 13 April and 15 May 2006 were unsuccessful, as the courts refused to examine their arguments.
(a)  Proceedings before the Constitutional Court 38.  The relatives of those who had taken part in the attack of 13 October 2005 contested the legislation governing the interment of terrorists before the Constitutional Court. 39.  On 28 June 2007 the Constitutional Court delivered a judgment (no. 8-P) in which, in essence, it rejected their complaints alleging that section 14(1) of the Interment and Burial Act and Decree no. 164 of the Government of the Russian Federation of 20 March 2003 were unconstitutional. The ruling stated, in particular, that the impugned legal provisions were, in the circumstances, necessary and justified. The court reached the following conclusions regarding the legitimate aims and necessity of the legislation in question:
“... At the same time, the interest in fighting terrorism, in preventing terrorism in general and specific terms and in providing redress for the effects of terrorist acts, coupled with the risk of mass disorder, clashes between different ethnic groups and aggression by the next of kin of those involved in terrorist activity against the population at large and law-enforcement officials, and lastly the threat to human life and limb, may, in a given historical context, justify the establishment of a particular legal regime, such as that provided for by section 14(1) of the Federal Act, governing the burial of persons who escape prosecution in connection with terrorist activity on account of their death following the interception of a terrorist act ... Those provisions are logically connected to the provisions of paragraph 4 of Recommendation 1687 (2004) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on combating terrorism through culture, dated 23 November 2005, in which it was stressed that extremist interpretations of elements of a particular culture or religion, such as heroic martyrdom, self-sacrifice, apocalypse or holy war, as well as secular ideologies (nationalist or revolutionary) could also be used for the justification of terrorist acts. 3.2.  Action to minimise the informational and psychological impact of the terrorist act on the population, including the weakening of its propaganda effect, is one of the means necessary to protect public security and the morals, health, rights and legal interests of citizens. It therefore pursues exactly those aims for which the Constitution of the Russian Federation and international legal instruments permit restrictions on the relevant rights and freedoms.
The burial of those who have taken part in a terrorist act, in close proximity to the graves of the victims of their acts, and the observance of rites of burial and remembrance with the paying of respects, as a symbolic act of worship, serve as a means of propaganda for terrorist ideas and also cause offence to relatives of the victims of the acts in question, creating the preconditions for increasing inter-ethnic and religious tension.
In the conditions which have arisen in the Russian Federation as a result of the commission of a series of terrorist acts which produced numerous human victims, resulted in widespread negative social reaction and had a major impact on the collective consciousness, the return of the body to the relatives ... may create a threat to social order and peace and to the rights and legal interests of other persons and their security, including incitement to hatred and incitement to engage in acts of vandalism, violence, mass disorder and clashes which may produce further victims. Meanwhile, the burial places of participants in terrorist acts may become a shrine for certain extremist individuals and be used by them as a means of propaganda for the ideology of terrorism and involvement in terrorist activity.
In such circumstances, the federal legislature may introduce special arrangements governing the burial of individuals whose death occurred as a result of the interception of a terrorist act in which they were taking part. ...” 40.  The ruling further noted that the application of the measures prescribed in the legislation could be regarded as justified if proper procedural safeguards, such as effective judicial review, were in place to protect individuals from arbitrariness. The court noted that Articles 123-127 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provided for such review. 41.  In sum, the Constitutional Court upheld the impugned provisions as being in conformity with the Constitution but at the same time interpreted them as requiring that the authorities refrain from burying bodies unless a court had confirmed the competent authority’s decision. It reasoned as follows:
“... The constitutional and legal meaning of the existing norms presupposes the possibility of bringing court proceedings to challenge a decision to discontinue, on account of the deaths of the suspects, a criminal case against or prosecution of participants in a terrorist act. Accordingly, they also presuppose an obligation on the court’s part to examine the substance of the complaint, that is, to verify the lawfulness and well-foundedness of the decision and the conclusions therein as regards the participation of the persons concerned in a terrorist act, and to establish the absence of grounds for rehabilitating [the suspects] and discontinuing the criminal case. They thus entail an examination of the lawfulness of the application of the aforementioned restrictive measures. Until the entry into force of the court judgment the deceased’s remains cannot be buried; the relevant State bodies and officials must take all necessary measures to ensure that the bodies are disposed of in accordance with custom and tradition, in particular through the burial of the remains in the ground ... or by [cremation], individually, if possible, and to ensure compliance prior thereto with the requirements concerning the identification of the deceased ... and of the time, location and cause of death ...” 42.  Judge G.A. Gadzhiyev issued a separate opinion in which he agreed that the impugned provisions were in conformity with the Constitution but held a different view as to how they should be interpreted. The opinion stated as follows:
“... if the relevant law-enforcement agencies find, as a result of a preliminary investigation, that a terrorist act has been committed and that a given person was involved, but the criminal proceedings against that person ... are discontinued on account of his or her death following interception of the terrorist act, and if they then conclude that the decision to return the body to the family for burial is capable of threatening public order and peace and the health, morals, rights, lawful interests and safety of others, they are entitled to take a decision refusing to hand over the body and applying special arrangements for burial.
At the same time, in the event of a refusal to return the body of an individual whose death occurred as the result of the interception of a terrorist act committed by him, the authorities competent to take a decision concerning the burial must secure compliance with all the requirements concerning the establishment of the deceased’s identity, the time and place of death, the cause of death, the place of burial and the data necessary for the proper identification of the grave (a given location and number). The burial must take place with the participation of the relatives, in accordance with custom and tradition and with humanitarian respect for the dead. The administrative authorities of a State governed by the rule of law must respect the cultural values of a multi-ethnic society, transmitted from generation to generation. ...” 43.  Judge A.L. Kononov issued a dissenting opinion in which he described the legislation in question as incompatible with the Constitution. In particular, he noted:
“... The impugned norms banning the return of the deceased’s bodies to their relatives and providing for their anonymous burial are, in our view, absolutely immoral and reflect the most uncivilised, barbaric and base views of previous generations ...
The right of every person to be buried in a dignified manner in accordance with the traditions and customs of his family hardly requires special justification or even to be secured in written form in law. This right is clearly self-evident and stems from human nature as, perhaps, no other natural right. Equally natural and uncontested is the right of every person to conduct the burial of a person who is related and dear to them, to have an opportunity to perform one’s moral duty and display one’s human qualities, to bid farewell, to grieve, mourn and commemorate the deceased, however he may be regarded by society and the state, to have the right to a grave, which in all civilisations represents a sacred value and the symbol of memory. ...”
(b)  Subsequent proceedings 44.  After the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 28 June 2007 the domestic courts apparently changed their approach and agreed to review the formal lawfulness of the decisions of 13 April and 15 May 2006. 45.  The applicants brought the following court proceedings in connection with the relevant decisions.

First instance judgment of the Nalchik Town Court
Appeal decision of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Kabardino-Balkariya
First applicant
14/09/2007 (decision of 13 April 2006 quashed)
4/12/2007
(upheld)
16/11/2007 (decision of 13 April 2006 quashed)
20/5/2008
(upheld)
Second applicant
6/11/2007
(decision of 13 April 2006 quashed)
Judgment was not appealed against and became final on 16 November 2007
Third applicant
19/11/2007
(decision of 13 April 2006 quashed)
25/1/2008
Fourth applicant
27/12/2007
(decision of 13 April 2006 quashed)
1/04/2008
Fifth applicant
19/11/2007
(decision of 13 April 2006 quashed)
25/1/2008
Sixth applicant
19/11/2007
(decision of 13 April 2006 quashed)
25/1/2008
Seventh applicant
28/01/2008
(decision of 13 April 2006 quashed)
11/03/2007 46.  As a result of the above-mentioned sets of proceedings the applicants succeeded in having quashed the decisions of 13 April and 15 May 2006 in part. It appears that the domestic courts subsequently changed their position and the relevant judgments were later quashed by way of supervisory review. After these changes, the courts still could not review the need for application of the measures set out in section 14 (1) of the Interment and Burial Act and Decree no. 164 of 20 March 2003 in individual cases. 47.  According to the applicants who took part in the identification of the bodies, for several days following the events of 13 and 14 October 2005 the corpses (except for the bodies of the relatives of the fourth and sixth applicant, who died at other dates and were identified later) were kept in the town morgue and other locations in wholly unsatisfactory conditions. In particular, the bodies gave off an intense smell owing to the lack of proper refrigeration and were chaotically piled on top of one other. 48.  In response to a letter from the applicants requesting an explanation for the appalling storage conditions, the Prosecutor General’s Office stated in a letter of 14 April 2006 that until a procedural decision in respect of the corpses had been taken they had been kept in specially equipped rooms in refrigerated chambers set to the appropriate temperature. The authorities refused to disclose the locality where the bodies were stored. 49.  According to the Government, the following applicants participated in the identification procedure in person:
No.
The applicants
Participation in identification
1
Mr Khusen Kadirovich Arkhestov
on 16 October 2005
2
Mrs Kulisum Zhantuganovna Balkizova
No, the deceased was identified by his brother, Mr Ramzan Safudinovich Balkizov
3
Mrs Asiyat Kunakovna Guziyeva
No, the deceased was identified by his sister, Mrs Anzhela Gumarovna Margusheva
4
Mr Askarbi Khamidovich Zhekamukhov
No, the deceased was identified by his mother, Mrs Fatima Magomedovna Zhekamukhova
5
Mr Arsen Khazhmastafovich Tukov
No, the body was identified through a genetic expert examination
6
Mrs Mariya Latifovna Khuranova
No, the deceased was identified by his father, Mr Anatoly Bashirovich Brayev
7
Mrs Lyuda Khazhmuradovna Shogenova
Yes, on 20 October 2005 50.  According to the applicants, they had access to the bodies both in the Nalchik town morgue and in two refrigerator wagons parked on a plot of land belonging to the Ministry of the Interior. Provision of access to the bodies was random, as not everyone who wanted to take part in the identification process was admitted. In some cases the provision of access was not properly documented. Since the provision of access was limited, the relevant facilities were usually surrounded by crowds of relatives of the deceased. 51.  The Government submitted that the corpses in question had been initially held in the Nalchik town morgue. Between 14 and 18 October 2005 the applicants examined the corpses and the clothing. Thereafter the bodies were placed in two refrigerator wagons. On 1 November 2005 the wagons were moved to the town of Rostov-on-Don for molecular genetic examinations and on 22 June 2006 all bodies were cremated. Between 13 and 22 October 2005 the person in charge of the identification procedure was the head of the investigation group investigator P. As of 22 October 2005 he was replaced by investigator S. The Government also acknowledged that immediately after the attack no facilities had been available to keep the bodies. 52.  According to the Government’s most recent submissions, the overall number of human casualties as a result of the events of 13 October 2005 was twelve civilians, thirty-five police and law-enforcement officers and eighty-seven participants in the attack.


4.  The applicants were born in 1943 and 1939 respectively and live in Istanbul. 5.  On 6 September 1993 the General Directorate of National Roads and Highways expropriated plots of land belonging to the applicants in Istanbul. A committee of experts assessed the value of the plots of land belonging to the applicants and compensation was paid to them when the expropriation took place. 6.  On 4 February 1994, following the applicants’ request for increased compensation, the Kartal First Instance Court awarded them additional compensation of 48,410,250,000 Turkish liras (TRL) plus interest at the statutory rate of 30% per annum, namely the rate applicable at the date of the court’s decision. The date, 6 September 1993 was fixed by the domestic court for the running of the statutory rate of interest. The parties appealed. 7.  On 12 May 1994 the Court of Cassation quashed the decision of the first instance court. On 2 November 1994 the first instance court re-examined the case and amended the amount of the additional compensation to TRL 45,692,700,000. The decision became final since none of the parties appealed. On 29 December 1997 the administration paid the applicants TRL 95,426,696,000 as the additional compensation together with interest. The interest on the additional compensation was calculated at the statutory rate applicable between the date of the decision of the first instance court in favour of the applicant and 31 December 1997. 8.  Between 1993 and 1999 the rate of inflation averaged 81.7% per annum.


5.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Tbilisi. 6.  On 8 May 2002 the applicant brought a civil action, claiming back the money which she had lent to a private person on 14 September 1998, further to a note envisaging repayment within two months. 7.  On 22 May 2002 the respondent replied in writing, claiming that she had repaid the debt and that the applicant's action was time-barred under Articles 129 and 130 of the Civil Code (“the CC”). 8.  On 14 June 2002 the Isani-Samgori District Court allowed the applicant's claim at an oral hearing. The court found that the respondent's assertion about payment of the debt was unsubstantiated. It did not reply to the time-bar objection. 9.  On 5 August 2002 the respondent appealed, reiterating, inter alia, that the applicant's action was time-barred.  The latter replied that, in view of the respondent's continuous promises to discharge the debt, she could not have concluded that her rights had been breached between 1998 and 2001. 10.  On 18 September 2002 the Tbilisi Regional Court quashed the judgment of 14 June 2002 and decided the case anew, dismissing the applicant's action as time-barred. The appellate court found that the limitation period had started to run from the date of non-compliance with the note of 14 September 1998, that is two months after the loan, on 14 November 1998. It noted that the case materials did not substantiate the applicant's assertion that the respondent had continuously promised to return the money. 11.  On 16 October 2002 the applicant lodged a cassation claim. Referring to various circumstances of the case, she reiterated that the respondent's verbal assurances had prevented her from applying to the court earlier. She consequently claimed that the appellate court had wrongly applied Articles 129 and 130 of the CC. 12.  On 19 November 2002 the Supreme Court of Georgia declared the applicant's cassation claim admissible but decided to dispense with an oral hearing on the merits. Both parties were informed of that decision on 22 November 2002. On the same day, the cassation claim was forwarded to the respondent for comments. No reply was forthcoming from the latter. 13.  On 6 February 2003 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's cassation claim. Endorsing the facts of the case as established by the appellate court, the cassation court found that the disputed Articles 129 and 130 of the CC had been correctly interpreted and applied in the appellate judgment of 18 September 2002 and that, consequently, there was no ground, under Article 393 §§ 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to quash it.


5.  The applicant was born in 1930 and lives in Warsaw. 6.  On 4 June 1992 the Minister of Internal Affairs, Mr Antoni Macierewicz, submitted to Parliament and made public a “list of secret collaborators with the security services between 1945 and 1990”. The list, unofficially called “the Macierewicz list”, contained names of public officials who appeared in the archives of the Ministry and included the President and many Members of Parliament. The publication of the list sparked uproar in the Sejm, a Chamber of the Polish Parliament, which led to the fall of the government of Jan Olszewski a couple of hours later. 7.  The applicant, who had been a Member of Parliament, appeared on the list. 8.  On 11 April 1997 the parliament passed the Law on disclosing work for or service in the State’s security services or collaboration with them between 1944 and 1990 by persons exercising public functions (ustawa o ujawnieniu pracy lub służby w organach bezpieczeństwa państwa lub współpracy z nimi w latach 1944‑1990 osób pełniących funkcje publiczne; “the 1997 Lustration Act”). It entered into force on 3 August 1997. Persons falling under the provisions of the 1997 Lustration Act, i.e. candidates or holders of public office such as ministers and members of parliament, were required to declare whether or not they had worked for or collaborated with the security services during the communist regime. 9.  On 26 March 1999 the applicant applied to the court to institute the so‑called “auto‑lustration” proceedings under section 18a § 3 of the Lustration Act. He submitted his lustration declaration, in which he stated that he had not been an intentional and secret collaborator with the secret services. 10.  The applicant was the first of many persons from the Macierewicz list who applied for auto‑lustration claiming that they had not been secret collaborators with the communist‑era secret services. In some cases the lustration courts agreed and cleared the name of the person concerned. 11.  On 6 May 1999 the Warsaw Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) decided to institute lustration proceedings in the applicant’s case. 12.  On 6 November 2001 the Court of Appeal gave a judgment in which it found that his lustration declaration had been truthful and that the applicant had not been an intentional and secret collaborator with the secret services. The panel of the court was composed of three judges. 13.  The Commissioner of the Public Interest (Rzecznik Interesu Publicznego) appealed against the judgment. 14.  On 30 July 2002 the Warsaw Court of Appeal, acting as the second‑instance lustration court allowed the appeal and remitted the case. The court was constituted of a panel of three judges which included judge R.K. 15.  On 6 April 2005 the Warsaw Court of Appeal acting as the first‑instance lustration court, found that the applicant had been an intentional and secret collaborator with the security services between 1969 and 1977. 16.  The applicant appealed against the judgment. 17.  On 12 September 2006 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the judgment. The court was constituted of a panel of three judges which again included Judge R.K. 18.  The applicant lodged a cassation appeal complaining inter alia about the lack of impartiality of Judge R.K. The applicant submitted that this judge had participated in the preparation of his lustration proceedings and was a member of a lustration court between 1999 and 2000. The latter panel was later dissolved; nevertheless, these factors cast doubt on the judge’s impartiality particularly as he was a member of the panels giving judgment at the second‑instance. 19.  The applicant’s cassation appeal was dismissed on 17 April 2008 by the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy). The Supreme Court examined inter alia the applicant’s complaint that Judge R.K. had participated in his trial at the first and, on two occasions, the second instance. It dismissed the argument that such participation had given rise to doubts regarding his impartiality, finding that the judge in question had not been a member of the panel that had given a decision at first instance. As regards the applicant’s complaint that Judge R.K. had been a member of the panel of the second-instance court twice, the court noted that, according to the domestic law, such judge was not ex lege excluded from dealing with the case. It was however open to the party having doubts as to the lack of impartiality of the judge to challenge him or her during the proceedings; the applicant had failed to do that. Since the applicant accepted the composition of the second-instance court which gave the judgment on 12 September 2006, he cannot effectively raise doubts as to the lack of impartiality of one of the judges at the cassation appeal stage. 20.  The applicant was barred from being a Member of Parliament for a period of ten years in application of the 1997 Lustration Act. 21.  The judgment was notified to the applicant’s representative in June 2008.


7.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Chişinău, Moldova. He is a journalist. 8.  On 14 August 1998 the Russian language weekly newspaper “Express” published an article entitled “The minor affairs of the big Airport”, signed by the applicant. He gave as sources for his article the outcome of an investigation conducted by him and the materials of a Parliamentary Commission concerning the selling of aircraft. The article stated, inter alia, that:
“The scandal of the sale of Moldovan aircraft at dumping prices attracted the public attention of Moldovan society, which is already used to being unsurprised by such events. However, these still ongoing events offered our newspaper the opportunity to focus on this topic (see, 'Express' No. 19 and 20 of 19 and 26 June 1998). This article is an attempt to give a meaning to the events, which happened within the State Administration of Civil Aviation ('SACA') in the last two years, on the basis of facts which became known as a result of a press investigation.
In 1995 Chişinău International Airport ('CIA') split from the State Air Company 'Air Moldova' and became an independent enterprise. The Head of SACA was L.P., while A.I. was appointed as Head of CIA. An agreement was signed between SACA and A.I. for a period of three years. In 1996 the above agreement was cancelled on the grounds of the negligence of A.I. in carrying out his duties. This fact was the starting point of the story which follows. A.I. disagreed with SACA's decision on his dismissal and lodged a court action seeking his reinstatement. Since court proceedings in Moldova are so lengthy, A.I., who could not accept his dismissal, took steps to approach CIA's staff. To this end, he organised with the support of his adherents a demonstration on the old Airport square. A.I. took the floor and the core of his speech was that he was the only person who, as head of CIA, could ensure its economic growth.
SACA also decided to seek the opinion of its staff and for this purpose, its Director General, L.P., summoned a meeting of his deputies and the Airport units' heads. Everyone expressed a view and the common opinion was that A.I. was not the right person to be the head of CIA. Hence, the meeting of the Airport administration clearly expressed its distrust of A.I.
Nevertheless, such an outcome did not discourage the pretender to the chairmanship. He even issued a leaflet entitled 'Appeal to the Airport staff', which stated: 1. SACA unfairly dismissed A.I.; 2. A.I. will inevitably become CIA's Chief Executive.
This proved to be true, when the court declared SACA's actions to be illegal and ordered the reinstatement of A.I. in his previous post. ...” 9.  The following related to the events that took place after A.I.'s reinstatement:
“...The purging and transfer of staff marked the reinstatement of A.I. in the position. Many were reminded of their disapproval of the candidature of A.I. for the position of Chief Executive of CIA, expressed at the meeting with directors and managers. ... Once he had become Chief Executive of the Chişinău Airport for the second time and after he had successfully accomplished the first staff purge by means of the reorganisation of the enterprise's structure, A.I. called up his 'team', which had been created in between his two directorships. ... the present Director General L.I., devoted to the policy chosen by his patron A.I. ...
...One can become convinced about this by the example of another worker promoted by A.I. It is I.V. Not long ago, I.V. was working somewhere in the system of road transport and knew no more about planes than an ordinary person knows, and perhaps what he had been told by his relative A.I. But, probably, I.V. had shown a special interest in airport matters and the idea to hire him at the Airport came to his influential relative. To this end, he did not even hesitate to invent a new position – Deputy Director of Handling. ...
...Later, A.I. dismissed them from their positions... Instead of them he appointed (a) K.V. (who some time ago had graduated the Odessa Institute of Communications), (b) S.I. (a graduate of the Kiev Institute of Food Industry).
...Frankly speaking, C.P. himself is not a great expert in landing planes...
...One of the most colourful figures of A.I.'s conscription became the head of the Staff Unit of the Airport, C.M. Indeed, his position can be characterised as follows: the head of the Airport's Staff Unit would puzzle even an employee of the Staff Unit of any penitentiary. Here are some extracts from reports made by Airport employees:
'I bring to your attention that on many occasions the head of the staff unit came to the Security Service and asked for a car... to take him home. Usually he was drunk.'
...
'I was silent for a long time about the sexual harassment I was exposed to from the head of the Staff Unit, until recently when he came to my office and invited me to his summer cottage. I refused but he started to touch me. I struggled free of his hands and threatened to hit him with a telephone if he would not stop.... Once, when I entered C.M.'s office for work-related purposes, he closed the door and asked me to show him my breasts.'
...
... it is probably unnecessary to describe every detail of the adventures of this unrestrained civil servant (распоясавшегося функционера)...
...The saying that everything is possible (не боги горшки обжигают) is borne out by another example, namely the former veterinary doctor, but currently the Manager of the Services' Purchase Unit, C.V...
...A.I. has appointed S.I. (a graduate of the Kiev Institute of Food Industry)....
However, now public opinion in Moldova is focused, as we already stated, on the shady deal of the sale of aircraft. The shady deal, behind which, in the opinion of many civil aviation employees, were A.I. and S.I.” 10.  On an unspecified date in 1998 six employees of CIA - I.V., C.P., C.M., C.V., S.I. and A.I. (hereinafter: “the complainants”) - lodged separate civil actions for defamation against the applicant and the publishing office of the newspaper with the Centru District Court. Relying on Articles 7 and 7/1 of the Civil Code, the complainants alleged that the article contained statements which were defamatory of them. On 5 September 1998 the Centru District Court decided to join all six actions. 11.  On 3 December 1998 the Centru District Court found that the information contained in the article was defamatory of each of the complainants and did not correspond to reality in respect of I.V, C.V., S.I. and A.I. In the same decision, the complainants were awarded damages to be paid by the applicant and the newspaper.
(i)  In respect of I.V. 12.  The court found that the following passage was defamatory of I.V. and did not correspond to reality:
“...One can become convinced about this by the example of another worker promoted by A.I. It is I.V. Not long ago, I.V. was working somewhere in the system of road transport and knew no more about planes than an ordinary person knows, and perhaps what he had been told by his relative A.I. But, probably, I.V. had shown a special interest in airport matters and the idea to hire him at the Airport came to his influential relative. To this end, he did not even hesitate to create a new position – Deputy Director of Handling. ...” 13.  The court found that I.V. was not a relative of A.I. and that there was no proof that it was A.I. who had invited I.V. to work at the Airport and created a new position for that purpose. The court also found that I.V. had completed technical studies and had graduated from the Academy of Public Administration. The applicant and the newspaper admitted that the information about I.V. being a relative of A.I. was not accurate. The newspaper offered to publish a notice withdrawing it. 14.  The court ordered the applicant and the newspaper to pay I.V. damages of 900 Moldovan Lei (MDL) and MDL 1,350 respectively.
(ii)  In respect of C.P. 15.  The court further ruled that the sentence:
“Frankly speaking, C.P. himself is not a great expert in landing planes”
was defamatory of C.P. The court agreed that C.P. had made a rough landing in Budapest once; however, that case could not serve as a basis to question his entire expertise. The court ordered the applicant and the newspaper to pay C.P. damages of MDL 900 and MDL 1,800 respectively.
(iii)  In respect of C.M. 16.  The court quoted in its decision the following two passages as being defamatory of C.M.:
“One of the most colourful figures of A.I.'s conscription became the head of the Staff Unit of the Airport, C.M. Indeed, his position can be characterised as follows: the head of the Airport's Staff Unit would puzzle even an employee of the staff unit of any penitentiary”
and
“it is probably unnecessary to describe every detail of the adventures of this unrestrained civil servant (распоясавшегося функционера).” 17.  The applicant explained that the words used to describe C.M. were justified by the latter's conduct (see paragraph 9 above). In this respect the applicant put forward three witnesses. One of them declared that on one occasion C.M. had been drunk and that the witness had written a report to the Chief Executive about that. The other two witnesses were female employees who declared that on several occasions C.M. had sexually harassed them. 18.  The court decided not to admit the testimony of the first witness, because no sanction had been applied to C.M. as a consequence of the report. As to the statements of the two female witnesses, the court did not make any assessment of them. 19.  The court ordered the applicant and the newspaper to pay the complainant damages of MDL 900 and MDL 1,350 respectively.
(iv)  In respect of C.V. 20.  The court found that the sentence:
“The saying that everything is possible (не боги горшки обжигают) is borne out by another example, namely the former veterinary surgeon, but currently the Manager of the Services Purchase Unit, C.V.”
was defamatory of C.V., and did not correspond to reality. 21.  The applicant admitted that a mistake had been made, since C.V. did not graduate from a veterinary school. The court found that C.V. had a diploma from a business school. 22.  The court ordered the applicant and the newspaper to pay the complainant damages of MDL 900 and MDL 1,350 respectively.
(v)  In respect of S.I. 23.  The court found that the phrases:
“A.I. has appointed S.I. (a graduate of the Kiev Institute of Food Industry) ....
... the shady deal, behind which, in the opinion of many civil aviation employees, were A.I. and S.I.”
were defamatory of S.I., and did not correspond to reality. 24.  The applicant admitted to having made a mistake as regards the university attended by S.I., the court finding that she had a diploma from a School of Commerce. As to the “shady deal”, the applicant argued that the dubious character of the transaction with State-owned aircraft was evident from an official report of a Parliamentary Commission and that the participation of S.I. in the conclusion of that transaction was not contested by S.I. herself. Relying on statements of A.I. and S.I., the court found that, even though they were involved in the transaction concerning the sale of State-owned aircraft, they were part of a special commission created by the Government for the purpose of the transaction and that they were not the key persons in that transaction. The court ordered the applicant and the newspaper to pay S.I. damages of MDL 900 and MDL 1,800 respectively.
(vi)  In respect of A.I. 25.  The court identified in its decision the following extracts as being defamatory of A.I. and as not corresponding to reality:
“... A.I. [...] organised with the support of his adherents a demonstration on the old Airport square. ... He even issued a leaflet, entitled 'Appeal to the Airport staff'. ... The purging and transfer of staff marked the reinstatement of A.I. in the position. Many were reminded of their disapproval of the candidature of A.I. for the position of Chief Executive of CIA, expressed at the meeting with directors and managers. ... Once he had become Chief Executive of the Chişinău Airport for the second time and after he had successfully accomplished the first staff purge by means of the reorganisation of the enterprise's structure, A.I. called up his 'team', which had been created in between his two directorships. ... the present Director General L.P., devoted to the policy chosen by his patron A.I. ... One can become convinced about this by the example of another worker promoted by A.I. It is I.V. Not long ago, I.V. was working somewhere in the system of road transport and knew no more about planes than an ordinary person knows, and perhaps what he had been told by his relative A.I. But, probably, I.V. had shown a special interest in airport matters and the idea to hire him at the Airport came to his influential relative. To this end, he did not even hesitate to invent a new position – Deputy Director of Handling. ... Later, A.I. dismissed them from their positions... Instead of them he appointed (a) K.V. (who some time ago had graduated the Odessa Institute of Communications), (b) S.I. (a graduate of the Kiev Institute of Food Industry). ... Later on, A.I. dismissed S.I. from the position of Director of the State Air Company 'Air Moldova'.... the shady deal, behind which, in the opinion of many civil aviation employees, were A.I. and S.I.” 26.  The applicant put forward a witness who claimed to have heard about a meeting that was held on the Old Airport Square. He also referred to five employees of the Airport who had been dismissed immediately after A.I.'s reinstatement, in support of his statement regarding the alleged staff purge. The court considered that there was no proof that it was A.I. who had organised the meeting on the Old Airport Square or that it was he who later organised a staff purge. The court found that, according to the existing procedures, A.I. did not have the right to employ or to dismiss personnel. Relying on statements of A.I. and S.I., the court also found that even though they had been involved in the sale of State-owned aircraft, they had been part of a special Commission created by the Government for the purpose of the transaction and that they were not the key persons in that transaction. 27.  The newspaper submitted that the article had not been intended to defame the complainants and that it was ready to publish a notice correcting the factual mistakes as to I.V. being a relative of A.I. and as to the schools attended by C.V. and S.I. 28.  The court ordered the applicant and the newspaper to pay A.I. damages of MDL 1,800 and MDL 3,600 respectively and to publish a notice withdrawing all the statements concerning the complainants found to be defamatory. 29.  The applicant and the newspaper lodged an appeal against this judgment with the Chişinău Regional Court. The applicant requested that the decision be quashed, submitting that he had produced sufficient evidence substantiating the accuracy of the statements made in the published article, despite certain minor and accidental factual errors. 30.  As regards I.V., the applicant provided copies of the former's employment record, including his previous job at an insurance company specialising in car insurance. The applicant also argued that there was nothing defamatory in the statement that I.V. was a relative of A.I. and that it was true that the position of Deputy Director of Handling had never existed before the employment of I.V. 31.  In respect of C.P., the applicant noted that the accuracy of his statements had been substantiated by the written depositions of the complainant himself, which established that he had been involved in a minor aircraft accident in Budapest. 32.  As to C.M., the applicant pointed out that the witnesses put forward by him (Airport employees) confirmed the acts of sexual harassment and abuse (see paragraphs 9 and 17 above) by C.M. 33.  As to C.V., the applicant admitted having made an error in the job profile and that C.V. was not a veterinary surgeon but had a basic diploma in nursing. The applicant did not consider the description given by him to be defamatory. 34.  In so far as S.I. was concerned, the applicant stated that confusion had occurred in respect of the institution she had graduated from. He also submitted that she had indeed worked on the economic aspects of the transaction regarding the sale of State-owned aircraft and that the dubious character of that deal was proved by an official report in an issue of the Official Gazette (“Monitorul Oficial”). 35.  As regards A.I., the applicant noted that the accuracy of the allegations had been proved by the depositions of witnesses and by the content of the leaflet attached to the appeal application. 36.  On 5 July 1999 the Chişinău Regional Court allowed in part the applicant's appeal and amended the District Court's decision by dismissing the initial action filed by C.P., on the ground that the statement contained in the article about him (see paragraph 15 above) had reflected the truth and had therefore not been of a defamatory nature. The court also reduced the amount of the damages to be paid by the applicant and the newspaper to the complainants. The court justified the reduction by the fact that the circulation of the newspaper “Express” was limited. Accordingly, the applicant and the newspaper were ordered to pay MDL 450 and MDL 1,350 respectively to I.V., MDL 900 and MDL 1,350 respectively to C.M., MDL 180 and MDL 1,350 respectively to C.V., MDL 180 and MDL 1,350 respectively to S.I. and MDL 900 and MDL 1,350 respectively to A.I. 37.  The applicant and the newspaper lodged an appeal in cassation with the Court of Appeal, submitting that sufficient supporting evidence had been produced to the first and the second instance courts to prove the truth of the statements made in the impugned article. In particular, the applicant noted that relevant supporting information had been contained in the report of the Parliamentary Comission on the illegal sale of aircraft published in the Official Gazette and that therefore he should be exonerated from any civil responsibility. 38.  On 7 September 1999 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal in cassation and upheld the decisions of the Regional Court and District Court, stating that the appeal in cassation was unfounded. The court concluded that the impugned article had contained both defamatory statements which did not correspond to reality and statements which were not of a defamatory nature but did not correspond to reality. The court further ruled that the award of damages imposed on the newspaper had not in any way infringed its right to freedom of expression guaranteed by the Constitution and by the Law on the Press.


4.  The applicant was born in 1935 and lives in Krasnogorsk, the Moscow Region. 5.  In May 1995 the applicant signed a contract with a building partnership. Under the terms of the contract the applicant was obliged to pay the company a certain sum, and the company was obliged to provide the applicant with a garage. 6.  Since the company failed to comply with its obligation, on 4 December 1996 the applicant brought court proceedings seeking to oblige the company to provide her with a garage and compensate her for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. 7.  On 19 March 1997 the Krasnogorsk Town Court scheduled a hearing for 31 March 1997. 8.  In the period between 31 March 1997 and 29 October 1997 the hearing was adjourned on two occasions because of the absence of the parties, and on two occasions because the judge was sitting in unrelated proceedings. 9.  On 29 October 1997 the applicant's case was joined to twenty-four similar cases initiated by other plaintiffs against the same defendant, and the hearing was adjourned until an unspecified date. 10.  On 4 December 1997 the applicant modified her claims in so far as they concerned the amount of interest and compensation for legal costs to be paid to her by the defendant. 11.  Following a request by the parties, on 9 December 1997 the hearing was adjourned until 14 January 1998. 12.  On 14 January 1998 some of the cases were assigned to be examined separately. The hearing was adjourned until an unspecified date. 13.  On 18 February 1998 the hearing was adjourned until 18 March 1998 because the judge was sitting in unrelated proceedings. 14.  On 18 March 1998 the Krasnogorsk Town Court examined the merits of the applicant's claim and dismissed it. The judgment was given in the applicant's absence, and she learned of it from other plaintiffs on 28 May 1998, that is, after the procedural time-limit for appealing had already expired. 15.  On 8 October 1998 the Moscow Regional Court upheld the judgment of 18 March 1998 in respect of all the plaintiffs except the applicant. 16.  The applicant applied for the restoration of the procedural time-limit for appeal against the judgment of 18 March 1998, and on 15 February 1999 her request was granted. 17.  On 28 April 1999 the Moscow Regional Court quashed the judgment of 18 March 1998 in respect of the applicant because it had been given in her absence. 18.  On 16 June 1999 the Presidium of the Moscow Regional Court quashed the appeal decision of 8 October 1998 by way of supervisory review and remitted the case for fresh examination. 19.  On 2 August 1999 the case in respect of all the plaintiffs, including the applicant, was submitted to the Krasnogorsk Town Court. 20.  On 5 October 1999 the hearing was adjourned until an unspecified date because the applicant had failed to appear. 21.  On 15 November 1999 the proceedings were suspended until an unspecified date because the defendant's representative was ill. 22.  Following a complaint by the applicant, on 10 April 2000 the proceedings were resumed, and a hearing was scheduled for 5 May 2000. 23.  On 5 May 2000 the Krasnogorsk Town Court again dismissed the applicant's claims. On 4 June 2000 the Moscow Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. 24.  Following a request filed by the Deputy President of the Supreme Court of Russia on behalf of the applicant and other plaintiffs, on 25 July 2001 the Presidium of the Moscow Regional Court quashed the judgment of 5 May 2000, as upheld on 4 June 2000, by way of supervisory review, and remitted the case for fresh examination. 25.  The case file was remitted to the Krasnogorskiy Town Court on 9 August 2001. 26.  During the period between 23 April and 30 September 2002 hearings were adjourned on four occasions owing to the defendant's failure to appear before the court. 27.  On 30 September 2002 a hearing was adjourned until 24 October 2002, on the court's initiative, in view of the necessity to obtain certain documents. 28.  On 24 October 2002 the hearing was adjourned until 22 November 2002, on the request of the defendant, for friendly-settlement negotiations. 29.  On 19 November 2002 the applicant asked the court to attach the defendant's property as a security measure. 30.  Following a request by the applicant, on 22 November 2002 the applicant's case was disjoined from the cases lodged by the other plaintiffs. The hearing was adjourned until 27 March 2003. 31.  On 27 March 2003 the applicant amended her claims. The hearing was adjourned until 3 June 2003 because of the necessity to obtain certain documents and because of a further amendment to the applicant's claims. 32.  In the period between 3 June and 21 October 2003, and between 21 December 2003 and 15 March 2004 hearings were adjourned on four occasions because the defendant had failed to appear before the court. 33.  On 20 August 2004 the Krasnogorsk Town Court refused to entertain the applicant's action in view of her failure to appear at the hearings of 23 July and 20 August 2004. 34.  Following an appeal by the applicant, on 26 April 2005 the Krasnogorsk Town Court quashed its decision of 20 August 2004, because there was no information in the case file recording that the applicant had been notified of the hearings of 23 July and 20 August 2004. The next hearing was set for 27 May 2005. 35.  On 27 May 2005 the hearing was adjourned until 8 July 2005 because the judge was sitting in unrelated proceedings. 36.  On 8 July 2005 the applicant challenged the judge, without success. The hearing was adjourned until an unspecified date. 37.  On 5 August 2005 the case was assigned to a different judge and a hearing was fixed for 25 October 2005. 38.  On 6 December 2005 the applicant amended her claims in so far as they concerned the amount to be paid to her in interest and in respect of non-pecuniary damage by the defendant. 39.  In the period between 7 December 2005 and 26 January 2006 hearings were adjourned on two occasions because the defendant had failed to appear. 40.  On 26 January 2006 the applicant waived some of her claims. The hearing was adjourned until 6 February 2006. 41.  On 6 February 2006 the Krasnogorsk Town Court partly granted the applicant's claims. The applicant appealed. 42.  The appeal hearing was scheduled for 18 July 2006. 43.  On 18 July 2006 the appeal hearing was adjourned until 14 August 2006 since both parties had failed to appear and the case file contained no proof that they had been properly notified of it. 44.  On 14 August 2006 the Moscow Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal.