4.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Korinthia. 5.  On 28 July 2000 he was involved in a car accident. On 20 November 2001 criminal proceedings were brought against him for manslaughter and bodily harm caused by a negligent act. 6.  On 15 November 2005 the Korinthos First Instance Criminal Court found the applicant guilty and sentenced him to a suspended prison sentence of sixteen months (judgment no. 3625/2005). The same day, the applicant lodged an appeal. 7.  By judgment dated 29 January 2008 the Korinthos Court of Appeal reduced his sentence to a suspended prison sentence of thirteen months (judgment no. 129/2008). 8.  On 25 February, 2008, the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. He challenged the reasoning of the appellate decision and alleged that his rights under Articles 6 §§ 2 and 3 (e) of the Convention had been violated. 9.  By judgment dated 12 June 2008 the Court of Cassation rejected the applicant’s appeal. It held that the appellate court’s decision was well reasoned and that there was no indication that the applicant’s defence rights had been infringed (judgment no. 1566/2008). This judgment was finalised on 9 July 2008.


5.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Kazan. 6.  In September 2009 the applicant left Uzbekistan for Russia looking for employment. On 8 September 2009 he arrived in the city of Kazan, Russia. 7.  On 24 December 2009 the Uzbek security service charged the applicant with attempting to overthrow the constitutional order, belonging to a religious group (the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan) and dissemination of subversive materials. 8.  On the same date, an Uzbek judge issued an arrest warrant against the applicant. His name was put on a wanted list. 9.  On 30 March 2010 the Russian police arrested the applicant, who had gone to the premises of the migration authority in order to apply for a temporary residence permit. The police relied on Articles 91 and 92 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCrP”) concerning the arrest of suspects. According to the respondent Government, the presence of the applicant’s name on the wanted list justified his arrest (Article 61 of the Minsk Convention). 10.  On the same date, the Uzbek authorities confirmed to the Russian authorities that the applicant’s name was still on the wanted list. 11.  A deputy town prosecutor applied to the Vakhitovskiy District Court of Kazan seeking the applicant’s detention with a view to extradition. On 1 April 2010 the District Court confirmed the lawfulness of the applicant’s arrest and authorised his detention until 8 May 2010 in anticipation of an eventual extradition request. The court referred to Articles 97 § 1, 99, 108 and 466 of the CCrP. The court noted that the applicant was a foreign national and had no permanent place of residence in Russia; a foreign court had issued an arrest warrant against him and his name had been put on a wanted list; he had fled justice in Uzbekistan; and thus there was a risk that he would flee again or continue his criminal activity. 12.  On 15 April 2010 the applicant applied to the Tatarstan Department of the Federal Migration Service for asylum. 13.  On 4 May 2010 the Uzbek Prosecutor General’s Office sent a formal extradition request to the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office. 14.  On 7 May 2010 the District Court examined a prosecutor’s request and extended the term of the applicant’s detention until 8 July 2010, with reference to Article 109 § 2 of the CCrP. 15.  Before the expiry of the previous detention order, for unspecified reasons on 25 May 2010 the District Court issued a new detention order, extending the applicant’s detention until 30 September 2010, with reference to Article 109 § 2 of the CCrP. 16.  The applicant considered that it was impracticable in such circumstances to appeal against the detention order of 7 May 2010. 17.  On 4 August 2010 the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office authorised the applicant’s extradition. 18.  The applicant was notified of this decision on 23 August 2010. He brought judicial review proceedings against the extradition order, claiming that as his asylum proceedings were pending, the enforcement of the extradition order was suspended. He also asserted that if extradited he would run a serious risk of torture or inhuman treatment. 19.  In the meantime, on 26 August 2010 the applicant was informed that his asylum request had been dismissed. He appealed to a higher migration authority. 20.  On 20 September 2010 the Supreme Court of Tatarstan held a hearing on the applicant’s appeal against the extradition order. The applicant’s counsel pleaded that in the event of his extradition the applicant would be subjected to torture, like many other individuals charged in relation to religious or extremist activities. On the same date the Supreme Court of Tatarstan dismissed the case, considering that the allegations of ill-treatment had been based on mere assumptions and that the applicant had applied for asylum only when criminal proceedings against him had already been pending in Uzbekistan. 21.  The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court of Russia. It appears that on an unspecified date it quashed the judgment of 20 September 2010 and ordered the re-examination of the extradition case. 22.  On 30 September 2010 the District Court extended the applicant’s detention until 30 November 2010. It is stated in the detention order that “if the defendant decides to lodge an appeal, he has the right to ask, within three days of receipt of the detention order, for his personal participation in the appeal hearing”. On 30 September 2010 the applicant also signed a note confirming receipt of a copy of the detention order and that he had been informed of his rights to “participate in the appeal hearing and to have legal assistance”. 23.  On 4 October 2010 the applicant’s lawyer lodged a statement of appeal, arguing that there was no evidence that the applicant would flee justice or reoffend; that his application for refugee status was pending; and that the prosecutor’s extension request had been submitted to the district court less than seven days before the expiry of the previous detention order, in breach of Article 109 § 8 of the CCrP. The statement of appeal did not contain any request for the lawyer’s and/or the applicant’s participation in the appeal hearing. 24.  On 5 October 2010 the prosecutor made observations in reply, stating that the applicant’s arguments had been unfounded and that the application for refugee status had been dismissed. 25.  According to the Government, the applicant and his counsel had been informed in advance of the date and time of the appeal hearing. On 8 October 2010 the Supreme Court of Tatarstan heard a prosecutor and upheld the detention order. Neither the applicant nor his lawyer had been present at the appeal hearing. 26.  On 25 November 2010 the district court extended the applicant’s detention to 30 January 2011. 27.  Having re-examined the extradition case, on 10 December 2010 the Supreme Court of Tatarstan annulled the extradition order. With reference to the international reports and other material submitted by the applicant and the European Court’s case-law on the matter, the court considered that there was a persistent practice of torture of detained suspects or convicts in Uzbekistan and that the applicant also faced a risk of such mistreatment. The court also noted that “in a number of judgments the European Court has held that the mere fact of detention in this country created a risk of ill-treatment”. 28.  The applicant was released on the same day. 29.  On 3 February 2011 the Supreme Court of Russia examined the prosecutor’s subsequent appeal and upheld the judgment of 10 December 2010. The appeal court noted that there had been a material difference between the criminal offences mentioned in the extradition request and the corresponding offences under the Russian Criminal Code; that the extradition order had been issued before the final decision had been taken on the applicant’s refugee application; and that there had been indications of a risk of ill-treatment in Uzbekistan, in particular in the absence of any relevant assurances on the part of the Uzbek authorities.


5.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Bucharest. 6.  Between 1994 and 1996 the applicant, in his capacity as the President of Bank B., facilitated the sponsoring of the Government by the bank in the production of a book promoting the image of Romania abroad. On 14 March 1997 the applicant was dismissed from his job. 7.  On 24 September 1996 the company O.P. filed a criminal complaint against the applicant, accusing him of abuse of authority (abuz în serviciu, under Article 248 of the Criminal Code) and misappropriation of funds (deturnare de fonduri, under Article 302 of the Criminal Code) in relation to the above-mentioned sponsorship contract. 8.  On 6 November 1996 the prosecutor attached to the Bucharest District Court took a statement from the applicant in connection with the allegations above. 9.  On 14 November 1996 the prosecutor decided not to start criminal proceedings as the facts in the case did not disclose the commission of a crime.
On the same date, the applicant was informed of the decision. 10.  On 26 September 1997 Bank B. filed a criminal complaint against the applicant for fraud (înşelăciune, under Article 215 of the Criminal Code) and abuse of authority (under Article 248 of the Criminal Code) in the handling of the same sponsorship contract mentioned above. 11.  On 9 January 1998 the applicant made a statement to the prosecutor. 12.  Witnesses’ and co-defendants’ depositions were taken in November 1996, November and December 1997, January, February, August and December 1998, and March and December 1999. 13.  On 2 February 1998 a criminal investigation for fraud was started in respect of the applicant. 14.  On 17 February 1998 the prosecutor attached to the Supreme Court of Justice enquired about French companies that had been involved in the publication of the book. He asked for evidence to be taken on commission (comisie rogatorie) by the prosecutor attached to the Paris Tribunal de Grande Instance. The request was reiterated on 13 October 1998. The documents were received from France on 13 November 1998. 15.  On 12 October 1998 the prosecutor attached to the Supreme Court of Justice overturned the prosecutor’s decisions of 14 November 1996 and 2 February 1998. He considered that as long as the decision of 14 November not to prosecute had not been overturned, the prosecutor could not have legally started the criminal prosecution on 2 February. He ordered the opening of a criminal prosecution for fraud through contracts. 16.  On 3 November 1999 the prosecutor attached to the Supreme Court of Justice changed the legal classification of the offence from fraud to abuse of authority. 17.  On 9 December 1999 the applicant was questioned by the prosecutor at the Supreme Court of Justice for the first time in connection with the new classification of the offence. On the same day the applicant was arrested and remanded in custody until 7 January 2000 on the prosecutor’s order. 18.  On 15 December 1999 the applicant (in the presence of the lawyer of his choice) was informed of the content of his criminal file. 19.  On 16 December 1999 the prosecutor attached to the Supreme Court of Justice issued an indictment for abuse of authority. 20.  The case was registered with the Bucharest County Court. Thirteen hearings took place before this court, from five of which the applicant was absent for medical reasons. On four other occasions the court postponed the oral hearings for various reasons, including requests made by the applicant’s counsel. 21.  On 27 February 2001 the Bucharest County Court declared null and void the prosecution acts, referred the case back to the prosecutor and ordered him to carry out a complete review of the facts under investigation (refacerea urmăririi penale). Upon an appeal by the prosecutor, in a final decision of 22 May 2001 the Bucharest Court of Appeal considered that only the indictment of 16 December 1999 was null and void and therefore referred the case back to the prosecutor and ordered him to review that act.
The courts found that the prosecutor had not allowed enough time for the applicant to familiarise himself with the prosecution file and to formulate his requests, if any, in connection with it, and that the prosecutor had acted in haste in indicting the applicant only one day after presenting him with the file. 22.  On 8 January 2002 the applicant made a statement to the prosecutor. 23.  On 18 April 2002 the prosecutor attached to the Supreme Court of Justice decided to end the prosecution against the applicant, on the ground that the legal relationships under examination were of a civil and commercial nature and not of a criminal nature.
On 22 April 2002 he informed the applicant of his decision. 24.  On 10 December 1999 the applicant contested his detention pending trial. The Bucharest County Court ordered his release on 14 December 1999. However, this decision was overturned by the Bucharest Court of Appeal in a final decision of 28 December 1999. The applicant remained in custody. 25.  He later requested the Bucharest County Court to revoke the order for his detention. On 7 January 2000 the court ordered his release from custody. The prosecutor appealed and the County Court’s decision was quashed by the Bucharest Court of Appeal on 24 January 2000. The applicant’s detention order was extended by thirty days. 26.  Upon the applicant’s request, the County Court concluded, on 2 February 2000, that his detention order had expired on 7 January. In a final decision of 15 February 2000 the Bucharest Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by the prosecutor. 27.  Consequently, on 15 February 2000 the applicant was released from custody. 28.  The applicant brought an action against Bank B. claiming compensation for illegal dismissal. In a final decision of 3 March 2003 the Bucharest County Court awarded the applicant 103,992 United States Dollars (USD) in respect of pecuniary damage (loss of earnings) and USD 33,000 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. 29.  On 9 April 2004 the applicant lodged an action against the State, under Articles 504-505 of the Code of Criminal Proceedings, 998-999 and 1000 § 3 of the Civil Code and the Convention, seeking compensation for unlawful detention. He claimed 10,000,000,000 Old Romanian Lei (ROL) in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, of which USD 12,999 represented salaries that he had not received from Bank B. during his arrest. 30.  On 24 September 2004 the Bucharest County Court allowed the action and granted the applicant ROL 250,000,000 in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. It held:
“The evidence in the file confirms the applicant’s right to compensation under Article 504 of the [Code of Criminal Procedure] for his detention...
The applicant’s detention for 30 days on the prosecutor’s order; the detention from 7 January 2000 to 15 February 2000 which, as decided by means of a final decision, contravened the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Constitution, which required that the arrest be ordered by a “judicial officer” and extended by a court...; and lastly, the decision to terminate the criminal prosecution against the plaintiff on the ground that the facts committed did not fall within the scope of the criminal law, required the State’s responsibility for the judicial error made in the case...
Concerning the salaries not received during his arrest, ... the court notes that the applicant was released from his position on 14 March 1997, [Bank B.’]s criminal complaint being posterior to his dismissal. Therefore ... the court considers that there is no causal link between the applicant’s arrest and loss of revenue.
Moreover, in the Bucharest County Court’s decision of 3 March 2003, ... [which became final], a causal link was established between ... the plaintiff’s dismissal of 14 March 1997, which had not been a consequence of his detention, and the damage incurred, that is, the loss of earnings; this decision awarded compensation for the damage...
...[ [U]nlawful arrest and prosecution causes moral, social and professional suffering, and breaches dignity, honour and individual freedom, human rights protected by law. However, the amounts claimed by the plaintiff exceed by far the awards made by the European Court ... for just satisfaction under the ... Convention, the instrument invoked by the plaintiff as the legal basis for his claims.” 31.  On 12 October 2005 the Bucharest Court of Appeal dismissed appeals lodged by the parties, upheld the County Court’s arguments and confirmed that:
“The plaintiff’s deprivation of liberty affected his honour and reputation, and the reparation can and must be made by a financial award.” 32.  In a final decision of 22 February 2007 the High Court of Cassation and Justice (the former Supreme Court of Justice) dismissed for being out of time and ill-founded respectively, appeals on points of law lodged by the applicant and the State. 33.  On 31 October 2007 the Government informed the Court that the applicant should request the execution of the final decision and communicate to the Ministry of Finance details of a valid bank account where the money could be transferred, but that to date no such steps had been taken by the applicant. 34.  The newspaper “România Liberă” presented in its 17 March 1997 edition the opinion of various political figures on the applicant’s dismissal and arrest:
“The former president of [Bank B.], Răzvan Temeşan, was called on Friday for questioning by the police, informs prosecutor G.M. from the General Prosecutor’s Office. G.M. pointed out that the hearings might continue in the following days.
The Prosecutor’s Office imposed an obligation on Răzvan Temeşan not to leave Bucharest for thirty days. The president of [Bank B.] was accused, in the press, of bad management... S.D., the president of the FPS [the State Property Fund], stated that the members of [Bank B.]’s executive board had been asked on Friday ... to dismiss Răzvan Temeşan ... from his position... C.A., deputy president of the PSDR [the Romanian Social-Democrat Party]: ‘We only comment when we know the exact content of the file. In the case at hand we can only say that, in principle, the investigation of Răzvan Temeşan is part of the general fight against corruption. ... [H]owever, his responsibility shall be determined after investigations by the police and the Prosecutor’s Office...’ H.R., leader of the PL ‘93 [the Liberal Party ‘93]: ‘I believe it is a good thing that the present political power, unlike the former one, is allowing the investigation of fraud in the banking world...’
The Romanian National Bank (BNR) considers that the changes in the administration of [Bank B.] reflect the shareholders’ right, in particular FPS’s right, as the major shareholder, to decide upon the bank’s fate, stated A.V., director for communications of BNR... I.D., president of PNTCD [the Agrarian Party] and CDR [the Romanian Democratic Convention]: ‘The facts surrounding Răzvan Temeşan were predictable. Have you not seen what the press published? Maybe it would have been better not to coincide his dismissal with the start of the criminal investigation by the police and the Prosecutor’s Office. But these authorities know better how to proceed...’” 35.  On 15 March 1997 the newspaper “Jurnalul Naţional” published an article on the applicant’s dismissal and arrest. The article presented the point of view expressed during a TV show on corruption and organised crime by E.C., the President of Romania at that time. He stated mainly that:
“Our objective is to save and protect the Romanian banking system, which needs consolidation. As from next week important action against corruption shall commence...
Our decision was to fight corruption from the top to the bottom and the action will continue.” 36.  On a different occasion E.M. reiterated his intention to have criminal investigations started in relation to all the corruption scandals that had previously only been investigated by the press. 37.  Other similar positions, as well as interviews with the applicant, were reported in the press. 38.  On 21 January 2000 the Minister of Justice told the newspaper “Cotidianul” that the courts should be more careful when dealing with requests for release from pre-trial detention and noted that some of the most inappropriate decisions to release individuals from custody had been adopted by the Bucharest County Court.


8.  The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Warsaw. 9.  On 13 July 1995 the applicant filed with the Warszawa-Mokotów District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) an action against the Office of the Council of Ministers (Urząd Rady Ministrów) and a housing co-operative K. In her action she requested, inter alia, that a flat be granted to her, submitting that the area of the one allocated to her by co-operative K, on the basis of an agreement between it and the Office of the Council of Ministers, allegedly differed from the area indicated in the decision granting it to her. The applicant also claimed damages for losses allegedly sustained by her as a result of the increase of construction costs. 10.  On 18 July 1995 the District Court declared its lack of jurisdiction over the case and transmitted it to the Warsaw Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki). 11.  On 23 September 1995 the court ordered the applicant to indicate the value of her claim (wartość przedmiotu sporu). On 5 October 1995 the court again ordered her to indicate that value, considering that the information provided by her in reply to the previous court order was not satisfactory. In her letter of 16 October 1995 the applicant indicated the value of her claim. On 8 November 1995 she was again ordered to provide certain information concerning the value of the claim. On 23 November 1995 she submitted the relevant information. 12.  On 27 November 1995 the Warsaw Regional Court, having examined the applicant's request, exempted her partially from the court fees. She appealed against that decision. On 27 February 1996 the Warsaw Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) dismissed her appeal. 13.  On 13 May 1996 the Warsaw Regional Court refused the applicant's request for free legal assistance, considering that at that stage of the proceedings legal assistance was not necessary. The court noted that neither the circumstances of the case, nor the applicant's financial situation called for granting her a legal-aid lawyer. The applicant appealed against that decision. On 19 July 1996 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed her appeal. 14.  On 9 October 1996 the Warsaw Regional Court held a hearing. On the same day the defendant co-operative lodged a counter-claim against the applicant. 15.  In the pleadings of 15 December 1996 the applicant's lawyer modified her action and raised additional claims, inter alia, for compensation for the allegedly deceitful taking over of her previous flat by the Office of the Council of Ministers. 16.  On 30 July 1997 the applicant requested an interim measure. On 13 August 1997 the court dismissed her request. 17.  On 19 January 1998 the applicant filed another request for an interim measure. On 23 January 1998 the court dismissed it. The applicant appealed against that decision and requested exemption from the court fees relating to that appeal. 18.  On 24 March 1998 the court held a hearing. 19.  On 3 August 1998 the defendant co-operative's lawyer requested the court not to fix hearings between 15 September and 15 October 1998 because of his vacation plans. 20.  On 30 September 1998 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal against the decision of 23 January 1998. 21.  On 17 February 1999 the applicant submitted a request for legal assistance, stating that she had not been able to contact a lawyer chosen by her. 22.  At the hearing held on 9 June 1999 the court ordered an expert opinion concerning the construction costs. 23.  On 2 July 1999 it requested the Office of the President of the Council of Ministers to submit documentation concerning the financing of the construction of the applicant's house. On 29 December 1999 the court repeated its request. 24.  On 14 January 2000 the Office informed the court that it did not possess any such documentation. 25.  On 19 January and 3 April 2001 the court held hearings. 26.  On 22 February 2001, in reply to the applicant's complaint, the Ministry of Justice admitted that the proceedings were lengthy and informed her that they had been taken under the President of the Regional Court's administrative supervision. 27.  On 10 April 2001 the applicant modified her claim and requested exemption from court fees. 28.  On 18 June 2001 the court refused her request. On 30 August 2001 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal against that decision. 29.  On 6 December 2001 the Regional Court summoned the applicant to pay a fee relating to her extended claim. 30.  On 24 January 2002 it declined her request for an interim order. 31.  On 18 June 2002 the court stayed the proceedings. On 9 December 2002 the Court of Appeal quashed that decision. 32.  On 27 January 2003 the Regional Court rejected the applicant's additional claim of 10 April 2002, since she had not paid the due fee. On the same day it ordered an expert opinion. 33.  On 10 April 2003 the court granted the applicant partial exemption from court costs. 34.  The proceedings are still pending.


7.  The applicant was born in 1968. 8.  The applicant is the father of two children, K. born in 1988 and H. born in October 1990. He and the mother of the children divorced in January 1992, having lived apart since November 1990 and K. having lived with his mother and H. with the applicant. The applicant assumed the care of H. some ten days after her birth. According to an agreement reached in connection with the separation and confirmed by the Social Welfare Board, K. was to remain with the mother and H. with the applicant. The parents had joint custody of the children. 9.  M. cohabited with the applicant from March to October 1994. Following their separation, she contacted the social welfare authorities, alleging that H. had been sexually abused by the applicant. The child's stories and behaviour had attracted M.'s attention and she had observed H. frequently touching her genitals and masturbating when going to sleep. M. also reported her suspicions to the family day care nurse. The applicant was not informed of the reports. 10.  On 16 November 1994 during a visit to the day carer's, social welfare officials requested her to monitor H.'s behaviour, which according to her was deviant in that she masturbated before going to sleep. The officials witnessed the same during their visit. On 17 January 1995 they again visited the day carer, who now had kept records of H.'s behaviour. Based on these notes and their own observations, the officials consulted the Family Advice Centre (perheneuvola, familjerådgivningen) and decided to organise H.'s interviews and other examinations owing to a suspicion that she had been sexually abused. The applicant was not informed of those visits. 11.  On 27 January 1995 when arriving to pick H. up from day care, the applicant was directed to the Family Advice Centre, where he was informed of the suspicion of sexual abuse. While denying the suspected abuse, he consented to an examination of H. but he did not accept that her place of residence should change for the period of examination. 12.  The applicant was then informed that H. was to stay with her mother, who was her other legal custodian. According to the Government, he commented on H.'s placement by saying that if H. could not stay with him, the best place for her was with her mother. He was also told that if he agreed on H.'s placement with her mother, the social welfare authorities would not issue a public care order. According to the Government, he consented to H.'s placement with her mother. This was contested by the applicant. 13.  On 2 February 1995 the social welfare authorities were contacted by the applicant's counsel who was told that if the applicant opposed H.'s placement with her mother during the examinations, the alternative was to issue an emergency care order. On the same day counsel withdrew the applicant's alleged consent to H.'s placement with her mother, following which a meeting with the parents was held at the Family Advice Centre on 3 February 1995. 14.  It is undisputed that from 3 February 1995 there was no consent by the applicant to H.'s placement outside his home. The parties disagree as to whether the applicant consented to H.'s placement with her mother for the period 27 January and 2 February 1995. 15.  By an emergency order issued on 8 February 1995 the senior social welfare official placed H. in public care with her mother, pursuant to section 18 of the Child Welfare Act (lastensuojelulaki, barnskyddslagen; Act no. 683/1983). The further consideration of the matter was referred to the Tampere Social Welfare and Health Care Board (hereinafter “the Board”; sosiaali- ja terveyslautakunta, social- och hälsovårdsnämnden), pursuant to section 17 of the said Act. The emergency care order referred to the need to conduct the necessary examinations in the Family Advice Centre in the light of the suspicion that H. had been sexually abused. The decision had not been written on the form approved by the Ministry for Social Welfare and Health Affairs in pursuance of section 14 of the Child Welfare Decree (lastensuojeluasetus, barnskyddsförordningen; Act no. 1010/1983). According to the notice of appeal incorporated into the decision, an appeal could be filed with the Board within fourteen days. 16.  In its decision of 24 February 1995 the Board ordered that the emergency care should continue until 27 March 1995 for the purpose of concluding the examinations. According to the notice of appeal attached to the decision, an appeal could be addressed to the County Administrative Court within thirty days. 17.  The Family Advice Centre's examinations commenced on 7 February 1995 and were completed on 24 March 1995. Two psychologists, J.K. and M.R., and a child psychiatrist, Dr A-K.R., stated in their written opinion of 24 March 1995 that it was highly likely that H. had been sexually abused by the applicant. He was informed of the results of the examination in a meeting on the same day during which J.K., H.'s mother and a friend of the applicant's were also present. The examinations resulted in a conclusion that H. should be placed in public care away from the applicant. 18.  On 24 and 27 March 1995 the Board heard the parents and the paternal grandmother. The applicant again denied having abused H., whereas the paternal grandmother had not noticed anything exceptional in H.'s behaviour. Following the emergency care, she had repeatedly inquired into H.'s “unusual talking” and had come to the conclusion that it had been triggered by something which had occurred in day care. She agreed to assume the care of H. in her home, as did the mother, who further stated that she had never accepted that H. should live with the applicant and that she had tried to avoid any contact with the applicant and his family. He again did not agree that H. would be staying with her mother. On 27 March 1995 the Board confirmed the care order in accordance with section 17 (2) of the Child Welfare Act. It reasoned:
“The examination of [H.] in the Family Advice Centre has come to an end ... . The examination results confirm the impression that the child has been sexually abused and that her development would be seriously jeopardised if she continued living with her father. In its opinion the Family Advice Centre recommends that the child be placed in public care in order to ensure her healthy development (appendix no. 5).
It is not possible to exclude possible abuse by providing open-care support measures.
Placing the child in public care is a precondition for ensuring that she receives care corresponding to her stage of development.” 19.  The Board referred its decision to the Häme County Administrative Court (lääninoikeus, länsrätten) and the applicant filed an appeal, to which he attached two medical opinions. The first opinion was issued by a general practitioner, Dr A.H., on 3 March 1995, who had seen H. four times at a child welfare clinic, the last occasion being in December 1993. The other opinion was given by a nurse, I.L., of the same clinic on 7 March 1995. She had seen H. last in October 1994. The opinions found nothing exceptional in the child's development and no failure on the part of the applicant in providing her with proper care. Given that H. had been staying with her mother during the period of examination, the applicant argued that it could not be excluded that the latter had influenced the child's behaviour. He reiterated that although H. had been monitored while in day care, he had not been informed of the suspicions until January 1995. He furthermore argued that he had not been heard in accordance with section 15 of the Administrative Procedure Act (hallintomenettelylaki, lagen om förvaltningsförfarande; Act no. 598/1982). When invited to the meeting on 27 January 1995, he had not been informed of its real purpose, namely the plan to take the child into public care. He had allegedly received a copy of the emergency care order of 8 February 1995 only after repeated requests and the paragraph indicating the possibility for him to have it reviewed by the Board had allegedly been crossed out. 20.  On 29 June 1995 social welfare officials and H.'s mother agreed that H. would stay with her paternal grandfather and his partner for two weeks in July 1995 owing to the mother's fatigue. On 18 July 1995 H.'s maternal grandmother informed the social welfare authorities that H. had not returned home the day before. They unsuccessfully tried to contact the mother, following which on 25 July 1995 they agreed with the paternal grandfather that H. would stay with him until the mother could be reached or until the situation could be evaluated. On 17 August 1995 the mother informed the authorities that H. could not stay with her as the situation had drained her strength. She suggested that H. should stay with her paternal grandfather. The same day social welfare officials visited H.'s paternal grandfather and his partner, a family day care nurse by profession, who informed the officials that they could not take care of H. in the long term. It was agreed, however, that H. would stay with them until the County Administrative Court had reached its decision. 21.  On 21 August 1995 the applicant informed the social welfare authorities that he did not approve of the public care. In an opinion of the same day a senior physician, Dr A.L., found H. to be normally developed both physically and mentally. 22.  In a hearing on 31 August 1995 the County Administrative Court examined six witnesses. The psychologist M.R. testified to having met once with H., following which the examination had been continued by the psychologist J.K., who had met her on a few occasions. As the child had appeared to shy away from male interviewers, Dr A-K.R. had eventually taken over the investigation. He further testified that the child's statements to Dr A-K.R., who had recorded the interviews on audio tape, had been consistent with her earlier statements to the day carer. 23.  The paternal grandmother testified that from March 1995 H. had started behaving in an explicitly sexual manner, referring to games played with another child in day care. H. had also referred to the day carer's husband, who had been tickling her. She also testified that the former girlfriend M. at the time of the separation in October 1994 had threatened to “seek revenge” on the applicant. 24.  The day carer testified that H. had continued to masturbate after having been removed from the applicant's home. She denied ever having left H. alone with her husband, which was contested by the applicant. 25.  The applicant requested that the court refer H. to a child psychiatrist for examination. The Board did not object to such an examination as long as it was conducted by a public institution. The applicant contended that in the autumn of 1994 he had, of his own motion, discussed his daughter's behaviour with a social welfare official in another local office, following which he had requested the day carer to observe H. particularly in this respect. The day carer denied that such a conversation had taken place. 26.  The County Administrative Court granted the applicant cost-free counsel retroactively from 27 March 1995. It however rejected his request for a further medical examination of H. By its decision of 29 September 1995 it upheld the care order, reiterating the contents of M.'s report of October 1994 and the observations made by the day carer. From the summer of 1994 the day carer had seen H. frequently masturbating during naps and when playing. According to her notes, such masturbation had lasted from fifteen minutes to one and a half hours at a time. H. had also repeatedly been saying that the applicant had been tickling her in her buttocks and kissing her with his tongue. 27.  The County Administrative Court's reasons for upholding the care order read in extenso as follows:
“According to the evidence available, the conditions in the home of [H.] have seriously jeopardised her health and development. Open-care support measures have not been possible. The public care of [H.] and her placement outside her original home must be considered to be in her interests.” 28.  The County Administrative Court's decision was notified to the Board on 5 October 1995. The following day social welfare officials presented themselves without giving any advance notice in the paternal grandfather's and his partner's home, removed H. and temporarily placed her in a substitute family. 29.  The applicant appealed against the County Administrative Court's decision, requesting a hearing before the Supreme Administrative Court (korkein hallinto-oikeus, högsta förvaltningsdomstolen) and a further examination of H. 30.  In a meeting on 11 October 1995 between social welfare officials and the applicant, he was informed that H. had been transferred to a substitute family, to which he objected. The mother consented to the placement. 31.  On 6 November 1995 the applicant removed H. from the venue of a supervised meeting and hid her during the following eleven months. On 1 December 1995 he and H. underwent an examination by a psychologist, H.H., who in a written opinion of 22 January 1996 found H. to be more developed than an average child of her age. She was balanced, very attached to her father and there was no indication of her having been sexually abused. 32.  Two days after the abduction the Board decided that the public care should be implemented in the substitute family. The Board did not accept the paternal grandfather's and his partner's offer to care for H. It noted that the applicant had been heard in person on 11 October 1995. He had been invited to attend the Board's meeting, but he sent instead a letter that was read out at the meeting. 33.  On 30 November 1995 the Board filed observations in reply to the applicant's appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court. On 19 January 1996 he submitted a rejoinder. 34.  On 27 February 1996 the court invited the National Authority for Medicolegal Affairs (hereinafter “the Medicolegal Authority”; terveydenhuollon oikeusturvakeskus, rättsskyddscentralen för hälsovården) to submit a written opinion on the conduct of the examinations by the Family Advice Centre, which was subsequently communicated to the applicant for comments. 35.  Meanwhile, and following the applicant's complaint as to the examinations by the Family Advice Centre, the Medicolegal Authority had obtained expert opinions from its standing experts, a professor in child psychiatry, Dr E.R., and a psychologist T.P., as well as a written opinion from Dr A-K.R. and J.K. In an opinion dated 30 January 1996 Dr E.R. noted inter alia the following:
“The examinations carried out on H. were initiated on account of 'the sexual games' with the father, of which the child had spoken to the day care nurse, and on account of H.'s frequent masturbation in day care, especially before taking a nap. Although masturbation is relatively usual at that age, it can no longer be considered to merely relate to the age of the child when it is so extensive and intense as described by the day care nurse, especially not where the masturbation is placed in the context of the child's description of 'sexual games' at home. In this light I find the initiation of the examinations concerning sexual abuse a justified measure. .... [Dr A - K.R's] questions [that were put to H.] were not leading although they tended to have an element of pressure given that they were repeated several times as the girl was unable to answer them. ... Whether the girl has undergone psychological tests, either projective tests or tests measuring the child's abilities, remains unclear. Also the contents of [H.'s] playing remain unclear. Thus, I cannot assess the quality of psychologist [J.K.'s] examinations. Pyschologist [M.R.] has met both parents, but the documents I have received do not disclose any detailed description of the contents of the discussions, thus preventing me from assessing also the quality of these discussions. With the exception of the interview carried out by child psychiatrist [A-K.R.], which I find appropriate, I cannot take a position on the nature of the examinations. ...The decision to take the child into public care was made in an appropriate manner by the social welfare authorities, considering that the father had proved to be the likely abuser of the child...” 36.  On 21 May 1996 the Medicolegal Authority gave the applicant permission to consult, during 24 hours, four tape recordings from the examination of H. at the Family Advice Centre. He was not allowed to copy the tapes but had them transcribed. 37.  On 3 June 1996 the Supreme Administrative Court invited the applicant's further observations. In his observations of 19 June 1996 he submitted a written opinion by the psychologist H.H., issued following the abduction. He also requested a hearing including the taking of witness evidence from the former girlfriend M., Dr A-K.R., the psychologist H.H. and Dr G.A., a child psychiatrist and consultant to the Ministry for Social and Health Affairs. Moreover, he objected to not having been provided with the full documentation underlying the Medicolegal Authority's opinion such as Dr A-K.R.'s and the psychologist J.K.'s observations. Lastly, he relied on a written opinion, dated 17 June 1996, by Dr G.A., who considered that the examination by the Family Advice Centre had not shown that H. had been sexually abused by the applicant. On the contrary, it transpired from the transcripts of the interviews that she had been led and pressurised by Dr A-K.R., the clear goal being to detect sexual abuse. Not all interviews had been recorded. Clinical annotations were missing from the records, which rendered it impossible for Dr G.A. to assess the credibility of the Family Advice Centre's examinations. 38.  Following the Medicolegal Authority's request for an additional opinion, Dr E.R. and the psychologist T.P., in their joint opinion of 8 July 1996, expressed the view that the decision to take H. into care and place her first with her mother and later in a substitute family, had been justified and appropriate, considering both H.'s own words and her behaviour. They also took the view that the Family Advice Centre should have considered more thoroughly the conditions for an additional examination of H. given the fact that the psychological examination and the interviews with the parents had been insufficient. Further, they took a stand regarding the examinations carried out on the applicant's request during H.'s abduction by the psychologist H.H. As noted above, the applicant relied on a written opinion of H.H in the Supreme Administrative Court.
“... Psychologist H.H. has carried out psychological examinations on both H. and her father. A written opinion has been given on account of these examinations. It indicates that H.H. had examined the father on two occasions and the child on one occasion. It is questionable especially in the context of suspected sexual abuse that the same psychologist tests both the suspect and the abused child. .... The examinations were carried out without consultation with those involved in the earlier examination, which in our opinion shows professionally unethical and inconsiderate conduct on the part of the examining psychologist. ....” 39.  In its further opinion of 29 July 1996 to the Supreme Administrative Court the Medicolegal Authority deemed the Family Advice Centre's examinations in 1995 to have been necessary and based on a reasonable suspicion of sexual abuse. The Medicolegal Authority had obtained the audio tapes and documents produced by the Family Advice Centre and had heard the psychologist J.K., Dr A-K.R. and the psychologist M.R. in writing. It had also obtained the above joint opinion of its standing experts. 40.  On 1 August 1996 the Supreme Administrative Court invited the applicant's further observations. In his observations of 19 August 1996 he noted that he had not been provided with copies of the above supplementary opinion by Dr A-K.R and the psychologist M.R. 41.  H. was missing from the authorities until 6 October 1996 when the police fetched her from the applicant's work place. She was placed in a family support centre (perhetukikeskus, familjestödscenter). The applicant was informed of her whereabouts on 22 October 1996. 42.  On 8 October 1996 H. underwent an examination in a university hospital. A paediatrician, Dr H.L., stated in her written opinion of 21 November 1996 that she had not found any signs of sexual abuse in her examinations and found H.'s behaviour to be normal for her age. Dr H.L. did not, however, take any stand regarding the earlier medical opinions. 43.  In a meeting on 21 October 1996 between social welfare officials and staff of the university hospital hesitation was expressed about undertaking new examinations concerning the alleged sexual abuse. 44.  From 8 October 1996 to 16 July 1997 H. underwent child psychiatric examinations at the Tampere university hospital on the basis of a referral dating back to December 1995. During that period the applicant was heard at the surgery on 16 December 1996 and 28 April 1997 and he was consulted over the telephone on 20 February and 1 April 1997. In her written opinion of 15 September 1997 a child psychiatrist, Dr M.R., described H. as a very lonely 6 year old girl, whose basic human relationships with her parents and her brother and other persons close to her were coloured by argument and conflict. The examinations did not concern the sexual abuse suspicion as such an examination would have damaged the child's mental health. H. was considered to suffer from a severe stress reaction and to have adjustment difficulties and she was in need of possibly long-lasting child psychiatric treatment. The opinion recommended child welfare measures with a view to protecting the child. 45.  On 7 November 1996 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's request for an oral hearing and a further examination of H., and upheld the County Administrative Court's decision with the following reasons:
“Since an oral hearing was held before the County Administrative Court, there is no reason to hold one before the Supreme Administrative Court.
In view of the opinions already obtained there is no need to obtain an additional opinion.
For the reasons given in the County Administrative Court's decision and considering, moreover, the disturbed behaviour of [H.], the Supreme Administrative Court considers that the conditions stated in section 16 of the Child Welfare Act have been met as regards the public care order issued on 27 March 1995. Accordingly, and in view of the requests in the matter, the evidence obtained, and the legal provisions invoked by the County Administrative Court, there is no reason to amend its decision.” 46.  In a meeting with social welfare officials on 17 December 1996 the applicant was informed that H., who was diagnosed as suffering from post-traumatic stress, would be moved out of the family support centre within six months. 47.  On 24 April 1997 in a meeting with social welfare officials, the applicant was informed that a substitute family home had been found and he was invited to comment in writing on the intention to transfer H. there. 48.  On the same day he requested the Board to terminate the public care as being no longer justified. He submitted that H.'s initial examination in the Family Advice Centre had been conducted on the basis of the preconceived idea that sexual abuse had taken place. This suspicion had been categorically refuted in the written opinions of Dr G.A. and the psychologist H.H. H.'s behavioural disturbance had not been shown to result from the conditions in the applicant's home. Before the taking into care she had not displayed any signs of being disturbed. Moreover, her wish to continue living with him had been recorded repeatedly. 49.  On 13 May 1997 the senior social welfare official refused the applicant's request that the public care be terminated, being of the view that no alternative care solution existed. Open-care assistance would be insufficient for ensuring the child's healthy physical and mental development. By placing H. in substitute care, the authorities were seeking to provide her with a secure and home-like growing environment and to ensure her mental rehabilitation as well as a healthy development corresponding to her age. Having received the decision, the applicant pursued his request before the Board. 50.  In his submission of 19 May 1997 he objected to the intended transfer of H. to a substitute family home and proposed that she be placed in the family of her former day care nurse, who had consented to receiving her. H.'s mother again consented to the transfer to a substitute family home. 51.  On 21 May 1997 the Board decided to transfer H. to the substitute family home. Her removal took place on the following day. The Board's decision stated, inter alia, that:
“According to M.R., the examining doctor of the Tampere university hospital, H. suffered from post-traumatic stress, inter alia, because of the abduction, and for the purpose of rehabilitation H. should be provided with a safe home-like growing environment. No suitable substitute family was found that could have taken the child, inter alia, because of the abduction threat by the father. A family home was found which has a home-like atmosphere and has long experience of the care of different children taken into public care. In the family both parents are at home, looking after the children.” 52.  On 26 June 1997 the Board also confirmed the official's refusal to terminate the public care, relying on the reasons given in the official's decision. It further noted that the care order had been triggered by the disturbed behaviour which H. had been repeatedly displaying during 1994. From the sexual point of view her symptoms had differed from those of other children of her age. She had been placed in public care on the basis of the Family Advice Centre's examinations. Her growing environment had been jeopardising her healthy development and open-care assistance had been considered insufficient. 53.  The applicant appealed against the Board's decisions of 21 May and 26 June 1997, arguing that it had failed to hear H. and the other interested parties. In considering that there was no alternative to the public care and in finding open-care assistance insufficient the Board had based itself on events which had occurred two years ago, without obtaining any fresh evidence as to the justification for its decisions. He furthermore recalled that, when H. had been removed from him in October 1996, the social welfare officials had requested her fresh examination in the clinic in view of the expert opinions submitted by him. However, after the Supreme Administrative Court had rejected his final appeal against the care order, social welfare officials had allegedly amended their request to the clinic, asking instead that H. receive treatment according to their instructions. 54.  On 16 July 1997 in a meeting involving social welfare officials, the substitute parents and medical staff, it was observed that according to the patient records of the clinic H.'s symptoms, which had already abated in the family support centre, had continued to diminish in the substitute family home. 55.  On 30 October 1997 the County Administrative Court heard thirteen witnesses. It had at its disposal, inter alia, a written opinion of a psychologist, E.S., whom the personnel of the family home had consulted. On 5 December 1997 it rejected the applicant's appeal against the decision to transfer H. to the substitute family home. It gave the following reasons:
“... Having been taken into public care, [H.] was officially placed in a substitute family from 6 October 1995 to 6 October 1996. In reality she was a fugitive with her father from 6 November 1995 to 6 October 1996, when she was placed in a family support centre.
A doctor of the university hospital who examined [H.] after her escape journey considered that she should be provided with secure conditions resembling a home. Her individual nurse at the family support centre has considered the placing of H. in a substitute family to be in her best interests.
On the basis of the aforementioned and, in particular, given [H.'s] age and the fact that she will be beginning school, the decision to change the premises for implementing the public care ... has been in her best interests.” 56.  The County Administrative Court also rejected the appeal against the decision not to terminate the public care. It reasoned as follows:
“On 6 November 1995 [the applicant] abducted [H.], who had been placed in the care of the Board, and was hiding her at different locations until 6 October 1996. After the escape journey [H.] was diagnosed as suffering from various behavioural disturbances, a serious post-traumatic stress syndrome and adjustment difficulties. Throughout her public care it has been difficult to initiate cooperation between the social authorities and [the applicant]. According to the evidence presented, [H.] has adjusted well to the substitute home. In this situation the decision to maintain the public care has been in her best interests.” 57.  The applicant appealed further, requesting an oral hearing before the Supreme Administrative Court. He argued, inter alia, that H. should have been heard prior to the Board's decisions. 58.  In response to the applicant's further query as to when the public care would be terminated, it was noted in the care plan of 24 April 1998 that H. was in the process of settling into the substitute family home. She was doing well in school and she would be able to stay in the family home as long as she needed to. It was also stated in the care plan that the social welfare authorities would consult child psychiatric experts in order to determine H.'s long-term needs as to whether she needed a long-term placement or whether the care could be terminated. 59.  In the spring of 1998 social welfare officials inspected the home of the applicant and his then common-law spouse. It appears that no report was made. 60.  In a meeting on 12 June 1998, which the applicant had not been invited to attend, social welfare officials and staff of the hospital and the Family Advice Centre agreed that the symptoms displayed by H. “more than likely” resulted from her having been subjected to sexual abuse. By now the substitute care had provided H. with sufficient security and in the prevailing circumstances she would be able to develop into a balanced young person and adult. A termination of her public care could have unforeseeable consequences. Her meetings with the applicant would be supported also in the future. 61.  On 11 January 1999 the Supreme Administrative Court, without having held an oral hearing, rejected the applicant's appeal against the County Administrative Court's decision of 5 December 1997. The court found the various documentary evidence and the evidence taken at the lower court's hearing sufficient for a ruling as follows:
“Section 17, subsection 1 of the Child Welfare Act provides that the Social Welfare Board must, whenever possible in view of the child's age and level of development, clarify his or her own wishes and opinion, and afford a child who has reached the age of twelve as well as his or her parents the opportunity to be heard, before a decision as to the child's placement in public care outside his or her home or as to whether to terminate such care. Considering that [H.] underwent examinations at the child psychiatric clinic of a university hospital and that, according to the results, she was suffering from a serious stress reaction and an adjustment difficulty, and considering that, according to [the Board's] decision of 21 May 1997 she had stated, after an introductory visit, that she was willing to move to the family home, although her opinion has later varied, her opinion has been clarified in accordance with the requirements of the aforementioned provision of the law.
Before the challenged decisions were reached the parties were afforded an opportunity to be heard. In the County Administrative Court an opportunity to be heard was provided and an oral hearing was held. The Supreme Administrative Court has further afforded the applicant an opportunity to consult all documents in the case. Accordingly, he has been provided with the material which has affected the decision.
Section 1 of the Child Welfare Act provides that a child is entitled to a secure and stimulating growth environment as well as to a harmonious and well-balanced development, and has a priority right to protection. Considering the evidence presented in respect of the reasons leading to the public care order, [H.'s] mental symptoms and the changes which have occurred in her life, the conditions for maintaining her public care and changing the premises of the care outside her home, as stipulated in sections 16 and 20 of the Child Welfare Act, existed at that stage. On these grounds and considering the reasons and legal provisions relied upon in the County Administrative Court's decision, there is no reason to amend the outcome of that decision.” 62.  In the care plan meeting on 15 January 1999 and following the applicant's request that the public care be terminated, it was agreed that the social welfare authorities would hold a meeting with child psychiatric experts to assess when it would be best to carry out the examinations in the child psychiatric family ward at the university hospital. 63.  On 28 January 1999 the social welfare authorities remitted the applicant and H. for an examination at the ward. The examination with regard to the applicant's parenting skills, his interaction with H. and H.'s psychological state and need for treatment took place in December 1999. In their opinion of 3 February 2000 Drs P.P-A. and E.K. considered, inter alia, that H.'s mental state had clearly improved during her placement in public care to which she seemed to have adjusted well. She was still suffering from a serious emotional disturbance which would require at least one or two psychotherapy sessions a week during the next two or three years. The relationship between her and the applicant displayed a certain inhibition and distance but the conditions for their bonding to improve were present. H. would need long-term individual therapy and long-lasting cooperation between the family, the carers and the child welfare authorities. They considered that the applicant and H. should have their new joint treatment sessions in June and August 2000. 64.  In a meeting on 13 March 2000 social welfare officials and the parents agreed that H.'s and the applicant's relationship would be observed by the child psychiatric family ward in June and August 2000 with a view to issuing an opinion on the conditions for the termination of the public care. It was further agreed that H. would begin receiving therapy. The therapy sessions began in April 2000. 65.  In her opinion of 28 September 2000 Dr P-P.A stated the following:
“It has been difficult to achieve cooperation and a treatment relationship at the ward, and no functioning cooperation relationship has emerged. ... The father has difficulties in processing H.'s situation at an emotional level and in seeing the burdening effects of the continuous ... trials on the child. He has repeatedly voiced mistrust towards the authorities and concerning the aims of and grounds for the treatment. Also his attitude towards H.'s individual therapy has changed from having been positive to being negative. Owing to this his acceptance of H.'s treatment has remained problematic ... H. needs long-term individual child psychiatric treatment and long-term cooperation between the family, medical staff and child welfare. ... The father's willingness to ensure the management of H.'s individual therapy has remained uncertain. Having regard to the above and to the evasive and distant nature of their interaction ... there are no preconditions for terminating the public care. ... The treatment will now be focusing on H.'s individual therapy. ... Interaction treatment at the ward will not be recommended for now. ...” 66.  From 27 January to 8 February 1995 there was no formal decision concerning access. 67.  The emergency care order of 8 February 1995 included an access restriction to the effect that the applicant and H. were allowed to meet twice a week under supervision. An agreement concerning access from 7 to 23 February 1995 was signed by the applicant. According to him, notwithstanding that he signed the agreement, he opposed restricting access. According to the Government, no access restriction was in force at the relevant time as the applicant had consented to the arrangement. 68.  The Board's decision of 24 February 1995 to uphold the emergency care included an access restriction to the effect that the applicant and H. were allowed to meet once a week under supervision. 69.  According to the Board's decision of 27 March 1995 following a meeting with the parents on 24 March 1995, H. would continue living with her mother while seeing the applicant under supervision. The decision did not specify the frequency of the meetings and it was to be reviewed at the end of 1995. The applicant accompanied by counsel took part in the Board's meeting on 27 March 1995. Following the meeting, the applicant was informed that he could visit H. at the family support centre once a week. 70.  In a care plan of 26 October 1995 following a meeting with the applicant on 11 October 1995, contacts were reduced to one supervised three-hour visit once a month, starting on 6 November 1995 in the family support centre. This arrangement was to be in force until March 1996. The applicant objected to the restriction and was allegedly not provided with all relevant documentation. No formal decision was issued. 71.  Following the abduction of 6 November 1995, the Board by its decision of 8 November 1995 prohibited access until 31 May 1996, pursuant to section 25 of the Child Welfare Act and section 9 of the Child Welfare Decree. The applicant had been invited to attend the Board's meeting, but he sent instead a letter that was read out at the meeting. As noted above, H. was found with the applicant on 6 October 1996. 72.  On 22 October 1996 the director of the family support centre issued a formal decision, prohibiting all meetings between the applicant and H. until 21 November 1996 owing to the risk of abduction. The applicant was informed that despite the prohibition he would be allowed to see H. in connection with her therapeutic visits to the clinic. On 22 November 1996 the Board issued a decision, maintaining the access prohibition until 30 May 1997. It referred to the abduction following which the applicant had been hiding her from the authorities for eleven months. Referring to section 15, subsections 3 and 4, of the Administrative Procedure Act, the Board did not hear him, considering that such a hearing could jeopardise the purpose of the decision and that the decision could not be postponed. He appealed to the County Administrative Court. In its rejoinder of 21 January 1997 to the applicant's appeal the Board submitted that the applicant had allegedly said, during a visit to the clinic on 16 December 1996, that he intended to abduct H. again. Moreover, the abduction threat had not been the only reason for the access prohibition as H. had been diagnosed as suffering from post-traumatic stress syndrome for which she needed care. 73.  In a letter of 11 February 1997 the senior social welfare official clarified the access prohibition ordered on 22 November 1996. Despite the prohibition, the applicant was allowed to meet H. during her therapeutic visits to the clinic and to write to and telephone her in the family support centre. It appears that, even though encouraged by social welfare officials to do so, he did not use this opportunity. 74.  On 21 February 1997 the County Administrative Court quashed the access prohibition imposed on 22 November 1996 and remitted the matter for a re-examination by the Board, finding that the Board had not shown sufficient grounds for not hearing the applicant prior to its decision. The decision was notified to the social welfare authorities on 20 March 1997. 75.  On 21 May 1997 the Board issued a formal decision restricting access which was to be in force until 31 December 1997. The frequency and implementation of the meetings were to be agreed upon in connection with the presentation of the care plan indicating where H. was going to live. The applicant had been heard on 24 April 1997. 76.  From 1 September 1997 the social welfare authorities repeatedly tried to arrange meetings with the applicant to draw up a new care plan in order to arrange future visits between him and H. However, he never accepted the suggested dates nor did he make his own proposals. 77.  In his letter of 5 January 1998 the applicant demanded that the family home be informed of his right to meet H., given that the last access restriction had ceased on 31 December 1997. In a letter of 16 January 1998 a social welfare official informed him that it was a normal practice concerning the arrangement of meetings with children placed in a substitute family to agree on the conditions at a meeting at which the social welfare authorities, the substitute parents and the parents were present. She further noted that:
“....we have on several occasions tried to fix consultations for the purpose of arranging meetings between you and H. but no progress has been made. The situation at present is that we have not made any decision on the restriction of the right of access but have agreed with the family home that you will be able to meet H. there. The frequency of meetings would be one visit per month, and you can directly agree with the family home on the most convenient dates for the meetings. ....” 78.  On 20 January 1998 the family home and the applicant agreed that the applicant and H. would meet in the paternal grandfather's home. The social welfare authorities informed the applicant in a letter dated 21 January 1998 that he could only visit H. in the substitute family home owing to the fact that H. had not seen him for a long time. Neither of the social welfare officials' letters of January 1998 constituted a formal decision. 79.  The social welfare authorities tried to arrange meetings to draw up a care plan again in February 1998 but a meeting was not held until 9 March 1998. According to the care plan, the applicant was to visit H. two times in the substitute family home and once at the paternal grand father's. The leading social officer would also visit the applicant in his home on 7 April 1998. The social welfare officials did not accept the applicant's proposal that H. would visit his home every other weekend. No formal decision was made. 80.  In a care plan meeting on 17 April 1998 social welfare officials did not accept the applicant's proposal that H. be allowed to stay with him and his common-law spouse every other weekend. According to the care plan of 24 April 1998, one visit a month would take place in the substitute family home and once a month the substitute parents would bring H. to the paternal grandfather's for the day. The applicant would be allowed to organise certain outings with H., as long as she would not be subjected to situations creating confusion in her as to which was really her permanent home at that particular moment. The access restriction was to be in force until 26 June 1998. No formal decision was made. 81.  Since a care plan meeting on 26 June 1998 it appears that the visits have been fully agreed on. It was agreed that H. would visit the applicant every other weekend from Saturday to Sunday. She could also spend a week with her paternal grandfather during the summer. The care plan indicated that her public care remained justified in the light of the conclusions reached in a meeting the same month. In a care plan meeting on 18 September 1998 it was agreed that H. would visit the applicant every other weekend from Friday until Sunday and spend the autumn holiday with him. The Christmas holiday would be agreed on between the substitute family home and the applicant. In a care plan meeting on 15 January 1999 it was agreed that the weekend visits were to be conducted as earlier. H. could also spend the winter holidays with the applicant. In a care plan meeting on 13 March 2000 it was agreed that H. would spend four weeks with the applicant in July 2000. It appears that H. has continued to visit the applicant's home every other week and to spend part of her summer holidays with him. 82.  Meanwhile, in civil proceedings initiated before the Tampere District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätten) on 15 March 1995, H.'s mother requested, allegedly on the recommendation of social welfare officials, that she be granted sole custody of the children and that H. be ordered to live with her. In an interim decision of 15 June 1995 the District Court ordered that H. should live with her mother, following the termination of the public care. It adjourned the further consideration of the case. 83.  In September 1996 the applicant started cohabiting with a woman, whom he married in 1999. 84.  On 3 February 1998 the District Court confirmed an agreement between the applicant and H.'s mother to the effect that they would exercise joint custody of their son K., whereas the applicant would have sole custody of H. and she would live with him following the termination of her public care. 85.  On 7 August 1998 the District Court, in response to the parents' joint request, awarded the applicant sole custody of K., who had moved into the home of the applicant and his common-law spouse in July 1998. 86.  On 3 June 2003 H. was placed temporarily with the applicant and the public care was terminated on 2 February 2004. 87.  On 9 November 2004 H. was again taken into emergency care on the applicant's request. On 4 May 2005 she returned to live with him. 88.  On 30 April 1996 the Board reported the applicant to the police, on suspicion of having sexually abused H. and having abducted her in violation of the public care order and the access restriction. 89.  Further, on an unspecified date, the applicant was charged with having sexually abused H. He was further charged with having abducted her on 6 November 1995. On 28 May 1997 the Tampere District Court held its first hearing. It subsequently heard the applicant and nine witnesses, including the paternal grandmother, the day carer, Drs A.R. and J.K., and received several written expert opinions. 90.  In its judgment of 29 January 1998 the District Court, notwithstanding that it considered H.'s behaviour at the time of the initial care order not to have been normal for her age, found that the evidence did not show that the applicant had committed the sexual acts that he had been charged with. It thus rejected the charges. It declined to consider the charges relating to the abduction, as the Board had not attested that the bringing of charges was in the interests of the child. The court reasoned as follows:
... Taking into account the incriminating facts, the District Court does not find it established in a reliable manner that [the applicant] is guilty of aggravated sexual abuse of a child nor of sexually indecent behaviour towards a child. ...
Witness A.K. [the day carer] had made notes about H.'s behaviour in day care between 16 November 1994 and 12 January 1995. When A.K. was heard as a witness, she explained that by “bottom” she had meant “the genitals”. The notes contain entries made in 35 different days. According to the notes of A.K., H. had “tickled” her genitals on all those days, which had lasted from 15 minutes to one and half hours. ....
According to witness A-K.R., who is specialising in child psychiatry, ... a child's behaviour becomes sexually coloured after sexual abuse. Such children masturbate more than usual. The witness had earlier met only one child who had masturbated to the extent of the present one. Child psychiatric literature does not give for this extensive masturbation any explanations other than that the child has in some way been subjected to sexuality. The witness is of the view that the child has been subjected to behaviour which is inappropriate for a child, at least when she has clearly had pathological behaviour. .... The witness is not able to tell whether masturbation is something that the child has herself discovered, but it has clearly been indicated that it is something that she has in some way done together with the father. According to the witness, H. is a strong and determined child whose words are even more convincing than the words of children usually are. In the view of the witness, the most important report in the case are the notes made by the day care nurse. ....
Witness J.K., who worked as a psychologist at the Family Advice Centre, has stated that a girl masturbating is not necessarily a sign of incest that she has experienced. However girls, who have had some kind of sexual experiences, often show disturbed or excessive sexual behaviour. Excessive masturbation could be a sign of experiences other than sexual abuse, for example other kind of mental instability. There may be hyper or overactive children, distressed children or children showing this kind of behaviour without any explanations thereto. ... 91.  On 26 August 1999, the Turku Court of Appeal (hovioikeus, hovrätten) confirmed the acquittal. In addition to the reasons given by the District Court, it found, inter alia, that it could not be concluded from the Family Advice Centre's initial examination that H. had been sexually abused.


5.  The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in the town of Novovoronezh in the Voronezh Region. 6.  The applicant is a Chernobyl pensioner. She sued the Welfare Office for the unpaid allowances. 7.  On 15 July 2003 the Novovoronezhskyy Town Court of the Voronezh Region (“the Town Court”) awarded her the unpaid disability allowance over the period between 1 July 2002 and 31 July 2003 in the amount of 22,109.75 Russian roubles (RUB). The judgment entered into force on 25 July 2003. It was enforced in full on 9 June 2005. 8.  By a judgment of 15 March 2004 the Town Court awarded the applicant the unpaid food and disability allowances over the period between 1 July 2002 and 31 December 2003 in the amount of RUB 4,329.72 and RUB 643.85 respectively. The judgment acquired legal force on 25 March 2004. It appears that it has not been enforced to date. 9.  On 15 March 2004 the Town Court recovered in the applicant's favour the unpaid disability allowance over the period between 1 August 2003 and 31 December 2003 in the amount of RUB 13,971.50. The judgment became final on 25 March 2004. It was fully enforced on 3 August 2005. 10.  By a judgment of 6 May 2004 the Town Court awarded the applicant the unpaid disability allowance over the period between 1 January 2004 and 31 March 2004 in the amount of RUB 9,494.54. The court also increased the monthly disability allowance to RUB 5,664.85 as of 1 April 2004 and held that it had to be index-linked in accordance with legislation. On 17 May 2004 the judgment acquired legal force. On 10 June 2004 the Welfare Office ordered to increase the applicant's monthly disability allowance to RUB 5,664.85. On 11 November 2005 the applicant received RUB 9,949.54. 11.  On 9 September 2004 the Town Court recovered in the applicant's favour the unpaid food allowance over the period between 1 January 2004 and 31 March 2004 in the amount of RUB 1,139.34 and the unpaid annual disability allowance for 2004 in the amount of RUB 1,132.96. The court also increased the applicant's monthly food allowance to RUB 679.78 as of 1 April 2004 and ordered to index-link it in accordance with legislation. The court further held that as of 2005 the Welfare Office was to pay the applicant an annual disability allowance and to index-link it in accordance with legislation. The judgment entered into force on 20 September 2004. It appears that it has not been enforced to date. 12.  On 29 September 2004 the Town Court awarded the applicant RUB 12,659.40 for the unpaid disability allowance over the period between 1 April 2004 and 31 July 2004. On 11 October 2004 the judgment acquired legal force. It was fully enforced on 11 November 2005.


4.  The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Bucharest. 5.  On 29 September 1994, the applicant was arrested mainly on charges of robbery and trespassing. The criminal proceedings against him and three other persons were opened the same day. 6.  On 28 November 1994, he was released from custody. 7.  In an indictment dated 29 September 1995, the Prosecutor's Office attached to the Bucharest County Court committed the applicant and the three other persons for trial. 8.  On 12 October 1995 the case was registered with the Bucharest District Court. 9.  On 2 April 1996, on an appeal by one of the co-accused against an interlocutory judgment rendered in the case, the file was sent to the Bucharest County Court, from where it was returned on 13 May 1996 and was entered into the court's list on 29 May 1996. However, none of the contents of the file could be found after this date. 10.  Consequently, on 7 March 1997, the District Court sent the case back to the County Prosecutor's Office to reconstitute the file. 11.  On 6 June 1997, under Article 510 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the County Prosecutor's Office referred the case back to the District Court, this being the appropriate judicial authority to reconstitute the file at that stage of the proceedings. 12.  Therefore, on 30 June 1997, the case was re-entered into the District Court's list.
Several items, such as the indictment and the arrest warrants, were requested from the Prosecutor's Office. 13.  On 7 December 2001 the District Court considered the file reconstituted. It gave judgment on 7 February 2003, sentencing the applicant to six years' imprisonment. 14.  Most of the adjournments of the hearings were caused by the failings of the judicial authorities in summoning the defendants or civil parties 15.  Following an appeal by the applicant, the sentence was upheld in a decision of 12 May 2004 of the Bucharest County Court and lastly in a final decision of 29 July 2004 of the Bucharest Court of Appeal.


4.  The applicants, who were born in 1982, 1975 and 1979 respectively, reside in Istanbul. 5.  On 13 July 1998 the first two applicants were arrested and taken into custody at Gaziosmanpaşa police station on suspicion of their involvement in a robbery. Subsequently, on 15 July 1998 the third applicant was taken into custody in connection with the same offence. 6.  The applicants alleged that during their police custody, they had been subjected to various forms of ill-treatment. In particular, they stated that they had been blindfolded, stripped naked, hung by their arms, given electric shocks, harassed, threatened, punched, kicked, beaten with truncheons and other blunt objects, and subjected to falaka (whipping on the soles of the feet). 7.  On 18 July 1998 the applicants were examined at a hospital. The doctor who examined them reported that there were no signs of physical violence on their bodies. According to the applicants, the doctor was a friend of the police officer who had accompanied them to the hospital, and he had drafted the report without carrying out a medical examination. 8.  On 19 July 1998 the applicants were interrogated by the public prosecutor and the investigating judge. The second and third applicants alleged before the investigating judge that they had been ill-treated during their time in police custody. The applicants were then remanded in custody upon the order of the investigating judge. 9.  On the same date, the applicants filed a criminal complaint with the public prosecutor and complained of ill-treatment. The public prosecutor initiated an investigation and ordered that the applicants be taken to the Gaziosmanpaşa Health Clinic for a medical examination. The doctor who examined the applicants noted the following injuries:
(a)  Mr Yazıcı had three parallel bruises on his back measuring 1x10 cm and a bruise inside his left cheek measuring 1 cm;
(b)  Mr Polat had two bruises measuring 1x10 cm on his back and a wound measuring 1x2 cm on the back of his right foot; and
(c)  Mr Sağın had four bruises measuring 1x10 cm on his back and a wound measuring 1x1cm on the outer side of his right foot. 10.  On 10 May 1999 the Gaziosmanpaşa Forensic Medicine Institute issued a report regarding the applicants’ injuries. Based on the findings indicated in the medical report of 19 July 1998, it was concluded that the first and second applicants were unfit to work for five days and the third applicant for seven days. 11.  On 1 October 1999 the prosecutor at the Eyüp Assize Court filed an indictment against three police officers, accusing them of torture pursuant to Article 243 of the former Criminal Code. 12.  On 13 October 1999 the criminal proceedings before the Eyüp Assize Court commenced. The applicants joined the proceedings as civil parties. 13.  On 21 December 2000 Law no. 4616 on conditional release was enacted. This law provided for the suspension of proceedings or of the execution of sentences in respect of crimes committed before 23 April 1999 and for which the maximum penalty did not exceed ten years’ imprisonment. Section 5(a) of Law no. 4616 stipulated that the execution of sentences in respect of offences proscribed by, amongst others, Article 243 of the former Criminal Code could not be suspended. 14.  On 25 October 2005 the Eyüp Assize Court decided that the acts allegedly committed by the accused police officers fell within the scope of Article 245 of the former Criminal Code, regarding ill-treatment. It therefore decided that pursuant to section 1(4) of Law no. 4616, the criminal proceedings should be suspended and subsequently discontinued if no offence of the same or a more serious kind was committed by the offenders within a five-year period. 15.  On 8 November 2007 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment of the first-instance court on the grounds that the statutory time-limit had expired. Accordingly, the criminal proceedings against the police officers were discontinued.


6.  It would appear from the case file that the salient fact in the domestic proceedings was the applicant’s association with the mujahedin in Bosnia and Herzegovina (“BH”)[1]. The term mujahedin has been widely used to refer to foreigners – mainly from the Arab world – who came to BH during the war in support of Bosnian Muslims[2]. However, the same term has been used to describe local Muslims who joined the foreign mujahedin, endorsed their ideology and adjusted to their way of dressing. The phenomenon has been explained by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) in Hadžihasanović and Kubura, IT-01-47-T, §§ 411‑18, 15 March 2006, and Delić, IT-04-83-T, §§ 166-199, 15 September 2008, as follows. 7.  The first foreign mujahedin arrived in BH in the summer of 1992 via Croatia and with the assistance of the Croatian authorities. It would appear that their arrival was welcomed by the BH authorities. While the presence of at least some foreign mujahedin seems to have been motivated by a desire to provide humanitarian assistance to the Bosnian Muslim population, most of them actively supported the military struggle against the Bosnian Muslims’ adversaries, ready to conduct a jihad or “holy war”. As stated by Ali Hamad, an ICTY witness of Bahraini origin who came to BH in 1992, some of the mujahedin were members of al-Qaeda who had the aim of “creating a base that would allow them to increase their area of operations”. Some of them also came to perform missionary work. 8.  Upon arrival, foreign mujahedin settled in various locations and did not form a homogeneous entity. Towards the end of 1992, Bosnian Muslims started to join the foreign mujahedin. The locals were provided with military training and participated in combat action. They were also given religious instruction. A number of groups comprising foreign and/or local mujahedin were active. Notwithstanding instances of participation in combat alongside each other, it appears that these groups were anxious to maintain their distinct identities. There were religious and ideological differences between them, which resulted in occasional violent clashes. 9.  On 13 August 1993 the foreign mujahedin were organised into a unit within the local ARBH (Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina) forces[3]. The unit, named “El Mujahedin”, was based in Zenica. Following its establishment, the unit significantly grew in size. By 1995, it consisted of around 1,000 fighters. Although the original idea had been to replenish the unit with foreign mujahedin only, locals soon outnumbered its foreign members. The factors that motivated locals to join it included: its stricter regimental discipline; a better degree of organisation; superior equipment and combat morale; its religious dedication; and material benefits. The unit received funds and assistance from many organisations and individuals from the Islamic world, including the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation[4] and the Benevolence International Foundation[5]. The Islamic Cultural Institute in Milan provided logistical support. 10.  El Mujahedin had a number of features setting it apart from regular ARBH units. It was led by foreign mujahedin who were not appointed by the ARBH. At the top of the hierarchy was an emir, who has been described as the highest-ranking person within the unit. Abu Haris, a Libyan, was its first emir. In December 1993, he was succeeded by an Algerian, Abu Maali, who remained in that position until the end of the war. A different person from the emir, the military commander, headed the military council and was responsible for the conduct of combat operations. In 1993, this post was held by an Egyptian named Vahidin or Wahiuddin. After his death in October 1993, another Egyptian, Muatez, succeeded him. Muatez was killed in September 1995. The unit had a religious council, the shura, which was its supreme decision-making body. It consisted of approximately twenty prominent members of the unit, mostly of Arab origin. The emir was elected by and answerable to the shura. At the end of 1994, Sheikh Shaban joined the leadership of the unit. He was the head of the Islamic Cultural Institute in Milan and known to be an extremist who was well-connected with Islamic fundamentalists all over the world (the ICTY relied in that regard on a judgment of the Milan Criminal Court of 1 January 2006). He facilitated the recruitment of volunteers from Arab countries for the struggle in BH. Although Sheikh Shaban did not hold an official function within the unit, its members considered him to be the political authority and even the real emir within the unit. He could issue binding rulings (fatwa) and his authority was never challenged by the shura. Sheikh Shaban was killed, together with Abu Haris, at an HVO (Croatian Defence Council)[6] military checkpoint on 14 December 1995. 11.  The General Framework Agreement for Peace, which ended the war in BH, was initialled at a military base near Dayton, the United States, on 21 November 1995 and signed in Paris, France, on 14 December 1995. Article III of Annex 1A to that Agreement called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces, including individual advisors, freedom fighters, trainers, volunteers, and personnel from neighbouring and other States, irrespective of whether they were legally and militarily subordinated to any of the local forces. In view of that, on 14 December 1995 the ARBH disbanded El Mujahedin and ordered its foreign members to leave the country by 10 January 1996. Despite initial resistance, the shura accepted that the unit be disbanded. It would appear that awards, such as the “Golden Lily”, were given to its members as an incentive for foreigners to leave. Members of the unit were also provided with ARBH certificates of service, which assisted its foreign members to acquire BH citizenship. Whereas most of the unit’s foreign members left BH, some of them (such as the present applicant) applied for BH citizenship and continue to live in BH to date. 12.  After the attacks of 11 September 2001, the official attitude towards foreign mujahedin changed dramatically. Many lost their BH citizenship or were deported from BH after being declared a threat to national security. 13.  The applicant was born in Iraq in 1960. 14.  He went to Bosnia and Herzegovina to pursue his studies in 1979. He first studied in Sarajevo and in 1983 moved to Zenica. In 1987 the applicant married a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina. They have five children together. 15.  During the 1992-95 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the applicant joined El Mujahedin unit mentioned above. 16.  The applicant acquired citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“BH citizenship”) on three occasions: on 23 March 1992, on 12 January 1995 (under the name of Awad Fadhil) and again on 20 February 1995. He has visited Iraq twice since the 1992-95 war, in 2003 and 2004. The applicant possesses an Iraqi passport, issued by the Iraqi Embassy in Vienna on 23 January 2007, which was valid until 22 January 2011. 17. On 30 August 2006 the competent administrative authorities established that the applicant’s BH citizenship had been acquired by means of fraudulent conduct, false information and concealment of some relevant facts (notably, the fact that he already possessed BH citizenship when he lodged the second application for naturalisation and that he had used documents issued in two different names) and quashed the decisions of 23 March 1992 and 20 February 1995. On 12 January 2007 the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“the State Court”) quashed the part of the decision of 30 August 2006 concerning the decision of 20 February 1995 and remitted the case for retrial. 18.  Meanwhile, on 6 June 2007 the applicant filed a request for a temporary residence permit. On 28 September 2007 the Aliens Service suspended those proceedings pending the final resolution of the applicant’s citizenship status. 19.  On 27 November 2008 the competent administrative authorities quashed the decision of 20 February 1995 again. On 3 December 2009 the State Court upheld that decision. On 1 February 2010 the applicant appealed to the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“the Constitutional Court”). It appears that those proceedings are still pending. This does not, however, prevent the applicant’s potential deportation, as he became an unlawful resident from the moment of the notification of the decision of 27 November 2008. The applicant, on the other hand, claimed that he still possesses BH citizenship based on a decision of 12 January 1995 (see paragraph 16 above). That decision was, however, issued in the name of another person (Awad Fadhil) and cannot, therefore, confer any rights on the applicant, as was confirmed in the Government’s observations on the admissibility and merits of the case. 20.   On 23 June 2009 the Aliens Service established that the applicant was a threat to national security and placed him in Istočno Sarajevo Immigration Centre. It relied on secret intelligence reports. On 30 June 2009 the State Court, having assessed the secret evidence, upheld that decision. On 17 September 2009 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal as manifestly ill-founded. The initial detention period had been extended on a monthly basis until April 2011 when the applicant was released (see paragraph 26 below). 21.  After the decision revoking the applicant’s citizenship of 27 November 2008 had become final, the proceedings before the Aliens Service concerning a request for a temporary residence permit were resumed at the applicant’s request (see paragraph 18 above). On 8 January 2010 the Aliens Service refused his request and granted him a period for voluntary departure of fifteen days. On 2 March 2010 the Ministry of Security upheld that decision. On 1 June 2010 the State Court upheld the decision of 2 March 2010. On 21 April 2011 the applicant appealed to the Constitutional Court. It would appear that those proceedings are still pending. 22.  On 17 February 2010 the applicant claimed asylum. He maintained that Iraqi citizens who had joined the foreign mujahedin during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina were treated in Iraq as suspected terrorists and were subjected to ill-treatment. He added that his friend had informed him that his name was on a “black list” and that his family was subjected to threats and ill-treatment due to their affiliation with the Ba’ath Party. The applicant also claimed that he would be persecuted by Shia Muslims and Kurds upon his return to Iraq (Kirkuk) because he is a Sunni Muslim. 23.  On 23 February 2010 the Asylum Service interviewed the applicant in the presence of his lawyer and a UNHCR representative. It also had regard to reports of the US Department of State, the UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration and the UK Border Agency on Iraq. At the interview the applicant stated that he has visited Iraq twice since the change of regime, in 2003 and 2004. During both visits he stayed with his family in Kirkuk. In 2003 he went to visit his sick father and stayed for one and a half months. He took care of his father and accompanied him to the hospital on several occasions. In 2004 the applicant went to Kirkuk to hold a commemoration for his father and remained there for the whole month of Ramadan and the Bayram holiday. However, he claimed that during these visits he had been forced to hide in fear of the Kurdish authorities as his friend had told him that he was under surveillance and that his name was on a “black list”. The applicant further claimed that in his subsequent contact with his family, after he had returned to Bosnia and Herzegovina, they had told him that the Kurds had searched their home looking for him. On 4 March 2010 the Asylum Service refused the asylum claim and granted him a period for voluntary departure of fifteen days. The Asylum Service held that the applicant’s statements were contradictory and that he had not provided any evidence in support of his claims. 24.  On 26 May 2010 the State Court quashed that decision and remitted the case for a retrial stating that the Asylum Service should make a more thorough assessment of the applicant’s claim. On 21 June 2010 the Asylum Service refused the applicant’s request for asylum and granted him a period for voluntary departure of fifteen days. On 22 September 2010 the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina upheld that decision. On 19 November 2010 the applicant appealed to the Constitutional Court against that decision. On 9 February 2011 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal as manifestly ill-founded. It held that, although the general situation in Iraq was insecure and problematic, the applicant had not proved that there was a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention on account of his personal circumstances. 25.  On 8 November 2010 the Aliens Service issued a deportation order accompanied with an entry ban for a period of five years. It stated, however, that removal directions would not be issued for as long as the Court’s interim measure was in force. On 3 December 2010 the Ministry of Security upheld that decision. On 16 March 2011 the State Court also upheld the deportation order. An appeal is pending before the Constitutional Court. 26.  On 5 April 2011 the State Court ordered the applicant’s immediate release from the immigration centre, quashing the last extension order (of 21 March 2011) as unlawful. It held that the relevant authorities had not provided any new evidence as a basis for the applicant’s continued detention. Furthermore, it prescribed the lesser measure of surveillance limiting the applicant’s freedom of movement to his home address in Zenica with the obligation to report daily to the Aliens Service field office in Zenica. It also ordered the confiscation of the applicant’s Iraqi passport and other personal documents he might use in an attempt to leave the country. The applicant was released from detention on 7 April 2011.