6.  The applicant was born in 1967 and is currently held in the Kırklareli Foreigners' Admission and Accommodation Centre, in Turkey. 7.  The applicant first entered Turkey on 24 September 2002 using a false passport. She began living and working in Istanbul without informing the Turkish authorities or the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“the UNHCR”). 8.  On 22 October 2003 the applicant applied to the UNHCR and asked to be recognised as a refugee. On an unspecified date in 2004 she was detained by the Turkish authorities and deported to Iran, where she claims to have been imprisoned for nine months and subjected to ill‑treatment. 9.  Following her release from prison in Iran, the applicant re‑entered Turkey illegally on 3 February 2005. She learned that her case before the UNHCR had been closed in her absence. 10.  In June 2006 the applicant was diagnosed with myomatosis of the uterus and operated in a private hospital on 5 June 2006. The medical reports, in particular the pathology results, revealed that there were no cancerous cells. 11.  In the meantime, she became interested in Christianity and began attending Bible classes. On 7 September 2007 the applicant was baptised in a Protestant church in Istanbul. On an unspecified date the applicant's son, who was attending the Iranian Consulate School in Istanbul, was expelled on the ground of “conduct against the school's faith”. Some time within a year of that incident the applicant applied to the Iranian Consulate in Istanbul for a passport. While there, she was asked to complete a form stating that she was a Christian. 12.  On an unspecified date at the end of 2007, the applicant applied to the UNHCR and requested that her case be re-examined. 13.  On 3 May 2008 the applicant went to the Fatih police headquarters in Istanbul in order to make statements as a witness regarding a criminal offence committed by third persons. As she was found to have identity documents with different names on them, an investigation was initiated into this and she was arrested. On an unspecified date she was released. 14.  On 9 May 2008 the applicant was rearrested on suspicion of infringement of visa requirements and forging official documents. According to a letter sent by the Istanbul police to the Department responsible for foreigners, borders and asylum attached to the General Police Headquarters on the same day, the applicant had stated that she did not wish to live in Iran and that she had come to Turkey in order to apply to the UNHCR. The same letter stated that the applicant had been placed in the Foreigners' Department of the Istanbul police headquarters with a view to her deportation from Turkey. 15.  On 13 May 2008 the director of the department responsible for foreigners, borders and asylum attached to the General Police Headquarters requested the Istanbul police headquarters to obtain statements from the applicant regarding a number of issues, including her failure to apply to the Turkish authorities when she had applied to the UNHCR, the reason why she had made multiple entries and exits between Iran and Turkey and why she was staying illegally in Turkey. The director also requested that the possible security risks that the applicant may pose in Turkey be determined. 16.  On 16 May 2008 the applicant sent another letter to the Ministry of the Interior. Referring to her medical condition, she requested urgent treatment and asked to be released and issued with a temporary residence permit pending the proceedings before the UNHCR and the Court. 17.  On the same day the applicant was questioned by a police officer at the Istanbul police headquarters. She maintained, inter alia, that she had initially entered Turkey with a false passport and that she had been deported to Iran where she had spent nine months in prison. She contended that when she re-entered Turkish territory on 3 February 2005 she had immediately re-applied to the UNHCR. She noted that she was against the present government in Iran and that she and her family members had been oppressed when they lived in Iran. The applicant mentioned that she had left and re‑entered Turkish territory as that was the only way to renew her visa. She further contended that she had not applied to the Turkish authorities earlier as her case had been closed by the UNHCR. 18.  On 20 May 2008 the applicant's statements were sent to the General Police Headquarters by the Istanbul police. 19.  On 6 and 16 May and 2 June 2008, the applicant's representative lodged petitions with the Istanbul Police Headquarters and requested that his client be released and given a residence permit pending the outcome of her application to the UNHCR. 20.  By a letter dated 10 June 2008, the deputy director of the Istanbul police headquarters informed the Kırklareli police headquarters that the applicant did not wish to return to her country, but wished to seek asylum, and had applied to the Court. The director reiterated that she had been held in the Istanbul police headquarters with a view to her deportation. He further maintained that the applicant should be held in the Kırklareli Foreigners' Admission and Accommodation Centre pending the outcome of the proceedings before the Court. On the same day the applicant was transferred to that facility. 21.  On 18 July 2008 the Ministry of the Interior informed the applicant that her case before the Turkish authorities was suspended pending the proceedings before the Court. 22.  On 29 December 2008 the applicant and her son were recognised as refugees, under the UNHCR's mandate, on religious grounds. 23.  On 14 April 2009 the applicant's representative lodged a case with the Ankara Administrative Court. He requested the court to annul the decision of the Ministry not to release his client and to order a stay of execution of that decision pending the proceedings. 24.  On 28 May 2009 the Ankara Administrative Court rejected the applicant's request for a stay of execution. 25.  The applicant's representative appealed. On 24 June 2009 the Ankara Regional Administrative Court dismissed the appeal. 26.  In his submissions to the Court dated 16 May 2008 the applicant's representative contended that, although the applicant was suffering from serious consequences of the operation she underwent in June 2006, she did not have access to a doctor in the Kırklareli Foreigners' Admission and Accommodation Centre. On 18 June 2008 he informed the Court that the applicant had been examined by a doctor, who had ordered a further medical examination. Despite this, the Ministry of the Interior did not authorise a further examination and the applicant's health was deteriorating. 27.  On 27 August 2008 the applicant, with four other persons, started a “fast to the death” to protest about her placement and the physical conditions in the Centre. 28.  Before the Court, the applicant maintained that the physical conditions in the Kırklareli Centre were below the minimum standards set by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (the “CPT”). In support of her submissions the applicant provided a number of photographs containing images of several parts of the Centre. In one room there were two bunk beds on which there were pillows and blankets. There was no bed linen on the beds. In another room there were two beds with bed linen, pillows and blankets. The photographs of the kitchen sinks and stoves showed that the latter were unusable. Another photograph showed that there were four sinks in the bathroom. Inside, the toilets were partially covered with some kind of dark substance. Photographs of the cleaning products that had labels in the Cyrillic alphabet showed that their dates had expired nine to ten years ago. 29.  The applicant finally alleged that the officers who worked at the Kırklareli Centre did not treat the detainees well. In particular, she had been insulted and threatened by a police officer. 30.  The Government replied that the applicant was subjected to a series of medical examinations during July 2008 at the Kırklareli State Hospital According to the documents submitted, blood tests, an abdomino-pelvic ultrasound examination and an abdominal tomography were performed on the applicant. The doctors found no pathological signs as a result of these examinations. 31.  The Government denied the applicant's allegation that the physical conditions at the Kırklareli Foreigners' Admission and Accommodation Centre did not comply with the minimum standards established by the CPT. Noting that the Centre in question was not a detention facility, the Government provided photographs of a birthday party and an engagement party, both organised in the common room of the Kırklareli Centre. They further submitted photographs of an Islamic celebration (Festival of Sacrifice) organised in the garden of the Centre. 32.  In their submissions dated 9 September 2009, the Government maintained that an investigation had been initiated into the actions of the police officer who had allegedly insulted the applicant in relation to the latter's complaint of ill-treatment.


4.  The applicants were born in 1945, 1935, 1948 and 1938 respectively and live in İskenderun and Belen respectively. 5.  In 1993 the applicants' plots of land in İskenderun were expropriated by the General Directorate of National Roads and Highways. A committee of experts assessed the value of these lands and the determined amounts were paid to them when the expropriation took place. 6.  On 20 August, 10 October and 21 November 1996 respectively, the applicants filed separate actions for compensation with the İskenderun Civil Court of First Instance. 7.  On 19 September 1997 the first-instance court ordered the administration to pay Mıstık Ateş 41,410,845,000 Turkish liras (TRL) plus interest at the statutory rate, running from 7 August 1996, the date on which the ownership of the property was transferred to the National Water Board. 8.  On 25 September 1997 the first-instance court ordered the administration to pay Gülizar Pembe TRL 6,467,500,000 plus interest at the statutory rate, running from 11 September 1996, the date on which the ownership of the property was transferred to the National Water Board. 9.  On the same day, the first-instance court ordered the administration to pay Yüksel Bozkaya TRL 80,274,368,000 plus interest at the statutory rate, running from 23 October 1996, the date on which the ownership of the property was transferred to the National Water Board. 10.  On 7 October 1997 the first-instance court ordered the administration to pay İsmail Karapınar TRL 13,075,000,000 plus interest at the statutory rate, running from 11 September 1996, the date on which the ownership of the property was transferred to the National Water Board. 11.  The Court of Cassation upheld the above-mentioned judgments of the İskenderun First Instance Court on 11 May, 20 May and 25 May 1998 respectively. 12.  On 8 April, 13 April, 12 May and 4 June 1999 respectively, the administration paid the applicants the amounts due together with interest.


4.  The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Tula. 5.  The applicant was a victim of the Chernobyl nuclear accident. He was subsequently granted category 2 disabled status and became entitled to various social benefits. 6.  On 23 January 2001 he lodged an action with the Tsentralniy District Court of Tula (“the District Court”) against the Department of the Interior of the Tula Region (his employer) for the adjustment of his monthly compensation payments for the damage to his health, and for the recovery of unpaid sums due to him. 7.  The first hearing of the case was scheduled for 24 July 2001 but was cancelled because the judge was on leave. 8.  On 23 October 2001 the applicant supplemented his claims. On the same date the District Court stayed the proceedings following a request by the Supreme Court filed with the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation for a review of the constitutionality of certain legal provisions determining the amount of compensation to be paid to Chernobyl victims. 9.  The Constitutional Court ruled on the relevant issues on 19 June 2002. 10.  On 28 August 2003 the proceedings were resumed. 11.  On 6 October 2003 the hearing was adjourned at the respondent’s request as its representative was ill. 12.  On 28 October 2003 the hearing was adjourned following a request by the respondent for third parties to be permitted to join the proceedings. 13.  On 17 December 2003 the hearing was adjourned because both parties failed to appear. 14.  On 10 February 2004 the applicant supplemented his claims. 15.  12 February 2004 the hearing was adjourned because both parties failed to appear. 16.  On 29 March 2004 the hearing was cancelled because the judge was ill. 17.  The next hearings, scheduled for 19 May 2004 and 16 August 2004, were cancelled because the judge was involved in another unrelated set of proceedings. 18.  On 18 October 2004 and 29 November 2004 the hearing was adjourned because the respondent failed to appear. 19.  On 26 January 2005 and 18 March 2005 the hearing was postponed at the request of the respondent; the reasons have not been specified. 20.  On 14 April 2005 the hearing was cancelled because the judge was on leave, and further postponed because the applicant was ill. 21.  On 11 May 2005 and 24 May 2005 the applicant supplemented his claims. 22.  The hearings of 8 June 2005 and 16 June 2005 were cancelled, respectively, in order for the judge to participate in a seminar and because he was ill. 23.  The hearings of 21 September 2005 and 27 September 2005 were held as planned. The next hearing was scheduled for 30 September 2005. 24.  By a decision of 30 September 2005 the District Court stayed the proceedings pending the outcome of another set of proceedings before the Constitutional Court of Russia in a case which was relevant to the determination of the applicant’s case. 25.  On 4 October 2005 the Constitutional Court of Russia resolved that matter. Meanwhile, on 23 May 2006 and 6 June 2006 the applicant supplemented his claims. 26.  On 23 June 2006 the proceedings were resumed and the hearing was scheduled for 11 September 2006, but was further postponed because of the judge’s involvement in other proceedings. 27.  On 20 December 2006 the hearing was held as planned. The next hearing was scheduled for 17 January 2007. 28.  On 17 January 2007 the hearing was held as planned. 29.  On 18 January 2007 the District Court granted the applicant’s claims in part. 30.  On 23 August 2007 the Tula Regional Court (“the Regional Court”), acting on appeal, quashed that judgement and remitted the case for fresh consideration. 31.  On 20 February 2008 the District Court granted the applicant’s claims in full. 32.  On 22 May 2008 the Regional Court overturned the judgement and ordered a new hearing. 33.  On 4 August 2008 the District Court granted the applicant’s claims in part. That decision was upheld on appeal on 13 November 2008.


7.  In or before the year 2009 criminal proceedings were instituted in Italy against named individuals (not including the applicants) who were charged, inter alia, of conspiracy, money laundering, abuse of a position of influence in financial trading, embezzlement, tax evasion and fraud. In particular it was suspected that Mr EMP organised, financed and managed, directly or indirectly a network of companies situated in various states (San Marino, Italy, Malta, Portugal (Madeira) and Vanuatu) which were all traceable to one source namely, San Marino Investimenti S.A. (hereinafter “S.M.I.”). According to the applicants, Mr EMP owned S.M.I.’s entire capital stock which was instrumental to the accomplishment of a series of investment and fiduciary operations (operazioni fiduciarie) the aim of which was to allow a number of Italian clients to launder money coming from illicit sources (by impeding the identification of the real source of the money entrusted to it by means of a double system of fiduciary mandates (mandati fiduciari)). The group of co-accused were suspected of having, through such network, abusively supplied investment services contrary to the legal requirements as provided in the relevant Italian law (Testo Unico Della Finanza) and of having abusively carried out financial activities without being in possession of the necessary economic and financial requisites and the relevant registration as required by Italian law (Testo Unico Bancario). 8.  In the context of these proceedings, by means of a letter rogatory received by the San Marino judicial authorities on 8 May 2009, the Public Prosecutor’s office (of the Rome Tribunal) asked the San Marino authorities for assistance in obtaining documentation and carrying out searches in various banks, fiduciary institutes and trust companies (banche, fiduciare e societa’ trust) in San Marino, in accordance with Article 29 of the Bilateral Convention on Friendship and Good Neighbourhood between Italy and San Marino of 1939. 9.  By a decision of 27 November 2009 (hereinafter also referred to as the exequatur decision), the ordinary first-instance tribunal (Commissario della Legge, hereinafter the Commissario), accepted the request in conjunction with the crimes of conspiracy, money laundering, aggravated fraud and embezzlement with the aim of fraud, considering that the relevant requirements for the execution of the request were fulfilled. In particular the Commissario considered that those crimes were also punishable under San Marino law. It therefore ordered, inter alia, an investigation in respect of all banks, fiduciary institutes and trust companies in San Marino. The purpose was to acquire information and banking documents (inter alia, copies of statements showing transactions and movements, cheques, fiduciary dispositions (disposizioni fiduciarie) and emails) related to a number of named current accounts in specified institutes as well as any other current account which could be traced back (riferibile) to S.M.I, held by all banks and fiduciary institutes in San Marino, which were directly or indirectly involved with the company or physical persons mentioned in this decision. In reaching that decision the Commissario bore in mind the relevant articles of the Bilateral Convention on Friendship and Good Neighbourhood between Italy and San Marino of 1939, law no. 104/2009, the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, and San Marino’s commitment to international organs such as the Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (MONEYVAL) as well as Article 36 of law no. 165/05 which provides that banking secrecy cannot be held against the criminal justice authorities and Article 13 of law no. 104/2009 according to which the act of acquiring copies of documentation amounts to seizure.
It gave further details as to the search and seizure operation, inter alia, that copies should be made of the documentation, that in the event that the investigation was successful the directors of the credit institute were to submit the relevant documents within twenty days to the Agency for financial investigations, who in turn would immediately transfer it, indicating the names of those involved (directly or indirectly), to enable notification. It further ordered that where data was held on electronic storage devices (supporti informatici), the collection of data from these devices should be supervised by appointed experts; and that clone copies were to be made of these storage devices, as well as back-up copies. Any means of information technology seized had to be sealed and kept in custody in appropriate places, and the removal of such seals had to be notified to the interested persons to enable them (or their lawyers) to be present. It ordered the judicial police to serve the decision upon the directors of all the banks and trust companies, to the legal representatives of the physical persons, to the directly interested persons, and to persons who were in possession, under whatever title, of the those places. It also warned that documentation obtained and forwarded could not to be used for purposes other than those linked to the criminal proceedings mentioned in the decree accepting the request made in the letter rogatory, unless the court decided otherwise following a further assessment. 10.  By a note of 26 April 2010 the Commissario ordered that Italian citizens who had entered into fiduciary agreements (aperto posizioni fiduciarie) with S.M.I. (1452 in all) should be notified of the decision. It was noted that any information referring to the said citizens and transmitted to the judicial authority of the requesting state could not be used for the purposes other than the prosecution of the criminal offences mentioned in the exequatur decision (non potra essere utilizzata per fini diversi dal perseguimento degli illeciti penali di cui alle norme di legge indicate nel provvedimento di amissione della rogatoria), unless the court decided otherwise following a new assessment. 11.  Following the investigation and implementation of the exequatur decision, in consequence of the last-mentioned order of the Commissario, the applicants were served with the relevant notification (M.N. on 24 January 2011, S.G. on 16 June 2011 and C.R. and I.R. on 4 February 2011). 12.  On an unspecified date the applicants lodged a complaint (Article 30 of law no. 104/2009) before the judge of criminal appeals (Giudice delle Appellazioni Penali) against the Commissario’s decision concerning the seizure of documents related to them on the basis that they were not persons charged with the criminal offences at issue. They alleged a violation of the principles contained in the San Marino Declaration on Citizens’ Rights and Fundamental Principles (hereinafter “the declaration”). In particular they contended that the principle that crimes had to be punishable under the law of the requested state had not been respected, that there had been a violation of both Italian and San Marino law, and they noted the absence of the fumus delicti and of any link between the crimes at issue and the position of the applicants. Moreover, given that many such complaints by persons in similar situations had already been declared inadmissible by the domestic courts for lack of standing - them not being the persons charged and therefore not the direct victims of the seizure - the applicants further complained that Article 30 (3) of law no. 104/2009 was not compatible with the principles laid down in the Declaration, in so far as it had been interpreted as not protecting or recognising the right to lodge a complaint by anyone who was subject to coercive measures of seizure of documents (related to their interests) as a result of an exequatur decision. 13.  By decisions of 25 February 2011 in respect of S.G., C.R. and I.R., and of 30 June 2011 in respect of M.N., the judge of criminal appeals declared the complaints inadmissible. The court noted that the applicants had been served with a notice of the exequatur order and had exhausted pleas available in law in that respect (hanno esperito le impugnazioni previste dalla legge). It further noted that an exequatur decision may only be challenged by a person who is involved in the investigation being carried out by the requested authority, or by a third party who is not investigated but who has been subjected to the measure. A person, who, in consequence of the investigation, is involved in any way with the activity undertaken, may not be considered as an interested person since any breach of the rights or interests of such persons, resulting from the execution of the exequatur decision, must be raised in the ambit of the Italian jurisdictions. The court considered that as established by domestic case-law it was only after the finding of admissibility of the application that a judge had to set a time-limit for submissions. For the purposes of admissibility one had to verify, amongst other things, the juridical interest of the appellant. Moreover, any constitutional complaints could give rise to an assessment of such question by the competent court (Collegio Garante), following a referral, only if the original proceedings were properly instituted, and not where, because of a lack of juridical interest of the appellant, the application was inadmissible. In the present case the appellants were not interested parties in relation to the exequatur decision, but may only have an eventual interest in the effects of such execution, and thus they did not have juridical interest to challenge the said decision. 14.  In relation to the complaint of incompatibility with the Declaration, the court of criminal appeals only pronounced itself on the request made by C.R.: on 29 April 2011 it declared the complaint inadmissible as on that date no proceedings appeared to be pending. 15.  The applicants appealed to the third instance criminal judge (Terza Istanza Penale) reiterating their complaints and invoking the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In particular they noted that the Commissario’s exequatur decision had ordered the seizure of documents related to them, despite them not being linked to any of the activities mentioned in that decision or them having ever had relations with the Italian companies. Moreover, the seized documents were irrelevant for the purposes of ascertaining the existence of the crimes attributed to the accused, thus, the only purpose behind the seizure was to name the Italians who had had dealings with S.M.I. irrespective of any involvement they had had with the facts object of the letter rogatory. They further challenged the appeal decisions in so far as they were issued in breach of the rights of the defence, in particular as they were not allowed to present submissions as provided for in law, neither in respect of the challenge nor in respect of the constitutional complaint. Furthermore, the decisions had lacked reasons and made no reference to the actual position of the applicants and a lack of reasoning in respect of the rejection of the constitutional complaint was particularly detrimental as it did not allow a proper examination of the matter by the third-instance judge. 16.  By decisions of 29 July 2011 filed in the registry on the same day and served on 3 August 2011 in respect of S.G., I.R and C.R., and of 27 October 2011 filed in the registry on the same day and served on 10 November 2011 in respect of M.N., the third-instance criminal judge confirmed the appeal decision in that the appellants lacked juridical interest. In consequence the appeal was inadmissible and in any event there appeared to be no violation of law tainting the impugned decision. The question of constitutional legitimacy of law no. 104/2009 was also rejected on the same ground as that put forward by the appeal court. 17.  In the meantime, the applicants (except for M.N.) had lodged an objection requesting the revocation of the exequatur decision in their respect, on the basis that the documents related to them were of no relevance to the investigation. 18.  By a decision of 7 September 2011, served on their lawyer on an unspecified date, the Commissario held that the objection was to be discontinued (non luogo a procedere) in view of the findings of the third-instance criminal judge. The Commissario noted that the authorities were not limited to carrying out the actions requested by the letters rogatory only in respect of persons formally charged, but could also extend such acts to third persons who were not so charged. 19.  The applicants lodged a further objection requesting the Commissario to restrict the use of the seized documents. By decisions filed in the relevant registry on 19 September 2011 the Commissario held that its exequatur decision of 27 November 2009 had already applied such a limitation, indeed that decision had clearly stated that such documentation was not to be used for purposes other than those linked to the criminal proceedings mentioned in the letters rogatory, unless the court decided otherwise following a further assessment.


5.  The applicants were both born in 1985 and live in Bad Bevensen and Berlin respectively. 6.  From 6 to 8 June 2007 a G8 summit of Heads of State and Government was held in Heiligendamm, in the vicinity of Rostock. 7.  The police considered that there was a threat of terrorist attacks, in particular by Islamist terrorists, during the summit. Furthermore, having regard to the experience of previous G8 summits, they considered that there was a risk of property damage by left-wing extremists. The latter were found to have planned to protest against, block and sabotage the summit. 8.  The police estimated that there would be around 25,000 participants at an international demonstration in Rostock on 2 June 2007, 2,500 of whom were ready to use violence, and that there would be around 15,000 demonstrators present during the summit, 1,500 of whom would be ready to use violence. 9.  On 2 June 2007 serious riots broke out in Rostock city centre, involving well-organised violent demonstrators, forming what has been termed a “black block”, who attacked the police with stones and baseball bats. 400 policemen were injured. 10.  According to a press release of the Mecklenburg-West Pomerania Ministry of the Interior dated 28 June 2007, some 17,000 police officers had been involved in ensuring that the G8 summit could be held without disruption and in protecting its participants from attacks by terrorists or anti‑globalisation demonstrators prepared to use violence. During the summit, 1,112 people had been detained in holding pens for prisoners (Gefangenensammelstellen). The courts had been asked to confirm the detainees’ detention in 628 cases; they had done so in respect of 113 individuals. 11.  In June 2007 the applicants drove to Rostock in order to participate in demonstrations against the G8 summit in Heiligendamm. 12.  On 3 June 2007 at around 10.15 p.m. the applicants’ identity was checked and established by the police in a car park in front of Waldeck prison, where they were standing next to a van in the company of seven other people. No other people were present in the car park. The police submitted that the first applicant had physically resisted the identity check. He had allegedly hit the arms of a policeman who had attempted to determine the second applicant’s identity. He had also kicked another policeman’s shin in order to prevent his own identity from being determined. The applicants submitted that the second applicant had himself been hit by the police, although he had already been holding his identity card in his hand ready for inspection. The police searched the van and found folded-up banners bearing the inscriptions “Freedom for all prisoners” and “Free all now”. The applicants were arrested. It appears that the banners found were seized. 13.  In two separate decisions taken on 4 June 2007 at 4.20 a.m. and 4 a.m. respectively, the Rostock District Court, having examined both applicants in person, ordered their detention (amtlicher Gewahrsam) until 9 June 2007, 12 noon at the latest. 14.  Relying on section 55(1), paragraph 2(a), and section 56(5) of the Mecklenburg-West Pomerania Public Security and Order Act (Gesetz über die öffentliche Sicherheit und Ordnung in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern – “the PSOA”, see paragraphs 37-38 below), the District Court found that the applicants’ detention had been lawful in order to prevent the imminent commission or continuation of a criminal offence. As the applicants had been found in front of Waldeck prison in a van in which objects calling for the liberation of prisoners had been discovered, it had to be assumed that they had been about to commit or aid and abet a criminal offence. 15.  The District Court further found that the applicants’ continued detention was indispensable and proportionate. At the hearing, both applicants had given the impression that they had intended to proceed with committing an offence. As they had not made any statements or submissions on the merits, they had been unable to justify their conduct. 16.  On 4 June 2007 the Rostock Regional Court, in two separate decisions, dismissed appeals (sofortige Beschwerde) lodged by the first and second applicants. 17.  The Regional Court confirmed the District Court’s finding that the applicants’ arrest had been lawful under section 55(1), paragraph 2 (a), of the PSOA. As the applicants had been found in the vicinity of Waldeck prison in possession of banners with an imperative wording (“free”), they had intended to incite others to free prisoners and that constituted an offence. Moreover, having regard to the material in the case file, the first applicant had obstructed police officers in the exercise of their duties. The second applicant, for his part, had been charged with dangerous interference with rail traffic in 2002 in connection with the transport of “castor”[1] containers. The Regional Court further agreed with the District Court’s reasoning to the effect that the continuation of the applicants’ detention was indispensable and proportionate. 18.  On 7 June 2007 the Rostock Court of Appeal dismissed further appeals (sofortige weitere Beschwerde) subsequently brought by the applicants. In their appeals, the applicants, represented by counsel, had submitted that the slogans on the banners had been addressed to the police and the authorities, urging them to end the numerous arrests and detentions of demonstrators. They had not been meant to call upon others to attack prisons and to free prisoners by force, an interpretation which had to be considered far-fetched, given that there had not been any violent liberation of detainees from German prisons in recent decades. 19.  The Court of Appeal upheld the lower courts’ finding that the requirements of section 55(1), paragraph 2(a), of the PSOA had been met. The applicants’ arrest and continued detention was indispensable in order to avert a danger to public security and order. The banner “Free all now”, together with the banner “Freedom for all prisoners”, could be understood as an incitement to liberate prisoners, an offence under Article 120 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 41 below). The police had been entitled to assume that the applicants had intended to drive to Rostock and display the banners at the partly violent demonstrations there. As a result, a crowd which had been ready to use violence might have been incited to liberate people who had been arrested and detained. 20.  In respect of the second applicant, the requirements of section 55(1), paragraph 2(c), of the PSOA (see paragraph 37 below) had also been met. The second applicant had been arrested in 2002 in comparable circumstances on suspicion of dangerous interference with rail traffic in connection with the transport of castor containers. It was irrelevant whether he had subsequently been convicted. 21.  The applicants had not contested the courts’ conclusions; they had not made any statements or submissions on the merits. The police had been obliged to take into consideration the general security situation in Rostock on 2 and 3 June 2007. On those days, very violent clashes between demonstrators and the police had taken place in the city centre. Moreover, the applicants had proved to be prone to violence themselves by attacking police officers. 22.  The Court of Appeal further considered that the applicants’ right to freedom of expression under the Basic Law did not warrant a different conclusion. It accepted that the slogans on the banners could be understood in different ways. However, in the tense situation in and around Rostock the police had been authorised to prevent ambiguous declarations which could have lead to a risk to public security and order. 23.  Furthermore, the duration of the applicants’ detention was proportionate. According to a report by the Rostock police of 6 June 2007, between 6,000 and 10,000 anti-globalisation activists, some of whom were very violent, were moving towards Heiligendamm and were calling for an “attack on the embankment”. It could not be ruled out that the applicants would have participated in those demonstrations with the banners and would thus have incited other demonstrators to liberate prisoners. 24.  On 6 June 2007 both applicants lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court and applied for an interim injunction ordering their immediate release. 25.  The applicants complained that their detention had violated, in particular, their right to liberty and their right to freedom of expression. The second applicant further submitted that his detention had been in breach of his right to freedom of assembly. Both applicants argued that it had been far-fetched to interpret the slogans on the banners as inciting other demonstrators to attack prisons and to liberate prisoners. The banners had been addressed to the police, who had already arrested many anti‑globalisation activists, to the participants in the G8 summit and to the public in general, and had not advocated acts of violence. The applicants further stressed that they did not have any previous convictions. The second applicant submitted, in particular, that the criminal proceedings against him for dangerous interference with rail traffic had been discontinued. 26.  These complaints were initially registered under file nos. 2 BvR 1195/07 and 2 BvR 1196/07. On 8 June 2007 the reporting judge at the Federal Constitutional Court informed the applicants’ representatives by telephone that the Federal Constitutional Court would not take a decision on the applicants’ request for interim measures. 27.  On 9 June 2007 at 12 noon the applicants were released from prison. 28.  The applicants’ constitutional complaints of 6 June 2007 were then considered to have become devoid of purpose following their release. 29.  On 6 July 2007 the applicants asked the Constitutional Court to find that their detention had been unconstitutional, despite the fact that they had been released in the meantime. Thereupon, their constitutional complaints were registered anew (files nos. 2 BvR 1521/07 and 2 BvR 1520/07). 30.  On 6 August 2007 the Federal Constitutional Court, in two separate decisions, declined to consider the first and second applicants’ constitutional complaints, without giving reasons (file nos. 2 BvR 1521/07 and 2 BvR 1520/07). 31.  The decision was served on the first applicant’s counsel on 14 August 2007 and on the second applicant’s counsel on 13 August 2007. 32.  The criminal proceedings instituted against the first applicant for having obstructed public officers in the exercise of their duties (Widerstand gegen Vollstreckungsbeamte) in the course of the identity check on 3 June 2007 were discontinued, in exchange for the first applicant paying 200 euros (EUR). The criminal proceedings against the second applicant for the same offence were discontinued on grounds of insignificance. 33.  The applicants submitted that one of the police officers involved in their arrest had later been convicted of causing bodily harm while discharging public duties in relation to a different matter. They submitted that the proceedings were still pending before the appellate court. The Government did not comment on that point. 34.  No criminal proceedings were brought against the applicants for having incited others to free prisoners. 35.  On 20 December 2007 the Rostock Court of Appeal dismissed the applicants’ complaints of a violation of their right to be heard. 36.  On 1 May 2008 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the first applicant’s fresh constitutional complaint (file no. 2 BvR 538/08) and on 3 May 2008 it declined to consider the second applicant’s fresh constitutional complaint (file no. 2 BvR 164/08). In their complaints the applicants had relied, in particular, on their rights to liberty, to freedom of expression and to freedom of assembly.


8.  The applicants were born in 1950, 1966, 1972, 1981, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1990 and 1993, respectively, and live in Diyarbakır. The first applicant is the wife and the remainder of the applicants are the children of Hakkı Kaya, who has been missing since 16 November 1996. 9.  On 16 November 1996 at about 3 p.m. Hakkı Kaya and his two friends Mr Ahmet Yaşar and a certain Mehmet (full name unknown) were walking in the city centre in Diyarbakır. While they were in front of the Forest Directorate building, a white Renault estate car, with the registration number 06 EKN 22, approached them. Three men dressed in civilian clothes and carrying walkie-talkies introduced themselves as police officers and carried out an identity check. They then forced Mr Kaya into the vehicle, stating that he had to go to the police station to make a statement. 10.  On 28 November 1996 the second applicant filed a complaint with the Diyarbakır State Security Court Public Prosecutor’s office and requested the Prosecutor to investigate Hakkı Kaya’s disappearance. On the same day, Hakkı Kaya’s brother, Mr Şefik Kaya, petitioned the Diyarbakır Public Prosecutor’s office and requested information about his brother’s whereabouts. 11.  On 4 December 1996 the police took a statement from Mr Ahmet Yaşar, an eye-witness to Hakkı Kaya’s abduction. In his statement, Mr Yaşar explained that on the day of the incident, while he and his two friends were walking in front of the Diyarbakır Forest Directorate Building, a white Toros estate car with the registration number 06 EKN 22 had approached them. The men in the car carried out an identity check and told Mr Yaşar that he could leave. Mr Yaşar explained that, as everything had happened very quickly, he was unable to give a precise description of these men. He recalled however that one of them was blond, and another had curly hair. He had no idea for whom they were working. 12.  On 5 January 1997 the Diyarbakır Gendarmerie Commander informed the Diyarbakır State Security Court Public Prosecutor that Hakkı Kaya had not been taken into custody. 13.  On 17 March 1997 the Diyarbakır State Security Court Public Prosecutor declared a lack of jurisdiction and transferred the case to the Diyarbakır Chief Public Prosecutor’s office. The latter commenced an investigation into Mr Kaya’s disappearance and requested the Diyarbakır Security Directorate to search for him. Since that date, the Security Directorate has been sending regular reports to the Prosecutor and checking the customs’ records to see whether Hakkı Kaya has left the country. 14.  On 27 March 1997 the Human Rights Investigation Committee at the Turkish Grand National Assembly informed the applicants that Hakkı Kaya was not in detention. The Committee further informed the applicants that the car with the registration number 06 EKN 22 was a Fiat Şahin, and not a white Toros estate car as alleged, and it belonged to a certain Y.C., who resided in Ankara. 15.  On 7 September 1998 the police took Efendi Kaya’s statement. In his statement, Efendi Kaya explained that his father had been missing since November 1996 and that he had not received any news from him since. 16.  On 28 January 2000 the applicants filed a further complaint with the Public Prosecutor. On 12 June 2000 the police once again took a statement from Efendi Kaya, who repeated his statement of 7 September 1998. 17.  On 13 June 2000 the police took a statement from Mr Recep Girçek, a neighbour of the Kaya family. In his statement, Mr Girçek explained that Hakkı Kaya had been missing since November 1996; however he had no information about his disappearance or his whereabouts. 18.  On 22 March 2001 the authorities took another statement from Efendi Kaya, who repeated his previous statements. 19.  On 11 March 2004 an interview with Mr Abdulkadir Aygan, a former member of the PKK and allegedly a member of JITEM (the Gendarme Intelligence Service), was published in the Ülkede Özgür Gündem newspaper. In this interview, Mr Aygan stated that Hakkı Kaya was one of the persons who had been killed by JITEM. He explained that Mr Kaya’s body had been buried at the Diyarbakır–Silvan motorway, between the villages of Karacali and Han. The applicants submitted a copy of this newspaper article to the Public Prosecutor for further investigation. 20.  On 6 April 2004 the Diyarbakır Security Department informed the Diyarbakır Public Prosecutor that Abdülkadir Aygan had been sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment for being a member of a terrorist organisation in 1986. However, as he had benefited from the repentance law of 1985, he had been released from prison and his whereabouts were unknown. The Public Prosecutor continued searching for Abdülkadir Aygan but was not able to locate him. 21.  On 8 June 2004 the second applicant filed a complaint against Abdülkadir Aygan for killing Hakkı Kaya. 22.  The parties submitted various documents with a view to substantiating their claims. These documents, in so far as they are relevant, may be listed as follows.


8.  The applicant was born in Uganda in 1974. She currently lives in London. 9.  The applicant entered the United Kingdom on 28 March 1998 under an assumed name. She was seriously ill and was admitted to hospital, where she was diagnosed as HIV-positive with “considerable immunosuppression and ... disseminated mycobacterium TB”. 10.  On 31 March 1998 solicitors lodged an asylum application on her behalf, claiming that she had been ill-treated and raped by the National Resistance Movement in Uganda because of her association with the Lord’s Resistance Army, and asserting that she was in fear of her life and safety if she were returned. 11.  In August 1998 the applicant developed a second Aids-defining illness, Kaposi’s sarcoma. Her CD4 count was down to 10 (that of a healthy person is over 500). After treatment with antiretroviral drugs and frequent monitoring, her condition began to stabilise so that by 2005, when the House of Lords examined the case, her CD4 count had risen to 414. 12.  In March 2001 a consultant physician prepared an expert report, at the request of the applicant’s solicitor, which expressed the view that without continuing regular antiretroviral treatment to improve and maintain her CD4 count, and monitoring to ensure that the correct combination of drugs was used, the applicant’s life expectancy would be less than one year, due to the disseminated Kaposi’s sarcoma and the risk of infections. The medication she needed would be available in Uganda, but only at considerable expense and in limited supply in the applicant’s home town of Masaka. Moreover, the author of the report pointed out that in Uganda there was no provision for publicly funded blood monitoring, basic nursing care, social security, food or housing. 13.  The Secretary of State refused the asylum claim on 28 March 2001 on grounds of credibility, and also because it was not accepted that the Ugandan authorities were interested in the applicant. The applicant’s Article 3 claim was also rejected, the Secretary of State noting that treatment of Aids in Uganda was comparable to that in any other African country, and that all the major antiretroviral drugs were available in Uganda at highly subsidised prices. 14.  An adjudicator determined the applicant’s appeal on 10 July 2002. He dismissed the appeal against the asylum refusal, but allowed the appeal on Article 3 grounds by reference to the case of D. v. the United Kingdom (2 May 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-III). He found that the applicant’s case fell within the scope of the Asylum Directorate Instructions which provide that exceptional leave to remain in or enter the United Kingdom must be given:
“... where there is credible medical evidence that return, due to the medical facilities in the country concerned, would reduce the applicant’s life expectancy and subject him to acute physical and mental suffering, in circumstances where the UK [United Kingdom] can be regarded as having assumed responsibility for his care. ...” 15.  The Secretary of State appealed against the Article 3 finding, contending that all the Aids drugs available under the National Health Service in the United Kingdom could also be obtained locally, and most were also available at a reduced price through the United Nations’ funded projects and from bilateral Aids donor-funded programmes. The applicant’s return would not, therefore, be to a “complete absence of medical treatment”, and so would not subject her to “acute physical and mental suffering”. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal allowed the appeal on 29 November 2002. It found as follows:
“Medical treatment is available in Uganda for the [applicant’s] condition even though the Tribunal accept that the level of medical provision in Uganda falls below that in the United Kingdom and will continue to lag behind the advance of continuing drug advances which inevitably first become available in highly developed countries. Nonetheless, extensive efforts are being made in Uganda to tackle the Aids situation – Aids-treating drugs are available, refined forms of drug are being supplied (albeit with time lags) and it would not be until the [applicant’s] specific and varying needs became known that her needs could be assessed and the then availability of appropriate treatment decided.” 16.  Leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal was granted on 26 June 2003, and on 16 October 2003 the applicant’s appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed by a majority of two to one ([2003] EWCA Civ 1369). With reference to the case of D. v. the United Kingdom (cited above), Lord Justice Laws (with whom Lord Justice Dyson concurred) stated:
“The contrast between the relative well-being accorded in a signatory State to a very sick person who, for a while, even a long while, is accommodated there, and the scarcities and hardships which (without any violation of international law) he would face if he were returned home, is to my mind – even if the contrast is very great – an extremely fragile basis upon which to erect a legal duty upon the State to confer or extend a right to remain in its territory, a duty unsupported by any decision or policy adopted by the democratic arm, executive or legislature, of the State’s government. The elaboration of immigration policy ... is a paradigm of the responsibility of elected government. One readily understands that such a responsibility may be qualified by a supervening legal obligation arising under the ECHR [the Convention] where the person in question claims to be protected from torture or other mistreatment in his home country in violation of the Article 3 standards, especially if it would be meted out to him at the hands of the State. But a claim to be protected from the harsh effects of a want of resources, albeit made harsher by its contrast with the facilities available in the host country, is to my mind something else altogether.
... I would hold that the application of Article 3 where the complaint in essence is of want of resources in the applicant’s home country (in contrast to what has been available in the country from which he is to be removed) is only justified where the humanitarian appeal of the case is so powerful that it could not in reason be resisted by the authorities of a civilised State. That does not, I acknowledge, amount to a sharp legal test ... an Article 3 case of this kind must be based on facts which are not only exceptional, but extreme; extreme, that is, judged in the context of cases all or many of which (like this one) demand one’s sympathy on pressing grounds ...”
Lord Justice Carnwath, dissenting, was unable to say that the facts of the case were so clear that the only reasonable conclusion was that Article 3 did not apply. Given the stark contrast between the applicant’s position in the United Kingdom and the practical certainty of a dramatically reduced life expectancy if returned to Uganda with no effective family support, he would have remitted the case to the fact-finding body in the case, the Immigration Appeal Tribunal. 17.  Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was granted, and on 5 May 2005 the House of Lords unanimously dismissed the applicant’s appeal ([2005] UKHL 31).
Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead summarised the applicant’s prognosis as follows:
“... In August 1998 [the applicant] developed a second Aids-defining illness, Kaposi’s sarcoma. The CD4 cell count of a normal healthy person is over 500. Hers was down to 10.
As a result of modern drugs and skilled medical treatment over a lengthy period, including a prolonged course of systematic chemotherapy, the [applicant] is now much better. Her CD4 count has risen [from 10] to 414. Her condition is stable. Her doctors say that if she continues to have access to the drugs and medical facilities available in the United Kingdom she should remain well for ‘decades’. But without these drugs and facilities the prognosis is ‘appalling’: she will suffer ill health, discomfort, pain and death within a year or two. This is because the highly active antiretroviral medication she is currently receiving does not cure her disease. It does not restore her to her pre-disease state. The medication replicates the functions of her compromised immune system and protects her from the consequences of her immune deficiency while, and only while, she continues to receive it.
The cruel reality is that if the [applicant] returns to Uganda her ability to obtain the necessary medication is problematic. So if she returns to Uganda and cannot obtain the medical assistance she needs to keep her illness under control, her position will be similar to having a life-support machine turned off.”
Lord Hope of Craighead, with whom Lord Nicholls, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe agreed, referred in detail to the Court’s case-law (see paragraphs 32-41 below), and held as follows:
“... that Strasbourg has adhered throughout to two basic principles. On the one hand, the fundamental nature of the Article 3 guarantees applies irrespective of the reprehensible conduct of the applicant. ... On the other hand, aliens who are subject to expulsion cannot claim any entitlement to remain in the territory of a Contracting State in order to continue to benefit from medical, social or other forms of assistance provided by the expelling State. For an exception to be made where expulsion is resisted on medical grounds the circumstances must be exceptional ... The question on which the Court has to concentrate is whether the present state of the applicant’s health is such that, on humanitarian grounds, he ought not to be expelled unless it can [be] shown that the medical and social facilities that he so obviously needs are actually available to him in the receiving State. The only cases where this test has been found to be satisfied are D. v. the United Kingdom ... and B.B. v. France ... [T]he Strasbourg Court has been at pains in its decisions to avoid any further extension of the exceptional category of case which D. v. the United Kingdom represents.
It may be that the Court has not really faced up to the consequences of developments in medical techniques since the cases of D. v. the United Kingdom and B.B. v. France were decided. The position today is that HIV infections can be controlled effectively and indefinitely by the administration of retroviral drugs. In almost all cases where this treatment is being delivered successfully it will be found that at present the patient is in good health. But in almost all these cases stopping the treatment will lead in a very short time to a revival of all the symptoms from which the patient was originally suffering and to an early death. The antiretroviral treatment can be likened to a life‑support machine. Although the effects of terminating the treatment are not so immediate, in the longer term they are just as fatal. It appears to be somewhat disingenuous for the Court to concentrate on the applicant’s state of health which, on a true analysis, is due entirely to the treatment whose continuation is so much at risk.
But it cannot be said that the Court is unaware of the advances of medical science in this field. All the recent cases since S.C.C. v. Sweden have demonstrated this feature. The fact that the Court appears to have been unmoved by them is due, I think, to its adherence to the principle that aliens who are subject to expulsion cannot claim any entitlement to remain in the territory of a Contracting State in order to continue to benefit from medical, social or other forms of assistance provided by the expelling State. The way this principle was referred to and then applied in Amegnigan v. the Netherlands ... is, in my opinion, highly significant. What the Court is in effect saying it that the fact that the treatment may be beyond the reach of the applicant in the receiving State is not to be treated as an exceptional circumstance. It might be different if it could be said that it was not available there at all and that the applicant was exposed to an inevitable risk due to its complete absence. But that is increasingly unlikely to be the case in view of the amount of medical aid that is now reaching countries in the Third World, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa. For the circumstances to be, as it was put in Amegnigan v. the Netherlands, ‘very exceptional’ it would need to be shown that the applicant’s medical condition had reached such a critical stage that there were compelling humanitarian grounds for not removing him to a place which lacked the medical and social services which he would need to prevent acute suffering while he is dying.
... So long as [the applicant] continues to take the treatment she will remain healthy and she will have several decades of good health to look forward to. Her present condition cannot be said to be critical. She is fit to travel, and will remain fit if and so long as she can obtain the treatment that she needs when she returns to Uganda. The evidence is that the treatment that she needs is available there, albeit at considerable cost. She also still has relatives there, although her position is that none of them would be willing and able to accommodate and take care of her. In my opinion her case falls into the same category as S.C.C. v. Sweden, Arcila Henao v. the Netherlands, Ndangoya v. Sweden and Amegnigan v. the Netherlands, where the Court has consistently held that the test of exceptional circumstances has not been satisfied. In my opinion the Court’s jurisprudence leads inevitably to the conclusion that her removal to Uganda would not violate the guarantees of Article 3 of the Convention. ...”
Lord Hope concluded by observing:
“[Any extension of the principles in D. v. the United Kingdom] would have the effect of affording all those in the [applicant’s] condition a right of asylum in this country until such time as the standard of medical facilities available in their home countries for the treatment of HIV/Aids had reached that which is available in Europe. It would risk drawing into the United Kingdom large numbers of people already suffering from HIV in the hope that they too could remain here indefinitely so that they could take the benefit of the medical resources that are available in this country. This would result in a very great and no doubt unquantifiable commitment of resources which it is, to say the least, highly questionable the States Parties to the Convention would ever have agreed to. The better course, one might have thought, would be for States to continue to concentrate their efforts on the steps which are currently being taken, with the assistance of the drugs companies, to make the necessary medical care universally and freely available in the countries of the third world which are still suffering so much from the relentless scourge of HIV/Aids.”
Baroness Hale of Richmond, agreeing that the appeal should be dismissed, reviewed the domestic and Convention authorities and phrased the test to be applied as follows:
“... whether the applicant’s illness has reached such a critical stage (i.e. he is dying) that it would be inhuman treatment to deprive him of the care which he is currently receiving and send him home to an early death unless there is care available there to enable him to meet that fate with dignity. ... [The test] is not met on the facts of this case.” 18.  According to information obtained by the Court of its own motion, HIV is normally treated by antiretroviral drugs. In the United Kingdom, in common with most developed countries, these drugs are provided in combination, a practice known as “highly active antiretroviral therapy” (HAART). The proper administration of antiretroviral drugs depends on regular monitoring of the patient, including blood tests, and the availability of medical personnel to adjust at frequent intervals the level and type of drugs taken. Such treatment is generally available free of charge on the National Health Service. 19.  In Uganda, attempts have been made to reduce the country’s dependency on imported medication, including producing generic drugs locally. However, in common with most sub-Saharan African countries, the availability of antiretroviral drugs is hampered by limited financial resources and by shortcomings in the health-care infrastructure required to administer them effectively. As a result, according to research carried out by the World Health Organisation (WHO), approximately only half of those needing antiretroviral therapy in Uganda receive it (WHO, “Progress on Global Access to HIV Antiretroviral Therapy”, March 2006, pp. 9, 11 and 72). The Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/Aids (UNAIDS) and WHO in their 2007 country situation analysis on Uganda also cited major barriers to HIV prevention, treatment, care and support as including limited public investment, limited service coverage and lack of a policy framework. There are also significant disparities in the provision of drugs between urban and rural areas (WHO, “Summary Country Profile for HIV/Aids Treatment Scale-Up: Uganda”, December 2005). In addition, progress in providing medical care has been offset by the ever-increasing number of people requiring treatment (UNAIDS/WHO, “Aids Epidemic Update”, 2006, p. 18) and given the rapid population growth in Uganda, its stable HIV incidence rate means that an increasing number of people acquire HIV each year (UNAIDS/WHO, “Aids Epidemic Update”, December 2007, p. 17).


5.  The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Płock. 6.  On 30 May 2004 the applicant was arrested. Two days later, on 1 June 2004 the Gostynin District Court decided to remand him in custody. 7.  By a judgment of 27 June 2005 the Płock Regional Court found the applicant guilty of manslaughter and other offences and sentenced him to 25 years’ imprisonment. On 3 November 2005 the Warsaw Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance judgment. 8.  On an unspecified later date the court granted the applicant’s request to assign a legal-aid lawyer to the case for the purposes of filing a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court. 9.  In a letter of 6 February 2006 the applicant’s legal-aid lawyer informed the Warsaw Court of Appeal that she had found no grounds on which to lodge a cassation appeal. 10.  By a letter of 7 February 2006 the Registry of the Warsaw Court of Appeal forwarded the legal-aid lawyer’s statement to the applicant. The letter read as follows:
“The Registry of the Warsaw Court of Appeal ... forwards, enclosed, a copy of a letter of your legal-aid lawyer, for your information. Please be informed that the time-limit for lodging a cassation appeal expires on 13 February 2006.” 11.  This Warsaw Court’s of Appeal letter, together with the legal-aid lawyer’s letter of 6 February 2006, were served on the applicant on an unspecified date after 7 February 2006.


5.  The applicants, who are brothers, were born in 1986, 1987 and 1985 respectively and live in Bucharest. 6.  In the early hours of 17 March 2008, around five minutes after midnight, the applicants, together with their parents, decided to go to a police station to report that the applicant Marius-Romeo Chinez had been a victim of crime. They stopped a taxi on the street and because the taxi driver, B.G., refused to take them, they got involved in a verbal dispute with him and one of the applicants punched the bonnet of the car. Shortly afterwards, several taxi drivers from the same taxi company arrived at the scene. A team of two police officers (D.M. and F.I.) who were patrolling the area also arrived at the scene of the incident. They were followed by three additional police units. 7.  In the presence of the police the dispute between the applicants and the taxi drivers escalated, with the applicant Mihai Chinez being hit in the face. When he tried to retaliate, the police handcuffed him and took him to their car. At the same time the applicant Ionuţ Ludovic Chinez was hit on the head by an unknown person and lost consciousness. When he saw his brother lying on the ground, the applicant Mihai Chinez refused to get into the police car. At this point the three police officers who had hold of him started hitting him and used their electric stun gun to force him into their car. Afterwards, Ionuţ Ludovic Chinez was lifted off the ground, handcuffed and put into a police car. The applicant Marius-Romeo Chinez, who was watching the scene from a distance, was pushed to the ground by two policemen, handcuffed and taken to another police car nearby. 8.  The applicants were then taken to the police station, where Mihai and Marius-Romeo were punched and kicked in the stomach and chest by the police officers who had brought them in. After several hours of waiting without being questioned and without making a statement, Marius-Romeo was taken by ambulance, under police escort, to the Floreasca Emergency Hospital, where he had treatment for two days. 9.  The other two applicants were questioned separately by different police officers. On 17 March 2008, at around 4 p.m., when a lawyer hired by their father arrived, they were allowed to leave the police station.
(b)  The Government’s account of the events 10.  According to the incident report drafted by the chief of the police units involved, on 17 March 2008 at around 00.20 a.m. the team of two police officers who were on patrol had seen a group of five persons attacking a taxi driver. When they intervened to stop the fight and to identify the persons involved, the applicants became aggressive towards them too and punched them. The officers asked for support and additional patrol units arrived at the scene. Subsequently, the decision was taken to accompany the attackers, namely the applicants, to the police station to identify them, but because they refused to go the police officers had to use force and handcuff them. The report further mentioned that the applicants had damaged a taxi belonging to Mr. B.G., who was identified by name, age, personal identity number and address.
The report also stated:
“Before the arrival of the police units, several colleagues came to protect the taxi driver and assaulted the five [people]; because of the injuries he sustained Marius-Romeo Chinez was taken to the Floreasca Emergency Hospital, where he was admitted to the surgical ward ...
On the occasion of the investigation at the crime scene four eyewitnesses were identified and gave statements ...” 11.  The report concluded that, in accordance with an order given by the prosecutor by telephone, an investigation was immediately launched in connection with assault on police officers by the applicants and their father. 12.  On the same day the chief asked for forensic expert reports from the National Forensic Medicine Institute in connection with the injuries suffered by police officers F.S.I. and N.C. The reports issued on 14 May 2008 confirm that officer F.S.I. had a 4 x 1 cm ecchymosis and excoriation on the left lumbar region, which could have been caused on 17 March 2008 by being hit with a hard object, and which required one to two days’ medical treatment. With respect to officer N.C., the report mentioned that he had a 2 x 2 cm ecchymosis in the left occipital region, which could have been caused by being hit with a hard object on 17 March 2008 and which required one to two days’ medical treatment. 13.  According to a forensic medical report issued on 2 April 2008, Mihai Chinez had a haematoma of 1 x 0.5 x 0.5 cm in the occipital area, numerous ecchymoses on the face, arms and left leg, and five electrical burns on the left thigh. It was considered that the injuries, which could have occurred on 17 March 2008, were caused by being hit with a hard object, and required two to three days’ medical treatment. 14.  According to a forensic medical report issued in June 2008, Marius-Romeo Chinez had an excoriation of 3 x 2 cm on the right of the forehead, a 1.5 x 1 cm ecchymosis outside the right eye, several ecchymoses and haematomas on the head, a 1 cm wound on the upper lip which had been sutured, several ecchymoses of 7 x 3 cm and 6 x 4 cm on the back and the lower right thorax, as well as on the right elbow. The report mentioned that he was drunk when he was brought to the Emergency Hospital. It was considered that the injuries, which could have been inflicted on 17 March 2008, had been caused by being hit with and against a hard object or surface, and required eight to nine days’ medical treatment. 15.  A forensic medical report issued in August 2008 mentioned that Ionuţ Ludovic Chinez had a haematoma of 1 x 0.5 x 0.3 cm on the right side of the head and two ecchymoses on the right thigh. He also had limited capacity to open his mouth because of an injury to the right side of the jaw. The report concluded that the injuries could have been inflicted on 17 March 2008 by being hit with and against hard surfaces and objects, and that they required one to two days’ medical treatment. 16.  On 7 July 2008 the applicants brought criminal proceedings against the police officers who were involved in the events of 17 March 2008, for abusive behaviour, unlawful arrest and misconduct. They claimed that on 17 March 2008 they had been beaten by police officers both before and after they were taken to the police station, following an incident they had been involved in with a taxi driver. 17.  The investigation of the applicants’ complaint conducted by N.I., a police officer from the Control Unit of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, commenced by taking statements from the applicants on 11, 12 and 14 August 2008. They described the course of the events as mentioned in paragraphs 6 to 9 above. The applicant Ionuţ Ludovic Chinez stated that, while he was approaching the two police officers who were handcuffing his brother Mihai, he was hit on the head and lost consciousness. He further mentioned that after his arrival at the police station he had not been ill-treated. The applicant Mihai Chinez stated that “he was told later that [Ionuţ Ludovic] had been hit by taxi drivers and policemen”. The applicants mentioned that they did not know the names of the taxi drivers involved in the incident or of the police officers present at the scene. Lastly, they requested criminal sanctions against the police officers who had assaulted them both in the street and inside the police station. 18.  On 11 August 2008, J.V., the applicants’ mother, who was present during the incident, declared that she had seen around twenty or thirty taxi drivers hitting the applicants Mihai and Ionuţ Ludovic Chinez. Then she had seen the two police officers pushing Marius-Romeo to the ground, hitting him and handcuffing him. She then stated that when the two police officers saw Ionuţ Ludovic lying on the ground they ran towards him, dragged him to their car, slapped him, turned him over with his face to the ground and handcuffed him. By this time all the taxi drivers had left the scene. Once they arrived at the police station she was not allowed to enter or to contact her sons. After approximately one hour she saw the applicant Marius-Romeo being taken away by ambulance, with his handcuffs still on and under police escort. 19.  The investigation continued with the identification of the police officers involved in the incident. In this respect, on 20 August 2008, the operational order of 17 March 2008 as well as the incident report drafted by the police chief (see paragraph 10 above) were attached to the investigation file. 20.  On 24 August 2008 N.I. took statements from police officers D.M. and F.S.I. They declared that they had been on patrol together in a police car when they saw several taxis and several individuals hitting another person. They immediately approached the scene of the incident and asked the aggressors to stop. When they refused the two officers called for back-up, and then intervened in order to remove from the crowd one person who was violent and had blood on his face. When they tried to immobilise this person he went up to a taxi and hit its windscreen with his fist, breaking it. They decided to handcuff him, and at that moment he kicked F.S.I. in the chest and refused to get into the police car, pointing to his brother, who had been beaten and was lying on the ground, and asking them to call an ambulance. Then they put him into the police car with the help of two other colleagues and drove him to their police station. They mentioned in their statement that they did not use any physical or psychological pressure on the person in question, and that they were not equipped with electric stun guns. When they arrived at the police station the person was identified as Mihai Chinez and “was taken over by officer F.L. from the criminal investigations unit and other colleagues who continued the investigation”. 21.  The same day officer D.A.M. gave a statement in which she mentioned that she was part of one of the units called as back-up by officers D.M. and F.S.I. When she arrived at the scene she found one person pointing out a taxi driver who had allegedly just beaten his brother. She got back into her car and drove in the direction indicated but could not find the taxi driver. Then she returned to the scene and, according to her statement, she “identified two eyewitnesses who could describe the incident and they accompanied her to the police station”. She further declared that, once inside the police station, she did not participate in the questioning and did not physically or verbally assault any of the persons involved in the incident. 22.  On 26 August 2008, in a note drafted by officer N.I., police officers D.M., Z.C., N.C., F.I., D.D.M., D.A., P.M.C. and S.L.E. were identified as having been present during the incident under investigation “together with other public order forces”. 23.  On 5 September 2008 officer N.G., who was on duty at the police station on the night of the incident, gave a statement mentioning that he had helped his colleagues D.M. and F.I. to identify the applicants and their parents, and took a statement from J.V., the applicant’s mother. 24.  On 24 and 25 September 2008 statements were taken from officers F.L.C. and D.D.M. They stated that they had not been on duty on the night of the incident, but were called in and asked to come to the police station. When they arrived they were informed about the incident and asked to help their colleagues. F.L.C. declared that he had heard statements from two eyewitnesses. D.D.M. declared that he had questioned Mihai Chinez. Both officers declared that they had not assaulted any of the participants in the incident. 25.  On 25 September 2008 investigating officer N.I. took a statement from officer A.S, who had also been called in from home to the police station in the early hours of 17 March 2008. He stated that “at the station there were a number of people, including taxi drivers, witnesses and members of the Chinez family”. He then proceeded to question Ionuţ Ludovic Chinez. He continued by stating that he was aware that the applicants were being investigated for charges of assault against police officers. Lastly, he concluded that between 2005 and 2007 he was the community police officer in charge of the area in which the applicants lived. He stated in this respect that the applicants were disruptive individuals who had been sanctioned on numerous occasions for disturbing public order, and that in his opinion their complaint was “biased and based on untruths”. 26.  The statements allegedly taken from the applicants and eyewitnesses immediately after the incident inside the police station were not included in the investigation file. 27.  On 2 October 2009 the Prosecutor’s Office of the Bucharest Court of Appeal decided to relinquish jurisdiction to the Prosecutor’s Office of the Bucharest County Court. On 14 January 2010 it was decided that the Prosecutor’s Office of the Bucharest Court of Appeal was competent to examine the case after all, and the file was sent back to them. 28.  On 15 and 17 March 2011 officers F.L.C., A.S. and D.D.M. were heard again, this time before the prosecutor. In addition to his initial statement given in 2008, officer F.L.C. pointed out that, once inside the police station and while he was handcuffed, the applicant Mihai Chinez had banged his own head against the wall and the floor several times. 29.  On 1 June 2011 the Prosecutor’s Office of the Bucharest Court of Appeal dismissed the criminal complaint lodged by the applicants against some of the police officers who had taken part in the incident of 17 March 2008, in particular those officers who had questioned the applicants after they were taken to the police station, on the ground that no unlawful act had been committed by them. It held that following the incident the applicants had been restrained by police officers and taken to the police station for identification and questioning, because a car had been destroyed during the incident and police officers had been assaulted. It was further held that when they reached the police station it was already apparent from physical evidence that the applicants had been involved in a violent incident. There was therefore no evidence in the criminal investigation file to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the police officers who questioned the applicants at the police station, in particular A.S, F.L.C. and D.D.M., had acted violently against the applicants. Moreover, it was held that one of the applicants, namely Mihai Chinez, had inflicted injuries on himself. The prosecutor finally decided that the criminal investigation in respect of the remaining police officers, not identified by name, should be continued by the Prosecutor’s Office of the Bucharest County Court. 30.  The applicants complained against this decision, arguing, inter alia, that no statements had ever been taken from any of the taxi drivers involved in the incident. They also argued that they had been hit by the taxi drivers in the presence of the police officers, who had done nothing to protect them. On the contrary, the police officers had also brutally attacked them, immobilising them in the street and then beating them up once they were inside the police station. They further alleged that two witnesses, namely I.S. and the applicants’ legal representative, had seen the injuries suffered by them but were never called to testify. 31.  On 30 June 2011 the applicants’ complaint was rejected as ill-founded by the General Prosecutor of the Prosecutor’s Office of the Bucharest Court of Appeal. 32. The applicants appealed against the prosecutors’ decisions before the Bucharest Court of Appeal, reiterating their previous arguments (see paragraph 30 above). Their appeal was rejected with final effect on 20 October 2011. In reaching this decision the Bucharest Court of Appeal firstly considered that sufficient investigative action had been taken, such as taking statements from the applicants and the police officers present in the police station, and, because the alleged ill-treatment took place in a police station, no other evidence was available that could verify the applicants’ complaint with respect to police officers A.S, F.L.C. and D.D. The court further held that it could not decide with respect to the incident which took place in the street and which involved the taxi drivers, because it was the object of an ongoing investigation conducted by the Prosecutor’s Office of the Bucharest County Court. 33.  The criminal investigation with respect to the rest of the police officers and concerning the incident which took place in the street is still pending before the Prosecutor’s Office of the Bucharest County Court. 34.  The criminal investigation against the applicants for assaulting police officers (see paragraph 11 above) has also not been completed to date.


4.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Novomoskovsk. In the early nineties the applicant worked in Russia, however, since 1992 she had a Ukrainian citizenship stamp in her U.S.S.R. passport, which she exchanged for a Ukrainian passport in 1999. 5.  In 1995 the applicant left Russia, moved into her Novomoskovsk house purchased in 1987, and sought to privatize an adjacent plot of land. In September 1996, having received a privatization certificate, she found out that part of the plot she considered to be entitled to, had been privatized by her neighbour, Mrs N.P. 6.  On 10 February 1997 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against Mrs N.P., seeking partial annulment of her privatization documents. 7.  On 19 March 1998 the Novomoskovsk Court (Новомосковський міський суд Дніпропетровської області) dismissed her claims as lodged outside the applicable statute of limitation. The applicant appealed. 8.  On 23 April 1998 the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Court (“the Regional Court”; Дніпропетровський обласний суд)[1] quashed this judgment and remitted the case for a fresh consideration. It found that the Novomoskovsk Court had insufficiently analysed the circumstances concerning the application of the statute of limitation. It further instructed the court to examine particular documentary and other evidence and to summon the City Council's Executive Committee (Виконавчий комітет Новомосковської міської ради), which had issued the privatization documents. 9.  In October 1998 Mrs N.P. lodged a counter-claim, seeking to annul the applicant's privatization certificate. She maintained that the applicant had not received Ukrainian citizenship until 1999 and so, under the applicable law, had not been entitled to privatize land before that time. 10.  On 18 January 2001 the Novomoskovsk Court accepted Mrs N.P.'s argument, having dismissed all of the applicant's claims and having allowed all those of Mrs N.P. The applicant appealed. 11.  On 5 March 2001 the Regional Court quashed this judgment. It found that the Novomoskovsk Court had misinterpreted applicable substantive law and breached a number of procedural requirements. Particularly, it had failed to examine a number of relevant documents and witnesses, as well as to substantiate the dismissal of the applicant's claims against Mrs N.P. 12.  On 4 January and 12 November 2003 the applicant amended her claims. 13.  On 15 July 2004 the Novomoskovsk Court partly allowed both parties' claims. In particular, it ordered the Executive Committee to change the planning scheme and record each party's ownership over the land, which she actually used. The applicant appealed. 14.  On 9 December 2004 the Regional Court quashed this judgment, having found that the Novomoskovsk Court had exceeded its procedural authority in deciding to design a planning scheme, which power was vested in the municipal authorities. Furthermore, the court still had failed to examine certain of the documents of relevance to the proceedings. The applicant appealed in cassation. 15.  As of June 2006 the proceedings were pending before the cassation court. 16.  In the course of the proceedings, the first-instance court scheduled some 33 hearings. Most of them were scheduled with intervals ranging from several weeks to five months. On two occasions the intervals between the hearings exceeded six and nine months respectively (28 January 1999 – 12 August 1999 and 3 April 2002 – 21 January 2003). Thirteen hearings were adjourned on account of the absences of municipal authorities summoned into the proceedings. Twice the hearings were adjourned on account of the applicant's failure to appear.


8.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Zagreb. 9.  On 10 July 1991 M.T. and H.T. (“the plaintiffs”) brought an action in the Zagreb Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zagrebu) against the applicant seeking damages for breach of contract. 10.  From 27 November 1991 until 27 January 1992 the plaintiffs were represented by their legal counsel, M.V. and thereafter by his daughter, S.T., who took over her father's law practice. 11.  The plaintiffs, but not M.V., attended the first hearing in the case that was held on 11 December 1991. M.V.'s activity in the proceedings was thus limited to filing one set of submissions with the court on 2 December 1991 in which he responded to the applicant's arguments. 12.  At the next hearing held on 27 January 1992 S.T. replaced her father as the plaintiffs' counsel. 13.  On 28 April 1992 the Municipal Court gave judgment for the plaintiffs. Following an appeal by the applicant, on 9 February 1993 the Zagreb County Court (Okružni sud Zagreb) quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case to the Municipal Court. 14.  In the resumed proceedings, on 6 July 1993 the Zagreb Municipal Court again gave judgment for the plaintiffs. The applicant appealed. 15.  On 27 September 1994 the Zagreb County Court reversed the first-instance judgment, only accepting part of the plaintiffs' claim. 16.  The applicant then lodged an appeal on points of law (revizija) with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) in which he argued, inter alia, that he had been unable to present his case properly in the Municipal Court. 17.  On 8 December 1999 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's appeal on points of law. 18.  On 28 July 2000 the applicant filed a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske). 19.  Following the service of the Supreme Court's decision, on 24 August 2000 S.T. informed the Zagreb Municipal Court that she had ceased to act for the plaintiffs some four years earlier and that the decision should have been served on the plaintiffs directly. 20.  On 18 December 2000 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant's complaint. It found that the articles of the Constitution on which the applicant sought to rely did not contain any substantive provisions enshrining human rights or fundamental freedoms.
Judge M.V. was a member of the panel of five judges which delivered that decision. The panel was presided over by another judge. The applicant became aware of the composition of the panel when he received the Constitutional Court's decision.


7.  The applicant was born in 1978 and is currently serving a sentence in Rivne Regional Penitentiary no. 76. 8.  According to the applicant, he was detained and ill-treated in police custody from 19 to 21 October 2003. There are no further details or documents. 9.  In the evening of 31 October 2003 the applicant, together with another person, was arrested by the Fontanka police unit of the Kominternovo District Police Department in flagrante delicto on the scene of a robbery and car hijacking. As it would later be confirmed by at least two eye-witnesses (see paragraph 23 below), the applicant attempted escaping from and showed resistance to the police. 10.  According to the applicant, he pleaded guilty to several counts of robbery under torture. He alleged in particular that he had been heavily beaten with rubber truncheons, hanged with his arms twisted behind him and administered electric shocks. 11.  On 1 November 2003 the applicant signed the arrest report in confirmation that his procedural rights had been explained to him. 12.  On the same day the applicant was taken to the Kominternovo Temporary Detention Facility, where a doctor examined him and made a note that he had a bruise under his left eye. 13.  On 4 November 2003 the investigator submitted to the Kominternovo Town Court (Комінтернівський районний суд – “the Kominternovo Court”) a motion on the applicant's detention as a preventive measure pending trial. The investigator noted that the applicant was suspected of having committed serious crimes (three counts of robbery with violence on 22, 26 and 31 October 2003), had no permanent place of residence and had a criminal record, and thus could hinder the investigation or abscond if at liberty. According to the investigator, the applicant had fully admitted his guilt. 14.  On the same date the Kominternovo Court remanded the applicant in custody, having upheld the investigator's reasoning. 15.  On 26 December 2003 the Kominternovo Court extended the term of the applicant's detention to four months, having referred to the necessity to complete the investigation. 16.  On 15 June 2004 the applicant was committed for trial. 17.  No further documents concerning the applicant's detention are available in the case file. 18.  While having raised a general complaint about the conditions of his detention, the applicant did not describe them until in response to the information submitted by the Government. 19.  According to the information provided by the Government, from 7 November 2003 to 3 November 2006 the applicant had been held in fifteen different cells, the smallest of which had measured 7.17 square meters (the applicant had spent three and a half months there, sharing with another inmate), while the largest one had measured about 34.1 square meters (where he had stayed for fifteen days, sharing with eleven other inmates). Each of the cells had a toilet separated from the living area, sufficient natural and artificial light, operational heating, ventilation, water supply and sewage system. 20.  As it transpires from a note by the Odesa SIZO administration issued on an unspecified date, disinfection, disinsection and rat extermination were regularly carried out on the SIZO premises. 21.  The Government provided seven colour photos of the cells the applicant had been detained in. The photos showed that the cells were clean and looked as if they had been repaired not long before the photos had been taken. They had sufficient natural light; the lavatories were separated from the living area and appeared to be clean. 22.  The applicant contested the accuracy of the information submitted by the Government in so far as the number of inmates per cell was concerned and alleged that there had been more detainees in the cells than indicated by the Government. He also alleged that he had not been detained in the cells shown in the photos. 23.  On 23 March 2006 the Malynovskyy District Court of Odesa (Малинівський районний суд – “the Malynovskyy Court”), to which the case had been transferred from the Kominternovo Court on an unspecified date, found the applicant guilty of three counts of robbery with violence, committed on 22, 27 and 31 October 2003 by a group of persons acting in concert, and sentenced him to fourteen years' imprisonment with confiscation of all his personal property. The court based its findings, inter alia, on the testimonies of the victims of all three instances of robbery, medical reports concerning the injuries they sustained during those robberies, as well as material evidence (certain items seized from the applicant and recognised by the victims as the stolen ones; two knives, a hammer and a sack discovered in the car, which the co-defendants had left immediately before their arrest). The court also heard two eye-witnesses of the applicant's arrest on 31 October 2003, according to whom he had shown resistance to the police and had tried to escape from the scene. Furthermore, it was noted in the verdict that both co-defendants had fully confessed to the crimes they had been charged with on 4 November 2003 and had consistently pled guilty throughout the pre-trial investigation. The court examined their allegations of ill-treatment in police custody, voiced for the first time at the trial, and found them unsubstantiated. Namely, it noted that they had failed to raise any such complaints in the course of the pre-trial investigation and that the circumstances of the case indicated (as confirmed by the eye-witnesses of the arrest and by the police officers who had carried out the arrest and who were questioned by the court) that the bruise on the applicant's face noted on 1 November 2003 might have been sustained in the course of his fight with the police prior to his arrest. 24.  On 22 May 2007 the Odesa Regional Court of Appeal (Апеляційний суд Одеської області) upheld that verdict. 25.  The applicant appealed in cassation, alleging that his conviction was not based on solid evidence. The cassation appeal did not contain any allegation of ill-treatment in police custody. 26.  No information about the final outcome of the proceedings has been provided by the parties. However, it appears from the case file that the Supreme Court found against the applicant. 27.  The applicant's letters to the Court dated 30 March, 10 May, 9 June, 12 July, 28 November, 8 and 15 December 2005, as well as 20 March, 16 May and 3 November 2006, were accompanied by cover letters, signed by the Governor of the Odesa SIZO, which contained a brief summary of their contents (for example: “Please find attached a complaint by the accused, Glinov, concerning his rights and the conduct of the investigation in his case”, “... concerning his case and actions of the police officers”, “...concerning the judge's actions”, “... concerning the defence of his rights”, “... concerning the withdrawal of his case”, etc.). 28.  The first page of each of the eighteen letters from the applicant to the Court bore the SIZO stamp with the dispatching date noted in handwriting (eight of those had been sent before 21 December 2005, the other ten on various dates after 21 December 2005 – see paragraph 38 below). 29.  From May 2005 to March 2006 the Registry of the Court requested the applicant eight times to submit documents in substantiation of his complaints under Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention. 30.  Each of the requests was followed by a letter from the applicant, in which he noted that: there were no copying facilities in the SIZO and that he would copy the documents by hand; the facts of his case were self-explanatory; the prospects of Ukraine's accession to the European Union were poor given the alleged violations in his case; and the witnesses allegedly required protection for unspecified reasons. The applicant made no explicit reference to the Court's requests. 31.  The applicant's letters reached the Court on average two weeks to two months following their dispatch. 32.  The case file contains copies of sixteen stamped certificates issued by Odesa-59 Post Office to the SIZO administration in confirmation that it had accepted correspondence from detainees (including the applicant) to be sent to the Strasbourg Court. It also contains copies of extracts from the SIZO logbooks of incoming and outgoing correspondence and “correspondence delivery acts” signed by the SIZO officials. 33.  Between the end of December 2005 and April 2006 (with the exact date not documented due to a technical mistake), the Court received a ten- page letter from the applicant dated 13 December 2005, in which he outlined his vision for the reform of penitentiaries in Ukraine with a view of improving the conditions of detention. It was accompanied by a cover letter from the SIZO administration dated 15 December 2005, according to which its registered number was 5-3-G-1087. The case file contains a copy of a post office receipt of 16 December 2005 for the dispatch, inter alia, of letter 5-3-G-1087 from Mr Glinov. 34.  By a letter of 15 May 2006, which reached the Court on 26 May 2006, the applicant sought the withdrawal of his application referring to “... the failure [of the SIZO administration] to forward [his] letter to the Court of 13 December 2005 in fifty-three pages; a partial change of the charges against [him] on 23 December 2005; a ruling of the court and ... the intense pressurising by the authorities ...” 35.  On 23 May 2006 the Court sent a letter to the applicant informing him that his application had been struck out of the list by decision of Committee on 16 May 2006. 36.  On 2 October 2006 the Court informed the applicant about the restoration of the application to the list of cases and its communication to the respondent Government on 25 September 2006. 37.  Following the communication of the application to the Government, the applicant's correspondence with the Court continued, with some of his letters bearing the SIZO stamp (see paragraph 28 above).