5.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in the village of Karakert, Armenia. 6.  The applicant has been a member of an opposition political party, the National Democratic Union, since 1995. Since 1997 he has headed the party’s local offices in the Baghramyan area. 7. In March and April 2004 a series of protest rallies were organised in Yerevan by the opposition parties who voiced their criticism of the alleged irregularities which had taken place during the presidential election of February-March 2003 and challenged the legitimacy of the re-elected President. It appears that the applicant participated in these rallies. He alleged that the authorities retaliated by arresting, harassing and searching opposition supporters. 8.  On 10 April 2004 at 5.10 p.m. the applicant was arrested and taken to a police station where an administrative case was initiated against him for disobeying the lawful orders of police officers. 9.  On the same date the Armavir Regional Court sentenced the applicant to ten days’ administrative detention. 10.  The running of the ten-day administrative sentence was to be calculated from 10 April 2004 at 5.10 p.m. The applicant was taken to a detention facility in the town of Ejmiatsin where he served his sentence. 11.  On 20 April 2004 at an unspecified hour, the Armavir Regional Court examined and granted an investigator’s motion, which had apparently been lodged on the same date, seeking to have the applicant’s home searched. The judicial warrant stated:
“The investigating authority has found it substantiated that on 27 March 2004 at around 12 noon the residents of the village of Myasnikyan of the Armavir Region [K.K. and B.K.] inflicted violence dangerous for health in the pasture located in the administrative area of Lernagogh village in the Armavir Region on representatives of the authorities performing their official duties, [namely] the head of Lernagogh village [S.M.] and head of staff of the Village Council [A.M.]. According to operative information, [B.K. and K.K.] had a weapon during the incident[. F]or the purpose of hiding the mentioned weapon, they gave it to the resident of Karakert village, member of the Union of Yezidis of the Baghramyan area, [the applicant], who may have hidden the mentioned weapon in one of his homes in Karakert village.
On 27 March 2004 the Armavir Regional Prosecutor’s Office instituted criminal proceedings no. 65200604 ... concerning this fact.
In view of the fact that the facts of the criminal case provide sufficient grounds to believe that an illegally possessed weapon and ammunition may be found in [the applicant’s] home situated in Karakert village in the Armavir Region, as well as other objects and valuables having significance for the criminal case, the court therefore finds that the motion is well-founded and must be granted.” 12.  It was stated in the warrant that it could be contested within 15 days before the Criminal and Military Court of Appeal. 13.  The applicant alleged that on that day, several hours before the expiry of his administrative sentence, he was taken from the Ejmiatsin detention facility to the Baghramyan Police Department. From there he was escorted home by at least ten police officers. 14.  According to the search record, the search was conducted from 5.10 p.m. to 6.55 p.m. by seven police officers of the Baghramyan Police Department, E.M., B.M., M.G., A.Ge., S.M., G.E. and A.Ga. Two neighbours, G.G. and M.S., were asked by the head of the police team to participate in the search as attesting witnesses. The applicant was asked to surrender the illegal weapon allegedly hidden in his house. The applicant stated that he had no illegal objects at home. As a result of the search, a plastic bag containing a cannabis-like herb was found in the boiler situated in the hallway. The applicant stated that he did not know what it was and who it belonged to. It was mentioned at the end of the record that the applicant had refused to sign the record without providing any reasons. 15.  According to the applicant and the statements of the two attesting witnesses which were appended to the application form, the search was conducted in the following manner. Upon his return home, accompanied by police officers, the applicant found his pregnant wife in a critical condition, apparently suffering a miscarriage, and his one-year-old son crying beside her. On seeing him, the applicant’s wife fainted. A doctor was called and a number of female neighbours came to help. At that point the head of the police team informed the applicant that his house was to be searched, briefly showing him the relevant search warrant. The applicant alleged that attesting witnesses G.G. and M.S. were asked to participate only after the search had already begun. It appears that G.G. was a war veteran who had suffered concussion and was seriously disabled, while M.S. was seventy‑four years old. The search was conducted by more than ten police officers who also used two specially trained dogs. Having searched the house and not found anything, the police officers started searching the yard and the adjacent buildings. The applicant alleged that during the search of the outside premises, the front door of his house was left open and people, including police officers, were coming and going. Moreover, a group of police officers was standing by the front door while the others continued the search. Having found nothing outside the house, the head of the police team announced that they would again search inside the house, to which attesting witness G.G. objected. Following the additional search the police officers found the above-mentioned plastic bag. The attesting witnesses submitted that their objections were not recorded. Moreover, they were persuaded and bullied by the police officers to sign the search record. 16.  The applicant alleged that he was taken back to the police station where the chief of police promised that, if he renounced his political convictions and resigned from the party, no further action would be taken in relation to the cannabis. The applicant refused to make such a deal. 17.  The applicant further alleged that he was kept at the police station overnight. There he was given a meal, including a hamburger. About 15 to 20 minutes after having eaten the meal he felt sick, started vomiting and lost consciousness. An ambulance was called and some injections were administered. According to the applicant, his meal had been laced with a drug. 18.  On 21 April 2004 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant under Article 268 § 2 of the Criminal Code on account of illegal drug possession. On the same date at 11.18 p.m. the applicant was formally arrested. 19.  On the same date the investigator decided to subject the applicant to a forensic toxicological examination. The applicant alleged that he did not receive a copy of this decision. He was taken to the Republican Centre for Narcotics where a urine sample was taken. 20.  It appears that on the same date, a lawyer was engaged in the case. It further appears that the applicant was questioned and denied the drug possession allegations. 21.  On an unspecified date the plastic bag and the herbal substance, weighing approximately 59 grams, were examined by a forensic expert and the substance was found to be cannabis. 22.  On 23 April 2004 the applicant was formally charged with illegal drug possession and detained by a court order. 23.  On the same date, a toxicological expert opinion was produced, according to which the applicant’s urine sample contained traces indicating cannabis consumption. 24.  On the same date the lawyer filed a motion with the Armavir Regional Prosecutor seeking to stop the prosecution on the ground that, inter alia, the search had been conducted with numerous procedural violations. A similar complaint was lodged on 27 April 2004. 25.  According to the applicant, on an unspecified date his lawyer requested a further examination of the cannabis and the plastic bag by a forensic expert. This request was rejected. He further alleged that, during the investigation, the police officers put pressure on the two attesting witnesses not to attend confrontations which had apparently been requested by the applicant. 26.  On 7 May 2004 the applicant’s lawyer applied to the Armavir Regional Prosecutor, challenging the investigator’s impartiality and complaining in detail about the unlawful manner in which the search had been executed, alleging, inter alia, that the bag containing cannabis had been planted by the police officers conducting the search. 27.  On 9 June 2004 the applicant’s lawyer complained to the Armavir Regional Prosecutor that the search warrant had lacked proper grounds and that the search had been conducted with numerous procedural violations. The lawyer argued that the investigator had failed to obtain any evidence when investigating his allegations of irregularities. Such evidence could have been obtained by questioning the applicant’s neighbours and the doctor who had provided first aid to his wife, who had been present during the search, and by holding confrontations between the applicant and the attesting witnesses. 28.  On an unspecified date the applicant’s criminal case was brought before the Armavir Regional Court. 29.  It appears that, in the proceedings before the Regional Court, the applicant’s lawyer filed a motion seeking to exclude the results of the search as unlawfully obtained evidence. It further appears that the Regional Court did not take any decision on this motion. 30.  Attesting witnesses M.S. and G.G. both testified before the trial court. In reply to the questions put by the applicant’s lawyer M.S. stated, inter alia, that he and G.G. were watching the police officers as much as they could while entering and going out of the rooms together with the police officers. When giving his account of the events G.G. stated among other things that he helped one of the police officers to reach the water boiler from which a plastic bag and a plate were taken out. He further stated that both the plastic bag and the plate were covered with dust. However, the plate was dustier compared to the plastic bag. Both M.S. and G.G. stated that they did not remember whether they were informed of their right to have the objections that they might have included in the search record and that the applicant refused to sign it stating that the discovered bag did not belong to him. 31.  On 22 June 2004 the Armavir Regional Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to one and a half years’ imprisonment. In doing so, the Regional Court relied on, inter alia, the witness testimony of the police officers who had conducted the search, including E.M., A.Gh., M.G., M.M., L.F. and A.Ga., and of the two attesting witnesses, as well as the results of the analysis of the applicant’s urine sample. 32.  On 29 June 2004 the applicant’s lawyer lodged an appeal. The lawyer argued, inter alia, that the search of the applicant’s home had been conducted with a number of procedural violations and therefore its results could not be used as evidence. In particular, he claimed that the search warrant was not presented to the applicant to get acquainted with it, no signature was obtained from him in this respect and that his objections were not included into the record of the search. He further argued that the search had been authorised by the court on the basis of fabricated police materials and therefore lacked any valid grounds. He also submitted that, according to the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Regional Court should not have relied on the testimony of the police officers, since they had been summoned and examined solely in connection with the performance of their procedural duties and not in connection with the irregularities alleged by the applicant. Furthermore, the Regional Court had failed to take into account the submissions of the attesting witnesses which confirmed the applicant’s allegations of irregularities. 33.  On 10 August 2004 the Criminal and Military Court of Appeal upheld the applicant’s conviction finding, inter alia, that no significant procedural violations had taken place during the investigation of the case. The Court of Appeal relied on the same evidence, except for the testimony of the police officers. 34.  No appeal was lodged against this judgment within the ten-day statutory time-limit, so it became final. 35.  On 6 September 2004 the applicant was released on parole. 36.  On 15 November 2004 an advocate holding a special licence lodged an appeal on points of law on behalf of the applicant against the final judgment of the Court of Appeal. He requested that the judgment of the Court of Appeal be quashed and the case be remitted for further investigation due to the procedural violations taken place during the investigation, including the execution of the search. 37.  On 10 December 2004 the Court of Cassation examined the appeal on the merits and decided to dismiss it finding that, inter alia, no significant violations of the procedural law had taken place which required the case being remitted for further investigation.


4.  Upon a private company’s request, in May 1996 L. K., a forest engineer employed by the company, made an estimation of the amount of damages caused to the company’s territory by wild animals under the responsibility of a hunting society. Subsequently, on 1 August 1996 the company brought an action in compensation against the hunting society, the members of which were the applicants. 5.  In March 1997 the hunting society was dissolved. The proceedings were discontinued on 10 June 1997, pending the identification of successors to the proceedings. 6.  On 6 March 1999 the proceedings continued, as the plaintiff designated the applicants as successors to the proceedings. 7.  The Kiskőrös District Court appointed an expert, J. K., to establish the value of the hunters’ house. The expert filed an opinion on 30 November 2000. 8.  On 9 July 2003 the Kiskőrös District Court found for the plaintiff. This judgment was quashed by the Csongrád County Regional Court on 23 February 2005. 9.  In the resumed proceedings, due to the bias declared by the judges in Bács-Kiskun County, the case was heard by the Szeged District Court. The court requested L. K. to submit a further expert report to establish the amount of damages caused. He filed an opinion on 24 January 2006. 10.  On 3 March 2006 the first-instance court gave judgment, finding for the plaintiff. The applicants appealed, arguing - among others - that they had not received the copy of minutes of the hearing of 28 October 2005 on time, and questioning the impartiality of L. K. 11.  On appeal, the Csongrád County Regional Court upheld the District Court’s judgment. Concerning the minutes of the hearing, the second-instance court pointed out that the District Court had no legal obligation to send them the minutes automatically. They had the options of requesting copies either by post or in person at the court. The applicants had requested the copies for the first time on 11 January 2006, following which the court had sent the minutes on 13 January 2006 despite the fact that the applicants had not paid the copy fees. The delivery of the mail sent according to the rules had not been successful. Following the repeated request of the applicants on 16 February 2006, the copies had been sent once again on 21 February 2006. Moreover, the court pointed out that the respondents had been present at the hearing, where they had the opportunity to take notes, and could have submitted observations within eight days to L. K.’s expert report, delivered to them on 13 February 2006. As to the impartiality of L. K., the court emphasised that he had been the only expert to see the damages on-site in 1996. Ten years after the occurrence of the damages, appointing a further forensic expert to proceed on the basis of documentary evidence would have been futile in the court’s opinion. In addition, L. K. had followed the court’s instructions when preparing the expert report. 12.  The applicants lodged a petition for review with the Supreme Court, which upheld the final judgment on 10 May 2007. This decision was served on the applicants on 14 June 2007.


5.  The applicant is the father of a son (S.), born on 30 July 1990. In 1997 the applicant and the child’s mother (K.) separated. S. remained with his mother. In 1998 the applicant and S.’s mother were divorced. 6.  On 21 January 1998 the Pankow District Court awarded K. sole custody of S. and decided that the applicant would be entitled to personal contact with his son every other weekend. In September 1998, however, the applicant ceased to have contact with his son. 7.  On 7 October 1998 the applicant requested the Pankow District Court to impose a coercive fine on the mother to enforce his access rights. The District Court registered his request under file number 11 F 4813/98. 8.  Between 9 November 1998 and 10 March 1999 the parties and the Youth Office submitted observations. 9.  On 17 May 1999 the applicant withdrew his request and stated that he now wished the court to mediate between the parents with a view to reaching an agreement on the applicant’s contact rights according to section 52a of the Non-Contentious Proceedings Act (Gesetz über die Angelegenheiten der freiwilligen Gerichtsbarkeit – see “Relevant Domestic Law” below). The District Court pursued the applicant’s modified request under the same file number (11 F 4813/98). 10.  On 13 August 1999 the District Court heard S., who declared that he wished to see his father only occasionally under the supervision of a third person. 12.  On 18 October 1999 the District Court held a further hearing at which the parties declared that the court currently did not need to take any action. 13.  On 22 February 2000 the applicant applied for the appointment of a guardian ad litem and a contact supervisor (Umgangsbegleitperson) arguing that the mediation proceedings had failed. 14.  On 10 March 2000 the District Court appointed a guardian ad litem and set down the case for hearing on 5 April 2000. However, that hearing was postponed to 15 May 2000 as agreed with the parties. 15.  On 5 June 2000 a further hearing was held, and on 14 June 2000 the District Court ordered supervised contact for a period between late June and mid-December. 17.  On 28 September 2000 the District Court asked the contact supervisor to comment on the failure to have contact established between the applicant and his son. In October and November 2000 the District Court reminded the contact supervisor of its request of 28 September 2000 and unsuccessfully attempted to contact the latter by phone. 19.  On 11 December 2000 the District Court sent a further reminder to the contact supervisor and requested the parties to comment on the question as to whether the mediation proceedings should be continued. 21.  On 20 March 2001 the District Court decided to continue the proceedings after the parties had agreed on a one-off supervised contact. 22.  On 6 July 2001 the contact centre informed the District Court that the contact supervisor had been replaced with another person, and on 11 July 2001 the District Court appointed that person as contact supervisor. 23.  On 14 August 2001 the District Court received the contact supervisor’s report, according to which S. refused to see his father. 24.  On 22 September 2001 the applicant asked the District Court to declare that the mediation proceedings had failed and to commission an expert report. 25. On 22 November 2001 the District Court heard S. again, who firmly declared that his father no longer existed for him. 26.  On 27 November 2001 the District Court commissioned a psychological expert report on the question of contact. That expert informed the court on 25 February 2002 that he could be biased. Accordingly, the mother’s representative challenged the expert for bias on 26 March. On 10 April 2002 the District Court ordered the expert to stop his examinations, and on 6 June 2002 the mother withdrew her challenge of bias. On 13 June 2002 the District Court ordered the expert to continue his examinations. 27.  On 11 September 2002 the District Court requested the expert to consider further questions raised by the applicant. 28.  On 19 November 2002 the expert informed the court that K. had refused to attend a meeting with the expert until mid-January 2003. Subsequently, the District Court asked K. to ensure that a meeting was held by the end of 2002. On 2 January 2003 the District Court asked all persons involved in the proceedings to support the expert in the preparation of his report. On 16 January 2003 the expert informed the District Court that for the time being K. was unwilling to meet the expert. On 23 January 2003 the District Court ordered K. to cooperate with the expert within two months and announced that further measures would be taken in the event of non-compliance. 29.  On 2 April 2003 the expert informed the court that a meeting had been held with K. on 13 March 2003, that the applicant and his son had called each other and that the applicant considered withdrawing his application. 30.  On 30 April 2003, at the applicant’s request of 11 April 2003, the District Court ordered the expert to swiftly continue his examination. On 30 June 2003 the expert gave his report in which he suggested a suspension of the applicant’s contact with S. for a period of two years. 31.  On 21 October 2003 the District Court heard S., who insisted that he did not wish to see his father any longer. 32.  At an oral hearing held on 22 October 2003 the applicant announced that he would withdraw his application. However, on 19 November 2003 the applicant insisted on a court decision. 33.  On 10 December 2003 the District Court, relying on the expert’s report, suspended the applicant’s rights to access for two years. 34.  On 30 December 2003 the applicant appealed to the Berlin Court of Appeal, and on 18 January 2004 he submitted his statement of grounds of appeal, which the court received on 2 February 2004. 35.  On 13 May 2004 the Berlin Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the District Court, arguing that S. had suffered from the persistent conflict between his parents about the applicant’s contact rights and from the respective proceedings, which had been pending now for more than five years and which had led to lasting psychological damage to the child. In order to protect himself, the boy refused to expose himself to this conflict, by refusing to see his father. 36.  On 30 June 2004 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court, which the Federal Constitutional Court refused to admit on 14 July 2004.


8.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Balassagyarmat. 9.  In 1974 the applicant married in former Czechoslovakia. Subsequently, the couple moved to Hungary. Their daughter was born in January 1980. 10.  On 17 September 1996 the applicant’s wife, then a Slovak national, filed for divorce before the Balassagyarmat District Court. She also sought custody of their child and the division of the matrimonial property. 11.  Shortly afterwards, the applicant challenged his paternity of their daughter before the District Court. On 24 January 1997 the District Court rejected this action as being incomplete. 12.  Meanwhile, on 25 November 1996 and 11 February 1997 the District Court held hearings in the principal proceedings. 13.  On 11 March 1997 the applicant filed a new paternity action. 14.  At the hearing on 13 June 1997 the District Court suspended the proceedings in the divorce case pending a decision on the paternity dispute. 15.  On 27 August 1997 the District Court again rejected the applicant’s paternity action as being incomplete. 16.  On 9 September 1997 the applicant filed a new paternity action. On 25 March 1998 the District Court dismissed his claims. On 10 September 1998 the Nógrád County Regional Court dismissed his appeal. 17.  Meanwhile, on 16 February 1998 the applicant’s wife requested that the principal proceedings be continued. She argued that their daughter had reached the age of 18 and for that reason it was no longer necessary to decide the question of custody; consequently, the outcome of the paternity proceedings was irrelevant to the determination of the divorce action. The proceedings were resumed soon afterwards. 18.  Subsequently, the applicant brought a counter-action seeking the invalidation of the marriage. At the hearing on 23 April 1998 the District Court ordered that the relevant provisions of the Czechoslovakian Civil Code be obtained via the Ministry of Justice. 19.  On 4 November 1998 the applicant’s daughter filed a rebuttal of the presumption of the applicant’s paternity. On 19 January 1999 the District Court appointed a medical expert to carry out a blood group examination of the parties. On 14 April 1999 the expert verified the applicant’s paternity. Subsequently, the plaintiff withdrew her claims and these proceedings were discontinued. 20.  In the principal proceedings, the translation of the Czechoslovakian law reached the District Court on 19 October 1999. 21.  On 26 October 1999 the District Court requested, via the Ministry of Justice, a copy of the parties’ marriage certificate from the archives of the Slovakian Nagykürtös District Registry. 22.  On 9 December 1999 another hearing was held. On the same day, the District Court dismissed, in a partial decision, the applicant’s counter-claim for invalidation of the marriage. The District Court relied on documentary evidence received from Slovakia. On 16 May 2000 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. 23.  On 28 August 2000 the District Court held a further hearing and ordered a bank to submit information about the parties’ assets. 24.  On 2 October 2000 the District Court pronounced the parties’ divorce and disjoined the remainder of the claims. In this latter respect, it ordered that the Land Registry be notified of the dispute concerning the division of the matrimonial property. 25.  On 14 November 2000 the applicant appealed against the first-instance decision and challenged the Regional Court for bias. On 8 February 2001 the Supreme Court dismissed his motion. On 10 May 2001 the Regional Court dismissed his appeal. 26.  On 18 December 2000 the District Court appointed experts to assess the value of the parties’ assets. 27.  On 21 January 2001 the applicant challenged all of the judges of Nógrád County for bias. On 22 January 2001 the Regional Court transferred the case file to the Supreme Court. 28.  On 20 March 2001 an inspection of the parties’ property holdings properties was carried out. 29.  On 28 March 2001 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s motion for bias and sent the case file back to the Regional Court. Subsequently, on 22 May 2001 the Regional Court appointed the Salgótarján District Court to hear the case. 30.  The case – in so far as it concerns the division of the matrimonial property – is still pending before the Salgótarján District Court.


4.  The first applicant was born in 1932, lives in Bratislava and is of fragile health. The second applicant was born in 1941 and also lived in Bratislava. She died on 28 October 2001 during the proceedings before the Court. In a letter of 2 April 2004 the first applicant informed the Court that he wished to pursue the application also in the name of the late second applicant. 5.  In 1989 the applicants concluded a contract with the State represented by the Bratislava II Housing Administration (bytový podnik) under which they purchased a family house located in Bratislava. The house had originally belonged to spouses S. Mrs S was a foreign national. The spouses S. had left the former Czechoslovakia in 1982. Mr S. was subsequently convicted of having stayed abroad illegally and sentenced to forfeiture of all his property. The house thus passed to the State. 6.  In 1990 the Bratislava II District Court (okresný súd) rehabilitated Mr S. by cancelling his criminal conviction. 7.  On 24 April 1991 the spouses S. lodged a civil action against the applicants and the State in the person of the Housing Administration with the Bratislava II District Court seeking a judicial ruling declaring the purchase contract of 1989 void. 8.  On 18 March 1992 the Convention entered into force in respect of the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, to which Slovakia is one of the successor states. Prior to this date, the parties appointed lawyers to represent them in the proceedings, the Housing Administration submitted written observations in reply, the District Court held three hearings and sought information from the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Finance as to what legal status had Mrs S. had as a foreigner in the former Czechoslovakia and whether this legal status had qualified her under the applicable foreign exchange rules to acquire immovable property. 9.  On 15 July 1992 the District Court requested information about the legal status of Mrs S. from the Police. 10.  On 23 September 1992 the District Court held a hearing at which the plaintiffs were not present in person. They were however represented by their lawyer. The Housing Administration was not present. The hearing was adjourned with a view to summoning the legal representative of the applicants. 11.  On 14 December 1992, following a hearing, the District Court declared the purchase contract of 1989 void. It found that Mrs S. had not been entitled to acquire the ownership of the house. Spouses S. thus had not become its legal owners. All later dispositions concerning the house had consequently been void. On 12 March 1993 the applicants appealed. On 4 June 1993 the Housing Administration also appealed. 12.  On 30 September 1993 the Bratislava Regional Court (then mestský súd, at present krajský súd) quashed the District Court’s judgment. It held that the first instance court had failed to establish the facts of the case sufficiently and to give adequate reasons for its decision which thus could not be reviewed. The case‑file was returned to the District Court on 9 December 1993. 13.  On 10 November 1994 the District Court listed a hearing for 18 January 1995. The plaintiffs were represented at this hearing by their lawyer. The case was adjourned and the District Court ordered the plaintiffs to submit further documentary evidence. 14.  On 18 October 1995 the District Court judge dealing with the case was replaced by another judge as the former had left for legal training at the Ministry of Justice. The new judge made requests for further information to the plaintiffs and the Police. 15.  On 28 November 1995 and 5 May 1996 the District Court repeatedly requested information from the Police concerning the legal status of Mrs S. as a foreigner at the relevant time. The Police replied on 31 May 1996. 16.  On 9 October 1996 the District Court held another hearing. One of the plaintiffs attended accompanied by their lawyer. The representative of the Housing Administration was not present. The hearing was adjourned with a view to obtaining further information concerning Mrs S. 17.  In a letter of 12 November 1996 the Police informed the District Court that, between 1974 and 1982, Mrs S. had been a lawful permanent resident in Czechoslovakia. 18.  In a letter of 24 July 1996 the President of the District Court informed the applicants that she had found no unjustified delays in the proceedings. The letter stated that the judge dealing with the case had a heavy workload and that a hearing was scheduled for 9 October 1996. 19.  In a letter of 2 August 1996 the applicants disagreed with the President’s reply and argued that the last hearing in the case had been held more than three and a half years ago. In a letter of 6 August 1996 the Vice‑President of the District Court informed the applicants that she had found no reasons for changing the position taken by the President of the District Court on 24 July 1996. 20.  On 22 January 1997, following another hearing, the District Court delivered a new judgment by which it dismissed the action. It found that Mr S. had lost his share of the ownership of the house by the forfeiture imposed on him in his criminal proceedings. It further found that Mrs S. had lost her share in the house by abandoning it (derelictio) and by taking up residence abroad. The District Court concluded that the title to the house had lawfully passed to the State and that it was later properly conveyed to the applicants by means of sale. 21.  On 13 March 1997 the plaintiffs appealed. On 6 May 1997 the Housing Authority filed its observations in reply. 22.  On 18 June 1997 the Bratislava Regional Court (krajský súd) held a hearing on the appeal. One of the plaintiffs attended accompanied by their lawyer. The applicants were represented by their lawyer. The hearing was adjourned and the plaintiffs were ordered to submit further documentary evidence. They did so on 24 June 1997. 23.  On 24 September 1997, following a hearing, the Bratislava Regional Court overturned the District Court’s judgment of 22 January 1997. It found that the house had originally belonged to spouses S. as their undivided matrimonial co‑ownership. The conviction of Mr S. entailed the dissolution of this co‑ownership and the passing of his share in the house to the State. However, the share of Mrs S. remained unaffected. Any dispositions concerning the house therefore necessitated her consent. As the contract of 1989 was concluded without her consent, it was void. 24.  On 3 December 1997 the applicants filed an appeal on points of law. On 22 December 1997 and on 17 February 1998 they were requested to pay the court fees which they did on 24 February 1998. In the meantime, on 23 February 1998, the plaintiffs filed their observations in reply. 25.  On 23 April 1998, in reply to their complaint, the President of the District Court dismissed the applicants’ complaint about the length of the proceedings as being unsubstantiated. The letter stated that the case‑file had been submitted to the Supreme Court (Najvyšší súd) for a decision on the appeal on points of law on 14 April 1998. 26.  On 16 December 1998 the Supreme Court quashed the Regional Court’s judgment of 24 September 1997 as well as the District Court’s judgment of 22 January 1997. It remitted the case to the District Court for a new adjudication. It expressed the view that the contract in question was unlawful only to the extent that it concerned the share of Mrs S. However, it was lawful in so far it concerned the share of Mr S. This share had lawfully passed from him to the State by means of forfeiture and from the State to the applicants by means of sale. In the given circumstances, the latter transfer did not necessitate the consent of Mrs S. The judgment and the case‑file were transmitted to the District Court on 8 February 1999. 27.  The hearing listed by the District Court for 13 September 1999 was adjourned at the applicants’ request, as, due to his health problems, the first applicant could not appear. 28.  On 22 November 1999 the District Court held a hearing at which the plaintiffs were represented by their lawyer. The representative of the Housing Authority was not present. At the hearing the applicants withdrew the power of attorney from their lawyer and objected that they had not been served a copy of the Supreme Court’s judgment. The hearing was adjourned until 10 February 2000. 29.  On 21 December 1999 the applicants filed a counter‑claim seeking compensation for the house in question and for pecuniary and non‑pecuniary damage they alleged that they had suffered. 30.  On 10 February 2000 the District Court held a hearing at which the applicants withdrew their counter‑claim. The proceedings on it were consequently discontinued. 31.  On 6 April 2000, following a hearing, the District Court gave a new judgment. It found that the contract of 1989 was void to the extent that it concerned the half of the property which belonged to Mrs S as that part of the property had not been transferred to State ownership prior to the sale to the applicant. After the judgment had been served on the parties and the period for filing an appeal had expired, the judgment became final and binding on 6 June 2000. 32.  On 13 March 2000 the applicants filed a submission with the Bratislava II District Court in which they maintained that the State was responsible for the extensive length of the proceedings concerning the validity of the purchase contract of 1989. They also maintained that the State was responsible for the fact that the contract was void. They sought to be provided with appropriate accommodation and compensated for both material and moral damage. On 10 August 2000 the District Court informed the applicants that the submission was unclear and that it did not meet the formal requirements for commencing proceedings. The District Court invited the applicants to remedy the shortcomings within 10 days. On 16 October 2000 the applicants filed further submissions and, on 18 November 2000, they demanded that the District Court deal with the case speedily. 33.  In a letter of 8 March 2001, in reply to the applicants’ complaint, the President of the District Court acknowledged that there had been undue delays in the proceedings in that the judge responsible for the case had taken no procedural steps and, since December 2000, she had been on maternity leave. On 23 March 2001 the President of the Regional Court sent a letter to the President of the District Court in which she referred to the latter’s response to the applicants’ complaint. She found that, despite her previous notice, the applicants’ case was still not being dealt with. She requested that the President of the District Court take effective measures in the matter and advised him that a failure to do so would entail consequences. 34.  On 7 September 2001 the District Court discontinued the proceedings on the ground that the applicants’ submissions were confused and did not meet the statutory requirements. The decision became formally final and binding on 17 October 2001 (see below). 35.  In a letter dated 15 October 2001 the applicants requested the District Court that the time‑limit for eliminating shortcomings in their submissions be extended to 30 October 2001. On the same day, they requested the Slovak Bar Association that a lawyer be appointed to represent them ex officio and free of charge. On 5 November 2001 the first applicant again requested an extension of the above time‑limit until 1 December 2001. 36.  On the advice of the Bar Association, the first applicant asked the District Court to grant him free legal assistance and to assign a lawyer to him on 15 November 2001 and on 8 January 2002. 37.  On 12 February 2002 the first applicant requested that the District Court re‑open the proceedings on his claim against the State and that it grant him free legal assistance. On 12 April 2002 the District Court invited the first applicant to pay the court fee. 38.  On 6 August 2002 the District Court dismissed the first applicant’s request for free legal assistance. It observed that the re‑opening of proceedings which had been discontinued on the grounds of formal defects in the action was inadmissible under the applicable procedural rules. The District Court therefore considered the first applicant’s request for re‑opening devoid of any prospect of success, in which case no free legal aid could be granted. 39.  On 29 October 2002, on the first applicant’s appeal, the Regional Court quashed the District Court’s decision of 6 August 2002. It considered that the first applicant’s submissions were incomprehensible. They could only be decided upon once the District Court further explored and safely established their legal nature which the Regional Court instructed it to do. 40.  The District Court summoned the first applicant for 17 March and for 5 May 2003 for an informative hearing in order to determine the legal nature of his submissions. The first applicant apologised for not being able to take part in the hearing of 17 March due to his health problems. In a letter of 9 April 2003 he again requested that the District Court grant him free legal aid and appoint a legal representative to him. 41.  On 26 August 2003 the District Court acceded to the first applicant’s request and assigned an advocate to assist him in formulating his claim. The case‑file contains no further information concerning the development, current state and possible outcome of the proceedings on the first applicant’s claim. 42.  In a letter of 23 November 2000 the applicants demanded that the Constitutional Court “assist them in expediting the proceedings concerning the validity of the purchase contract of 1989”. In a letter of 27 December 2000 a single Constitutional Court judge informed the applicants that the expediting of court proceedings fell outside the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction. In a letter of 15 January 2001 the applicants reiterated their request. On 6 February 2001 the Constitutional Court judge informed them that he had found no reasons to change his previous position. 43.  On 6 September 2001 the applicants again requested that the Constitutional Court expedite the proceedings concerning the validity of the purchase contract of 1989. In a letter of 20 September 2001 the constitutional judge informed the applicants that their submission did not meet the requirements for a formal constitutional complaint. At the same time the judge advised the applicants of the requirements in question and requested that he remedy his submission accordingly within 15 days. On 15 October 2001 the Constitutional Court judge granted the applicants’ request to extend the time‑limit for remedying his submission until 26 October 2001. 44.  On 13 November 2001 the first applicant asked the Constitutional Court to assign a lawyer ex officio and free of charge to him. By a decision of 4 December 2001 the Constitutional Court granted the request. On 8 January 2002 the first applicant again requested that the Constitutional Court assign a lawyer ex officio and free of charge to him. The case‑file contains no further information concerning the development, current state and possible outcome of the proceedings before the Constitutional Court.


9.  The applicant is an Italian national who was born in 1958. He was in Spoleto Prison when he lodged his application.
Among other measures, he was held in pre-trial detention for his involvement in the murder of Judge Falcone and his escort on 26 September 1997. He was subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment by the Caltanissetta Assize Court. On 12 November 1997 he was given a second life sentence, on other charges, by the Palermo Assize Court. That sentence became final on 26 November 1999. 10.  After his arrest on 4 June 1993 the applicant was placed under the special prison regime provided for in section 41 bis of the Prison Administration Act, which derogates from the conditions for ordinary detention laid down in the Act.
Between 13 November 1996 and 31 December 2000 the Minister of Justice issued nine decrees, each introducing restrictions for the following six-month periods: 13 November 1996 to 13 May 1997 (decree no. 1); 13 May 1997 to 13 November 1997 (decree no. 2); 14 November 1997 to 14 May 1998 (decree no. 3); 15 May 1998 to 15 November 1998 (decree no. 4); 12 November 1998 to 12 May 1999 (decree no. 5); 11 May 1999 to 11 November 1999 (decree no. 6); 8 November 1999 to 31 December 1999 (decree no. 7); 28 December 1999 to 28 June 2000 (decree no. 8); and 23 June 2000 to 31 December 2000 (decree no. 9).
The applicant indicated that he had remained under the same regime for the period following 31 December 2000, but did not provide any precise details. 11.  Decrees nos. 2 to 9 were not formal extensions of the previous decree, but fresh decisions that nonetheless reiterated the earlier decision. 12.  By virtue of the nine decrees, the following restrictions were imposed on the applicant:
(a)  limits on visits by family members, with a maximum of one visit for one hour per month;
(b)  no meetings with third parties;
(c)  prohibition on using the telephone, except for one call – to be recorded – per month to members of the family if the applicant had not had a visit;
(d)  prohibition on receiving or sending out sums of money in excess of a specified amount, except for defence costs or fines;
(e)  no more than two parcels of laundry per month;
(f)  no organisation of cultural, recreational or sports activities;
(g)  no right to vote in elections for prisoners' representatives or to be elected as a representative;
(h)  no handicrafts;
(i)  no more than two hours per day to be spent outdoors. 13.  The applicant appealed against those decrees to the court responsible for the execution of sentences. The parties submitted the factual information set out below.
Decree no. 1 – The applicant appealed on 2 January 1997. The Palermo court responsible for the execution of sentences held a hearing on 11 March 1997. In an order of 11 March 1997, deposited with the registry on 15 March 1997, the court declared the appeal inadmissible in accordance with the restrictive case-law followed at the time to the effect that the court hearing the case did not have power to examine the merits of the restrictions imposed.
Decree no. 2 – In an order of 29 July 1997, deposited with the registry on 31 July 1997, the Florence court responsible for the execution of sentences declared inoperative the restrictions referred to in (a), (e) and (f) of the above list.
Decree no. 3 – On an unknown date the applicant appealed to the Bologna court responsible for the execution of sentences. The court held a hearing on 27 January 1998 and dismissed the appeal in an order of the same day, which was deposited with the registry on 30 January 1998.
Decree no. 4 – The applicant appealed on 19 May 1998. On 10 October 1998 the Perugia court responsible for the execution of sentences set the case down for hearing on 12 November 1998. On 30 March 1999 the President of the court declared the appeal inadmissible. He noted that the period of validity of the decree had expired and that the applicant accordingly no longer had any interest in having it examined.
Decree no. 5 – The applicant did not appeal against this decree.
Decree no. 6 – The applicant appealed on 14 May 1999. On 9 June 1999 the rehabilitation unit of Spoleto Prison confirmed a report that had previously been made in connection with another appeal. In a request of 21 September 1999 sent to the Perugia court responsible for the execution of sentences, the applicant's lawyer asked for the appeal to be heard. On 4 December 1999 the President of the court declared the appeal inadmissible. He noted that the period of validity of the decree had expired and that the applicant accordingly no longer had any interest in having it examined.
Decree no. 7 – The applicant appealed on 12 November 1999. On 12 February 2000 the President of the Perugia court responsible for the execution of sentences declared the appeal inadmissible. He noted that the period of validity of the decree had expired and that the applicant accordingly no longer had any interest in having it examined.
Decree no. 8 – On 28 March 2000 the President of the Perugia court responsible for the execution of sentences granted the applicant legal aid. On 10 April 2000 he set the case down for hearing on 4 May 2000. In an order of the same date, deposited with the registry on 8 May, the court allowed the appeal regarding the restriction on the applicant's right to receive parcels and dismissed the remainder.
Decree no. 9 – The applicant appealed on 28 June 2000. On 8 January 2001 the President of the Perugia court responsible for the execution of sentences declared it inadmissible on the ground that the applicant no longer had any interest in having it examined since the period of validity of the decree had expired on 31 December 2000.


4.  The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Plevník - Drienové. 5.  Inheritance proceedings in respect of the applicant's father's estate were concluded by a decision of 31 July 1962. The stamp on that decision indicates that it became final on 27 October 1962. 6.  On 17 February 1995 the Banská Bystrica Regional Court, upon the appeal of an heir lodged on 15 October 1962, quashed the above decision on the ground that it (i) had been issued without sufficient establishment of the facts and (ii) could not be reviewed for lack of reasons. On 6 March 1995 the case file was remitted for further examination to the Považská Bystrica District Court which had taken over similar cases in the meantime. 7.  On 13 July 1998 the district court discontinued the proceedings since the matter at issue was a res iudicata. The district court stated that the decision of the State Notary of 31 July 1962 had become final on 27 October 1962 and that no new assets had been found. On 31 May 1999 the Trenčín Regional Court quashed the decision of 13 July 1998 and remitted the case file for further examination to the first-instance. It reasoned that the decision of the State Notary of 31 July 1962 had been quashed by the Banská Bystrica Regional Court on 17 February 1995 and the case file had been remitted for further examination. On 25 May 2000 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant's appeal on points of law lodged against the decision of the Trenčín Regional Court of 31 May 1999. 8.  On 25 March 2004 the district court stayed the inheritance proceedings pending the outcome of another set of civil proceedings (file no. 6 C 156/04, see below). On 15 July and 18 November 2004 the district court corrected errors in its decision. The district court decided on the applicant's appeal in its decision of 5 May 2005. The decision to stay the inheritance proceedings became final on 3 June 2005. 9.  In the subsequent period, the district court repeatedly verified whether the related civil proceedings had ended. The inheritance proceedings are still stayed. 10.  On 18 March 2010 the Považská Bystrica District Court delivered a judgment. Those proceedings are now pending before the appellate court. 11.  On 7 March 2002 the Považská Bystrica District Court dismissed the applicant's claim to have a donation contract declared null and void. On 22 April 2003 the Trenčín Regional Court confirmed the judgment. 12.  On 10 May 2006 the Constitutional Court found that the Považská Bystrica District Court had violated the applicant's right to a hearing without unjustified delay in proceedings nos. D1133/98, Dnot 652/96. 13.  The Constitutional Court awarded 60,000 Slovakian korunas to the applicant as just satisfaction in respect of non-pecuniary damage and ordered reimbursement of the applicant's legal costs. It did not order the district court to avoid further delays as the inheritance proceedings were stayed pending the outcome of related civil proceedings. 14.  The Constitutional Court noted that (i) it had jurisdiction to examine the duration of the proceedings only as from 15 February 1993 and (ii) until 6 March 1995 the district court had correctly assumed that the inheritance proceedings had been concluded by a final decision. Therefore, it examined the delays which had occurred in the proceedings only after 6 March 1995. It further stated that even after that date the proceedings had lasted nine years and the district court had been responsible for four years and nine months of delays. 15.  A Constitutional Court judge informed the applicant in a letter of 24 August 2004 that his submission concerning the proceedings before the Považská Bystrica District Court in case no. 3 C 845/01 did not comply with the formal requirements for proceedings before the Constitutional Court. 16.  On 18 February 2010 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicant's complaint about the length of unspecified proceedings before the Považská Bystrica District and Regional Court and the State Notary as falling short of the statutory requirements.


5.  The applicants were born in 1970, 1963 and 1989 and live in Paks and Budapest respectively. 6.  At the material time, Mr Vajnai was Vice-President and Ms Noé and Mr Bakó were activists of the Workers’ Party (Munkáspárt), a registered left-wing political party. The party had no known intention of participating in Hungarian political life in defiance of the rule of law. 7.  On 21 December 2008 the applicants organised an event in front of a shopping mall in Budapest, entitled “Anti-Capitalist Santa Claus”, with the intention to demonstrate against consumerism, draw attention to poverty, point out the shortcomings of market economy, and demand free internet access for all. 8.  To express their affiliation with Communism, four persons, including the applicants, displayed a sheet and a flag with a five-pointed red star and distributed leaflets with their political message, depicting red stars. 9.  In application of section 269/B(1) of the Criminal Code, a police patrol which was present called on the applicants to terminate the demonstration, checked their identity and committed them to Budapest VI District Police Department for interrogation. 10.  On 23 December 2008 the applicants lodged a complaint with the Independent Police Complaints Board against the police measures. They relied on the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights adopted in the case of Vajnai v. Hungary (no. 33629/06, ECHR 2008). They referred to the Court’s finding that the prosecution for having worn a red star had amounted to a violation of Mr Vajnai’s freedom of expression enshrined in Article 10 of the Convention. 11.  The applicants’ complaints were dismissed by the Complaints Board on 4 March 2009. 12.  The applicants’ further complaints against the measures were dismissed by the District Police Department on 22 May 2009. This decision was upheld by the Budapest Chief Police Commander, acting as a second-instance authority, on 17 November 2009. 13.  On 29 June 2010 the Budapest Regional Court dismissed the applicants’ requests for judicial review. The court held that the display of the red star contravened section 269/B of the Criminal Code, despite the Vajnai judgment, whose application in the circumstances had been no task of the police officers present on the premises. Consequently, the applicants’ identity check and committal to the Police Department was justified under sections 29 (1) and 33 (1) of Act no. XXXIV of 1994 on the Police. 14.  In review proceedings, the Supreme Court upheld the Regional Court’s decision on 22 June 2011 (in the case of Mr Bakó), 27 June 2011 (in the case of Ms Noé), and 5 September 2011 (in the case of Mr Vajnai), endorsing in essence the first-instance decisions’ reasoning. 15.  The applicants, jointly (they had a lawyer in common), incurred altogether 2,760 euros in legal costs.


5.  The applicant was born in 1931 and lives in Kraków. 6.  The realities of the international situation following the end of the Second World War prevented the Republic of Poland from asserting any claims arising out of persecution of its citizens by Nazi Germany, including as forced labourers. 7.  In the period immediately following the Second World War Poland did not conclude a specific agreement with Germany regarding the issue of reparations. It relied on the Potsdam Agreement of 1 August 1945, concluded by the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 8.  On 27 February 1953 the London Agreement on Germany’s External Debts (London Debt Agreement) was concluded by the United States of America, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union. Under this Agreement, consideration of claims arising out of the Second World War by countries which were at war with or were occupied by Germany during that war, and by nationals of such countries, against the Reich or agencies of the Reich was deferred until final settlement of the issue of reparations. 9.  On 23 August 1953, a day after a similar declaration by the Government of the Soviet Union, the Government of Poland declared that it renounced any claims against Germany in respect of war reparations as of 1 January 1954. In a declaration of 27 September 1969, made at the United Nations, the Government of Poland clarified that the renouncement of 1953 did not affect individual claims arising out of unlawful acts. 10.  In 1972 the Federal Republic of Germany made an ex-gratia payment of DM 100 million to the Polish Government for the victims of pseudo-medical experiments. 11.  It was only after the conclusion of the Treaty on the Final Settlement with respect to Germany of 12 September 1990 (the so‑called Two‑Plus‑Four Treaty) and the conclusion of two treaties between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Poland in 1990[1] and 1991[2] that the issue of persons persecuted by the Nazi regime was addressed in the bilateral Agreement of 16 October 1991 (see paragraph 30 below). 12.  The issue of compensation for slave and forced labour during the Second World War was addressed in the Joint Statement of 17 July 2000 and the German Law of 2 August 2000 on the Creation of the “Remembrance, Responsibility and Future” Foundation (see relevant law below). 13.  In June 1942 the applicant was deported from Grójec, which was then part of the Polish territories annexed by the Third Reich, to Wadów, located on the territory of the General Government (Generalna Gubernia, an administrative entity established by the German authorities in occupied Poland). He worked as a forced labourer on a German farm in Wadów until the liberation in January 1945. 14.  In August 2001 the applicant applied to the “Polish-German Reconciliation Foundation” (“the Foundation” or “the Polish Foundation”) for payment of compensation for his forced labour during the war. That request was made under the scheme for slave and forced labourers (“the second compensation scheme”). On 23 July 2004 the Foundation’s Verification Commission dismissed the applicant’s claims. It found that the applicant’s forced labour did not entitle him to receive benefits under any of the categories for eligibility. The applicant appealed on 31 August 2004. He argued that he had worked on a German farm and submitted three documents in support of his claim. The first document was a certificate issued by the Ruszcza Catholic Parish on the basis of its parish records. The certificate stated that between 1942 and 1945 there had been a farm in Wadów owned by Z.K. (married name: Hochsman) and administered by W. Hochsman, a German national. The second document was a certificate issued by the Wadów Agricultural Society. It confirmed that there had been a farm in Wadów owned and administered by a German national, W. Hoffman. The last document was issued by the Kraków Regional Agrarian Office and certified that in 1945 the farm in Wadów had been acquired by the State in the context of agrarian reform. 15.  On 21 December 2004 the Foundation’s Appeal Commission upheld the refusal. It found that the applicant had been deported from Grójec in Upper Silesia to Wadów in the General Government. In the case of persons deported from one administrative entity to another, it was necessary to establish that they had been subjected to forced labour on a German farm or for a German company. According to the Appeal Commission, the applicant did not adduce documents demonstrating that the farm in Wadów had been under German administration or that its owners had belonged to the List of German Nationals (Deutsche Volksliste; niemiecka grupa narodowościowa). In particular, the Appeal Commission refused to accept a certificate issued by the Ruszcza Catholic Parish as relevant proof, since it had not been based on archival documents. Similarly, it did not consider as relevant the document issued by the Agricultural Society, as it had been based on witness statements. Other documents produced by the applicant did not confirm that the farm in Wadów had been under German administration. 16.  The applicant strongly contested the Verification Commission’s findings. He turned to various authorities and institutions, seeking to challenge those findings. In 2006 he complained to the Ombudsman about the Foundation’s refusal to grant him compensation. 17.  Following the Ombudsman’s inquiry, the Foundation’s Appeal Commission re-examined the applicant’s claims. However, on 29 May 2006 it again refused them. First, the Appeal Commission stated that section 11 of the German Foundation Act (“the GFA”), which set out the categories of eligible persons, was not directly applicable to the applicant. However, following the agreement made in the framework of the so-called “openness clause” (tzw. klauzula otwartości; section 9 § 8 of the GFA) the Polish Foundation with the approval of the German Foundation agreed to extend the category of eligible claimants to other groups, including relocated persons (osoby dyslokowane). That category included forced labourers who had been deported within the territory of the Polish State and crossed the border between the administrative entities established by the occupying authorities. The additional condition for relocated persons was to produce documents which attested that they had worked on a farm under German administration or for a German company. Relevant evidence to that effect should have been produced on the basis of the local archives, indicating which documents had been relied on. 18.  The Appeal Commission underlined that the applicant had not established in a requisite manner that the farm in question had been under German administration. It could not take into consideration the certificate issued by the Wadów Agricultural Society as it had been based on witness statements. The applicant was informed that documents based on witness statements were not regarded as relevant evidence. Furthermore, the Appeal Commission did not consider the certificate issued by the Ruszcza Catholic Parish as sufficient proof that the farm in question had been under German administration. That certificate had been issued on the basis of the parish records but without providing further details about the latter. Similarly, the document issued by the Regional Agrarian Office was not considered relevant.


5.  The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Budapest. 6.  On 17 January 2007 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant, then employed as a security guard, and his alleged accomplices. They were charged with aggravated extortion, endorsement of and profiteering from prostitution and other offences. The applicant, when he learned that the police had been looking for him, presented himself at the police station on his own initiative. 7.  On 18 January 2007 the prosecution filed a motion for his pre-trial detention. The risks of absconding, repetition of crime and collusion were referred to. 8.  On 19 January 2007 the Pest Central District Court ordered the detention. Only the last-mentioned reason was retained, since the court held that – in the face of the applicant’s settled family life, legal income and the fact that he had no previous convictions – the impending severe sanction was insufficient reason for assuming that he might abscond and, moreover, that the continuous nature of the offence he was charged with did not necessarily entail the risk of repetition of crime. 9.  On 1 February 2007 the Budapest Regional Court upheld the measure, retaining all the reasons proposed by the prosecution. The Regional Court observed that the applicant had no legal income, his personal situation was unknown and one of his accomplices had absconded. 10.  The applicant’s detention was then repeatedly prolonged at the statutory intervals on the basis of the risk of collusion and intimidation of witnesses. In particular, it was pointed out by the courts that there were elements in the investigation file according to which the applicant and his associate had attempted to influence some witnesses and that a summons sent to a witness – who had subsequently withdrawn his testimony – had been seized by the police from one of the defendants in the case. 11.  On 4 May 2007 the defence proposed, to no avail, that the detention be substituted with a less stringent measure, since at this late stage of the proceedings the risk of collusion was no longer relevant. On 7 May 2007 the applicant’s lawyer complained that no evidence was accessible to him from the prosecution’s side underlying the risk of the applicant’s intimidating the witnesses. On 31 May 2007 the applicant filed another motion, again unsuccessfully, pointing out that the risk of collusion was not substantiated by any evidence known to him. A similar complaint was made in vain on 13 September 2007. 12.  Another prolongation order issued meanwhile, on 12 September 2007, was based afresh on the risk of repetition of crime, in addition to that of absconding. On appeal, the former reason was discarded but the latter retained, with the reasoning that although the investigation had been terminated, the organised nature of the crime with which the accused were charged and their attitude towards the witnesses necessitated the continued detention. 13.  On 17 October 2007 a bill of indictment was preferred. 14.  On 19 October 2007 the detention was prolonged because of the risk of absconding and collusion. The applicant appealed, arguing that nothing indicated that he would abscond in the face of his settled background, and that no elements communicated to him by the authorities would allude to any real risk of collusion.
On 28 November 2007 the appeal was rejected but the risk of collusion was not maintained. 15.  At the first court hearing, on 18 December 2007 one of the accomplices was released on bail. However, the same was refused in respect of the applicant. The court pointed out that the proposed bail did not secure the applicant’s availability for justice in view of the impending severe sanction. 16.  A further motion with a view to release on bail was decided on 19 February 2008. The applicant’s detention was maintained, because of the risk of absconding, given the seriousness of the charges. His appeal and further requests for release on bail or the application of less stringent coercion were to no avail. The trial court made repeated references to the risk of absconding in the face of the potential severe sanction. 17.  Finally, on 10 December 2008 the applicant was released but was prohibited from leaving his domicile.


6.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in the town of Chekhov in the Moscow region. He is the pastor of the “Christ's Grace” Church of Evangelical Christians (Церковь евангельских христиан “Благодать Христова”). 7.  On 9 September 2002 the applicant applied to the Chekhov Town Council for permission to hold a service in public between 11 a.m. and 1 p.m. on 22 or 29 September 2002. 8.  On 20 September 2002 the deputy head of the Chekhov Town Council refused permission. In particular, he stated that the Chekhov Town Council had on many occasions informed the applicant that it was not possible to hold services in public areas in the town (squares, streets, parks, etc.). The applicant was advised to hold services and other religious rites at the registered seat of the church or on other premises owned or used by the church members. 9.  On 26 September 2002 the applicant challenged the refusal of the Town Council before a court. He alleged violations of the rights to freedom of religion and assembly. 10.  On 11 October 2002 the Chekhov Town Court of the Moscow Region examined the applicant's claim and dismissed it. The court found that, pursuant to the domestic law, public worship and other religious rites were subject to an authorisation by a municipal authority. It further ruled as follows:
“The contested refusal is lawful because it is justified. As the Church of Evangelical Christians practices a religion that is different from the religion professed by the majority of the local residents, and having regard to the fact that in the Chekhov district there are more than twenty religious organisations of different denominations, a service of worship in a public area held by one of them may lead to ... the discontent of individuals of other denominations and public disorder.
In these circumstances, the contested acts of the Chekhov Town Council cannot be deemed to impair the rights of the 'Christ's Grace' Church of Evangelical Christians as they do not prevent it from holding services in religious buildings or on other premises intended for that purpose.” 11.  The applicant appealed. On 4 November 2002 the Moscow Regional Court upheld the judgment of 11 October 2002.


7.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Ankara. 8.  In the parliamentary elections of 3 November 2002, as a member of the People's Republican Party (CHP), he was elected MP for the Konya constituency to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (“the National Assembly”). 9.  Prior to his election he practised as a lawyer in Konya and, in the course of his professional activities, two sets of criminal proceedings were brought against him, one for insulting a lawyer and the other for insulting a public official. 10.  As an MP he enjoyed parliamentary immunity. 11.  On 23 December 2002 the Karapınar public prosecutor applied to the General Directorate of the Ministry of Justice to have the applicant's parliamentary immunity lifted for the purposes of the criminal proceedings against him for insulting a lawyer. 12.  On 17 January 2003 the General Directorate of the Ministry of Justice transmitted the request to the Prime Minister's Office. 13.  On 11 April 2003 the Konya Assize Court (“the Assize Court”) adopted a decision suspending the criminal proceedings against the applicant for insulting a public official, by virtue of Article 83 of the Constitution (on parliamentary immunity) and Article 253 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 14.  On 4 December 2003 the Assize Court transmitted the case file to the Ministry of Justice with a view to having the applicant's parliamentary immunity lifted. 15.  On 23 December 2003 the Department of Criminal Affairs of the Ministry of Justice referred the question to the Prime Minister. 16.  The Prime Minister's Office transmitted the case file to the National Assembly's joint committee (“the joint committee”). 17.  On 28 May 2004, after noting that the applicant had requested the lifting of his immunity, the joint committee decided, in view of the nature of the charges, to stay the proceedings against him for insulting a public official until the end of his term of parliamentary office. It transmitted its decision to the plenary Assembly of the National Assembly (“the plenary Assembly”). 18.  When the plenary Assembly met on 8 December 2004 the joint committee's report was read and appended to the minutes of the meeting. 19.  On 15 December 2004 the applicant challenged the joint committee's decision. In his pleadings he made the point that parliamentary immunity had not been introduced to render Members of Parliament unaccountable or immune from punishment, but to allow them to discharge their duties wholly independently and dispassionately. Unlike non-liability, he argued, immunity was by nature a relative and temporary privilege. However, the scope of the immunity, the procedure for lifting it and the shortcomings in its implementation had undermined due respect for the National Assembly. The applicant added that it was unacceptable, in a society governed by the rule of law, that an institution originally meant to help MPs to discharge their duties should be transformed into a personal privilege. 20.  On an unspecified date examination of the matter of the lifting of the applicant's parliamentary immunity in the proceedings concerning the insulting of a lawyer was referred to the joint committee under Rules 131 et seq. of the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly. The National Assembly decided to stay the proceedings until the dissolution of the 22nd Parliament. 21.  On 31 January 2005 the applicant challenged that decision. 22.  His file was then sent before the plenary Assembly. 23.  On 7 February 2005 the Secretariat of the Speaker's Office informed the applicant that the files concerning him had been placed on the agenda of the plenary Assembly. 24.  At the meeting of the plenary Assembly on 16 February 2005 the applicant once again asked to be allowed to avail himself of his right to be judged in a fair trial and requested that the obstacles to his exercise of that right be removed. 25.  The applicant was re-elected as CHP party MP for the Konya constituency in the parliamentary elections of 22 July 2007. 26.  On 8 January 2008 the Speaker of the National Assembly sent him a letter informing him of progress with the procedure for lifting his parliamentary immunity.
The relevant passages read as follows:
“(...) during the 22nd Parliament [2002-2007] 299 files concerning immunity were forwarded to the joint committee. In 252 cases the committee decided to stay the proceedings until the next dissolution. In 226 cases that decision was challenged. The files corresponding to those cases were placed on the plenary Assembly's agenda for examination. However, the plenary Assembly did not examine them.
During the 22nd Parliament's term two files concerned your immunity. The first, file no. 3/176, concerned the proceedings brought against you by the Konya-Ereğli public prosecutor for insulting a lawyer; the second, file no. 3/453, concerned the proceedings before the Konya Assize Court for insulting a public official. In both cases the joint committee decided to stay the proceedings until the end of your term of office. Following your appeal, the files were placed on the plenary Assembly's agenda but have not been examined.
In this 23rd Parliament [which started in 2007] 77 files concerning the lifting of immunity remain pending before the joint committee. Two of those files are in your name; they were given the numbers 3/107 and 3/129 following your re-election on 22 July 2007. Since the beginning of this Parliament all the files, including yours, have been sent before three preparatory committees set up by the joint committee. These committees started work on 27 December 2007 (...). They are to announce their decisions within a month of that date.” 27.  On 23 and 24 January 2008 the applicant filed two defence memorials against the suspension of the two sets of criminal proceedings against him. In them he repeated his wish to be allowed to exercise his right to a fair trial.


6.  On 7 August 2000 a mother contacted the police on account of a suspicion that her children, a girl born in 1991 and a boy born in 1993, had been sexually abused by a neighbour, the applicant. On 10 August and 2 September 2000 the siblings were interviewed by a police officer experienced in investigating sexual abuse of children. The applicant was also suspected of having abused two other girls, both friends of the siblings and born in 1991. The girls were interviewed by the police on 11 August and 18 August respectively and again on 3 September 2000. All the interviews were recorded on videotape. 7.  At the time of the first interviews, i.e. on the morning of 10 August 2000, the applicant had not been informed of the suspicions against him and no defence counsel had yet been appointed for him. Neither the applicant nor his counsel was present during the later interviews. The siblings and one of the other girls underwent a psychological examination in the Family Advice Centre with a view to assessing whether their testimonies during the pre-trial investigation were reliable. 8.  Meanwhile, on the afternoon of 10 August 2000 the applicant was questioned by the police. Before the questioning he was notified of the suspicions against him and it appears that he did not exercise his right to have his counsel present. The applicant was in detention from that day until 7 September 2000 when travel restrictions were imposed on him. He was accompanied by counsel when questioned again on 17, 18, 19 and 23 August and 6 September 2000. He was questioned alone on 12 January 2001. 9.  Prior to the close of the pre-trial investigation, in his closing statement the applicant requested, on 7 December 2000, having watched the above-mentioned video recordings, that the siblings be questioned again and that his questions be put to them about how and where they had learnt about the sexual things they had mentioned to him and, in particular, if they had been subjected to sexual acts at a place other than the applicant's home. His request was however refused on 21 January 2001. According to the Government, this was because their mother had refused to allow any further questioning of the children, now aged 7 and 9. 10.  The applicant was charged before the District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätten) with having sexually abused the four children during the summer of 2000. He denied the charges. He however admitted having tapped two of the girls on their buttocks. 11.  In February 2001 the District Court held an oral hearing during which the applicant, the parents of the siblings and the mothers of the other two girls gave evidence. The children were not heard in person. The videotaped interviews with the children were shown during the hearing. The court also heard evidence from a psychologist on the reliability of the statements of the siblings and of one of the other girls. The applicant did not request that the children give evidence at the hearing. 12.  The mother of the siblings testified that they had told her about the improper touching in the same manner as they had done on the videotape. When the touching had become known, on 1 August 2000, her son had reacted intensely by crying and slamming doors. He had also suffered from sleeping problems and her daughter had suffered from headaches. Neither of these ailments had occurred before. According to two written opinions of the Family Advice Centre, the siblings' accounts of the events were considered credible given their detailed and precise nature. There was nothing to suggest that they were the siblings' own inventions. The mothers of the two other girls testified that they had told them about the improper touching in the same manner as they had done on the videotape. 13.  In its judgment of 28 February 2001 the District Court observed that the evidence was mainly of an indirect nature and that the sole direct evidence was the testimony of a psychologist, who had testified as to the children's credibility. 14.  The court noted that the applicant had argued that the main evidence in the case was flawed due to the fact that he had not been afforded an opportunity to put questions to the children and that the authorities had put leading questions to them. He had also argued that there were shortcomings insofar as the psychological examinations carried out by the Family Advice Centre were concerned. The court however found no such flaws as would significantly have reduced the evidentiary value of the examinations. 15.  The court then stated that the case turned on an assessment of the credibility of the children's statements. While it was true that the pre-trial statements' probative value was weakened by the fact that the applicant had not been able to put questions to the children, these statements were nonetheless reliable as the children had provided details about the events and as their young age gave no reason to believe that they would have sought to lie about the events. Although some leading questions may have been put to the children, there was nothing to suggest that they would have sought to please the interviewer and adapted their replies accordingly. This being so, the court found that questioning the children in court would not have added anything significant to the case. Having regard to their best interests, the questioning of children of such a young age before a court could not be considered justifiable. The court found that the testimonies of the psychologist and the parents supported the credibility of the children's accounts. 16.  It convicted the applicant of having sexually abused the four children and sentenced him to two years and three months' imprisonment. 17.  The applicant appealed, alleging inter alia a breach of Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention in that he had not been afforded an opportunity to put questions to the children. 18.  The Court of Appeal (hovioikeus, hovrätten) held an oral hearing and was presented with the same evidence as had been before the District Court. The parties agreed that it was in the best interests of the children that they should not be heard before the court. The applicant however rejected the admission of the children's pre-trial statements as evidence since he had not been afforded an opportunity to put questions to them. 19.  In its judgment of 6 November 2001 the Court of Appeal noted that the children had been interviewed twice during the pre-trial investigation and all but one of the girls had been examined in the Family Advice Centre using tests and interviews. As the questioning of the children, now aged 8 to 10, before the court would probably have caused them suffering, it was possible to use in evidence their pre-trial statements, although the applicant's minimum rights under, inter alia, Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention would thereby be violated. In evaluating the weight to be attached to the children's statements, the court found that it had to take into account the discrepancies pointed out by the applicant and the fact that the police had not put to the children the questions proposed by him in his pre-trial closing statement. 20.  In its assessment of the evidence the appellate court reached the same conclusions as the lower court and upheld the conviction. It however reduced the sentence to one year and eight months' imprisonment, which it considered fair, having regard to the fact that the applicant had not forced the children into doing anything, the relevant sentencing practice and the fact that the applicant had no previous convictions. 21.  The applicant requested leave to appeal, maintaining, inter alia, that there had been a breach of Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention. He did not submit any request for the children to be heard. 22.  On 28 February 2002 the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen) refused leave to appeal.