6.  The applicant was born in 1954 and until his arrest lived in St Petersburg. He is currently serving his sentence in a correctional colony in the Arkhangelsk Region. 7.   The applicant was arrested on 31 July 2010 on suspicion of aggravated kidnapping, extortion and conspiracy. He remained in detention throughout the investigation and trial. 8.  On 22 June 2012 the Leningrad Regional Court found the applicant guilty as charged and sentenced him to nine years’ imprisonment in a high‑security correctional colony with the release to be followed by a year‑long restriction of liberty. 9.  On 8 November 2012 the Supreme Court of Russia upheld the conviction on appeal. 10.  The parties provided the Court with the applicant’s medical documents, including his clinical records, discharge summaries, and expert opinions. 11.  The medical records show that the applicant had a long history of cerebral diseases as a result of having sustained a head injury in 1997 that developed into traumatic cystic arachnoiditis. Two years later he underwent a tomography examination which confirmed the presence of a growing liquor cyst located in the right frontotemporal part of the brain. The cyst impacted on his acoustic and visual nerves. The examination also revealed moderate internal hydrocephalus. In the recommendations written on 11 May 2000, the applicant’s doctor noted that a nuclear magnetic resonance examination, an electroencephalography examination and a liquor analysis were required to properly diagnose the applicant’s condition. He further observed that, in the absence of any treatment, it would be reasonable to perform urgent cerebral bypass surgery in order to prevent the applicant from going irreversibly blind. Nothing in the medical documents submitted suggests that the applicant had had any recourse to specific medical assistance or examinations regarding his cerebral problems during the ten years preceding his arrest. 12.  After the arrest the applicant was taken to temporary detention facility no. IZ-47/1 in St Petersburg (“facility no. IZ-47/1”). On admission to that facility the resident prison doctor performed a general medical check-up of the applicant, having noted in the medical file that he had a brain cyst. The doctor concluded that the applicant was “somatically healthy” and was therefore fit to remain in the conditions provided by the detention facility. 13.  On 23 September and 26 October 2010 the applicant was seen by a neurologist. In the absence of any medical documents the prison doctor was only able to perform a visual examination of the applicant. He diagnosed the applicant with hydrocephalus and recommended that an X-ray examination of the skull be carried out to make the correct diagnosis. 14.  In January 2011 the applicant’s medical file was supplemented with his old clinical records from a civilian hospital and the prison doctor examined him anew, paying regard to the additional medical information. He confirmed the diagnosis made in 2000 and recommended a consultation with an ophthalmologist. The applicant was prescribed drug therapy for a month. 15.  An ophthalmologist diagnosed the applicant with angiopathy. 16.  In February 2011 the applicant was diagnosed with tuberculosis. He was immediately transferred to prison hospital no. 2 in St Petersburg, where the disease was successfully treated. The applicant was discharged from hospital with the doctors’ attestation of his full recovery from the infection. 17.  On 8 April 2011 the applicant was sent to Gaaza prison hospital in St Petersburg for an in-depth medical examination. He underwent a large variety of diagnostic procedures, including a magnetic resonance tomography of the brain and cervical vertebrae performed in a Russian civilian hospital, the Mariinskiy Hospital of St Petersburg. The tests showed that the applicant had a liquor cyst in the right frontotemporal part of the brain and that he suffered from vicarious hydrocephalus of mixed genesis and encephalopathy at the initial stage. In addition, doctors were able to establish that the applicant’s cervical vertebrae had several herniated disks and perineural cysts. 18.  Following completion of the diagnostic cycle, the applicant was released from the hospital and sent back to the detention facility. Discharge summaries issued on 15 April 2011 contained a recommendation of supervision by a prison doctor and regular consultations with a neurologist. 19.  In September 2011 the applicant complained about headaches to the attending prison doctor. In response it was recommended that he undergo an additional neurological medical examination in Gaaza prison hospital. However, the hospital refused to admit him because it did not employ a suitably qualified medical specialist, such as a brain surgeon. 20.  In October 2011 the applicant’s lawyer contacted Dr K. from the neurosurgical department of the Scientific Research Institute for Emergency Treatment, who agreed to study the applicant’s clinical records and give his opinion about the state of the applicant’s health at a court hearing on 4 October 2011, where he saw the applicant for the first time. At the hearing the doctor stated that the computer tomography performed on the applicant in 2000 had indicated a brain oedema at the base of the skull. He insisted that any change of the applicant’s lifestyle could induce complications related to the brain oedema and also seizures. Surgery was required to treat the cyst. However, Dr K. concluded that the applicant’s spinal problems were even more serious, as they could leave the applicant entirely paralysed. Nevertheless, the doctor noted that surgery would be only required if the applicant’s health were to deteriorate. The doctor recommended chondroprotective therapy and cerebral bypass surgery for the applicant. He was also to wear a cervical collar. 21.  The applicant also provided the Court with a certificate issued in November 2011 by Dr T., the head of the hospital where the applicant had received medical treatment in 1997-1998. Dr T. argued that the applicant’s condition called for permanent medical supervision by a neurologist and neurosurgeon so that the applicant could be subjected to urgent surgical intervention should the need arise. In Dr T.’s opinion, a detention facility was ill equipped to guarantee such supervision. The applicant also argued that his transfer to a northerly region in which to serve out his sentence had run contrary to the recommendations of his doctor and might have resulted in serious complications of his illness. Finally, he alleged that he lacked effective remedies whereby to complain about the poor quality of his medical treatment. 22.  On 1 December 2011 in response to a request from the applicant’s lawyer, a medical expert commission assessed the applicant’s health and checked for the existence of medical grounds warranting his release from detention. The commission observed that the applicant had received out‑patient treatment and that he had no focal brain injuries, epileptic seizures or significant limitations of his day-to-day activity. Taking account of the results of his dynamic medical examinations, the doctors concluded that the applicant was in satisfactory health and that there were no medical grounds warranting his release from detention. 23.  On 5 April 2012 Dr K. visually examined the applicant. No recommendations were made. 24.  On 4 December 2012 the applicant was examined by a neurologist to whom he complained about headaches, vomiting and vertigo. The doctor recommended drug therapy based on vasobral, piracetam, and vinpocetine. The following visit in January 2013 by the neurologist resulted in a modification of the drug regimen. 25.  On 20 February 2013 a prison doctor approved the applicant’s transfer to a correctional colony, finding him fit to make the journey. 26.  The applicant arrived on 4 March 2013 at correctional colony no. IK‑42/4 in the Astrakhan Region (“colony no. IK-42/4”), where he was seen by the colony doctor, who noted that the applicant had been suffering from brain cyst. At the end of April 2013 the doctor recommended the applicant’s transfer to a hospital for further assessment. No urgency was warranted. 27.  On 25 July 2013 Dr K. drafted another report, assessing the applicant’s condition on the basis of his medical records and the results of his examination on 5 April 2012. Dr K. concluded that his recommendations had not been complied with and that the applicant’s cyst had increased. He stressed that the appropriate treatment could only be ensured in a specialised medical institution, not least because the requisite dynamic monitoring of the applicant’s condition using computer and magnetic resonance tomography examinations needed to be performed every eight months. Lastly, the doctor emphasised that the applicant’s detention in a northerly region could lead to a further deterioration in his health by inducing epileptic seizures and brain ischemia, thus putting his life at risk. 28.  On 8 August 2013 the authorities transferred the applicant to a prison hospital in the Arkhangelsk Region. Following a number of tests, a medical panel declared that the applicant was not suffering from any disability. The applicant was discharged from the hospital with the recommendation that he be re-admitted for further treatment in June 2014. 29.  The last two entries in the applicant’s clinical records are illegible. The parties did not provide the Court with any additional information on the state of his health.


5.  The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Istanbul. He is a high school teacher, an executive member of the Education and Science Workers’ Union and a member of the Confederation of Public Workers’ Unions. 6.  The 2004 NATO summit took place in Istanbul from 28 to 29 June. The Governor of Istanbul designated thirteen locations in Istanbul where people would be allowed to hold demonstrations. 7.  As the remaining facts of the case are in dispute between the parties, they will be set out separately. The facts as presented by the applicant are set out in Section B below (paragraphs 8-10) and the Government’s submissions concerning the facts are summarised in Section C below (paragraphs 11-13). The documentary evidence and further factual elements submitted by the applicant and the Government is summarised in Section D (paragraphs 14-27).
 B.  The applicant’s submissions on the facts 8.  On 28 June 2004 the applicant and a number of other teachers arrived at the square outside the Mecidiyeköy Underground Station in Istanbul, which is one of the thirteen locations referred to above, to issue a press release. 9.  The applicant and all his colleagues were unarmed and behaved in a peaceful manner. Nevertheless, police officers who had been circling the crowds grabbed the applicant and his friends by the arms, sprayed them with tear gas and beat them up. 10.  The police officers then took the applicant to a police station, where he was kept for a period of eleven hours. He was subsequently brought before a prosecutor, who ordered his release. 11.  After the applicant and other demonstrating teachers finished reading their press release, police officers asked them to disperse. When the demonstrators refused to do so, the police officers warned them that they would be taken into custody. The group continued to refuse to disperse and, instead, went on to stage a sit-in protest. They told the police officers that they would continue with their protest until their friends, who had been arrested elsewhere, had been released. 12.  When the police continued to try to persuade them, the demonstrators attacked the police with stones and sticks. They also damaged cars in the vicinity and injured a number of police officers. As a result, the police officers used tear gas in order to disperse them. The applicant was taken to the police station, where he was kept for a period of eleven hours before his release was ordered by a prosecutor. 13.  On the same day the applicant was examined by two doctors. The first examination was carried out at 11.30 a.m. at the Haseki State Hospital. The doctor noted that the applicant’s eyes were red, and considered it necessary for the applicant to be examined by a specialist doctor. The specialist doctor who examined the applicant at Sağmalcılar Hospital at 6.45 p.m. on the same day noted that there was no sign on the applicant’s body that he had been subjected to ill-treatment. 14.  According to a report prepared on 28 June 2004 by nine of the police officers who had taken part in the incident, the spokesperson for the demonstrators in Mecidiyeköy told the police officers that a number of fellow union members had been arrested at another location in Istanbul earlier in the day. The spokesperson added that the demonstrators in Mecidiyeköy would not be dispersing unless and until their friends had been released, and would instead march to Taksim Square. When the police informed the spokesperson that this would not be allowed and warned the demonstrators to disperse, the demonstrators attacked the police officers with the sticks from their banners, and proceeded to stage a sit-in protest. The Rapid Response Force (Çevik Kuvvet) then dispersed the demonstrators and arrested eleven persons, including the applicant, who refused to disperse. 15.  The incident was widely reported in the national press. In a photograph published in the daily newspaper Sabah the applicant is pictured between two police officers who are holding him by the arms, and one of whom is spraying the applicant’s nose and mouth with gas at very close range. 16.  At 11.30 a.m. on the same day the applicant was examined by a doctor at Haseki Hospital, who noted redness in both eyes and referred him to a specialist doctor. The ophthalmologist who examined the applicant later that day at the same hospital observed hyperaemia in both eyes, and recorded his findings in a report. 17.  At 6.45 p.m. on the same day the applicant was apparently examined by another doctor. However, no entries were made by that doctor in the sections of the report reserved for detailing the incident, the applicant’s allegations and the doctor’s findings. These parts of the report were simply crossed out by the doctor. Thus, the report only mentions the name of the applicant, his date of birth, the time of the medical examination and the name of the police officer who accompanied him. 18.  It appears that the applicant was examined by yet another doctor on the same day. The doctor noted in his report (report no. 3015) that there were ecchymosed areas measuring 8 centimetres and 5 x 8 centimetres below the applicant’s shoulders. The doctor also noted that the applicant’s eyes were reddened. 19.  According to medical reports submitted by the Government, the ten demonstrators who had been arrested together with the applicant (see paragraph 14 above) also had various injuries on their bodies. 20.  The applicant and the other demonstrators were brought before the prosecutor and questioned. In his statement the applicant maintained that he had not committed any offences but had simply exercised his democratic rights. He also informed the prosecutor that the police had used pepper spray against him. According to the statement, a lawyer was present during the applicant’s questioning. 21.  On 7 September 2004 the applicant lodged an official complaint with the Şişli prosecutor against the police officers. He argued that when he and his colleagues had been preparing for their press release at 10.00 a.m. on the day of the incident, a number of police officers had attacked them with their truncheons and sprayed them with tear gas. He complained that he had been beaten up with truncheons and punched and kicked by the police officers even after he had been arrested. He pointed out that the police officers responsible could be identified from the photographs published in the newspapers. The applicant argued that the police officers’ actions had been in violation of both the domestic legislation and his rights under the Convention, including his rights to liberty and security, freedom of expression and protection from ill-treatment. 22.  The applicant subsequently found out in 2007 that before he had even lodged his official complaint on 7 September 2004 a prosecutor had already decided on 30 June 2004 not to prosecute the police officers. In the prosecutor’s decision sixteen persons, including the applicant, were referred to as “the complainants”. The sixteen persons also included the ten demonstrators arrested together with the applicant (see paragraph 14 above). The nine police officers (see paragraph 14 above) were named as the defendants. The offence in question was given as “ill-treatment”. 23.  The prosecutor stated in his decision that the police officers had allowed the demonstrators to read out their press release but that when the demonstrators had wanted to march to Taksim square, they had had to disperse them. In the opinion of the prosecutor the officers had been carrying out their duties under the Act on the Powers and Duties of the Police, and had not committed any offences. Despite the fact that it was expressly stated in the decision that it was to be communicated to the complainants, and that the complainants could lodge objections against it, the prosecutor’s decision was not communicated to the applicant. 24.  On 4 July 2007 the applicant wrote to the Şişli prosecutor and asked for information about the investigation. 25.  In his reply of 21 November 2007 the Şişli prosecutor forwarded to the applicant’s legal representative a copy of the decision adopted by his office on 30 June 2004. 26.  On 4 December 2007 the applicant lodged an objection against the decision and drew attention to the prosecutor’s failure to have regard to the medical reports described above (see paragraphs 16 and 18 above) and the photographs of him in the press. 27.  On 8 February 2008 the Beyoğlu Assize Court rejected the objection, stating that the prosecutor’s decision of 30 June 2004 had been in compliance with the applicable legislation and procedure.


6.  The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Yambol. 7.  Around 9 a.m. on 21 April 2004, while shopping in a small supermarket in the town of Yambol, the applicant was stopped by supermarket employees on suspicion of stealing a small bottle of vodka. The bottle cost 1.2 Bulgarian levs, the equivalent of approximately 61 euro cents. The supermarket employees took the applicant to an office at the back of the supermarket and left him with the manager, S.F. The owner of the store, P.D., was also informed and arrived at the supermarket before the police came. 8.  Meanwhile, someone called the police and notified them that a theft had been committed in the supermarket. 9.  According to the applicant, he was searched and his shopping basket was taken away from him. S.F. then accused him of theft, punched him in the face, knocked him down and began kicking his chest, while the applicant was yelling and pleading with him to stop. When S.F. stopped, the applicant managed to stand up and realised that a small amount of his money was missing. When he asked for the money back, as well as his glasses, which had fallen off during the beating, S.F. punched him again in the side of the head and knocked him down, after which P.D. also kicked him several times and told him that people like him caused damage to his business. 10.  Shortly thereafter, two police officers arrived and found the applicant squatting by the wall in the presence of S.F. and P.D. The latter left immediately after the police had arrived, apparently using the back door. 11.  According to the applicant’s statements, made during the ensuing investigation, he had told the police officers that he had been beaten up by two men and that he needed medical help. He also claimed that after the incident he could hardly walk and the police officers had helped him to the police car. During the investigation the police officers stated that upon their arrival they had been informed by the applicant about the beating. They contested the applicant’s assertions that he had requested medical help and maintained that he had not been injured and had been able to walk on his own. 12.  The policemen drove the applicant to the police station in order to establish the circumstances surrounding the theft. While waiting in the reception hall to meet the officer in charge of the case, the applicant apparently felt severe pain, so he left and asked a stranger to drive him home. 13.  Soon after that two police officers headed towards the applicant’s apartment. They found him sitting on a bench in front of the apartment building and accompanied him to the apartment. There the applicant signed a record in connection with the theft. During the ensuing investigation one of the police officers contended that while the officers had been at his apartment the applicant had lain in bed and had looked ill. 14.  After the police officers had left, the applicant felt very sick and his wife called an ambulance. 15.  On the same day the applicant was admitted to the emergency department of the Yambol Hospital, where it was established that he had five broken ribs, bilateral pneumothorax, subcutaneous emphysema of the upper part of the body and bruising to the head, chest and abdomen. 16.  Two days later, on 23 April 2004, the applicant was transferred to Stara Zagora Hospital, where he underwent several examinations. According to the medical reports he had ten broken ribs, subcutaneous emphysema, haematomas on the front, the back, and both sides of the chest, large hematomas in the lumbar area and bilateral hemopneumothorax. On 28 April 2004 he underwent an abdominal ultrasound scan which revealed two-sided pleurisy and traumatic functional changes in the kidneys. 17.  The applicant underwent several medical procedures, including, inter alia, thoracentesis for the removal of 200 ml of liquid from the pleural space. 18.  The applicant was discharged on 5 May 2004 and was granted forty‑five days’ sick leave. 19.  On 14 May 2004 the applicant underwent a chest and lung examination. In his report the doctor noted, in particular, old fractures of ten ribs and pulmonary fibrosis. At another check up, on 4 June 2004, the doctors reiterated those conclusions. 20.  In the afternoon of 21 April 2004 the authorities of Yambol Hospital informed the police about the admission of the applicant and his condition. A police officer was dispatched to the hospital but was unable to see the applicant because of the latter’s serious medical condition. 21.  On the next day, 22 April 2004, the same police officer visited the applicant in hospital. This time the applicant was able to communicate and informed the officer that he had been beaten up by two men at the supermarket who he could identify. 22.  On the same day a police investigation (дознание) was instituted against unknown perpetrators. 23.  On 23 April 2004 the applicant’s wife filed an official complaint with the Yambol District Police Administration, describing the events and requesting that an investigation be opened and the responsible individuals punished. 24.  Between 23 April and 18 May 2004 a police investigator questioned P.D., S.F. and two employees of the shop, the police officers who had been dispatched to the scene of the incident, the police officer who had visited the applicant in hospital and the applicant. The policemen who had been in the supermarket stated that the applicant had smelled of alcohol and had told them he had been beaten up, but that there had been no visible signs of violence on his body. They further stated that he had been able to walk unaided and had not requested medical help. S.F. claimed that while he had been calling the police, the applicant had tried to leave the room. S.F had put a hand against the applicant’s chest to stop him and the latter had bumped into the door. He denied having beaten the applicant up and maintained that the applicant had been drunk and had threatened him. P.D. claimed that when he had arrived at the supermarket the applicant and S.F. had indeed been in the back room but the applicant had been drunk and had not had any injuries. He denied having hit the applicant. He further added that he was not aware of what had happened between the applicant and S.F. while they had been by themselves in the room. The applicant provided a detailed account of the events, although he claimed to have vague memories of certain moments immediately after the incident due to the shock he had experienced. 25.  On 18 May the police investigator ordered a forensic medical report, which was submitted on 23 May 2004. It reiterated the information contained in the applicant’s hospital file. The expert concluded that the applicant’s injuries could have been inflicted in the manner described by the applicant, namely by punching and kicking, but not in the manner asserted by S.F. 26.  The investigator organised a line up on 25 May 2004 during which the applicant identified the supermarket manager, S.F., and the owner, P.D., as the individuals who had beaten him up. 27.  On 27 May 2004 the applicant was questioned before a judge of the Yambol District Court. He reiterated his account of the events and said that he would bring a civil claim against the alleged perpetrators during the judicial phase of the proceedings. 28.  On 2 June 2004 S.F. was questioned as a suspect (уличен). He decided to remain silent. On the same day the police investigator concluded the police investigation and transferred the file to the Yambol district prosecutor’s office with the opinion that S.F. should be brought to trial for causing the applicant an intermediate bodily harm. It appears that no charges were brought against P.D. 29.  On 8 June 2004 prosecutor R.L. at the Yambol district public prosecutor’s office terminated the proceedings against S.F., finding that there was not sufficient evidence that he and P.D. had beaten the applicant up. The prosecutor stated, in particular, that the account of the events asserted by the applicant had been contradictory. She made two points in this regard. First, the applicant had not informed the police officers that he had needed medical help. Secondly, despite his allegations that he had been punched in the head twice the witnesses had not reported any injuries and the doctors who had examined the applicant had not recorded any such injuries in their reports. She further added that in addition, the applicant had vague memories of the period immediately after the incident. 30.  On an unknown date the applicant appealed to the court. He maintained that he had informed the police officers that he had been beaten up and that it had been natural for his injuries to become visible later. He also contested the prosecutor’s version of events, which, in the applicant’s view, could have been interpreted as implying that the applicant had inflicted his injuries by himself. 31.  On 2 July 2004 the Yambol District Court quashed the prosecutor’s decree as ill-founded and remitted the case for further investigation. Judge D.S. held that there was substantial circumstantial evidence that the applicant had been beaten up by two men in the shop. As regards the conclusions of the prosecutor, the court noted that right after the incident the applicant had informed the police officers that he had been beaten up by two individuals and had later identified them and that the alleged punching in the head had been recorded in the medical documents which stated, inter alia, that the applicant had suffered from subcutaneous emphysema of the upper part of the body and contusion of the head. The court also specifically referred to the expert’s report, which found that the applicant’s injuries could have been inflicted in the manner described by the applicant, namely, by punching and kicking, but not in the manner asserted by S.F. 32.  Following the remittal, on 15 July 2004 the prosecutor instructed the investigator to question the police officers who had seen the applicant in the police department in order to elucidate whether the applicant had had visible injuries, had requested medical help, had needed assistance walking and whether he had consumed alcohol. On 16 and 19 July 2004 the police investigator questioned several officers. The witnesses stated, in particular, that the applicant had been able to move on his own and had not had any visible injuries. 33.  On 20 July 2004 the police investigator concluded the investigation and transferred the file to the prosecutor’s office with the opinion that S.F. should be brought to trial for inflicting intermediate bodily harm. 34.  On 22 July 2004 prosecutor R.L. once again terminated the criminal proceedings against S.F., finding with identical reasoning that despite the additional investigative measures taken there was no evidence that the alleged perpetrators had beaten the applicant up. She stated, in particular, that the applicant had not requested medical help and had had no visible injuries. 35.  The applicant appealed against that decree, maintaining that the prosecutor had failed to discuss crucial evidence. He further argued that the evidence collected supported accusations not only against S.F., but also against P.D. 36.  On 4 October 2004 the Yambol District Court quashed the decree of 22 July 2004 as ill-founded and remitted the case. Judge G.K. noted, in particular, that the applicant had complained to the police officers that he had been beaten up and had later identified the alleged offenders; furthermore, his statements regarding his injuries had been corroborated by the doctors’ opinions. In view of that the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence allowing the prosecutor to bring the accused to trial. Nevertheless, in order to supplement the evidential material, the court instructed the prosecution authorities to question the applicant’s wife and an employee at the shop, who had not been questioned earlier. 37.  Following the remittal, in accordance with the court’s instructions the police investigator questioned the said witnesses. On 15 October 2004 the police investigator concluded the investigation and transferred the file to the prosecutor with the opinion that S.F. should be brought to trial. 38.  On 3 November 2004 prosecutor R.L. once again terminated the criminal proceedings against S.F. with identical reasoning. She further concluded that the statements of the witnesses who had been additionally questioned could not alter her prior conclusions. 39.  The applicant appealed, reiterating his earlier arguments against the discontinuation. In a decision of 9 December 2004 the District Court quashed the decree of 3 November 2004 and remitted the case to the prosecution authorities for a third time. Judge N.N. noted that most of the inflicted injuries had been internal and therefore the witnesses could not have noticed them. The court found that the prosecutor’s conclusions did not correspond to the facts of the case, that she had failed to take into account the medical reports and that there had been sufficient evidence to bring the offenders to trial. It also instructed the prosecutor to question one of the police officers who had been at the scene of the incident. 40.  In the meantime the applicant filed a complaint with the Yambol regional public prosecutor’s office, stating that prosecutor R.L. was not impartial and should be replaced. By a decree of 27 December 2004 the regional prosecutor dismissed the complaint. He stated that the discontinuation of the investigation had been based on the prosecutor’s opinion, which had been formed on the basis of the additional investigation carried out in compliance with the court’s instructions, and that in the absence of other indications the mere fact that the prosecutor had discontinued the proceedings on several occasions did not cast doubt on her impartiality. 41.  On 17 January 2005 the police investigator questioned one of the police officers who had been in the supermarket and on 21 January 2005 concluded the investigation with the opinion that the accused should be brought to trial. On 25 February 2005 the same prosecutor terminated the criminal proceedings for the fourth time with identical reasoning. She stated that the applicant’s memory about events was extremely vague and that there was no information indicating what exactly had happened in the period between his leaving the police department and his arrival at his home. 42.  The applicant appealed. On 11 July 2005 the District Court quashed the decree of 25 February 2005 as unlawful and unsubstantiated and remitted the case. Judge A.A. held, inter alia, that the prosecutor’s conclusions suggested that after leaving the police department the applicant had somehow injured himself or had been attacked by unknown individuals. The court stated that, having regard to the time and location of the incident as suggested by the prosecutor, namely while the applicant was retuning home, it was very unlikely that it would have gone unnoticed. 43.  Meanwhile on an unspecified date S.F. made a request under Article 239a of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1974 that the case against him be examined by a court or terminated as the proceedings had already lasted for too long. In a decision of 24 November 2005 the District Court instructed the prosecutor to either submit an indictment within two months or terminate the proceedings. 44.  It appears that no investigation was conducted in the period between 11 July and 2 December 2005. On 2 December 2005 the case was assigned to another prosecutor as prosecutor R.L. had been promoted. 45.  On 10 January 2006 the prosecutor instructed a different police investigator to proceed with the investigation. 46.  On 17 January 2006 the police investigator ordered a medical report. On an unspecified date before 2 February 2006 the medical expert presented his conclusions. He stated that the injuries sustained by the applicant had aggravated with time, therefore he had been able to walk independently immediately after the incident. He also stated that it normally took thirty minutes to up to two hours for haematomas to become visible; therefore it was possible that the applicant’s injuries could not have been seen immediately after they had been inflicted. 47.  As in the meantime the two-month deadline under Article 239a for discontinuing the proceedings or filing an indictment to the court had expired, by a decision of 9 February 2006 the District Court terminated the criminal proceedings. 48.  The applicant appealed against the decision, arguing that although intermediate bodily harm was a serious offence within the meaning of Article 93 § 7 of the Criminal Code and the accused was therefore entitled to request discontinuation of the proceedings after two years of investigation, the two-year period had not expired and the accused’s request in this respect had therefore been premature. 49.  On 8 May 2006 the Yambol Regional Court upheld the decision. It held that intermediate bodily harm was an offence which did not fall within the scope of Article 93 § 7 of the Criminal Code and therefore the accused’s request had not been premature. It reasoned that pursuant to Article 239a of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1974 after a certain period of time the suspect was entitled to have his case examined by the court or terminated and that in this case the court was only competent to verify whether the prosecution authorities had observed the statutory deadlines and could not examine the merits of the case. 50.  On 3 August 2006 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Chief Public Prosecutor, stating, in particular, that prosecutor R.L. had repeatedly terminated the criminal proceedings despite the court’s instructions to bring the accused to trial and that the second prosecutor in charge of the case had been inactive, which had led to the termination of the proceedings. 51.  On 16 August 2006 a prosecutor from the Supreme Cassation Prosecutor’s Office opened an inquiry into the applicant’s allegations and requested an explanation from the second prosecutor in charge of the case and his superior in respect of the delay in filing an indictment with the court. 52.  On 30 August 2007 the district prosecutor of Yambol informed the Supreme Cassation Prosecutor’s Office that no disciplinary penalty had been imposed on the prosecutor as he was considered a reliable employee and that the failure to file an indictment on time had been an unintentional mistake. 53.  There is no information on whether disciplinary action was pursued against prosecutor R.L.


9.  The applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Wrocław, Poland. 10.  On an unknown date in 1995 the Wrocław District Prosecutor (Prokurator Rejonowy) issued a warrant to search for the applicant by “wanted” notice on suspicion of his having committed fraud. 11.  On 3 March 1995 the police arrested the applicant under that warrant. 12.  On 10 March 1995 the applicant was brought before the Wrocław Stare Miasto District Prosecutor (Prokurator Rejonowy). The prosecutor charged him with several counts of aggravated fraud and ordered that he be remanded in custody until 2 June 1995. The detention order was based on Articles 210 § 1 and 217 § 1(2) and (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As to the grounds for the applicant’s detention, the prosecution first relied on the reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offence with which he had been charged. They also considered that the offence in question represented a serious danger to society (wysoki stopień społecznego niebezpieczeństwa czynu) and considered that there was a risk that the applicant might induce witnesses to give false testimony or obstruct the criminal proceedings against him by other unlawful means. 13.  On 26 May 1995, on an application made by the Wrocław District Prosecutor, the Wrocław-Śródmieście District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) prolonged the applicant’s detention until 31 August 1995 in view of the reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offence with which he had been charged and the serious nature of that offence. The court also found that, in the light of the material collected in the investigation, there was a high risk that the applicant would obstruct the proper conduct of the proceedings. Finally, the court held that the interests of the investigation, such as the need to obtain and secure evidence, militated in favour of keeping him in custody. 14.  Subsequently, the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor (Prokurator Wojewódzki) took over the investigation from the District Prosecutor. 15.  On 24 August 1995 the Wrocław Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki), on an application made by the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor, prolonged the applicant’s detention until 30 November 1995, finding that it was necessary because there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the serious offence. Furthermore, the court found that the need to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings militated against releasing him since, at the current stage of the investigation, it was necessary to hear evidence from all the injured parties, to carry out confrontations between witnesses and defendants and to lay further charges of dealing in stolen goods against several other persons who had not to date been involved in the proceedings. 16.  On 24 November 1995, on the subsequent application from the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor, the Wrocław Regional Court prolonged the applicant’s detention until 31 December 1995, holding that there was a reasonable suspicion that he had committed the serious offence with which he had been charged. The court also stressed that the applicant should be kept in custody in order to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings, especially as the charges originally laid against the suspects needed to be supplemented. 17.  On 27 December 1995 the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor completed the investigation and, on 30 December 1995, lodged a bill of indictment with the Wrocław Regional Court. The applicant was indicted on several counts of aggravated fraud. The bill of indictment comprised charges against 13 co-defendants. The prosecution asked the court to hear evidence from 9 expert witnesses and 104 lay witnesses, and to consider 400 pieces of documentary evidence. 18.  The first hearing was to be held on 15 April 1996. Yet it was eventually cancelled because one of the applicant’s co-defendants, who had already been released under police supervision, was absent. 19.  Subsequently, between 15 April 1996 and 28 August 1997, the Wrocław Regional Court listed 12 hearings for various dates but cancelled all of them because several of the applicant’s co-defendants who had already been released under police supervision had repeatedly failed to appear before it. They had submitted medical certificates to the effect that they could not participate in the trial because of their poor health and asked the court to adjourn the proceedings. 20.  During that time the applicant made numerous unsuccessful applications for release on bail or under police supervision. He submitted that even though his detention pending trial had exceeded any reasonable limits, not a single hearing on the merits had so far been held. He also asked the Regional Court to order, under Article 24 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that the charges against the released co-defendants be severed from the case so as to ensure that the trial proceeded without any further impediment. 21.  In the meantime, on 31 December 1996, the Wrocław Regional Court had released A.A., one of the thirteen co-defendants, under police supervision. From then on, only the applicant and two other co-defendants (D.P. and W.K.) were still kept in detention pending trial. 22.  On the same day the Regional Court held a session in camera at which the Regional Prosecutor was present. It made an application under Article 222 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy), asking it to prolong the applicant’s and his two co-defendants’ detention for six further months. That application was prepared in view of the fact that on 1 January 1997 the amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure were to take effect. The new provisions set statutory time-limits for detention pending trial and, in consequence, in all cases where detention had already exceeded, or was about to exceed, the relevant terms, the courts had either to release the person concerned or to ask the Supreme Court to prolong his detention (see also “B.  Relevant domestic law and practice” below).
The reasons for the Regional Court’s application read, in so far as relevant:
“[In respect of the applicant and two other co-accused] the [maximum] time-limits for detention on remand laid down in Article 222 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure have expired and 31 December 1996 is the deadline for lodging a request for further prolongation of their detention on remand.
During the period following the date on which the bill of indictment was lodged with this court, it scheduled numerous hearings; however, the trial has not yet began as this court, for valid reasons [,such as the fact that the defendants, one after another, had failed to appear before us,] could not proceed with the trial. In this connection, this court has, in accordance with the suggestion of the Wrocław Court of Appeal, considered whether it would be sensible to sever the charges laid against the co-defendants concerned, pursuant to Article 24 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Yet, as all the charges in the present case are interrelated, this court finds that there is no just cause to proceed in this way.
The detained defendants have repeatedly asked this court to lift or vary the preventive measure imposed on them. This court has dismissed their applications and in doing so it has had [particular] regard to the serious nature of the offences, the likelihood that a severe penalty would be imposed and, more particularly, to the conduct of the defendants during the investigation, that is to say [the fact that they had had to be] searched for by a “wanted” notice and that there had been problems in the course of their arrest [which had justified the risk that] they might go into hiding. The [Wrocław] Court of Appeal, which has dealt with the defendants’ appeals [against decisions refusing to release them], expressed the same opinion.
That being so, and there being other serious obstacles [to the proper course of the trial] the present application for the defendants’ detention to be prolonged must be submitted to the Supreme Court.” 23.  The application was posted to the Supreme Court on 13 January 1997. 24.  On 24 January 1997, a panel of three judges, sitting in camera as the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court, after obtaining oral comments from the State Prosecutor (Prokurator Krajowy), who had been summoned to the session and represented the prosecution, dealt with, and granted, the application. The Supreme Court prolonged the applicant’s and his co-defendants’ detention “from 24 January 1997 to 24 July 1997”. The defendants were not present. Nor were they legally represented since, under Polish law as it stood at that time, defendants or their counsel were not entitled to participate in court sessions held in camera (see also paragraphs 65-66 below). 25.  The Supreme Court’s decision contained exhaustive reasons, the relevant part of which may be summarised as follows:
The Supreme Court, noting that the application was filed on 31 December 1996 but posted as late as 13 January 1997, first considered what was the proper date of “lodging” such an application for the purposes of Article 222 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The Supreme Court next observed that, depending on the answer to this question, it would have to determine the legal consequences of a potential failure on the part of the Wrocław Regional Court to respect the rule laid down in Article 10 (a) § 2 of the Interim Law of 1 December 1995, which stated that in cases where no request for a further prolongation of detention on remand had been “lodged”, the detention on remand had to be lifted and the person concerned released not later than on 1 January 1997.
The Supreme Court considered that it should also deal with the question of whether it was competent to rule on the application if it had been “lodged” after the expiry of the term referred to in Article 10 (a) of the Interim Law of 1 December 1995, i.e. after 1 January 1997.
Referring to the first question, the Supreme Court held that the proper date of “lodging” an application under Article 222 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had to be deemed either the date of posting the request or the date of submitting it to the registry of the Supreme Court since to hold otherwise would mean leaving a detainee without any guarantee that the Supreme Court was properly supervising his detention. Moreover, if the requesting court was not bound by any time-limits for submitting its application, detention, the most severe among the preventive measures, might continue for an unspecified and unlimited time outside the Supreme Court’s supervision. In consequence, an application under Article 222 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a mere “proposal” to continue detention, would, for all practical purposes, transform into a basis for continuing detention. Clearly, that was not the intention of the legislator.
The Supreme Court therefore concluded that since in the applicant’s case no application for a further prolongation of his detention was “lodged” before 1 January 1997, the applicant’s (and his co-defendants’) detention from that date to the date of its present decision lacked any legal basis and was, accordingly, unlawful.
It went on to find that it was, nevertheless, competent to deal with the application lodged outside the relevant date. It considered that a lower court’s obligation to release a detainee in case of its failure properly to lodge an application under Article 222 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was one thing, but its right to make such an application at any time was another. In the Supreme Court’s opinion, the application in question should be deemed a “fresh application” and be examined as such.
It considered that further prolongation of the applicant’s detention was necessary. In essence, it repeated the arguments adduced by the Wrocław Regional Court and stressed the complexity of the case. 26.  On 9 July 1997 the Wrocław Regional Court made another application under Article 222 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It asked the Supreme Court to prolong the applicant’s, W.K.’s and D.P.’s detention until 31 December 1997. The Regional Court submitted that regardless of its consistent efforts to proceed with the trial, it could not begin the main hearing because several released co-accused had repeatedly failed to appear before it. However, the applicant had to be kept in custody since there was still a risk that he might go into hiding because at the initial stage of the proceedings he had had to be searched for by a “wanted” notice and, likewise his two detained co-defendants, had obstructed his arrest. Finally, the court relied on the complexity of the case and the fact that evidence gathered in the investigation sufficiently supported the charges laid against him. 27.  In the meantime, in July and August 1997, the applicant repeatedly complained to the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor, the Wrocław Regional Court, the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice and the Ombudsman (Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich) that, from 1 to 24 January 1997, he had been kept in detention without any legal basis. He also asked for release. 28.  On 28 August 1997 a panel of three judges, sitting in camera as the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court, after obtaining oral comments from the State Prosecutor, prolonged the applicant’s, W.K.’s and D.P.’s detention pending trial until 31 December 1997. The Supreme Court fully upheld the arguments adduced by the Wrocław Regional Court in its application. However, it expressed the opinion that, for the sake of the proper conduct of the trial, the charges against the released co-defendants should be severed from the case. 29.  On 8 September 1997 the Wrocław Regional Court held the first hearing. It did not deal with the merits of the case but ordered that the charges against three of the released co-defendants be severed from the case and adjourned the trial until 13 October 1997. The applicant asked for release. The court refused, holding that the reasons for his continued detention, as cited in the Supreme Court’s decision of 28 August 1997, were still valid. 30.  In August, September and October 1997 the applicant sent numerous petitions, letters and applications to, inter alia, the Minister of Justice, the Supreme Court, the Ombudsman, the Wrocław Regional Court, the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor and the Wrocław District Prosecutor. He complained about the unlawfulness and length of his detention, the slow conduct of his trial and asked the authorities to release him and to institute criminal proceedings against the persons who had kept him in unlawful custody. He invoked Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, submitting that he had no remedy whereby he could challenge the lawfulness of his detention from 1 to 24 January 1997 and obtain release. He also relied on Article 5 § 3 of the Convention and maintained that his right to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial was not respected. 31.  On 15 September 1997 the applicant made an application for release to the Wrocław Regional Court. He asserted that there was no risk of his going into hiding. He admitted that it was true that, nearly three years previously and before he had been detained, he had used a false identity card. However that single fact could not justify holding him in custody for such a long time. At that point, he added, his detention had already exceeded thirty months. The applicant further complained that there had been an exceptional delay in the proceedings which, in his opinion, had resulted solely from the fact that the Regional Court had failed to ensure the presence of the released co-defendants at the trial. He also maintained that, following his arrest, there had been no single attempt on his part to obstruct the proper course of the proceedings. In his view, there was no evidence whatsoever to demonstrate that, had he been released, he would have evaded justice or any sentence that might be imposed. 32.  That application was dismissed on 9 October 1997. The Regional Court repeated the reasons previously given to justify the applicant’s detention. It was stressed that he should be kept in detention to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings. Moreover, the court considered that the applicant had failed to adduce any arguments militating in favour of his release. On 13 October 1997 the court cancelled a hearing since one of the released co-defendants had failed to appear before it and submitted a medical certificate stating that he was ill. 33.  On 28 October 1997 the Wrocław Regional Court held the first hearing on the merits. Since some of the co-defendants decided not to give any oral evidence at the trial stage, the court read out the record of evidence given by them in the investigation. 34.  The next hearing was to be held on 18 November 1997 but was cancelled because one of the released co-defendants had submitted a medical certificate stating that he was ill. 35.  On 20 November 1997 the Regional Court, at the Minister of Justice’s request, submitted to the Ministry a report on the progress of the proceedings. Further similar reports were submitted on 23 and 30 March, 25 May, 26 August and 9 December 1998. 36.  On 25 November 1997 the court held a hearing and had the record of evidence taken from other five co-defendants in the investigation read out. The court then started to hear witnesses. After hearing evidence from two of them, it adjourned the trial in order to hear six other witnesses. 37.  In the meantime, in November 1997, the applicant had again filed several petitions with the Ombudsman, the Minister of Justice and the Division of Judicial Supervision (Wydział Wizytacyjny) of the Wrocław Regional Court. He complained that the overall period of his detention had meanwhile amounted to nearly thirty-three months but the determination of the charges against him had merely begun. He asked the authorities concerned to react, in an appropriate manner, to the fact that he had been unlawfully detained in January 1997, a fact that had already been confirmed by the highest national court. 38.  On 11 December 1997 the Wrocław Regional Court dismissed a further application for release which had been filed by the applicant on an unknown date. The court held that all the legal and factual grounds previously given for his detention were still valid. It also considered that since there were no circumstances justifying release, as listed in Article 218 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, his detention should continue to ensure the proper conduct of the proceedings. 39.  On 19 December 1997 the court held a hearing. It heard evidence from three witnesses and adjourned the trial until 30 January 1998 because other witnesses had not appeared. 40.  On the same day the Regional Court made a fresh, and third, application under Article 222 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the Supreme Court, asking for the applicant’s, D.P.’s and W.K.’s detention to be prolonged until 31 March 1998. It stressed that it had eventually been able to begin the trial. It considered that, given that evidence had already been taken from all the co-defendants, it could not be said that the court had not handled the case efficiently. While it was true that the process of obtaining evidence had not come to an end, that was not due to any fault on the part of the trial court but had arisen out of other factors. There were still valid reasons justifying the defendants’ continued detention, notably the well-founded suspicion that they had committed the offences with which they had been charged and the risk that they might abscond or go into hiding. 41.  From 19 December 1997 to the beginning of January 1998 the applicant filed numerous petitions with the Minister of Justice, the Supreme Court and the Wrocław Regional Court, submitting that his constitutional right to personal liberty, as well as his rights secured by Article 5 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention, had been violated. He maintained that he had spent nearly three years in detention because the trial court had – wrongly – concluded that there was a risk of his absconding even though, after his arrest, there had never been a single basis for such a finding. Whatever his arguments, the court had never believed him and never given him a chance to prove that his release would not have obstructed the course of the trial. In fact, the applicant claimed, the proper conduct of the proceedings had constantly been impeded by his seven released co-defendants. 42. On 15 January 1998 a panel of three judges, sitting in camera as the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court, after obtaining oral comments from the State Prosecutor, prolonged the applicant’s, W.K.’s and D.P.’s detention until 31 March 1998. The Supreme Court fully upheld the reasons given by the Wrocław Regional Court to justify its application. 43. On 30 January 1998 the Wrocław Regional Court held a hearing but the trial was again adjourned since, in the applicant’s words, “one of the defence counsel [had] left the courtroom”. 44. On 20 March 1998 the court released the applicant, D.P. and W.K. under police supervision. In its decision, the court conceded that the period of nearly three years that the applicant had spent in detention had been nearly as long as the anticipated penalty and that, in consequence, his continued detention would amount to serving a sentence of imprisonment. 45. Between 20 March 1998 and 4 February 1999 the Regional Court held eleven hearings. At the hearings held on 30 November and 1 December 1998 the court heard evidence from thirty-one witnesses. On 5 January 1999 the court heard fifteen witnesses. The applicant twice failed to appear before the court. 46. Further hearings were held on 4 February, 11 March, 14 April, 7 and 28 May and 9 June 1999. During that time the court heard evidence from 8 witnesses and read out records of evidence taken from 11 witnesses. 47. At a hearing held on 15 December 1999 the court heard evidence from 3 witnesses and read out records of evidence taken from 5 witnesses. The trial continued on 14 and 21 January 2000. 48. On 21 January 2000 the Regional Court gave judgment. It convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to 4 years and 6 months’ imprisonment and a fine. The applicant did not appeal against his conviction. Accordingly, the judgment became final on 29 January 2000. 49. On 16 January 2001 the Court’s registry received the applicant’s declaration of means filed on 12 December 2000. It was delivered in an envelope bearing two stamps. The first of them read:
“Wrocław Remand Centre – Department of Records and Employment.
Received on [handwriting] 2000-12-13. No. 651/099”
The second stamp read “cenzurowano” (censored).
The envelope itself bore traces of opening after being sealed: its right side had been cut open and then resealed with six white self-sticking paper slips.
It was postmarked 8 January 2001.


4.  The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Deputatskiy, the Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya). 5.  In the 1990s the applicant subscribed to a State savings scheme which would entitle him to receive a VAZ car in 1993. He paid the car’s full value but never received the car. 6.  On 13 February 2003 he received a partial compensation in the amount of 18,538.20 Russian roubles (RUB) equal to 13.35% of the car value. 7.  The applicant brought the court action against the authorities, seeking to recover the monetary value of the State promissory notes for purchasing of a car. 8.  On 30 June 2003 the Ust-Yanskiy District Court of the Sakha Republic (Yakutiya) allowed the applicant’s action against the Government and awarded him RUB 120,428.80 as the full car value less the amount already paid in February 2003. The award was to be paid at the expense of the Federal Treasury. 9.  On 28 July 2003 the Supreme Court of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic upheld the judgment and it became final. The award remained unenforced. 10.  On 19 September 2003 the Ministry lodged a request for supervisory review of the case with the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic. 11.  On 15 July 2004 the Presidium quashed the judgment of 30 June 2003 and the appeal decision of 28 July 2003 on the ground of a violation of the substantive law and delivered a new judgment in which it dismissed the applicant’s claim in full.


6.  On the evening of 14 May 1994 the applicant, at that time aged fourteen, went out with several friends in the centre of Vidin to play electronic games. On the way back he left the main group to see a classmate of his and her sister to their door. After he had walked the girls home at about 9.40 p.m., he ran back to re‑join his friends. The applicant was wearing shorts, a yellow tee‑shirt and a green sleeveless jacket. 7.  On the same evening, some time after 9.00 p.m., the Vidin police received a report that an ice‑cream booth in the centre of the town had been vandalised by two individuals. A police patrol was dispatched to the scene and arrested the first of them, but the second managed to get away. All patrols in the area were put on alert and ordered to track him down. The description given over the police radio was of a man wearing short pants and a light‑coloured tee‑shirt. 8.  At that time Mr G.G. and Mr V.E., both trainee police officers, were in the area of the incident, patrolling in Mr V.E.'s private car. Although they were supposed to be accompanied by a supervising police officer, chief sergeant A., they were patrolling by themselves, as sergeant A. had been dispatched elsewhere. Their car was in a street which was not well lit. Seeing the applicant running past the car, they assumed that he was the offender at large. They got out of the car and gave chase. The applicant heard their steps, but, seeing that they had come out of an unmarked rather than a police car, kept on running. It was disputed whether or not Mr G.G. and Mr V.E. had shouted “Stop! Police!” after the applicant. They submitted that they had done so, whereas the applicant and several witnesses stated that they had not heard the officers shouting. The chase continued for about a minute. The applicant ran by a Mr I.P. Shortly afterwards, Mr G.G. caught up with the applicant in front of a beauty parlour and apparently tripped him over. The applicant fell on the ground, face down. Mr G.G. then started hitting the applicant's back and legs with a truncheon and kicking his torso. Soon after that Mr V.E. caught up with them and also started hitting the applicant's back and legs with a truncheon and kicking his torso. The applicant averred that Mr V.E. had sat on his back and had delivered several truncheon blows to his head. The applicant was crying and begging the officers to stop, insisting that he had done nothing wrong. Mr I.P. was an eyewitness to the incident, and so were a Mr P.S. and a Mr V.K. 9.  Shortly afterwards, chief sergeants A.K. and I.G. arrived at the scene. By that time the physical assault on the applicant had stopped. The applicant was lying on the ground and Mr G.G. and Mr V.E. were standing beside him. The applicant's tee‑shirt was soaked with blood coming from the neck area. 10.  Chief sergeants A.K. and I.G. helped the applicant get into their patrol car. On the way to the hospital they stopped at a fountain and told him to wash the blood off his neck. The applicant told the officers that he felt pain in his legs and in his right lumbar area. 11.  The applicant was admitted to the emergency ward of the Vidin Regional Hospital at 10.01 p.m. Upon his admission he stated that he could not see. His blood pressure was measured to be 70/0. It was found that he had a traumatic‑lacerated injury on the back of his head. He was also complaining of severe pain in the area of the right kidney. He was taken to the surgical ward and the injury on his head was treated. 12.  From the hospital the applicant was taken to the police station, where he was questioned at about 10.30 p.m. It was established that he had nothing to do with the breaking of the ice‑cream booth. After the questioning an officer took the applicant home. When the applicant's mother saw the state the applicant was in, she asked a friend to drive the applicant and herself back to the emergency ward of the Vidin Regional Hospital. There she was informed that the applicant had already been treated and that there was nothing more the staff could do, as there were no doctors on the ward at that time, only paramedics. 13.  The applicant and his mother then went to the police station to find out why he had been beaten and apprise the police of the names of the eyewitnesses to the incident. They were given the names of the officers who had assaulted the applicant and sometime around midnight left the station and went home. 14.  When the severe pain in the applicant's right lumbar area continued through the night and blood showed up in his urine, a doctor was called in and examined the applicant at 2.10 a.m. on 15 May 1994. He found that the applicant had a reddening of the skin in the groins, parallel traces of blood suffusions and grazes on the calves, three on the left leg and two on the right leg, and a head injury. 15.  At 9.15 a.m. on 15 May 1994 the applicant went once more to the emergency ward of the Vidin Regional Hospital. At 10 a.m. he was admitted to the surgical ward. He was diagnosed as suffering from contusion in the right lumbar area, commotion of the right kidney and haematuria (blood in the urine), and was treated with styptics and antibiotics. He remained in hospital until 28 May 1994. 16.  Two days later, on 30 May 1994, the applicant was urgently admitted to the urology centre of the Medical Academy in Sofia because of macroscopic haematuria (high levels of blood in his urine) and sustained dull pain in his right lumbar area. His right kidney was found to be surrounded by a haematoma and retaining liquid. It was established that his blood pressure was 140/100 because of, among other reasons, the pressure from the haematoma on the kidney. The applicant was treated with spasmolytics, analgesics and antibiotics. The applicant had to be released on 13 June 1994 due to an in‑hospital infection outbreak. 17.  Throughout the following years the applicant underwent numerous examinations of his right kidney. 18.  On 15 July 1996 the applicant was admitted to the urology ward of the National Institute for Urgent Medical Care “Pirogov”, after complaining from dull pain in his right lumbar area. He was diagnosed as suffering from hydronephrosis of the right kidney (pathological chronic enlargement of the collecting channels of a kidney, leading to the compression and the eventual destruction of kidney tissue and the deterioration of the kidney function). On 22 July 1996 he underwent surgery and his right kidney was removed. On 9 August 1996 he was released from hospital. 19.  On 14 May 1994 the applicant's mother complained about his beating to the Vidin Regional Prosecutor's Office. On 16 May 1994 the applicant's father also lodged a complaint with the Vidin District Prosecutor's Office. 20.  On 21 June 1994 the Pleven Military Prosecutor's Office, which was competent to deal with offences allegedly committed by police officers, opened criminal proceedings against Mr G.G. and Mr V.E. 21.  The investigator to whom the case was assigned conducted a series of interviews on 27, 28 and 29 June 1994. He questioned the applicant, Mr I.P., Mr V.K. and several other witnesses. On 16 and 17 August 1994 the investigator questioned chief sergeant A.K. and two other police officers. 22.  On 17 August 1994 Mr G.G. and Mr V.E. were charged and questioned. During questioning Mr G.G. stated that he had tripped the applicant but had not subjected him to any other violence. Mr V.E. stated that he had only hit the applicant once with a truncheon on the legs, but had not subjected him to any other violence. 23.  On an unspecified date the investigator ordered a medical expert report to determine the extent of the applicant's injuries. The report was drawn up by Dr A.I., head of the forensic medicine ward of the Vidin Regional Hospital. She found that the applicant had had a wound on his head, haematomas and grazing on his legs, contusion of the right lumbar area and haematuria. She concluded that the beating had caused the applicant a short‑term life‑threatening health disorder, due to a traumatic-haemorrhagic shock resulting from the contusion of the right kidney and a massive haematoma around the kidney. 24.  On 6 July 1995 the applicant's mother, acting for the applicant, who was still underage, submitted a civil claim against Mr G.G. and Mr V.E. She sought 400,000 old Bulgarian levs (BGL)[1] on the applicant's behalf. 25.  Another series of interviews was conducted on 20 September 1995 by another investigator at the Pleven Regional Military Prosecutor's Office. Mr V.K. and Mr P.S. were questioned. 26.  On 3 November 1995 the Pleven Military Prosecutor's Office submitted to the Pleven Military Court an indictment against Mr G.G. and Mr V.E., charging them with causing intermediate bodily harm to the applicant. On 6 November 1995 the case was set down for hearing. 27.  The first hearing took place on 12 February 1996. Mr G.G. and Mr V.E. were represented by Mr L.I., a former military prosecutor‑general. The applicant, who was also represented by counsel, amended his civil claim, seeking interest as from the date of the beating and naming the Vidin Regional Directorate of Internal Affairs as a third defendant. The court heard Mr G.G., Mr V.E., the applicant, the applicant's mother, chief sergeant A.K., several other police officers, Mr I.P., Mr V.K. and Mr P.S. Noting that the statements of the accused differed from those of the eyewitnesses, the court carried out a confrontation. Finally, the court heard Dr A.I., the medical expert who had given an opinion about the extent of the applicant's injuries. The accused disputed Dr A.I.'s conclusions and requested a new medical report to be drawn up by three experts, excluding Dr A.I. The court acceded to the request and ordered a new expert report, to be drawn up by three medical experts. 28.  In their report the three medical experts (Dr P.L., head of the forensic medicine and ethics department of the High Institute of Medicine in Pleven, Dr V.G., head of department at the Urology Clinic of the Institute, and Dr K.P., senior assistant at the anaesthesiology and intensive care departments of the Institute) concluded that as a result of the 14 May 1994 incident the applicant had suffered a contusion of the right kidney, haematomas and grazing of the two legs, a wound on the head and a reddening in the right part of the groins. Unlike Dr A.I., they concluded that the traumatic‑neurogenic shock suffered by the applicant had not become truly life‑threatening. They also found that before the incident the applicant had been suffering from a congenital kidney anomaly, which had been the reason for the applicant's haematuria after the incident. In the experts' view, the applicant's kidney injury had not been life‑threatening and had had no long‑lasting effects on his health. The beating had caused the applicant only a temporary (two‑ or three‑week) health problem. 29.  The next hearing took place on 19 June 1996. The court heard the three medical experts, who stated that they adhered to the conclusions given in their report. The prosecutor noted that the first report, drawn up by Dr A.I., and the second report, drawn up by the three medical experts, substantially differed on the issue of the extent of the injuries suffered by the applicant. He therefore requested an additional expert report, to be drawn up by five experts, including Dr A.I. The court acceded to the request. 30.  On 20 May 1997 the report of the five medical experts was ready. They concluded that the applicant had suffered a traumatic‑neurogenic shock, which, however, had not deteriorated and had not become life‑threatening. They also concluded that before the incident the applicant had been suffering from a congenital kidney anomaly, which had been the reason for his haematuria after the incident. In the experts' view, the applicant's kidney injury had not become life‑threatening. As regards the later surgical removal of the kidney and its potential causal link with the beating, the experts were of the opinion that, in view of the long time-span between the beating (14 May 1994) and the surgery (22 July 1996) and the nature of the injury, it could not be concluded that the removal of the kidney had been a direct and proximate consequence of the beating. Additionally, the applicant's congenital kidney anomaly had been prone to natural deterioration and could have led on its own to a decline in the kidney function, which was what had made the removal necessary. It could not be categorically established that the beating had not contributed to the need for the removal of the kidney, but the main factor had been the congenital anomaly. 31.  After several adjournments due to difficulties with the attendance of all five medical experts, the Pleven Military Court listed a hearing for 26 January 1998. At that hearing the court heard all five medical experts. Four of them stated that they adhered to the conclusions made in their report. By contrast, Dr A.I. stated that she did not agree with the conclusions of the report and that she still maintained the opinion expressed in her initial report. The applicant presented X‑rays of his kidneys and, after examining them, the four experts stated that they still adhered to the conclusions reached in their report. The applicant increased his civil claim to BGL 10,000,000. In his concluding argument the public prosecutor stated that, in view of the experts' opinion, he did not pursue the charge of intermediate bodily harm, and urged the court to characterise the officers' act as inflicting minor bodily harm. 32.  In a judgment of 26 January 1998 the Pleven Military Court found Mr G.G. and Mr V.E. guilty of inflicting the applicant minor bodily harm and not guilty of inflicting him intermediate bodily harm. It sentenced them to five months' imprisonment, suspended for three years. The court also partially allowed the applicant's claim for damages, awarding him BGL 300,000[2], to be paid jointly and severally by the two officers and the vicariously liable Regional Directorate of Internal Affairs in Vidin. 33.  The court found that Mr G.G. had tripped the applicant and that the applicant had fallen on the ground face down. After that Mr G.G. had delivered a number of blows on the applicant's back and legs with a truncheon and had kicked several times his torso. When Mr V.E. had arrived he had also hit the applicant's back and legs with a truncheon and had kicked his torso. During the beating the applicant had told the two accused that he had done nothing wrong. The court stated that it did not find the accused's averment that they had not beaten the applicant persuasive, because it was disproved by the testimony of two eyewitnesses – Mr I.P. and Mr V.K. – and of the applicant himself. The court considered that the eyewitnesses' and the applicant's testimony was consistent and reliable. 34.  The court also examined the officers' assertion that they had acted lawfully, in a situation calling for the arrest of a suspect, and that they had inflicted bodily harm in their efforts to subdue the applicant. In that connection, it noted that the accused were substantially stronger physically than the applicant, that Mr I.P., Mr V.K. and chief sergeant A.K. had testified that the applicant had not tried to resist, and that at the time of the incident the applicant had been fourteen years old. The court accordingly rejected the assertion. 35.  As regards the extent of the applicant's injuries, the court held that the opinion of the four medical experts, which appeared objective, impartial, consistent, well‑reasoned and in conformity with the medical documents in the case file, should be given more credit than that of Dr A.I. In the court's view, the four experts' arguments confuted her opinion. The court therefore held that as a result of the beating the applicant had suffered a temporary (two‑ or three‑week) non‑life‑threatening health disorder, which amounted to minor bodily harm within the meaning of Articles 128 to 130 of the Criminal Code of 1968 (“the CC”). 36.  Finally, the court rejected Mr G.G. and Mr V.E.'s defence under Article 12a of the CC that they had only used the force necessary to arrest a presumed offender, injuring the applicant in the process of subduing his resistance. The court acknowledged the great disparity in terms of physical strength between the two policemen and the applicant. Moreover, the other witnesses had clearly indicated that the applicant had not put up any resistance requiring the use of force. Finally, at the time of the incident the applicant had been only fourteen years old and his age was visible from his physical features. 37.  Mr G.G. and Mr V.E. appealed, arguing that their actions had not constituted an offence, as they had acted within the bounds allowed by the National Police Act of 1993. In the alternative, they submitted that the sentences imposed on them were too harsh. The applicant also appealed, arguing that the amount of damages awarded to him was too low. 38.  The Military Court of Appeals held a hearing on 8 June 1998. The officers were represented by their counsel, Mr L.I. The applicant was represented by two lawyers. 39.  In a judgment of 8 June 1998 the Military Court of Appeals upheld the Pleven Military Court's judgment. It held that the manner in which the applicant's injuries had been caused had been correctly established by the lower court. There existed direct evidence that the applicant had been subjected to violence even after he had been brought to the ground and had not had the possibility to resist or run away. Even if the officers had misidentified the applicant, this had not legally justified the physical assault that they had inflicted on him. Moreover, the use of force had continued after the applicant had been subdued. There existed a direct causal link between the violence and the injuries sustained, as confirmed by all of the medical expert reports. The court went on to state that it did not agree with the lower court's conclusion as regards the extent of the applicant's injury. To exclude the causal link between the surgical removal of the applicant's right kidney and the incident of 14 May 1994, the Pleven Military Court had relied on the conclusion of four medical experts and had rejected as illogical the conclusion of Dr A.I. However, that court had disregarded that conclusion on purely formal grounds, without discussing its main points. It was unclear whether the opinion of the four experts was in fact based on the raw medical data, which in turn cast doubt on its correctness. The court concluded that if the lower court had taken into account these considerations, it could have made a different finding as to the reason for the surgical removal of the applicant's right kidney. However, since no appeal had been lodged by the prosecution, the court only noted this factual mistake and did not correct it in its judgment by holding that the applicant had suffered intermediate bodily harm, as that would worsen the accused's position. 40.  Mr G.G. and Mr V.E. appealed on points of law to the Supreme Court of Cassation. The applicant also appealed, requesting an increase in the amount of damages awarded. 41.  The Supreme Court of Cassation held a hearing on 17 September 1998. It heard the applicant's and the officers' oral argument and accepted their written pleadings for consideration. The prosecutor present at the hearing submitted that both appeals were groundless and should be dismissed. 42.  In a final judgment of 11 November 1998 the Supreme Court of Cassation reversed Mr G.G.'s and Mr V.E.'s convictions and acquitted them. It also dismissed the applicant's civil claim. Its opinion read as follows:
“...The courts below arrived at the erroneous conclusion that the two [officers]' act had been wrongful and contrary to Article 131 [§ 1] (2) of the CC...
This is so for the following reasons:
The [officers'] act does not amount to an offence, as they acted under the prerequisites of section 40(1), points 1 and 2 of the National Police Act [of 1993] and within the bounds set by this Act on the use of physical force, namely information about the perpetration of a publicly prosecutable offence in the centre of Vidin, which was broadcast over the [police] radio station and was received by [Mr G.G.] and [Mr V.E.]. Moreover, the description of the perpetrator who had fled from the crime scene coincided with the appearance of the [applicant], and for this reason the ... officers mistook him for the wanted offender. What is more, the [applicant] did not obey and through his actions refused to comply with the lawful order of the [officers], who tried to stop him by shouting 'Stop! Police!' Instead, he tried to escape, in order to avoid arrest by the [police], who, in line with their duties, gave chase with a view to arresting the suspect. As it were, not only did the [applicant] not obey, but he also resisted the [police officers]. Finally, the injuries he sustained upon his arrest are within what is permissible under sections 40 and 41 of the [National Police Act of 1993].
The overall situation, including the [applicant]'s inadequate behaviour, led the [officers] to conclude that he was the offender who was being sought after and who had to be caught, overawed and apprehended. This conclusion and the lawful actions of the officers, including the use of force with its consequences for the [applicant], rule out the criminality of their act. [To hold o]therwise [would mean to render] the above‑mentioned provisions of the [National Police Act of 1993] nugatory.”


5.  Flats represented nearly 20% of the pre-war housing stock of Bosnia and Herzegovina[1] (around 250,000 housing units out of 1,315,000). By local standards, they were a particularly attractive type of home, equipped with modern conveniences and located in urban centres. Practically all flats were under the regime of “social ownership” – a concept which, while it does exist in other countries, was particularly highly developed in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (“the SFRY”). They were generally built by socially owned enterprises or other public bodies for allocation to their employees, who became “occupancy right holders”[2]. All citizens of the SFRY were required to pay a means-tested contribution to subsidise housing construction. However, the amount an individual had contributed was not amongst the legal criteria taken into account in the waiting lists for allocation of such flats. 6.  The rights of both the allocation right holders (public bodies which nominally controlled the flats) and the occupancy right holders were regulated by law (the Housing Act 1984, which is still in force in Bosnia and Herzegovina[3]). In accordance with this Act, an occupancy right, once allocated, entitled the occupancy right holder to permanent, lifelong use of the flat against the payment of a nominal fee. When occupancy right holders died, their rights transferred, as a matter of law, to their surviving spouses (indeed, spouses held occupancy rights in common) or registered members of their family households who were also using the flat (sections 19 and 21 of this Act). Furthermore, in the event of a divorce, the spouses were free to choose which one of them would continue to use the flat; in the absence of an agreement, either of them could apply to a court for a transfer of the occupancy right (section 20 of this Act). In practice, these provisions on transfer meant that occupancy rights originally allocated by public bodies to their employees could pass, as of right, to multiple generations for whom the initial employment-based link to the allocation right holder no longer existed. Occupancy rights could be cancelled only in court proceedings (section 50 of this Act) on limited grounds (sections 44, 47 and 49 of this Act), the most important of which was failure by occupancy right holders to physically use their flats for their own housing needs for a continuous period of at least six months without justified grounds. Although inspections were foreseen to ensure compliance with this requirement (section 42 of this Act), occupancy rights were rarely, if ever, cancelled on these grounds prior to the 1992-95 war. Moreover, on 24 December 1992 the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina annulled the inspection provisions[4]. 7.  Following its declaration of independence on 6 March 1992, a brutal war started in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 15 May 1992 the United Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, adopted its Resolution 757 urging that all units of the JNA, the armed forces of the SFRY, and all elements of the Croatian Army either be withdrawn from Bosnia and Herzegovina, or be subject to the authority of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or be disbanded and disarmed with their weapons placed under effective international monitoring. While the JNA formally withdrew from Bosnia and Herzegovina on 19 May 1992, the United Nations Secretary General (report of 3 December 1992, A/47/747, § 11) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (see its judgment in the Tadić case of 15 July 1999, § 151) later established that JNA members born in Bosnia and Herzegovina actually remained there with their equipment and joined the VRS forces[5] and only those born in Serbia and Montenegro left and joined the VJ forces[6]. As regards the participation by foreign armed forces in the 1992-95 war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Đokić, cited above, §§ 16-17. 8.  The concept of “social ownership” was abandoned during the 1992-95 war[7]. Socially owned flats were thus effectively nationalised. As regards the administration of such flats during and after the war, see “Relevant domestic law and practice” below. 9.  The applicant was born in 1959. She lives in Banja Luka, Bosnia and Herzegovina. 10.  In 1983 her husband, a JNA sergeant, was allocated a military flat in Sarajevo. As the JNA formally withdrew from Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992, he decided to continue his military career in Serbia. The applicant also moved to Serbia, where she was granted refugee status. 11.  The applicant’s husband’s military service was terminated in 1998. 12.  In 1998 the applicant made an application for the restitution of the flat in Sarajevo. Shortly thereafter, she filed a petition for divorce in Serbia and returned to Bosnia and Herzegovina. She was granted a divorce on 2 March 2000. 13.  On 25 March 2000 her restitution claim was rejected pursuant to section 3a of the Restitution of Flats Act 1998 (“section 3a”; see paragraph 54 below). On 28 September 2000 the competent Cantonal Ministry upheld that decision. 14.  On 29 June 2001 the applicant lodged an application with the Human Rights Chamber, a domestic human-rights body set up by Annex 6 to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (“the Dayton Peace Agreement”). 15.  On 27 June 2002 the Sarajevo Cantonal Court, on an application for judicial review, quashed the decisions of 25 March and 28 September 2000 and remitted the case for reconsideration. 16.  On 9 July 2002 the restitution commission set up by Annex 7 to the Dayton Peace Agreement (“the CRPC”), before which the applicant pursued parallel proceedings, held that the applicant’s husband was neither a refugee nor a displaced person and declined jurisdiction. 17.  On 22 November 2002 the competent housing authorities rejected again the applicant’s claim pursuant to section 3a. On 23 September 2003 the competent Cantonal Ministry upheld that decision. 18.  On 9 September 2004 the Human Rights Commission, the successor of the Human Rights Chamber, held that the applicant shared the fate of her former husband as to the restitution of their flat and found no breach of the Convention owing to her former husband’s service in the VJ forces. 19.  On 20 January 2006 the Sarajevo Cantonal Court, on an application for judicial review, quashed the administrative decisions of 22 November 2002 and 23 September 2003 and remitted the case for reconsideration. 20.  On 5 October 2006 the authorities rejected again the applicant’s claim pursuant to section 3a. On 8 December 2006 the competent Cantonal Ministry upheld that decision. The decision of 8 December 2006 was served on the applicant on 30 September 2007. The applicant did not appeal. 21.  On 17 November 2008 the Constitutional Court found a breach of Article 6 of the Convention in consideration of the length of the restitution proceedings and awarded the applicant 1,200 convertible marks (BAM)[8] for non-pecuniary damage. Regardless of the excessive length of the restitution proceedings, it held that the applicant should have nevertheless lodged an application for judicial review against the administrative decision of 8 December 2006 and rejected her substantive complaints on non-exhaustion grounds. 22.  The applicant was born in Serbia in 1934. He lives in Serbia. 23.  In 1978, as a JNA medical officer, he was allocated a military flat in Sarajevo. Whilst he was transferred to Belgrade in 1989, his wife stayed in that flat until 1994. His military service was terminated on 31 October 1992. 24.  On an unknown date, after having renounced his occupancy right on the flat in Sarajevo, the applicant was allocated a tenancy right of unlimited duration on a military flat in Serbia. In addition, he was provided a loan, co‑financed by the military authorities, for another flat in Serbia (see paragraph 59 below). 25.  In 1998 the applicant made an application for the restitution of the flat in Sarajevo. 26.  On 8 August 2000 his restitution claim was rejected pursuant to section 3a. On 12 March 2001 the competent Cantonal Ministry upheld that decision. 27.  On 15 August 2002 the Sarajevo Cantonal Court, on an application for judicial review, quashed the decisions of 8 August 2000 and 12 March 2001 and remitted the case for reconsideration. 28.  On 17 September 2002 the applicant lodged an application with the Human Rights Chamber. 29.  On 22 November 2002 the competent housing authorities rejected again the applicant’s restitution claim pursuant to section 3a. The decision was delivered on 30 December 2002. The applicant did not appeal. 30.  On 7 July 2004 the Human Rights Commission, the successor of the Human Rights Chamber, found that there was no breach of the Convention. That decision was delivered on 11 November 2004. 31.  The applicant was born in Croatia in 1944. He lives in Serbia. 32.  In 1983, as a JNA officer, he was allocated a military flat in Mostar. When the JNA formally withdrew from Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992, he decided to continue his military career in Serbia. His military service was terminated in 2000. 33.  In 1998 the applicant made an application for the restitution of the flat in Mostar. On 4 September 2001 his application was rejected pursuant to section 3a. The decision was upheld by the competent Cantonal Ministry, the Mostar Cantonal Court and the Supreme Court of the relevant Entity on 22 December 2003, 29 December 2004 and 11 October 2006 respectively. 34.  In 2003 the applicant lodged an application with the Human Rights Chamber. In 2006 the Human Rights Commission found a breach of Article 6 of the Convention in view of the length of the restitution proceedings and awarded the applicant BAM 1,000 for non-pecuniary damage. Given their excessive length, the Human Rights Commission held that the restitution proceedings did not constitute a remedy which would have to be used as a condition for the examination of the applicant’s substantive complaints. It then held, in line with its well-established jurisprudence, that the applicant’s occupancy right constituted “possessions” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and that his inability to repossess his flat amounted to an interference with the enjoyment of that rights. As regards the proportionality of the interference, the Commission held that the applicant’s service in the VJ forces had shown his disloyalty to Bosnia and Herzegovina. It concluded that the interference was therefore justified and found no breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Lastly, it considered that it was unnecessary to examine the discrimination and Article 8 complaints. 35.  The applicant was born in Serbia in 1952. He lives in Serbia. 36.  In 1988, as a JNA medical officer, he was allocated a military flat in Sarajevo. When the JNA formally withdrew from Bosnia and Herzegovina, he decided to pursue his military career in Serbia. 37.  After having renounced his occupancy right on the flat in Sarajevo, on 1 June 1999 the applicant was provided a mortgage loan, co-financed by the military authorities, for a flat in Serbia (see paragraph 59 below). 38.  In 1999 the applicant made an application for the restitution of the flat in Sarajevo. On 22 June 2004 his application was rejected pursuant to section 3a. That decision was upheld by the competent Cantonal Ministry, the Sarajevo Cantonal Court and the Supreme Court on 1 November 2004, 24 September 2007 and 15 January 2010 respectively. 39.  In the meantime, on 9 July 2002, the CRPC mentioned in paragraph 16 above, before which the applicant pursued parallel proceedings, held that he was neither a refugee nor a displaced person and declined jurisdiction. 40.  The applicant’s military service was terminated in 2003. 41.  The applicant was born in 1942. He lives in Serbia. 42.  In 1987, as a JNA officer, he was allocated a military flat in Mostar. Although the JNA formally withdrew from Bosnia and Herzegovina on 19 May 1992, he stayed in Mostar. On paper, however, he was a member of the newly-established VJ forces, the armed forces of the neighbouring Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, until 31 July 1992. On 3 August 1992 the HVO forces[9] arrested the applicant. He was detained at Dretelj internment camp until 18 August 1992 and then deported to the area controlled by the VRS forces. Shortly thereafter, the Red Cross Society of Montenegro transferred the applicant to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. On 26 August 1992 he was examined at Skopje Military Hospital. According to the medical report, the applicant was subjected to serious ill-treatment at Dretelj internment camp. 43.  In 1998 the applicant made an application for the restitution of the flat in Mostar. On 9 October 2002 his claim was rejected pursuant to section 3a. On 7 November the competent Cantonal Ministry upheld that decision. On 16 April 2003 the Mostar Cantonal Court, on an application for judicial review, quashed both decisions and remitted the case for reconsideration. 44.  On 11 February 2004 the housing authorities rejected again the applicant’s restitution claim under section 3a. On 5 July 2004 the competent Cantonal Ministry upheld that decision. On 2 December 2004 the Mostar Cantonal Court quashed both decisions and remitted the case to the housing authorities. 45.  On 16 April 2007 the housing authorities rejected for a third time the restitution claim pursuant to section 3a. That decision was upheld by the competent Cantonal Ministry and the Mostar Cantonal Court on 11 February and 2 December 2008 respectively. 46.  On 26 April 2007 the Serbian authorities terminated the proceedings for the allocation of a flat in Serbia because the applicant had not renounced his occupancy right on the flat in Mostar (see paragraph 59 below). On 6 October 2009 the applicant was placed in an old people’s home in Serbia, as he had no other place to live. 47.  The applicant was born in Montenegro in 1941 where he now lives. 48.  In 1981, as an economist employed at a military facility, he was allocated a military flat in Sarajevo. When the JNA formally withdrew from Bosnia and Herzegovina, he accepted a similar job at a military facility in Montenegro. 49.  In 1999 the applicant made an application for the restitution of the flat in Sarajevo. On 17 March 2003 his restitution claim was accepted. On 27 November 2003 the competent Cantonal Ministry quashed that decision and rejected the restitution claim pursuant to section 3a. 50.  Meanwhile, on 24 April 2003, the CRPC mentioned in paragraph 16 above, before which the applicant pursued parallel proceedings, held that he was neither a refugee nor a displaced person and declined jurisdiction. 51.  In November 2005 he retired. After having renounced his occupancy right on the flat in Sarajevo, he was allocated a tenancy right of unlimited duration on a military flat in Montenegro in December 2005 (see paragraph 59 below). 52.  On 6 February 2006 the Sarajevo Cantonal Court, on an application for judicial review, quashed the decision of 27 November 2003 and remitted the case to the Cantonal Ministry. On 29 March 2006 the Cantonal Ministry quashed the decision of 17 March 2003 and remitted the case to the housing authorities. On 10 April 2007 the housing authorities rejected the restitution claim under section 3a. The Cantonal Ministry and the Sarajevo Cantonal Court upheld that decision on 5 June 2007 and 24 June 2008 respectively. The last decision was delivered on 10 December 2008.