5.  The applicant was born in 1961. He is married; he and his wife (born in 1968) have three children, born in 1992, 1993 and 1998 respectively. The family are resident in Zoetermeer. 6.  On 8 December 1997 the applicant arrived in the Netherlands, five months after his wife and two children had arrived there. On 10 December 1997 the applicant applied for asylum. The Deputy Minister of Justice (Staatssecretaris van Justitie) rejected this application on 19 February 1999 but he did grant the applicant a conditional residence permit (voorwaardelijke vergunning tot verblijf), valid as of 10 December 1997, on the basis of a temporary “policy of protection for certain categories” (categoriaal beschermingsbeleid). The applicant’s wife and children received residence permits for the purpose of asylum that same day. The applicant lodged an objection against the decision to refuse him asylum. 7.  The situation in Afghanistan not having sufficiently improved, the applicant’s conditional residence permit was ex lege converted into an indefinite residence permit after he had held it for a period of three years. Subsequently, with the entry into force of the Aliens Act 2000 (Vreemdelingenwet 2000) on 1 April 2001, the permit held by the applicant came to be named an indefinite residence permit for the purpose of asylum. In view of this development, the applicant’s objection against the decision of 19 February 1999 was declared inadmissible on 16 July 2001. 8.  On 28 May 2004 the Minister for Immigration and Integration (Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie, at that time the successor to the Deputy Minister of Justice) withdrew the applicant’s residence permit (but not those of his wife and children) as Article 1F of the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees was held against him. The applicant filed an appeal against this decision which was rejected by the Regional Court (rechtbank) of The Hague on 29 March 2005. On 4 August 2005 the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State (Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak van de Raad van State) confirmed the decision of the Regional Court at final instance. 9.  The applicant’s wife and children were granted Netherlands nationality on 13 December 2004. 10.  On 21 October 2005 the applicant filed a new application for asylum, which was rejected by the Minister on 27 October 2005. The applicant’s appeal was dismissed by the Regional Court of The Hague on 17 November 2005, and on 22 December 2005 the Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State dismissed the applicant’s appeal at final instance. 11.  Subsequently, on 9 January 2006, the applicant applied for a residence permit for the purpose of residing in the Netherlands with his wife. At the same time, he requested an exemption from the obligation to pay the statutory administrative charges (leges) of 830 euros (EUR). In this respect he invoked Decision 2005/46 amending the Aliens Act Implementation Guidelines 2000 (Wijzigingsbesluit Vreemdelingencirculaire 2000), according to which an alien who has a justifiable claim under Article 8 of the Convention in proceedings to obtain a residence permit for the purposes of family reunion (gezinshereniging) or family formation (gezinsvorming) could be exempted from paying the required charges if he or she complied with certain conditions. The applicant argued that he had a legitimate claim under Article 8 and that he had provided sufficient proof that he did not have the resources to pay the charges: since the withdrawal of his residence permit he himself was no longer eligible for social assistance and his family had to survive on social assistance intended for a single-parent family. There were no relatives or third persons prepared or able to pay the charges for him. He submitted a copy of his wife’s social assistance pay slip for the month of December 2005 (stating a total payable amount of EUR 988.71), an official extract from the register of marriages dated 29 December 2005 showing him to be married to his wife, and an official document showing him, his wife and their children to be registered at the same address. 12.  On 23 March 2006 the Minister decided not to process the application for a residence permit, as the applicant had failed to pay the required charge. 13.  The applicant lodged an objection with the Minister against that decision, arguing that he had submitted a reasoned request to be exempted from the obligation to pay the administrative charge, which request the Minister had rejected without stating any grounds. On 31 March 2006 the applicant also applied for a provisional measure (voorlopige voorziening) to the Regional Court of The Hague in order to be allowed to await the outcome of his appeal in the Netherlands. 14.  On 27 March 2007 the Regional Court rejected the request for a provisional measure and at the same time dismissed the objection. It considered that the applicant had failed to submit sufficient proof of his lack of resources to pay the required fees; it had therefore not been unreasonable for the Minister to decide not to process the applicant’s request for a residence permit. 15.  No appeal lay against the judgment of the Regional Court. 16.  On 11 January 2008, in reply to questions put to them pursuant to Rule 49 § 3 (a) of the Rules of Court, the Government confirmed that, at the time the applicant lodged his request for a residence permit for the purpose of residing with his wife, the latter was in receipt of social assistance benefits for a single-parent family. They further confirmed that the applicant was not in possession of a residence permit entitling him to acquire income by working in the Netherlands. He had nevertheless not qualified for the exemption from the obligation to pay administrative charges as he had submitted neither the required declaration of income and assets nor evidence relating to efforts made by his wife (being the residence permit holder with whom the applicant intended to stay) to obtain the necessary funds. 17.  In reply to a further question, the Government submitted on 28 May 2008 that the assessment framework for an objection against the decision not to process an application for a residence permit due to a failure to pay the administrative charges was based on an ex tunc evaluation of whether that decision had been taken on reasonable grounds. Paying the administrative charges or submitting the required evidence subsequently was not an option; nor would it have any bearing on the decision not to process the application, as an ex nunc assessment was no longer possible. 18.  On 21 July 2008, in response to a further question, the Government confirmed that the applicant could submit a new application for a residence permit, which would be processed once he had paid the administrative charges or obtained an exemption from the obligation to pay them. The examination of the merits of such an application would include an assessment of compliance with Article 8 of the Convention.


6.  The applicants were born in 1953, 1950, 1969 and 1969 and live in Uster, Zürich, Bäretswil and Nussbaumen respectively. 7.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows. 8.  In 2003 the third applicant, an editor of the Kassensturz television programme, prepared a report on practices employed in selling life-insurance products. The report was prompted by the annual reports of the Private Insurance Ombudsman for the Canton of Zürich and by letters which the programme’s editors had received from viewers expressing their dissatisfaction with insurance brokers. Kassensturz is a long-running weekly consumer-protection programme on Swiss-German television (SF DRS). 9.  The third applicant agreed with the first applicant (the editor-in-chief of SF DRS) and the second applicant (the editor in charge of the programme) that she would record meetings between customers and brokers, using a hidden camera, to provide evidence of the brokers’ inadequate advice. It was decided that the meetings would be recorded in a private flat and that an insurance expert would then be asked to comment on them. 10.  The fourth applicant, a journalist working for SF DRS, arranged a meeting with an insurance broker from company X, which took place on 26 February 2003. She pretended to be a customer interested in taking out life insurance. The SF DRS crew installed two hidden cameras (Lipstickkameras) in the room in which the meeting was to take place, transmitting the recording of the conversation to a neighbouring room where the third applicant and the insurance expert had taken up position, together with a camera operator and a technician who had been assigned to film the expert’s views on the meeting. 11.  Once the meeting had finished, the third applicant joined the broker and the fourth applicant in the room, introduced herself as an editor of Kassensturz and explained to the broker that the conversation had been filmed. The broker replied that he had suspected as much (“Das habe ich gedacht”). The third applicant told him that he had made some crucial errors during the meeting and asked him for his views, but he refused to comment. 12.  The first and second applicants subsequently decided to broadcast part of the filmed meeting during a forthcoming edition of Kassensturz. They suggested that company X be invited to comment on the conversation and the criticism of the broker’s methods, and assured the company that his face and voice would be disguised and would therefore not be recognisable. Before the programme was broadcast, the applicants proceeded to pixelate the broker’s face so that only his hair and skin colour and his clothes could still be made out. His voice was also distorted. 13.  On 3 March 2003 the broker brought a civil action in the Zürich District Court, seeking an injunction preventing the programme from being broadcast. The action was dismissed in a decision of 24 March 2003. 14.  On 25 March 2003 the day after the application for an injunction to protect the broker’s interests had been rejected, excerpts from the meeting of 26 February were broadcast, with the broker’s face and voice disguised as planned. 15.  On 29 August 2006 the single judge for criminal cases at the Dielsdorf District Court (Canton of Zürich) found the first three applicants not guilty of intercepting and recording the conversations of others (offences under Article 179 bis §§ 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code), and the fourth applicant not guilty of the unauthorised recording of conversations (Article 179 ter § 1 of the Criminal Code). 16.  Both the Principal Public Prosecutor (Oberstaatsanwalt) of the Canton of Zürich and the broker, as an injured party, appealed against the judgment of 29 August 2006. 17.  In a judgment of 5 November 2007, the Court of Appeal (Obergericht) of the Canton of Zürich found the first three applicants guilty of recording the conversations of others (Article 179 bis §§ 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code) and of breaching confidentiality or privacy by means of a camera (Article 179 quater §§ 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code). It also found the fourth applicant guilty of unauthorised recording of conversations (Article 179 ter § 1 of the Criminal Code) and breaching confidentiality or privacy by means of a camera (Article 179 quater §§ 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code). The first three applicants were given suspended penalties of fifteen day-fines of 350 Swiss francs (CHF), CHF 200 and CHF 100 respectively, while the fourth applicant received a penalty of five day-fines of CHF 30. 18.  The applicants appealed jointly to the Federal Court against their convictions, relying in particular on the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention. They argued that their recourse to the impugned technique had been necessary to achieve the aim pursued. 19.  In a judgment of 7 October 2008, which was served on the applicants’ representative on 15 October 2008, the Federal Court allowed the appeal in so far as it concerned the charge of breaching confidentiality or privacy by means of a camera within the meaning of Article 179 quater of the Criminal Code. It held that there had been a violation of the principle that the trial must relate to the charges brought and a violation of the rights of the defence, and remitted the case to the lower court. 20.  The Federal Court dismissed the remainder of the appeal. It held that the applicants had committed acts falling under Article 179 bis §§ 1 and 2 and Article 179 ter § 1 of the Criminal Code and dismissed their defence of justification. It acknowledged that there was a significant public interest in being informed about practices employed in the field of insurance, and that this interest was liable to be weightier than the individual interests at stake. However, it considered that the applicants could have achieved their aims by other means entailing less interference with the broker’s private interests, for example by commenting on the Ombudsman’s annual reports or interviewing the Ombudsman’s staff or customers who were dissatisfied with their broker’s services. It also found that instead of filming the meeting with a hidden camera, the journalist could have drawn up a record of the conversation, although it acknowledged that the probative value of that method would obviously have been less striking. Lastly, it held that the filming of a single case was insufficient to provide reliable evidence of the scale of the alleged problems, since examples of malpractice in this field were widespread and common knowledge. The public could therefore not draw general conclusions about the quality of advice given by insurance companies from the broadcasting of an isolated example. 21.  On 24 February 2009 the Court of Appeal of the Canton of Zürich found the applicants guilty of breaching confidentiality or privacy by means of a camera, an offence under Article 179 quater of the Criminal Code. It therefore slightly reduced the penalties previously imposed on them: the first three applicants were given twelve day-fines of CHF 350 (approximately 290 euros (EUR)), CHF 200 (approximately EUR 160) and CHF 100 (approximately EUR 80) respectively, instead of fifteen day-fines, and the fourth applicant was given four day-fines of CHF 30 instead of five day-fines. The penalties were all suspended for a probationary period of two years. The applicants did not appeal against that judgment.


8. The applicant is the owner of a flat in Milan, which she had let to L.D.Z. 9.  In a registered letter of 6 June 1984, the applicant informed the tenant that she intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 29 December 1984 and asked her to vacate the premises by that date. 10.  On 11 February 1985, she served a notice to quit on the tenant, but she refused to leave. 11.  In a writ served on the tenant on 19 February 1985, the applicant reiterated her intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Milan Magistrate. 12.  By a decision of 27 February 1985, which was made enforceable on 14 March 1985, the Milan Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 27 February 1986. 13.  On 23 January 1986, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises. 14.  On 7 March 1986, she served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 18 April 1986. 15.  Between 18 April 1986 and 18 June 1992 the bailiff made 23 attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as, under the statutory provisions providing for the suspension or the staggering of evictions, the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 16.  Thereafter, the applicant decided not to pursue the enforcement proceedings, in order to avoid useless costs, given the lack of prospects of obtaining the assistance of the police. 17.  On 13 April 1996 the applicant repossessed the flat, which the tenant vacated in pursuance of an agreement reached with the applicant.


9.  The applicant, Josef Müller, is a Swiss citizen born in 1924. A businessman by profession, he resides in Zurich in Switzerland. 10.  In 1957 and 1959 the applicant acquired three adjacent properties, used for farming purposes, in Niederhasli in the vicinity of Zurich airport. The combined surfaces of the properties amount to approximately 25,500m2. During the ensuing proceedings at issue, there were, apart from an empty storehouse, no constructions on the properties. 11.  In 1966 these properties were attributed to the residential zone, and in 1984 to the commercial zone. 12.  Meanwhile, in 1983, the area of these properties was designated as pertaining to Security Zone I of Zurich airport and therefore the construction height of any new buildings was to be limited to between 21 and 38 meters. 13.  On 8 July 1983 the applicant applied to the President of the Federal Assessment Commission (Eidgenössische Schätzungskommission), requesting the institution of compensation proceedings on account of an alleged de facto expropriation (materielle Expropriation). The request was refused by the Commission in 1984 and, upon appeal, by the Federal Court (Bundesgericht) on 29 May 1986. 14.  On 7 March 1986 the applicant filed a new request for compensation which was declared inadmissible by the Commission “for the time being” (zur Zeit) on 4 February 1987 although, following the designation of new noise protection zones, the Commission decided to resume proceedings in 1988. Against both decisions the applicant filed administrative law appeals which were dismissed by the Federal Court in 1989. 15.  Meanwhile the applicant requested compensation from the Niederhasli municipality for the change in zone of his properties. The case was transmitted successively to the Federal Assessment Commission, the Dielsdorf District Council and the Government of the Canton of Zurich, which in 1990 ordered the Niederhasli municipality to institute compensation proceedings. Against this last decision the applicant filed an appeal with the Administrative Court of the Canton of Zurich, which in 1992 found that it was up to the Cantonal Assessment Commission rather than the Niederhasli municipality to conduct the compensation proceedings. These proceedings were then instituted before the Cantonal Assessment Commission, though on 30 June 1995 the Federal Assessment Commission decided to suspend the proceedings until the Federal Court had given its judgment. 16.  Meanwhile, the Federal Assessment Commission dismissed on 26 October 1990 the applicant’s request for compensation of 7 March 1986 as, inter alia, there were still adequate possibilities for the applicant to use his properties. 17.  On 6 February 1991 the applicant filed an administrative law appeal (Verwaltungsgerichtsbeschwede) with the Federal Court against this decision, requesting compensation for the depreciation in value of his properties on account of the extension and operations of Zurich airport. He also challenged all the Federal Court judges as they had previously sat in other proceedings concerning himself. 18.  By decision of 5 June 1991, the Federal Court dismissed the applicant’s challenge. 19.  The Federal Court then brought the applicant’s administrative appeal to the attention of the Government of the Canton of Zurich, which in its observations requested the court to dismiss the appeal. The Federal Assessment Commission refrained from filing observations. Upon the applicant’s request, the court authorised a further exchange of observations between the parties. 20.  On 19 August 1993 a delegation of the Federal Court visited the applicant’s properties. On that occasion he was informed that other cases concerning noise protection zones at Geneva airport raised similar problems as the applicant’s case, and that they all had to be dealt with together. 21.  On 14 March 1995 the applicant went bankrupt. The proceedings before the Federal Court were suspended and the bankruptcy office of the Küsnacht municipality was requested to inform the court whether the bankruptcy estate, or individual creditors, wished to continue the proceedings. Following an extension of the time-limit, the Küsnacht bankruptcy office filed its reply on 29 January 1997 whereupon the Federal Court resumed proceedings. On 11 March 1997 the applicant informed the court that he wished to continue the proceedings. 22.  On 4 June 1997, upon the Federal Court’s request, the Federal Agency for Examining Materials and Research (Eidgenössische Materialprüfungs- und Forschungsanstalt) submitted a report on the noise nuisance affecting the applicant’s properties. By letter dated 11 June 1997, the applicant expressed his disagreement with the report, whereas the Government of the Canton of Zurich accepted it on 26 June 1997. 23.  On 17 September 1997 the Federal Court conducted a hearing at which the applicant took the floor, complaining, inter alia, of the duration of the proceedings. The court then deliberated in public, whereby the Rapporteur (Referent) explained the legal considerations of his report and proposed to dismiss the applicant’s appeal. In the further discussion, it transpired that the other four judges shared the Rapporteur’s opinion. The presiding judge then read out the operative part of the judgment. 24.  The judgment, numbering 30 pages, was served on the applicant on 9 October 1997. The Federal Court concluded that the situation of the applicant’s properties did not warrant compensation.


5.  The applicants were born in 1956 and 1957 respectively and live in Zagreb. 6.  On 16 October 1991 the Gospić police learned that seven civilians had been killed that day in the village of Bukovac. Their bodies were transported to the Pathology Department of the Gospić Medical Centre by the members of the Croatian Army who had found them. Two of the bodies were identified as the applicants’ parents, Mile and Ana Pocrnić, and the third as their grandmother, Marija Pocrnić. An investigating judge of the Gospić County Court was informed of the killings. The investigating judge decided that it was not possible to carry out an on-site inspection because of the danger of further attacks by unidentified persons from Široka Kula. 7.  On the same day a pathologist performed an autopsy on the corpses and drew up a post-mortem report. He established that the applicants’ parents and their grandmother had been shot dead. 8.  On 28 December 1991 the Gospić police lodged a criminal complaint with the Gospić County State Attorney’s Office against persons unknown on charges of murder in connection with the killing of seven inhabitants of the Bukovac village on 16 October 1991, including the applicants’ parents, Mile and Ana Pocrnić, and their grandmother Marija Pocrnić. 9.  On 11 September 1992 the Gospić police interviewed I.P., who had been living in Podlapača, a village near Bukovac, during the critical period. On an unspecified date in December 1991 three members of the Serbian paramilitary forces, M.B., R.Š. and J.G., had fired at him, but he had escaped into the woods. While visiting one of his neighbours on 26 October 1991 he had met B. and Č., who had said that they had killed some people in Bukovac. When the police showed him photographs of some members of the Serbian paramilitary forces he recognised B.G. and Č.B. as B. and Č., the persons he had met at his neighbour’s house. 10.  On 14 September 1992 the police interviewed P.J. and I.J., who were brothers. P.J. said that he had met B.G., Č.B. and another man in a prison in Knin. When he had asked B.G. why they had been imprisoned he had told him that they had killed some civilians in Korenica. However, I.J. and P.J. thought that this had not happened in Korenica but in one of the Croatian villages near Lički Osik. 11.  On 15 September 1992 the Gospić police sent a report to the Karlovac Military Prosecutor stating that B.G. and Č.B may have been among the perpetrators of the killings in Bukovac. 12.  Immediately before the Croatian Army military action “Storm” which started on 4 August 1995, the vast majority of the Serbian paramilitary forces fled Croatia, firstly to Bosnia and then to Serbia in some cases. 13.  In 1996 the United Nations Security Council established the United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (the “UNTAES”). On 15 January 1998 the UNTAES mandate ceased and the transfer of power to the Croatian authorities began. 14.  On 19 March 1996 the second applicant handed the police a letter sent to her by her relative D.P. 15.  In 2001 the police interviewed the second applicant. 16.  On 23 August 2001 the Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order (Služba za zaštitu ustavnog poretka) sent a report to the Ministry of Justice and the Gospić County State Attorney’s Office on the killing of the applicants’ parents and grandmother, allegedly by members of the Serbian paramilitary forces. The report stated that the only survivors who had any information about the killings were D.P. and J.P., who both lived in Canada. A letter of 19 March 1996, drafted by D.P., was also enclosed, as well as a letter drafted by D.P. and his father J.P. on an unspecified date and sent to the Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order. D.P. alleged that on 16 October 1991 a group of members of the Serbian paramilitary forces from Široka Kula had come to their village, Bukovac, and killed several people. He named D.L., M.Su., M.O., D.V., M.Se., Bo.K., Da.M., N.M., Du.M., Br.K., Ma.U., S.G., Mi.U. and T.G. as those personally known to him. He openly named commanders of various formations of these forces as: P.R., M.O., S.Č. or Ɖ., Mi.Se. and M.K. The only survivors had been himself and his parents. They had been taken from Bukovac to a prison in Korenica. His mother had died in the meantime while he and his father J.P. had emigrated to Canada after the war. 17.  On 1 October 2001 the Gospić County State Attorney’s Office lodged a request for an investigation with the Gospić County Court and asked that D.P. and J.P. be heard as witnesses. 18.  On 15 January 2004 the police interviewed S.Ɖ. and D.S., former members of the Serbian paramilitary forces, in the Zagreb Prison Hospital. S.Ɖ. said that a formation of Serbian paramilitary forces under the command of Mi.S. and D.L. had carried out “actions”, inter alia, in the area of Bukovac. He named several members of that formation. D.S. described various actions in which members of Serbian paramilitary forces had killed civilians in Croatian villages in the broader area of Široka Kula and Lički Osik, including Bukovac, but had no information about the killing of the applicants’ relatives. 19.  On 23 January 2004 the police interviewed B.Č., also a former member of the Serbian paramilitary forces, who described various actions in which members of Serbian paramilitary forces had killed civilians in Croatian villages in the broader area of Široka Kula and Lički Osik, including Bukovac, but had no information about the killing of the applicants’ relatives. 20.  On 2 May 2006 an investigating judge of the Gospić County Court asked the Gospić County State Attorney’s Office whether they still insisted on interviews with D.P. and J.P. since their address was “uncertain”. On 29 June 2006 the investigating judge asked the Gospić Counter-Information Service for the address of D.P. and J.P. On 9 August 2006 the Centre provided the investigating judge with the address of D.P. and J.P. in Canada. 21.  On 16 September 2008 the Department for War Crimes of the Ministry of the Interior sent a detailed report about the possible suspects to the Ličko-senjska Police Department. 22.  On 16 July 2010 the Gospić County State Attorney’s Office sent a report to the State Attorney’s Office on the killing of seven civilians in Bukovac in 1991. The Gospić County Court had informed them that the Canadian Ministry of Justice had invited D.P. and J.P. on three occasions to give their statements, which they had refused to do with the explanation that they had already given their statements in writing. They had almost certainly been referring to a letter to their relatives in Croatia and the one sent to the Service for the Protection of the Constitutional Order. 23.  On 14 September 2010 an investigating judge of the Gospić County Court heard evidence from M.Ć., who confirmed that members of the Serbian paramilitary forces had captured D.P. in 1991. As to the killing of the seven persons in Bukovac, he had heard about that from one I.K., who had died in the meantime. 24.  On 24 October 2011 the police interviewed M.P., I.J. and P.J. M.P. had no relevant information about the killing of the civilians in Bukovac. I.J. and P.J. repeated their earlier statements (see paragraph 10 above). 25.  On 25 October 2011 the police again interviewed I.P., who repeated his statement of 11 September 1992 (see paragraph 9 above). On the same day the police also interviewed N.P., a neighbour of I.P., who admitted that B.G. and Č.B. had visited him in 1991 but said that they had not mentioned the killing of civilians in Bukovac. 26.  On 26 October 2011 the police noted that in March 2011 B.G. and Č.B. had been convicted of war crimes in connection with the killing of R.’s family in Lički Osik, Croatia, and sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment by a court in Belgrade. 27.  In 2011 the police interviewed the second applicant again. 28.  On 20 January 2011 the police interviewed D.M., one of the Croatian soldiers who had found the bodies in Bukovac. He had no relevant information about the killing of the civilians in Bukovac. 29.  On 21 January 2011 the police interviewed B.Č., a former member of the Serbian paramilitary forces. He repeated his earlier statement (see paragraph 19 above). 30.  On 22 August 2011 the Belgrade Interpol Office informed the Zagreb Interpol Office that one of the suspects, D.V., had been placed in pre-trial detention in connection with a different set of criminal proceedings. He had in the meantime become a Serbian citizen. 31.  On 2 February 2012 the Ličko-senjska Police Department sent a report to the Karlovac County State Attorney’s Office informing it that two of the persons mentioned in D.P.’s letter (see paragraph 14 above), namely D.L. and M.S., had died. A report drawn up by M.Š., a member of the Serbian paramilitary forces was enclosed. It stated that on 16 October 1991 “they had killed seven people”. A list of the members of the paramilitary forces from the Teslingrad area was also enclosed. 32.  On 21 September 2012 the Rijeka County State Attorney’s Office sent a criminal complaint against B.G. and Č.B. to the Serbian Prosecutor for War Crimes and asked him for the address of another suspect, M.Š., indicating that he should be questioned about the report he had allegedly drawn up on the events of 16 October 1991 in Bukovac. 33.  On 28 January 2013 the Rijeka County State Attorney’s Office forwarded a report on the interviews with B.G., Č.B. and M.Š., carried out by the Serbian authorities, to the Ličko-senjska Police Department. They denied any involvement in the killing of the applicants’ relatives. 34.  Between 21 February and 5 March 2013 the Ličko-senjska Police Department interviewed P.J., I.J., D.P., M.P., I.P. and N.P., M.P. and D.P. had no relevant information about the killing of the applicants’ relatives. The others repeated their earlier statements. 35.  On 27 February and 8 March 2013 the Ličko-senjska Police Department sent a report to the Rijeka County State Attorney’s Office listing the suspected perpetrators of the killings in Bukovac on 16 October 1991. Four of them had died, fourteen had moved to Serbia, three to the United States and in respect of two of them there was no relevant information. 36.  On 15 March 2013 the Rijeka County State Attorney’s Office sent the report of 8 March 2013 to the Serbian Prosecutor for War Crimes and asked him to interview the suspects living in Serbia. 37.  In April 2013 the police learned that one of the suspects, I.S., had died.


4.  The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Rostov-on-Don. 5.  In 1986 the applicant took part in the cleaning-up operation at the Chernobyl nuclear disaster site. He was subsequently granted Category 2 disability status and became entitled to various social benefits. The subjects of the present case are the disputes concerning these benefits. 6.  In 1996 the applicant lodged a complaint before the Proletarskiy District Court of Rostov-on-Don alleging a failure of the authorities to comply with the pension law. On 24 July 1996 the District Court upheld the complaint, noting the authorities' unlawful inactivity. 7.  On 18 November 1997 the Proletarskiy District Court upheld the applicant's action against the authorities and awarded him monthly payments of 2,495,023 Russian roubles (RUB) in compensation for health damage and as food allowance. The District Court also awarded him a lump sum of RUB 47,314,000 in outstanding compensation. The judgment was not appealed against and became final. The authorities did not pay the applicant the lump sum, and made the monthly payments only until September 2000. 8.  On 15 March 2001 the Presidium of the Rostov Regional Court, by way of supervisory-review proceedings, quashed the judgment of 18 November 1997 and remitted the case for re-examination to the Proletarskiy District Court. 9.  The hearings were adjourned on 14 May 2001 and on 7 June 2001 due to the authorities' failure to appear. 10.  The next hearing was fixed for 5 July 2001 when it was again postponed as the applicant had amended his claims. 11.  On 17 September 2001 the applicant lodged additional claims. 12.  On 24 September 2001 the court granted the authorities' request for stay in the proceedings on the grounds that there were pending related proceedings in the Supreme Court of Russia and in the Constitutional Court of Russia. The proceedings in the Constitutional Court had been initiated by the applicant (see para. 60 below). The applicant appealed against the decision to stay the proceedings, to no avail. 13.  On 24 October 2002 the case was reopened and assigned for hearing for 21 November 2002. 14.  On 21 November 2002 the authorities failed to appear and the proceedings were adjourned. 15.  On 10 December 2002 the Proletarskiy District Court accepted the applicant's claims in part. It ordered that the Social Security Services should pay him a lump sum of RUB 37,992.75 in compensation for health damage, monthly payments of RUB 4,850 and a lump sum of RUB 5,000 in compensation for damage caused by a delay in the payment of monthly benefits. The District Court also noted that the amount of monthly payments was to be index-linked in accordance with the law. The judgment was upheld on appeal and became final on 7 May 2003. 16.  In 2003 the authorities, as well as the applicant, requested reopening of the proceedings by way of supervisory review. 17.  On 13 November 2003 the Presidium of the Rostov Regional Court quashed the judgments of 10 December 2002 and 7 May 2003 and sent the case for a fresh examination. The Presidium held that the lower court had not calculated the sums of compensation and adjustment of monthly payments in accordance with the relevant law provisions, considering it as mistakes in implementation of substantive, as well as procedural, law. 18.  On 18 December 2003 the authorities failed to appear in court and the hearing was adjourned. 19.  On 23 January 2004 the applicant specified his claim. 20.  On 12 February 2004 the case was postponed as the authorities were not properly informed about the hearing. 21.  On 26 February 2004 the authorities failed to appear and the hearing was adjourned. 22.  On 4 March 2004 the examination of the case was postponed as the judge was considering another case. 23.  On 1 April 2004 the case was adjourned because of default in appearance of the applicant. 24.  On 22 April 2004 the Proletarskiy District Court dismissed the applicant's action in full. The applicant appealed. However, on 29 April 2004 the District Court adjourned the examination of the appeal because the applicant had only submitted a short version of his appeal statement. On 7 June 2004 the Rostov Regional Court quashed the decision of 29 April 2004 as unlawful. 25.  The applicant contested the accuracy of the minutes of the hearing of 22 April 2004. On 29 April 2004 the Proletarskiy District Court dismissed the claim without consideration on the merits. The applicant appealed and on 7 July 2004 the Rostov Regional Court quashed the decision of 29 April 2004 and remitted the matter for fresh consideration. On 2 September 2004 the applicant's claim concerning the minutes was dismissed on the merits. 26.  On 13 October 2004 the Rostov Regional Court, acting on appeal, quashed the judgment of 22 April 2004 and remitted the case for a fresh examination. 27.  On 16 November 2004 the case was assigned to examination for 30 November 2004. On that date the applicant asked the court to request some documents from the defendant. The hearing was adjourned to 21 December 2004. 28.  Upon the applicant's requests the subsequent hearings were adjourned until 16 February 2005. 29.  On 16 February 2005 the case was adjourned due to the absence of a prosecutor. 30.  On 2 March 2005 the case was not tried again due to the applicant's failure to appear. 31.  On 24 March 2005 the District Court partly upheld the applicant's action and awarded him a lump sum of RUB 45,919.02 in outstanding compensation for health damage, monthly payments of RUB 3,857.94 in compensation for health damage and RUB 6,000 in compensation for damage caused by a delay in payment of monthly sums. Thus, as compared with the quashed final judgment of 18 November 1997, the court awarded a lesser lump sum but higher monthly payments. 32.  On 7 July 2005 the Rostov Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. 33.  As to the enforcement of the judgment, the monthly payments were made regularly and the lump sum was transferred to the applicant's account by 30 November 2005. 34.  On 15 February 2006 the Proletarskiy District Court of Rostov-on-Don granted the applicant's request and quashed the judgment of 24 March 2005 as upheld on 7 July 2005 due to newly-discovered circumstances. 35.  On 28 February 2006 and on 28 March 2006 the applicant unsuccessfully requested suspension of the proceedings as the same claims were considered by another court (see para. 46 below). 36.  On 17 April 2006 the Proletarskiy District Court of Rostov-on-Don discontinued the proceedings as the applicant failed to appear before the court and did not request the case to be tried in his absence. 37.  In August 2000 the applicant lodged an action against the Federal Treasury complaining that the lump sum awarded under the judgment of 18 November 1997 had never been paid to him. He sought compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. 38.  On 14 December 2000 the Leninskiy District Court stayed the proceedings because the President of the Rostov Regional Court had lodged an application for a supervisory review of the judgment of 18 November 1997. 39.  The decision of 14 December 2000 was quashed on appeal on 6 March 2001 and the proceedings were resumed. 40.  On 4 June 2003 the Leninskiy District Court disallowed the applicant's action against the Treasury. That decision was quashed on 9 July 2003 and the action was sent to the District Court for an examination on its merits. 41.  On 6 October 2003 the Leninskiy District Court dismissed the applicant's action on the ground that the judgment of 18 November 1997 had been quashed by way of supervisory review on 15 March 2001 and that on 10 December 2002 the applicant had obtained another judgment in his favour. On 12 November 2003 the Rostov Regional Court upheld the judgment of 6 October 2003. 42.  In September 1999 the applicant brought proceedings against authorities demanding adjustment of his monthly payments. 43.  On 22 May 2000 the Leninskiy District Court of Rostov-on-Don dismissed the applicant's action. The judgment was upheld on appeal and became final on 11 October 2000. 44.  On 13 February 2006 the applicant requested the case to be reopened due to newly discovered circumstances. 45.  On 30 March 2006 the Leninskiy District Court granted the claim and quashed the judgment of 22 May 2000. 46.  After the resumption of the proceedings the applicant amended his claims several times. Eventually he claimed damages for the delays in payments and failures to adjust them, making the claims similar to those considered in another case (see para. 35 above). 47.  On 17 January 2007 the Leninskiy District Court granted the applicant's claims in part. It made the relevant adjustments and awarded the applicant compensation for the underpaid sums in the amount of RUB 231,065.39, monthly payments of RUB 7,766.51 and yearly payments of RUB 2,387.32. 48.  On 14 May 2007 the Rostov Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal. 49.  The monthly payments were made without delay. As to the lump sum, it was received by the applicant in November 2007. 50.  In July 2000 the applicant lodged another action seeking adjustment of his monthly payments to take account of increases of the minimum monthly wage. 51.  On 27 October 2000 the Leninskiy District Court upheld the action. That judgment was quashed on appeal on 21 August 2002 and the case was remitted for a fresh examination. 52.  On 4 October 2002 the District Court dismissed the claims in full. On 25 December 2002 the Rostov Regional Court upheld the judgment. 53.  In September 2000 the authorities, by a unilateral decision, reduced the amount of monthly payments to the applicant. Two months later he lodged an action against the authorities complaining about the reduction and seeking compensation for damage. 54.  On 13 December 2000 the Pervomayskiy District Court of Rostov‑on-Don held that the authorities the applicant sued were not the proper respondent and disallowed the action against them. However, the District Court ordered another authority, the local Social Security Service, to join the proceedings as a respondent party and to resume payments of monthly sums to the applicant in accordance with the judgment of 18 November 1997. 55.  On 28 January 2001 the Rostov Regional Court, acting on appeal, upheld the judgment of 13 December 2000 in the part concerning the disallowance but quashed the remaining part of the judgment and sent the matter for a fresh examination. 56.  On 15 November 2001, as a result of the re-examination, the District Court dismissed the applicant's claims in full. The applicant did not appeal. 57.  The applicant lodged an action before the Pervomayskiy District Court asking for information to be disclosed about local judges who had not been provided with housing premises in accordance with the law. By the final judgment of 19 December 2001 the Rostov Regional Court dismissed the action, noting that the information was confidential. 58.  In 2001 the applicant unsuccessfully asked the authorities to provide him with information concerning the representation of their interests in courts. He complained about the refusal to a court. 59.  On 19 December 2001 the Rostov Regional Court, in the final instance, dismissed the complaint, noting that the applicant's rights and freedoms had not been infringed by the refusal. 60.  On 24 January 2001 the applicant brought proceedings before the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation claiming unconstitutionality of some of the law provisions concerning payments for disability caused by the Chernobyl nuclear disaster. 61.  On 19 June 2002 the Constitutional Court found the provisions constitutional, thus rejecting the applicant's claim. At the same time it noted that by these norms the State took an obligation to make the relevant payments within a specified period of time. It underlined, with the reference to the practice of the European Court of Human Rights, that when an award is made by a final judgment, it should be enforced without delay. 62.  The applicant, relying on the decision of 19 June 2002 of the Constitutional Court, asked the Pervomayskiy District Court to review its final judgment of 15 November 2001 due to newly discovered circumstances. 63.  On 18 February 2002 the District Court dismissed the request. That decision became final on 7 May 2003 when the Rostov Regional Court upheld it on appeal.


6.  The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Zagreb. She has suffered since her early childhood from cerebral palsy and uses a wheel chair. In 1968 she was deprived of her legal capacity on account of “her physical illness and intellectual underdevelopment”. On 10 July 1979 her legal capacity was fully restored by a ruling of the Zagreb Municipal Court. 7.  On 12 November 2009 the Pešćenica Social Welfare Centre (hereinafter “the Centre”) asked the Zagreb Municipal Court to institute proceedings with a view to partially depriving the applicant of her legal capacity in order to prevent her from disposing of her assets. They relied on a previous ruling of 1968 by the same court by which the applicant had been deprived of her legal capacity (see the preceding paragraph). They further asserted that the applicant had been suffering from “grave bodily damage” (velika tjelesna oštećenja) since early childhood, as she had been diagnosed with cerebral palsy and various chronic illnesses such as diabetes, high blood pressure and defective eyesight. 8.  They further asserted, relying on a statement given by the applicant’s son at the Centre and a report by the Centre’s social worker, that the applicant’s condition had worsened after she had undergone an operation on her head on 9 September 2008. Since then she had suffered from personality changes, manifested in managing her money in an irrational manner, such as by not paying the monthly instalments for the purchase of her flat, electricity, water and other bills, and by purchasing mobile telephone cards instead of food. This could have led to the applicant’s eviction from the flat she occupied, as she had already received a final warning that a civil action in that respect was to be lodged. 9.  The Centre’s request was supported by evidence, such as an electricity bill of 27,625.70 Croatian kunas (HRK) dated 30 March 2009, a copy of a final demand for payment of monthly instalments for the purchase of the applicant’s flat, with the debt amounting to HRK 8,290.25 as at 7 March 2009, a notice that the water supply for the applicant’s flat would be stopped as of 25 May 2009 on account of non-payment of a debt in the amount of HRK 4,447.42, and a debt recovery notice for the amount of HRK 451.70 payable to Croatian Radio and Television (HRT). 10.  On 28 October 2009 the Centre appointed its employee, Ms J.T., as the applicant’s legal guardian in the proceedings before the Zagreb Municipal Court. In the proceedings before that court the guardian gave her full consent to the Centre’s application. The applicant was represented by a lawyer of her own choosing. 11.  The Municipal Court heard the applicant on 24 March 2010 and established that:
“The respondent was found at her address in a wheelchair. She gave very meaningful answers; [she] stressed that she acted autonomously, kept her flat tidy, prepared her meals and was provided with help by her son and a tenant. She moved about independently in her wheelchair and did her own shopping, [and] paid [her own] bills, which gave rise to difficulties during winter. She stated that in the period when she had underwent a head surgery in September [2008], she had been late with paying her utility bills ... She did not agree with the proceedings [being brought] and considered that she did not need a guardian. She stressed that she regularly took [her] prescribed medication ... It is to be noted that the respondent was presentable and her home was tidy.” 12.  In her written submissions the applicant explained that during her hospitalisation she had empowered her son to retrieve money from her bank account and pay the utility bills, which he had not done but had instead taken the money for himself. She asked that her son be examined by the court. 13.  A psychiatric report commissioned for the purposes of the proceedings, drawn up on 12 April 2010 by D.P. and G.M., in so far as relevant reads as follows:
“A psychiatric examination of the respondent was carried out on 3 April 2010 at her home ... She stated that she had completed elementary school and had been an average pupil, that she had studied law for one year and knew all about the law. To me she said: ‘You know how it was when you operated on me.’ She is dissatisfied with the court proceedings [being brought]: ‘I dislike the Pešćenica [Social Welfare Centre] because they attempted to send me to [a home in] Novi Marof.’ And in respect of her son she said: ‘I am sorry when someone blackmails him’. She stated that she had been paying all her bills and that ‘I previously had a huge negative [balance], [because] I had to pay for the hospital’. She stated that she had a lot of acquaintances who were her former lodgers, whom she saw regularly when out and about in her wheelchair in her neighbourhood and ‘they all respect me’. Upon a direct question she denied having any mental problems.
Psychological status: conscious, contact easily established, uncertain about time, in other respects well oriented. Has a wide and viscous (viskozni) thought process, with loss of determining tendency. Interacts without distance. In thought content confabulatory with a paranoid position, projections and infantile explanation. Basic disposition is elevated. Intellectually – memory functions are primarily insufficient at the LMR level, additionally compromised with psychoorganic type. Lacks insight into her condition.
Marija Ivinović suffers from MB. Little, parapresis spast., monoparesis ext. sup. spast. sin., LMR, condition after brain haemorrhage, condition after stroke, condition after meningoencephalitis, with a lack of insight into her condition [and] the need for and purpose of treatment. Owing to this, she is not able to entirely look after her personal needs, rights and interests. Also, because of her state of health and lack of insight she may jeopardise the rights and interests of others.” 14.  On 19 May 2010 the applicant lodged written submissions whereby she objected to the psychiatrists’ findings, stating that it was not clear how they had concluded that she was unable to properly dispose of her money, given that the debts referred to had been incurred by her son when she had been hospitalised. 15.  At a hearing held on 21 October 2010 the psychiatrists gave the following opinion evidence:
“We entirely endorse our written report of 3 April 2010 and to the objections filed by the respondent we would state the following: on the basis of the enclosed medical records, social history and our own examination we have established that the respondent suffers from Morbus Littlee. She also suffers from triparesis with preserved functions of her right hand, mild mental retardation, and conditions following a brain haemorrhage and meningoencephalitis. Her intellectual capabilities are, owing to the above-mentioned [conditions], additionally compromised on the psychoorganic type. During the interview we noticed confabulations in the content of her thoughts, that is to say fabricated content, a paranoid position, in particular as regards her close family and the employees of the social welfare centre, and infantile explanation. The respondent lacks insight into her condition. All this led us [to conclude] that the respondent does not possess sufficient intellectual capacity to adequately protect her own rights and interests, and because of her lack of insight she might also jeopardise the rights and interests of others. We therefore consider that the application for deprivation of the respondent’s legal capacity as regards disposing of her money and assets and as regards taking decisions about her medical treatment, is appropriate.” 16.  On 21 October 2010 the Zagreb Municipal Court partially deprived the applicant of her legal capacity, thereby stopping her from disposing of her money and other assets and from making independent decisions concerning her medical treatment. The ruling relied exclusively on the opinion given by the two psychiatrists and extensively repeated their findings stated in their written report and their oral evidence given at the hearing of 21 October 2010. 17.  The applicant lodged an appeal on 11 November 2010, in which she argued that partially depriving her of her legal capacity solely on the basis of the psychiatric report had not been justified, because the psychiatrists had lacked knowledge of how she spent her money and how she disposed of her assets. She argued that she had purchased the flat where she lived herself and there was no danger that she would give it up. The assertion that she was paranoid as regards her close family members was not correct. She had had troubled relations with her son at times because he had moved into her flat with his girlfriend and her daughter and had had an interest in having her removed from the flat and placed in a home. Therefore, she had successfully sought their eviction from her flat. She had also changed her bank and her son no longer had authority to use her credit card. She lived a peaceful life, and was a member of the Association of Disabled Persons with Cerebral Palsy and Poliomyelitis. The court conducting the proceedings had had the chance to establish that normal communication with her was possible and that she lived in a tidy flat. The Centre had not proven the need for her to be partially deprived of her legal capacity. Only a bookkeeping expert could have established the facts concerning her debts. 18.  The applicant’s appeal was dismissed by the Bjelovar County Court on 26 January 2012, which again relied extensively on the psychiatric report. The appeal court added that the applicant had been hospitalised between 9 and 25 September 2008 and 23 October and 13 November 2008, whereas the unpaid bills (see paragraph 9 above) were dated 9 April 2009 (electricity bill of HRK 27,625.70), 18 March 2009 (HRK 8,290.25 in monthly instalments for the purchase of the flat) and 22 May 2009 (water bill of HRK 4,477.42), which indicated that the debts concerned a much longer period than the applicant’s hospitalisation. 19.  The applicant then lodged a constitutional complaint, in which she repeated the arguments from her appeal, stressing that the debts in question had been incurred during the period in which she had been hospitalised and her son had had her bank card. Instead of paying her bills he had used the money from her account for his own needs. She added that only one of the psychiatrists who had drawn up the report on her mental state had interviewed her. She also stressed that it was entirely unclear what rights and interests of others she might jeopardise. The complaint was dismissed by the Constitutional Court on 13 June 2012.


4.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Bratislava. 5.  On 30 December 1997 the applicant’s wife stopped living with the applicant. She moved to her parents’ house together with her and the applicant’s son who was born on 4 July 1995. 6.  On 20 March 1998 the applicant sought the determination of his right to meet his son. His wife counter-claimed that the applicant should be prohibited from meeting the boy. 7.  On 8 June 1998 the applicant requested the Bratislava III District Court to issue an injunction granting him the right to meet his son every weekend.  On 7 July 1998 the District Court dismissed that request. On 29 October 1998 the court of appeal upheld that decision. It noted that the request was premature as no decision had yet been given as regards the custody of the child. 8.  On 29 June 1999 the Bratislava III District Court granted a divorce to the applicant and his wife. The latter was given custody of their son and the applicant was obliged to contribute to his maintenance. 9.  On 28 July 1999 the applicant, with reference to the above judgment, informed the District Court that he wished to withdraw his action. His former wife withdrew her counter-claim. The Bratislava III District Court therefore discontinued the proceedings on 21 October 1999. 10.  In an action filed on 18 January 2000 before the Bratislava III District Court the applicant claimed the right to meet his son. 11.  A hearing was held on 4 May 2000. On 24 May 2000 the child’s mother counter-claimed that the applicant should be prohibited from meeting their son on the ground that the applicant drank and had behaved in an aggressive manner. At a hearing held on 15 June 2000 the District Court decided to examine jointly the claims of both parents. 12.  On 13 July 2000 neither the child’s mother nor her lawyer appeared before the District Court. The mother did not appear on 17 August 2000 either, and the District Court imposed a procedural fine on her. On 11 September 2000 the police informed the court that they had been unable to serve a document on the applicant’s former wife in person. 13.  A hearing was held on 5 October 2000. 14.  On 16 October 2000 the Bratislava III District Court appointed an expert and instructed her to submit an opinion. 15.  On 3 November 2000 the court requested the applicant to pay an advance on the expert’s fee. The applicant paid the sum on 21 June 2001. 16.  On 6 April 2001 the expert asked to be excused from the case as she was ill. 17.  On 17 April 2001 the District Court excused the expert. At the same time it appointed a different expert and instructed her to submit an opinion within thirty days. 18.  On 2 July 2001 the new expert asked to be excused as she could not assess the case in an impartial manner. 19.  On 1 August 2001 another person was instructed to submit an expert opinion. On 12 September 2001 that person informed the court that he no longer worked as a court expert. According to a note of 16 October 2001 drafted by the judge dealing with the case, the person in question was still registered as an expert. 20.  On 24 September 2001, in reply to the applicant’s complaint, the president of the Bratislava Regional Court admitted that there had been undue delay in the proceedings between November 2000 and the beginning of April 2001. Otherwise, the judge had dealt with the case in an orderly manner, holding hearings at regular intervals. 21.  On 12 November 2001 a fourth expert was appointed. On 22 March 2002 the court urged the expert to submit an opinion. It was submitted on 9 April 2002. 22.  On 29 April 2002 the applicant appealed against the decision of 12 April 2002 concerning the expert’s fees. The appeal was submitted to the Regional Court on 15 May 2002. The Regional Court dismissed the appeal on 5 August 2002. 23.  At the hearing held on 12 November 2002 the District Court heard the expert. The applicant requested that the expert be excluded from the case on grounds of bias. On 12 December 2002 the District Court requested the expert to comment on the applicant’s request. The expert replied on 31 December 2002. On 27 January 2003 the District Court found that the expert was not biased. The applicant appealed on 17 February 2003. 24.  In the meantime, on 15 January 2003 the applicant appealed against the District Court’s decision of 19 December 2002 on the expert’s fees. 25.  On 12 February 2003 and on 25 April 2003 the applicant made further written submissions to the District Court. 26.  In February 2003 the case was submitted to the Regional Court for a decision on the applicant’s appeals against the above-mentioned procedural decisions. 27.  On 25 March 2003 the child’s mother sought an interim measure ordering the applicant to abstain from any contact with their son. She submitted that the applicant had attacked her and the boy on their way to school. 28.  On 27 March 2003 the District Court asked the Regional Court to return the file to it so that it could decide on the request for an injunction. 29.  On 6 May 2003 the Regional Court returned the file to the District Court after it had upheld the first-instance decisions challenged by the applicant. 30.  On 7 May 2003 the District Court asked the expert to answer additional questions. The court dismissed the mother’s request for an injunction. The decision stated that extensive expert evidence was being taken with a view to establishing in a reliable manner whether or not the applicant’s contacts with the child could threaten the latter’s physical and mental health. At that time, it had not yet been established that the injunction which the mother sought to obtain was required to protect the interests of the child.
The child’s mother appealed on 20 May 2003.
On 28 November 2003 the Regional Court in Bratislava upheld the first-instance decision. It underlined that the mother’s fear of the applicant’s negative impact on the child did not, as such, justify the injunction requested. The court also noted that, because of the mother’s behaviour, the applicant had been unable to participate in the education of his son. 31.  On 12 May 2003 the District Court appointed a guardian to represent the child in the injunction proceedings. On the same day the file was sent to the Constitutional Court which dealt with the applicant’s complaint about the length of the proceedings. The file was returned to the District Court on 5 June 2003. 32.  On 18 June 2003 an administrative authority submitted observations to the District Court. 33.  As indicated above, on 28 November 2003 the court of appeal upheld the decision of 7 May 2003 on the mother’s request for an injunction. The file was returned to the District Court on 14 January 2004. 34.  On 6 February 2004 the District Court asked the applicant to explain one of his earlier submissions. The applicant replied on 18 February 2004. Between 24 February 2004 and 16 March 2004 the case was submitted to the court of appeal. The latter found that no request for the exclusion of the judge of the first-instance court had been filed. 35.  On 21 April 2004 the District Court found that the expert was not to be excluded. 36.  On 21 May 2004 the District Court ordered the assessment of the applicant’s mental health. The expert’s opinion was submitted on 22 November 2004. On 3 February 2005 the opinion was sent to the parties. On the same day the expert who had submitted an opinion on 9 April 2002 was requested to supplement it. On 1 March 2005 that expert informed the court that the child’s mother had refused to co-operate with him. Subsequently, the mother and the child appeared before the expert and he submitted his opinion on 11 May 2005. The opinion was sent to the parties on 17 May 2005. 37.  The District Court scheduled a hearing in the case for 30 May 2006. 38.  The Court has received no information about any further development in the case. 39.  On 7 February 2003 the applicant complained to the Constitutional Court about undue delays in the Bratislava III District Court proceedings. He requested that the Constitutional Court find as follows:
“The Bratislava III District Court violated the applicant’s right under Article 48(2) of the Constitution to a hearing without unjustified delay in proceedings 26 P 9/00.
[The Constitutional Court] awards the applicant 1.2 million Slovak korunas by way of just satisfaction as well as 120,000 Slovak korunas for costs and expenses.”
In the reasons for his complaint the applicant also mentioned Article 8 of the Convention submitting that he had been prevented from meeting his son for more than five years. However, as the applicant did not include this particular complaint in the text of the finding which he requested the Constitutional Court to make, the relevant domestic law prevented the Constitutional Court from expressing its view on that issue (see paragraphs 46-48 below). 40.  On 17 September 2003 the Constitutional Court found that the applicant’s right under Article 48(2) of the Constitution had not been violated. 41.  The Constitutional Court held, in particular, that the case was complex. The applicant had contributed to the length of the proceedings in that he had repeatedly challenged the expert and the decisions on the expert’s fees, thus prolonging the period for an overall period of nine months. The Constitutional Court also took into account that the applicant had belatedly paid the advance on the expert’s fees. 42.  As to the conduct of the District Court, the Constitutional Court held that the judge had displayed due diligence when dealing with the case. The length of the proceedings was substantially due to difficulties in obtaining an expert opinion. However, the fact that the three experts appointed were unable to submit an opinion could not have been foreseen and no unjustified delays could be imputed to the District Court on that account. The fact that the judge had not urged the first expert to submit the opinion after the expiry of the time-limit set could not affect the position.


7.  The first applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Joensuu. He is a member of the Finnish Bar. The other 17 applicants were his clients at the relevant time (“the client applicants”). 8.  On 26 January 1999 the police conducted a search – it is not entirely clear of which premises – based on the suspicion that the first applicant's clients X and Y (not client applicants before the Court) had committed aggravated debtor's fraud. In the course of that search X managed to destroy the original of a promissory note which the police had attempted to seize and which may have been relevant to the financial arrangements underlying the suspected offence. 9.  At the time the first applicant's status in the investigation had been that of a witness. On 22 February 1999 the police requested him to attend for questioning in this capacity. This request was apparently cancelled before he had taken any action thereon. 10.  A police officer in charge of the criminal investigations granted a search warrant and on 2 March 1999 seven officers of the National Bureau of Investigation (keskusrikospoliisi, centralkriminalpolisen), assisted by a tax inspector and an enforcement official (ulosottomies, utmätningsman), searched the first applicant's law office, flat and vehicles. This search warrant was likewise based on the suspicion that X and Y had committed aggravated debtor's fraud but the first applicant was now indicated as a suspect, namely that he had aided and abetted the offences by drafting certain documents. 11.  Under the terms of the warrant the search aimed at examining “the documents, computers and archives of the law office” as well as the first applicant's flat and vehicles “so as to investigate the share transactions by the limited liability company [H.] in 1998 and to find material relating to those transactions”. 12.  During the search of his law office all of the first applicant's client files were allegedly perused. The police also examined all floppy disks and examined his note books pertaining to his meetings with clients. In addition, the hard disks in the office computers were copied: two were copied on the spot and two computers, including the one used by the first applicant himself, were seized for later disk-copying on police premises. Those computers were returned on 4 March 1999. 13.  The first applicant's computer also contained software for electronic mail, including his private and professional messages. 14.  A fellow member of the Bar assisted the first applicant during part of the search. 15.  On 4 March 1999 the first applicant requested the District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätten) of Joensuu to revoke the seizure as being unlawful. On 24 March 1999 the court nevertheless maintained it, noting that the first applicant was suspected of aiding and abetting aggravated debtor's dishonesty. 16.  On 11 May 1999 the Court of Appeal (hovioikeus, hovrätten) of Eastern Finland upheld the District Court's decision and on 25 November 1999 the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen) refused the first applicant leave to appeal. 17.  On 4 May 1999 the police certified the return of three of the four hard disks and that they had destroyed any copies thereof. They stated however that they would retain a copy of the fourth hard disk until the lawfulness of the seizure had been finally decided or until the material could be destroyed for any other reason. 18.  In June 1999 three of the applicants (nos. 2-3 and 8) requested the District Court to revoke the seizure of the copy of the fourth hard disk (which contained material relating to their instructions to the first applicant) and to order the police to compensate their costs. They argued that the seizure had been unlawful from the outset. At any rate, the copy in question was of no relevance to the pre-trial investigation concerning X and Y. 19.  In its rejoinder the National Bureau of Investigation referred to the Court of Appeal's decision of 11 May 1999 in which the seizure had been found lawful. Moreover, the hard disks had only been subjected to a targeted search and they were able to search information concerning only relevant companies and individuals. Only the potentially relevant client files in the law office had been perused. The search and seizure had thus not been of wholesale nature. The tax and enforcement officials who had witnessed the search had been – and remained – under a duty to keep secret any information thereby obtained. 20.  On 17 June 1999 the District Court agreed with the three client applicants and ordered that the copy of the fourth hard disk be returned. It rejected, as not being based on law, the applicants' claim for compensation in respect of their costs. The applicants appealed on this point, whereas the police appealed against the revocation order. 21.  In its submissions to the Court of Appeal the National Bureau of Investigation listed the contents of the copied hard disk. For example, specific mention was made of what appears to have been the promissory note which the police had been looking for (and had found). The submissions indicated the debtor's and the creditor's names as well as the amount of the debt. The National Bureau of Investigation furthermore explained that the material on the relevant hard disk had been copied to a so-called optical disk which could in any case not be returned as it also contained internal police data. The submissions by the Bureau were apparently not ordered to be kept confidential. 22.  On 27 January 2000 the Court of Appeal declined to examine the parties' appeals, considering that the matter had been resolved res judicata in the first set of proceedings ending with the Supreme Court's decision of 25 November 1999. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to the three client applicants in question. 23.  On 3 March 2000 the public prosecutor charged, among others, X and Y with aggravated debtor's dishonesty but decided to press no charges against the first applicant, having found no evidence of any crime. 24.  On 20 April 2001 the Supreme Court ruled that although a final decision had already been rendered in respect of another appellant, it did not prevent the courts from examining similar appeals filed by other parties. The case was referred back to the Court of Appeal which, on 4 October 2001, revoked the District Court's decision on the basis that the seizure had been lawful. 25.  The three client applicants in question were again granted leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. On 18 October 2002 it revoked the seizure in so far as it pertained to information which those applicants had given to the first applicant. 26.  The Supreme Court found it undisputed that the copied hard disk contained information relating to the three client applicants' instructions to the first applicant. It had not been argued that this information was not protected by counsel's secrecy obligation under Chapter 17, section 23 of the Code of Judicial Procedure. Nor did the information in question pertain to any suspicion that the first applicant or any one else had committed a crime. 27.  The Supreme Court accepted that the police had been entitled by Chapter 4, section 1 of the Coercive Measures Act (pakkokeinolaki, tvångsmedelslagen 450/1987) to seize the first applicant's hard disk and make a copy thereof. Technical reasons and practical needs (the fact that the police had been obliged at the time of the search to copy the whole hard disk) did not however permit any deviation from the prohibition on seizure of privileged material. The police should therefore have returned the computer files immediately or destroyed them. The appellants were awarded reasonable compensation for their costs and expenses. 28.  On 11 November 2002 the Chief Enforcement Officer of Vantaa confirmed that the copy of the hard disk had been destroyed on that day. 29.  On 22 August 2003 the Deputy Chancellor of Justice (valtioneuvoston apulaisoikeuskansleri, justitiekansleradjointen i statsrådet) issued his decision in response to a petition by the Finnish Bar Association concerning, inter alia, the alleged unlawfulness of the coercive measures against the first applicant. He found it established that the tax inspector and the enforcement official had attended the search in their respective capacity as a witness and expert. He nevertheless concluded, inter alia, that from the point of view of foreseeability of domestic law, as required by Article 8 of the Convention, the relationship between the Coercive Measures Act (Chapter 4, section 2, subsection 2), the Code of Judicial Procedure (Chapter 17, section 23, subsection 1 (4)) and the Advocates Act (section 5 c) was somewhat unclear and permitted very diverging interpretations as to the extent to which privileged material could be subject to search and seizure. The Deputy Chancellor therefore requested the Ministry of Justice to consider whether there was a need to amend the relevant legislation.


4.  The applicant was born in 1934 and lives in Oberalm. 5.  On 16 March 1994 the applicant requested legal aid as he intended to bring an action for damages against M.L., a lawyer who had represented him in previous civil proceedings. On an unspecified date the applicant withdrew his request. 6.  The applicant, now represented by E.H., a lawyer appointed by him, brought an action against M.L. for damages on 30 November 1994. 7.  On 3 January 1995 the Salzburg Regional Court summoned the applicant for a hearing, scheduled for 6 February 1995. However, on 16 January 1995 the Salzburg Regional Court cancelled the hearing and interrupted proceedings, as the competent Hallein District Court needed to examine the question whether a guardian should be appointed for the applicant. In the decision it noted that as early as 1984 the applicant had suffered from psychosis and a guardian had been appointed. Guardianship had been terminated in June 1987. 8.  On 23 January 1995 the applicant filed a motion challenging judge S., the judge of the Regional Court dealing with the civil proceedings against M.L., for bias. The Regional Court returned the motion to the applicant. On 13 February 1995, as it did not carry the signature of a lawyer. 9.  On 8 June the Hallein District Court provisionally appointed a guardian for the applicant. On 13 September 1995 the Regional Court set the applicant a time-limit of fourteen days for re-submitting the motion of 23 January 1995 signed by his lawyer, otherwise it would be deemed that he had withdrawn his motion. 10.  The applicant again applied for legal aid for the proceedings against M.L. on 23 October 1995. The Regional Court, on 9 November 1995, informed the applicant that his request for legal aid would be transmitted to E.H., who had meanwhile been appointed the applicant’s provisional guardian, for signature. E.H. signed the request on 15 November 1995. 11.   Judge S. commented on the applicant’s motion challenging him for bias on 16 November 1995 and, on 23 November 1995, the Salzburg Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s motion of 23 January 1995. The applicant appealed. 12.  On 19 January 1996 the District Court discontinued the guardianship proceedings against the applicant. According to an expert opinion obtained he was capable of understanding his actions and their consequences. 13.  By decision of 11 April 1996 the Linz Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the Regional Court’s decision of 23 November 1995. On 9 May 1996 the Regional Court dismissed a further motion challenging the judge for bias. On 8 January 1997 the Linz Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s motion challenging judge S. for bias. 14.  The applicant requested the Salzburg Regional Court to resume the proceedings against M.L. and to schedule a hearing on 19 March 1997. On 1 April 1997 the applicant requested under Section 91 of the Court Act (“section 91 request”), to the Salzburg Regional Court, that a time-limit be set for deciding upon his request for legal aid. 15.  The President of the Regional Court, referring to the applicant’s section 91 request, informed him on 23 April 1997 that, after his motion challenging the judge for bias had finally been dismissed, Judge S. could take further steps in the proceedings. 16.  On 30 May 1997 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s request for legal aid, finding that the applicant had sufficient means to afford assistance by a lawyer. On 12 June 1997 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s request for legal aid in order to appeal against the decision of 30 May 1997, as no representation by a lawyer in such proceedings was necessary. 17.  On 30 September 1997 the applicant made a section 91 request, asking that a time-limit for scheduling a hearing be set. He submitted that he was not represented by a lawyer. 18.  On 20 November 1997 the applicant deposited a folder of documents with the Regional Court. On the next day the Regional Court returned the folder to the applicant, informing him that evidence could only be properly submitted by counsel representing him in the proceedings and in conformity with the rules of the code of civil procedure. 19.  The Salzburg Regional Court, on 10 December 1997, ordered the applicant to re-submit his section 91 request, properly signed by a lawyer. He was also informed that in future submissions made by him personally would no longer be taken into account. 20.  On 29 January 1998 a newly-appointed lawyer, S.K., requested the Regional Court to resume the proceedings against M.L., as after the Hallein District Court’s decision of 19 January 1996 there was no longer a justification for interrupting the proceedings. Thereupon, on 3 February 1998, the Regional Court scheduled a hearing for 1 April 1998. On 1 April 1998 the hearing took place. The Regional Court held further hearings on 9 June 1998 and 8 July 1998. 21.  On 10 July 1998 the Salzburg Regional Court gave a judgment in the proceedings against M.L.. It granted a part of the applicant’s claim and dismissed the remainder. 22.  The applicant appealed on 21 September 1998 and the opposing party replied on 28 October 1998. The Court of Appeal held a hearing on 7 July 1999, in which the applicant, assisted by his counsel, was heard. 23.  On 7 July 1999 the Linz Court of Appeal gave a partial judgment (Teilurteil). It confirmed the Regional Court’s judgment in so far as it had granted the applicant’s claim and modified the Regional Court’s further decision, holding that 50% of the applicant’s further claim was well-founded in substance (dem Grunde nach) but further proceedings had to be conducted to assess the amount due. 24.  The applicant informed the Regional Court on 8 November 1999 that he had withdrawn the power of attorney from his lawyer S.K. and at the same time he requested legal aid. On 22 November 1999 the applicant, at the time not represented by counsel, brought an action for the reopening of the proceedings against the judgment of the Linz Court of Appeal of 7 July 1999. He submitted that one of the documents on which he had relied in these proceedings had actually been forged by him and as this changed the material facts, proceedings should be reopened. 25.  On 18 February 2000 the applicant made a section 91 request for a time-limit to be set for a decision on his request for legal aid concerning his action for reopening the proceedings. 26.  On 10 April 2000 the applicant was granted legal aid and on 21 April 2000 K.R. was appointed his ex officio lawyer. On 3 May 2000 K.R. re-submitted the action for reopening of the proceedings and the section 91 request. 27.  By decision of 30 August 2000 the Supreme Court dismissed an extraordinary appeal on points of law by the applicant against the partial judgment of the Linz Court of Appeal of 7 July 1999. 28.  The applicant’s lawyer informed him on 9 October 2000 that the Regional Court had scheduled a hearing for 22 November 2000. This hearing was subsequently adjourned to 13 February 2001. On 16 November 2000 the defendant M.L. replied to the action for reopening of the proceedings. 29.  On 20 February 2001 the applicant himself made a section 91 request in proceedings against M.L., complaining that the hearing had been adjourned at the request of counsel for the opposing party, which in his view led to an undue prolongation of the proceedings, and that a time-limit for scheduling a hearing should be set. 30.  On 22 February 2001 K.R. informed the applicant that he had agreed to the adjournment request by the opponent party’s lawyer. K.R. informed the applicant on 5 March 2001 that the section 91 request had now been transmitted to him for signature and that he would only sign it on the express instruction of the applicant. On 7 March 2001 the applicant instructed his lawyer to do so, arguing that otherwise he would not be awarded compensation in future proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights. 31.  Judge S. commented on the section 91 request on 21 March 2001. He stated that the hearing had been adjourned with the consent of both parties’ representatives and must therefore be considered vexatious. 32.  On 18 May 2001 the Salzburg Regional Court dismissed the action for reopening of the proceedings. On 20 August 2001 the applicant, represented by K.R., appealed against the refusal to reopen the proceedings. On 24 September the opposing party replied. 33.  By decision of 16 April 2002 the Linz Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the Regional Court’s refusal of 18 May 2001 to reopen the proceedings. It granted, however, an ordinary appeal on points of law against that decision, as it considered that there was no case-law on the question whether a reopening could be based on the ground that forged documents had been used, if such an argument had been raised by a plaintiff who had forged the relevant document himself. On 2 May 2002 the applicant lodged an extraordinary appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court. 34.  On 11 July 2002 the Supreme Court dismissed the extraordinary appeal on points of law. This decision was served on K.R. on 2 September 2002. 35.  In the ongoing proceedings following the partial judgment of the Court of Appeal of 7 July 1999 the Regional Court held hearings on 9 January and 11 April 2003. Meanwhile, on 14 January 2003, the applicant modified his claims. 36.  On 5 April 2004 the applicant made a further section 91 request, complaining that on 11 April 2003 the oral proceedings had been closed but up to then no written judgment had been issued. 37.  By decision of 19 April 2004 the Salzburg Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s further claims against M.L. by final judgment (Endurteil). On 11 May 2004 the applicant appealed and on 9 June 2004 the opposing party replied. On 14 July 2004 the Linz Court of Appeal did not grant the applicant’s appeal, but reduced the award of procedural costs to the opposing party. 38.  Meanwhile, on 22 June 2004 the applicant brought a further action for reopening of proceedings. On 31 August 2004 the Linz Court of Appeal corrected clerical errors in its judgment of 14 July 2004. 39.  On 22 September 2004 the applicant lodged an extraordinary appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court, which the latter rejected as inadmissible on 21 October 2004. 40.  On 1 March 2005 the applicant made a criminal deposition (Anzeige) against Judge S. On 21 April 2005 the Salzburg Public Prosecutor’s Office refused to open criminal proceedings against Judge S. On 9 May 2005 the Review Chamber (Ratskammer) of the Salzburg Regional Court rejected an appeal by the applicant against this decision. 41.  By decision of 22 June 2005 the President of the Salzburg Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s motion challenging Judge S. for bias. It noted that the Regional Court had given its judgment on 19 April 2004, the Court of Appeal had decided on 14 July 2004 and the Supreme Court on 21 October 2004. The applicant’s challenge of 1 March 2005 was therefore belated. The applicant filed a motion challenging Judge S. for bias because he considered the judgment arbitrary, but he could have raised this critique in appeal proceedings.
The applicant’s detention on remand 42.  The applicant remained in detention on remand from 14 May to 14 July 1999 on suspicion of having uttered dangerous threats. On 18 June 1999 the Salzburg Regional Court convicted him of this offence and sentenced him to eight months’ imprisonment, of which six months were suspended. 43.  During his detention on remand a hearing was scheduled by the Court of Appeal in the civil proceedings against M.L.. The applicant submits that when he was brought from his cell to the courtroom he was handcuffed. 44.  On 30 December 1999 the applicant complained to the Salzburg Independent Administrative Panel (Unabhängiger Verwaltungssenat) about the handcuffing and claimed compensation. On 1 February 2000 the IAP rejected the application as inadmissible. It found that the measure at issue was taken in the course of criminal proceedings before ordinary courts (namely the proceedings against him for uttering dangerous threats) and was not imputable to an administrative authority, so the IAP did not have jurisdiction.


7.  The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Kurgan. 8.  In 2002 the criminal proceedings were brought against the applicant. On 19 May 2003 he was acquitted by the Kurgan Regional Court (“the Regional Court”). That acquittal was upheld on appeal by the Supreme Court of Russia and became final. 9.  The applicant lodged a claim for compensation. On 22 October 2003 the Kurgan Town Court partly allowed that claim and awarded the applicant 5,000 Russian roubles (RUB), this sum was equal to approximately 140 euros (EUR) at the material time. The award was payable from the federal budget. 10.  The judgment of 22 October 2003 was upheld on appeal by the Regional Court on 11 December 2003 and thus became final. Writ of execution was issued. 11.  On 17 February 2004 the court bailiffs returned the writ of execution to the applicant who was advised to address himself directly to the Ministry of Finance in Moscow. He apparently did so. 12.  On 17 February 2005 the Director of Legal Department at the Ministry of Finance wrote to the applicant assuring him that the final judgment of the Town Court of 22 October 2003 in his favour had been in the course of being enforced. 13.  That judgment remains unenforced.


6.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Celje. She is an advocate practising in Celje. 7.  In 2001, the applicant was representing M.Š. in civil proceedings for compensation for injuries which M.Š. had allegedly sustained in a physical attack by the defendant. The proceedings were conducted before the Domžale Local Court sitting in a formation of a single judge. The judge in the case was Judge M., a Ljubljana Higher Court judge who had been temporarily appointed to the local court. 8.  It appears from the transcript of the hearing of 28 November 2001 that the applicant was not permitted to ask the defendant certain questions as they were considered suggestive by Judge M. Her proposal that a witness be heard was also rejected, as this evidence was not considered necessary by the judge. 9.  On 28 November 2001 the Domžale Local Court delivered a judgment rejecting M.Š.’s claim for compensation. 10.  On 27 December 2001 the applicant’s client appealed. In the appeal statement drafted by the applicant, Judge M. was criticised for not putting on record some of his procedural decisions and for not including the applicant’s client’s statements in full. It stated, inter alia:
“It would be reasonable to expect that the judge of a higher court would explain before the trial hearing why it is he who is presiding over this case which ... is being considered at first instance; this is what the judicial code of behaviour would expect him to do. However, the judge was trampling on that code of behaviour by behaving arrogantly and chewing gum during the hearing, and by covering his mouth while talking.
On 28 November 2001 proceedings were held before the Domžale Local Court following the principle of the inquisitorial system. The transcript of the hearing shows that [the proceedings] were not carried out in accordance with the Civil Procedure Act.... The judge, despite requests, did not include in the transcript the statements and messages which were given by the plaintiff or her representative...
The judge asked the plaintiff whether she understood the Slovenian language, and she confirmed that she did. However, he then chewed gum during the interview, so that the plaintiff could not understand him.
Following this superficial evidence-taking, the judge, without deciding on the other requests for evidence, concluded the hearing. For that reason, the facts of the case were wrongly and insufficiently established...” 11.  On 26 May 2004 the Ljubljana Higher Court upheld the appeal in the part concerning compensation for bodily injuries. However, it rejected the complaints concerning the alleged procedural defects and inaccuracy of the transcript of the hearing. In particular, the court found that the transcript had been signed by the parties without objection and that none of the parties had challenged the impartiality of the judge by instituting proceedings to that effect. 12.  On 8 January 2002 Judge M., having received the appeal against his judgment of 28 November 2001, issued a decision fining the applicant 150,000 Slovenian tolars (SIT) for contempt of court for her statements in the appeal. It stated that the fine should be paid within fifteen days. The decision reads as follows:
“In the above civil case, the plaintiff’s representative Alenka Pečnik, attorney, lodged an appeal against judgment no. P 107/97 of this court. In the appeal she gravely insults the presiding judge by stating that he was trampling on the judicial code of behaviour by behaving arrogantly, chewing gum and covering his mouth while communicating with those present at the hearing, and that the proceedings were conducted on an inquisitorial basis. These are insulting and invented allegations and for that reason a monetary fine has been imposed on the plaintiff’s representative on the basis of section 109 read together with section 11, paragraphs 3 to 7, of the Civil Procedure Act. The monetary fine for the attorney can be set up to SIT 1,000,000. Since the present case involves a grave insult, the court considers that the appropriate penalty should be SIT 150,000.” 13.  On 29 January 2002 the applicant lodged an appeal, alleging an incorrect application of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as “the CPC”) and an incorrect assessment of the facts. In particular, she stated that her statements were true and were not intended to insult the judge but to describe the atmosphere during the hearing, where the judge had repeatedly raised his voice. She also stated that her client was not a native speaker of Slovenian and had been unable to understand the judge because of his behaviour. She claimed that her remarks had been taken out of context, and submitted statements by her client and a witness in support of her allegations. 14.  In her appeal the applicant also requested that the venue of the proceedings be changed, as Judge M. was a judge of the Ljubljana Higher Court, which would normally have had jurisdiction to decide the appeal. Her request was upheld and the case was transferred to the Koper Higher Court. 15.  On 8 April 2003 the Koper Higher Court rejected the applicant’s appeal. If found that although the impugned decision relied on statements which had been taken out of context, these statements were indeed insulting and the tone of the appeal in question was in any event inappropriate. The fact that the applicant tried to tone down the impugned allegations in her appeal undermined her credibility and supported the first-instance court’s conclusion that the allegations were invented. Finally, the Koper Higher Court found that the applicant could have defended her client’s interest by using proper language, without insults. 16.  On 12 May 2003 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal. Citing Articles 14, 21, 22 and 23 of the Constitution, the applicant complained that she had been convicted of contempt of court in proceedings which had been unfair and biased. In her submission, it was unacceptable that a judge who felt personally affected by the impugned statements could convict her and impose a penalty, which could be converted to imprisonment. Furthermore, no evidence apart from that provided by the judge himself was examined in the proceedings, and the Higher Court rejected the appeal by relying merely on the statements of the judge. The applicant alleged that the purpose of the statements she had made in the appeal at issue was to draw attention to the inappropriate behaviour of the presiding judge. These were statements of fact, and were supported by the transcript of the hearing and witness statements. They were not made with the intention of humiliating the presiding judge but in defence of her client’s interests. 17.  On 27 May 2003 the applicant paid the fine. 18.  Declaring the appeal admissible on 26 October 2004, the Constitutional Court delivered its decision on the merits on 27 October 2005. Referring to its conclusion concerning judicial impartiality in the decision of 23 June 2005 (see paragraph 21 below), the Constitutional Court found (by five votes to four) that the applicant’s right to an impartial tribunal had not been violated. The Constitutional Court then reviewed the reasons for sentencing the applicant given by the lower courts. It agreed with the lower courts that the applicant’s statements did not represent a legitimate exercise of a lawyer’s duty to defend her client’s interest. It noted that a judicial decision could always be criticised in a way that did not involve an attack on the reputation of the judiciary or a personal attack on a particular judge.


5.  Between 1 March 2005 and 21 September 2011 the applicant was held in remand prison IZ-42/2 in the Kemerovo Region. The prison was overcrowded. Thus, cell 219 measuring 36 sq. m was designed for 12 and housed up to 18 individuals. Since October 2011 the applicant was isolated from the other detainees and kept in virtually solitary confinement conditions. In addition, the applicant claimed that on several occasions he had been beaten by prison wardens. 6.  From 12 June to 7 September 2005, from 29 October to 27 November 2009 and from 7 to 15 December 2010 the applicant was transferred from the remand prison to a prison hospital to undergo medical treatment. 7.  It appears that the applicant complained to the regional prosecutor about the conditions of his detention in the remand prison. On an unspecified date he received the prosecutor’s reply and challenged it before courts. 8.  On 28 April 2011 the Kuznetskiy District Court of Novokuznetsk rejected the applicant’s claims. 9.  On 21 June 2011 the Kemerovo Regional Court upheld the above judgment on appeal.