5.  The applicants were born in 1962 and 1976 respectively and live in Budapest. 6.  At about 3.45 a.m. on 1 October 2006 the applicants were riding a motorbike in Budapest. Police Officers N. and S. halted them in order to carry out an identity check. The applicants produced American passports. 7.  According to the applicants, the procedure to check their identities degenerated as follows. After Mr Réti’s stepping aside and attempting to make a cell phone call, Officer N. started to behave aggressively and repeatedly kicked him. Officer S. first tried to restrain his partner, but following a remark made by Ms Fizli, he also became aggressive; the officers hit Mr Réti repeatedly and finally handcuffed him, forcing him to the ground. Subsequently, reinforcement was called in. Several officers arrived and joined their colleagues in hitting Mr Réti. When Ms Fizli intervened, an officer pushed her in the chest and then down on the ground, knelt on her face, ordered her to shut up, and finally banged her head against the soil. Simultaneously, another officer knelt on Mr Réti’s back, while an officer forced his truncheon against his neck, thus compressing his throat. Mr Réti lost consciousness. Eventually, the applicants were driven to the police station in two separate police vehicles. 8.  The Government gave the following account of the incident. Despite their understanding of the purpose of the police measure, Mr Réti and Ms Fizli initially insisted on speaking English and were not willing to cooperate, therefore the police officers, Officer N. and Officer S., applied force. As Mr Réti resisted, the police patrol called in reinforcements and handcuffed him with the help of the officers just arriving. Ms Fizli questioned in anger the police officers applying force against her partner and, in the heat of the argument, suddenly turned against Officer P., one of the reinforcement officers. It was perceived that she was trying to hit the officer with the cell phone she held in her hand. Officer P. raised his hands in defence and pushed her away. Ms Fizli bounced back from the officer’s hands, lost her balance and fell against the officer standing behind her, who immobilised her.
Mr Réti was then driven to the police station on suspicion of drunken driving and violence against an official. In the police car, he furiously banged his head against the window and kept kicking the window; therefore, force had to be used to restrain him. On account of her behaviour and lack of cooperation, Ms Fizli was also handcuffed, placed in another police car and taken to the police station. 9.  Committed to the Budapest II District Police Headquarters, the applicants were tested for blood alcohol levels. Mr Réti was under very mild influence (0.45 g/l) while Ms Fizli was under none.
Subsequently, the applicants were released. 10.  According to the medical report submitted, Mr Réti suffered the following injuries: a contusion and a haematoma on the right cheek, another over the right eye, a further one behind the right knee, several abrasions and contusions on the chest and the belly, and a brain commotion. Ms Fizli had haematomas on her right wrist, several contusions on her right palm, a contusion on her left foot, and a haematoma with a contusion on the right side of her waist. 11.  On 9 October 2006 the applicants filed a criminal report for ill‑treatment in official proceedings. In the subsequent proceedings they maintained in essence the above version of the events. Officers N., S. and P. were interrogated as witnesses. They stated that only lawful force had been applied to overcome the applicants’ resistance. 12.  A forensic expert was appointed, according to whose opinion it could not be determined whether the applicants’ injuries had been caused as they suggested or according to the officers’ version. 13.  On 11 June 2007 the Budapest Investigation Office discontinued the investigation, essentially with regard to the inconclusive medical evidence. 14.  In different proceedings conducted against the applicants for violence against officials, Officers N., S., P. and V. were heard as witnesses. Officers N. and S. were also confronted with the applicants. This procedure was eventually discontinued on 15 May 2007 for want of conclusive evidence. 15.  The applicants filed a complaint against the discontinuation of their case (see paragraph 13 above). They submitted a number of motions in order to have more evidence taken. However, on 24 July 2007 the Budapest Public Prosecutor’s Office dismissed the complaint. 16.  On 27 September 2007 the applicants, acting as substitute private prosecutors, filed a motion with the Budapest Regional Court.
The court held five hearings and heard the applicants as well as Officers N., S. and P., along with several witnesses. It took testimonies from the other officers present at the incident and the medical expert. In these proceedings, no confrontation took place, although Ms Fizli by then stated that an Officer M. – rather than the accused Officer P. – had brutalised her. For the court, this amounted to an inconsistency.
In his final address to the court, the applicants’ lawyer pointed out that several contradictions in the file and the testimonies were not resolved. In particular, it remained unclear how many times and under what circumstances the officers had forced the applicants to the ground, and how the applicants could strongly smell of alcohol (as reported by the officers) given the very low blood values. 17.  On 5 October 2009 the court acquitted the accused, observing inter alia that the medical evidence was inconclusive.
The applicants appealed. On 21 October 2010 the Budapest Court of Appeal held a hearing and upheld the acquittal (service: 29 November 2010).


6.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Armavir. She is disabled and is confined to a wheelchair. She depends on her disability pension as a means of subsistence. 7.  On an unspecified date the applicant instituted proceedings against her neighbour, M., seeking to have dismantled a construction that the latter had built in 1987 inside the entrance of their multi-flat house for the purpose of insulating the building. In its place the applicant sought to install a wooden ramp for her wheelchair in order to facilitate her access to her flat, situated on the ground floor. 8.  It appears that during the court proceedings the applicant, who was not represented by a lawyer, modified her claim and asked for the construction in question not to be dismantled but to be allocated to her so that she could install a wooden ramp in its place. 9.  On 26 July 2007 the Armavir Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s claim, finding that the applicant had failed to substantiate with any proof, such as an expert opinion, that it was necessary and possible to dismantle the construction and that it was technically possible to install a wooden ramp in its place. 10.  On 1 August 2007 the applicant, still not represented, lodged an appeal. 11.  On 13 September 2007 the Civil Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s claim on appeal. The court found that the applicant’s request to have the construction allocated to her was ill-founded since the construction had not been built by her and, moreover, belonged to the owner of the underlying plot of land. The court further referred to an opinion issued on 16 January 2007 by the Armavir Municipality, according to which it was technically preferable to build a wooden ramp from the balcony side of the applicant’s flat rather than from the building’s main entrance. 12.  On 7 November 2007 the applicant, still unrepresented, lodged an appeal on points of law with the Court of Cassation. 13.  By a letter of 12 November 2007 the Chief Registrar of the Court of Cassation returned the applicant’s appeal, informing her that the appeal had not been admitted for examination as it had not been lodged by an advocate licensed to act before the Court of Cassation, pursuant to Article 223 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the CCP).


5.  All of the applicants live in Baskil, Turkey. 6.  On 19 July 1993 each of them brought separate actions before the Baskil Civil Court against the National Water Board. They alleged that their plots of land were illegally seized by the administration for a dam construction without any payment, and requested compensation. 7.  On 18 November 1993 the court ruled that the cases should be characterised as compensation claims arising from de facto expropriations rather than claims for illegal seizures. The court established that a committee of experts had assessed the value of the expropriated land in advance and that the authorities had paid the resulting amounts to the owners registered in the local land registry. The court ordered the administration to pay the applicants an amount of increased compensation, plus interest at the statutory rate, starting from 1986 when the land was submerged in the waters of the dam. 8.  On 6 October 1994 the Court of Cassation quashed these judgments, holding that the cases could not be characterised as compensation claims arising from expropriation. Upon the applicants' request, however, the Court of Cassation reversed its decision and held, on 10 March 1995, that the cases could in fact be characterised as compensation claims arising from expropriation. It proceeded to quash the judgments of the first-instance court only in respect of the date from which the statutory rate of interest began to run. 9.  By decisions of 21 December 1995 and 25 January 1986, the Baskil Civil Court ordered the administration to pay the applicants a certain amount of compensation, plus interest running from 1986, despite the earlier rulings of the Court of Cassation regarding the starting date from which interest was to be calculated. 10.  On 20 November 1996 the Plenary Court of Cassation quashed the judgments of the Baskil Civil Court. The same court rejected the applicants' rectification request on 2 May 1997. 11.  On 9 October 1997 the Baskil Civil Court ordered the administration to pay the applicants 315,650,000, 297,439,800, 265,571,250, 404,680,000 and 708,190,000 Turkish liras (TRL) respectively, plus interest at the statutory rate running from 19 August 1993, the date on which the land was transferred to the National Water Board. 12.  On 17 March 1998 the Court of Cassation upheld these judgments. On 2 April 1998 the Court of Cassation's rulings were served on the applicants. 13.  On 9 December 1998 the administration paid TRL 934,027,000 to Ms Mürvet Fidan, 884,579,000 TRL to Mr Murat Fidan, TRL 790,746,000 to Mr Hikmet Fidan, TRL 1,190,092,000 to Ms Zehra Fidan and TRL 2,041,230,000 to Ms Elif Özbilge.


4.  The applicant was born in 1943 and lives in Rab. 5.  On 20 June 2001 the applicant’s brother J.K. brought a civil action against the applicant and their father in the Rab Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Rabu) seeking to be declared a co-owner of the house previously owned by their father. 6.  On 20 February 2002 the applicant lodged a counter-claim against J.K. 7.  By a judgment of 4 October 2004 the single judge of the Rab Municipal Court, Mrs L.P.M., ruled for J.K. and dismissed the applicant’s counter-claim. 8.  By a judgment of 12 December 2007 the Rijeka County Court (Županijski sud u Rijeci) dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the first-instance judgment. This judgment was served on the applicant’s representative on 14 January 2008. 9.  On 23 January 2008 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) against the judgments of the ordinary courts. He complained, inter alia, that the first-instance judgment in his case had been rendered by a person whose appointment as a judge had later on been quashed by the Administrative Court (Upravni sud Republike Hrvatske). 10.  On 6 March 2012 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint. The Constitutional Court held that judgments of the Administrative Court quashing judicial appointments had ex nunc effects only and that therefore the first-instance judgment in his case had been reached by a person who had been a judge at the relevant time. This decision was served on the applicant’s representative on 15 March 2012. 11.  Meanwhile, on 26 November 2003 National Judicial Council (Državno sudbeno vijeće) appointed Mrs L.P.M. a judge of the Rab Municipal Court. L.P.M. took her office on 15 December 2003. 12.  However, a certain Mrs N.M., who was running for the same office, lodged a request for the protection of a constitutionally guaranteed right (zahtjev za zaštitu ustavom zajamčenog prava i slobode čovjeka i građanina) with the Administrative Court against the above decision of the National Judicial Council claiming that L.P.M. had not satisfied statutory requirements for the appointment. 13.  By a judgment of 2 December 2004 the Administrative Court ruled for N.M. and quashed the National Judicial Council’s decision. It found that L.P.M. had not had the required work experience as a law clerk (sudski savjetnik) at the time when the notice of competition for the judicial office at issue had been published. 14.  On 13 July 2005 the Constitutional Court dismissed subsequent constitutional complaint by L.P.M.


6.  The applicants were born in 1992 and 1996 respectively and live in Belgrade. 7.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 8.  On 28 December 2000 the Third Municipal Court (Treći opštinski sud) in Belgrade dissolved the marriage between the applicants' parents and ordered their father (hereinafter “the defendant”) to pay each of them 25% of his monthly income in child maintenance. 9.  On 27 June 2001 this judgment became final. 10.  On 2 April 2003 the applicants' mother filed a criminal complaint against the defendant, alleging his failure to pay the child maintenance awarded. 11.  On 13 May 2003 the Third Municipal Public Prosecutor's Office requested the opening of the investigation. 12. On 29 May 2003, in the course of the preliminary proceedings before the Third Municipal Court, the applicants' mother, acting on behalf of the applicants, sought payment of the child maintenance accrued on the bases of the judgment adopted on 28 December 2000 (i.e. submitted a “civil-party complaint”; “podnela predlog za ostvarivanje imovinsko-pravnog zahteva”). 13.  On 14 July 2003 the Third Municipal Public Prosecutor's Office formally indicted the defendant in this respect. 14.  The first hearing scheduled for 9 December 2003 was adjourned. 15.  Between March 2004 and April 2005 two hearings were held whilst another three hearings were adjourned on various procedural grounds. 16.  On 25 April 2005 the Third Municipal Court decided to consider the applicants' civil complaint on the merits and requested an expert opinion in respect of the amount of accrued maintenance between January 2001 and June 2005. 17. The expert produced his report on 7 July 2005. 18.  Between August 2005 and October 2006, four hearings were adjourned either because of the failure of the defendant's lawyer to appear before the court or the court's failure to summon him properly. 19.  In view of a possibility of settling the problem with the defendant, the applicants' legal representative requested the court to grant a short adjournment of the hearing of 22 November 2006. The court rescheduled the hearing for 8 December 2006. 20. Between December 2006 and October 2007, another two hearings were held whilst three hearings were adjourned on procedural grounds, one of them because of the presiding judge's “other commitments” (zbog sprečenosti). 21. In a letter of 11 September 2007, addressed to the President of the Third Municipal Court, the applicants alleged that the presiding judge had herself indicated that she “did not know what to do with the case” and would gladly be replaced by another judge. 22.  On 22 November 2007 the Third Municipal Court requested an updated version of the expert's opinion. 23.  The expert submitted his report on 8 January 2008. 24.  The court served this report on the parties at the hearing of 8 February 2008, which was adjourned to allow them to submit their written comments. 25. The hearing scheduled for 6 March 2008 was adjourned because the prosecutor and the applicants' representative had failed to appear, and re-scheduled for 1 April 2008. 26.  Given the defendant's failure to appear in court, the court adjourned the hearing of 1 April 2008 and scheduled the next hearing for 9 July 2008. This hearing would appear to have been also adjourned. 27.  On 8 October 2008 the Third Municipal Court found the defendant guilty of failing to pay child maintenance and sentenced him to three months' in prison, suspended for one year. The court further advised the applicants, under Article 206 of the Criminal Proceedings Act (see paragraph 35 below), to pursue the compensation claims which they had made in the course of the criminal proceedings by means of a separate civil action before the civil courts. It was noted that the data collected in the course of the criminal proceedings were not sufficient to determine the matter in the criminal context. 28.  It would appear that this judgment was not served on the applicants' representative. 29. On 12 February 2009 the District Court (Okružni sud) in Belgrade quashed the Third Municipal Court's judgment and remitted the case for re- consideration. 30.  The Third Municipal Court subsequently adjourned the hearing scheduled for 22 June 2009 in view of the defendant's failure to appear in court. 31.  On 16 July 2009 the Third Municipal Court discontinued the proceedings because the prosecution had become time-barred. It further advised the applicants that they could pursue their claim for damages in a separate civil suit. No appeal having been submitted, this decision became final on 9 October 2009.


5.  The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Mariupol. 6.  According to the applicant, on 25 December 1999 he lent 3,400 United States dollars (USD) to S. The latter had repaid part of his debt and had agreed to meet the applicant on 18 April 2000 to pay back the remainder, which according to the applicant was USD 2,030. 7.  On 11 April 2000 criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant following a complaint by S. that the applicant had extorted money from him. 8.  On 18 April 2000 at around 3 to 4 p.m. and during the applicant’s meeting with S., the applicant was arrested by police officers of the Mariupol Department for the Prevention of Organised Crime (співробітники Маріупольського ВБОЗ УБОЗ УМВС України) and taken to a police station. Two passers-by, B. and Bo., provided written statements on the same day to the Head of the Mariupol Department for the Prevention of Organised Crime to the effect that the applicant had been talking to S. and F. (S.’s sister) on the street when the policemen arrived and asked him to follow them. The applicant had tried to run away and to throw something from his pocket. The policemen had tried to stop the applicant but he had resisted, sworn at and threatened the policemen. He was handcuffed, put “with difficulties” into B.’s car and taken to the police station. The sum of USD 1,500 and some personal belongings had been confiscated from the applicant. In the report drawn up in relation to the applicant’s arrest, it was stated that the applicant was arrested at 9 p.m. on suspicion of committing a crime, because he could otherwise have absconded. 9.  According to the applicant, from 3 to 9 p.m. on 18 April, and on 26 April 2000, he had been beaten in the police station and had been tortured with the use of an electric current. 10.  On 21 April 2000 the prosecutor of Mariupol authorised the applicant’s pre-trial detention because he “had committed a serious crime and was likely to abscond and pervert the course of justice”. The applicant, who was questioned on the same day, submitted that he had been ill-treated by the policemen. Following these submissions, the investigating officer ordered a forensic medical examination of the applicant (see paragraph 19). 11.  By August 2000 the pre-trial investigation regarding the charges against the applicant had been completed and the case was transferred to court. According to the applicant, during the examination of his case by the court, twenty-one court hearings were postponed because of the victim’s failure to appear. 12.  On 15 April 2002 the Prymorskiy District Court at Mariupol sentenced the applicant to three years’ imprisonment for physically threatening behaviour made with the aim of securing the repayment of debt, and released him on two years’ probation. In particular, it was found that the applicant had threatened S. and that on 2 February 2000 the applicant, together with unknown accomplices, had beaten S., as confirmed by a medical examination of S. 13.  The applicant submitted extracts from the records of court hearings in his criminal case. On one undated separate page, it is mentioned that police officer R. testified in court that the applicant had suffered a kidney contusion and two broken ribs. Witnesses Sh. and Shi. testified that they had witnessed the applicant’s arrest and that he had been handcuffed and put into a van, but that nobody had beaten him. 14.  On 23 May 2003 the Donetsk Court of Appeal upheld the applicant’s conviction of 15 April 2002. 15.  On 13 January 2004 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the applicant’s application for leave to appeal in cassation. According to the applicant, he had not been informed about the date of the hearing. Neither the applicant nor his lawyer had been present at the hearing, whilst the prosecutor had been present and had been heard by the judges. The applicant had received a copy of that decision only on 14 April 2004. 16.  On 19 April 2000 the applicant was taken to the Mariupol Town Emergency Hospital (Маріупольська міська лікарня швидкої медичної допомоги). Upon examination it was noted that the applicant had suffered blows to his back and the left side of his chest, and also had a kidney contusion and haematuria (red blood cells in his urine). 17.  On 24 April 2000 the applicant’s mother requested that a prosecutor institute criminal proceedings against the policemen who had subjected her son to ill-treatment. 18.  On the same date the applicant was placed in the Mariupol Pre-Trial Detention Centre No. 7 (Слідчий ізолятор № 7 м. Маріуполя, hereinafter “the SIZO”). Upon his arrival he complained of headache and difficulties in urination and breathing. He was examined by the SIZO doctor who noted that the applicant had haematuria and an extensive haematoma on his chest. 19.  On 5 May 2000 a forensic medical examination found that the applicant had suffered minor bodily injuries, comprising numerous bruises on his chest, on the right side of his back and on the hips. The examiner found that these bruises could have been inflicted on 18 April 2000 by blows from fists and feet or by the applicant falling down. As for the two broken ribs, the expert noted that on an X-ray of 19 April 2000 it was visible that the applicant had a consolidated fracture of two ribs. Therefore, this injury was not taken into consideration as it had been inflicted earlier than 18 April 2000. 20.  On 27 May 2000 the Head of the Mariupol Department for the Prevention of Organised Crime requested that the Mariupol Town Emergency Hospital submit certain X-ray images of the applicant’s ribs to him. According to the applicant, these X-rays were subsequently lost by the police. 21.  On 10 May 2000, following a complaint lodged by the applicant’s mother, the Donetsk Regional Prosecutor’s Office (прокуратура Донецької області – “the Regional Prosecutor’s Office”) refused to institute criminal proceedings against the policemen. It stated that during his arrest on 18 April 2000 the applicant had disobeyed police orders, had sworn and had tried to run away, and that the policemen had therefore been forced to use martial arts on the applicant. S., who was questioned during the investigation, testified that on 18 April 2000 he had had a fight with the applicant, that the policemen had then come and used force against the applicant, and that the applicant had fallen on a fence but “finally was brought to the police station”. 22.  On 19 and 20 May 2000 the applicant was examined by a SIZO physician. The applicant complained of pain in his back, heart pain, headache, and haematuria. His diagnosis was the same as upon his arrival at the SIZO and he was prescribed an anti-inflammatory drug. 23.  On 10 October and 15 November 2000 the applicant was again examined by a SIZO physician and diagnosed with acute post-traumatic pyelonephritis on his left side. 24.  On 17 November 2000 the applicant was released from the SIZO. On 24 November 2000 he was hospitalised at the Azov Central Basin Hospital (Азовська центральна басейнова лікарня на водному транспорті м. Маріуполя). He was diagnosed with post-traumatic kidney deformations, possible chronic nephritis and haematuria. In the extract from the applicant’s medical file provided by this hospital it is also mentioned that in April 2000 the applicant had suffered two broken ribs. 25.  The applicant stayed in hospital until the end of December 2000. On 21 December 2000 the applicant was transferred to the Nephrological Ward of the Donetsk Regional Clinical Territorial Medical Unit (нефрологічне відділення Донецького обласного клінічного територіального медичного об’єднання). 26.  The applicant complained of, amongst other things, ill-treatment by the policemen and his unlawful conviction to a Member of Parliament, V. V. redirected the complaint to the General Prosecutor’s Office (Генеральна Прокуратура України). On 11 March 2001 the General Prosecutor’s Office informed the applicant that his complaint had been transferred to the Prymorskyy District Court at Mariupol, which had exclusive competence to deal with such complaints. 27.  On 14 March 2001 the Prymorskyy District Court sent the applicant’s complaints to the Regional Prosecutor’s Office because the applicant had requested that criminal proceedings be brought against certain people and the Regional Prosecutor’s Office had failed to address this request. Moreover, the court found that the examination of the applicant’s complaints did not fall within its competence. 28.  On 6 April 2001 the Donetsk Regional Court, following a complaint lodged by the applicant, quashed the above-mentioned decision of the Regional Prosecutor’s Office of 10 May 2000. The court pointed out the need to investigate the applicant’s complaints of ill-treatment by the policemen in the police station, to question a number of witnesses (B., Bo., S.’s sister and a policeman, indicated by the applicant) and to conduct an additional expert medical examination of the applicant. Moreover, the court noted that it had not been established during the investigation exactly how the applicant had resisted the policemen and who in particular had used martial arts techniques against him. 29.  On the same date the General Prosecutor’s Office again redirected the applicant’s complaints, originally received from V. and the Secretariat of the Ombudsman of Ukraine (Секретаріат Уповноваженого Верховної Ради України з прав людини), to the Prymorskyy District Court for consideration. 30.  On 27 April 2001 the Prymorskyy District Court returned the applicant’s complaints to the General Prosecutor’s Office for the same reasons as mentioned above. 31.  However, on 18 May 2001 the General Prosecutor’s Office sent the applicant’s complaints back to the court, indicating that their examination fell within the exclusive competence of the court. 32.  On 23 May 2001 the Regional Prosecutor’s Office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the policemen owing to the lack of evidence that a crime had been committed. Police officers R., M., P. and Va. testified that during his arrest the applicant had behaved very aggressively and had insulted F. The applicant had been struck on the face three times by S. and had fallen to the ground. In order to arrest the applicant, the policemen had used martial arts techniques, as the applicant had been struggling and kicking and did not want to get into the car. S. and F. also confirmed the above findings. No force had been used against the applicant in the police station. The prosecutor also noted that, according to the forensic medical examination of 5 May 2000, the applicant had broken his ribs before 18 April 2000 and had been suffering from kidney disease since 1994. 33.  On 29 October 2001 the Voroshylovskyy District Court at Donetsk quashed the decision of 23 May 2001 and remitted the case materials to the Regional Prosecutor’s Office for additional investigation. The court indicated that the Regional Prosecutor’s Office had failed to comply with the instructions given by the Donetsk Regional Court on 6 April 2001. In particular, witnesses B. and Bo. had not been questioned and an additional forensic medical examination had not been conducted. 34.  From 7 to 26 December 2001 the applicant underwent further treatment at the Azov Central Basin Hospital. He was diagnosed with a recurrent and persistent haematuria. 35.  On 12 July 2002 a forensic medical examination found that at the material time the applicant presented with light bodily injuries: bruises all over the right side of his chest and back, on the right hip and on the left shoulder, small scratches on his wrists and puffiness in the area of the sixth and seventh ribs. The report stated that such injuries could have been inflicted during the applicant’s arrest in the circumstances indicated by the policemen or in the circumstances described by the applicant. It was also stated that the laboratory findings had failed to confirm the kidney contusion. However, the back contusion could have caused temporary (five to seven days) haematuria. In particular, the applicant had suffered a contusion on the lower part of his back, which could have led to a short‑term (five to seven days) kidney concussion. In the absence of the X‑ray images of the applicant’s ribs, it was also impossible to establish whether the applicant had suffered broken ribs. 36.  On 2 August 2002 the Regional Prosecutor’s Office rejected the applicant’s criminal complaint against the policemen on account of a lack of corpus delicti. The prosecutor referred to the findings of the forensic medical examinations of 5 May 2000 and 12 July 2002. As to the two broken ribs, it was mentioned that on an unidentified date the applicant had been X-rayed at Mariupol Town Emergency Hospital and diagnosed with an old fracture of two ribs. Since the applicant had refused to explain the origin of this fracture, it was concluded that it had occurred before 18 April 2000. During the pre-trial investigation, S. had testified that he had hit the applicant three times on his head and body because the applicant had insulted his sister. The applicant had fallen on a metal fence. Later, the applicant had resisted the policemen, who had then used martial arts techniques and had handcuffed him. The applicant had broken free from the police but had fallen down. He had then been put into the car. The policemen, M., R. and P. confirmed these submissions. R. also testified that S. had hit the applicant whilst the policemen had been holding the applicant by the hands. While being put in the car, the applicant had also hit the car door. 37.  On 29 January 2003 the Voroshylovskyy District Court quashed the above decision and remitted the case materials to the Regional Prosecutor’s Office for further investigation. The court referred to the previous court findings of 6 April 2001 and 29 October 2001 and underlined the investigator’s repeated failure to question witnesses B. and Bo. The court also pointed out the contradictions in the policemen’s statements as regards the circumstances of the use of force against the applicant and the blows inflicted by S. In particular, the court indicated the absence of any injuries on the applicant’s head, whereas S. had submitted that he had hit the applicant on the head three times. 38.  On 24 March 2003 the Regional Prosecutor’s Office again refused to institute criminal proceedings against the policemen and S., repeating the same arguments as in its previous decisions. In addition, S. and F. submitted that when police officer R. had showed the applicant his police card, the applicant had knocked it out of his hands, rushed to S. and gripped his throat, whereupon S. had hit the applicant several times. Therefore, the use of force by the police and S. had been justified. 39.  On 23 June 2003 the Voroshylovskyy District Court quashed the above decision and remitted the case materials to the Regional Prosecutor’s Office for further investigation. The court reiterated its findings from the decision of 29 January 2003 and indicated that the prosecutor had failed to verify whether the applicant’s injuries could have been inflicted on him in the circumstances indicated by the applicant – that is to say, in the police station. 40.  Between 20 May 2004 and 27 July 2005 the Regional Prosecutor’s Office refused to institute criminal proceedings against the policemen on three further occasions, until on the last-mentioned date criminal proceedings for abuse of authority were finally instituted against the policemen of the Mariupol Department for the Prevention of Organised Crime. 41.  However, on 20 December 2005 the proceedings against the officers were terminated on account of the lack of evidence of a crime. 42.  On 15 March 2006 the above decision was quashed by the Regional Prosecutor’s Office. The Regional Prosecutor’s Office determined that the applicant should be given victim status, should be questioned and that it should be decided whether a further forensic medical examination was necessary. 43.  On 10 July 2006 the applicant was given victim status and questioned on the next day. 44.  On 19 July 2006 the senior investigation officer of the Mariupol Prosecutor’s Office terminated the proceedings in the case for the absence of evidence of a crime. 45.  On 19 October 2006 the Zhovtnevyy District Court quashed the above decision and remitted the case for additional investigation. The court expressly noted that police officer P. should be questioned, that the applicant’s lawyer should be allowed to participate in the case and that the inconsistencies in the witnesses’ testimonies should be clarified. 46.  On 6 December 2006 the Mariupol Prosecutor’s Office (прокуратура м. Маріуполя) again terminated the proceedings in the case for the absence of evidence of a crime. 47.  On 15 January 2007 the prosecutor of Mariupol quashed the above decision and remitted the case for additional investigation. 48.  Following the prosecutor’s remittal, some additional investigatory actions were held. Officer P. was questioned again. He testified that he had seen the applicant lying on the floor in police officer R.’s office. R. had not allowed P. to enter the office, so he had not seen exactly what was happening in there. Face-to-face confrontations had taken place between Sh. and V. and the police officers (Sh. and V. are the applicant’s alleged acquaintances who had testified during the investigation of the criminal case against the applicant that they had witnessed the applicant’s apprehension by the police but that they had not seen that any force had been used on him). As a result it was concluded that “V.’s testimonies had been rebutted”. It had been impossible to check similar testimonies made by Shi., another witness of the applicant’s arrest, because her whereabouts were unknown. The applicant’s mother and the applicant’s neighbour Zh., who had allegedly been questioned earlier in the investigation, stated that the applicant had had no injuries before 17 April 2000. 49.  On 9 April 2007 the Mariupol Prosecutor’s Office terminated the proceedings in the case for the absence of evidence of a crime. The prosecutor referred to previous decisions in the case, the testimonies of the applicant, police officers and witnesses, and to the conclusions of the forensic medical examinations of 5 May 2000 and 12 July 2002. It was determined that during his arrest the applicant had resisted the police officers. The police officers testified that the applicant had hit them and had tried to escape so they had used force on him and had “literally dragged him to a minibus”. Since the applicant had also offended F., her brother S. had several times hit the applicant, causing him to fall on the metal fence. 50.  On 6 May 2008 the Zhovtnevyy District Court at Mariupol upheld the above decision. The court noted the contradictory evidence given by those who had been involved or witnessed the events in question, but concluded that the applicant’s injuries had been inflicted on him by S. and by the police officers when he had resisted his arrest. 51.  On 2 June 2008 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal referred to the findings of the Zhovtnevyy District Court and upheld its decision. 52.  On 17 December 2008 the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected the applicant’s request for leave to appeal in cassation. 53.  On 30 August 2004 the Zhovtnevyy District Court found in part for the applicant and awarded him 8,170.80 hryvnias (UAH) in respect of pecuniary damage, UAH 1,000 for non-pecuniary damage and UAH 1,260 in costs and expenses to be paid by the State. The above damage had resulted from the seizure of his personal belongings such as keys and money during his arrest on 18 April 2000. 54.  On 2 November 2005 the Zhovtnevyy District Court again found in part for the applicant and awarded him UAH 2,676.03 in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, together with costs and expenses, in connection with the unlawful seizure of two cameras in the course of the criminal proceedings against the applicant. 55.  According to the applicant, these decisions were enforced in full.


4.  The applicant was born in 1935 and lives in Split. He is a pensioner. 5.  The applicant submitted that his pension had been regularly adjusted in line with the increase in wages according to section 30 of the 1991 Pension Insurance Act (Zakon o osnovnim pravima iz mirovinskog i invalidskog osiguranja, Official Gazette no. 53/1991 of 8 October 1991). 6.  On 19 February 1997 the Act on Adjustment of Pensions and Other Benefits from Pension and Invalidity Insurance Funds and on Management of the Pension and Invalidity Insurance Funds (Zakon o usklađivanju mirovina i drugih novčanih primanja iz mirovinskog i invalidskog osiguranja, te upravljanju fondovima mirovinskog i invalidskog osiguranja, Official Gazette no. 20/1997 of 19 February 1997 – “the Pension Adjustment Act”) entered into force, derogating, inter alia, section 30 of the 1991 Pension Insurance Act. Section 3 of the new law provided that the pensions were to be adjusted in line with the increase in living expenses. 7.  On 12 May 1998 the Constitutional Court quashed certain provisions, including section 3, of the aforementioned 1997 legislation as unconstitutional. The Government submitted that, as a result thereof, 427,809 applications had been filed with the Croatian Pension Fund’s regional offices by those seeking adjustment of their pensions in accordance with the Constitutional Court’s decision, that is, in line with the increase in wages. 8.  On 23 June 1998 the applicant applied to the Croatian Pension Fund, Split Office seeking adjustment of his pension for the period between August 1993 and June 1998. 9.  Since the Split Office did not render a decision within the statutory time-limit of two months, on 25 August 1998 the applicant lodged an appeal for failure to respond (see paragraph 25 below) with the Croatian Pension Fund, Central Office as if his request had been denied. 10.  Given that the Central Office also failed to decide on this appeal within the statutory time-limit of two months, on 5 November 1998 the applicant brought an action for failure to respond (see paragraph 26 below) with the Administrative Court (Upravni sud Republike Hrvatske) under the Administrative Disputes Act. 11.  On 8 December 2000 the Pensions Increase Act (Zakon o povećanju mirovina radi otklanjanja razlika u razini mirovina ostvarenih u različitim razdobljima, Official Gazette no. 127/2000 of 20 December 2000) entered into force. Stating as its aim the implementation of the Constitutional Court’s decision, the Act increased the pensions of those retired before 31 December 1998. On 19 December 2001 the Constitutional Court refused to institute proceedings for abstract constitutional review of the Act. 12.  On 28 December 2001 the Administrative Court adopted a judgment ordering the Central Office to decide on the applicant’s appeal within 60 days. It also instructed the Central Office to adjust the applicant’s pension for the period between January 1997 and June 1998 in line with the increase in wages, pursuant to the section 30 of the 1991 Pension Insurance Act, but also taking into consideration the increase already provided by the Pensions Increase Act. 13.  On 5 March 2002 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint challenging the Administrative Court’s judgment and complaining about the length of the proceedings. He argued that the court had instructed the Central Office wrongfully. He also alleged that the Croatian Pension Fund and the Administrative Court had failed to decide on his case within a reasonable time. 14.  On 4 July 2002 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s complaint inadmissible. In respect of the Administrative Court’s judgment, it found the complaint premature since the administrative proceedings were still pending. In respect of the length of the proceedings, it held that the applicant had lodged the constitutional complaint when the case had already been decided; however that remedy could only be used while the proceedings before the Administrative Court were still pending. 15.  Meanwhile, following the judgment of the Administrative Court of 28 December 2001, on 2 April 2002 the Central Office ordered the Split Office to issue a decision in the applicant’s case. 16.  On 23 July 2002 the Split Office dismissed the applicant’s request. It held that it was not possible to adjust the applicant’s pension for the period and in the manner indicated by the Administrative Court since no subordinate legislation had been adopted enabling the Fund to calculate the exact amount of the applicant’s pension for that period in line with increase of wages. In any event, the applicant’s pension had been increased by the Pensions Increase Act, which had fully implemented the Constitutional Court’s decision of 12 May 1998. The applicant appealed. 17.  On 21 October 2002 the Central Office dismissed the appeal. 18.  On 29 November 2002 the applicant brought an action with the Administrative Court challenging the decision of the Central Office. 19.  On 5 August 2004 the Act on the Implementation of the Constitutional Court’s Decision of 12 May 1998 (Zakon o provođenju odluke Ustavnog suda od 12. svibnja 1998., Official Gazette no. 105/2004 of 28 July 2004 – “the Implementation Act”) entered into force. Section 2 provides that retired persons whose pensions were reduced in the period between 1 September 1993 and 31 December 1998 (“the pensioners”) have a right to compensation calculated as a difference between the pension to which they had been entitled and the pension actually received during that period, taking into account the increases provided by the Pensions Increase Act. The compensation was to be obtained through a special fund that was to be established by subsequent legislation. 20.  On 29 July 2005 the Pensioners Fund Act (Zakon o umirovljeničkom fondu, Official Gazette no. 93/2005 of 29 July 2005) entered into force. The Act provides that each pensioner has a right to a share in the Fund depending on the amount of compensation he or she is entitled to. In particular, section 41(1) provides that pensioners, who had already been compensated on the basis of a final and enforceable court decision, are not entitled to compensation from the Pensioners Fund. Section 41(2) provides that pensioners involved in pending administrative proceedings, instituted with a view to obtaining compensation (adjustment of their pensions), shall obtain that compensation pursuant to the Pensioners Fund Act. 21.  On 29 December 2005 the Administrative Court gave judgment dismissing the applicant’s claim. It found that the applicant actually retired under a special statute regulating the pensions of military personnel and that therefore the Constitutional Court’s decision of 12 May 1998 had not mandated the increase of his pension. This had been confirmed by the subsequent legislation (see paragraphs 11, 19 and 20 above) implementing that decision. In any event, the legal gap that had followed the decision of the Constitutional Court had been overcome by that legislation. Therefore, the applicant’s claim for the adjustment of his pension would have already been satisfied by increases provided therein. The judgment was served on the applicant on 26 January 2006. 22.  On 17 February 2006 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court against that judgment. The proceedings are currently pending before that court.


4.  The applicant was born in 1963 and lives in the town of Blagoveshchensk, Amur Region. 5.  On 30 November 1998 the Amur regional police stopped a car. During an inspection of the car, the police discovered a large quantity of aviation fuel. As the driver was unable to produce a certificate for the fuel he was transporting, the police (officer S) seized 22,622 litres of fuel. The police entrusted it for safe keeping to a Belogorsk technical college and later to military unit no. 62266. 6.  As the fuel allegedly belonged to a private company OPIUMIK (the “company”), officer S required the company director, Mr P, to produce a document confirming that the fuel had been acquired lawfully. Mr P submitted an invoice dated 1 August 1998. Criminal proceedings were, however, instituted against Mr P on suspicion of forgery of this invoice. The Belogorsk town prosecutor subsequently discontinued the proceedings on the ground that only the forgery of official documents was punishable under the Criminal Code. No decision was taken regarding the fate of the fuel. 7.  As can be seen from the domestic courts’ findings (see paragraph 15 below), in the meantime, officer S decided not to institute any criminal proceedings in relation to the seized fuel. However, on 2 February 1999 the Belogorsk deputy prosecutor set aside this decision and ordered an additional inquiry. There is no indication that this inquiry led to any prosecution or that any decision was taken in relation to the seized fuel. 8.  The company thus attempted to regain possession of its fuel. By a letter of 17 May 1999 the Belogorsk deputy prosecutor informed the company that the fuel had not been attached to the criminal case file against Mr P as evidence and thus no decision had to be taken. He invited Mr P to collect the fuel through the police department. On an unspecified date, however, the company learnt from the Amur police department that the fuel had been stolen when it had been stored in the military unit. 9.  Meanwhile, the national authorities endeavoured to identify the officials responsible for the loss of the fuel. Criminal proceedings were instituted against officer S for abuse of power, as well as against the commander of the military unit and officer St, who had allegedly misappropriated the fuel in the military unit. On 18 December 1999 the Belogorsk town military prosecutor discontinued the proceedings against officer St and the head of the military unit because there was no indication of a criminal offence. On 8 April 2000 the proceedings against officer S were discontinued because his participation in the disappearance of the fuel had not been proven. 10.  It does not appear that any criminal or other investigation continued thereafter in relation to the seized but missing fuel. No further claim was lodged in respect of it by the company or any other person or legal entity. Nor does it appear that the company made any attempts to obtain compensation after 17 May 1999 (cf. paragraph 8 above). Instead, the company chose to assign the related claims to the applicant (see below). 11.  On 26 October 2001 the company transferred title to the seized fuel to the applicant. On 25 November 2001 the parties amended the assignment agreement, indicating that the assignment included a claim in respect of any damage or loss caused by the authorities on account of the seizure of the fuel, as well as a claim for compensation in respect of unjustified enrichment on the same account and a claim for return of the fuel. The amended agreement also stated that the signing of that agreement “annulled the company’s debt of 50,000 Russian roubles under a contract dated 20 October 2000”. 12.  The company informed the regional police department of the transfer of title. Since 27 October 2001 the applicant has unsuccessfully requested the police department to return the fuel. 13.  In November 2001 the applicant sued the Amur Regional Treasury, claiming compensation for the damage incurred as a result of the seizure and loss of the fuel. The Commercial Court of the Amur Region designated the Ministry of the Interior as the proper respondent, with the applicant’s consent. The court also gave the regional police department, the military unit and the company leave to intervene as third parties in the proceedings. 14.  By judgment of 14 March 2002 the Commercial Court of the Amur Region dismissed the applicant’s action. The court held as follows:
“Under an assignment agreement of 26 October 2001 the OPIUMIK company transferred all its rights to the fuel to [the applicant]...The assignment did not contravene Articles 158, 388 and 389 of the Civil Code... The fuel had been seized in relation to the accusation of forgery against Mr P...
[T]he criminal prosecution against officer S was discontinued ...The fuel was misappropriated by officer St, against whom proceedings were discontinued on 18 December 1999...
[T]he responsibility of an officer of the Ministry of the Interior for unlawful seizure of the company’s fuel must be established by a final judgment in a criminal case. The commercial court, under Article 22 of the Code of Arbitration Procedure, does not have the right to assess the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the actions (failure to act) of the investigating authorities and the prosecutor’s office.
The plaintiff did not submit any evidence showing that the seizure of the fuel by the officer of the Amur regional police department had been declared unlawful by a court and that [the officer] was responsible for the loss of the fuel.
The action must be dismissed because there was no fault on the part of the person who allegedly caused the damage.” 15.  The applicant appealed contending that the absence of a criminal conviction in respect of the officer had been irrelevant and that the respondent and the military unit had entered into a contract for storage of the fuel seized from the company. On 15 April 2002 the Appellate Division of the Commercial Court of the Amur Region upheld the judgment of 14 March 2002. The court stated inter alia as follows:
“Officer S acted lawfully when he inspected and seized the fuel...Having verified whether the fuel had been lawfully acquired, officer S decided not to bring criminal proceedings; on 2 February 1999 the Belogorsk deputy prosecutor set aside this decision and ordered an additional inquiry...
Officer S’s failure to observe the procedure for inspection and transfer of the fuel for safe-keeping purposes has no direct causal link with the loss of the fuel...”
Lastly, the appeal court made the following observations in relation to the military unit:
“Military unit no. 62266 received the seized fuel for storage ... in accordance with Article 84 § 2 of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure. Under Article 906 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation the military unit became civilly liable vis-à-vis the plaintiff for the safe keeping of the fuel. Under Article 902 § 1 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, in the event of the loss of the fuel [the military unit] had to compensate the plaintiff for the resulting damage, unless otherwise provided by the law.”
The appeal judgment became final on the same date. 16.  On 11 June 2002 the Commercial Court of the Far Eastern Circuit, sitting as a cassation-instance court, upheld the judgments of 14 March and 15 April 2002. The court noted that the seizure of the fuel had been due to the absence, at the time, of any document confirming the company’s title to it. The court held that the plaintiff had not proved that the investigator had been responsible for the damage caused. 17.  In the meantime, on 29 April 2002 the applicant brought proceedings in the Blagoveshchensk Town Court of the Amur Region against, inter alia, the military unit. He claimed that the authorities’ failure to return the fuel or to pay compensation be declared unlawful. 18.  By a judgment of 12 November 2003 the Town Court rejected the applicant’s claim. The court held that the fuel seizure had been carried out by officer S before any criminal proceedings had been initiated because of the need to conduct urgent investigative measures, namely a crime-scene inspection, in compliance with the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 26 below). The Town Court also held as follows:
“As established in the judgment of the commercial court, during the seizure of the fuel the OPIUMIK company had not supplied any document to confirm the lawfulness of its acquisition. Later Mr P submitted a forged invoice, which gave rise to criminal proceedings against him. An agreement dated 2 November 1998 between the OPIUMIK company and a Mr G for the purchase of 22,622 litres of fuel was produced before this court. It cannot be accepted as a proof of the lawfulness of the fuel acquisition because the content of that agreement does not correspond to the materials in the criminal case which had been discontinued. Nor does it correspond to Mr P’s deposition in the criminal proceedings, to the invoice or the expert report no. 141-k of 17 February 1999 which stated that the handwritten inscriptions in invoice no. 983 of 1 August 1998 had been done by Mr P. The Court rejects as unfounded Mr P’s allegation that the documents in the criminal file and his deposition had been obtained under duress. Besides, the Court considers that Mr P’s and [the applicant’s] arguments are intended to challenge the circumstances already determined by the final judgment of the commercial court, in particular as regards the lawfulness of the fuel acquisition by the company...The Court concludes that no evidence has been adduced to confirm [it]. The Court does not accept [the applicant’s] argument that the commercial court had confirmed the lawfulness of the fuel acquisition; such matter had not been contested before the commercial court...
The grounds for compensation in respect of damage caused by the investigating authorities, including a claim for restitution of the fuel, are regulated by Articles 1069 and 1070 of the Civil Code. Those grounds were also examined by the commercial courts and cannot be subject to a re-examination in the present case. No legal relationship (обязательственные отношения) was established between [the applicant] on the one hand and the military unit, the Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of the Interior on the other. Hence, his claims ... should be rejected.”
Lastly, the court found that the applicant had missed the statutory time-limit under Article 256 of the Code of Civil Procedure for bringing the matter before the courts of general jurisdiction. 19.  On 9 January 2004 the Amur Regional Court upheld the judgment. The court considered that the commercial court’s judgment of 14 March 2002 had dismissed the applicant’s claims, inter alia, due to his failure to produce evidence confirming the lawfulness of the fuel acquisition. Neither was the civil court provided with any proof that the company had had title to the fuel. 20.  A commercial court issued a private company with an enforcement order for a sum of money against a State-owned enterprise. The company did not submit the writ within the statutory time-limit and bailiffs refused to enforce the judgment. The company assigned the claim to the applicant, who then requested the commercial court to designate him as creditor in respect of the above judicial award and to restore the time-limit for lodging the enforcement order. In 2002 the commercial court rejected both requests. The applicant did not appeal. 21.  The applicant also requested a court of general jurisdiction to designate him as creditor in respect of the assigned award and to award him compensation for the damage sustained. On 26 February 2003 the Primorye Regional Court, at final instance, disallowed the first claim because it had already been determined on 24 October 2002 by the final decision of the commercial court. On 12 March 2003 the Regional Court, at final instance, dismissed the claim for damages on the ground that the applicant’s title had never been confirmed by a court.


5.  The applicant was born in 1989 and lives in Newtownabbey, Northern Ireland. 6.  In 2006 a solicitor in Northern Ireland was arrested and charged with a number of offences, including inciting paramilitaries to murder and perverting the course of justice. The case arose out of the covert recording of his consultations with clients at Antrim police station. As a direct consequence of the criminal proceedings, solicitors in Northern Ireland became aware that their private consultations with detainees in police stations and prisons could be the subject of covert surveillance. Thereafter, solicitors attending detainees in police stations and prisons began to seek assurances from the police that their consultations would not be the subject of such surveillance. 7.  When the police refused to give assurances, judicial review proceedings were initiated on the basis that there had been a breach of the common law right to legal and professional privilege, the statutory right to a private consultation with a lawyer, and Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention. 8.  In the case of Re C & Others [2007] NIQB 101A the Divisional Court of the High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland found that, despite the express statutory right to private consultations, the covert surveillance of lawyer-client consultations was permitted by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (“RIPA”). However, RIPA provided for two principal surveillance schemes: intrusive surveillance and directed surveillance. At the time of the hearing, covert surveillance of legal consultations was being treated as directed surveillance, which was the least restrictive of the two schemes. The Divisional Court held that the fundamental right of a detained person to consult a legal adviser privately necessitated an enhanced authorisation scheme and that protections afforded by the directed as opposed to the intrusive surveillance scheme offered insufficient protection. If the surveillance of consultations between legal advisers and clients in police custody was to be lawful for the purposes of Article 8 of the Convention, the safeguards for the carrying out of intrusive surveillance had to apply. 9.  The applicants in these judicial review proceedings appealed against the court’s ruling that the surveillance was permitted by the domestic legislation. The appeal went to the House of Lords, where it was referred to as Re McE (Northern Ireland) [2009] UKHL 15. The House of Lords agreed with the Divisional Court that although the provisions of RIPA could override, inter alia, legal professional privilege, the higher level of authority necessary for an intrusive surveillance warrant was required rather than the directed surveillance warrants that had, until then, been issued. 10.  As the Police Service of Northern Ireland (“PSNI”) had not appealed against the Divisional Court’s ruling that the use of the directed surveillance scheme had breached Article 8 of the Convention, the House of Lords criticised the Secretary of State for not having taken any steps to ensure that covert surveillance of legal consultations was not treated as directed surveillance. 11.  Following the decision of the House of Lords in Re McE the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Extension of Authorisation Provisions: Legal Consultations) Order 2010 (“the 2010 Order”) was adopted and on 6 April 2010 a revised Covert Surveillance Code of Practice (“the Revised Code”) came into effect. Pursuant to the 2010 Order, directed surveillance of consultations between a detainee and his or her professional legal adviser, representative or medical practitioner in connection with legal proceedings was to be treated, for the purposes of RIPA, as intrusive surveillance. 12.  On 15 March 2009 the applicant was arrested in connection with the murder of a Police Constable believed to have been killed by dissident Republicans. 13.  When first arrested the applicant was assessed by the Forensic Medical Officer as a “vulnerable person” within the meaning of the Terrorism Act Code of Practice. Pursuant to paragraph 11.9 of that Code of Practice, he could not be interviewed, save in exceptional circumstances, in the absence of an “appropriate adult”. In the case of a person who was mentally vulnerable, an appropriate adult could be a relative or guardian, or a person experienced in dealing with mentally disordered or mentally vulnerable people. However, prior to being seen by either a solicitor or an appropriate adult, the applicant asked to speak to the officers in charge of the investigation “off the record”. He was interviewed by police officers in the absence of a solicitor or an appropriate adult and during the course of that interview he gave information which led to the recovery of the gun used in the Constable’s murder. 14.  The applicant was detained in custody for twelve days. During this time he was twice seen by a Consultant Psychiatrist and on each occasion he was assessed as being vulnerable and requiring the presence of an appropriate adult. Also during this time his solicitor obtained an assurance from the PSNI that his consultations with the applicant would not be subject to covert surveillance. 15.  On 25 March 2009 the applicant was charged with withholding information about the Constable’s murder. 16.  Following the charge the applicant was detained in custody on the ground that if released he would be at risk of harm from dissident Republicans. 17.  The applicant was released on bail on 8 June 2009. He was arrested and questioned on a further occasion in October 2009 but was subsequently released without charge. 18.  On 4 May 2010 the applicant was arrested for a third time in connection with the Constable’s murder. Following his arrest his solicitor again sought an assurance from the PSNI that his consultations would not be subjected to covert surveillance. The PSNI informed him that
“[they could] neither confirm nor deny whether any form of covert surveillance has been conducted in any instance. Covert surveillance is regulated by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, related statutory instruments and the Revised [Covert Surveillance] Code of Practice”. 19. The applicant sought permission to apply for judicial review of the PSNI’s refusal to give an undertaking that his consultations with his solicitor would not be subjected to covert surveillance. In particular, he alleged that the grounds upon which the authorisation of such surveillance would be appropriate were not sufficiently clearly defined and that the guidance concerning the securing and destruction of legally privileged confidential information was not sufficiently clear or precise. 20.  On 6 May 2010 he was granted permission to apply for judicial review. In granting permission, the court directed that any subsequent consultations with his solicitor and his medical adviser should not be subject to covert surveillance. 21.  On 7 May 2010 the applicant had his first consultation with a Consultant Psychiatrist. 22.  The applicant was released without charge on 8 May 2010. 23.  The charge of withholding evidence appears to have concluded without trial. 24.  The hearing of the judicial review application took place before a Divisional Court of the High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland on 28 June 2010. On 21 September 2010 the Divisional Court dismissed the applicant’s claim. 25.  In dismissing the claim, the court relied on Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, no. 26839/05, 18 May 2010, which found that the regime under Part I of RIPA was compatible with Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention. Although it noted that Kennedy was concerned only with Part I of RIPA, the court considered that the reasoning expressed was “very relevant in view of the parallels between Part I and Part II of the surveillance legal regimes”. 26.  The court found, in particular, that reading RIPA, the 2010 Order and the Revised Code together it was clear that a surveillance operation could only properly be justified if it was a truly proportionate response to a real risk posed by the individual who was the subject of the surveillance, and if the potential usefulness of the surveillance was demonstrably shown. As the Court had indicated in Kennedy, the requirement of foreseeability did not require an exhaustive definition of all conduct that might justify a decision on, for example, national security grounds, and similar reasoning applied in the present case. Consequently, the court held that the wording in the Revised Code was sufficiently clear. 27.  With regard to the applicant’s second allegation, the court accepted that the statutory provisions under Part I of RIPA, which had been considered by the Court in Kennedy, were more detailed, prescriptive and precise than those in Part II. However, taking together the 2010 Order, the Revised Code and the PSNI Service Procedure Implementing Code, the arrangements in place for the use, retention and destruction of retained material in the context of legal consultations was compliant with the Article 8 rights of persons in custody. Moreover, as the Revised Code made it clear that material subject to legal professional privilege was not admissible in court and should be safeguarded by the taking of steps to ensure that it did not prejudice any criminal or civil proceedings, a breach of Article 6 of the Convention would not occur. While there was a risk of a potential “chill factor” (insofar as clients might be less than frank with their solicitors if they were concerned that they were under covert surveillance), the court considered that the revised Code was sufficiently detailed and precise to reassure those in custody that, save in exceptional circumstances, their consultations with lawyers would be in private. 28.  Finally, the court observed that the special considerations which applied to consultations with lawyers or doctors did not apply in the case of meetings with an appropriate adult. It therefore followed that surveillance of such meetings could be authorised as directed surveillance rather than intrusive surveillance. 29.  On 9 November 2010 the Divisional Court heard an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Leave to appeal was refused although the court certified four questions of law of general public importance. These were as follows:
“a. Do the current arrangements for authorisation of covert surveillance of consultations between a detained person and (i) his/her solicitor (ii) his/her medical practitioner and/or (iii) an appropriate adult violate Article 6 ECHR in as much as they permit the covert surveillance of legally privileged consultations and the retention of material deriving from legally privileged consultations?
b. Do the current arrangements for authorisation of covert surveillance of consultations between a detained person and (i) his/her solicitor (ii) his/her medical practitioner and/or (iii) an appropriate adult violate Article 8 ECHR as a result of:-
(i) a lack of precision and clarity in the guidance governing the authorisation of such surveillance; and/or
(ii) inadequate guidance as to how and when legally privileged material obtained from such surveillance should be handled, stored, used and destroyed.
c. Is the Police Service of Northern Ireland’s Service Procedure “in accordance with the law” within the meaning of Article 8 ECHR?
d. Do the current arrangements for authorisation of covert surveillance of consultations between a detained person and an appropriate adult violate Article 8 ECHR because such surveillance can be authorised as directed rather than intrusive surveillance?” 30.  An application for permission to appeal to the Supreme Court was refused by the Supreme Court on 11 April 2011.


6.  The applicant, Mr Vladimir Parnov, is a Moldovan national who was born in 1986 and lives in Chişinău. At the time of the events he worked as a security guard in a café in Chişinău. 7.  According to the applicant, on 22 March 2005, he was approached by four individuals while walking along a street. They offered him a package, the content of which was unknown. At that moment two plain-clothed persons shouted: “Police, don't move”. All the persons started to run, including the applicant. According to the applicant, he was not convinced that the person running after him was a police officer. After being chased for approximately seven hundred metres, the applicant stumbled not far from his house and was arrested by the chasing police officer. The applicant was wrestled to the ground and a pistol with tear gas, which he possessed by virtue of his job, was removed from its holster. The police officer beat him up and then called other police officers to the scene. Later, several passers-by and the applicant's brother-in-law approached the scene, stopped the police officer from beating the applicant and forced him to let the applicant go. The applicant and his brother-in-law were handcuffed and taken to the police station. The former was arrested on charges of aiding the latter to resist arrest. 8.  The applicant submitted that he was ill-treated in the car on the way to the police station and at the police station by several police officers. In particular, he was punched and kicked all over and hit on his head and other parts of his body with a plastic bottle full of water. His head was banged against walls, the floor and furniture. 9.  According to the Government, during the chase the applicant shot at the chasing police officer from his pistol and then resisted arrest. The Government contested the applicant's allegations about any ill-treatment after the arrest and submitted that all of his injuries were a result of his resisting arrest. 10.  On 23 March 2005 the applicant was taken to a court and charged with the administrative offence of resisting arrest. He confessed during proceedings to having fired at the police officer from his tear-gas pistol. On the same date he was found guilty of firing from a tear-gas pistol at a police officer during the chase and sentenced to five days' imprisonment. The next day the Chişinău Court of Appeal upheld the applicant's appeal and changed the sentence to a fine of 180 Moldovan lei (MDL). 11.  On 23 March 2005 the police officer who had arrested the applicant lodged a criminal complaint against the applicant complaining that he had shot at him with a tear-gas pistol. On the same date he underwent a forensic examination which showed that he had scratches and bruises on his knees, the palms of his hands and elbows. The injuries were qualified as “light injuries” needing between six and twenty-one days of medical care. The criminal complaint was finally dismissed on 20 May 2005 on the grounds that the applicant had already been convicted for the same offence in the administrative proceedings which ended with the judgment of the Chişinău Court of Appeal of 23 March 2005. 12.  On 23 March 2005 the applicant was visited in custody by a prosecutor. He complained that he had suffered ill-treatment by the police officers and the prosecutor ordered a forensic examination of the applicant's injuries. That examination was carried out on 31 March 2005. In the meantime the applicant was released from custody on 24 March 2005 and was seen by doctors who diagnosed him with a fractured cranial bone, first-degree concussion, post-traumatic acute otitis media of the right ear with perforation, and contusion of the soft tissue of the head and face. On 30 March 2005 the applicant underwent surgery in order to repair the torn tympanic membrane (eardrum). 13.  On 31 March 2005 the applicant was examined by a forensic doctor who found that he had suffered a perforation of the right eardrum and a first-degree head injury. The doctor concluded that the injuries had been caused by contact with a blunt object of a limited surface area, possibly in the circumstances described by the applicant, and that they qualified as “light injuries” which needed between six and twenty-one days of medical care. 14.  On 19 May 2005 the Rascani Prosecutor's Office dismissed the applicant's complaint of ill-treatment. The grounds for dismissing the complaint were the statements of the accused police officers, according to which the applicant had resisted arrest and shot at one of them from a tear-gas pistol. According to the police officers they were obliged to apply force in order to arrest and restrain the applicant and all of his injuries were a result of that. The applicant submitted that he had been ill-treated at the moment of the arrest, in the car and at the police station. He also denied that he had fought the police officers and fired at them from his gun. He submitted that his confession that he had fired at a police officer in the administrative proceedings had been made under duress. The Prosecutor's Office heard testimonies from several witnesses who had seen the applicant being restrained on the ground by a police officer and later being released after several persons had intervened. Some witnesses said that they had heard a gun shot. Only one of them stated that they had seen the applicant shooting at the police officer. Nobody had seen the applicant fighting the arresting police officer. 15.  The applicant challenged the above decision before an investigating judge. He contested the findings of the Prosecutor's Office and reiterated his complaints about the ill-treatment at the hands of the police. However, on 18 April 2006, following a public hearing, an investigating judge from the Râşcani District Court dismissed the applicant's appeal as ill-founded. 16.  On 8 February 2007 the Râşcani District Court acquitted the applicant in the main criminal proceedings against him concerning the possession and sale of marijuana. The court dismissed, inter alia, the accusations concerning the applicant's shooting at the arresting police officer with a pistol on the grounds of inconsistency in the statements of the witnesses concerning that event. It also considered that there was no evidence that the package of marijuana had belonged to the applicant and that he had intended to sell it.


5.  The applicant was born in 1976 and is currently imprisoned in the city of Zhytomyr, Ukraine. 6.  On 27 January 2001 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of murdering a taxi driver, M., and of several other crimes committed in 2001 (“the 2001 crimes”) and was placed in a cell at the Kyiv Kharkivsky District Police Department. 7.  The same day the applicant requested Mr O. Kh. as his lawyer in the case. This was allowed and the lawyer attended the initial questioning of the applicant. 8.  On 28 January 2001 the applicant was questioned in the presence of his lawyer by Mr G., an investigating prosecutor at the Kyiv Kharkivsky District Prosecutor’s Office (“the Kharkivsky Prosecutor’s Office”). 9.  On 1 February 2001 Mr M., a police officer at the Kyiv Kharkivsky District Police Department (“the police department”), who was in charge of investigating the death of a taxi driver, Kh., in the summer of 1998, questioned the applicant with a view to establishing his possible involvement in that crime. The crime was classified as infliction of grievous bodily harm causing death, for which legal representation of a suspect was not obligatory. The applicant signed a waiver of his right to counsel. The applicant was then questioned and confessed that he and Mr S. had murdered Kh. in the summer of 1998 (“the 1998 crime”). On the same day that criminal case was transferred to the Kharkivsky Prosecutor’s Office on the ground that the applicant’s actions could be classified as murder and the investigation of such a crime was within the competence of the prosecutor’s office. 10.  On 2 February 2001 the criminal cases in respect of the 1998 and 2001 crimes were joined. 11.  On the same day, the applicant participated in a videotaped on-site reconstruction of the 2001 crimes. According to the minutes of this investigative action, which was attended by the applicant, his lawyer, two attesting witnesses, investigating prosecutor G. and police officer M., who had questioned the applicant on the previous day, the applicant made statements concerning the circumstances of the 2001 crimes, but denied his involvement in the 1998 crime. 12.  On 2 February 2001, after the reconstruction had been conducted, the applicant signed a waiver in respect of his counsel, O. Kh., on the ground that the latter had prevented him from confessing to the 1998 crime. According to the applicant, while the waiver bore the date of 2 February 2001 it had actually been signed on a later date under coercion from the police officers and the case investigator. 13.  Following the reconstruction of 2 February 2001, the applicant’s lawyer, O. Kh., sought a meeting with the applicant. However, his oral requests, as well as written requests of 6 and 7 February, were rejected by investigating prosecutor G. 14.  On 7 February 2001 the applicant, who was represented by a newly‑appointed counsel, K., participated in a videotaped on-site reconstruction of the 1998 crime and confessed that he had committed it with Mr S. 15.  On 8 February 2001 the lawyer O. Kh. complained to prosecutor V. that investigating prosecutor G. had not replied to his request for a medical examination of the applicant, would not permit him to visit the applicant and had tried to force the applicant to request replacement of his lawyer. 16.  On 9 February 2001 O. Kh. was informed that he had been removed from the case and was furnished with the investigator’s decision to that effect dated 2 February 2001. The decision stated, inter alia, that the applicant had confessed to the 1998 crime but had later asserted his innocence on the advice of O. Kh. The investigator had therefore decided to remove O. Kh. from the case on the basis of Articles 61 and 130 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 17.  On 9 February 2001 the applicant, who was represented by yet another lawyer, M., was officially charged with the 1998 and 2001 crimes, served with the indictment and questioned as an accused. 18.  By letter of 10 February 2001, prosecutor V. informed the lawyer O. Kh. that his requests of 2, 6 and 7 February could not be met since he had been removed from the applicant’s case. 19.  In a complaint lodged on 12 February 2001 (see paragraph 36 below), the applicant’s wife raised the issue, inter alia, of the allegedly unlawful removal of O. Kh. from the case against her husband. 20.  On 14 February O. Kh. complained to prosecutor V. about the decision to remove him from the case, and asked him to quash that decision. In his reply of 19 February 2001, prosecutor V. informed O. Kh. that his removal from the case had been well-founded and was in accordance with Article 61 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He further noted that the lawyer had breached professional ethics by advising his client to assert his innocence and retract part of his previous confession. 21.  In his letter of 4 March 2001 to the General Prosecutor’s Office (GPO) (see paragraph 39 below), the applicant complained that he had signed the waiver in respect of O. Kh. under pressure from the police officers and the case investigator. 22.  On 6 March 2001 O. Kh. complained to the Kyiv Prosecutor’s Office about his removal. In its reply of 13 April 2001, the Kyiv Prosecutor’s Office stated that the decision to remove the lawyer had been well-founded and that, moreover, the criminal case file contained the waiver in respect of the lawyer signed by the applicant. 23.  On 10 March 2001 the applicant submitted a request to investigating prosecutor G., asking that the lawyer M. be replaced by O. Kh., his first lawyer in the case, as his defence counsel. 24.  On 24 April 2001 the Kharkivsky Prosecutor’s Office replied to the applicant’s letter of 4 March 2001. It informed the applicant that replacement of the lawyer had taken place at his request, that lawyer O. Kh. was allowed to return to the case and that they had found no violation of criminal procedural legislation in the investigation of the criminal case against the applicant. 25.  On 27 May 2001 the applicant asked investigating prosecutor G. to cross-examine him together with his co-accused S., since the accusations against him had been mainly based on statements made by Mr S. 26.  On 1 June 2001 investigating prosecutor G. replied that the cross‑examination would be conducted after additional questioning of S., in case any discrepancies emerged between the testimonies of the applicant and Mr S. 27.  On 8 June 2001 the applicant was questioned in the presence of his first lawyer O. Kh. He confirmed all the statements with regard to the 2001 crimes which he had made during the interview on 27 January 2001. He also repeatedly claimed that he was innocent of the 1998 crime and explained that he had been forced to confess to the latter crime by officers from the police department. 28.  On 24 June 2001 investigating prosecutor G. informed the applicant that his request for cross-examination had been rejected, since no discrepancies had been found between the statements of the applicant and S. 29.  On the same date investigating prosecutor G. issued a new indictment, which was served on the applicant on the following day. 30.  On 20 November 2001 the Kyiv Appellate Court, acting as a first‑instance court, convicted the applicant and S. of the 1998 and 2001 crimes and sentenced them to life imprisonment. Three other individuals were sentenced to between three and six years’ imprisonment. The court did not mention the fact of the lawyer’s removal from the case in its judgment. The court also disregarded the denials by the applicant and S. of their involvement in the 1998 crime on the ground that their confessions during pre-trial investigation were detailed and consistent. 31.  On 18 April 2002 the Supreme Court of Ukraine upheld the judgment of the appellate court. In reply to the applicant’s complaint about a violation of his right to a defence, the Supreme Court in its judgment of 18 April 2002 stated that it found no evidence of a violation of the right to a defence or of any other serious violation of criminal procedural law that could provide a basis for quashing the judgment of the appellate court. 32.  On arrival at the Kharkivsky police station (according to the Government, on 30 January 2001) the applicant was examined by a paramedic who found him to be in good health. 33.  According to the applicant, on 1 February 2001 he was beaten with truncheons on wrists and shoulders by officers from the police department, who forced him to sign a waiver of his right to counsel and to confess to the 1998 crime, which he had not committed and about which he knew nothing. 34.  On 2 February 2001 the applicant informed his lawyer O. Kh. about the events of 1 February 2001. The lawyer advised the applicant to assert his innocence and to complain about the ill-treatment. The lawyer himself officially asked the authorities to conduct a medical examination of the applicant. This request was handed to the investigating prosecutor, G., who acknowledged its receipt by signing a copy of the request. On an unknown date prosecutor G. replied to O. Kh., stating that his request could not be granted since he had been removed from the case (see paragraph 16 above). 35.  At the end of the interview on 9 February 2001 (see paragraph 17 above) investigating prosecutor G. asked the applicant whether he had any bodily injuries; the applicant answered that at the moment he had none. 36.  On 12 February 2001 the applicant’s wife, Mrs S., complained to the Kyiv City Prosecutor’s Office (“the Kyiv Prosecutor’s Office”) that investigating prosecutor G. of the Kharkivsky Prosecutor’s Office and (unnamed) police officers of the police department had ill-treated the applicant in order to extract confessions with regard to the 1998 crime. She further wrote that, during the investigative action of 2 February 2001, the applicant had retracted his confession and that the lawyer O. Kh. had requested a medical examination of the applicant. In addition, she complained that investigating prosecutor G. had also been threatening her. On 14 February 2001 the Kyiv Prosecutor’s Office transferred the request to the Kharkivsky Prosecutor’s Office. 37.  Meanwhile, on 13 February 2001 the applicant was transferred to a pre‑trial detention centre. On arrival the applicant was examined by a doctor and was found to be in good health. The applicant made no complaints of ill-treatment. 38.  On 28 February 2001 the head of the Kharkivsky Prosecutor’s Office, prosecutor V., issued a decision refusing to institute criminal proceedings in respect of the allegations that bodily harm had been inflicted on the applicant. The prosecutor noted that the applicant had denied any physical violence against him and that no evidence of unlawful actions by the police officers had been found. However, he did not refer to the applicant’s wife’s allegations concerning his subordinate, investigating prosecutor G. That decision was sent to Mrs S. on 2 March 2001 with a cover letter saying that the applicant had denied any violence towards him. 39.  On 4 March 2001 the applicant wrote a complaint to the Prosecutor General of Ukraine. In his complaint the applicant stated that on 28 January 2001 police officers had forced him to confess to the 1998 crime, which he had not committed, and that on 2 February 2001 he had been forced to sign a waiver in respect of his lawyer O. Kh., and had been warned by investigating prosecutor G. and by the officers from the police department that he would have problems if he refused to cooperate. The applicant asked the GPO to ensure that his case was given objective consideration and to reinstate O. Kh. as his defence counsel. On 23 March 2001 the Kyiv Prosecutor’s Office forwarded this complaint to the Kharkivsky Prosecutor’s Office. On 26 March 2001 the complaint was transferred to investigating prosecutor G. for examination in the context of the investigation into the criminal case against the applicant. 40.  According to the Government, the applicant did not provide the names of the officers from the police department who had allegedly ill-treated him until he was questioned on 8 June 2001. 41.  On 21, 23 and 24 June 2001 investigating prosecutor G. questioned three police officers who had been named by the applicant. All three denied any coercion or other unlawful actions on their part. 42.  In its judgment of 20 November 2001, the Kyiv Court of Appeal stated that the applicant’s retraction of his confessions and his allegations of ill‑treatment had been examined and found to be groundless. The court based its conclusion on the fact that the applicant had not complained of ill-treatment during the investigation, that the first complaint about ill-treatment had been lodged by the applicant on 4 March 2001, more than two months after his arrest, and that the police officers and the investigating prosecutor had denied the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment. The court also noted that the applicant had been informed of his right to have a lawyer. 43.  The applicant raised the issue of coercion in his appeal to the Supreme Court. 44.  In its judgment of 18 April 2002 the Supreme Court stated that it found no evidence that the applicant had been ill-treated.


5.  The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Užice. 6.  The applicant was employed by Raketa-Putnički Saobraćaj AD, a company based in Užice (hereinafter “the debtor”). 7.  On 15 June 2008 the applicant was dismissed from his employment. 8.  On unspecified dates the applicant instituted three separate sets of civil proceedings against the debtor, seeking payment of his salary arrears and various social security contributions. 9.  On 2 March 2007 the Užice Municipal Court ruled in favour of the applicant and ordered the debtor to pay him:
(a)  salary arrears in the amount of 8,232 Serbian dinars (RSD) for June 2006, RSD 9,408 for July 2006, and RSD 8,232 for August 2006, plus statutory interest;
(b)  RSD 900 for his legal costs; and
(c)  the pension, disability, health and unemployment insurance contributions due for the period June to December 2006. 10.  On 22 September 2007 the judgment became final. 11.  On 2 October 2007 the applicant filed a request for the enforcement of the above judgment before the Požega Municipal Court. 12.  On 16 April 2008 the court accepted the applicant’s request and issued an enforcement order. 13.  On 26 July 2007 the Užice Municipal Court ruled in favour of the applicant and ordered the debtor to pay him:
(a)  salary arrears in the amount of RSD 8,800 for February 2007, RSD 9,680 for March 2007, RSD 9,240 for April 2007, and RSD 10,120 for May 2007, plus statutory interest;
(b)  employee meal benefits (naknada za ishranu na radu) in the amount of RSD 4,385 for December 2006, RSD 4,385 for February 2007, RSD 4,385 for March 2007, and RSD 4,385 for April 2007, plus statutory interest;
(c)  holiday pay (regres za godišnji odmor) in the amount of RSD 25,000 for 2006, plus statutory interest from 1 January 2007;
(d)  RSD 1,950 for his legal costs; and
(e)  the pension, disability, health and unemployment insurance contributions due for the period February to May 2007. 14.  On 11 September 2007 the judgment became final. 15.  On 2 October 2007 the applicant filed a request for the enforcement of the above judgment before the Požega Municipal Court. 16.  On 7 February 2008 the court accepted the applicant’s request and issued an enforcement order. 17.  On 24 August 2007 the Užice Municipal Court ruled in favour of the applicant and ordered the debtor to pay him:
(a)  salary arrears in the amount of RSD 10,648 for February 2007, RSD 10,648 for March 2007, RSD 10,648 for April 2007, and RSD 10,648 for May 2007, plus statutory interest;
(b)  employee meal benefits (naknada za ishranu na radu) in the amount of RSD 4,620 for September 2006, RSD 4,620 for December 2006, RSD 4,620 for January 2007, RSD 4,620 for February 2007, RSD 4,620 for March 2007, RSD 4,620 for April 2007, and RSD 4,620 for May 2007, plus statutory interest;
(c)  holiday pay (regres za godišnji odmor) in the amount of RSD 35,135 for 2007, plus statutory interest from 24 June 2007;
(d)  RSD 6,748.50 for his legal costs; and
(e)  the pension, disability, health and unemployment insurance contributions due for period October 2006 to June 2007. 18.  On 20 September 2007 that judgment became final. 19.  In January 2009 the applicant filed a request for the enforcement of the above judgment before the Municipal Court in Požega. 20.  On 12 May 2009 the court accepted the applicant’s request and issued an enforcement order. 21.  On 12 July 2010 the Užice Commercial Court opened insolvency proceedings in respect of the debtor, which led to the ongoing enforcement proceedings before the Požega Municipal Court being stayed. 22.  In July 2010 the applicant duly registered a claim for the sums specified in the judgments referred to above. 23.  On an unspecified date he was recognised as a secured creditor. 24.  On 17 April 2012 some of the debtor’s property was sold. A sale of the remaining assets was advertised in the newspapers and a public bid opening procedure was scheduled for 29 June 2012. 25.  On 30 December 2002 the debtor was privatised. 26.  On 17 July 2007 the contract for the sale of the debtor was annulled because the buyer in question had failed to fulfil his contractual obligations. 27.  Following the annulment of the debtor’s privatisation the State owned 58.18% of the debtor’s shares. 28.  On 11 December 2008 the State sold its shares to a private company.