4.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Valjevo. 5.  The applicant worked as a truck-driver in a company (“E”) until a work-related accident in July 1990. 6.  On 27 February 1991 the employer declared him redundant. On 9 July 1992 the Municipal Court (Opštinski sud) in Valjevo quashed this decision and remanded the case for reconsideration. This judgment became final on 9 September 1992. 7.  On 12 July 1993 and 30 January 1996 the applicant was reassigned to a position of a tractor-driver and a dumper-driver, respectively. 8.  On 9 May 1996 the applicant was dismissed. 9.  On 29 September 1999 the applicant was reinstated following a court order in that respect (see paragraph 15 below). On 2 March 2000 he was dismissed again. 10.  The applicant had instituted a number of civil and criminal proceedings in respect to the above: 11.  On 6 July 1990 the applicant instituted civil proceedings before the Labour Court (Sud udruženog rada) in Šabac against his employer seeking payment of salary arrears due from 6 July 1987 to 1 March 1993. On 9 September 1993 the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud) of Serbia delegated the Municipal Court in Šabac to trial the case. 12.  Following remittals in 1995 and 2001, on 28 February 2006 the Municipal Court rejected the applicant’s claim. On 28 April 2006 the District Court (Okružni sud) in Šabac upheld the judgment of 28 February 2006. 13.  On 8 March 2007 the Supreme Court declared the applicant’s appeal on points of law inadmissible. 14.  On 13 September 1993 the applicant instituted labour dispute before the Municipal Court in Valjevo seeking revocation of the employer’s decisions of 12 July 1993, 30 January 1996 and 9 May 1996 (see paragraphs 7 and 8 above), reinstatement, as well as compensation of due salary arrears, pension benefits and damages. On 18 February 1997 the Supreme Court delegated the Municipal Court in Čačak to trial the case. 15.  On 23 February 1999 the Municipal Court, in a partial judgment (delimična presuda), ordered the applicant’s reinstatement and dismissed his request for revocation of the employer’s decision of 12 July 1993 and his claim for the payment of pension benefits. On 26 August 1999 the District Court in Čačak upheld the judgment of 23 February 1999. 16.  On 9 May 2000 the Municipal Court suspended the proceedings until a final resolution of the labour dispute instituted by the applicant in 1999 (see Part B.3 below). On 12 July 2000 the District Court upheld the decision of 9 May 2000. 17.  On 23 November 2009 the applicant requested the proceedings to be resumed. 18.  On 5 March 2010, the Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud) in Čačak, now acting as the competent court, rejected the applicant’s request pending the outcome of his request for reopening of the case instituted by him in 1999 (see paragraph 28 below). On 17 June 2010 the High Court (Viši sud) in Čačak quashed this decision and reversed the case for reconsideration. 19.  On 21 December 2012 the Court of First Instance rejected the applicant’s claim for compensation of due salary arrears. On 10 April 2013 the High Court quashed this judgment and ordered a retrial. 20.  According to the information in the case-file, the proceedings are still pending before the Court of First Instance. 21.  On 6 October 1999 the applicant filed with the Municipal Court in Valjevo a lawsuit seeking revocation of the employer’s decision of 29 September 1999 (see paragraph 9 above). 22.  On 8 March 2000 the applicant filed with the same court a lawsuit seeking revocation of the employer’s decision of 2 March 2000 (see paragraph 9 above). 23.  On 21 June 2000 the Municipal Court joined the two sets of proceedings, ruled partly in favour of the applicant and quashed the employer’s decision of 29 September 1999. 24.  On 16 February 2001 the District Court in Valjevo upheld the judgment of 21 June 2000 in its part favourable to the applicant, quashed it in the remaining part and ordered a retrial in that respect. 25.  Following remittals in 2004, 2005 and 2006, on 21 June 2006 the Municipal Court rejected the applicant’s claim for revocation of the employer’s decisions of 9 May 1996 and 2 March 2000, reinstatement and payment of due salary arrears and other employment related benefits. 26.  On 22 December 2006 the District Court rejected the applicant’s appeal. 27.  On 19 April 2007 and 15 May 2008 the Supreme Court declared the applicant’s appeal on points of law inadmissible. 28.  On 2 November 2009 the applicant filed a request for reopening of the case. On 14 May 2010 the Court of First Instance in Valjevo rejected this request. On 23 December 2010 the High Court in Valjevo upheld the decision of 14 May 2010. 29.  On 14 January 2011 the applicant submitted new request for reopening of the case. It would appear that this request is still pending before the Court of First Instance in Valjevo. 30.  On 26 October 2004 the applicant instituted civil proceedings before the Municipal Court in Valjevo against his former employer for the payment of employment related benefits due from 1 September 1985 to the date of judgment. 31.  On 10 September 2007 Municipal Court rejected the applicant’s claim. On 31 January 2009 the District Court in Valjevo upheld the judgment of 10 September 2007. 32.  On 12 June 2008 the Supreme Court declared the applicant’s appeal on points of law inadmissible. 33.  On 5 February 2007 the applicant instituted civil proceedings before the Municipal Court in Valjevo against his former employer seeking payment of salary arrears due in the period from 1 April 1994 to the date of judgment. 34.  Following a partial reversal in 2009, on 26 January 2011 the Court of First Instance in Valjevo, now acting as the competent court, rejected the applicant’s claim. 35.  On 7 March 2012 the Appeals Court upheld the judgment of 26 January 2011. 36.  On 5 March 2010 the applicant instituted civil proceedings before the High Court in Valjevo seeking compensation of damages from the respondent State for alleged judicial malfeasance in several civil and enforcement proceedings including, inter alia, those described in Parts B.1, 2, 3 and 5 above. 37.  On 18 September 2012 the High Court ruled partly in favour of the applicant awarding him 200,000 Serbian dinars (1,725 euros[1]) on account of non-pecuniary damages. 38.  On 18 January 2013 the Appeals Court quashed the High Court judgment and ordered a retrial. 39.  According to the information in the case-file, the proceedings are still pending before the High Court. 40.   On 30 April 2008 the District Court in Valjevo dismissed the applicant’s request for criminal investigation filed on 4 June 2007 against private persons for alleged criminal offence of perjury and forgery of documents related to the applicant’s employment. 41.  By 5 May 2008 the domestic courts dismissed the applicant’s requests for criminal investigation and indictments against several judges sitting in his civil cases. 42.  On 5 November 2008 the District Public Prosecutor (Okružni javni tužilac) in Užice dismissed the applicant’s criminal complaint against several judges and prosecutors. 43.  On 20 April 2012 the applicant filed a constitutional appeal with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud) of the Republic of Serbia. 44.  On 25 February 2013 the Constitutional Court declared the constitutional appeal inadmissible since the applicant failed to provide documents and information expressly requested by it.


6.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Ştefan Vodă. 7.  In March 1999 the applicant's apartment was burgled. The police caught the burglars and recovered most of the stolen goods, which were deposited at the Ştefan Vodă Police Station as evidence. 8.  In 1999 the applicant's goods were stolen from the police station. 9. On 24 July 2000 the applicant brought an action against the Ministry of the Interior (“the Ministry”), seeking compensation for the stolen goods. 10.  By a judgment of 26 September 2003 the Căuşeni District Court ruled in favour of the applicant and ordered the Ministry of the Interior to pay her 183,752 Moldovan lei (MDL) (the equivalent of 11,960 euros (EUR) at the time). The judgment was not appealed against and after fifteen days it became final and enforceable. The District Court issued an enforcement warrant which was received by a Bailiff on 5 November 2003. 11.  On 26 April 2004 a Bailiff informed the applicant that on 14 November, 25 November, 8 December 2003 and 20 February 2004 the Ministry had been ordered to comply with the judgment. The Bailiff also informed her that administrative proceedings had been instituted against the Minister of the Interior for non-enforcement of the final judgment in favour of the applicant. 12.  On 27 May 2004 the Ministry informed the applicant that it had not received the enforcement warrant and that the enforcement would be possible only after having received funds for that purpose. 13.  On 29 December 2004 the applicant received MDL 30,993 (EUR 1,825), on 26 January 2005 she received MDL 7,336 (EUR 450) and on 19 September 2005 she received MDL 72,700 (EUR 4,722). On 13 December 2005 the applicant received the last part of the judgment debt of MDL 72,723 (EUR 4,767).


6.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Berlin. 7.  The proceedings at issue in the present application are part of a large number of proceedings which have been brought before the Liechtenstein courts since 2001. All of these proceedings concern, in substance, questions relating to the property rights to considerable assets (more than 14 million Swiss francs (CHF)) which the applicant had brought into five different foundations (including the H. foundation) set up by him in 1999 in Liechtenstein and of which he was the beneficiary. The applicant’s mother G.B., represented by her guardian, and the applicant’s sisters R. and K. claimed in different sets of proceedings that the applicant had not been the owner of the assets he had brought into the foundations, but that these assets had partly belonged to G.B. and partly to their deceased husband and father. 8.  On 30 August 2001 the Regional Court, on a request lodged by the applicant’s sisters R. and K. in interlocutory proceedings, prohibited the H. foundation and the applicant from disposing of assets amounting to more than three million euros (EUR) deposited with the P. bank. 9.  By submissions dated 27 September 2001, received by the Regional Court on 28 September 2001, the applicant’s two sisters brought an action for payment of some EUR 3,3 million against both the H. foundation and the applicant (file no. 2 CG.2001.317). 10.  On 12 November 2003 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s request for legal aid as he had not given sufficient information on his financial condition despite the court’s repeated requests. That decision was quashed by the Court of Appeal on 3 March 2004, which found that the Regional Court had been obliged to investigate further into the applicant’s financial condition on its own motion. 11.  On 21 July 2004 the Regional Court, having received further information from the applicant, granted the latter legal aid. 12.  On 28 July 2004 R. and K. withdrew the action against the applicant and maintained it only against the H. foundation. 13.  On 30 December 2004 the Regional Court, having questioned the parties and ten witnesses and having inspected numerous documents, ordered the H. foundation to pay R. and K. some EUR 240,000 each and dismissed the remainder of their claim. It found that the applicant’s allegation that he had received the assets he had brought into the H. foundation as a gift from his mother had not been proven. The applicant had therefore not been authorised to bring the assets of the estate of his deceased father into the H. foundation. The amounts payable to R. and K. corresponded to their respective rights to a share in the deceased’s estate. 14.  On 8 February 2005 both R. and K. and the H. foundation lodged an appeal with the Court of Appeal against the Regional Court’s judgment. 15.  On 7 March 2005 the applicant, being the beneficiary of the H. foundation, requested leave to intervene in the proceedings as a third party and applied for legal aid. 16.  On 14 June 2005 the Regional Court granted the applicant legal aid and appointed him a lawyer. On 26 August 2005 the applicant joined the proceedings as an intervening third party. 17.  On 7 September 2005 the Court of Appeal, granting the H. foundation’s appeal, quashed the Regional Court’s judgment and dismissed the action brought by R. and K. as inadmissible. It found that the plaintiffs, two of several statutory heirs, had not been authorised to claim assets from the H. foundation for their own account. 18.  On 4 May 2006 the Supreme Court quashed the Court of Appeal’s decision and remitted the case to that court. It found that, having regard to the principle of good faith, the plaintiffs had standing to sue the H. foundation as the Court of Appeal had accepted that the applicant had unlawfully brought assets from his deceased father’s estate into the foundation, of which he was the beneficiary. It ordered the Court of Appeal to decide upon the plaintiffs’ and the H. foundation’s appeals in the light of its findings. 19.  Subsequently, the Constitutional Court (file no. StGH 2006/56; decision of 26 March 2007) dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint of 26 May 2006 against the Supreme Court’s decision of 4 May 2006. It found that the complaint was inadmissible as the Supreme Court’s impugned decision to remit the case to the lower court did not terminate the proceedings by a final decision on the matter in dispute. 20.  On 21 September 2006 the Court of Appeal, following the remittal of the case to it by the Supreme Court on 4 May 2006, granted the H. foundation’s appeal. It quashed the judgment of the Regional Court dated 30 December 2004, finding that the latter had not sufficiently investigated the facts relevant in order to determine the property of the assets in question, remitted the case to the Regional Court and ordered that court to further investigate the facts of the case. 21.  On 21 November 2007 the Regional Court, granting the applicant’s request, quashed its decision of 14 June 2005 to appoint the applicant a lawyer. The applicant was from then on represented by his wife. 22.  On 10 June 2008 the Regional Court, having examined ten witnesses, essentially by letters of request, and having inspected numerous documents, again ordered the H. foundation to pay R. and K. some EUR 240,000 each (new file no. 02.CG.2006.315-415). The facts it established and the grounds it gave corresponded to those given in its judgment of 30 December 2004. 23.  On 28 June 2008 the applicant and on 9 July 2008 the H. foundation, R. and K. appealed against the Regional Court’s new judgment. 24.  On 25 March 2009 the Court of Appeal, allowing the H. foundation’s and the applicant’s appeal, quashed the Regional Court’s judgment and dismissed the action brought by R. and K. Contrary to the Regional Court and to the courts in parallel sets of proceedings, the Court of Appeal, having taken evidence, found that the assets at issue had belonged to the applicant’s mother alone, and not jointly to her and to the applicant’s deceased father. The applicant had received these assets as a gift from his mother in 1993. R. and K. did not, therefore, have a claim against the applicant as the assets at issue were not part of their deceased father’s estate. 25.  On 1 October 2009 the Supreme Court, allowing the appeal on points of law lodged by R. and K., quashed the judgment of the Court of Appeal dated 25 March 2009 and remitted the case to that court. The Supreme Court considered that the Court of Appeal had not sufficiently established the facts which had led it to the conclusion – which ran counter to the conclusions reached by all other courts before in different sets of proceedings – that there had been a valid contract of donation between the applicant and his mother on the assets in question. 26.  On 19 October 2009 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against the Supreme Court’s decision of 1 October 2009 with the Constitutional Court. Relying on Article 6 of the Convention, he claimed, inter alia, that his right to a hearing within a reasonable time had been violated. 27.  On 21 May 2010 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant’s motion for bias against the judges of the Constitutional Court as abusive. It further dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint (file no. StGH 2009/177). 28.  The Constitutional Court found that the complaint was inadmissible as the Supreme Court’s impugned decision of 1 October 2009 to remit the case to the lower court did not terminate the proceedings by a final decision on the matter in dispute. 29.  As to the alleged breach of the right to be heard within a reasonable time, the Constitutional Court found that it could still rule on the alleged human rights violation after the Supreme Court had handed down a final decision. In any event, in cases of excessive delays in proceedings the problem arose that the fundamental rights violation caused thereby could not be effectively redressed. The Constitutional Court could only declare that the length of the proceedings had been unreasonable, but could not undo the delays. It noted in this context that in proceedings before the administrative authorities, a complainant could assume the rejection of the request made by him to that authority when the latter had remained inactive for more than three months and could pursue his case on appeal (see Article 90 § 6a of the National Administrative Justice Act (Gesetz über die allgemeine Landesverwaltungspflege)). However, this did not apply to the proceedings before the Constitutional Court. 30.  As regards costs and expenses, the Constitutional Court ordered the applicant to pay R. and K. lawyer’s costs in the amount of CHF 3,087.05 and declared the court costs uncollectible, referring to its practice in previous proceedings brought by the applicant before it. 31.  It emerged from a letter dated 17 July 2013 from the Court of Appeal to the applicant’s wife that the Court of Appeal had stayed the proceedings before it pending the proceedings before this Court having regard to a proposal made by the applicant to that effect. 32.  By decision of 2 April 2014 the Court of Appeal declared that the proceedings were terminated and that the court costs were to be borne in accordance with the Court Fees Act (Gerichtsgebührengesetz). It noted that by submissions dated 29 January 2014 the applicant, who had revoked his wife’s power of attorney to represent him in the proceedings before that court, the applicant’s sisters R. and K. and the H. foundation had informed the court that they had agreed on a settlement of the case and requested that the proceedings be stayed perpetually (ewiges Ruhen). This Court has not been informed of the content of the settlement. The proceedings were thus stayed ex lege. The Court of Appeal further explained that the proceedings before it had not been continued following the remittal of the case to it by the Supreme Court’s decision dated 1 October 2009 because the applicant had lodged a constitutional complaint against that decision with the Constitutional Court and subsequently an application with the European Court of Human Rights. None of the parties to the proceedings before the Court of Appeal had requested that the proceedings be continued while the complaint and the application were pending before the Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights respectively.


5.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Vienna. 6.  The applicant started practising as a lawyer in 1984. In 1995 he and an Austrian bank (hereinafter “the bank”) entered into a trusteeship agreement in connection with real estate transactions. 7.  One of the applicant’s tasks was to transfer 20,000,000 Austrian schillings (ATS, approximately 1,450,000 euros (EUR)), which he held as a trustee, to company X in exchange for a loan guarantee. 8.  In a report dated 10 May 1996 the bank complained to the Vienna Bar Association (Rechtsanwaltskammer) that the applicant had transferred ATS 20,000,000 to company X, but had not handed over the guarantee, as was stipulated in the trusteeship agreement that he should do. 9.  On 26 August 1996 the Vienna Regional Criminal Court opened preliminary investigations against the applicant on suspicion of embezzlement (Veruntreuung) as regards a breach of the trusteeship agreement with the bank. 10.  On 21 October 1998 the applicant was formally charged with embezzlement for abusing his power under another trusteeship agreement. He was accused of paying out ATS 6,000,000 (approximately EUR 436,000) to a creditor of his clients without being instructed to do so, and of diverting ATS 8,500,000 (approximately EUR 618,000). These proceedings ended with the applicant’s acquittal on 12 January 2000. 11.  During the trial and before the acquittal was pronounced, the public prosecutor had stated that he intended to reserve the applicant’s prosecution for breach of the trusteeship agreement with the bank regarding the transfer of ATS 20,000,000 in exchange for a loan guarantee. 12.  On 7 July 2000 the applicant was charged with fraudulent conversion (Untreue) under Article 153 of the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) in respect of the transfer of ATS 20,000,000. On 12 April 2002 the Vienna Regional Criminal Court convicted the applicant of fraudulent conversion and sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court quashed the conviction for nullity on 16 October 2002. 13.  On 5 February 2003 the Vienna Regional Criminal Court convicted the applicant again of fraudulent conversion under Article 153 of the Criminal Code and sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment. It found that the applicant and the bank had concluded a trusteeship agreement on 31 August 1995 under which the bank was to provide a loan of ATS 20,000,000 to the applicant’s client, X, while the applicant was to provide the bank with a loan guarantee in the same amount. The General Conditions for Real Estate Transactions by Trustees applied to that agreement. The bank had transferred the money to the applicant’s account on 5 September 1995. Only two days later the applicant had transferred the entire amount to a savings account. In breach of the trusteeship agreement including the above-mentioned General Conditions, the applicant had transferred part of the sum to his client without obtaining a loan guarantee, and had invested the remainder abroad in the hope of achieving considerable profits. He had told the bank, which had set 31 December 1995 as the deadline for submitting the guarantee, that he would be able to obtain it by 15 February 1996. Although the bank had repeatedly requested the fulfilment of the trusteeship agreement or the reimbursement of the loan, and the applicant knew by then that his investments had been unsuccessful and that he no longer disposed of the entire amount, he continued to use the remaining money, for instance to pay his own fees of ATS 840,000 (approximately EUR 61,000). 14.  On 3 September 2003 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s plea of nullity and referred the case to the Vienna Court of Appeal to decide on the appeal against sentence. On 18 February 2004 the Court of Appeal reduced the sentence to three years’ imprisonment. 15.  The applicant served his prison sentence from December 2004 to December 2005 and was released after receiving a pardon from the President of Austria. Before the pardon, the applicant had lodged an application with the European Court of Human Rights (application no. 10185/04), complaining of unfairness of the criminal proceedings. The applicant states that the presidential pardon had been subject to the condition that he withdraw the application with the Court, which he did. 16.  On 24 May 1996 the Vienna Bar Association received the bank’s complaint of 10 May that the applicant had breached the trusteeship agreement (see paragraph 8 above). On 29 May 1996 the Disciplinary Lawyer (Kammeranwalt) appointed an Investigating Commissioner. The applicant made submissions on 5 June and 16 September 1996. 17.  On 25 September 1996 the Disciplinary Council of the Vienna Bar Association (“the Disciplinary Council”, Disziplinarrat der Rechtsanwaltskammer), issued an interim measure prohibiting the applicant from representing clients before the Vienna Regional Criminal Court, and before the prosecution authorities working at the Vienna Regional Criminal Court, as criminal proceedings against the applicant were pending before that court. 18.  On 15 November 1996 the Disciplinary Council extended the interim measure, imposing on the applicant a temporary ban on practising as a lawyer. 19.  On 20 December 1996 the applicant appealed to the Appeals Board (Oberste Berufungs- und Disziplinarkommission für Rechtsanwälte und Rechtsanwaltsanwärter), which dismissed the appeal on 14 April 1997. 20.  As interim measures are only valid for a period of six months, the measures were extended every six months. The reason given was that criminal proceedings were pending against the applicant. No hearings were held. 21.  On 26 January 2000 the Disciplinary Council lifted the temporary ban on practising as a lawyer, since the applicant had informed it that he had been acquitted (see paragraph 10 above). 22.  On 4 May 2000 the Disciplinary Council again issued an interim decision imposing a temporary ban on practising as a lawyer. It noted that criminal proceedings against the applicant were still pending at the Vienna Regional Criminal Court concerning charges of fraudulent conversion to the detriment of the bank. On 2 October 2000 the Appeals Board dismissed the applicant’s appeal. 23.  The final judgment of the Vienna Court of Appeal of 18 February 2004 (see paragraph 14 above) reached the Disciplinary Council on 24 May 2004. The Disciplinary Council scheduled a hearing on 12 October 2004. The applicant did not receive a summons. Subsequently, a new hearing was scheduled for 15 February 2005. 24.  After holding a hearing at which the applicant and his counsel were present, the Disciplinary Council found on 15 February 2005 that the applicant had breached his professional duties and had infringed the profession’s honour and reputation (section 1 (1) of the Disciplinary Act for Lawyers and Trainee Lawyers (Disziplinarstatut für Rechtsanwälte und Rechtsanwaltsanwärter – the Disciplinary Act) and ordered that he be struck off the register pursuant to section 16 (1) subparagraph (4) of the said Act. Furthermore, it held in favour of him in respect of a number of other alleged disciplinary offences. 25.  The Disciplinary Council held that the applicant had failed
(1)  to provide the bank with a loan guarantee in exchange for the amount of ATS 20,000,000, as required under the trusteeship agreement of 31 August 1995;
(2)  to reply to repeated requests from the bank for assurances that the said amount was still in his possession;
(3)  to transfer the amount to a separate trustee account (Anderkonto); and
(4)  finally, to fulfil the trusteeship agreement as a whole.
It referred to the establishment of facts contained in the Vienna Regional Court’s judgment of 5 February 2003 (see paragraph 13 above) and noted that this was confirmed by its own establishment of the facts. Moreover, the Disciplinary Council referred to the Appeals Board’s established case-law, in accordance with which the disciplinary authorities were bound by the establishment of facts contained in a judgment of a criminal court convicting a lawyer alleged to have committed a disciplinary offence. It noted that disposing of such a large amount of money in breach of the trusteeship agreement amounted to serious professional misconduct and a severe infringement of the profession’s honour and reputation within the meaning of section 1 (1) of the Disciplinary Act. Given the circumstances of the case, which had also become publicly known and had caused serious damage to the legal profession, it was not sufficient to impose a ban on practising of up to one year but it was necessary to order that the applicant be struck off the register. It would be unacceptable that the applicant, who was at that time serving his prison sentence, could resume practising immediately after his release. Moreover, no client would entrust his affairs to a lawyer who had diverted such a large amount of money in breach of his duties as a trustee. 26.  The applicant appealed to the Appeals Board, inter alia on the ground that his conviction by the criminal court excluded disciplinary proceedings, which were based on the same facts. In the alternative, he argued that the sanction was disproportionate, having particular regard to the fact that he had already been banned from practising as a lawyer while the proceedings were pending. 27.  On 25 July 2005 the Appeals Board upheld the Disciplinary Council’s decision in respect of points (1) to (3), but amended it in respect of point (4), finding that the applicant had failed to fulfil the trusteeship agreement only in respect of part of the sum. It also confirmed the sanction. 28.  In so far as the applicant relied implicitly on Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, the Appeals Board referred to the Constitutional Court’s established case-law according to which conduct of a lawyer qualifying as a criminal offence and also infringing the profession’s honour and reputation contained an element, the “disciplinary-law surplus” (“disziplinärer Überhang”) which justified a disciplinary sanction. The Constitutional Court’s case-law relied on the explanatory report to Protocol No. 7, according to which Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 did not protect a person against conviction for the same act in criminal proceedings and in a different set of proceedings, such as disciplinary proceedings against a civil servant. It thus appeared that disciplinary proceedings did not qualify as criminal proceedings. Moreover, the Disciplinary Council had not merely relied on the matters which constituted the criminal offence, but had had particular regard to the ensuing damage to the profession’s honour and reputation. The commission of a serious criminal offence which had a direct link with the exercise of a lawyer’s professional activity served to undermine the trustworthiness of the profession as a whole. This was all the more so where the violation of duties concerned the core activities of a practising lawyer, such as fulfilling a trusteeship agreement. 29.  Regarding the sanction, the Appeals Board noted in particular that meticulous observance of the duties attached to the core activities of a practising lawyer, such as acting as a trustee, was an indispensable condition for maintaining the confidence the general public placed in the legal profession. In the event of a very serious breach of these duties the Bar Association had to show that it was ready to dissociate itself from such misconduct in an unequivocal manner. It had therefore been necessary to impose the maximum sanction, namely striking the applicant off the register. 30.  The applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court alleging, inter alia, that he had been tried twice for the same conduct. He also repeated that the imposition of the severest sanction possible, namely striking him off the register, was not justified in the circumstances. 31.  On 28 February 2006 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint. It found that the disciplinary decisions were properly reasoned, and that the legal basis on which they had been taken was transparent and clear. As regards the applicant’s complaint that he had been punished twice for the same conduct, the Constitutional Court repeated that the applicant’s actions amounted to a criminal offence, but that they also contained a “disciplinary-law surplus” which could be subject to disciplinary sanctions without violating either Article 6 of the Convention or Article 4 of Protocol No. 7. 32.  The Constitutional Court’s judgment was served on the applicant’s counsel on 27 April 2006.


8.  The first applicant, Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. (“the applicant company”), is a limited liability company operating in the television-broadcasting sector, with its registered office in Rome. The second applicant, Mr Francescantonio Di Stefano, is an Italian national who was born in 1953 and lives in Rome. He is the statutory representative of the applicant company. 9.  By a ministerial decree of 28 July 1999, the appropriate authorities granted Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. a licence for nationwide terrestrial television broadcasting in accordance with Law no. 249/1997 (see paragraphs 56-61 below), authorising it to install and operate an analogue television network. The licence specified that the applicant company was entitled to three frequencies covering 80% of national territory. As regards the allocation of the frequencies, the licence referred to the national frequency-allocation plan, adopted on 30 October 1998. It indicated that the installations should be brought into line with the requirements of the “assignment plan” (piano di assegnazione) within twenty-four months and that the measures taken to that end should conform to the adjustment programme (programma di adeguamento) drawn up by the Communications Regulatory Authority (Autorità per le garanzie nelle comunicazioni – AGCOM) in conjunction with the Ministry of Communications (“the Ministry”). It appears from the Consiglio di Stato’s judgment no. 2624 of 31 May 2008 (see paragraph 14 below) that, under the terms of the licence, the allocation of frequencies was deferred until such time as the authorities had adopted the adjustment programme, on the basis of which the applicant company should have upgraded its own installations. The adjustment programme should, in turn, have taken into account the requirements of the national frequency-allocation plan. However, the plan was not implemented. A succession of transitional schemes that benefited existing channels were applied at national level, with the result that, even though it had a licence, the applicant company was unable to broadcast until June 2009 as it had not been allocated any frequencies. 10.  The applicant company, through its statutory representative, made a number of applications to the administrative courts. 11.  In November 1999 the applicant company served formal notice on the Ministry to allocate frequencies to it. In a note of 22 December 1999, the Ministry refused its request. 12.  In 2000 the applicant company lodged an application with the Lazio Regional Administrative Court against the Ministry and RTI (a network of Italian television channels controlled by the Mediaset group), complaining that the authorities had not allocated it any broadcasting frequencies. The application was also directed against RTI because the Retequattro channel had been authorised to broadcast on frequencies that should have been transferred to the applicant company. 13.  On 16 September 2004 the Regional Administrative Court found in favour of the applicant company, holding that the authorities were required either to allocate the frequencies or to revoke the licence. Accordingly, it declared the note of 22 December 1999 void. 14.  RTI appealed to the Consiglio di Stato. In judgment no. 2624 of 31 May 2008, the Consiglio di Stato dismissed the appeal and upheld the Regional Administrative Court’s judgment. It noted that no deadline had been set in the licence for the authorities to adopt the adjustment programme drawn up by AGCOM in conjunction with the Ministry, but that the applicant company had been given twenty-four months to make improvements to its installations. Accordingly, the Consiglio di Stato found that the adjustment programme should have been approved promptly.
The Consiglio di Stato added that the Ministry had to give a decision on the applicant company’s request to be allocated frequencies, in accordance with a judgment delivered in the meantime by the European Court of Justice (ECJ – see paragraphs 33-36 below). 15.  On 23 October 2008 the applicant company, because it had still not obtained the frequencies, brought proceedings against the Ministry in the Consiglio di Stato, complaining that the judgment of 31 May 2008 had not been executed. 16.  On 11 December 2008 the Ministry extended the validity of the licence granted in 1999 until the analogue switch-off date and allocated Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. a single channel with effect from 30 June 2009. 17.  The Consiglio di Stato consequently held in judgment no. 243/09 of 20 January 2009 that the Ministry had properly executed its judgment of 31 May 2008. 18.  On 18 February 2009 the applicant company brought a further application in the Regional Administrative Court, arguing that the decree of 11 December 2008 by which the frequencies had been allocated was insufficient in that, contrary to the terms of the licence, it concerned a single channel that did not cover 80% of national territory. In its application the company sought the annulment of the decree and an award of damages. 19.  On 9 February 2010 the applicant company signed an agreement with the Ministry of Economic Development (the former Ministry of Communications), which undertook to assign to it additional frequencies in accordance with the terms of the licence. 20.  On 11 February 2010, pursuant to one of the clauses of that agreement, the applicant company asked for the proceedings pending before the Regional Administrative Court to be struck out. 21.  On 8 March 2011 the applicant company applied to the Regional Administrative Court to restore the case to its list. It sought the annulment of the decree of 11 December 2008 by which the frequencies had been allocated, and an award of damages. It argued that the administrative authorities had not complied fully with their obligation to allocate additional frequencies and had failed to observe the agreement of 9 February 2010 and the decision of 11 December 2008. 22.  Paragraph 6 of the agreement in question stated:
“Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. undertakes to request, by 11 February 2010, the striking out of application no. 1313/09 pending before the Lazio Regional Administrative Court, to allow it to lapse for failure to submit a fresh application to schedule a hearing within the statutory time-limit and, by the same date, to waive the claims for compensation brought in that application, provided that, by the date on which the case lapses, this agreement, the decision allocating the additional frequencies and the decision of 11 December 2008 have not in the meantime become invalid.
The Administration, for its part, undertakes to comply fully with its obligation to allocate additional frequencies, and with this agreement and the decision of 11 December 2008. Should it fail to do so, Centro Europa 7 and the opposing authorities shall regain full possession of their respective procedural prerogatives. In the event that the assignment of the additional frequencies becomes invalid, it is specified that Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. may reactivate application no. 1313/09 only if it would be impossible in this situation for Europa Way S.r.l. to operate one or more of the installations mentioned in Technical Attachment A.” 23.  The proceedings are currently pending before the Regional Administrative Court. 24.  In the meantime, on 27 November 2003, while its initial application was still pending before the Regional Administrative Court, the applicant company had lodged a further application with the same court, seeking in particular an acknowledgment of its entitlement to have the frequencies allocated and compensation for the damage sustained. 25.  In a judgment of 16 September 2004, the Regional Administrative Court dismissed the application, holding in particular that the applicant company had only a legitimate interest (interesse legittimo), that is, an individual position indirectly protected as far as was consistent with the public interest, and not a personal right (diritto soggettivo) to be allocated frequencies for analogue terrestrial television broadcasting. 26.  The applicant company appealed to the Consiglio di Stato, arguing that, since it had been granted a licence by the appropriate authorities, it did in fact have a personal right. In particular, it contended that Legislative Decree no. 352/2003 and Law no. 112/2004 did not comply with Community legislation (see paragraphs 65-67 below). 27.  On 19 April 2005 the Consiglio di Stato decided to restrict its examination to the applicant company’s claim for damages and not to rule at that stage on the request for allocation of frequencies. 28.  It nevertheless observed that the failure to allocate frequencies to Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. had been due to essentially legislative factors. 29.  It noted that section 3(2) of Law no. 249/1997 (see paragraph 58 below) enabled the “de facto occupants” of radio frequencies authorised to operate under the previous system to continue broadcasting until new licences were awarded or applications for new licences were rejected, and in any event not after 30 April 1998. 30.  It further noted that section 3(7) of Law no. 249/1997 (see paragraph 61 below) authorised the continuation of such broadcasts by entrusting AGCOM with the task of setting a deadline, on the sole condition that programmes were to be broadcast simultaneously on terrestrial frequencies and by satellite or cable. It pointed out that, in the event of failure by AGCOM to set a deadline, the Constitutional Court had set 31 December 2003 as the date by which programmes broadcast by the “over-quota channels” (that is, existing national television channels exceeding the concentration restrictions imposed by section 2(6) of Law no. 249/1997) were to be broadcast by satellite or cable only, with the result that the frequencies to be allocated to licence holders such as the applicant company would have been freed up. The Consiglio di Stato observed, however, that the deadline had not been complied with following the intervention of the national legislature: section 1 of Legislative Decree no. 352/2003, which had subsequently become Law no. 43/2004 (see paragraph 65 below), had prolonged the activities of the over-quota channels pending the completion of an AGCOM investigation into the development of digital television channels. It added that section 23(5) of Law no. 112/2004 (see paragraph 67 below) had subsequently, by a general authorisation mechanism, extended the possibility for over-quota channels to continue broadcasting on terrestrial frequencies until the national frequency-allocation plan for digital television was implemented, with the result that those channels had not been required to free up the frequencies intended for allocation to licence holders, such as the applicant company. 31.  Law no. 112/2004 had therefore had the effect, according to the Consiglio di Stato, of blocking the frequencies intended for allocation to holders of analogue licences and of preventing new operators from participating in digital television trials. 32.  That being so, the Consiglio di Stato decided to stay the proceedings and requested the ECJ to give a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the provisions, in the EC Treaty, on freedom to provide services and competition, Directive 2002/21/EC (“the Framework Directive”), Directive 2002/20/EC (“the Authorisation Directive”), Directive 2002/77/EC (“the Competition Directive”) and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, in so far as Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union referred to it. 33.  On 31 January 2008 the ECJ gave judgment. It declared two questions inadmissible, holding that it did not have sufficient information to give a ruling on them. 34.  With regard to the question concerning Article 10 of the Convention, the ECJ concluded as follows:
“By its first question, the national court asks the Court, essentially, to state whether the provisions of Article 10 of the [Convention], in so far as Article 6 EU refers thereto, preclude, in television-broadcasting matters, national legislation the application of which makes it impossible for an operator holding rights, such as Centro Europa 7, to broadcast without the grant of broadcasting radio frequencies.
...
By those questions, the national court is thus seeking to determine whether there are infringements of Community law for the purpose of ruling on an application for compensation for the losses flowing from such infringements.
... Article 49 EC and, from the date on which they became applicable, Article 9 § 1 of the Framework Directive, Article 5 § 1, the second sub-paragraph of Article 5 § 2 and Article 7 § 3 of the Authorisation Directive and Article 4 of the Competition Directive must be interpreted as precluding, in television-broadcasting matters, national legislation the application of which makes it impossible for an operator holding rights to broadcast in the absence of broadcasting radio frequencies granted on the basis of objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and proportionate criteria.
That answer, by itself, thus enables the national court to rule on the application made by Centro Europa 7 for compensation for the losses suffered.
Consequently, regard being had to the Court’s answer to the second, fourth and fifth questions, it is not necessary to rule on the first and third questions.” 35.  As to the merits, the ECJ observed that the existing channels had been authorised to pursue their broadcasting activities as a result of a series of measures by the national legislature, to the detriment of new broadcasters which nevertheless held licences for terrestrial television broadcasting. It noted that these measures had entailed the successive application of transitional arrangements structured in favour of the incumbent networks, and that this had had the effect of preventing operators without broadcasting frequencies, such as the applicant company, from accessing the television-broadcasting market even though they had a licence (granted, in the applicant company’s case, in 1999). The ECJ held:
“... Law no. 112/2004 ... does not merely allocate to the incumbent operators a priority right to obtain radio frequencies, but reserves them that right exclusively, without restricting in time the privileged position assigned to those operators and without providing for any obligation to relinquish the radio frequencies in breach of the threshold after the transfer to digital television broadcasting.” 36.  The ECJ added that the application of the transitional schemes was not in accordance with the new common regulatory framework (NCRF), which implemented provisions of the EC Treaty, in particular those on freedom to provide services in the area of electronic communications networks and services. It observed in that connection that several provisions of the NCRF stated that the allocation and assignment of frequencies had to be based on objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and proportionate criteria. In the ECJ’s view, such criteria had not been applied in the present case, since the status of the existing channels had not been amended under the transitional schemes and they had continued their broadcasting activities to the detriment of operators such as the applicant company, which, because it had not been allocated any broadcasting frequencies, had been unable to exercise its rights and make use of its licence.
The ECJ therefore reached the following conclusions:
“... it must be stated that, in the area of television broadcasting, freedom to provide services, as enshrined in Article 49 EC and implemented in this area by the NCRF, requires not only the grant of broadcasting authorisations, but also the grant of broadcasting radio frequencies.
An operator cannot exercise effectively the rights which it derives from Community law in terms of access to the television-broadcasting market without broadcasting radio frequencies.
...
Article 49 EC and, from the date on which they became applicable, Article 9 § 1 of Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive), Article 5 § 1, the second subparagraph of Article 5 § 2 and Article 7 § 3 of Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services (Authorisation Directive), and Article 4 of Commission Directive 2002/77/EC of 16 September 2002 on competition in the markets for electronic communications networks and services must be interpreted as precluding, in television-broadcasting matters, national legislation the application of which makes it impossible for an operator holding rights to broadcast in the absence of broadcasting radio frequencies granted on the basis of objective, transparent, non-discriminatory and proportionate criteria.” 37.  In decision no. 2622/08 of 31 May 2008, the Consiglio di Stato concluded that it could not allocate frequencies in the government’s place or compel the government to do so. It ordered the government to deal with the applicant company’s request for frequencies in a manner consistent with the criteria laid down by the ECJ. It made the following observations in particular:
“The adoption by the authorities of a specific measure relates more to issues of performance and implementation than to damages: in cases involving an unlawful refusal to take an administrative measure that has been requested, the adoption of the measure does not amount to compensation, but rather to the performance of an obligation incumbent upon the authorities, unless the private party concerned has sustained any damage.” 38.  With regard to the request for the allocation of frequencies, the Consiglio di Stato observed:
“Where legitimate interests are at stake, however, it is not possible to envisage a specific means of redress because inaction, a delay or an unlawful refusal will always have an impact on a situation that was or remains unsatisfactory, with the result that there is nothing to restore; the issue in relation to such interests concerns the practical implementation of any ruling setting aside the measure complained of.
...
Applying these principles to the present case, the Consiglio finds that the appellant’s request for an order requiring the authorities to allocate the network or frequencies is inadmissible.” 39.  The Consiglio di Stato deferred until 16 December 2008 its final decision on the payment of compensation to the applicant company, holding that it was necessary to wait for the relevant regulations to be passed by the government before assessing the amount. 40.  The Consiglio di Stato requested both parties to comply with the following requirements by 16 December 2008. The Ministry was, firstly, to specify what frequencies had been available following the public tendering procedures in 1999 and why they had not been allocated to the applicant company and, secondly, to justify its assertion that the licence granted to the applicant company had expired in 2005. 41.  The applicant company, for its part, was asked by the Consiglio di Stato to submit a report on its activities between 1999 and 2008, and also to explain why it had not taken part in the 2007 public tendering procedure for the allocation of frequencies. 42.  The Consiglio di Stato also asked AGCOM to explain why the national frequency-allocation plan for terrestrial television broadcasting had never been implemented. Lastly, it dismissed the applicant company’s request for the suspension of the provisional authorisation granted to a channel belonging to the Mediaset group (Retequattro) for the use of the frequencies. 43.  In its reply, AGCOM explained to the Consiglio di Stato that the national frequency-allocation plan had been implemented only on 13 November 2008. According to AGCOM, this delay was due to several factors. Firstly, the legal situation was complicated because it was difficult to identify the available broadcasting frequencies as a result of the court decisions in which the over-quota channels had been allowed to continue broadcasting. In addition, the transitional arrangements introduced by Law no. 66/2001 (see paragraphs 63-64 below), which had allowed the channels in question to continue broadcasting in analogue mode, had prevented the plan from being implemented on account of the incompatibility between the interests of the channels likely to be allowed to broadcast under the plan and the interests of the channels that were legally entitled to continue their existing operations. 44.  The applicant company submitted an expert valuation by the commercial bank Unipol assessing the damage sustained at 2,175,213,345.00 euros (EUR). The valuation was based on the profits achieved by Retequattro, the over-quota channel which should have relinquished the frequencies allocated to the applicant company. 45.  In a judgment of 20 January 2009, the Consiglio di Stato, on the basis of Article 2043 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 69 below), ordered the Ministry to pay the applicant company the sum of EUR 1,041,418 in compensation. It observed that, over a period of ten years, the Ministry had acted negligently by having granted Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. a licence without assigning it any broadcasting frequencies. 46.  The Consiglio di Stato found that there was a causal link between the conduct of the administrative authorities and the damage alleged, and that the award of the licence to Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. had not conferred on it the immediate right to pursue the corresponding economic activity; accordingly, the compensation should be calculated on the basis of the legitimate expectation of being allocated the frequencies by the appropriate authorities. 47.  In the opinion of the Consiglio di Stato, the fact that the frequencies had not been allocated until 11 December 2008 was attributable to the authorities. Damage had thus been sustained as a result of an unlawful act for which the authorities incurred non-contractual liability, concerning both the breach of legitimate expectations and the delay in allocating the frequencies. The fact that the authorities had launched a public tendering procedure for the frequencies in 1999, although the situation in the broadcasting sector had not been clarified and there were outstanding technical issues, had been “risky”. The Consiglio di Stato considered that the question of redress for the damage sustained by the applicant company should take this context into account. The authorities’ conduct had not been characterised by “significant gravity” (notevole gravità) and the unlawful act was thus attributable to “negligent” and not intentional conduct on their part. 48.  The Consiglio di Stato added that the pecuniary damage should be assessed with effect from 1 January 2004, since the Constitutional Court had ruled that the “transition period” after which legislation would have to be passed to allow licence holders to start broadcasting had expired on 31 December 2003 (see paragraph 62 below). As to the criteria for determining the damages to be awarded, the Consiglio di Stato pointed out that, as regards the losses sustained, the applicant company had been fully aware, at the time of the call for tenders, of the circumstances of the case and the conditions to which the licence was subject. Furthermore, the sequence of events that had prevented the frequencies from being allocated had been largely foreseeable. Accordingly, the applicant company should have known that it was unlikely to obtain the frequencies, at least in the short term. In addition, it could have purchased the frequencies under section 1 of Law no. 66/2001 (see paragraph 64 below).
Having regard to the above considerations, the Consiglio di Stato, without ordering an expert valuation, decided to award the applicant company EUR 391,418 for the losses sustained. As regards loss of earnings, it found that, from 1 January 2004, the applicant company could have achieved profits but had been unable to do so because of the delay in allocating the frequencies; the amount could be assessed at EUR 650,000. It refused to take into account the expert valuation submitted by the applicant company and held that it was unlikely that the company would have purchased shares in the market, even in the event that the over-quota channels had relinquished the frequencies. In the Consiglio di Stato’s view, the comparison between the applicant company and the two leading operators (Mediaset and RAI) was unjustified, especially as it did not take into account the other nationwide operator (La 7), which, although it had greater economic power than the applicant company, was nevertheless operating at a loss.


4.  The applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Novosibirsk. She receives an old-age pension. 5.  On 1 February 1998 the Law on Calculation and Adjustment of State Pensions (hereafter “the Pensions Act”) introduced a new method of calculation of retirement benefits based on what is known as the “individual pensioner coefficient” (“the IPC”). The IPC was the ratio between an individual's wages at the time of retirement and the national average wage. The IPC was meant to maintain a link between pensions and previous earnings. 6.  The applicant considered that the Zayeltsovskiy District Division of the Pension Fund (hereafter “the Fund”) had incorrectly calculated her pension and in March 1999 she sued the Fund for an increase of her pension in accordance with the Pensions Act. 7.  On 22 November 1999 the Zayeltsovskiy District Court of Novosibirsk found in the applicant's favour. The District Court held that the Fund had misconstrued the law and that the applicant's pensions should be recalculated and increased in line with an IPC of 0.7 starting from 1 February 1998. The District Court also awarded the applicant 3,004.08 Russian roubles (RUR) in pension arrears. On 25 January 2000 the Novosibirsk Regional Court upheld the judgment. 8.  On 21 August 2000 the Fund requested the Zayeltsovskiy District Court to reopen the case owing to a newly-discovered circumstance. The Fund claimed that on 29 December 1999 the Ministry of Labour and Social Development had issued an Instruction on the Application of Limitations established by the Pensions Act. The Instruction clarified how the Pensions Act should be applied. The Fund further indicated that on 24 April 2000 the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation had dismissed the complaint by a group of individuals challenging the Instruction. The Supreme Court found that the Ministry of Labour had acted within its competence when it had issued the Instruction, and that the Ministry's interpretation of the Pensions Act had been correct. The Fund contended that since it had been unaware of the Supreme Court's decision of 24 April 2000 at the time of the judgment of 22 November 1999, the judgment would have to be reconsidered. 9.  On 31 January 2001 the Zayeltsovskiy District Court granted the Fund's request, quashed the judgment of 22 November 1999 and reopened the proceedings. The District Court applied Article 333 of the RSFSR Code of Civil Procedure according to which judgments could be reconsidered in the event of discovery of significant circumstances which were not, and could not have been, known to the party concerned. The District Court found that the Instruction could serve as such a circumstance. The decision of 31 January 2001 was final and not amenable to appeal. 10.  On 12 February 2001 the Zayeltsovskiy District Court, after the fresh examination of the case, dismissed the applicant's action in full. On 5 April 2001 the Novosibirsk Regional Court upheld the judgment.


5.  The applicant was born in 1934 and lives in Warsaw. 6.  The applicant owns a plot of land with a surface area of 2,183 square metres, located in the municipality of Milanówek, near Warsaw. It is listed in the local land register under entry No. 29735. 7.  On 20 March 1993 the applicant and his neighbours lodged their objections to a proposed new land development plan to be adopted by the municipality. 8.  On 30 March 1993 the municipal council of Milanówek adopted the local land development plan. The applicant's objections were not taken into consideration. Under the plan, the applicant's land was designated for agricultural purposes. A road and a hospital were to be constructed on his land after expropriation. 9.  The applicant and his neighbours complained of this decision to the Mazowsze Governor, arguing inter alia that the plan breached their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions. They submitted that the local land development plan had been prepared in a manner which failed to take properly into consideration and reconcile the various interests of the municipality and the local owners. As a result, the plan was unreasonable and did not comply with the standards of good land administration. 10.  They transferred the complaint to the Supreme Administrative Court, after being informed that it alone was competent to examine the matter. 11.  By a judgment of 25 September 1995, the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the complaint, considering that there were no indications that the municipal authorities had failed to take into consideration and properly weigh the various competing interests involved in the preparation of the local land development plan. It noted that the restrictions on ownership imposed by land development measures were not per se incompatible with the nature of ownership guaranteed by the Civil Code. 12.  In 1997 the applicant and 36 other inhabitants of Milanówek requested the Mayor to amend the 1993 plan in order to avoid the loss of various investments they had made in their land after the implementation of the plan's projects. This request apparently remained unanswered. 13.  In a letter of 4 April 2000 the Municipal Office, in reply to a query submitted by the applicant and other persons, stated that the municipal authorities were under no obligation to provide any compensation for owners whose property was to be expropriated in the future. They were also informed that the validity of the 1993 plan had been prolonged for a further two years under the amendment to the Local Planning Act 1994 adopted in 1999. 14.  On 7 July 2001 the Mayor of Milanówek refused the applicant's request for an initial approval of a development project on his land (decyzja o warunkach zabudowy), considering that the project would be incompatible with the local land development plan. The applicant wished to have a house built on his land while, under the plan, it was designated for the construction of a road and a hospital. 15.  The applicant appealed against this decision to the Mazowiecki Governor. In a reply of 19 July 2001, he was informed that the appeal should be lodged with the Local Government Board of Appeal and that the construction of the road in Milanówek would not be budgeted before 2010 at the earliest. The applicant addressed the Appeal Board. 16.  On 21 November 2001 the Local Government Board of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal on the ground that his construction project was incompatible with the land development plan. It was further reiterated that, under the Local Planning Act 1994, he had no right to compensation for the fact that his land had been “frozen” or for the restrictions on its use. 17.  On 1 October 2001 the Municipal Office informed the applicant that the plan had been amended in that the construction of the hospital was no longer foreseen. However, the project to build a road remained valid, but no timeframe was specified. 18.  On 11 March 2002 the applicant requested the Municipality to acquire his property. The Municipal Office refused to do so by a letter of 9 May 2002. 19.  On 17 June 2002 the applicant complained to the Municipal Office that the decisions it had given in respect of the land development in his neighbourhood were incompatible with the land development plan adopted in 1993. 20.  By a letter of 2 July 2002, the Office informed the applicant that, under domestic law, the owners of property to be expropriated in the future had no right to compensation for the fact that their land could not be developed. They would be entitled to compensation only after the final expropriation decisions in respect of their property had been taken. 21.  On the same day the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed his appeal against the decision of 19 December 2000. The court observed that its jurisdiction was limited to the examination of the lawfulness of the impugned decision. It found that the decision was lawful as it was common ground between the parties that the applicant's construction project was incompatible with the local land development plan.
It further noted that the applicant had complained that his situation could not be seen as being compatible with the Constitution, given that owners affected by plans adopted prior to the Constitution's entry into force could not benefit from compensation claims provided for by section 36 of the Local Planning Act 1994. The court referred to the judgment of the Constitutional Court given in 1995 (see paragraph 36 below), which had examined the compatibility with the Constitution of section 68 § 1 of the 1994 Act. That provision had excluded the application of the owners' right to compensation under section 36 to land development plans adopted before 31 December 1994. It had found the provision to be compatible with the Constitution.
The Supreme Administrative Court observed that it was not its task to amend or criticise existing laws and that it was bound by this provision. Otherwise, there were no grounds on which to consider that the decision challenged by the applicant had been unlawful. 22.  In the meantime, in January 2002 the applicant petitioned the Ombudsman. 23.  On 20 February 2002 the Ombudsman informed him that the legal framework for “frozen land” was governed by the Local Planning Act 1994. Under section 36 of this Act, owners of such plots were entitled to various forms of compensation, but only insofar as their plots were affected by land development plans adopted after 1 January 1995. 24.  On 31 December 2002 the validity of the 1993 land development plan expired. 25.  On 25 August 2003 the applicant was granted an initial planning permit (decyzja o warunkach zabudowy) in respect of his land.


5.  The first applicant, Mrs Valentina Nikolaeva Bevacqua, is a Bulgarian national who was born in 1974 and at the relevant time lived in Sofia. In 2003 or 2004 she moved to Italy. The application is submitted by the first applicant on her own behalf and also on behalf of her son S. (“the second applicant”), a minor, who was born in 1997. 6.  The first applicant married Mr N. in 1995 and gave birth to S. in January 1997. 7.  Later, the relations between the spouses soured, Mr N. became aggressive and on 1 March 2000 the first applicant left the family home with her son and moved into her parents’ apartment. On the same day the first applicant filed for divorce and sought an interim custody order, stating, inter alia, that Mr N. often used offensive language, battered her “without any reason” and did not contribute to the household budget. 8.  On 7 March 2000 a judge at the Sofia District Court examined the case file and fixed the date of the first hearing for 11 April 2000, without examining the request for an interim order. 9.  During the first two months following the separation, Mr N. visited his son every day and took him to his apartment on weekends, with the first applicant’s consent. 10.  On 11 April 2000 the District Court could not proceed with the examination of the divorce case as Mr N. had been taken ill and did not appear. 11.  On 6 May 2000 Mr N. did not bring S. home after a walk. He telephoned the first applicant and told her that his son would live with him. For the next six days he refused the first applicant’s requests for meetings or telephone conversations with her son. 12.  On 9 May 2000 the first applicant complained to the prosecuting authorities. The relevant prosecutor apparently gave instructions that Mr N. should be summoned and served with an official warning. That was not done until 22 June 2000. 13.  On 12 May 2000 the first applicant went to see her son at the kindergarten and took him to her home. In the evening Mr N. telephoned and then appeared outside the first applicant’s home. He was shouting and banging on the door, thus frightening the child and the first applicant. Mr N. eventually managed to enter the apartment, when the first applicant’s father came home. He allegedly hit or pushed the first applicant in the presence of her parents and the child. At one point Mr N. seized his son, but the first applicant was trying to hold him. The child was screaming. Eventually, Mr N. left with the child. 14.  On 18 May 2000 the first applicant visited a forensic doctor who noted a small bruise on her face and a bruise on her hip.  On 25 May 2000 she filed a complaint with the District Prosecutor’s Office and enclosed the medical certificate. 15.  The first applicant also sought the help of a non-governmental organisation assisting female victims of domestic violence. She was offered the possibility to stay with her son in a hostel for such victims in Bourgas. On 25 May 2000 the first applicant collected her son from the kindergarten and travelled with him to Bourgas. She spent four days at the hostel there without disclosing her whereabouts to Mr N. 16.  Mr N. complained to the local Juveniles Pedagogic Unit (see paragraph 43 below), stating that the first applicant had abducted their son. The first applicant was summoned by the police. On 31 May 2000 she returned to Sofia and met the district juveniles inspector. She explained that she had been the victim of violence and that her son’s health was in danger because of the father’s violent behaviour. It appears that the inspector disbelieved the first applicant’s version of the events and allegedly insisted that she could be prosecuted for having abducted her son. 17.  On the same day in the evening Mr N. visited the first applicant in her home, allegedly threatened her and took their son away. 18.  On the following day, 1 June 2000, the juveniles inspector organised a meeting between the first applicant, her former husband and the child. According to the first applicant, the meeting lasted four hours. The child was asked whether he preferred to be with his mother or with his father. The meeting resulted in an oral agreement between the parents, according to which the child would live with his father for a month and then with his mother for another month. As a result of this agreement Mr N. withdrew his complaint for abduction. 19.  According to the first applicant, the agreement was only implemented for a very limited period. 20.  In the following days Mr N. allowed contacts between the first applicant and her son. On an unspecified date the child was ill and the first applicant took care of him in Mr N.’s apartment. 21.  On 13 June 2000 the first applicant appeared before the District Court for a hearing in the divorce proceedings. She was not legally represented. Mr N. did not appear. His lawyer was present. The first applicant stated that she wished to pursue her claims. The court did not examine the request for an interim order. The first applicant did not raise the issue. The court fixed a time-limit for reconciliation, as required by law, and adjourned the examination of the case until 29 September 2000. 22.  On 22 June 2000 the police summoned Mr N. and gave him an official warning in relation to the first applicant’s complaint of 9 May 2000 (see paragraph 12 above). As a result Mr N. allegedly became aggressive. On 28 June 2000, when he brought S. for a visit to his mother’s apartment, Mr N. reacted angrily to remarks by the first applicant and hit her in their son’s presence. On the next day the first applicant visited a medical doctor who noted a bruise on her left eyelid and a swollen cheek. She also reported pain in her right wrist. 23.  On 3 and 6 July 2000 the first applicant complained to the juveniles inspector at the local police station but was told that nothing could be done and that the dispute should be decided by the courts. 24.  In July and August 2000 the first applicant complained to the Ministry of the Interior, stating that they should assist her to obtain the custody of her child and that measures should be taken to protect her son, who was in danger because Mr N. was not taking care of him properly and was aggressive towards her. The first applicant complained that nothing had been done in this respect by the police. In August 2000 she received replies stating that the matter had been examined and that no unlawful conduct on the part of police officers had been noted. The police had done what they could and the remaining issues concerned a private dispute. 25.  On 11 September 2000 the first applicant filed written submissions with the District Court reiterating her request for an interim order. She informed the court about the relevant events since 6 May 2000 and referred to her complaints to the prosecuting authorities. She also stated that her son had been living in conditions which endangered his development. The first applicant sought leave to have two witnesses examined in this respect. 26.  On 12 September 2000 the judge examined the applicant’s submissions in private and decided that the request for an interim order should be dealt with on 12 October 2000, not at the hearing fixed for 26 September 2000. 27.  On 26 September 2000 the District Court held a hearing in the divorce proceedings. It noted the failure of the parties to reconcile and fixed a hearing on the merits for 14 November 2000. 28.  On 12 October 2000 the District Court held a hearing on the issue of interim measures. Mr N. requested that the files of the prosecutors and the police who had examined the first applicant’s complaints be admitted in evidence. He stated that those authorities had heard impartial witnesses – several neighbours – and had convincingly established that the first applicant’s allegations about physical violence were unfounded. The first applicant’s lawyer objected, stating that the files could be relevant to the merits of the divorce proceedings but should not be examined in the interim measures procedure. The court decided to adjourn the hearing until 14 November 2000 in order to allow the production of the prosecutors’ files. 29.  On 14 November 2000 the District Court dealt with the request for an interim order. It heard one witness for each party. The first applicant’s father, who was heard as a witness, confirmed that Mr N. had been aggressive on two occasions and that quarrels often erupted between the child’s parents. A relative of Mr N. testified that he took good care of the child. The first applicant also presented a written opinion by a psycho-therapist working for the non-governmental organisation whose help she had solicited. The therapist described the first applicant’s visits to the centre for victims of domestic violence and stated that in her opinion the first applicant had suffered a strong emotional upset as a result of the behaviour of Mr N. and the authorities’ passive attitude. Mr N. disputed the statements contained in the written opinion. The court decided that that was tantamount to contesting the authenticity of a document and invited the parties to adduce evidence in this respect. Having regard to the need to give the parties time to adduce such evidence and noting that the prosecutors’ files concerning the applicants’ complaints had not been transmitted to it, the District Court adjourned the matter until 12 December 2000. The hearing listed for 12 December 2000 was later adjourned on unspecified grounds. 30.  The next hearing was held on 13 February 2001. In relation to the proceedings concerning the authenticity of the psycho-therapist’s written opinion, the first applicant’s lawyer presented documents demonstrating that the non-governmental organisation for which the therapist worked had been registered in 1997. Mr N.’s lawyer stated that in accordance with legislation in force since 1 January 2001 non-governmental organisations needed re-registration. On that basis he objected to the admission in evidence of the written opinion of the psycho-therapist. The court interpreted that objection as a challenge to the authenticity of the registration documents and invited the parties to adduce evidence in that respect. 31.  At that point, the first applicant withdrew her request and asked the court to rule on the merits of the divorce claims, including the child custody claim. Thereupon, the court terminated the interim measures proceedings. It then heard two witnesses. A neighbour testified that she had heard the spouses quarrelling often in the past and had seen bruises on the first applicant’s body. The latter had complained that Mr N. battered her. A colleague of Mr N. testified that he had never seen him being aggressive. The court also admitted in evidence the prosecutors’ files concerning the first applicant’s complaints submitted in 2000. As the parties sought leave to examine other witnesses, the court adjourned the hearing until 24 April 2001. 32.  From the summer of 2000 the first applicant could only see her son at his kindergarten as the visits to Mr N.’s home created tension. On 7 March 2001 she collected her son and brought him to her home. Mr N. complained to the prosecution authorities and the police and also wrote to the judge dealing with the divorce proceedings. As a result, on 19 March and 17 April 2001 the first applicant was summoned by the police and given official warnings. According to the first applicant, Mr N. also threatened her with physical violence but she kept the child. According to Mr N., on 11 March 2001 in the evening he was attacked by men hired by the first applicant, in her presence. 33.  The last hearing in the divorce proceedings was held on 24 April 2001. In accordance with the Child Protection Act (see paragraph 47 below), an expert of the newly created local Social Care Office gave an opinion after having studied the file and met the child. He reported that the child was afraid of his father as he had battered his mother and that the child preferred to live with his mother. 34.  By judgment of 23 May 2001 the District Court pronounced the divorce and found that both spouses had been responsible for the failure of their marriage. The court further considered that both parties had been good parents but that in view of the low age of the boy he needed his mother. Therefore, the first applicant obtained custody of her child and Mr N. was given visiting rights. 35.  Mr N. appealed, arguing that the allegations that he had been violent were untrue and that he had always cared better for his child. 36.  In the appeal proceedings the Sofia City Court held a hearing on 19 March 2002. It heard two witnesses who confirmed Mr N.’s aggressive behaviour. 37.  On 21 March 2002 the Sofia City Court upheld the lower court’s judgment but considered that there was ample evidence that Mr N. had been aggressive and had battered the first applicant during their marriage. Such behaviour was a bad example for a young boy to witness. The first applicant was therefore better suited to raise the child. 38.  On 18 June 2002 the first applicant visited Mr N.’s apartment, accompanied by two friends, to collect her belongings. Her former husband became aggressive and battered her. On the following day the first applicant visited a forensic doctor who noted bruises on her face, right arm and armpit and her left hip. She complained to the prosecution authorities, which by decisions of October and December 2002 and January 2003 refused to institute criminal proceedings against Mr N., noting that it was open to the first applicant to bring private prosecution proceedings, as the alleged injuries fell into the category of light bodily injuries.


5.  The applicant was born in 1954. She lives in Gdańsk-Zaspa. 6.  By a judgment of 30 March 2006 the Gdańsk Regional Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's appeal against a second‑instance administrative decision by which she had been refused a monthly social assistance benefit. This judgment, with its written reasons, was served on the applicant on 28 April 2006. 7.  On an unspecified later date the applicant was granted, by a decision of an official of the court's registry, legal aid for the purposes of lodging a cassation appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court. 8.  By a further decision of a registry official given on 25 April 2006 the registry requested the local Bar Association to assign a legal-aid lawyer to the case. That order was complied with on 12 June 2006. 9.  On 19 June 2006 the Gdańsk Bar informed the court that Mr M. S. had been assigned to the case. Mr M.S. was so informed on 20 June 2006. 10.  On 21 June 2006 he examined the case file and found that the time-limit for lodging a cassation appeal had expired on 28 May 2006. 11.  By a letter to the court dated 1 July 2006 the lawyer informed the court that he saw no legal grounds on which he could draft a cassation appeal. He presented a detailed legal analysis of the case and an explanation why he considered that legal grounds for a cassation appeal did not obtain. He further observed that in the circumstances of the case he could not, in any event, be required to prepare an appeal, having been served with the judgment after the time-limit for its submission had already expired.