6.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Paris. 7.  On 21 June 2005 the French first-instance court of Paris pronounced the divorce of the applicant and his wife, Ms K.O., a Hungarian national. It granted the parents joint custody of their daughter, born in October 2000, and placed her with the mother, regulating the applicant’s access rights. At that time, the mother and the child lived in Paris. This decision was upheld by the second-instance French court on 29 November 2006. 8.  Meanwhile, on 19 September 2005, Ms K.O. filed a criminal complaint against the applicant with the French authorities, alleging that he had sexually abused their child. She further requested the suspension of the applicant’s custody and access rights. However, in the absence of any evidence supporting her allegations, the complaint was dismissed on 2 November 2005. 9.  On 29 December 2007, the mother took the child to Hungary for the holidays. The applicant was aware of this. However, in a letter dated 5 January 2008 she informed the applicant that she had enrolled their daughter in a Hungarian school without his consent, with no intention to return her to France. 10.  On 12 March 2008 the applicant brought an action against the mother before the Hungarian Pest Central District Court. He requested the court to establish the abduction of their child by the mother and to order her to return the child to him, relying on Council Regulation (EC) no. 2201 of 2003 concerning Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Matrimonial Matters and Matters of Parental Responsibility (“EC Regulation on Recognition of Judgments”) and the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“Hague Convention”). The District Court established that the habitual residence of the child was in France, because she had the centre of her life there. Moreover, it observed that having had joint custody over their daughter, neither parent could have decided on the habitual residence of the child without the approval of the other parent. The District Court ordered a forensic expert examination of the parties and their daughter. The expert report concluded that abuse or indecency against the child had not been probable and therefore there were no reasons to disregard the obligation to order her return based on Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention. Thus, on 30 May 2008 this court established the abduction of the child and ordered the mother to take her back to France by 6 June 2008, or to hand her over to the applicant in Hungary on 10 June 2008. 11.  On 2 September 2008 the Budapest Regional Court upheld the District Court’s decision, but established that the time-limit to return the child back to France was 27 September 2008, or 1 October 2008 for handing her over in Hungary. (For the execution of this judgment, see heading 3 below.) 12.  The mother lodged a petition for review of the final decision with the Supreme Court, which shared the Regional Court’s view that the legal conditions for the child’s continued stay in Hungary were absent. It assessed forensic psychology reports and concluded that the child was still emotionally attached to her father as well, thus her return to France would not cause her serious trauma. On 18 November 2008 the Supreme Court therefore upheld the Regional Court’s decision. 13.  Following the final judgment delivered by the Regional Court (see paragraph 11 above), the Pest Central District Court ordered the enforcement of the judgment for the return of the child on 15 October 2008. 14.  On 29 October and 26 November 2008 the bailiff unsuccessfully called on Ms K.O. to comply voluntarily with the court order. 15.  On 5 December 2008 the bailiff referred the case file to the Heves District Court in order for it to establish the method of enforcement. 16.  On 17 December 2008 the mother requested the suspension of the enforcement proceedings. The request was dismissed by the Hungarian Heves District Court on 19 December 2008. It further ordered her to pay a fine of 50,000 Hungarian forints (HUF) (approximately 180 euros (EUR)) and warned her to comply with her obligations. It pointed out that the court could not review an enforceable decision. This decision was upheld by the Heves County Regional Court on 12 February 2009. 17.  Upon the bailiff’s request, the mother’s living conditions were examined by the Guardianship Authority. The attempts to promote the mother’s voluntary compliance with her obligations were without success. 18.  Moreover, Ms K.O. initiated an action before the Pest Central District Court to have the enforcement proceedings terminated. The District Court dismissed her action on 14 January 2009. 19.  On 27 April 2009 the Heves County Regional Court ordered the enforcement of the child’s return with police assistance. The decision became final on 18 June 2009. 20.  On 20 July 2009 the bailiff invited the mother to ensure the child’s return during the on-site proceedings to be effected on 29 July 2009. 21.  In the meantime, on 31 March 2009 the first-instance court of Paris had issued a European arrest warrant against Ms K.O. for the offence of change of custody of a minor. On 27 July 2009 she was arrested in Hungary. 22.  On 28 July 2009 the mother was released by the Budapest Regional Court, which refused to enforce the European arrest warrant. It observed that criminal proceedings were pending against Ms K.O. before the Hungarian authorities for the same act (see paragraphs 40–41 below), which rendered the European arrest warrant obsolete. 23.  On 29 July 2009 the bailiff attempted to hold on-site proceedings, which were unsuccessful as Ms K.O. and her daughter had absconded. The Heves Police Department declared them missing and issued a warrant. 24.  On 19 October 2009 the bailiff effected on-site proceedings at the primary school of the child and established that the child had not attended the classes during the school year. 25.  On 28 October 2009 the bailiff attempted to locate the mother and the child in Eger. However, it was recognised that the address given was non-existent. With police assistance, he searched all potential buildings in the neighbourhood, without success. 26.  Moreover, the police authority carried out regular inspections at the mother’s registered address (on 10, 13, 14, 23 September 2009, 14 January and 18 February 2010) in order to detect potential contact between the mother and her parents. 27.  On 17 February 2010 the bailiff ordered the stay of the enforcement proceedings as the mother and the child were staying at an unknown location. 28.  In the spring of 2010, following a request for mutual legal assistance made by the investigating judge of the French appellate court, the authorities gathered information on the mother from telecommunication providers, contacted Ms K.O.’s former employer, the Mayor’s Office of the registered place of her residence, and heard several witnesses. 29.  The Police Headquarters also monitored the database of the National Health Insurance Fund in order to obtain data as to any potential medical service provided for the mother or the child. 30.  The child’s school was also being monitored. Exemption from class attendance was granted by the school principal on 23 November 2009. It was established that the child failed to appear at exams scheduled for 4 June and 18 August 2010. 31.  The Eger Police Headquarters regularly (on 1, 4, 13 September, 15 October 2009, 20 January, 19 February, 19 March, 24 April, 27 May, 22 June and 25 July 2010) checked the public areas and places as well as the mother’s former address in Eger as, according to certain information, the mother is allegedly residing in Eger. 32.  To date, these measures have not led to locating Ms K.O. or her daughter. 33.  On 15 April 2008 the Paris Court of Appeal issued a certificate concerning the applicant’s access rights established by the French decision of 29 November 2006 (see paragraph 7 above) based on Article 41(2) of the EC Regulation on Recognition of Judgments. 34.  The applicant thereafter requested the Hungarian Eger District Court to enforce his access rights. The case was transferred to the competent guardianship authority on 29 April 2008. The Gyöngyös District Guardianship Authority dismissed his request on 23 May 2008. It established its lack of jurisdiction, relying on Article 10 of the EC Regulation on Recognition of Judgments, as proceedings concerning the child’s abduction were pending before the Pest Central District Court (see paragraph 10 above). 35.  On 12 January 2009 the Heves County Prosecutor’s Office raised an objection against this decision, finding it unlawful. It relied on Article 41 of the EC Regulation on Recognition of Judgments, arguing that the Guardianship Authority not only had jurisdiction, but also a legal obligation to enforce the applicant’s access rights. It therefore proposed that the Guardianship Authority’s decision be quashed. 36.  The Gyöngyös District Guardianship Authority did not accept this proposal and submitted it for review to the North-Hungarian Regional Administrative Office, which shared the Guardianship Authority’s opinion establishing lack of jurisdiction. The applicant sought judicial review of this decision before the Heves County Regional Court. On 27 May 2009 the court dismissed the applicant’s action, finding that it would legalise the child’s unlawful retention in Hungary by enforcing his access rights and would be contrary to Article 16 of the Hague Convention. 37.  The applicant’s access rights have not been respected ever since. 38.  At the applicant’s request, but in Ms K.O.’s absence, the French first-instance court of Créteil issued a preliminary injunction placing the child with the applicant and granting him exclusive custody rights on 14 April 2008. 39.  In 2009 the applicant initiated proceedings before the Eger District Court for the recognition of this judgment in Hungary. Following a remittal, the case is currently pending before the Heves Country Regional Court. 40.  On 1 June 2009 the applicant filed a criminal complaint with the Eger District Public Prosecutor’s Office against the mother. Relying on section 195(4) of the Criminal Code, he considered that Ms K.O. was guilty of endangering a minor due to not having complied with a final judgment obliging her to hand over their daughter to him. 41.  The Heves County Public Prosecutor’s Office dismissed the complaint on 24 June 2009. It considered that the constitutive elements of the crime had not been fully present as the mother should have been fined for not respecting access rights. However, the fine imposed on her (see paragraph 16) served to enforce her obligation to hand over the child to the applicant. 42.  In the meantime, in the autumn of 2008 the applicant had filed a criminal complaint with the Hungarian authorities for change of custody of a minor, based on section 194 of the Criminal Code. On 29 September 2009 the Heves District Public Prosecutor’s Office ordered investigations. However, finding that no enforceable decision existed concerning exclusive custody of the child, it terminated the investigations on 8 January 2010. The applicant’s appeal was dismissed. 43.  On 14 January 2009 the applicant submitted a complaint to the European Commission, claiming a violation of the Regulation (EC) no. 1393/2007 on the Service in the Member States of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (“EC Regulation on Service of Documents”), the EC Regulation on Recognition of Judgments and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. On 3 November 2009 the Commission issued a letter of formal notice to the Hungarian authorities concerning the possible violation of the EC Regulation on Recognition of Judgments. Reply to the letter of formal notice was submitted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs in December 2009. The proceedings are still pending. 44.  This Regulation entered into force on 1 March 2005 (with the exception of Denmark) and has direct effect in the Member States of the European Union, including Hungary.
Article 1 - Scope
“1. This Regulation shall apply, whatever the nature of the court or tribunal, in civil matters relating to:
...
(b) the attribution, exercise, delegation, restriction or termination of parental responsibility. 2. The matters referred to in paragraph 1(b) may, in particular, deal with:
(a) rights of custody and rights of access”
Article 2 - Definitions
“For the purposes of this Regulation: 11. the term "wrongful removal or retention" shall mean a child’s removal or retention where:
(a) it is in breach of rights of custody acquired by judgment or by operation of law or by an agreement having legal effect under the law of the Member State where the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and
(b) provided that, at the time of removal or retention, the rights of custody were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention. Custody shall be considered to be exercised jointly when, pursuant to a judgment or by operation of law, one holder of parental responsibility cannot decide on the child’s place of residence without the consent of another holder of parental responsibility.”
Article 10 - Jurisdiction in cases of child abduction
“In case of wrongful removal or retention of the child, the courts of the Member State where the child was habitually resident immediately before the wrongful removal or retention shall retain their jurisdiction until the child has acquired a habitual residence in another Member State and:
(a) each person, institution or other body having rights of custody has acquiesced in the removal or retention;
or
(b) the child has resided in that other Member State for a period of at least one year after the person, institution or other body having rights of custody has had or should have had knowledge of the whereabouts of the child and the child is settled in his or her new environment and at least one of the following conditions is met:
(i) within one year after the holder of rights of custody has had or should have had knowledge of the whereabouts of the child, no request for return has been lodged before the competent authorities of the Member State where the child has been removed or is being retained;
(ii) a request for return lodged by the holder of rights of custody has been withdrawn and no new request has been lodged within the time limit set in paragraph (i);
(iii) a case before the court in the Member State where the child was habitually resident immediately before the wrongful removal or retention has been closed pursuant to Article 11(7);
(iv) a judgment on custody that does not entail the return of the child has been issued by the courts of the Member State where the child was habitually resident immediately before the wrongful removal or retention.”
Article 11 - Return of the child
“1. Where a person, institution or other body having rights of custody applies to the competent authorities in a Member State to deliver a judgment on the basis of the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (hereinafter "the 1980 Hague Convention"), in order to obtain the return of a child that has been wrongfully removed or retained in a Member State other than the Member State where the child was habitually resident immediately before the wrongful removal or retention, paragraphs 2 to 8 shall apply. ... 3. A court to which an application for return of a child is made as mentioned in paragraph 1 shall act expeditiously in proceedings on the application, using the most expeditious procedures available in national law.
Without prejudice to the first subparagraph, the court shall, except where exceptional circumstances make this impossible, issue its judgment no later than six weeks after the application is lodged. ... 8. Notwithstanding a judgment of non-return pursuant to Article 13 of the 1980 Hague Convention, any subsequent judgment which requires the return of the child issued by a court having jurisdiction under this Regulation shall be enforceable in accordance with Section 4 of Chapter III below in order to secure the return of the child.”
Article 21 - Recognition of a judgment
“1. A judgment given in a Member State shall be recognised in the other Member States without any special procedure being required.”
Article 23 - Grounds of non-recognition for judgments relating to parental responsibility
“A judgment relating to parental responsibility shall not be recognised:
...
(c) where it was given in default of appearance if the person in default was not served with the document which instituted the proceedings or with an equivalent document in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable that person to arrange for his or her defence unless it is determined that such person has accepted the judgment unequivocally; ...”
Article 40 - Scope
“1. This Section shall apply to:
(a) rights of access;
and
(b) the return of a child entailed by a judgment given pursuant to Article 11(8).”
Article 41 - Rights of access
“1. The rights of access referred to in Article 40(1)(a) granted in an enforceable judgment given in a Member State shall be recognised and enforceable in another Member State without the need for a declaration of enforceability and without any possibility of opposing its recognition if the judgment has been certified in the Member State of origin in accordance with paragraph 2.
Even if national law does not provide for enforceability by operation of law of a judgment granting access rights, the court of origin may declare that the judgment shall be enforceable, notwithstanding any appeal.”
Article 42 - Return of the child
“1. The return of a child referred to in Article 40(1)(b) entailed by an enforceable judgment given in a Member State shall be recognised and enforceable in another Member State without the need for a declaration of enforceability and without any possibility of opposing its recognition if the judgment has been certified in the Member State of origin in accordance with paragraph 2.
Even if national law does not provide for enforceability by operation of law, notwithstanding any appeal, of a judgment requiring the return of the child mentioned in Article 11(b)(8), the court of origin may declare the judgment enforceable.”
Article 47 - Enforcement procedure
“1. The enforcement procedure is governed by the law of the Member State of enforcement. 2. Any judgment delivered by a court of another Member State and declared to be enforceable in accordance with Section 2 or certified in accordance with Article 41(1) or Article 42(1) shall be enforced in the Member State of enforcement in the same conditions as if it had been delivered in that Member State.”
Article 60 - Relations with certain multilateral conventions
“In relations between Member States, this Regulation shall take precedence over the following Conventions in so far as they concern matters governed by this Regulation:
(e) the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.” 45.  Hungary acceded to this Convention on 7 April 1986, promulgating it in Law-Decree no. 14 of 1986.
Article 12
“Where a child has been wrongfully removed or retained ... and, at the date of the commencement of the proceedings before the judicial or administrative authority of the Contracting State where the child is, a period of less than one year has elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or retention, the authority concerned shall order the return of the child forthwith. ...”
Article 13
“Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if the person, institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that -
...
b)  there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.”
Article 16
“After receiving notice of a wrongful removal or retention of a child in the sense of Article 3, the judicial or administrative authorities of the Contracting State to which the child has been removed or in which it has been retained shall not decide on the merits of rights of custody until it has been determined that the child is not to be returned under this Convention or unless an application under this Convention is not lodged within a reasonable time following receipt of the notice.” 46.  According to section 172(1) of the Act, the obligor is first called to voluntarily fulfil his or her obligation within a given deadline. In case of non-compliance, the bailiff immediately submits the case file to the competent court in order to determine the method of enforcement.
The possible methods of enforcement are governed by section 174 of the Act and include the possibility to impose a fine up to HUF 500,000 which may be renewed. Moreover, the court may order the enforcement with police assistance. In such cases, the bailiff sets a date for the on-site proceedings and informs the competent guardianship authority, the obligor, the applicant and the police. If the child to be returned cannot be found at his or her place of residence, the bailiff orders a search warrant.


5.  The applicant was born in 1930 and lives in Ljubečna. 6.  On 14 February 2000 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against her brother before the Ljubljana District Court seeking the reimbursement of costs for taking care of their mother, which in accordance with a signed agreement was a shared responsibility of both. 7.  On 8 July 2000 the first-instance court held an opening hearing. 8.  On 3 October 2002 a hearing was held and a judgment delivered. The applicant’s request was rejected. She appealed. 9.  On 22 January 2003 the Ljubljana Higher Court delivered a judgment and remitted the case for re-examination. 10.  On 29 May 2003 a hearing was cancelled on the request of the applicant. 11.  Between 16 June 2003 and 6 October 2003 two hearings were held. At the last hearing the first-instance court delivered a judgment upholding the applicant’s request in part. An appeal was lodged. 12.  On 2 March 2005 the Ljubljana Higher Court delivered a judgment upholding the first-instance judgment in part and remitting the question on the amount of interests for re-examination. 13.  On 5 July 2005 a hearing was cancelled on the request of the applicant, since the defendant had paid the amount due. 14.  On 12 July 2005 the first-instance court issued a decision on partial withdrawal of the claim and on the amount of costs of proceedings. An appeal was lodged. 15.  On 6 October 2005 the Ljubljana Higher Court upheld the appeal. The decision was served on the applicant on 10 November 2005.


5.  The applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Chişinău. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  The applicant was a victim of a work accident in 1984. He was rendered 100% unfit to work and was found to be in the first degree invalidity category. The employer, The National Institute of Vineyards and Wine (“the NIVW”), was obliged by law to pay him monthly invalidity benefit. After the introduction of the new national currency the amount of benefit was set at approximately 18 euros (EUR) per month and had risen to approximately EUR 50 per month by 2003. He also receives a small State pension. 8.  From 1996 the NIVW stopped paying the compensation and the applicant accumulated a significant debt to public utility companies. He initiated court proceedings to oblige the employer to resume payment of the benefit and to recover benefit for the entire period due. According to the Government, the employer did not have sufficient information about the applicant during the period 1996-2001 and this was the reason for discontinuing the payments. The applicant submitted a copy of his complaint to NIVW regarding the discontinuation of the payments dated January 1998 and the NIVW's two letters in response, according to the last of which (March 1998) the payment of the benefit had been suspended because of lack of funds. The applicant also complained to various authorities in 2000 about the NIVW's failure to pay. In a letter dated 2 August 2000 the deputy Minister of Agriculture and Food Processing assured the applicant that his benefit would soon be paid. 9.  On 11 April 2001 the Ciocana District Court accepted the applicant's claims and awarded him 23,921 Moldovan lei (MDL) (the equivalent of EUR 2,076 at the time) in respect of compensation due to him to that date. It ordered the NIVW to pay the court fees. No appeal was lodged and the judgment became final and enforceable 15 days later. The court then issued a warrant for the enforcement of the judgment. 10.  On 20 February 2002 the NIVW was declared insolvent and an Administrator was appointed for the period of its liquidation. The applicant submitted that the organisation was, in fact, in the process of restructuring and was not liquidated, as evidenced by official documents signed by the NIVW's administrator. He also claimed that the NIVW had continued to pay staff salaries and had even purchased new equipment. He referred to a decision of the Court of Audit (no. 2, 2001), according to which the NIVW had been given a credit in the amount of 2,890,000 United States dollars (USD) by the Ministry of Finance from its own loan from the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development and that this money had been used to purchase wine production equipment. By July 2000 the NIVW had obtained revenue from this new equipment amounting to approximately EUR 14,500. The applicant also referred to another decision of the same court (no. 20, 2004) according to which in 2003 the NIVW had received from the State budget MDL 785,000 to finance research and specialised education. 11.  From June 2002 until October 2002 the NIVW paid the applicant a total of MDL 8,000. 12.  On 30 October 2002 the applicant initiated new court proceedings requesting the recalculation of the compensation due (because inflation had decreased the value of the earlier award) and also payment of an additional MDL 49,178 (EUR 3,630 at the time) in damages for the late and partial payment of the previous award (in 2001). He also claimed payment of the compensation arrears which had accumulated since that previous judgment. 13.  On 13 November 2002 the NIVW paid him the balance of the 2001 award (MDL 15,900). In a letter dated 14 April 2003 it recognised a part of the applicant's new claims for invalidity benefit for 2002 and stated that the calculation for 2003 would be carried out in cooperation with the Ministry of Labour. 14.  On 26 June 2003 the Centru District Court accepted the applicant's new claims in part and awarded him MDL 7,729 (EUR 478 at the time) for the period 11 April 2001 until 1 June 2003, during which he had been paid only a part of his monthly benefit. The court rejected his claim for compensation for damage caused by delayed enforcement and by inflation during the relevant period. 15.  Having exempted the applicant from payment of the court fees when initiating this second action, the court ordered that the fees be paid by the unsuccessful party, namely the NIVW. 16.  On 10 November 2003 the Economic Court of Appeal issued a certificate confirming that the NIVW was in the process of reorganisation. On 11 November 2003 the Court of Appeal rejected an appeal lodged by the applicant against the judgment of 26 June 2003. 17.  He then appealed twice to the Supreme Court of Justice. By letters of 27 November 2003 and 23 April 2004 the court informed the applicant that his appeal had not been examined because he had failed to pay the court fees (approximately EUR 50). His request for an exemption was rejected, the only reason given being that the relevant legal provisions (Articles 85(4) and 86 of the Code of Civil Procedure, see paragraph 21 below) did not apply. 18.  In view of the Supreme Court of Justice's refusal to examine his appeal, the judgment of 11 November 2003 became final. 19.  According to a letter from the NIVW director submitted to the Court by the Government, by Government Decision no. 159 of 20 January 2004 the NIVW was split into two separate State companies and received approximately 20% of its funds from the State budget.


5.  The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Podgorica. 6.  On 8 May 2001 the applicant murdered X and immediately thereafter left the country. 7.  On 6 March 2002 the applicant, in his absence, was found guilty of murder and sentenced to twenty years in prison. 8.  On 27 June 2002 the applicant was arrested in Spain pursuant to an international arrest warrant (potjernica), and placed in custody. 9.  On 14 May 2003 he was extradited to Montenegro. 10.  On 3 February 2004 the criminal proceedings against the applicant were re-opened (ponavljanje krivičnog postupka). 11.  On 10 April 2009 the High Court (Viši sud) in Podgorica found the applicant guilty, sentenced him to fourteen years’ imprisonment and ordered him to pay the costs of the proceedings as well as court fees (na osnovu sudskog paušala). 12.  On 29 January 2010 the Court of Appeal (Apelacioni sud) in Podgorica quashed the judgment and ordered a retrial. 13.  On 4 October 2010 the High Court found the applicant guilty, sentenced him to fourteen years’ imprisonment, and ordered him to pay the costs of the proceedings and court fees. 14.  On 21 March 2011 the Court of Appeal upheld that decision. It would appear that on 26 April 2011 the decision was served on the applicant and he was transferred to prison. 15.  On 19 September 2011 the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud) in Podgorica dismissed an appeal on points of law (zahtjev za ispitivanje zakonitosti pravosnažne presude) lodged by the applicant. 16.  On 25 November 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal complaining, in substance, about the reasoning of the courts, their assessment of the evidence and their interpretation of the law. He also complained of various irregularities in dealing with his request for review and his action for fair redress (see paragraphs 17-22 below). On 2 November 2012 the applicant withdrew his constitutional appeal and the Constitutional Court terminated the proceedings (obustavio je postupak) on 27 November 2012. 17.  On 10 November 2009 the applicant lodged a request for review (kontrolni zahtjev), complaining that the Court of Appeal had not ruled on his appeal within three months (see paragraph 75 below). 18.  On 11 January 2010, having received no reply to the previous request, the applicant appealed to the Supreme Court. 19.  On 7 July 2010, having still received no reply, the applicant lodged an action for fair redress (tužba za pravično zadovoljenje). 20.  On 29 September 2010 the Supreme Court rejected the action on the grounds that the applicant had not lodged a request for review. 21.  On 10 May 2011 the applicant lodged another action for fair redress. 22.  On 17 June 2011 the Supreme Court ruled that the criminal proceedings had been unreasonably long. Considering that the applicant’s detention required urgent proceedings, but also that it had been a complex case and that the applicant had contributed to the overall length of the proceedings, the court awarded him 2,000 euros (EUR). The applicant’s proposal that that decision be published was refused as the court did not consider it to be a “serious breach” of the right to a trial within a reasonable time. It was also noted that the applicant had indeed submitted a request for review beforehand, which had not been considered, and that his appeal in that regard had never been forwarded by the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court. 23.  On 25 July 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal against that decision, complaining, in particular, about the Supreme Court’s rejection of his first action for fair redress, the conclusion that he had contributed to the overall length of the criminal proceedings, and the amount awarded. He also requested that the Supreme Court’s decision be published. In March 2013, when the Government submitted their observations, the constitutional appeal was still pending. 24.  On 6 March 2002 the High Court issued a detention order against the applicant in his absence. 25.  On 20 April 2004, after the applicant was extradited to Montenegro, the High Court issued a new detention order for fear that he might abscond, especially in view of the fact that he had already been in hiding and had been arrested pursuant to an international warrant. 26.  The detention was further extended by the High Court on 1 June 2004, 26 September 2005, 8 September 2008, 23 December 2008, 27 February 2009 and 10 April 2009. The decisions to extend the detention appear to have been subsequently upheld by the Court of Appeal. 27.  The decision rendered on 8 September 2008 also took account of the gravity of the criminal offence of which the applicant was accused and the sentence that might be imposed on him. 28.  In its decision of 10 April 2009 the High Court took account in addition of the applicant’s personal circumstances, considering that his being unemployed and single increased the risk that he might flee. The decision specified that the applicant’s detention could last until a final decision was issued in the criminal proceedings or, at the most, until he had served fourteen years in prison. 29.  The authorities did not consider in any of those decisions the possibility of ensuring the applicant’s presence at trial by the use of other preventive measures. 30.  On 14 January 2010 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal complaining about the length of his detention. It would appear that he amended this appeal on three occasions thereafter, 1 March 2010, 8 December 2010 and 9 December 2010, enclosing some of the relevant documents, such as his request for review, the subsequent appeal, the action for fair redress, as well as the Supreme Court’s decision thereon. In March 2013, when the Government submitted their observations, the constitutional appeal was still pending. 31.  It would appear that the applicant remained in detention until his conviction became final by the Court of Appeal’s ruling in 2011, after which he was transferred to prison to serve his sentence. 32.  The parties’ submissions in this regard differed. 33.  The applicant maintained, in particular, that the cell in which he had been detained had been overcrowded, and that he had lacked drinking water and daily exercise. 34.  More specifically, the cell had measured 25 m2 and had housed fourteen detainees, sleeping on three-tier beds. The cell had also contained closets, a sanitary facility and a dining table. Apparently, the detainees were given a television set in 2007. 35.  Furthermore, between 2003 and 2007, especially in the summer, there was no running water during the day. The detainees, including the applicant, had to collect water in containers during the night so that there would be enough during the day, for both drinking and cleaning purposes. A well was dug in 2007, but this water was apparently not suitable for drinking as it was dirty. 36.  Lastly, until 2007 the daily walks lasted for forty minutes instead of the 120 minutes provided for by the relevant law, and were cancelled altogether on Thursdays and Fridays, as well as on rainy days. It would appear that after the prisoners’ strike in 2007 the duration of walks was increased to sixty minutes and that they were reintroduced on Thursdays. There would still appear to be no walks on Fridays. Until 2009 detainees were not allowed outdoors at all on rainy days and sometimes they would not get out of the cell for twenty days. 37.  The Government, for their part, submitted that the applicant had been detained in a cell measuring 28 m2 with four or five other persons, and only occasionally with nine other detainees. There were general shortages of water supply in the area where the prison was situated and the applicant had two thirty-minute long outdoor walks on a daily basis. They also submitted that the conditions in prison had been significantly improved after the visit of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment (“the CPT”) in 2008 (see paragraphs 114-118 below). 38.  On 14 May 2003, when he was extradited to Montenegro and remanded in custody, the applicant was examined by a prison doctor. On that occasion the applicant claimed that he had no illnesses. In December 2003 he had blood and urine tests. There is no evidence in the case file that he was suffering from any illness at the time. 39.  In March 2006 the applicant was examined at the clinical centre of Montenegro. The medical report issued at the time is mostly illegible. The legible part states that two months earlier when he was under stress, the applicant had had an abnormal pain in his chest which had not recurred, and that his blood pressure was also high at the time. The doctor recommended a cardiological examination (holter monitoring) and a check-up in three months. 40.  Between 15 August 2006 and 26 January 2007 the applicant had four blood tests, the results of which showed that at various times one or two parameters were slightly increased while the remaining parameters were either within the normal range or illegible. There is no evidence in the case file that the applicant underwent the recommended cardiological examination or check-up. 41.  In March 2011 the applicant was again examined at the clinical centre by a specialist in internal medicine (internista). The medical report issued at the time states that the applicant had been having spasms (stezanje) behind the breast bone, which had become more frequent and stronger. The prison doctor recommended holter monitoring by a cardiologist and specified that the applicant’s condition could worsen if the tests were delayed. 42.  Between 22 March and 4 April 2011 the applicant was examined by a cardiologist (holter, electrocardiogram and ergometric tests). The results showed that the applicant’s left heart chamber was slightly enlarged, with hypertrophic walls. There was also a grade I diastolic dysfunction. 43.  On various dates between February 2005 and May 2011 the applicant was examined several times by a dermatologist, a urologist, a physiatrist and a surgeon, and his abdomen and spine were x-rayed. He was prescribed the relevant treatment where needed. 44.  On 7 December 2006 the Ombudsman (Zaštitnik ljudskih prava i sloboda) lodged an application with the Constitutional Court for an assessment of the constitutionality of Article 572 of the Criminal Procedure Code 2003 (see paragraph 70 below). On 3 July 2008 the Constitutional Court terminated the proceedings (obustavio postupak) as a new Constitution had been adopted in the meantime, whereas the Ombudsman’s request related to the Constitution that was no longer in force. 45.  On 12 September 2008 several detainees, including the applicant, wrote to the President of the Supreme Court complaining about the length of their detention. 46.  It would appear that in 2008 and 2010 two amnesties were granted to prisoners who had been convicted before those dates. On 6 June 2011 the Court of First Instance (Osnovni sud) in Podgorica dismissed the applicant’s request that one of those amnesties be granted to him as well. On 30 June 2011 the High Court upheld that decision. 47.  On various dates in 2009 the applicant complained to different international organisations represented in Montenegro, as well as to the Montenegrin Ombudsman, about the length of his detention and of the criminal proceedings. Some of the organisations apparently did not reply at all and others replied that they had no competence to deal with individual cases. The Court of Appeal, in response to an enquiry by the Ombudsman, replied that all realistic measures would be undertaken to expedite the proceedings at issue, although it would be difficult because there had been an influx of urgent and complex cases. 48.  On 14 January 2010, as well as lodging a constitutional appeal in respect of the length of his detention, the applicant also applied for an assessment of the constitutionality of Article 572 of the Criminal Procedure Code 2003. On 10 May 2012 the Constitutional Court rejected (odbacuje se) the request, as the Code had ceased to be in force as of 1 September 2011 (see paragraph 76 below) and thus there was no legal ground to examine if the above-mentioned provision had been in accordance with the Constitution while it had been in force. 49.  On 22 November 2011 the applicant appears to have requested the State Prosecutor (Osnovno državno tužilaštvo) to investigate some of the employees of the Court of Appeal responsible for not having forwarded his request for review to the Supreme Court. On 21 February 2012 the Deputy State Prosecutor (zamjenik osnovnog državnog tužioca) informed the applicant that she would not pursue any criminal prosecution ex officio in this regard. The applicant could, however, take on the prosecution as a subsidiary prosecutor. There is no evidence in the case file as to whether the applicant did so. 50.  On 22 February 2012 the applicant’s sentence was reduced by six months following an amnesty (pomilovanje) granted to him by the President. 51.  On 19 August 2013 the applicant’s sentence was further reduced in view of an amnesty provided for by the new legislation (see paragraph 81 below). On 27 August 2013 that decision became final and the applicant was released.


5.  The applicant was born in 1928 and lives in Irkutsk. 6.  On 8 December 1993 the applicant’s son, Vladimir Shumkov, was arrested on suspicion of murder and placed in a temporary remand centre. On 10 December 1993 he was transferred to a remand prison. 7.  On 9 March 1995 Mr Shumkov was convicted of murder and perjury and sentenced to nine years and six months’ imprisonment. The sentence was due to expire on 7 June 2003. 8.  On 15 July 1995 Mr Shumkov was transferred from the remand prison to correctional facility ITK-19 in Irkutsk to serve his sentence. 9.  On 14 January 1999 he was transferred to correctional facility IK-6 in Irkutsk so as to prevent a conflict with other detainees. 10.  On 6 February 1999 Mr Shumkov requested to be transferred to a different correctional facility since he was in conflict with other detainees and had allegedly been threatened by them. 11.  On 13 July 1999 Mr Shumkov was transferred from correctional facility IK-6 to correctional facility IK-15 in Angarsk, again to prevent a conflict with other detainees. 12.  On 10 April 2001 he was transferred to correctional facility IK-20 in Ust-Kuta, once again to prevent a conflict with other detainees. 13.  In 1995 Mr Shumkov was diagnosed with epilepsy. Later the diagnosis was changed to psychopathic personality disorder. Between 1995 and 2001 he regularly underwent medical examinations and in-patient treatment in prison hospitals:
- on 2 August 1995 Mr Shumkov was admitted to prison hospital no. 1 in Irkutsk and was diagnosed with psychopathic personality disorder and epilepsy;
- on 26 August 1995 he was transferred to prison hospital no. 2 in Angarsk with a diagnosis of epilepsy; he was discharged on 13 September 1995 following an improvement in his condition;
- on 23 July 1996 Mr Shumkov was admitted to prison hospital no. 1 in Irkutsk and was diagnosed with psychopathic personality disorder, with explosive-type accentuation; he was discharged on 23 August 1996 following an improvement in his condition;
- on 20 March 1997 he was again placed in prison hospital no. 1 in Irkutsk with a diagnosis of psychopathy of explosive-hysteroid type, and demonstratively blackmailing behaviour with simulation of psychic equivalences and paraxial disorders; he was discharged on 14 May 1997 following an improvement in his condition;
- on 24 February 1998 Mr Shumkov was admitted to prison hospital no. 1 in Irkutsk with a diagnosis of psychopathy of explosive-hysteroid type; he was discharged on 12 March 1998 following an improvement in his condition;
- on 7 July 1998 he was admitted to prison hospital no. 2 in Angarsk with a diagnosis of psychopathy of explosive-hysteroid type with simulation of paraxial disorders; he was discharged on 18 August 1998 following an improvement in his condition;
- on 1 April 1999 Mr Shumkov was admitted to prison hospital no. 1 in Irkutsk with a diagnosis of psychopathy of hystero-excitable type and neurocirculatory dystonia; he was discharged on 14 April 1999 following an improvement in his condition;
- on 9 March 2000 Mr Shumkov was admitted to prison hospital no. 2 in Angarsk with a diagnosis of psychopathy of explosive-hysteroid type with simulation of paraxial disorders; he was discharged on 30 March 2000 following an improvement in his condition;
- on 26 April 2000 he was admitted to prison hospital no. 1 in Irkutsk with a diagnosis of psychopathy of explosive type and a duodenal ulcer; he was discharged on 19 June 2000 following an improvement in his condition;
- on 28 February 2001 Mr Shumkov was again admitted to prison hospital no. 1 in Irkutsk with a diagnosis of a duodenal ulcer and hypertension; he was discharged on 30 March 2001 following his recovery;
- on 23 May 2001 Mr Shumkov was once again admitted to prison hospital no. 1 in Irkutsk with a diagnosis of psychopathy of explosive type; he was discharged on 6 June 2001 following an improvement in his condition. 14.  On 17 June 2001 Mr Shumkov was placed in a disciplinary cell, where on 1 August 2001 he slashed his left wrist. After medical aid had been administered to him, he was ordered to return to the cell. When Mr Shumkov refused to comply, officers L. and S. used rubber truncheons and physical force to return him to his cell. 15.  On 4 August 2001 at 2 a.m. Mr Shumkov knocked at the door of his cell to attract the warder’s attention, and when the warder Yu. came over Mr Shumkov said that he needed pills for blood pressure. Warder Yu. reported accordingly to Major P., an officer on duty, who promptly arrived at the disciplinary cell and, having opened the door, found that Mr Shumkov had slashed veins in his elbows. Mr Shumkov said that he needed a bandage but refused to accept medical assistance from the warders and also said that he would not let anybody into the cell except for the prison doctor. At 2.15 a.m. Major P. sent officer D. to fetch the prison doctor, G. At around 2.40 a.m. Dr G. arrived, dressed the wounds and administered injections of cardiamine and caffeine. Mr Shumkov was then placed on a stretcher and transported to the medical unit; however, he was dead upon arrival at the unit as a result of heavy blood loss. The time of death was entered in the register as 2.40 a.m. 16.  On 6 August 2001 a post-mortem report was drawn up. According to the report, the cause of Mr Shumkov’s death was heavy blood loss as a result of injuries to the large blood vessels in the antecubital fossa and forearms. 17.  On 10 August 2001 the prison governor, K., decided not to open a criminal investigation into the death of Mr Shumkov for lack of corpus delicti. 18.  On 17 August 2001 the Kazachinsko-Lenskiy District Prosecutor’s Office quashed that decision and referred the case back for additional inquiries. He stated, in particular, that in the course of the inquiries conducted it had not been established whether the officers on duty had tried to provide Mr Shumkov with medical aid and that neither the officers on duty nor the detainees held in adjacent cells had been questioned. 19.  On 20 August 2001 the prison doctor G. provided an explanation concerning the events of 4 August 2001 to the Kazachinsko-Lenskiy District Prosecutor’s Office. He submitted:
“At 2.30 a.m. on 4 August 2001 a service car arrived to collect me from my home, and I was told that I had to go urgently to the [correctional facility] since a detainee [had collapsed] in a disciplinary cell. I immediately got into the car and at 2.40 a.m. we arrived at the [correctional facility]. Having entered the disciplinary wing, I asked to open the cell where [Mr] Shumkov was being held. [When] the warder opened the door, I saw that [Mr Shumkov] was lying motionless on the floor and blood was splashed around the whole cell. Having examined [Mr Shumkov’s] elbow joints, I found that a vein and an artery were cut open on the left elbow joint and similar injuries had been caused to the right elbow joint. I immediately dressed the wounds and administered injections of cardiamine, caffeine..., glucose and gluconate and performed artificial ventilation. Since the treatment had no effect, [Mr Shumkov] was transported to the medical unit and fifteen minutes after the beginning of the treatment I pronounced him dead as a result of heavy blood loss. Before my arrival at the disciplinary cell the warders did not provide [Mr] Shumkov with medical aid since he requested to be seen by a doctor and refused to accept medical aid until the [doctor’s] arrival. On 1 August 2001 [Mr] Shumkov had committed an act of self-mutilation, having slashed minor blood vessels on his left arm... An antiseptic dressing was applied. If [on 4 August 2001] I had arrived twenty or thirty minutes earlier, it would still have been impossible ... to save [Mr Shumkov’s] life since he had arteries and veins slashed in both arms.” 20.  On 21 August 2001 the prison governor K. again refused to open a criminal investigation as no crime had been committed. He stated that on 4 August 2001 the prisoner had asked warders to call for a doctor because he had high blood pressure. The warders had discovered that the prisoner had cut veins in both elbows. Mr Shumkov had then been placed in the medical unit, where he had died as a result of heavy blood loss. 21.  On 24 August 2001 the Kazachinsko-Lenskiy District Prosecutor’s Office refused to open a criminal investigation into the death of Mr Shumkov for lack of corpus delicti. 22.  On 4 June 2002 the Office of the Prosecutor General set aside the decision of 24 August 2001 and opened a criminal investigation. The prosecutor noted that the district prosecutor’s office had failed to investigate the grounds for Mr Shumkov’s confinement in a disciplinary cell, the circumstances leading to his suicide and his mental state, in particular taking into account the medical records concerning his treatment from 1996 to 2001. Nor had they identified the object with which Mr Shumkov had slashed the veins in his elbows. 23.  The case was forwarded to the Irkutsk Regional Prosecutor’s Office. The applicant was informed of that decision by letters of 7 and 25 June 2002. 24.  On 8 July 2002 another post-mortem report was drawn up on the basis of Mr Shumkov’s medical file. It confirmed the findings of the post‑mortem report of 6 August 2001. 25.  On 15 July 2002 the prison doctor G. was questioned. He stated that he had known Mr Shumkov since June 2001, when the latter had complained of headaches and high blood pressure. At around 2.40 a.m. on 4 August 2001, following a call from the officer on duty, he had arrived at the disciplinary cell, where he had found that Mr Shumkov had slashed his veins. Dr G. had dressed the wounds and administered an injection of caffeine; however, by that time Mr Shumkov was already in a semi‑conscious state. Mr Shumkov had been then transported to the medical unit, where, according to doctor G.’s statement, he had died at 2.40 a.m. 26.  On the same date the Ust-Kuta District Prosecutor’s Office refused to institute criminal proceedings against officers L. and S. concerning the events of 1 August 2001, and against warder Yu. and Major P. concerning the events of 4 August 2001. The decision stated, inter alia, that after Mr Shumkov had committed an act of self-mutilation on 1 August 2001, his cell had been searched on several occasions and no forbidden items had been found. On 4 August 2001 warder Yu. and Major P. had immediately provided Mr Shumkov with first aid. 27.  On an unspecified date the applicant complained about the length of the criminal investigation. On 30 December 2002 the Ust-Kuta District Prosecutor’s Office replied to her that it had questioned all the witnesses and had examined medical evidence and that an expert report on Mr Shumkov’s mental state at the relevant time had been commissioned. 28.  On 27 January 2003 the Ust-Kuta District Prosecutor’s Office discontinued the criminal proceedings against the prison governor K. and officer Y., the head of the operating unit, for lack of corpus delicti. It appears that on an unspecified date that decision was quashed. 29.  On 31 January 2003 a commission of four psychiatrists and one psychologist drew up a forensic psychiatric report in respect of Mr Shumkov. The commission concluded as follows:
“[The commission’s] conclusion:
[Mr] Shumkov suffered from a chronic psychiatric disorder in the form of psychopathy of mixed type. [This diagnosis] is confirmed by the anamnesis, medical documents and the criminal case file: [Mr Shumkov] had such character traits as difficulty in communication, quarrelsomeness, hot temper, irritability, aggressiveness, affective instability, tendency towards hysterical and demonstrative reactions with self-mutilation in subjectively difficult situations, tendency towards simulative behaviour (his examination and lengthy monitoring in the course of repeated placements for psychiatric and neurological in-patient treatment did not confirm the epileptic nature of the ‘fits’) ... However, the above-mentioned peculiarities of [Mr Shumkov’s] psychic state were not accompanied by a broad decrease in intellect or disturbances of thought, delirium, hallucinations or disturbances of critical and prognostic functions, since as a whole he could control his actions (his conduct changed depending on the place and environment, he took into account the social status and rank of the interlocutor), realise the meaning of his actions and direct them. In the period preceding [the act of self-mutilation committed by Mr Shumkov] ... he did not display signs of a temporary mental disorder or dementia, he did not have delirium or hallucinations, and he could realise the meaning of his actions and direct them.
The psychologist’s conclusion:
Psychological analysis of the contents of the criminal case file confirms that [Mr] Shumkov had such individual psychological peculiarities as egocentrism, emotionally volitional instability, hot temper, increased irritability, malignance, aggressiveness, difficulties in interpersonal contact, tendency towards conflict in close contact, tendency to create conflict situations, [tendency towards] asocial acts, and impulsiveness. In subjectively difficult situations [he] displayed affective outbursts, demonstrative behaviour, a tendency towards impulsive behavioural reactions, simulative behaviour and suicide attempts... The analysis of the contents of the criminal case file confirms the lack of extreme conditions which would have prompted the suicide, and of conditions that would have been conducive to the accumulation of negative emotional experiences and ... neuropsychological tension. [Mr Shumkov’s] individual psychological peculiarities were conducive to his committing suicide.” 30.  On 28 February 2003 Ust-Kuta District Prosecutor’s Office again discontinued the criminal proceedings against the prison governor K. and officer Y. on the same ground as before. 31.  On 31 March 2003 the Deputy Prosecutor of the Irkutsk Region quashed the decision of 28 February 2003 as ill-founded and premature. He stated, in particular, that the investigating authorities had failed to clarify all the circumstances preceding Mr Shumkov’s death, had not fully complied with the instructions of the Office of the Prosecutor General, had not made a legal assessment of the correctional facilities’ officers’ actions as regards the search in the disciplinary cell, and of the prison doctor G.’s actions as regards the untimely medical aid provided on 4 August 2001. 32.  On 28 May 2003 the Ust-Kuta District Prosecutor’s Office discontinued the criminal proceedings on the following grounds. 33.  According to the decision, Mr Shumkov was irritable, aggressive, had an explosive temper and had constant conflicts with other detainees and warders. He often complained of poor health and headaches. During the period of serving his sentence, that is, from December 1993 to August 2001, Mr Shumkov was on eleven occasions admitted to hospitals within the penal system. In 1995 he was diagnosed with epilepsy; however, the diagnosis was not confirmed and in 1998 it was changed to psychopathy. From 23 May to 9 June 2001 Mr Shumkov underwent treatment for his condition in Hospital No. 1 in the Irkutsk Region. For swearing and threatening physical violence he was discharged from the hospital on 9 June 2001 and transferred back to correctional facility IK-20. Between 10 April and 1 August 2001 Mr Shumkov was subjected to disciplinary measures on six occasions. 34.  On 17 June 2001 Mr Shumkov was placed in a disciplinary cell for a breach of discipline. On 1 August 2001 he cut his veins. After medical aid had been administered to him, he refused to return to his cell, insulted and threatened officers L. and S. and grabbed L.’s uniform. So as to prevent his unlawful threats, L. and S., using physical force and rubber truncheons, placed him in the cell. Thereafter Mr Shumkov was examined by a member of staff of the medical unit, who noted bruises on his body and extremities. According to the results of the investigation, officers L. and S. lawfully used rubber truncheons and physical force against Mr Shumkov. On the same date the prison governor ordered Mr Shumkov’s placement in a disciplinary cell for the act of self-mutilation. 35.  At around 2.10 a.m. on 4 August 2001 Mr Shumkov, while being held in disciplinary cell no. 20, cut his veins. He refused medical aid from the officers on duty and requested to be seen by a doctor. At around 2.40 a.m. the prison doctor G. provided Mr Shumkov with medical aid, having dressed the wounds and administered injections, following which Mr Shumkov was transported to the medical unit, where he died at 2.45 a.m. as a result of heavy blood loss. 36.  The prison governor K. submitted that on 1 August 2001 he had ordered Mr Shumkov’s placement in a disciplinary cell for having committed an act of self-mutilation. 37.  A witness, S-v, stated that on 4 August 2001 he had been held in an adjacent disciplinary cell when he had heard Mr Shumkov shouting and complaining of high blood pressure. Then Mr Shumkov had cut his veins. S-v did not know why he had done so. 38.  Major P. stated that on 4 August 2001 he and warder Yu. had been among the officers on duty in the disciplinary wing. At around 2.10 a.m. he had heard screaming from cell no. 20, where Mr Shumkov was being held. At around 2.15 a.m. he and warder Yu. had entered the cell and had seen that Mr Shumkov had cut his veins. They had tried to provide him with medical aid so as to stop the bleeding, but he had firmly refused to be aided and to leave the cell and had stated that he needed a doctor. Major P. had then called for a doctor, who had arrived at the disciplinary wing at 2.40 a.m. Dr G. had dressed the wounds and had administered injections, following which Mr Shumkov had immediately been transported to the medical unit. However, because of the blood loss he had died there at around 2.45 a.m. In the course of additional questioning Major P. submitted that late in the evening of 3 August 2001 he and warders D. and Yu. had conducted an inspection of the disciplinary wing and had not found any forbidden objects. 39.  Warder Yu. made a similar statement and added that after Mr Shumkov had been pronounced dead, officer Y., the head of the operating unit, had arrived at the disciplinary wing and conducted an inspection of cell no. 20. 40.  Dr G. submitted that on 4 August 2001 he had been the prison doctor on standby duty. At around 2.40 a.m., after a call from an officer on duty, he had arrived at the disciplinary wing, where in cell no. 20 he had dressed the wounds and administered an injection of caffeine to Mr Shumkov, who had cut his veins. At the time Mr Shumkov had been in a semi-conscious state. Then Mr Shumkov had been transported on a stretcher to the medical unit, where he had died. Dr G. had pronounced him dead at 2.45 a.m. 41.  The post-mortem report stated that the death of Mr Shumkov had occurred because of heavy blood loss as a result of injuries caused by the slashing of the large vessels in the elbows and forearms. It also noted that the prisoner had had bruises on his body and legs. 42.  According to a psychiatric and psychological expert report, Mr Shumkov suffered from psychopathic personality disorder, was in constant conflict with other persons, and tended towards hysterical behaviour, self-mutilation, suicide attempts and simulation of epileptic fits. However, he was able to assess and control his conduct and never showed symptoms of imbecility. The experts did not establish the existence of any circumstances which could have prompted Mr Shumkov to commit suicide. 43. In the course of the investigation no proof of prison governor K.’s and officer Y.’s having committed such offences as abuse of official powers and incitement to suicide was found. 44.  In the course of additional inquiries, it was established that Mr Shumkov had cut his veins with a piece of a blade from a disposable safety razor which he had had with him in the disciplinary cell as it was allowed by the internal regulations. When warder D. had asked Mr Shumkov what he had done with the piece of blade, he had replied that he had placed it in the lavatory pan. 45.  The additional check also established that duty schedules were fixed for medical staff for holidays and weekends. At night a member of the medical staff remained on duty at his home. The time required for a member of the medical staff to arrive at the correctional facility in reply to an urgent call depended on the distance between his home and the facility. Dr G., who had been the prison doctor on duty on 4 August 2001, had arrived at the facility within twenty minutes from the departure of the operating unit to fetch him. This was also confirmed by Dr G. in the course of additional questioning and by the head of the medical unit, K-v. 46.  Warder D. stated that during the night of 3 to 4 August 2001 he had been the assistant officer on duty. At around 10 p.m. on 3 August 2001 he, Major P. and warder Yu. had conducted an inspection of the disciplinary wing and had found no forbidden objects. At around 2 a.m. on 4 August 2001 or a little later, following a call from warder Yu., he had arrived at disciplinary cell no. 20 and had seen that Mr Shumkov had cut his veins. When he had asked him how he had cut his veins, Mr Shumkov had explained that he had used a piece of blade from a disposable safety razor which he had thrown into the lavatory pan. Mr Shumkov had refused to leave the cell to be provided with first aid and requested to be seen by a doctor. Warder D. then had gone to fetch Dr G. and had returned with him twenty minutes later. He did not know what medical aid Dr G. had provided since he had left to inspect the facility. Having reached the medical unit, he had learnt from Dr G. that Mr Shumkov had died of blood loss. 47.  Having regard also to (i) Annex 1 to the Internal Regulations of Correctional Institutions, adopted by order no. 224 of the Ministry of the Interior of 30 July 2001, which did not forbid the keeping of a disposable safety razor in a disciplinary cell, and (ii) the Instruction on Supervision of Inmates held in Correctional Facilities, adopted by order no. 83 of the Ministry of Justice of 7 March 2000, which provided that constant supervision of inmates held in disciplinary cells must be effected through the inspection hole in the doors of the cells, and that officers on duty must call a doctor for inmates requiring medical assistance, the Ust-Kuta District Prosecutor’s Office concluded that the prison governor K., the head of the operating unit Y., Major P., warders D. and Yu. and the prison doctor G. had not committed the alleged offences of incitement to suicide, abuse of official powers and neglect of duty or failure to assist in a dangerous situation, and discontinued the criminal proceedings. 48.  On 9 September 2004 the Office of the Prosecutor General dismissed a complaint by the applicant about the discontinuation of the criminal proceedings, finding that decision to have been lawful and well-founded. 49.  On an unspecified date the applicant challenged the decision of 28 May 2003 before a court. She also complained that her son’s beating with rubber truncheons by warders on 1 August 2001 had not been lawful. 50.  On 29 October 2004 the Ust-Kuta District Court of the Irkutsk Region dismissed the applicant’s complaint. The applicant was not present at the hearing. 51.  On 14 February 2005 the Irkutsk Regional Court quashed that decision and remitted the case for a fresh examination on the ground that the applicant had not been duly notified of the hearing of 29 October 2004. 52.  On 5 April 2005 the Ust-Kuta District Court held that the prosecutor’s decision was lawful and dismissed the applicant’s complaints. 53.  On 6 September 2005 the Irkutsk Regional Court upheld the decision on appeal. The applicant’s subsequent application for supervisory review of that decision was refused by the Irkutsk Regional Court on 18 January 2006. 54.  On 29 July 2002 Dr P., a neuropathologist at prison hospital no. 2, was questioned. He submitted that in March 2000 Mr Shumkov had been admitted to the hospital, having been diagnosed with epilepsy. However, the diagnosis had not been confirmed and Mr Shumkov had been diagnosed with a psychopathic disorder. During his stay at the hospital he had displayed unbalanced behaviour and mood swings, and had been irritable and emotionally unstable. Mr Shumkov had been provided with a complete course of treatment. His parents had never been asked to provide any medicines for him since all the required medicines had been available at the hospital. 55.  Having examined Mr Shumkov’s medical file, the neurologist G. stated that in his childhood he had suffered a craniocerebral trauma. Since 1988 he had been suffering from frequent fits that had mostly occurred at night. He had been diagnosed with epilepsy and had undergone in-patient treatment in 1992. Later he had been treated in the psychiatric ward of prison hospital no. 1. There he had repeatedly feigned polymorphous fits and had been placed under constant monitoring, which had revealed no momentary lapses of reason or convulsive contractions, although irritability, hot temper and rudeness had remained. Accordingly, the diagnosis of epilepsy had been changed to one of psychopathy. During the term of Mr Shumkov’s detention, in-patient and outpatient treatment and supervision had been fully available to him. 56.  The head of a psychiatric ward, Sh., having studied Mr Shumkov’s medical file, concluded that while in detention he had been fully provided with the requisite medical assistance for his mental and somatic state. The diagnosis of epilepsy had been correctly discarded and had not subsequently been confirmed. 57.  On 30 April 2009 L., the head of the medical unit of correctional facility IK-20, issued a certificate concerning the circumstances of Mr Shumkov’s death. The certificate stated:
“At around 2 a.m. on 4 August 2001 ... [Mr Shumkov] knocked at the door of disciplinary cell no. 2, told [warder Yu.] that he had high blood pressure and asked him to call for a doctor on duty.
[Warder Yu.] reported to [Major P.], [who] immediately sent [warder D.] in a car to fetch [prison doctor G.], who lived near the correctional facility and was required to go to the facility in the event of an emergency. At the same time [Mr Shumkov] was placed under constant visual supervision through the inspection hole in the door of the cell.
At 2.15 a.m. [the warders] opened cell no. 20 following changes in [Mr Shumkov’s] behaviour and discovered that he had committed an act of self-mutilation, having cut blood vessels in both arms.
[Mr Shumkov] refused to leave the cell to receive medical assistance and stated that he would wait for the doctor in the cell. [The warders] brought bandages to the cell in order to dress the wounds. [Mr Shumkov] took the bandages but refused [the warders’] medical assistance.
At 2.30 a.m. [Dr G.] arrived and immediately provided [Mr Shumkov] with medical assistance in the cell. [He] dressed the wounds so as to stop the bleeding, administered injections to increase blood pressure and stimulate cardiac activity ..., and performed artificial lung ventilation and indirect heart massage, following which [Mr Shumkov] was taken to the medical unit ... where, despite the efforts to resuscitate him, at 2.40 a.m. he was pronounced dead as a result of heavy blood loss caused by the injuries to the large blood vessels.” 58.  According to a certificate of 21 April 2009 issued by the prison authorities, during Mr Shumkov’s detention in correctional facility IK-20 from 10 April to 23 May 2001 and from 9 June to 4 August 2001 he was held in conditions which complied with the relevant regulations. There was no infringement of Mr Shumkov’s right to life by any officers of the correctional facility. 59.  Another certificate issued on the same date stated, inter alia, that in the course of serving his sentence Mr Shumkov had breached prison discipline thirty-five times, as a result of which he had on six occasions been placed in the disciplinary wing and twenty-seven times in solitary confinement in a disciplinary cell. In 2000 he was recognised as a persistent offender and placed in stricter conditions of detention. All these measures were applied lawfully. Mr Shumkov was hot-tempered, tended to create conflicts, behaved defiantly and did not react to admonitions. 60.  In an undated certificate prison officer A. stated that throughout the term of his imprisonment Mr Shumkov had physically resisted prison officers, provoked conflicts with other inmates, behaved aggressively and breached disciplinary regulations. 61.  In two undated certificates prison officers U. and E. stated that in 1999 they had served in correctional facility IK-6. They submitted that Mr Shumkov had been mentally unstable and had repeatedly created conflicts with other detainees, which was the reason for his subsequent transfer to a different correctional facility. A number of times he had attempted to commit acts of self-mutilation by cutting his forearms. He had also regularly been admitted for treatment in prison hospital no. 1. 62.  In a certificate of 16 April 2009 prison officer B. stated that during the term of his imprisonment Mr Shumkov had on a number of occasions been subjected to disciplinary sanctions for disobedience, insults and conflicts with other inmates. He had often been aggressive and violent. Such behaviour had been caused not only by his psychological particularities but by a manifest unwillingness to follow the prison rules. 63.  In a report of 20 April 2009 prison officer P-na stated that from 1996 to 2000 she had held a post as inspector of the living quarters. She remembered Mr Shumkov as a frequent offender who had behaved defiantly towards other detainees, which had often caused conflicts. 64.  On 2 August 2001 inspector K. of correctional facility IK-20 drew up an internal inspection report concerning the incident of 1 August 2001. According to the report, the use of rubber truncheons in respect of Mr Shumkov was lawful and proportionate. 65.  On 15 August 2002 the Ust-Kuta Prosecutor’s Office refused to institute criminal proceedings against officers L. and S. in respect of the events of 1 August 2001. The decisions stated, inter alia:
“On 1 August 2001 [the detainee Mr] Shumkov committed an act of self-mutilation having slashed his veins. However, he was provided with medical aid in due time. After [officers L. and S.] asked [Mr] Shumkov to return to his cell, the latter refused, grabbed [L.’s] uniform, swore at him and threatened him with physical violence. So as to prevent the unlawful threats of [Mr] Shumkov, [L. and S.], using physical force and rubber truncheons, placed him in the cell. [Thereafter] [Mr] Shumkov was examined by a member of staff of the medical unit, who noted bruises on his body and extremities.
Taking into account the foregoing, as well as the fact that [officers L. and S.] used [rubber truncheons] and physical force in respect of [Mr] Shumkov after the latter’s refusal to comply with their lawful orders, the institution of criminal proceedings against [L. and S.] should be refused for lack of corpus delicti.”


6.  The applicant was born in 1983 and lives in Bratislava. 7.  On 28 April and 8 and 16 September 2005 the applicant was charged with attempted murder, robbery and fraud respectively. 8.  On 15 December 2005 the applicant was indicted to stand trial in the Bratislava Regional Court (Krajský súd) on those charges. 9.  On 26 January 2006 the Regional Court remitted the case to the Public Prosecution Service (“the PPS”) for the taking of further evidence, in particular in respect of the mental health of the key witness. That decision was upheld by the Supreme Court (Najvyšší súd) on 27 April 2006, following an interlocutory appeal by the PPS. 10.  On 27 September 2006 the applicant was again indicted to stand trial on the charges mentioned above. 11.  On 30 October 2006 the Bratislava District Court (Okresný súd) held a meeting with a view to making an initial assessment of the indictment (predbežné prejednanie obžaloby). At the conclusion of the meeting, the District Court ordered a hearing of the indictment (hlavné pojednávanie) for 6 December 2006. 12.  In the course of the trial the applicant’s initial charges were re‑qualified and, on 18 May 2007, the District Court found him guilty of a number of offences, including oppression, unlawful restriction of liberty and robbery, and sentenced him to nine years in prison. The judgment was, however, quashed on appeal and the case was remitted to the District Court for re‑examination. The Court has not been informed of any further developments in the case, or of its outcome. 13.  On 29 April 2005 the applicant was arrested and on 2 May 2005 he was remanded in detention pending trial on the murder charge. He was detained under Article 67 §§ 1 (c) and 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CCP”) (Law no. 141/1961 Coll., as applicable at the relevant time) as he was facing a charge carrying a penalty of imprisonment for eight years or more and there was a risk that he would continue offending. The applicant lodged an interlocutory appeal (sťažnosť) against the remand decision, which was declared inadmissible as belated on 16 June 2005. 14.  The applicant’s first request for release was dismissed by the District Court on 22 September 2005 and, following his interlocutory appeal, by the Regional Court on 18 October 2005. The decisions were taken in private (neverejné zasadnutie). 15.  Meanwhile, on 12 October 2005 the PPS had requested judicial authorisation for an extension of the applicant’s detention until 29 April 2006. The request was acceded to by the District Court on 17 October and, following an interlocutory appeal by the applicant, by the Regional Court on 8 November 2005. The decisions were taken in private. 16.  On 26 January 2006, when the applicant’s case was remitted to the PPS for the taking of further evidence (see paragraph 9 above), the Regional Court also ruled that the applicant should remain in detention. That decision was upheld by the Supreme Court on 27 April 2006 following an interlocutory appeal by the applicant. The decisions were taken in private. 17.  On or around 2 or 4 October 2006, the applicant again requested release. The request was dismissed by the District Court on 16 October 2006 and, following an interlocutory appeal by the applicant, by the Regional Court on 23 November 2006. The decisions were taken in private. 18.  On 2 November 2006 the applicant lodged an application arguing that, at the preparatory meeting on 30 October 2006 (see paragraph 11 above), the District Court had failed to make a ruling concerning his continued detention. 19.  On 6 November 2006 the relevant Chamber of the District Court ruled that the applicant’s detention should continue; this was confirmed by a ruling on 27 November 2006 by which the President of the Chamber corrected what was termed a clerical error in the decision of 6 November 2006. The decisions were taken in private. 20.  On 24 January 2007 the Regional Court dismissed interlocutory appeals by the applicant against both the decision of 6 November and that of 27 November 2006. The decisions were taken in private.
The Regional Court accepted the applicant’s objection that mistakes had occurred on the part of the District Court in that it had failed to rule on his detention during the meeting of 30 October 2006 and in that it had made the ruling of 6 November 2006 with reference to the wrong provisions of the CCP.
However, those errors were merely technical in nature, had been remedied, and had resulted in no prejudice to the applicant.
At the same time, the Regional Court rejected a request by the applicant for release in return for a pledge under Article 80 § 1 (b) of the CCP that he would live in accordance with the law. 21.  On 30 July 2007 the applicant challenged the above-mentioned decisions in the Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd) by way of a complaint (sťažnosť) under Article 127 of the Constitution (Constitutional Law no. 460/1992 Coll., as amended).
On 27 September 2007 the complaint was declared inadmissible as having been lodged outside the statutory two-month time-limit. 22.  On 11 January 2007 the applicant filed a third request for release, which was received at the District Court on 16 January 2007, and which he amended on 26 June 2007. 23.  In its later observations in reply to the applicant’s constitutional complaint (see paragraphs 26 et seq. below), the District Court submitted as follows:
“... no decision had been taken in respect of [the request for release], which was explained by the ... judge as being because he had considered [the request for release] to be a supplement to the [applicant’s] interlocutory appeal against the decision of 6 November 2006” [see paragraph 19 above]. 24.  In the absence of any decision, on 21 August 2007 the applicant requested that his submissions of 11 January and 26 June 2007 be responded to. The request was lodged with the Regional Court, which transmitted it to the District Court, where it was received on 5 September 2007. 25.  On 24 September 2007 the District Court held a public session (verejné zasadnutie) at which it ordered the applicant’s immediate release, finding that his detention was no longer justified. The written version of the order refers to the applicant’s “request for release”, the release to be “based on the Regional Court’s decision [to quash the convicting judgment]” (see paragraph 12 above), without any further specification.
The order was implemented immediately. 26.  The applicant lodged a new complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution. No copy of it has been submitted to the Court. However, from the summary of the complaint in the Constitutional Court’s judgment (nález) (see below), the following can be established. 27.  The complaint was received at the Constitutional Court on 22 August 2007. It was assessed to be a separate complaint from the complaint of 30 July 2007 (see paragraph 21 above). Upon an invitation by the Constitutional Court, the applicant’s lawyer provided further and better particulars on 4 December 2007. 28.  The applicant challenged the District Court’s handling of his request for release of 11 January 2007, alleging a violation of his rights under Article 5 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention, as well as the constitutional counterpart of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 29.  The applicant claimed the equivalent of approximately 6,600 euros (EUR) in compensation, citing “a particularly arbitrary and grave violation of [his] rights”. 30.  On 13 December 2007 the complaint was declared admissible. 31.  In its observations in reply to the complaint, which were filed with the Constitutional Court on 26 May 2008, the District Court made the submission cited above (see paragraph 23). 32.  On 17 June 2008 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the applicant’s rights under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. It observed, inter alia, that it was clear from the title and content of the applicant’s submission of 11 January 2007 that it was a request for release and not a supplement to his interlocutory appeal against the decision of 6 November 2006. It had been the responsibility of the District Court to deal with it accordingly, with priority and adequate expeditiousness, which it had failed to do. 33.  The Constitutional Court awarded the applicant the equivalent of approximately EUR 660, and the reimbursement of his legal costs, by way of just satisfaction. The amount of just satisfaction was determined “on an equitable basis” and with reference to Article 41 of the Convention, the “character of the violation found”, the “length of the District Court’s inactivity”, and the fact that the applicant had been released in the meantime. 34.  In so far as the applicant had invoked Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, the Constitutional Court observed that the case concerned matters of procedure falling within the ambit of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, and not the former provision, taken in conjunction with Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention. Similarly, as no determination of the merits of the case was involved, the constitutional equivalent of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention was not applicable.


11.  The applicant was born in 1950. 12.  On 11 February 1980 the applicant pleaded guilty to manslaughter on the ground of diminished responsibility. His guilty plea was accepted on the basis of medical evidence that he was a man with a severe personality disorder to such a degree that he was amoral. He was sentenced to a term of discretionary life imprisonment. 13.  The applicant’s tariff (that part of the sentence relating to retribution and deterrence) expired on 25 June 1994. His continued detention was based on considerations of risk and dangerousness, the Parole Board considering that he continued to present a risk of serious harm to the public. 14.  The applicant, who is barred by section 3 of the Representation of the People Act 1983 from voting in parliamentary or local elections, issued proceedings in the High Court under section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998, seeking a declaration that this provision was incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. 15.  The applicant’s application was heard by the Divisional Court on 21 and 22 March 2001, together with an application for judicial review by two other prisoners, Mr Pearson and Mr Feal-Martinez, who had applied for registration as electors and been refused by the Registration Officer and who also sought a declaration of incompatibility. 16.  In the Divisional Court judgment dated 4 April 2001, Lord Justice Kennedy noted that section 3 had a long history and cited the Secretary of State’s reasons, given in the proceedings, for maintaining the current policy:
“By committing offences which by themselves or taken with any aggravating circumstances including the offender’s character and previous criminal record require a custodial sentence, such prisoners have forfeited the right to have a say in the way the country is governed for that period. There is more than one element to punishment than forcible detention. Removal from society means removal from the privileges of society, amongst which is the right to vote for one’s representative.”
Examining the state of practice in other jurisdictions, he observed that in Europe only eight countries, including the United Kingdom, did not give convicted prisoners a vote, while twenty did not disenfranchise prisoners and eight imposed a more restricted disenfranchisement. Reference was made to the United States Supreme Court which had rejected a challenge to the Californian Constitution’s disenfranchisement of convicted prisoners (see Richardson v. Ramirez [1974] 418 United States: Supreme Court Reports 24). Some considerable attention was given to Canadian precedents, which were relied on by both parties, in particular that of the Canadian Supreme Court which, in Sauvé v. Canada (no. 1) ([1992] 2 Supreme Court Reports 438), struck down the disenfranchisement of all prisoners as too widely drawn and infringing the minimum impairment rule, and that of the Federal Court of Appeal which, in Sauvé (no. 2) ([2000] 2 Federal Court Reports 117), upheld the subsequent legislative provision restricting the ban to prisoners serving a sentence of two years or more in a correctional institution. While it was noted that the Canadian courts were applying a differently phrased provision in their Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Divisional Court commented that the judgment of Linden JA in the second case in the Federal Court of Appeal contained helpful observations, in particular as regards the danger of the courts usurping the role of Parliament. The cases before the European Commission of Human Rights and this Court were also reviewed, the Divisional Court noting that the Commission had been consistent in its approach in accepting restrictions on persons convicted and detained.
Lord Justice Kennedy concluded:
“... I return to what was said by the European Court in paragraph 52 of its judgment in Mathieu-Mohin. Of course as far as an individual prisoner is concerned disenfranchisement does impair the very essence of his right to vote, but that is too simplistic an approach, because what Article 3 of the First Protocol is really concerned with is the wider question of universal franchise, and ‘the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature’. If an individual is to be disenfranchised that must be in the pursuit of a legitimate aim. In the case of a convicted prisoner serving his sentence the aim may not be easy to articulate. Clearly there is an element of punishment, and also an element of electoral law. As the Home Secretary said, Parliament has taken the view that for the period during which they are in custody convicted prisoners have forfeited their right to have a say in the way the country is governed. The Working Group said that such prisoners had lost the moral authority to vote. Perhaps the best course is that suggested by Linden JA, namely to leave to philosophers the true nature of this disenfranchisement whilst recognising that the legislation does different things.
The European Court also requires that the means employed to restrict the implied Convention rights to vote are not disproportionate, and that is the point at which, as it seems to me, it is appropriate for this Court to defer to the legislature. It is easy to be critical of a law which operates against a wide spectrum (e.g. in relation to its effect on post-tariff discretionary life prisoners, and those detained under some provision of the Mental Health Act 1983), but, as is clear from the authorities, those States which disenfranchise following conviction do not all limit the period of disenfranchisement to the period in custody. Parliament in this country could have provided differently in order to meet the objectives which it discerned, and like McLachlin J in Canada, I would accept that the tailoring process seldom admits of perfection, so the courts must afford some leeway to the legislator. As [counsel for the Secretary of State] submits, there is a broad spectrum of approaches among democratic societies, and the United Kingdom falls into the middle of the spectrum. In course of time this position may move, either by way of further fine tuning, as was recently done in relation to remand prisoners and others, or more radically, but its position in the spectrum is plainly a matter for Parliament not for the courts. That applies even to the ‘hard cases’ of post-tariff discretionary life sentence prisoners ... They have all been convicted and if, for example, Parliament were to have said that all those sentenced to life imprisonment lose the franchise for life the apparent anomaly of their position would disappear. ...
If section 3(1) of the 1983 Act can meet the challenge of Article 3 [of the First Protocol] then Article 14 has nothing to offer, any more than Article 10.” 17.  The applicant’s claims were accordingly dismissed as were those of the other prisoners. 18.  On 2 May 2001 an application for permission to appeal was filed on behalf of Mr Pearson and Mr Feal-Martinez, together with a forty-three-page skeleton argument. On 15 May 2001 Lord Justice Buxton considered the application on the papers and refused permission on the ground that the appeal had no real prospect of success. 19.  On 19 May 2001 the applicant filed an application for permission to appeal. On 7 June 2001, his application was considered on the papers by Lord Justice Simon Brown who refused permission for the same reasons as Lord Justice Buxton in relation to the earlier applications. The applicant’s renewed application, together with the renewed applications of Mr Pearson and Mr Feal-Martinez, were refused on 18 June 2001, after oral argument, by Lord Justice Simon Brown. 20.  On 25 May 2004 the applicant was released from prison on licence.


4.  The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Crikvenica, Croatia. 5.  On 6 July 1992 his weekend house in Nin, Croatia, was blown up by unknown perpetrators. 6.  On 18 May 1993 he instituted civil proceedings before the Zadar Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zadru) seeking damages from the Republic of Croatia for his damaged property. 7.  Pursuant to the Civil Obligations (Amendments) Act 1996 (Zakon o izmjeni Zakona o obveznim odnosima), the Zadar Municipal Court stayed the proceedings on 17 December 1998. 8.  The proceedings resumed on 24 October 2003 pursuant to the “Damage from Terrorist Acts and Public Demonstrations Act 2003” (Zakon o odgovornosti za štetu nastalu uslijed terorističkih akata i javnih demonstracija). 9.  On 20 February 2004 the Zadar Municipal Court rejected the applicant’s claim for damages. The applicant appealed and the case is now apparently pending before the Zadar County Court (Županijski sud u Zadru).