5.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Zagreb. 6.  On 25 April 1992 the applicant married Ms Z.J. 7.  On 9 October 1993 Z.J. gave birth to their son I.R. 8.  In December 1993 Z.J., together with their son, moved out of the flat in which she had lived with the applicant and went to live with her parents. After that she started avoiding contact with the applicant. Prior to the institution of the divorce and custody proceedings in February 1996 (see paragraphs 9-30 below) the applicant saw his son only twice, in January 1994 and in 1995 during Easter holidays. The applicant and Z.J. officially divorced by a court judgment to that effect on 12 February 2002 (see paragraphs 21-22 below). 9.  On 19 February 1996 Z.J. brought a civil action against the applicant in the Zagreb Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zagrebu) seeking divorce, custody of, and the maintenance for their son. 10.  On 22 April 1997 the court asked the Zagreb Social Welfare Centre (Centar za socijalnu skrb Zagreb, hereafter “the local social welfare centre”) to prepare a report on the family situation in the Ribić family and submit its recommendation as to whom of the parents custody of their son should be awarded. 11.  The Government submitted that the applicant had ignored the local social welfare centre’s calls to attend interviews necessary for the preparation of the report by not collecting the centre’s letters to that effect from the post office. The applicant denied that allegation, noted that the Government had not substantiated it by relevant documents and invited them to do so. He further submitted that while it was true that in the period between 1993 and 2003 he had worked in Ljubljana (Slovenia) on weekdays, he had been staying in Zagreb every weekend. If there had been any problem with the service of the local social welfare centre’s correspondence to him, the centre should have contacted the advocate who had represented him in the civil proceedings in question. 12.  On 7 July 1997 the applicant’s and Z.J.’ legal representatives agreed to temporarily suspend the proceedings (mirovanje postupka) for a period of three months with a view to reaching an amicable solution, which however did not materialise. 13.  Thus, in the further course of the proceedings, on 23 January 1998, the court decided to obtain information on the parties’ income, and scheduled the next hearing for 20 April 1998 with a view to hearing the parties. 14.  However, the hearing scheduled for 20 April 1998 was adjourned because the applicant did not attend it. 15.  At the hearing held on 22 May 1998 the court again decided to hear the parties and invited Z.J. to provide information on her income, something the applicant had already done. 16.  At that hearing and in his written submission of 9 March 1999 the applicant asked the court to issue a provisional measure whereby it would provisionally regulate his contacts with his son. According to the information submitted by the parties, the court did not decide on the applicant’s motion, apparently because under the legislation in force at the material time interim contact orders were in the exclusive jurisdiction of the social welfare centres as administrative authorities (see paragraph 81 below). 17.  At the hearing held on 9 October 1998 the court heard the parties and decided to obtain an opinion from an expert in psychiatry with a view to deciding on custody and access rights. However, since the applicant and Z.J. did not advance the costs of the expert opinion until seven months later, the case-file was not sent to the appointed expert institution before 11 June 1999. 18.  In the course of the preparation of the expert opinion, on 26 February 2000 the applicant met with his son, for the first time since Easter of 1995 (see paragraph 8 above). On the same date the applicant and Z.J. signed an agreement regarding the contact schedule they would propose to the court. In particular, it was agreed to propose to the court that the contacts between the applicant and his son take place in the presence of both parents for two hours on the premises specified by the local social welfare centre and in the presence of a child-welfare professional designated by the centre. In the first three months, the contacts were to take place twice a month, and thereafter every week. After a year the local social welfare centre were to assess the situation and propose further arrangements. 19.  By 3 April 2000 the designated expert institution had finalised the expert opinion, which was received by the court 11 days later. The experts’ recommendation was in line with the parties’ agreement of 26 February 2000, which they endorsed. The experts particularly emphasised the need for the contacts between the applicant and his son to take place in the presence of Z.J. and a child-welfare professional designated by the local social welfare centre. 20.  Since both parties objected to the expert opinion, the court held three more hearings, on 25 May and 14 and 28 September 2001 during which the court heard the psychiatrist who had prepared it. The court also obtained fresh information on the parties’ income with a view to deciding on the maintenance for their son. 21.  On 26 October 2001 the Municipal Court pronounced judgment whereby it: (a) dissolved the marriage between the applicant and Z.J., (b) awarded custody of their son to Z.J., (c) granted the applicant access (contact) rights, and (d) ordered the applicant to regularly pay a certain amount of money as maintenance for his son. The relevant part of that judgment reads as follows:
“Contacts between I.R. and his father Zdenko Ribić shall take place twice a month on Saturdays for two hours for the period of two months, and after that once a week on Saturdays in the child’s home in the presence of the mother and a psychologist or social worker. After a year the local social welfare centre may propose changes in the frequency [of contacts].
...
Since both parties repeatedly, by their non-attendance and their failure to advance the costs of the expert opinion, caused hearings to be postponed and thereby protracted the proceedings for several years ... each party should bear their own [litigation] costs.” 22.  Following an appeal by both parties, on 12 February 2002 the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu) quashed the first-instance judgment in so far as it concerned access rights and maintenance and remitted the case. It upheld the contested judgment in so far as it concerned divorce and custody, which part thereby became final. 23.  In the resumed proceedings, the Zagreb Municipal Court held hearings on 5 July 2002, and on 27 January, 19 March and 12 July 2003. 24.  In addition, on 26 August 2002 the court invited the local social welfare centre to prepare a report and submit its recommendation on the applicant’s contact with his son. In the course of their preparation the expert team of the centre, consisting of a social worker and a psychologist, conducted several joint and separate interviews with the parties. The centre’s experts also contacted the applicant’s son’s school and obtained an opinion on his school performance. 25.  On 7 February 2003 the local social welfare centre submitted its report and recommendation to the court. Its expert team recommended that the contacts between the applicant and his son take place every second Saturday for two hours for the period of three months, and after that every Saturday, in the presence of the mother and a child-welfare professional. However, the centre’s experts suggested that the contacts should not take place in the child’s home as it was not a neutral ground and could give rise to conflicts between the applicant on the one side and Z.J. and her parents on the other. Their report indicated that the applicant’s son was very emotionally attached to his mother, that he did not know his father but wanted to meet him. The expert’s opinion also suggested that the centre impose a child-protection measure of supervision of exercise of parental authority focusing on contacts between the applicant and his son, with a view to facilitating those contacts and assisting the parents in improving communication between them (see paragraph 59 below). 26.  At the hearing held on 19 March 2003 the court heard the parties. 27.  On 4 July 2003 the court rendered a partial judgment whereby it decided on the maintenance for the applicant’s son. At the same time it decided to stay the proceedings in so far they concerned the applicant’s access rights pending the outcome of the concurrent civil proceedings his former wife had instituted against him with a view to depriving him of parental responsibility (see paragraphs 77-78 below). The applicant appealed. 28.  On 3 February 2004 the Zagreb County Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the partial judgment on maintenance and upheld it. At the same time it quashed the first-instance decision to stay the proceedings and remitted the case. It held that the applicant had the right to maintain contact with his son as long as he was not deprived of parental responsibility. 29.  In the resumed proceedings, on 23 July 2004 the Zagreb Municipal Court adopted a judgment whereby it again granted the applicant access rights and issued a detailed contact schedule. In particular, the court decided that in the first three months the contacts between the applicant and his son were to take place every second Saturday for two hours on the premises of the local social welfare centre and in the presence of the mother and either a psychologist or social worker designated by the centre. In the next three months the contacts were to be arranged in the same manner but every Saturday, and, after another three months, in the same way but in the absence of the mother. After nine months the applicant were to exercise his access rights for four hours every Tuesday and Thursday in those weeks when the applicant’s son had school in the morning, every second weekend, thirty days of summer and seven days of winter holidays, as well as every second official or church holiday. 30.  On 12 April 2005 the Zagreb County Court dismissed an appeal by Z.J. and upheld the first-instance judgment. The first-instance judgment of 23 July 2004 became final when the second-instance judgment of 12 April 2005 was served on both parties on 29 June 2005. 31.  As Z.J. refused to comply with the above judgment of 23 July 2004 and obstructed the exercise of the applicant’s access rights, on 12 May 2005 he applied for enforcement of that judgment before the Zagreb Municipal Court. 32.  On 25 August 2005 that court issued a writ of execution (rješenje o ovrsi) whereby it ordered Z.J., at the risk of fine of 3,000 Croatian kunas (HRK), to allow the applicant to exercise his access rights. 33.  On 8 November 2005 the Zagreb County Court dismissed an appeal by Z.J. and upheld the writ. 34.  On 2 December 2005 the local social welfare centre informed the court that Z.J. was not complying with judgment of 23 July 2004 as she had not been bringing the applicant’s son to the scheduled meetings on the centre’s premises where the contacts between him and the applicant were to be arranged. The centre thus asked to court to enforce the judgment through a judicial enforcement officer. 35.  On 22 December 2005 the Zagreb Municipal Court issued a decision whereby it fined Z.J. HRK 3,000 for non-compliance with the judgment of 23 July 2004, and again ordered her, at the risk of further fine of HRK 6,000, to do so within fifteen days. Z.J. appealed but on 21 November 2006 the County Court dismissed her appeal. 36.  In the meantime, on 29 December 2005, Z.J. asked for postponement of enforcement but the Municipal Court dismissed her motion. 37.  Since Z.J. had paid the fine but nevertheless did not comply with the judgment, on 30 November 2006 the Zagreb Municipal Court accepted the applicant’s motion of 27 September 2006 and issued a new writ of execution whereby it ordered a judicial enforcement officer, with the assistance of a pedagogue or a social worker employed with local social welfare centre, and a police officer, to take the applicant’s son from Z.J., or any other person each time the applicant was entitled pursuant to the contact schedule to exercise his access rights, and to return him to her afterwards. Even though the court ordered that the costs of that intervention by the enforcement officer were to be borne by Z.J., it invited the applicant to advance those costs within eight days of the service of the writ. 38.  By a decision of 14 February 2007 the Municipal Court discontinued the enforcement proceedings because the applicant had not advanced the costs. The applicant then first on 7 March 2007 appealed against that decision but, on 29 March 2007 withdrew that appeal and, eventually, on 23 November 2007 withdrew his application for enforcement of 12 May 2005 (see paragraph 31 above). 39.  Accordingly, on 4 December 2007 the Zagreb Municipal Court discontinued the enforcement proceedings.
(b)  Second set of enforcement proceedings 40.  Meanwhile, on 23 April 2007 the applicant again applied for enforcement of the above judgment of 23 July 2004 (see paragraph 29 above) before the Zagreb Municipal Court. 41.  On 6 December 2007 that court issued a writ of execution identical to the one of 30 November 2006 (see paragraph 37 above). 42.  On 24 December 2007 Z.J. appealed against the writ and on 2 January 2008 sought that the enforcement be postponed. 43.  On 6 February 2008 the Zagreb Municipal Court dismissed Z.J.’s motion for postponement of the enforcement. On 25 February 2008 Z.J. appealed against that decision. 44.  On 28 February 2011 the Municipal Court forwarded Z.J.’s appeals of 24 December 2007 and 25 February 2008 to the Zagreb County Court for a decision. 45.  By a letter of 19 April 2011 the County Court returned the case file to the Municipal Court asking it to correct certain errors in the first-instance proceedings. 46.  In the meantime, on 10 June 2009 the applicant had lodged a request for protection of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time (zahtjev za zaštitu prava na suđenje u razumnom roku) with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske), complaining about the length of the second set of the enforcement proceedings. 47.  On 26 September 2011 the Supreme Court found a violation of the applicant’s right to a hearing within a reasonable time and: (a) awarded him HRK 5,000 in compensation, (b) ordered the Zagreb Municipal Court to correct the errors indicated in the Zagreb County Court’s letter of 19 April 2011 within a month (see paragraph 45 above), and (c) ordered the Zagreb County Court to decide on Z.J.’s appeals of 24 December 2007 and 25 February 2008 within three months upon receiving the case file again from the Municipal Court. 48.  By decisions of 6 March 2012 the County Court dismissed Z.J.’s appeals of 24 December 2007 and 25 February 2008. 49.  Meanwhile, on 9 October 2011 the applicant’s son turned eighteen and became an adult. Accordingly, the above enforcement proceedings became obsolete. Consequently, by a decision of 13 January 2013 the Municipal Court discontinued the enforcement proceedings. 50.  Parallel to the above civil proceedings concerning inter alia custody and access, the local social welfare centre acted in various ways in order to solve the family conflicts. 51.  On 20 March 2003 the local social welfare centre issued a decision whereby it provisionally granted the applicant access rights until the judgment in the above civil proceedings became final, and issued a contact schedule. In particular, the centre decided that the contacts between the applicant and his son were to take place every second Friday for one hour on its premises in the presence of a child-welfare professional for a period of three months. The decision specified that an appeal against it did not suspend its enforcement. On 14 April 2003 Z.J. appealed against that decision. 52.  On 15 April 2003 the centre informed Z.J. of the need to cooperate with it and enable the contacts between the applicant and his son. It warned her that the failure to do so may be considered as dereliction of her duties as a parent calling for more stringent child-protection measures. 53.  On 27 June 2003 the applicant applied to the centre for enforcement of its decision of 20 March 2003. 54.  However, acting on the appeal by Z.J. of 14 April 2003, on 22 September 2003 the relevant Ministry, as the second-instance administrative authority, quashed the centre’s decision of 20 March 2003 and remitted the case. Accordingly, on 3 December 2003 the centre discontinued the administrative enforcement proceedings instituted by the applicant on 27 June 2003. 55.  On 30 October 2003 the applicant applied to the centre to issue a new decision on his access rights. 56.  On 22 December 2003 the local social welfare centre issued a new decision whereby it again provisionally granted the applicant access rights until the judgment in the above civil proceedings became final, and issued a new contact schedule. The decision specified that an appeal against it did not suspend its enforcement. On 19 January 2004 Z.J. appealed. 57.  On 13 July 2004 the relevant Ministry dismissed that appeal and upheld the centre’s decision. Z.J. then brought an action in the Administrative Court against the Ministry’s decision, which that court dismissed on 17 February 2005. 58.  In the meantime, on 15 October 2004 the applicant applied for enforcement of the local social welfare centre’s decision of 22 December 2003 (see paragraph 56 above). However, it would appear that before 29 June 2005, that is, the date on which the judgment of the Zagreb Municipal Court of 23 July 2004 in the above civil proceedings became final (see paragraph 29-30 above) and thus superseded the decision the applicant sought to enforce, the local social welfare centre did not issue an enforcement order or undertake other steps to enforce its decision. 59.  Concurrently with the administrative proceedings described above (see paragraphs 51-58), the local social welfare centre conducted other administrative proceedings. In particular, by a decision of 23 December 2003 the local social welfare centre imposed a child-protection measure of supervision of the exercise of parental authority (see paragraph 82 below) for a period of one year, appointed a supervising officer and drafted a supervision programme. 60.  On 2 February 2004 the supervision officer informed the centre that Z.J. ignored her calls to arrange the first meeting between the applicant and his son in the execution of the centre’s decision of 22 December 2003 (see paragraph 56 above) granting him provisional access rights. On the same day the centre adopted the opinion that the supervision measure should be discontinued as ineffective and that criminal-law measures should be set in motion instead (see paragraph 68 below). 61.  On 1 March 2004 the supervising officer submitted her report to the centre stating that no contacts between the applicant and his son had taken place since the adoption of the centre’s decision of 22 December 2003 (see paragraph 56 above). At the same time she proposed that the contacts between the applicant and his son be arranged on school premises in the presence of a pedagogue. 62.  By a decision of 9 March 2004 the centre discontinued the application of the child-protection measure of supervision of the exercise of the parental authority imposed by its decision of 23 December 2003 (see paragraph 59 above). It stated that the measure was ineffective given Z.J.’s lack of cooperation and that other, more stringent, child-protection measures were warranted. On 17 March 2004 Z.J. appealed against that decision. 63.  On 17 February 2005 the relevant Ministry quashed the centre’s decisions of 23 December 2003 and 9 March 2004 (see paragraphs 59 and 62 above) and remitted the case. 64.  In the resumed proceedings, after having heard the applicant and Z.J. on 19 April 2005, by a decision of 13 May 2005 the centre again imposed the child-protection measure of supervision of the exercise of parental authority for a period of one year, appointed a supervising officer and prepared a programme of supervision. Z.J. appealed. 65.  On 3 June, 4 and 31 July 2005 the supervising officer informed the centre that contacts between the applicant and his son had not taken place due to Z.J.’s lack of cooperation. 66.  On 29 December 2005 the relevant Ministry dismissed an appeal by Z.J. and upheld the centre’s decision of 13 May 2005 (see paragraph 64 above). 67.  The child-protection measure imposed by the centre in its decision of 13 May 2005 expired on 15 May 2006. Monthly reports submitted by the supervising officer suggest that in that one-year period the applicant had not met his son. 68.  On 5 February 2004 the local social welfare centre invited the Zagreb State Attorney’s Office to bring criminal charges against Z.J. for her failure to cooperate with the centre and the supervising officer, obstruction of measures issued by the centre and dereliction of her duties as a parent regarding her son’s contacts with his father. 69.  On 24 March 2004 the Zagreb State Attorney’s Office informed the social welfare centre that, for the time being, there were no grounds to prosecute Z.J. for the criminal offence of obstruction of the child-protection measures defined in section 215 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 84 below) because the decisions whose execution Z.J. allegedly obstructed had not become final. 70.  On 14 April 2004 the applicant filed a criminal complaint against Z.J. with the same State Attorney’s Office accusing her of the same criminal offence. 71.  On 29 September 2004 the State Attorney’s Office dismissed his criminal complaint. In so doing, it advanced the same reasons as those stated in its letter to the social welfare centre of 24 March 2004 (see paragraph 69 above). 72.  On 18 November 2005 the local social welfare centre informed the State Attorney’s Office that decisions whose execution Z.J. had been obstructing had become final and invited the State Attorney’s Office to criminally prosecute her. 73.  On 5 December 2005 the State Attorney’s Office indicted Z.J. before the Zagreb Municipal Court for having been obstructing the court-ordered contacts between the applicant and his son. In particular, she was charged with the criminal offence of obstruction of child-protection measures laid down in section 215 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 84 below). 74.  By a judgment of 24 June 2008 the Municipal Court found Z.J. guilty as charged and convicted her but the judgment was subsequently quashed by the Zagreb County Court following her appeal and the case was remitted. 75.  In the resumed proceedings, by a judgment of 24 January 2011 the Zagreb Municipal Court again found Z.J. guilty as charged and sentenced her to five months’ imprisonment but imposed a suspended sentence with supervision (uvjetna osuda sa zaštitnim nadzorom) for a period of three years provided that in that (probation) period she did not commit a further offence. In its judgment the court noted, inter alia, the following:
“This court is deeply aware that all decisions and judgments including this one can no longer remedy the harm and evil caused by the conduct of the accused, primarily to her child, who grew up without a father ... However, it can at least emphasise that such behaviour is unacceptable and punishable ... When determining the penalty the court took into account, as aggravating circumstances, the fact that for a number of years the accused deliberately, perfidiously and deceitfully obstructed enforcement of any court decision or decision of the social welfare centre and in so doing behaved arrogantly and acted as if she was untouchable and in that way hindered a healthy and undisturbed development of her son. The court did not find any special mitigating circumstances.” 76.  By a judgment of 16 March 2012 the Zagreb County Court dismissed an appeal by Z.J. and upheld the first-instance judgment. 77.  In 2002 Z.J. instituted non-contentious proceedings against the applicant before the Zagreb Municipal Court with a view to depriving him of parental responsibility for his son. 78.  By a judgment of 2 November 2004 the court dismissed Z.J.’s petition. It held that her claims that the applicant had abandoned his son, grossly neglected his duties as a parent and failed to pay (regularly) for his maintenance were unfounded. In so doing it relied on the report of the local social welfare centre suggesting that it was Z.J. who had obstructed the applicant’s contacts with his son.


7.  The applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Nicosia. 8.  On 19 July 1989 she joined an anti-Turkish demonstration in the Ayios Kassianos area in Nicosia in which the applicants in the Chrysostomos and Papachrysostomou v. Turkey and Loizidou v. Turkey cases (see below) also took part. 9.  According to an affidavit sworn by the applicant before the Nicosia District Court on 3 January 2000, the demonstration of 19 July 1989 was peaceful and was held on the fifteenth anniversary of the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in support of the missing persons and to protest against human rights violations. 10.  The demonstrators gathered at the Ayios Kassianos school in Nicosia. After United Nations (UN) soldiers had shouted a warning to the demonstrators not to advance further, the applicant was seized by the hair, beaten and assaulted by Turkish military personnel and/or other personnel acting under Turkish control. The beating was inflicted with electrical batons by 3 or 4 policemen all over the applicant’s body, in particular the head and back. One of the blows caused a painful injury to the applicant’s right arm and elbow, with loss of blood. She was then dragged to a small, stiflingly hot room in which other demonstrators were also being held. One of the prisoners had been severely beaten and was unconscious. 11.  The applicant and the other detainees were subsequently led through a hostile crowd that spat and swore at them to a bus that was waiting to take them to the so-called “Pavlides Garage”. As she entered the garage her handbag was seized. She was forced to sit on the floor; the toilet facilities were filthy. A crowd that had gathered outside the garage was swearing, shouting abuse and threats and throwing stones, some of which came through the corrugated iron roof. One of the detainees, a doctor, treated the applicant’s arm, which was still bleeding, with whatever he had to hand and bandaged it. One of the female prisoners (Mrs Vrahimi – see application no. 16078/90) was then beaten in front of the others, who remained silent, fearing for their own fate. A woman shouted that she was an American citizen and was released shortly afterwards. 12.  While in the garage, the applicant was interrogated but refused to sign the statement, which was written in Turkish. The interrogation took place in Greek and touched mainly on political subjects. The next day, 20 July 1989, she and the other detainees were given food and at the same time photographed and filmed by a television crew. 13.  Later that day, after being subjected to a body search, the applicant was taken to a court which remanded her in custody for two days. She was transferred with other women who had been arrested at the same time to the Ortakeuy prison, where she was held in a cell with another woman. The conditions of detention were appalling, the cell was unbearably hot and during the night the applicant and the other detainees were constantly checked and counted by the guards and as a result, were unable to sleep. The applicant went on hunger strike. 14.  During the evening of 21 July 1989 the applicant was taken to the Nicosia District Court for trial. The judge asked her and the other accused whether they wanted legal representation; they replied that they would only accept as defence counsel a lawyer registered with the bar association of the Republic of Cyprus. As a result, they were not assisted by a lawyer. The interpretation into Greek was poor and did not cover all the words used by the witnesses and the parties. Each time an accused tried to speak and give an explanation, she was interrupted. Although the applicant had never previously seen some of the exhibits that were produced at the trial (notably a pair of scissors, gloves and a saw), one of the prosecution witnesses said that he had found a penknife in her handbag. The applicant alleged that she had taken it with her to peel an apple and that the blade was not even two inches long. She tried to explain the position to the judge but was not allowed to. She showed her bandaged arm in order to complain about the beating she had suffered, but an officer replied that she could have injured herself by falling down. After the trial the applicant was taken back to prison. 15.  On 22 July 1989 the court ordered the applicant to enter into a recognizance of 1,000,000 Turkish liras as a guarantee that she would not commit further breaches of the peace for a period of one year. The trial judge noted that it was the second time the applicant had illegally entered “TRNC” territory. Most of the accused, including the applicant, were also sentenced to 2 days’ imprisonment and a fine of 50 Cypriot pounds (CYP – approximately 85 euros (EUR)), with five additional days in prison in default of payment within 24 hours. After the public delivery of the judgment, they were returned to prison. 16.  On 24 July 1989 the applicant was released and taken by bus to southern Cyprus. 17.  As a result of the beating described above, three of the applicant’s vertebrae were damaged. The doctors told her that the condition of her central nerve was continuously deteriorating and that no surgery could be carried out. 18.  The Government alleged that the applicant had participated in a violent demonstration with the aim of enflaming anti-Turkish sentiment. The demonstrators, supported by the Greek-Cypriot administration, were demanding that the “Green Line” in Nicosia should be dismantled. Some carried Greek flags, clubs, knives and wire-cutters. They were acting in a provocative manner and shouting abuse. The demonstrators were warned in Greek and English that unless they dispersed they would be arrested in accordance with the laws of the “TRNC”. The applicant was arrested by the Turkish-Cypriot police after crossing the UN buffer zone and entering the area under Turkish-Cypriot control. The Turkish-Cypriot police intervened in the face of the manifest inability of the Greek-Cypriot authorities and the UN Force in Cyprus to contain the incursion and its possible consequences. 19.  No force was used against demonstrators who did not intrude into the “TRNC” border area and, in the case of demonstrators who were arrested for violating the border, no more force was used than was reasonably necessary in the circumstances in order to arrest and detain the persons concerned. No one was ill-treated. It was possible that some of the demonstrators had hurt themselves in the confusion or in attempting to scale barbed wire or other fencing. Had the Turkish police, or anyone else, assaulted or beaten any of the demonstrators, the UN Secretary General would no doubt have referred to this in his report to the Security Council. 20.  The applicant was charged, tried, found guilty and sentenced to a short term of imprisonment. She pleaded not guilty, but did not give evidence and declined to use the available judicial remedies. She was asked if she required assistance from a lawyer registered in the “TRNC”, but refused and did not ask for legal representation. Interpretation services were provided at the trial by qualified interpreters. All the proceedings were translated into Greek. 21.  In his report of 7 December 1989 on the UN operations in Cyprus, the UN Secretary General stated, inter alia:
“A serious situation, however, arose in July as a result of a demonstration by Greek Cypriots in Nicosia. The details are as follows:
(a) In the evening of 19 July, some 1,000 Greek Cypriot demonstrators, mostly women, forced their way into the UN buffer zone in the Ayios Kassianos area of Nicosia. The demonstrators broke through a wire barrier maintained by UNFICYP and destroyed an UNFICYP observation post. They then broke through the line formed by UNFICYP soldiers and entered a former school complex where UNFICYP reinforcements regrouped to prevent them from proceeding further. A short while later, Turkish-Cypriot police and security forces elements forced their way into the area and apprehended 111 persons, 101 of them women;
(b) The Ayios Kassianos school complex is situated in the UN buffer zone. However, the Turkish forces claim it to be on their side of the cease-fire line. Under working arrangements with UNFICYP, the Turkish-Cypriot security forces have patrolled the school grounds for several years within specific restrictions. This patrolling ceased altogether as part of the unmanning agreement implemented last May;
(c) In the afternoon of 21 July, some 300 Greek Cypriots gathered at the main entrance to the UN protected area in Nicosia, in which the UN headquarters is located, to protest the continuing detention by the Turkish-Cypriot authorities of those apprehended at Ayios Kassianos. The demonstrators, whose number fluctuated between 200 and 2,000, blocked all UN traffic through this entrance until 30 July, when the Turkish-Cypriot authorities released the last two detainees;
(d) The events described above created considerable tension in the island and intensive efforts were made, both at the UN headquarters and at Nicosia, to contain and resolve the situation. On 21 July, I expressed my concern at the events that have taken place and stressed that it was vital that all parties keep in mind the purpose of the UN buffer zone as well as their responsibility to ensure that that area was not violated. I also urged the Turkish-Cypriot authorities to release without delay all those who had been detained. On 24 July, the President of the Security Council announced that he had conveyed to the representatives of all the parties, on behalf of the members of the Council, the Council’s deep concern at the tense situation created by the incidents of 19 July. He also stressed the need strictly to respect the UN buffer zone and appealed for the immediate release of all persons still detained. He asked all concerned to show maximum restraint and to take urgent steps that would bring about a relaxation of tension and contribute to the creation of an atmosphere favourable to the negotiations.” 22.  The applicant produced 21 photographs taken at different times during the demonstration on 19 July 1989. Photographs 1 to 7 were intended to show that, notwithstanding the deployment of the Turkish-Cypriot police, the demonstration was peaceful. In photographs 8 to 10 members of the Turkish-Cypriot police are seen breaking up the UNFICYP cordon. The final set of photographs show members of the Turkish-Cypriot police using force to arrest some of the women demonstrators. 23.  The English translation of the Nicosia District Court judgment of 22 July 1989 indicates that the applicant, together with 23 other women, was charged with two offences: entering “TRNC” territory without permission (contrary to sections 2, 8 and 9 of Law No. 5/72 – see paragraph 30 below) and entering “TRNC” territory other than through an approved port (contrary to subsections 12(1) and (5) of the Aliens and Immigration Law – see paragraph 31 below). 24.  The judgment was given in the presence of the accused and of an interpreter. The trial judge noted the following:
(i) the accused did not accept the charges against them and stated that they did not wish to use the services of a lawyer registered in the “TRNC”;
(ii) some of the accused had fainted during the trial and had been taken to hospital and excused from attending the hearing;
(iii) the public prosecutor called 7 witnesses, whose statements were translated into Greek for the accused’s benefit;
(iv) the witnesses (mainly police officers on duty at the time of the demonstration) declared that the accused had illegally entered the “TRNC” buffer zone, shouted abuse at the Turkish-Cypriot forces, resisted arrest by pulling and pushing; knives and other cutting objects had been found in the bags of some of the demonstrators who had been arrested; in particular, the witnesses declared that the demonstrators had passed the barriers at the UN observation post, broken the wooden door of a church and moved toward a water reservoir; according to a map shown at trial, the area where the accused had entered was “TRNC” territory;
(v) the accused did not call any defence witnesses and did not address the court;
(vi) the accused had been told that they could cross-examine witnesses in turn and, if they so wished, choose one of their number to cross-examine the witnesses on behalf of all the accused; however, they had not done so;
(vii) relying on the statements of the prosecution witnesses, the District Court came to the conclusion that the accused had crossed the borders of the “TRNC” at an unapproved entry point and without permission and had resisted by various means the UN and Turkish forces which had tried to stop them;
(viii) the prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, so that the accused were guilty on both counts;
(ix) in deciding on the sentence, the District Court took into account the seriousness of the offence, and the fact that the accused had shown no remorse and continued to deny the validity of the “TRNC”.


4.  The first applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Beograd. The second applicant is a joint stock company with its seat in Beograd. 5.  On 11 October 1991 the second applicant directly instituted enforcement proceedings in the Novi Sad Commercial Court (Trgovinski sud u Novom Sadu) against a certain company V. 6.  On 30 October 1991 the court issued an enforcement order. Since V. filed an objection, the case was transformed into civil proceedings. 7.  The second applicant amended its claim on four occasions: on 4 May and 19 November 1993, 9 February and 12 October 1994. 8.  On 15 February 1995 the court gave a judgment in the second applicant’s favour, accepting its claim in part. On 6 October 1995 the court gave a supplementary judgment (dopunska presuda) in the case. 9.  On 30 May 1996 the Beograd High Commercial Court (Viši Trgovinski sud u Beogradu) quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case because of factual shortcomings. 10.  By this time, four different judges had been assigned to hear the second applicant’s case, the last change of judges having occurred on 23 January 2003. 11.  On 11 November 2004 the court appointed an expert, ordering him to prepare his opinion within 30 days. This expert submitted his opinion on 14 October 2005. 12.  The court subsequently held hearings on 30 November 2005, 25 January and 13 February 2006. The hearing scheduled for 20 December 2005 was adjourned because the second applicant failed to appear. 13.  On 13 February 2006 the court closed the main hearing and gave a judgment dismissing the second applicant’s claim. 14.  On appeal, on 3 November 2006 the Beograd High Commercial Court again quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case. 15.  In the resumed proceedings, on 8 December 2006 the Novi Sad Commercial Court stayed the proceedings because, meanwhile, on 22 March 2006 the Zrenjanin Commercial Court (Trgovinski sud u Zrenjaninu) had opened bankruptcy proceedings against the second applicant. 16.  The proceedings resumed on 16 February 2007, when the Novi Sad Commercial Court declared that it no longer had territorial jurisdiction in the matter and sent the case file to the Zrenjanin Commercial Court.


9.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Tychy, Poland. 10.  He is a member and an employee of a labour co-operative (spółdzielnia pracy). 11.  On 12 April 1991 he filed with the Warsaw Regional Court an action in which he requested the annulment of several resolutions adopted by the assembly of the representatives of the co-operative (walne zgromadzenie). The contested resolutions concerned the co-operative’s finances. 12.  Between 1992 and 1995, in addition to the original claim, the applicant challenged other resolutions relating to the division of the yearly profits of the co-operative. 13.  On 18 November 1992 the court heard two witnesses and ordered an expert opinion. 14.  On 14 May 1993 the applicant extended his claim. 15.  On 9 September 1993 an expert refused to prepare the opinion ordered by the court, relying on the applicant’s alleged lack of co-operation. The applicant submits that that allegation was not confirmed by the court. 16.  At the hearing held on 15 October 1993 the court summoned the applicant to submit documents that could be of relevance to that opinion. 17.  The opinion was submitted to the court in March 1994. 18.  On 3 March 1994 the applicant modified his claim. 19.  On 24 March 1994 the court issued a decision concerning the remuneration of the court expert. The decision was subsequently amended by the Warsaw Court of Appeal. 20.  On 9 May 1994 the applicant extended his claim. 21.  In a letter of 9 August 1994 the President of the Warsaw Court of Appeal admitted that the time-limit for preparing the expert opinion had not been observed by the expert and that there had been periods of inactivity on the part of the Regional Court. On 10 October 1994 the court refused the applicant’s request for exemption from court costs. On 13 December 1994 the Warsaw Court of Appeal upheld that decision. 22.  On 21 October 1994 and 4 April 1995 the applicant modified his claim. 23.  According to the Government, on 19 May 1995 the court held a hearing. The applicant submits that it was adjourned because the defendant had not been duly summoned. 24.  On 23 May 1995 the court dismissed the applicant’s subsequent request for exemption from court costs. On 3 October 1995 the Warsaw Court of Appeal amended in part that decision. 25.  On 7 February 1996 the Warsaw Regional Court held a hearing. 26.  On 21 March and 1 July 1996 the applicant extended his claim. 27.  The Government submit that the hearing scheduled for 4 December 1996 was adjourned, as the parties considered reaching a settlement. The applicant states that the court itself suggested the settlement of the case and gave the parties a time-limit to start negotiations. On 22 January 1997 the defendant informed the court that no settlement had been reached. 28.  On 5 November 1997 the court held another hearing. 29.  On 14 November 1997 it gave judgment in which it dismissed the applicant’s action. The applicant appealed. 30.  On 24 April 1998 the Warsaw Court of Appeal gave judgment. It quashed a part of the first-instance court’s judgment and remitted the case in that part for re-examination. The applicant lodged with the Supreme Court a cassation appeal against the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 31.  On 25 May 2001 the Supreme Court refused to admit that appeal. 32.  Subsequently, pursuant to the judgment of the Warsaw Court of Appeal, some of the applicant’s claims were remitted to the Warsaw Regional Court for re-examination. 33.  On 14 January 2002 the Warsaw Regional Court held a hearing. 34.  On 28 January 2002 it gave judgment in which it dismissed the applicant’s claim. On 14 May 2002 the applicant appealed. 35.  By a final judgment of 4 April 2003 the Warsaw Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal.


4.  The applicant company was founded in 1992 and is based in Baia Mare. 5.  On 14 March 1996 the applicant company lodged an action seeking to compel company A. (a State-owned private company) to return 2,934,854,487 Romanian lei (ROL), representing the price of merchandise delivered by the applicant and not paid by A., plus interest. The defendant objected, claiming that the debt had already been paid. 6.  The applicant paid ROL 10,000 in court fees but was asked by the court to make a supplementary payment to cover a percentage of the total claim. On 31 May 1996 the court calculated the fee at ROL 270,162,136.
On 28 June 1996 the company contested the new court fee and argued that according to the law, as interpreted by the higher courts, it should only pay ROL 10,000.
On 4 October 1996 it reiterated its position on the matter. 7.  On the same day the court started deliberations in the case. 8.  On 11 October 1996 the court restored the case to its list and summoned the parties to a hearing on 29 November 1996 to discuss the need for an expert evaluation of the claims. 9.  On 20 January 1997 company A. accepted the calculation of the debt. 10.  An evaluation of the debt was ordered and the report was submitted to the court on 11 December 1997. 11.  On several occasions during the proceedings the defendant asked that the applicant company be requested to pay court fees. Several adjournments were granted to this end. 12.  On 26 September 1997 the defendant informed the court that insolvency proceedings had been initiated against it (see paragraph 19 below). 13.  On 5 February 1998 the Maramureş County Court cancelled the action for failure to pay the court fees. It also noted that the applicant company had never contested the level of the court fee. 14.  The applicant company appealed, arguing that according to the law on which it based its initial action the court fee was set at a lump sum of ROL 10,000 irrespective of the amount claimed, a sum which it had already paid over at the start of the proceedings. The applicant paid the court fees for the appeal in the amount of ROL 10,000 and ROL 3,000 in judicial stamps. 15.  On 27 May 1998 the Cluj Napoca Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as unfounded. The decision was enforceable. 16.  On 24 June 1998 the applicant company lodged an appeal on points of law. 17.  On 9 May 2006 the applicant company sought information on the proceedings from the Maramureş County Court. In reply, on 12 May 2006 the County Court informed the applicant company that due to an administrative error the appeal on points of law had only been forwarded to the Supreme Court of Justice on 12 May 2006. 18.  In a final decision of 15 February 2008 the High Court of Cassation and Justice dismissed the appeal as ill-founded. It noted that in so far as the debtor contested the claim, the first‑instance court was correct in seeking court fees proportionate to the value of the claim. 19.  On 5 April 1995 one of company A.'s creditors sought institution of insolvency proceedings against company A., under the relevant Articles of the Commercial Code. 20.  From 10 May 1995 to 25 June 1997 the proceedings were stayed at company A.'s request, as the Government had adopted programmes for the financial rehabilitation of the company (Government Ordinance no. 13/1995 on restructuring State-owned companies). 21.  On 18 March 1998 the Maramureş County Court declared company A. insolvent. Following the reports on the company's financial situation, on 9 July 1998 it started winding-up proceedings. 22.  On 11 June 1998 the applicant company requested the inclusion in the creditors' list of its claim of 1,474,012.64 United States dollars (USD). The claim was contested by the “debtor”, company A.
On 9 February 1999 the applicant reiterated its claim, which was included provisionally in the creditors' list pending examination of the objections raised. 23.  On 16 February 2000 the County Court rejected the applicant company's claim as no longer enforceable (prescrisă). It considered that enforcement time had not been interrupted by the action for recovery of debt, in so far as that action had been annulled for failure to pay the court fees. 24.  On 22 November 2000 the Cluj Napoca Court of Appeal upheld the judgment. It reiterated that the claim was no longer enforceable. It also considered that the claim, which had been contested by the debtor, had not been certified and quantified in the proceedings for recovery of debt, because the applicant's action had been cancelled. 25.  On 20 November 2002 the Supreme Court of Justice upheld the decision, which thus became final. 26.  On 30 May 2000 the Oradea Customs Office (Direcţia Generală Vamală Oradea) sought the winding up of the applicant company's business for an unpaid debt of ROL 458,121,902. 27.  On 26 June 2000 the proceedings were stayed as the applicant company contested the debt (the applicant company won that action on 18 September 2002). 28.  On 3 November 2003 the Maramureş County Court started the winding-up proceedings. On 21 January 2004 the Cluj Napoca Court of Appeal quashed the decision and rejected the 30 May 2000 request.


4.  The applicants were born in 1949, 1951, 1976, 1977, 1984, 1993, 2003 and 1981 respectively and live in Yerevan. 5.  Mr Sisak Danielyan, Ms Kima Danielyan, Mr Andranik Danielyan, Ms Naira Danielyan, Ms Seda Danielyan and Ms Sona Danielyan jointly owned a house measuring 130 sq. m. situated at 11 Byuzand Street, Yerevan. The applicants alleged that Ms Meri Danielyan and Ms Kristine Mnatsakanyan, as members of their family, enjoyed a right of use in respect of this house, while the Government contested this allegation and claimed that they did not enjoy the right of use in respect of the house and simply had the right to live in it. 6.  On 1 August 2002 the Government adopted Decree no. 1151-N, approving the expropriation zones of the immovable property (plots of land, buildings and constructions) situated within the administrative boundaries of the Central District of Yerevan to be taken for the needs of the State for the purpose of carrying out construction projects, covering a total area of 345,000 sq. m. Byuzand Street was listed as one of the streets falling within such expropriation zones. 7.  On 17 June 2004 the Government adopted Decree no. 909-N, contracting out the construction of one of the sections of Byuzand Street – which was to be renamed as Main Avenue – to a private company, Glendale Hills CJSC. 8.  On 28 July 2004 Glendale Hills CJSC and the Yerevan Mayor’s Office signed an agreement which, inter alia, authorised the former to negotiate directly with the owners of the property subject to expropriation and, should such negotiations fail, to institute court proceedings on behalf of the State, seeking forced expropriation of such property. 9.  It appears that Glendale Hills CJSC attempted to organise a measuring and valuation of the applicants’ house in order to offer them compensation for the purposes of expropriation, unsuccessfully, since the applicants created obstacles. 10.  On 10 March 2005 Glendale Hills CJSC instituted proceedings on behalf of the State against all the applicants except one (Ms Kristine Mnatsakanyan), seeking to oblige them to allow a valuation of their house and sign an agreement on taking of their property for State needs based on the results of such valuation, and to evict them. 11.  On 15 March 2005 all the applicants except one (Ms Meri Danielyan) lodged a counter-claim in which they contested the constitutionality of Government Decree no. 1151-N. They submitted, inter alia, that this Decree contradicted Article 28 of the Constitution, according to which property could be expropriated only through the adoption of a law concerning the property in question. They further submitted that the Government was not authorised under the same Article to decide on the expropriation of property. 12.  On the same date the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan granted the claim of Glendale Hills CJSC, ordering that the defendants be evicted through payment of compensation. The amount of compensation was to be estimated according to the market value following the relevant valuation. The District Court also ordered that they pay court fees in the amount of 4,000 Armenian drams (AMD). It appears that the District Court refused to admit the applicants’ counter-claim on the ground that it was not competent to decide upon the constitutionality of Government Decree no. 1151-N. 13.  On 29 March 2005 the defendant applicants lodged an appeal. 14.  It appears that on 18 April 2005 Orran Ltd real estate company carried out a valuation of the house in question, which was valued at the Armenian dram equivalent of USD 82,600. 15.  On 21 April 2005 the Court of Appeal granted the claim of Glendale Hills CJSC. The Court of Appeal found that the defendants were obliged to give up their ownership through payment of compensation and decided to terminate their ownership by awarding them the Armenian dram equivalent of USD 82,600. 16.  On 5 May 2005 the seven applicants in question lodged an appeal on points of law. On 13 May 2005 they filed additional submissions to their appeal, arguing, inter alia, that the deprivation of their property was in violation of Article 28 of the Constitution. 17.  On 27 May 2005 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicants’ appeal.


5.  The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Ruše. 6.  On 11 November 2006 K.R. sent a letter to the applicant by registered mail. In the letter, she asked the applicant to repay a loan which she had given to her in 2004 within thirty days of receipt of the letter, and stated that she would institute court proceedings if the applicant failed to pay. 7.  Following the applicant’s refusal on 13 November 2006 to accept the letter and sign the notice of receipt, K.R. resent it by ordinary mail. 8.  On 20 November 2006 the applicant replied to K.R. with a letter, the relevant parts of which read:
“I do not owe you anything!
It is true that you gave me some money as a gift. I did not want to take it, but you literally forced me, saying that you did not have anyone to whom you could give it and that I had helped you a lot... Those were your words, remember!
For the time being, I do not have any money. I have a loan that I have not yet repaid; therefore, for now, I cannot return your gift.
...
When I have it, I will gladly return your gift!” 9.  On 13 December 2006 K.R. brought an action against the applicant, claiming repayment of the loan (totalling 14,000 euros (EUR)) which she had allegedly given to her in July and August 2004, on the basis of oral agreements. In order to prove that the loan existed, K.R. attached to her claim the letter written by the applicant on 20 November 2006 (see paragraph 8 above), as the only evidence in support of her claim. 10.  On 22 January 2007 the applicant, allegedly unaware of the claim which had been brought against her, travelled to Vienna in order to obtain a visa for a trip to Namibia. She stayed in Vienna until 26 January 2007, when she obtained a visa, and flew to Namibia on the same day. 11.  On 24 January 2007 the Maribor District Court forwarded K.R.’s claim to the applicant, advising her that she had thirty days to file her observations. Referring to section 277 of the Civil Procedure Act, the District Court warned the applicant that, in the event that she failed to reply within the given time-limit, it would grant the claim by default judgment. 12.  On 25 January 2007 the postman tried (unsuccessfully) to serve the applicant with the court documents, including the claim, at her home address. He left in her mailbox a standard official delivery slip used in registered mail deliveries, which was printed on a thin piece of paper measuring 7.3 cm by 10 cm. The slip informed her that he would return the following day. 13.  The following day, having not located the applicant at her address, the postman left another delivery slip of identical dimensions in her mailbox, informing her that she could collect the relevant correspondence at the post office within the next fifteen days. The delivery slip included a reference to sections 140 and 141 of the Civil Procedure Act (see paragraph 26 below). 14.  As the applicant did not collect the mail from the post office within fifteen days, the letter in question was returned to the Maribor District Court by the post office, with a note indicating that the correspondence had not been collected, and that a delivery slip had been left in the applicant’s mailbox. Service was deemed to have been effected on 26 January 2007, when the delivery slip was left in her mailbox; therefore, the deadline for her to file any observations expired on 26 February 2007. 15.  The applicant claims that, upon her return from Namibia on 24 March 2007, she did not find either of the two delivery slips allegedly left by the postman in her mailbox, and that she was entirely unaware of the proceedings which were pending. 16.  On 14 September 2007 the Maribor District Court issued a default judgment, allowing K.R.’s claim and ordering the applicant to pay her EUR 14,000 with default interest within fifteen days. The relevant reasoning of the District Court was as follows:
“The court had to establish from the facts which were submitted with the claim whether or not the claim was well-founded, and whether or not the facts on which the claim was based contradicted the evidence submitted by the plaintiff herself, or facts which are generally known.
The plaintiff submitted with the claim a letter from the defendant dated 20 November 2006 (A3), from which it appears that she received ‘some money’ as a gift.
The submissions of the defendant in the letter dated 20 November 2006 – that she received some money as a gift – do not, of themselves, negate the plaintiff’s submissions that the plaintiff gave the money as a loan, yet the defendant was given the opportunity and the right to defend her position in the proceedings before the court by submitting a response to the claim [and] has failed to do so.
In addition, the submissions of the defendant in the letter dated 20 November 2006 that she would return the money which had been given to her (‘When I have it, I will gladly return your gift!’) cannot be ignored either.” 17.  The default judgment was served on the applicant on 19 September 2007. 18.  On 28 September 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal against the District Court’s default judgment and an application to reinstate the proceedings. She explained that she had failed to respond to the claim owing to her absence from Slovenia, submitted that she had not received the delivery slips allegedly left in her mailbox, and asked the court to set aside the decision and order the reservice of K.R.’s claim. As proof of her absence, she attached to both the appeal and the application to reinstate the proceedings a document issued by a travel company, L., confirming that she had been issued with a plane ticket for a flight from Munich to Windhoek on 26 January 2007 and a return ticket for 24 March 2007. She also attached copies of pages from her passport which contained a valid tourist visa for Namibia for the period between 26 January 2007 and 21 April 2007, and Namibian border control stamps confirming her entry to Namibia on 27 January 2007 and her departure on 24 March 2007. 19.  On 13 December 2007 the Maribor District Court rejected the applicant’s application to reinstate the proceedings, on the basis that the application had been lodged outside the three-month time-limit. It held that the applicant should have found the delivery slips left in her mailbox by the end of March at the latest after she had returned from Namibia. Therefore, she should have lodged an application to reinstate the proceedings within three months of her return. The applicant appealed. 20.  On 9 September 2008 the Maribor Higher Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the 14 September 2007 and 13 December 2007 decisions of the District Court. It held that it could not accept the applicant’s submissions that there had been no delivery slips in her mailbox, as it had been noted on the notice of delivery that they had been left there. It further dismissed the applicant’s submissions that the evidence used by the plaintiff (namely the letter of 20 November 2006) contradicted the facts alleged. 21.  On 4 November 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. 22.  On 11 November 2010 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law. It held that the conditions for issuing a default judgment had been fulfilled. In respect of the issue of whether or not the evidence used by the plaintiff contradicted the submissions set out in the claim, the Supreme Court held as follows:
“It appears from the evidence that the plaintiff attached to the claim [the applicant’s letter of 20 November 2006 – see paragraph 8 above] that the letter referred to a gift as well as to the return of a gift. It should be stressed that, for the purpose of issuing a default judgment, it is not important that the evidence submitted confirms the plaintiff’s allegations (in the present case, allegations concerning a loan). It is only important that the allegations contained in the claim do not contradict either the evidence which has been submitted or generally known facts. Since it cannot be concluded from the letter that [the money] was not a loan but a gift, the issuing of the default judgment was correct.” 23.  On 17 January 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint. 24.  On 22 May 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint by referring to section 55(b) of the Constitutional Court Act (see paragraph 30 below). 25.  On an unknown date after the decision of 14 September 2007 became final, K.R. instituted enforcement proceedings against the applicant. She later withdrew the application for enforcement after the applicant paid her the sum of EUR 4,000.


5.  The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Yerevan. 6.  The applicant is an active member of civil society who holds leading positions in several NGOs, including the Unity of Armenian Volunteers, the Defence of Liberated Lands and Araks‑Kur charity fund. He is of an Armenian origin and since 1992 has apparently been permanently resident in Armenia where he has a family and owns an apartment. 7.  The applicant appears to be a critic of the Armenian authorities. He alleges that in this connection he has been invited to visit the National Security Service (NSS) on several occasions, where he was ordered to stop his cooperation with the opposition and his criticism of the government. 8.  On an unspecified date the Head of the Principal Department for Safeguarding the Constitutional Order and Fight Against Terrorism of the NSS filed a motion, seeking to carry out secret surveillance and recording of the applicant’s telephone and other conversations. 9.  On 15 August 2006 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan examined the motion, finding:
“It is evident from the materials submitted to the court and the motion that the Principal Department for Safeguarding the Constitutional Order and Fight Against Terrorism of the NSS has sufficient grounds to believe that [the applicant], born in 1967 in Lebanon, a Lebanese national, residing at 17 Lepsius Str, apt 42, Yerevan, leader of the Armenian Volunteers Unity organisation, is carrying out activities aimed to destabilise the internal political situation in Armenia and to create a situation of civil disobedience, thereby creating a basis for the change of government in Armenia through unconstitutional means by making public calls.” 10.  The District Court decided to grant the motion, authorising the interception and recording of the applicant’s telephone and other conversations made to and from the applicant’s three mobile and three landline numbers for a period of six months, taking into account that they might contain information substantiating the above-mentioned circumstances, the use of which would facilitate the disclosure of a crime and obtaining evidence, since there were elements of an offence prescribed by Article 301 of the Criminal Code (CC) in the applicant’s actions. In doing so, the District Court referred to, inter alia, Articles 281 and 284 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP). 11.  On 2 December 2006 the applicant gave a speech at an assembly organised by the Unity of Armenian Volunteers. The assembly took place in the hall of the Yerevan State Choreography College and was attended by about 150 people. The applicant called on the participants of the assembly to get organised, otherwise nothing would move forward. It was not enough to keep telling the President and the Prime Minister to resign; they would never do that. Peaceful assemblies would not make them resign. Nor would external pressure. He called on the participants to create a significant force, in order to make the authorities resign, stating that the main and only objective was to get rid of them. He further stressed that they should not allow those in power to multiply, otherwise the future plans of the participants of the assembly would encounter serious obstacles. The applicant called the authorities “monsters” who would become even more dangerous if they were allowed to multiply. The applicant agreed with other speech makers that any means were acceptable for achieving their goals. 12.  On 8 December 2006 the Investigative Department of the National Security Service decided to institute criminal proceedings under Article 301 of the CC on the ground that public calls for a violent overthrow of the government had been made during the speeches given at the above assembly. 13.  On 9 December 2006 at 10.30 p.m. the applicant was arrested and taken to the NSS. 14.  On the same date the applicant’s office was searched, as a result of which a revolver and various types of bullets were found. 15.  On 10 December 2006 at 3.45 p.m. the relevant arrest record was drawn up. It stated that the applicant was suspected of offences under Articles 235 § 1 and 301 of the CC. It appears that his passport was seized. 16.  On the same date the applicant was questioned as a suspect. He refused to give testimony, stating that the criminal proceedings against him were politically motivated. 17.  On 12 December 2006 the applicant was formally charged under Articles 235 § 1 and 301 of the CC. He was accused of making calls for a violent overthrow of the government and of not handing in, and illegally keeping, his weapon after his demobilisation in 1998. Another person, V.M., who had also given a speech at the above assembly, was accused together with the applicant under Article 301 of the CC. Their speeches had been recorded. 18.  On the same date the investigator filed a motion with the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan, seeking to have the applicant detained for a period of two months and arguing that, if at large, he could abscond and obstruct the investigation. It appears that on the same date three members of the parliament filed a statement with the District Court, giving their personal guarantees for the applicant’s proper conduct and requesting that no detention be imposed. 19.  On the same date the District Court examined the investigator’s motion, including the charge and the circumstances surrounding it. The District Court decided to grant the motion, taking into account the nature and degree of dangerousness of the imputed offence and the fact that it was at the top of the list of offences directed against state power and finding that the materials of the case provided sufficient reasons to believe that the applicant could abscond and obstruct the investigation by exerting unlawful influence on persons involved in the proceedings. 20.  On 19 December 2006 the applicant lodged an appeal, arguing, inter alia, that there was no reasonable suspicion of his having committed an offence and that the District Court had failed to provide reasons justifying the necessity of his placement in detention. He submitted, in particular, that the investigating authority had a recording of his speech at its disposal, so the allegation that he could unlawfully influence witnesses was unfounded. Furthermore, the allegation that he could abscond was not supported by any arguments or evidence, while the court did not take into account the fact that he was a permanent resident in Armenia, with two minor children and an elderly, sick mother who were dependent on him. 21.  On 27 December 2006 the Criminal and Military Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. In dismissing the applicant’s argument about the lack of a reasonable suspicion, the Court of Appeal found that his involvement in the imputed acts, which included features of offences envisaged by Articles 235 § 1 and 301 of the CC, was substantiated by evidence, such as various records and expert opinions, produced by the investigator and examined in court. As to the reasons given by the District Court, the Court of Appeal found these to be justified. 22.  On the same date the applicant filed a motion requesting to be released on bail. He submitted that he was known to the investigating authority and the court, he had a clear and concrete place of residence and he had never attempted to abscond. He asked the court to fix the amount of bail. 23.  On 30 December 2007 another person, V.A., who was the applicant’s friend, was also charged under Article 235 § 1 of the CC with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in the context of the same criminal proceedings. 24.  On 7 January 2007 the District Court refused the applicant’s request for bail, citing the same grounds as those justifying his detention. 25.  On 22 January 2007 the Court of Appeal upheld this decision, adding that the applicant was a foreign national and therefore could abscond. Furthermore, it was unacceptable to release the applicant on bail in view of the fact that his co-accused, V.A., who was also charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, was in detention. 26.  On 1 February 2007 the investigator filed a motion with the District Court seeking to have the applicant’s detention period, which was to expire on 10 February 2007, extended by two months. The investigator argued that the applicant could abscond because he was a foreign national. He further argued that on 15 January 2007 the applicant had transmitted through his lawyer a short note to co-accused V.A. which said “be strong”. This suggested that he was attempting to exert unlawful influence on the participants in the proceedings. 27.  On 7 February 2007 the District Court, having examined the investigator’s motion and other materials, granted this motion, finding that there was a need to carry out further investigative measures and citing the same grounds as before in justifying the applicant’s continued detention. 28.  On 8 February 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal. In his appeal he argued, inter alia, that the extension of his detention had been effected in violation of the time-limits prescribed by Article 139 § 1 of the CCP. 29.  On 23 February 2007 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the District Court, taking into account the circumstances mentioned in the investigator’s motion, had taken a reasoned decision, since the grounds for the applicant’s detention had not ceased to exist. As to the violation of the time-limits, the Court of Appeal considered this not to be of such gravity as to have affected the correct outcome of examination of the investigator’s motion. 30.  On 30 March 2007 the investigator filed a motion with the District Court seeking to have the applicant’s detention period, which was to expire on 10 April 2007, extended by two months on the same grounds. 31.  On 4 April 2007 the District Court examined and granted this motion on the same grounds. In the proceedings before the District Court the applicant’s lawyer asked the court whether any evidence had been submitted by the investigator in support of his motion which would be examined in court. The presiding judge replied that the materials of the criminal case related to the motion had been submitted by the investigator during the examination of his previous motion. These materials had been examined and returned by the court. The criminal procedure rules did not allow the lawyers access to the materials of a criminal case before the completion of the investigation. 32.  Following this announcement the applicant’s lawyer challenged the judge’s impartiality, inter alia, on the ground that the judge had not disclosed the materials in question to the defence during the previous proceedings. The judge dismissed this challenge with reference to, inter alia, Article 73 § 1 (12) of the CCP. 33.  On 19 April 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal, raising similar arguments as previously. 34.  The applicant alleged that his lawyers had not been notified of the hearing to take place upon his appeal and were therefore not able to appear. 35.  The Government contested this allegation and alleged that on 11 May 2007 the Court of Appeal had sent notifications to both the General Prosecutor’s Office and the applicant’s lawyers, which were received by them, informing them that the hearing on the applicant’s appeal would take place on 14 May 2007. 36.  On 14 May 2007 the applicants lawyers filed a challenge with the Chairman of the Court of Appeal, contesting the impartiality of the judges who were assigned to examine the appeal. The lawyers stated in their challenge that they had been informed on 11 March that the case had been assigned to a judge rapporteur. 37.  On the same date the Court of Appeal examined the applicant’s appeal in the absence of both parties. The Court of Appeal decided to dismiss the appeal with the same reasoning as on 23 February 2007. This decision stated that the parties had been duly notified of the hearing but failed to appear. The same follows from the transcript of the court hearing, in which it was stated that the parties had also been informed by a judge’s assistant by telephone. It appears that a copy of this decision was received by the applicant’s lawyers on 18 May 2007. 38.  In May 2007 the investigation was over and from 15 to 29 May the applicant was granted access to the case file. He submits that only then did he find out about the decision of 15 August 2006 authorising the secret surveillance of his telephone communications. 39.  On 5 June 2007 the prosecutor approved the indictment and the case was sent to court. 40.  On 7 June 2007 Judge M. of the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan decided to take over the applicant’s criminal case. 41.  On 10 June 2007 the applicant’s detention period, authorised by the decision of 4 April 2007, expired. 42.  On 12 June 2007 the applicant complained to the General Prosecutor and the Minister of Justice that his detention authorised by a court had expired on 10 June 2007 and that his continued detention was unlawful. He sought to be released. 43.  On 22 June 2007 Judge M. decided to put the applicant’s criminal case down for trial. This decision stated that the preventive measure imposed on the applicant was to remain unchanged. 44.  On 6 August 2007 the Kentron and Nork-Marash District Court of Yerevan found the applicant guilty under Article 235 § 1 and acquitted him under Article 301. The District Court, having examined the statements the applicant had made in his speech, found that they could not be qualified as calls for a violent overthrow of the government. As to the charge of illegal possession of a weapon, the District Court found that the applicant had kept the weapon and the ammunition without a permit after his demobilisation. The applicant was sentenced to one year and six months’ imprisonment. The applicant’s two co-accused were found guilty as charged. 45.  On 25 September 2007 the Criminal Court of Appeal upheld this judgment on appeal.


4.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in the town of Novovolyns'k, Volyn' region. 5.  On 12 November 2002 the Novovolyns'k Court ordered the State-owned mine No. 5 “Novovolyns'ka” to pay the applicant UAH 28,422[1] in compensation for damage to his health. This judgment became final and the writ of execution was issued on the same day. 6.  On 25 December 2002 the Novovolyns'k Office of the Bailiffs' Service (hereinafter “the Bailiffs”) initiated the enforcement proceedings. 7.  On 1 April 2003 the debtor company was reorganised and joined to the State-owned “Volyn'vugillya” company, which became the debtor in the enforcement proceedings. 8.  Between November 2003 and April 2005 the applicant was partially paid the judgment debt owed to him. 9.  On 13 April 2005 the remainder of the debt was transferred to the applicant's bank account and the enforcement proceedings were discontinued on the same date.


5.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Štúrovo. 6.  On 5 February 2004 the police arrested the applicant. He was accused of planning a robbery[1] and remanded in custody from that date. 7.  Several decisions extending the applicant’s detention were made. In particular, on 18 November 2004 the Žilina District Court extended his detention in the context of the pre-trial proceedings until 24 January 2005. 8.  On 21 January 2005 the public prosecutor indicted the applicant and several other persons before the Žilina Regional Court. 9.  The applicant requested to be released, arguing that the Regional Court had not extended his detention after the expiry of the period indicated in the District Court’s decision of 18 November 2004. 10.  On 20 April 2005 the Regional Court ordered the applicant’s release. Upon a complaint lodged by the public prosecutor the Supreme Court decided on 24 May 2005 that the applicant should remain remanded in custody. 11.  On 2 June 2005 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s request for release. On 15 June 2005 the Supreme Court dismissed a complaint by the applicant against that decision. 12.  On 22 July 2005 the applicant complained to the Constitutional Court that his detention in the period after 24 January 2005 and the Supreme Court’s above decision of 24 May 2005 were both unlawful. In a separate complaint lodged on 31 August 2005 the applicant complained about the refusal to release him in the proceedings leading to the Supreme Court’s decision of 15 June 2005. 13.  On 5 February 2006 the applicant was released. 14.  On 10 May 2006 the Constitutional Court found that the applicant’s right under Article 5 § 1 had been violated as a result of the Supreme Court’s decision of 24 May 2005. There had been no judicial decision extending his detention after 24 January 2005, and there existed no justification for that situation. 15.  The Constitutional Court quashed the Supreme Court’s decision of 24 May 2005 in so far as it concerned the applicant and ordered the Supreme Court to reimburse the applicant’s costs in the constitutional proceedings. It dismissed the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction with reference to a conclusion which a different chamber of the Constitutional court had reached in the case of one of the applicant’s co-accused. According to that conclusion, (i) the finding of a violation of Article 5 § 1 provided appropriate redress to the plaintiff and (ii) the Supreme Court’s decision of 24 May 2005 was based on that court’s earlier practice, which, however, was not in accordance with practice under the Convention. 16.  In a judgment of 30 November 2006 the Constitutional Court found that by its decision of 15 June 2005 the Supreme Court had breached the applicant’s right under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. In particular, the Supreme Court should have remedied the situation resulting from the applicant’s unlawful detention from 25 January 2005 by ordering his release. 17.  The judgment stated, in particular:
“In the Constitutional Court’s view, the jurisdiction of the court involved at the pre-trial stage ended with the filing of the indictment on 21 January 2005. The indictment as such is not a ground for continued detention of a person, as it does not explicitly follow from the law, and it is inadmissible to extend the possibilities of restricting a person’s liberty by extensive interpretation of several provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
However, a court’s decision on detention of a person given at the pre-trial stage can constitute a ground for such person’s detention for a short period following the indictment. Otherwise it would be practically impossible to ensure continued detention of a person after an indictment has been filed. In the circumstances, a ground for the applicant’s detention existed until 25 January 2005. The detention should have been extended by a decision given no later than 25 January 2005 if it was to continue after that date. In the absence of any such decision, the restriction of the applicant’s liberty after 25 January 2005 was unlawful.
The unlawfulness of the applicant’s deprivation of liberty after 25 January 2005 cannot be justified retrospectively, not even by a judicial decision. Subsequent judicial decisions could not have extended the applicant’s detention, as it had ended on 25 January 2005. The only existing possibility was to remand the applicant in custody again. As this was not done, his subsequent deprivation of liberty had no legal ground.” 18.  The Constitutional Court quashed the Supreme Court’s decision of 15 June 2005, granted the equivalent of 2,818 euros (EUR) to the applicant as just satisfaction and ordered the Supreme Court to reimburse the applicant’s costs.