6.  The applicant company specialises in taking soil samples by way of drilling for geological examination, inter alia, for the purpose of assessing suitability for building sites and for the construction of wells. 7.  In the building industry in Germany, a number of collective agreements operated, which contained regulations related to the social welfare of employees working in that sector (see relevant domestic law and practice paragraphs 21-28). The employers’ associations in the building industry (Hauptverband der Deutschen Bauindustrie and Zentralverband des Deutschen Baugewerbes) and the trade union (IG Bauen-Agrar-Umwelt) concluded the Collective Agreement on Social Welfare Proceedings in the Building Trade (Tarifvertrag über das Sozialkassenverfahren im Baugewerbe, “VTV”). The VTV contained rules about contributions and entitlements in relation to both the ZVK and the Holiday and Wage Equalisation Fund of the Construction Industry (Urlaubs- und Lohnausgleichskasse der Bauwirtschaft, “ULAK”), which jointly comprised the Social Welfare Fund in the building industry which went by the common name “SOKA-BAU”. 8.  As the Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs declared the VTV generally binding (allgemeinverbindlich) pursuant to Section 5 § 1 of the Law on Collective Agreements (Tarifvertragsgesetz), it was binding on all employers in the building industry, even if they did not belong to the employers’ association (Section 5 § 4 of the Law on Collective Agreements, see relevant domestic law and practice paragraph 20). As a consequence, all employers in the building industry were obliged to contribute to the Social Welfare Fund an additional sum amounting to 19.8% of the gross wages paid to their employees. 9.  The applicant company was not a member of an employers’ association that was party to the relevant collective agreements. It was thus not directly bound by any collective agreements by virtue of such membership. 10.  On 10 August 2004 the Social Welfare Fund sent a letter to the applicant company with key information about the supplementary welfare schemes, including with regard to contributions to be paid and possible benefits it might receive. The applicant company did not react to this letter. 11.  On 12 April 2005, following enquiries made in order to establish whether the applicant was obliged to pay contributions, the Social Welfare Fund sent a letter to the applicant company, informing it about its duty to pay contributions and that an account had been opened into which benefits would be paid. 12.  On 28 April 2005 the applicant company’s lawyer sent a letter to the Social Welfare Fund, objecting to being registered with the Fund. 13.  On 11 October 2007 the Wiesbaden Labour Court ordered the applicant company to pay 63,625.58 euros (EUR) in welfare fund arrears for the period between September 2002 and March 2004 to the ZVK. The applicant company was further ordered to submit copies of the wage slips issued to its employees between January 2006 and June 2007. The Labour Court considered that the applicant company was bound by the VTV, which was binding on all employers in the building industry even if they did not belong to one of the employers’ associations. The activities of the applicant company fell within the scope of the VTV which, in its Article 1 § 2 (v) no. 6, listed drilling as an activity within its scope. 14.  The applicant company lodged an appeal submitting, in particular, that the generally binding effect of the VTV violated the negative aspects of its right to freedom of association. It argued that it was obliged to contribute to a fund jointly set up by the employers’ association and the trade union, even though it did not belong to either of these associations. The applicant company further complained that it was prevented from founding its own association, due to a lack of funds. 15.  On 27 June 2008 the Hesse Labour Court of Appeal rejected the applicant company’s appeal and did not grant leave for an appeal on points of law. As well as confirming the Labour Court’s reasoning, the Court of Appeal held that the generally binding effect of the VTV did not violate the applicant company’s right to freedom of association. It observed that the generally binding effect did not entail an obligation to adhere either to one of the employers’ associations or to the Social Welfare Fund. Referring to the case-law of the Federal Constitutional Court (decision of 15 July 1980, 1 BvR 24/74, see relevant domestic law and practice paragraph 27), the Labour Court of Appeal conceded that the applicant company, which was not a member of one of the employers’ associations, had the disadvantage of not being able to assert its interests by exercising control over the activities of the Social Welfare Fund via these associations. The right to participate in the decision-making process within these associations was reserved to members of the respective association. In so far as this fact exerted a certain pressure to become a member of one of the employers’ associations, this was, however, not sufficient to amount to a violation of the negative aspect of its right to freedom of association. 16.  The Court of Appeal further considered that the obligation to contribute to the Social Welfare Fund did not prevent the applicant company from founding its own association. It observed that the major parts of the contributions due would be reimbursed to the applicant if properly declared. 17.  The Court of Appeal finally considered that the obligatory contribution to the Social Welfare Fund took account of the high fluctuation of employees in the building industry and served the public interest of allowing for management of the employee’s claims by the Social Welfare Fund, thus preventing a distortion of competition. 18.  On 10 December 2008 the Federal Labour Court rejected the applicant company’s complaint against the refusal to grant leave to appeal. 19.  On 5 February 2009 the Federal Constitutional Court refused to accept the applicant company’s constitutional complaint for adjudication without providing reasons (1 BvR 243/09).


5.  The applicant was born in 1969. 6.  On 27 June 2005 a criminal investigation was initiated into a theft allegedly committed by the applicant in the Republic of Uzbekistan. On 12 September 2005 an investigator ordered the applicant’s arrest and placed him on the list of fugitives. 7.  It appears that in the meantime the applicant moved to the Russian town of Perm. On 21 January 2007 he was arrested there. On 23 January 2007 a prosecutor issued a decision to detain the applicant pending resolution of the extradition request in his regard. The decision referred to Article 61 of the Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, Family and Criminal Matters (signed in Minsk on 22 January 1993 and amended on 28 March 1997, “the Minsk Convention”). It did not indicate that it was amenable to appeal. On 25 January 2007 the prosecutor wrote to the prison authorities asking them to hold the applicant in detention until further notice. 8.  On 19 February 2007 the Uzbek authorities requested the applicant’s extradition. On 6 March 2007 the prosecutor applied to the court for authorisation of the applicant’s detention pending extradition. He again relied on Article 61 of the Minsk Convention and Articles 97‑101, 108 and 466 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of Russia (“the CCrP”). On 9 March 2007 the Leninskiy District Court of Perm authorised the applicant’s detention pending extradition. The District Court did not set a limit on the length of the applicant’s detention. It referred to Article 108 of the CCrP. On 27 March 2007 the Perm Regional Court upheld the decision on appeal. No court subsequently reviewed or extended the applicant’s detention. 9.  It appears that on 10 July 2007 the applicant was handed over to the authorities of the Republic of Uzbekistan.


4.  The applicants were born in 1976 and 1978 respectively and are detained in Vilnius Correctional Facility and Kybartai Correctional Facility. 5.  The first applicant was detained in Šiauliai Remand Prison from 11 January 2011 to 3 November 2011. The documents submitted to the Court show that he was held in four different remand prison cells: nos. 9, 104, 29 and 37. 6.  In 2012 the applicant instituted proceedings for damages. He argued that the conditions in which he had been held in Šiauliai Remand Prison had been degrading: cell no. 9 had not been renovated, had had almost no natural light and the artificial light provided in the evening had been very poor; the ventilation had been insufficient and the cell was cold; cell no. 104, although renovated, lacked sufficient ventilation and was cold, and there was almost no natural light; cell no. 29 had insufficient light and ventilation; cell no. 37 was dirty, the electrical system was damaged and thus dangerous, the sanitary facilities were not separated from the cell, the cell lacked light, ventilation and the temperature was too low. The applicant also submitted a document from the Šiauliai Health Care Centre from 19 April 2012, which noted violations of hygiene norms in the remand prison’s cells. 7.  On 21 December 2012 the Šiauliai Regional Administrative Court held that the applicant’s right to adequate conditions of detention had been breached but dismissed his claim for compensation. The court held that the applicant had not complained about his conditions of detention while in prison and had only lodged his complaint a year after leaving it. Moreover, it was up to the applicant to prove that he had sustained damage. The court held that there was no information to show that the remand prison had purposely interfered with his right to dignity or treated him inhumanely, that he had not suffered a great enough negative impact from the hygiene violations, and that there were no grounds to award him compensation. 8.  The applicant appealed but on 17 July 2013 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance decision. The court observed that the document from the Šiauliai Health Care Centre (see paragraph 6 above) had been issued five months after the applicant had left the remand prison and it was not able to determine the negative impact of the unsanitary conditions on the applicant on the basis of such evidence alone. 9.  The second applicant was detained in Šiauliai Remand Prison from 15 December 2009 to 8 February 2012. The documents submitted to the Court show that he was held in several different cells: nos. 101, 95, 54, 14 and 49. 10.  On 27 December 2011 the applicant instituted proceedings for damages and on 9 January 2012 he submitted a detailed complaint. He argued that the conditions in which he had been held in Šiauliai Remand Prison had been degrading: the cells were damp and dirty, there was insufficient light and ventilation, and the walls had not been painted. As a result, his health had deteriorated: his sight had worsened and he had pain in his joints and his back. 11.  On 28 December 2012 the Šiauliai Regional Administrative Court held that the applicant’s right to adequate conditions of detention had been breached but dismissed his claim for compensation. The court found that the Šiauliai Health Care Centre had examined cell no. 101 on 7 January 2011, while the applicant had been detained there from 5 January 2011 to 3 February 2011 and from 14 February 2011 to 28 April 2011. The cell had been dirty, the toilet doors broken, and there was mould on the walls and ceiling. The health centre also examined cell no. 101 on 27 April 2011 and established that there was no longer any mould and the temperature was satisfactory, but the lighting was still insufficient. The court thus held that the applicant had proven that the conditions in cell no. 101 had been unsanitary. However, the court noted that the applicant had not proven the existence of unsanitary conditions in the other cells. The court further noted that the inmates were responsible for keeping the cells clean, but that the remand prison had not proven that it had provided the applicant with cleaning materials for at least six months. As regards the applicant’s health, the court observed that he had been prescribed several drugs for spinal osteochondrosis, but that there was no relation between his illness and the unsanitary conditions in cell no. 101. The court also noted that during the hearing the applicant had claimed that all the cells had been overcrowded but he had failed to mention this in his written complaint. The court thus held that the case concerned sanitary conditions and not overcrowding. 12.  The applicant appealed and on 11 June 2013 the Supreme Administrative Court found that the court of first instance had acted unreasonably in dismissing his compensation claim, and awarded him with 300 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 87 euros (EUR)) for non-pecuniary damage.


5.  The applicant was born in 1934 and lives in Strausberg. Before the reunification of Germany he lived in the former GDR, serving in the police force from 1952 to 1954. 6.  On 13 June 1958, the Frankfurt (Oder) District Court convicted the applicant of “criminal assault against the local bodies of the State” (“verbrecherischer Angriff gegen die örtlichen Organe der Staatsmacht”) after he had attacked a member of the GDR parliament of the ruling Socialist Unity Party. He was sentenced to one year and eight months’ imprisonment and served 14 months in prison. 7.  On 8 February 1994 the Frankfurt (Oder) Regional Court annulled the 1958 judgment for its incompatibility with the principles of the rule of law and rehabilitated the applicant pursuant to Section 1 § 1 of the Criminal Rehabilitation Act (Gesetz über die Rehabilitierung und Entschädigung von Opfern rechtsstaatswidriger Strafverfolgungsmaßnahmen im Beitrittsgebiet ‑ Strafrechtliches Rehabilitierungsgesetz) designed to rehabilitate and compensate prisoners of the GDR regime for deprivation of their liberty incompatible with the principles of the rule of law. 8.  On 25 April 1994 the applicant lodged an application for compensation under the Criminal Rehabilitation Act. The application form contained instructions that, according to Section 16 § 2 of the Act (see Relevant domestic law and practice, paragraphs 23 and 24 below), such compensation could not be granted to a person who had offended against the principles of humanity and the rule of law. The applicant declared on the questionnaire that he had never acted in disregard of these principles and never worked for the former GDR’s Ministry of State Security (Ministerium für Staatssicherheit). On 13 February 1995 the President of the Frankfurt (Oder) Regional Court, acting as the competent authority, awarded him compensation of 8,250 German marks, equivalent to about 4,218 euros (EUR), pursuant to Section 17 in conjunction with Section 16 §§ 1 and 3 of the Criminal Rehabilitation Act. 9.  On 7 August 2007, after an amendment of the Act, the applicant also applied for a special, income‑related pension which benefits former victims of imprisonment (monatliche besondere Zuwendung für Haftopfer). He again confirmed that he had never offended against the principles of humanity and the rule of law and never worked for the former GDR’s Ministry of State Security. On 14 November 2007 he was granted a special monthly pension of EUR 250 pursuant to Section 17a of the Criminal Rehabilitation Act, with the reservation that information held by the Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the former GDR (“the Federal Commissioner”) must not contradict the applicant’s statements. A respective request for information was submitted on 19 November 2007. 10.  On 25 February 2008 the Federal Commissioner informed the President of the Regional Court that the applicant, between 22 September 1953 and 25 November 1954, had been a secret informant of the Ministry of State Security while he was a member of the police force. This information was based on a number of documents, including 32 handwritten reports allegedly drafted by the applicant and a declaration to commit to serve as a secret informant to the state security service. 11.  On 18 February 2009 the President of the Regional Court, relying on Section 48 §§ 1 and 2, third sentence, no. 2 of the Brandenburg Administrative Procedure Act (Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz für das Land Brandenburg), withdrew the decisions granting compensation and a special pension and at the same time ordered the applicant to reimburse the amounts already received pursuant to Section 49a of the same Act. The President considered that the decisions had been unlawful from the beginning as the prerequisites for either entitlement had never been met and that the applicant could not legitimately rely on these decisions being maintained, as he had obtained them by giving information that was substantially incorrect. Referring to Section 16 § 2 of the Criminal Rehabilitation Act, he observed that the applicant, contrary to the statements in his applications, had worked as a secret informant for the Ministry of State Security and had produced at least five reports for the Ministry in which he put at real risk the persons on whom he had informed. 12.  On 9 March 2009 the applicant applied for judicial review of that decision and asked to be heard in person. He claimed that the information contained in the documents of the Federal Commissioner was incomplete and not accurate. The fact that at the time of recruitment he was only 19 years old and had been severely traumatised when fleeing his home town in Silesia in 1945 and experiencing the bombing of Dresden on 13 February 1945, followed by several months of homelessness after the war had ended, also had to be taken into account. His father had returned, incapacitated for work, from Soviet captivity only in 1947 or 1948. While serving in the police forces he had not been aware of working for other government agencies. The written commitment to the state security service might have been dictated to him when he was under the influence of alcohol but he had no memory of it whatsoever. In any case, he ruled out that the wording was his own and that he had known that the reports were to be used by the state security service. 13.  On 16 February 2010 the Frankfurt (Oder) Regional Court, sitting as a chamber of three judges, dismissed the applicant’s request for judicial review, finding that his work as a secret informant for the Ministry of State Security was of such nature, scope and duration that it was reprehensible enough to justify ruling out the applicant’s eligibility for compensation payments pursuant to Section 16 § 2 of the Criminal Rehabilitation Act. Acknowledging that in a dictatorship which lasted for decades, minor involvement with the regime was frequent, it considered that the applicant’s position as a secret informant of the state security service did not itself suffice to trigger the application of that provision. However, compensation provided under the Act was intended to benefit innocent victims only, but not those who had also participated in offences contrary to the principles of humanity and which were harmful to others or at least put them at risk. This could be assumed when a secret informant voluntarily reported on others and the reports could potentially cause persecution by the state security service. In that case compensation payments were ruled out, no matter how great the offender’s own suffering had been. The courts were not to compare the extent of suffering involved. 14.  The Regional Court observed that the applicant had penned a handwritten commitment to serve the state security service after he had already reported twice on others. Thus the applicant’s submission that he had believed that he was reporting to police officers and not to the state security service was, in the light of that declaration, not credible (“nicht glaubhaft”). Furthermore, the five reports mentioned in the decision of the President of the Regional Court, as well as two more reports were capable of putting in danger the persons informed on. The applicant mainly reported on their contacts with West Germany and West Berlin. An intention to leave the former GDR without permission, in particular, could have led to severe criminal persecution of the persons involved. The reports were not meaningless but contained valuable information for the state security service. The applicant’s claim that some reports were unknown to him and factually incorrect and that he did not recognise the names of the superior officers was irrelevant to the Regional Court’s decision. 15.  The Regional Court also pointed out that it was unnecessary to hear the applicant in person. His personality at the time and the circumstances of his recruitment would have been relevant only if there were indications that the applicant acted under insupportable pressure. However, there were no such indications and the applicant had made no claims in this regard. He had reported twice on others, even before being recruited by the state security service. Further, the court could not see a connection between the applicant’s experiences relating to the impact of war and the post-war period on him and his psychological strain at the time of recruitment on the one hand and his willingness to cooperate with the state security service on the other hand. 16.  On 24 August 2010 the Brandenburg Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal, endorsing the Regional Court’s reasons. 17.  On 28 October 2010 the Federal Constitutional Court declined to consider the applicant’s constitutional complaint without providing reasons (2 BvR 2329/10).


5.  The applicant was born in 1976 and, until his death in 2006, lived in Vinnytsya. 6.  The background to the case, including the Transdniestrian armed conflict of 1991-1992 and the subsequent events, is set out in Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia ([GC], no. 48787/99, §§ 28-185, ECHR 2004‑VII) and Catan and Others v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia ([GC], nos. 43370/04 and 2 others, §§ 8-42, ECHR 2012 (extracts)). 7.  In 2001 the applicant was arrested in the self-proclaimed “Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria” (the “MRT”) on charges of murder. On 28 June 2002 he was convicted in a final judgment by the “MRT” Supreme Court and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. 8.  According to the applicant, during his pre-trial detention he was subjected to ill-treatment to make him confess to committing the murder. 9.  After his conviction the applicant’s mother made many requests to various Ukrainian official bodies to obtain the transfer of her son to a Ukrainian prison. The case file before the Court contains approximately forty replies received by her from various Ukrainian authorities. However, her efforts were not successful. In particular, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine informed the applicant that it had contacted its counterpart in Moldova, which had informed it that Moldova could not secure the applicant’s transfer to a Ukrainian prison because it did not have control over the territory of the “MRT”. The Ukrainian authorities also contacted the “MRT” authorities, but to no avail. In a letter to the applicant’s mother, the “MRT” authorities stated that they would only transfer the applicant to a Ukrainian prison after the conclusion of a treaty between Ukraine and the “MRT” which would make the transfer of prisoners possible. Since Ukraine refused to sign such a treaty with it, the transfer was not possible. The applicant’s mother went so far as to initiate court proceedings against the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, denouncing its lack of action, but she was not successful. 10.  On several occasions the applicant’s representative also contacted the Moldovan authorities, enquiring about the status of the Transdniestrian region and, on at least two occasions, asking them for assistance with the question of the applicant’s transfer to a Ukrainian prison. It does not appear from the material submitted by the applicant and his mother that he complained to the Moldovan authorities about alleged breaches of his Convention rights by the “MRT” authorities. In a letter of 25 April 2003 the Prosecutor General’s Office of Moldova informed the applicant’s representative that it had contacted the prosecuting authorities of the “MRT” and requested the necessary documents to have the applicant transferred to a Ukrainian prison. It is not clear from the case file whether the “MRT” authorities reacted to that letter. In another letter sent to the applicant’s representative by the office of the President of the Republic of Moldova, the lawyer was informed that the Moldovan authorities were unable to bring about the applicant’s transfer to a Ukrainian prison while the Transdniestrian conflict remained unsettled. 11.  The applicant’s mother also wrote to the OSCE mission in Moldova, which informed her that her letter had been forwarded to the Ukrainian Embassy in Chisinau. 12.  In around March 2006 the applicant broke his leg and was admitted to hospital. It appears from his mother’s statements that she was able to spend time with him during his stay in hospital. 13.  On 24 May 2006 the applicant was found hanged in the gym of the prison in which he was being detained. It does not appear that the applicant’s mother requested or obtained a medical forensic report concerning the circumstances of his death. However, it appears from her statements that the applicant did not have any signs of violence on his body.


4.  In a dispute between the applicant and the domestic pension authorities, on 18 February 2011 the Kryviy Rih Dovgyntsivskyy District Court ruled in his favour, ordering an increase of his pension based on the rise in the average wages in the country since his retirement. The court sat in camera. 5.  On 3 November 2011 the first-instance court amended the judgment at the applicant’s request, indicating that it was enforceable immediately. In doing so, the court referred to the provision of the Code of Administrative Justice governing abridged procedure (see paragraph 11 below). 6.  The defendant pension authority appealed to the Dnipropetrovsk Administrative Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”). 7.  On 23 November 2011 the first-instance court informed the applicant that an appeal had been lodged in his case. On 29 February 2012 he wrote to the Court of Appeal, requesting to be informed about the date of the hearing of his case. According to him, he received no response and no further information about the proceedings until 22 February 2013 when he received the Court of Appeal’s final decision, dated 26 June 2012, quashing the first-instance court’s judgment. 8.  It can be seen from the material before the Court that the applicant’s domestic case file contains copies of the ruling of the Court of Appeal’s judge (date illegible) opening appeal proceedings in his case and a notification letter dated February 2012 from the court clerk informing him of the upcoming examination of his case in camera on 26 June 2012 and stating that the judge’s ruling and a copy of the appeal were enclosed with the letter. The Government alleged that the above documents had been sent to the applicant, while the applicant alleged that they had not. The file does not contain any postal documents or registers of sent correspondence showing that the above documents had been sent or delivered to the applicant. 9.  On 26 June 2012 the Court of Appeal, in a final decision not amenable to appeal, quashed the first-instance court’s judgment, dismissing the applicant’s claim for a pension increase and holding that the domestic law did not require the pensions to be increased in case of rise in the average wages in the country following retirement. The court sat in camera.


5.  The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Split. 6.  The applicant is the owner of a commercial building in Split, which he uses as a car repair workshop. The building in issue was bought from the State in 2001. At the time of purchase, no limitation on its use was registered or apparent. 7.  On 28 March 2003 the Split Department for the Conservation of Cultural Heritage (Ministarstvo kulture, Uprava za zaštitu kulturne baštine, Konzervatorski odjel u Splitu, hereafter “the Split Department”) ordered a measure of preventive protection relating to cultural heritage with regard to the applicant’s building, pending the final evaluation of its cultural value. It explained that the building, which was being used as a car repair workshop at that point, appeared to be a rare example of early industrial architecture in Split, and therefore this warranted a measure limiting its use by the applicant. Under section 10 of the Protection and Preservation of Cultural Heritage Act (Zakon o zaštiti i očuvanju kulturnih dobara, hereafter “the Cultural Heritage Act”) the measure would remain in place for a period of three years, and, in accordance with section 11 of the same Act, would afford the same protection as a final protective measure (see paragraph 21 below). 8.  The decision ordering the preventive protection was not transmitted to the applicant. It was forwarded to the land registry of the Split Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Splitu) and duly registered in the land register. 9.  On 10 January 2007, after the expiry of the three-year period, the Split Department again ordered a measure of preventive protection with regard to the applicant’s commercial building, reiterating the same grounds as those specified in its previous decision. 10.  The applicant was not informed of the above decision relating to the second measure of preventive protection in respect of his building. On 3 September 2007 the measure was registered in the land register. 11.  On 16 October 2007, after becoming aware of the second measure of preventive protection following an enquiry with the land registry, the applicant challenged the extended application of that measure before the Ministry of Culture (Ministarstvo culture, hereafter “the Ministry”). He contended, in particular, that he had not been informed of the decision ordering the preventive protection, and that the protection could no longer be ordered, since the maximum duration of such a measure under the Cultural Heritage Act was three years. The applicant also enquired about compensation in respect of the pecuniary damage he had sustained as a result of the measure of preventive protection. 12.  On 8 January 2008 the Split Department forwarded the applicant’s appeal to the Ministry. It stressed that the decision of 10 January 2007 extending the preventive protection after the expiry of the first three-year period had been necessary, owing to the fact that it had not been possible to obtain an excerpt from the land register from the Split Municipal Court, and that the building represented an important example of early industrial architecture in Split. 13.  On 31 January 2008 the Ministry dismissed the applicant’s appeal as unfounded, on the grounds that there was nothing in the law preventing the competent authority from applying the measure twice for periods of three years, and that the measure of preventive protection had not limited the applicant’s ownership rights. It also pointed out that it was necessary to extend the preventive protection in respect of the building, as the determination of its heritage value required further comprehensive assessment. 14.  On 9 March 2008 the applicant lodged an administrative action in the Administrative Court (Upravni sud Republike Hrvatske), challenging the lawfulness and reasonableness of the measure of preventive protection, and emphasising the passivity of the competent authorities in finally resolving the matter. He also contended that the decisions of the lower authorities had been arbitrary. He pointed out that, contrary to what the Ministry had stated, his ownership rights had been significantly limited, as his freedom to deal with the property as he wished had been restricted. In particular, his several attempts to sell the building and set up another business cooperation had failed, owing to the existing preventive protection. The applicant also asked the Administrative Court to award him 200,000 euros (EUR) in respect of the damage he had sustained as a result of the conduct of the administrative authorities. 15.  Meanwhile, the Split Department found that the applicant’s building should not be registered as an object of cultural heritage. On 15 April 2010, after the expiry of the measure of preventive protection, the Split Municipal Court ordered that the entry concerning the measure be deleted from the land register. 16.  On 18 May 2011 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s administrative action as unfounded, endorsing the reasoning of the lower authorities. In particular, it pointed out that there had been solid evidence suggesting that the building was an important object of cultural heritage, and that the measure of preventive protection was therefore justified given the need to carry out further assessments. Moreover, the Administrative Court considered that nothing in the relevant domestic law prevented the adoption of the second decision on preventive protection following the expiry of the first three-year time-limit. 17.  On 10 September 2011 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske), complaining of a violation of his property rights under Article 48 of the Constitution with regard to the allegedly unlawful and unreasonable application of the measure of preventive protection in respect of his property. 18.  On 14 December 2011 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s constitutional complaint inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded.


5.  Between 2005 and 2006 the applicants successfully sued the authorities for miscalculating social benefits. The judgments became final. 6.  On various dates the supervisory review courts quashed the judgments delivered in the applicants’ favour after applications by the defendant authorities, considering that the lower courts had misapplied substantive or procedural law (for more details see the Appendix). 7.  On 3 July 1986 the applicant was sentenced to three and a half years’ imprisonment. On 25 February 1997 he was acquitted. 8.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an application with the Sovetskiy District Court, claiming 3,973,578 Russian roubles (RUB) in compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage on the grounds of wrongful prosecution. 9.  On 24 May 1999 the Sovetskiy District Court allowed the applicant’s claim in part, awarding him RUB 43,568 in compensation for unpaid salary, the confiscation of his car, and judicial costs and expenses. The judgment was fully enforced. 10.  On an unspecified date the applicant brought a similar set of proceedings against the Ministry of Finance, claiming compensation for wrongful prosecution in 1997. 11.  On 27 July 2006 the Leninskiy District Court granted the applicant’s claim in full and awarded him RUB 761,815 in compensation for unpaid salary; the confiscation of his car and other property; rent for his flat; travel expenses; and judicial costs and expenses. No appeal against the judgment was lodged and it became final. 12.  On 1 February 2007 the Presidium of the Rostov Regional Court quashed that judgment by way of supervisory review on the grounds that the same issue had already been decided by the judgment of 24 May 1999 and that there had been no grounds to examine the complaint a second time.


4.  The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Moscow. 5.  The flat at 137A-9-267 Samarkandskiy Boulevard, Moscow, had been owned by the City of Moscow. G. had resided there as a tenant under the social housing agreement with the City. On 21 February 2007 G. died. 6.  On an unspecified date G.’s daughter Get. submitted to a local real estate registration body a forged copy of a court’s decision recognising her as G.’s heir and asked the latter to confirm her title to the flat at 137A-9-267 Samarkandskiy Boulevard, Moscow. On 19 March 2008, following the expert review of her application, she obtained the relevant certificate. 7.  On 17 April 2008 Get. sold the flat to N. On 28 May 2008, following the expert review of the transaction, N. was issued with a certificate confirming his title to the flat. 8.  On 28 July 2008 N. sold the flat to the applicant. On 28 August 2008, following the expert review of the transaction, the applicant obtained a certificate confirming his ownership in respect of the flat. He and his family moved into the flat and resided there. 9.  On 15 May 2009 the police opened a criminal investigation into the fraudulent acquisition of the flat by Get. The Government did not inform of the outcome of the proceedings. 10.  On an unspecified date the Department for Municipal Housing and Housing Policy of the City of Moscow (the “Housing Department) brought a civil claim seeking (1) the annulment of the entry in the real estate register confirming the existence of Get.’s title to the flat; (2) annulment of the flat purchase agreements between Get. and N. and N. and the applicant; (3) transfer of the ownership to the flat to the City of Moscow; and (4) the applicant’s eviction. 11.  On 19 June 2009 the Kuzminskiy District Court of Moscow granted the Housing Department’s claims. The court ruled that the case fell under one of the two exceptions to the protection of a bona fide purchaser’s title, which required that precedence be given to the City of Moscow as a previous owner who had been deprived of the property against its will. The applicant’s title to the flat was annulled and the ownership of the flat was transferred to the City of Moscow. The court also ordered the applicant’s eviction. The applicant appealed. 12.  On 29 September 2009 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 19 June 2009 on appeal. 13.  On 25 January and 12 May 2011 the applicant unsuccessfully lodged an application with the Housing Department asking for provision of housing. 14.  On 13 December 2011 the applicant was evicted from the flat. 15.  According to the Government, on 16 July 2012 the Housing Department assigned the flat as social housing to a family of four. On 25 April 2014 the ownership of the flat was transferred to them under the privatisation scheme. 16.  On 19 June 2009 the District Court granted the applicant’s claims against N. and awarded him 990,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in damages. 17.  On 12 October 2011 the bailiff opened enforcement proceedings. 18.  On 15 March 2006 the bailiff discontinued enforcement proceedings as it was impossible to establish N.’s whereabouts or to obtain information about his assets. 19.  According to the Government, the enforcement proceedings are still pending. The judgment in the applicant’s favour has not been yet enforced.


5.  The applicant is a privately owned company which was established in 1989 and registered in Belgrade. 6.  On 9 September 2003 the applicant and Beranka AD, a socially‑owned company, concluded a guarantee agreement. To secure the payment of obligations under this agreement, the applicant and Beranka AD concluded Annex No. 1 on the fiduciary transfer of the latter’s property to the applicant (Anex br. 1 Ugovora o fiducijarnom prenosu prava svojine). In this Annex, the property offered as collateral was: (a) property no. 6 – storehouse (magacin); (b) property no. 29 – power plant (energana); (c) property no. 30 – boiler-room (kotlovnica); (d) property no. 9 – laboratory (laboratorija); and (e) property PM2 – paper machines (papir mašine). 7.  On 31 October 2003 the fiduciary transfer of Beranka AD’s property to the applicant was registered by the Real Estate Office in Berane (Direkcija za nekretnine, Područna jedinica Berane). 8.  On 8 April 2004 the Commercial Court in Bijelo Polje (Privredni sud u Bijelom Polju) opened insolvency proceedings in respect of Beranka AD. 9.  On 5 June 2004 the applicant reported its claim in these proceedings. 10.  On 17 September 2004 the Commercial Court refused to recognise this claim. 11.  Following the decision of 17 September 2004, on 11 October 2004 the insolvency administrator for Beranka AD (stečajni upravnik) lodged a request with the Real Estate Office in Berane seeking that the registration of the fiduciary transfer of property to the applicant be erased. On the same day the Real Estate Office Registry accepted this request. 12.  On 5 November 2004 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Real Estate Department in Berane (Uprava za nekretnine Područna jedinica Berane). On 26 November 2004 the Real Estate Department amended the said decision. 13.  On 13 April 2005 the Real Estate Department in Podgorica (Uprava za nekrentine u Podgorici) quashed both decisions on appeal and remitted the case for reconsideration. 14.  On 1 June 2005 the Real Estate Department in Berane re-registered the fiduciary transfer on properties nos. 6 and 9, as well as on PM2, but refused to re-register the fiduciary transfer on properties nos. 29 and 30. 15.  On 22 November 2005 the Real Estate Department in Podgorica upheld this decision. 16.  The applicant appealed to the Administrative Court. On 6 February 2007 the Administrative Court quashed the decision of the Real Estate Department in Podgorica and remitted case to the Real Estate Department in Berane. It would appear that the case is still pending before that body. 17.  On 11 April 2007 the Administrative Court issued an enforcement decision ordering the registration of the applicant’s fiduciary rights in respect of all properties. 18.  Following the Commercial Court’s decision of 17 September 2004 (see paragraph 10 above), the applicant lodged an objection. The hearings concerning the objection were held on 11 August 2004, 31 May 2005 and 17 April 2006. On 24 August 2006 the Commercial Court dismissed the applicant’s objection. 19.  On 17 January 2007 the Real Estate Department in Berane again erased the fiduciary transfer of Beranka AD’s property from the public register. On 24 February 2007 the applicant lodged an appeal against this decision. 20.  On 3 September 2007 the Ministry of Finance upheld the decision of the Real Estate Department to erase the applicant’s fiduciary rights. 21.  On 8 July 2008, upon an appeal by the applicant, the Administrative Court quashed the decision of the Ministry and remitted the case to the Real Estate Department in Berane for reconsideration. 22.  On 2 October 2008 the Real Estate Department in Berane ordered the removal of the applicant’s rights on Beranka AD’s property from the public register. 23.  On 9 April 2009 the Ministry of Finance quashed the decision of 2 October 2008 and remitted case to the first instance. 24.  On 8 April 2010 the Real Estate Department in Berane stayed the proceedings, because it needed some documents which were in the file of a case pending before the Commercial Court. This decision was quashed by decision of the Ministry of Finance and the matter was remitted to the first instance. 25.  On 26 October 2011 the Real Estate Department adopted a decision allowing the deletion of the applicant’s rights from the public register. The same authority confirmed that decision on 2 November 2011. 26.  On 16 November 2011 the applicant filed an objection with the Ministry of Finance. 27.  On 9 July 2012 the applicant also lodged an appeal with the Administrative Court. On 30 November 2012 the Administrative Court rendered a decision in the applicant’s favour and ordered the Ministry of Finance to reconsider on the applicant’s prior objection. 28.  On 14 June 2013 the Ministry of Finance remitted the case to the first instance. The proceedings are still pending before the Real Estate Department in Berane.


5.  The applicants were claimants in civil proceedings. 6.  In the applications Trapeznikov v. Russia and Bychkov and Others v. Russia, the applicants were former participants of the Chernobyl clean-up operation who sued the relevant authorities for an inflation adjustment to their social benefits. 7.  In the application Markova v. Russia, the applicant sought the eviction of her late son’s wife and her granddaughter from the flat she was living in, alleging that she was the sole owner because her son had renounced his share in the flat in her favour. 8.  In the application Ryabchikov v. Russia, the applicant inherited a house in accordance with a will drawn up by his late mother. Later he discovered that she had two plots of land which she transferred back in 1994 to an agricultural company to which she was a member. The applicant sought to recover the property of these two plots of land alleging that the transfer had not been duly formalised and that consequently the land formed part of his inheritance. 9.  In all of the applications, the first-instance courts found for the applicants, the judgments were upheld on appeal and they became enforceable. Subsequently, at the defendants’ requests, the presidia of the relevant regional courts quashed the judgments by way of supervisory review. In the applications Trapeznikov and Bychkov and Others, the presidia found that the lower courts failed to take into account the specific method of calculation of indexation established by the Government for this particular category of social benefits. In the applications Markova and Ryabchikov, they concluded that the findings of the lower courts favorable to the applicants were based on the retrospective application of the law (see Appendix).


6.  The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Zvolen. 7.  In 1929 the applicant’s grandfather built a house in Piešťany. His predecessors retained ownership under the communist regime. Ownership was transferred to the applicant from his mother on 21 December 1998. 8.  The house comprises four flats. Two have a surface area of 108 sq. m each in size, while the other two measure 123 sq. m each. 9.  At the time the application was lodged, the flats were inhabited by tenants with a regulated rent. Their or their predecessors’ right to use the flats had been established by decisions taken by the municipal authorities between 1953 and 1986. After 1 January 1992 their right of use had been transformed into tenancies with regulated rent for an indefinite period. 10.  Under the relevant legislation, the applicant had to accept that his flats were occupied by those tenants and that he could charge them no more than the maximum amount of rent fixed by the State (“the rent-control scheme”). The applicant had no possibility of unilaterally terminating the leases on his flats. 11.  Under the applicable legislation, the maximum monthly rent chargeable for the flats in 1999 was the equivalent of some 13 to 33 euros (EUR). After several increases in the regulated rent, in 2004 the applicant was able to charge EUR 115 monthly in respect of each of the smaller flats and EUR 124 monthly in respect of the larger ones. 12.  The applicant contended that he, in fact, received from the tenants less than the maximum amount of rent set by the applicable legislation. To this end he led several property disputes with them and the local municipality. 13.  The parties provided differing figures as to the market rent.
The applicant relied on data from the National Association of Real Estate Agencies (“the NAREA”) and claimed that the monthly market rent for similar flats reached EUR 600 to 800 between 2004 and 2007.
The Government submitted an expert valuation according to which the monthly market rent for the applicant’s flats in 2010 amounted to EUR 265.50 and EUR 325 respectively. 14.  In submissions made on 16 June 2014 the applicant informed the Court that the rent control in respect of his four flats had been terminated. The first flat had been subject to rent control until May 2007, the second and third flats until August 2007, and the fourth flat until April 2008.


7.  Mr Tadeucci (“the first applicant”) was born in 1965. Mr McCall (“the second applicant”) was born in 1958. They live in Amsterdam. 8.  The applicants have formed a same-sex couple since 1999. They lived in New Zealand, with the status of unmarried couple, until December 2003, when they decided to settle in Italy on grounds of the first applicant’s poor health. 9.  During their first period of residence in Italy the second applicant had a student’s temporary residence permit. He subsequently applied for a residence permit for family reasons, under Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998 ... . 10.  On 18 October 2004 the chief of the Livorno police rejected his application on the ground that the statutory criteria were not satisfied. 11.  On 27 January 2005 the applicants appealed on the basis of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998, requesting that the second applicant be issued with a residence permit for family reasons. 12.  In a judgment of 4 July 2005 the Florence Civil Court allowed the applicants’ appeal. 13.  The court observed that the applicants were recognised as a couple in New Zealand, the first applicant having been issued with a residence permit in that country for family reasons in his capacity as an unmarried partner. The court found that the applicants’ status as an unmarried couple was not contrary to Italian public policy, as de facto couples received social and legal recognition in the Italian system. In the court’s view, Article 30 of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998 ... had to be interpreted in conformity with the principles established by the Constitution, which meant that a same-sex cohabiting partner should be regarded as a “member of the family” of the Italian national and thus entitled to obtain a residence permit. 14.  The court found that the right asserted by the second applicant also derived from Articles 3 and 10 of Directive 2004/38/EC of 29 May 2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council ..., which recognised the right of the partner of a citizen of the European Union (EU) to obtain a residence permit where the existence of a durable relationship was duly attested. 15.  The Minister of Foreign Affairs appealed against the judgment of the Florence Civil Court. 16.  In a judgment of 12 May 2006 the Florence Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. It observed that the New Zealand authorities had recognised that the applicants had the status of “unmarried cohabiting partners” and not that of “members of the same family”. 17.  The Court of Appeal found, first, that the lower court’s recommended interpretation of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998, according to which the “cohabiting partner” was regarded as a “member of the family”, was not compatible with the Italian legal system, which, according to the court, ascribed a different scope and meaning to those two legal concepts. Secondly, the Court of Appeal pointed out that the Constitutional Court had repeatedly held that a relationship based on cohabitation alone, and lacking stability and legal certainty, could not in any circumstances be regarded as a legitimate family based on marriage. 18.  The Court of Appeal found that New Zealand law was not compatible with Italian public policy on the grounds, firstly, that it regarded persons of the same sex as “cohabiting partners” and, furthermore, that it could be construed as conferring the status of “family members” on them for the purposes of granting them a residence permit. Lastly, it added that neither European law, particularly Directive No 2004/38/EC ..., nor the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights, obliged the States to recognise same-sex relationships. 19.  The applicants appealed on points of law. 20.  In a judgment of 30 September 2008, the text of which was deposited with the registry on 17 March 2009, the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicants’ appeal. 21.  The Court of Cassation observed first that, according to the terms of Article 29 of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998 ..., the concept of “family member” extended only to spouses, minor children, adult children who were not self-supporting for health reasons, and dependent relatives who lacked adequate support in their country of origin. It pointed out that as the Constitutional Court had, moreover, ruled out the possibility of extending to cohabiting partners the protection granted to members of a legitimate family, the Constitution did not require an extensive interpretation of Article 29 cited above. 22.  The Court of Cassation also considered that Articles 8 and 12 of the Convention did not require such an interpretation either. In its view, those provisions left a wide margin of appreciation to the States regarding the choice of means of exercising the rights they guaranteed, particularly in the area of immigration control. The Court of Cassation added that there had been no discrimination on grounds of the applicants’ sexual orientation in the present case. It observed in that connection that the non-eligibility of unmarried partners for a residence permit for family reasons applied to opposite-sex couples as well as same-sex partners. 23.  Lastly, it held that European Directive 2004/38/EC ..., which concerned the right of EU citizens to move freely within the territory of the Member States other than their State of origin, did not apply to the present case, which concerned family reunification with an Italian national resident in his own country. 24.  After being notified of the Court of Cassation’s judgment, the applicants left Italy in July 2009. They moved to the Netherlands, where the second applicant was issued with a five-year residence permit on 25 August 2009 as a de facto partner in a long-term relationship with an EU national. 25.  On 8 May 2010 the applicants married in Amsterdam. They stated that they had chosen to marry for personal reasons and not in order to obtain a residence permit, as the Netherlands authorities had already issued one to the second applicant. They added that the marriage contracted in the Netherlands did not allow them to live together in Italy. On 22 August 2014 the second applicant obtained a second five-year residence permit in the Netherlands, valid until 22 August 2019.
...


5.  The applicants in each case were affected by decisions of the Russian Federal Penal Authority («Федеральная служба исполнения наказаний», “the FSIN”) on prisoners’ allocation to post-conviction penal facilities. The applicants’ individual circumstances are detailed below. 6.  The application was lodged on 13 June 2009 by Ms Elvira Vasilyevna Polyakova, who was born in 1976 and lives in Vladivostok, Primorskiy Region. She was represented before the Court by Ms L. Ovchinnikova, a lawyer practising in Vladivostok. 7.  The applicant is the live-in partner of Mr R. The couple originally set up home in Vladivostok in the Primorskiy Region. They have a son born in 2003. 8.  On 22 May 2008 Mr R. was convicted of drug-related crimes and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment in a strict-regime penal facility. After the conviction became final he was allocated to IK-33 in the Primorskiy Region, close to his family home. 9.  In September 2008 the head of the Primorskiy regional department of the FSIN decided to transfer Mr R. to the Krasnoyarsk Region, some 5,000 kilometres from Vladivostok. It appears that the basis for this decision was a telegram of 18 April 2008 from the deputy head of the FSIN of Russia that read as follows:
“The Primorskiy regional department of the FSIN are allowed, until special notice, to send up to thirty convicts per month from remand prisons to the care of the Krasnoyarskiy regional department of the FSIN pursuant to Article 73 § 2 of the CES.” 10.  On 30 September 2008 the Primorskiy regional department of the FSIN informed Ms Polyakova that her request for Mr R. to be allowed to remain in the facility in the Primorskiy Region had been refused, and advised the applicant as follows:
“... pursuant to Article 73 § 2 of the CES and the instruction by the FSIN of Russia, on 14 September 2008 Mr R. was sent to serve the remainder of his sentence in the care of the Krasnoyarskiy regional department of the FSIN. You will be notified of his arrival at a penal facility.” 11.  The applicant challenged the FSIN’s decision before a court, asking for her partner to be transferred back to the Primorskiy Region so that she and their son could afford to visit him. 12.  On 28 October 2008 the Sovetskiy District Court of Vladivostok examined the applicant’s complaint under Article 258 of the Russian Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) and dismissed it. It found, referring to Article 73 § 2 of the Russian Code on the Execution of Sentences (“CES”), that strict-regime facilities in the Primorskiy Region were overcrowded and that transfers of a number of detainees to other facilities had been necessary for their own safety, as there could be conflicts among inmates fighting for a sleeping place. The District Court dismissed the applicant’s argument related to her family life as unsubstantiated, stating that she could apply to the FSIN for permission to visit Mr R. in the Krasnoyarsk Region. 13.  On 30 December 2008 the FSIN of Russia dismissed the applicant’s request for Mr R. to be transferred from the penal facility in the Krasnoyarsk Region to one in the Primorskiy Region, stating that under Article 81 of the CES prisoners should, as a rule, serve the entirety of their sentence in the same penal facility, and that there were no reasons for Mr R.’s transfer. 14.  On 13 January 2009 the Primorskiy Regional Court summarily dismissed the applicant’s appeal. 15.  The applicant and her son visited Mr R. in the penal facility in the Krasnoyarsk Region on three occasions. 16.  The application was lodged on 6 June 2011 by Ms Natalya Anatolyevna Kibalo, born in 1979, Miss Linda Aliyevna Kibalo, born in 2006, and Miss Iman Aliyevna Kibalo, born in 2009. The applicants live in the village of Dubovskaya in the Shelkovskiy District of the Chechen Republic. They were represented before the Court by lawyers of the Memorial Human Rights Centre. 17.  Ms Natalya Kibalo is the wife of Mr Kh. The couple are the parents of Linda and Iman Kibalo. 18.  On 29 May 2007 the Supreme Court of Dagestan found Mr Kh. guilty of kidnapping, illegal possession of arms, and attempted murder of a law-enforcement officer. Mr Kh. was sentenced to twenty years’ imprisonment in a strict-regime penal facility. The judgment was upheld on appeal. 19.  On an unspecified date the FSIN decided to send Mr Kh. to serve his sentence outside the North Caucasus area. 20.  On 7 February 2008 Mr Kh. arrived at UV14/8, a strict-regime penal facility in the town of Blagoveshchensk in the Amur Region, some 8,000 kilometres from Dubovskaya village. 21.  Ms Natalya Kibalo asked the FSIN to transfer Mr Kh. to a penal facility located closer to their home village, arguing that she had been de facto deprived of the opportunity to visit her husband because it would take her about eight days to travel from her home village to Blagoveshchensk by train, and because the cost of the trip was prohibitive for her as an unemployed mother of two young children. 22.  On 25 May 2009 the head of a department of the FSIN dismissed the first applicant’s request, referring to the lack of grounds for transfer listed in Article 81 of the CES. Ms Natalya Kibalo challenged the refusal before a court. 23.  On 21 August 2009 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow refused to examine Ms Natalya Kibalo’s complaint on the merits, stating that she had no standing to bring a complaint on behalf of her husband. The Moscow City Court quashed that ruling on 14 January 2010 on appeal. 24.  On 17 June 2010 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow held a hearing in the absence of both parties. It examined Ms Natalya Kibalo’s complaint under Articles 254-6 and 258 of the CCP and dismissed it. The District Court observed that Mr Kh. had been allocated to the penal facility in Blagoveshchensk under Article 73 § 4 of the CES, and that under Article 81 of the CES, as a rule, convicts should serve their sentence in the same facility throughout. It reasoned that Mr Kh. had breached prison rules on multiple occasions both in the remand prison and in UV14/8, and that he had been “convicted of terrorist offences in the Dagestan Republic, shows no remorse, and does not undertake to commit no unlawful actions in the future”. The judgment read, in particular, as follows:
“The claimant’s argument that neither she nor her children could come to visit [Mr A. Kh.] because he is serving his sentence in the Amur Region cannot be taken into consideration, because the possibility of receiving visits is governed by the norms of the CES and is unrelated to the location of a penal facility.” 25.  On 7 December 2010 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 17 June 2010 on appeal. It reasoned that the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court had not erred in finding that there were no grounds listed in Article 81 of the CES that would warrant Mr Kh.’s transfer to another penal facility, and that “the appeal statement contain[ed] no references to circumstances that would refute the [first-instance] court’s findings and demonstrate that there were grounds for Mr Kh.’s transfer from one facility to another within the meaning of Article 81 of the CES”. 26.  Between 2008 and 2012 Ms Natalya Kibalo visited her husband in Blagoveshchensk on eight occasions. On six of those occasions, between 2008 and 2010, her travel expenses were sponsored. She visited her husband once in 2011 and once in 2012 but could not afford to travel at all in 2013 or 2014. Miss Linda Kibalo accompanied her mother on her trip to visit Mr Kh. once. Miss Iman Kibalo, born during Mr A. Kh.’s detention, has never seen her father. 27.  The application was lodged on 13 July 2013 by Mr Ivan Dhzimsherovich Yeliashvili, who was born in 1979 and lives in Noginsk, the Moscow Region. He is currently serving his sentence in IK-8 in Labytnangi, the Yamalo-Nenetskiy Region. The applicant, who had been granted legal aid, was represented before the Court by Mr V. Shukhardin, a lawyer practising in Moscow. 28.  By a final judgment of 8 September 2009 the Moscow Regional Court convicted the applicant of robbery and sentenced him to eleven years’ imprisonment in a strict-regime facility. 29.  On 15 September 2009 the FSIN decided to send the applicant to serve his sentence in IK-8 in the settlement of Labytnangi in the Yamalo‑Nenetskiy Region, located about 3,300 kilometres from Noginsk. 30.  The applicant asked the FSIN to transfer him to a facility closer to Noginsk, arguing that his father, brother, sister and nephew all lived in that town and that they would have no realistic opportunity to visit him in Labytnangi. On 21 November 2011 the FSIN dismissed his request, noting that the applicant had been allocated to the penal facility in Labytnangi under Article 73 § 2 of the CES because of the lack of strict-regime penal facilities in the Moscow Region, and that under Article 81 of the CES prisoners should serve their entire sentence in the same penal facility. 31.  The applicant challenged the FSIN’s refusal before a court. On 11 April 2012 the FSIN submitted their objections to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow, which read, in particular, as follows:
“The claimant’s arguments that he is unable to receive visits from his relatives cannot be taken into account, because the possibility of receiving visits from next of kin and relatives is governed by the norms of the Russian Code on the Execution of Sentences and is unrelated to the location of any penal facility.” 32.  On 5 June 2012 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow examined the applicant’s complaint under Articles 254-5 and 258 of the CCP, and dismissed it with reference to Articles 73 and 81 of the CES. The judgment read, in so far as relevant, as follows:
“The claimant’s arguments that it is difficult to receive visits from relatives owing to the remoteness of the [place of] the sentence is being served cannot be taken into account by the court, because the possibility of receiving visits is governed by the norms of the Russian CES and is unrelated to the location of any penal facility.” 33.  On 14 January 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld the first-instance judgment. 34.  To date, the applicant’s relatives have not been able to afford to visit him in Labytnangi. 35.  The application was lodged on 6 November 2014 by Mr Vladimir Aleksandrovich Palilov, who was born in 1968 and lives in the Yaroslavl Region. He is currently serving his sentence in IK-18 in the settlement of Kharp, the Yamalo-Nenetskiy Region. The applicant, who had been granted legal aid. was represented before the Court by Mr E. Markov, a lawyer practising in Strasbourg. 36.  On 11 August 2006 the Yaroslavl Regional Court convicted the applicant of murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The conviction was upheld on appeal and became final. 37.  On 19 February 2007 the applicant was sent to serve his sentence in a special-regime facility for those sentenced to life imprisonment in the village of Kharp in the Yamalo-Nenetskiy Region, 2,000 kilometres from the Yaroslavl Region. 38.  On 9 January 2013 the applicant asked the FSIN to transfer him to any detention facility located closer to his elderly mother’s and sister’s place of residence. 39.  On 14 February 2013 the FSIN dismissed the request, stating that the applicant had been sent to serve his sentence in a remote penal facility under Article 73 § 4 of the CES, and noting that under Article 81 of the CES a prisoner must serve their entire sentence in the same facility. The applicant challenged the decision before a court. In his statement of claims he requested to be present at court hearings. 40.  On 19 July 2013 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow held a hearing in the applicant’s absence, which was referred to in the judgment as follows: “[t]he applicant was notified of the date of the hearing. He has failed to appear at the court hearing owing to the fact that he is serving a sentence”. The representative of the FSIN was also absent. The District Court examined the complaint pursuant to Articles 254-5 and 258 of the CCP and dismissed it, noting that there were “no grounds listed in Article 81 § 2 of the CES that would preclude Mr Palilov from continuing to serve his sentence in the penal facility in the Yamalo-Nenetskiy Region”. The applicant’s argument related to the difficulties of maintaining his family ties was rejected as follows:
“The claimant’s arguments that he cannot receive visits from his relatives does not give grounds for allowing the claims, because the possibility of receiving visits from family members and relatives, receiving correspondence, or using the telephone, are all governed by the norms of the Code on Execution of Sentences and are unrelated to the location of any penal facility.” 41.  The applicant appealed against the judgment and requested that an appeal hearing be held in his presence. 42.  On 4 June 2014 the Moscow City Court held a hearing in the applicant’s absence, which was explained as follows: “under Article 167 of the Code of Civil Procedure the appellate collegium deems it possible to examine the case in the absence of the parties to the proceedings; they have been notified of the date and place of the court hearing”. The appellate court upheld the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court’s judgment. Referring to Article 73 § 4 of the CES, it stated that the rule on serving a sentence in a particular region close to a detainee’s permanent residence was inapplicable to the applicant given the nature of the crime of which he had been convicted. The City Court also found that the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court had correctly interpreted Article 81 § 2 of the CES, reasoning as follows:
“... there were no medical recommendations that would contain contraindications for Mr Palilov’s serving his sentence in the penal facility in the Yamalo-Nenetskiy Region. Other exceptional circumstances that the law connects with the FSIN’s obligation to grant a claimant’s request to be transferred to another penal facility were not referred to in the appeal statement and cannot be discerned from the circumstances of the case.
The argument that Mr Palilov is being deprived of the opportunity to maintain contact with his relatives because of the remoteness of the penal facility cannot serve, in the context of Article 73 § 4 of the CES, as grounds for declaring the actions of the penal authority’s officials unlawful.” 43. The applicant’s mother and sister could not afford to visit him in Kharp. The mother died in 2013.


6.  The applicant was born in 1960 and until his conviction lived in the town of Slantsy in the Leningrad Region. 7.  In 1991 the applicant sustained a penetrating head injury, which involved the crushing of brain tissue. This trauma caused paralysis of the entire right side of his body, light speech impairment and post-traumatic epilepsy. To reduce the frequency of epileptic seizures the applicant was obliged to take Benzonal. 8.  The following year the applicant was examined by a social security medical assessment board (бюро медико-социальной экспертизы) and certified as having the highest-degree disability on the grounds that he had lost the ability to work, to walk without assistance or to look after himself. Those findings were confirmed by the board during routine re-examinations in 1994, 1996, 1998 and 2000, when the applicant was granted life-long disability status. 9.  In 2005 the applicant committed a homicide. On 16 April 2007 the Slantsy Town Court found him guilty of murder and sentenced him to seven years’ imprisonment in a highly secure correctional colony. On 15 August 2007 the Leningrad Region Court upheld the sentence on appeal. 10.  On 16 April 2007 the applicant was taken to a police ward in the town of Slantsy. 11.  Two days later he was transferred to remand prison no. IZ-47/6 in St Petersburg. On admission to that facility the resident prison doctor conducted a general medical check-up of the applicant and noted his disability. The applicant was allowed to take Benzonal supplied by his wife in order to minimise his suffering from epileptic seizures. 12.  In the remand prison the applicant was detained in a normal cell block where he allegedly faced great difficulties in his daily routine owing to the lack of special arrangements, in particular when using the squat toilet and shared dormitory shower, which lacked handrails and non-slip flooring. 13.  On 26 September 2007, when the sentence became final, he was transferred to correctional colony no. 7 in the Leningrad Region, where he was also placed in a cell designed for healthy inmates and, allegedly, continued to experience the inconveniences arising from his disability. 14.  Having no licence to treat inmates with as strong a medication as Benzonal, the colony’s medical authorities offered the applicant two substitute drugs with similar anticonvulsive effect, but the latter refused, alleging their low efficiency and possible side effects. 15.  On 3 March 2008, at his own request, the applicant was sent to Gaaza prison hospital in St Petersburg (“the prison hospital”) for an in‑depth medical examination and treatment. In the hospital he was subjected to various medical tests which showed that his health was stable. On 1 April 2008 the applicant was discharged from the hospital. In the discharge summary the supervising doctor mentioned that the patient was able to look after himself and to walk without assistance. 16.  On 10 October 2008 the deputy head of the correctional colony ordered the applicant’s transfer to a special unit for disabled prisoners. According to the Government’s description, this unit had “enhanced housing conditions” and “less strict security regime”. It accommodated only disabled inmates, who were detained in a prison wing located close to the medical unit. 17.  The applicant submitted that even after his transfer to the special unit he had not been provided with nursing assistance. Being unable to dress himself or perform hygiene procedures without assistance, he had asked his inmates for help in exchanging valuable prison products such as tea, coffee, sweets and cigarettes. 18.  On 1 July 2009 the special medical board, at the request of the penal authorities, issued an advisory report confirming the gravity of the applicant’s disability. 19.  On 4 August 2009 the applicant was examined by a medical board composed of the prison hospital management and a neurosurgeon. The doctors noted that the applicant’s health had remained stable, that he was able to look after himself, and that nursing assistance was not required for him. However, due to the gravity of the applicant’s brain condition it was decided to check whether his illness fell within the established list of illnesses warranting early release. 20.  Three days later a special medical board confirmed that the applicant’s condition justified his early release. 21.  It appears that the applicant remained in the prison hospital until 8 September 2009. 22.  In the meantime the detention authorities applied for his early release on medical grounds. 23.  On 28 August 2009 the Smolninskiy District Court of St Petersburg dismissed their application, citing the gravity of the applicant’s offence, the fact that he had developed paralysis and epilepsy prior to his arrest and that in detention his condition had remained stable. The decision was upheld on appeal by the St Petersburg City Court on 17 November 2009. 24.  Between 1 February and 18 March 2010, at his own request, the applicant was admitted to the prison hospital for treatment, and on 16 March 2010 he was re-examined by a medical board, which confirmed his right to early release on medical grounds. 25.  On 10 April 2010 the applicant was transferred to correctional colony no. 4 in the Leningrad Region. He was accommodated in a special unit for disabled prisoners. It appears that the conditions of his detention were similar to those in correctional colony no. 7. The applicant continued to receive Benzonal from his wife and refused to take any substitutes. 26.  On 10 June 2010 the Tosnenskiy Town Court dismissed the application for early release on medical grounds, referring to the gravity of the applicant’s offence, the fact that his health status had already been taken into account by the court which sentenced him, and, lastly, to the fact that the applicant’s medical condition had not worsened in detention.


4.  The applicant was born in 1975 and lives in Novokuznetsk, the Kemerovo Region. 5.  In the morning of 14 June 2007 policemen came to the applicant’s flat and took him to the police station in Pospelikha village in the Altay Region (“the police station”) for an interview. He was questioned about the circumstances of a theft which had occurred the day before and made self‑incriminating statements. 6.  During the questioning the investigator had to answer a telephone call and stepped out of the office. Left alone, the applicant attempted to walk out but was stopped at the door by a policeman who told him to stay inside and wait. He spent around four hours in the investigator’s office before he was allowed to leave. According to the Government, the applicant came to the police station voluntarily and stayed there for no longer than forty minutes. 7.  On 18 June 2007 the investigators charged the applicant with theft but dropped the charges one month later. 8.  In 2009 the applicant brought a civil claim for compensation for unlawful criminal prosecution and deprivation of liberty. 9.  On 20 October 2009 the Pospelikhinskiy District Court of the Altay Region examined the case in the applicant’s absence. The court noted that the applicant had been informed about the date and place of the hearing but, as he was serving a term of imprisonment, his presence in person could not be ensured. On the merits, the court held that the applicant was entitled to compensation for the unlawful criminal prosecution. It also considered that the questioning of 14 June 2007 had not amounted to a deprivation of liberty and could not give rise to any form of compensation. The applicant was awarded 1,000 Russian roubles (RUB) in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 10.  The applicant appealed against the judgment, arguing that the court award was too low and that it did not take into account the deprivation of liberty. He also requested leave to appear before the appeal court. On 10 February 2009 the Altay Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal in his absence, endorsing the District Court’s reasoning. 11.  The judgment of 20 October 2009 was enforced on 5 March 2011. 12.  In 2007 Ms I. brought a civil action against the applicant, seeking to recover a contractual debt. On 5 July 2007 the Justice of the Peace of the Pospelikhinskiy District of the Altay Region examined the case in the applicant’s absence. The judgment indicated that the applicant was serving a term of imprisonment and that he had been informed in a timely way about the date and place of the hearing. The Justice of the Peace granted the claim and ordered the applicant to pay RUB 11,311 to Ms I. 13.  The applicant appealed to the Pospelikhinskiy District Court and sought leave to appear before the appeal court. By an interim decision of 12 September 2007, the District Court refused the applicant leave to appear, finding that the Code of Civil Procedure did not provide for escorting detained litigants to courts hearing civil cases. On 10 October 2007 the Pospelikhinskiy District Court upheld the judgment on appeal, endorsing the findings of the Justice of the Peace. The applicant received a copy of the appeal judgement in November 2007.


5.  Details of the applicants are set out in the appendix. 6.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 7.  On 3 December 2004 the third and fourth applicants filed a request with the Restitution and Compensation Commission (hereinafter “the Commission”), seeking compensation for land expropriated from their legal predecessor in 1946. 8.  Between 17 July and 12 August 2005 the first and second applicants made statements waiving their rights in respect of the property belonging to the same legal predecessor in favour of the third and fourth applicants. 9.  On 28 August 2005 the Commission ruled in favour of the third and fourth applicants. 10.  On 14 October 2005 the Ministry of Finance quashed that decision upon an appeal filed on 19 September 2005 by the Supreme State Prosecutor (Vrhovni državni tužilac) in his capacity as legal representative of the respondent State. 11.  On 17 April 2006 the Commission issued a new decision, awarding compensation to all the applicants as they were all heirs of the legal predecessor. In so doing, it also examined the waiver statements of the first and second applicants made in 2005, but considered that, pursuant to section 40 of the Restitution of Expropriated Property Rights and Compensation Act, such waiver statements could only be validly made in non-contentious proceedings before a competent court (see paragraph 20 below). 12.  Between 12 June 2006 and 27 March 2014 the competent second‑instance administrative body (firstly the Ministry of Finance and later the Appeals Commission) and the Administrative Court, before which the case was first brought on an unspecified date in 2006, issued sixteen decisions in total (eight decisions each). The second-instance body ruled upon a series of appeals and gave decisions within 55 days, 65 days, 30 days, 53 days, 14 days, 78 days, 94 days, and 132 days. The Administrative Court gave rulings within 1 year 8 months and 17 days, 7 months and 22 days, 7 months and 27 days, 3 months and 23 days, 5 months, 5 months and 19 days, 4 months and 16 days, and 4 months and 23 days. 13.  On at least four occasions, when initiating an administrative dispute before the Administrative Court, the applicants explicitly referred to section 37 and/or section 58 of the Administrative Disputes Act (see paragraph 26 below) and urged the Administrative Court to decide on the merits of their request. The Administrative Court never ruled on the merits of the initial compensation request, but instead quashed or upheld the quashing of the first-instance decision of the Commission. Its last decision was issued on 27 March 2014, in substance remitting the case once again to the Commission. 14.  On 27 June 2014 the Supreme Court upheld the Administrative Court’s decision. The Supreme Court’s decision was served on the applicants on 8 July 2014. 15.  On 25 July 2014 the applicants each lodged a constitutional appeal against the decision of the Supreme Court, relying on, inter alia, Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention. The Government submitted that, on the same day, in addition to those constitutional appeals against the Supreme Court’s decision, the applicants had also each lodged a second constitutional appeal against the decision of the Administrative Court of 27 March 2014. No copies of those second constitutional appeals were provided by either party. 16.  On 28 October 2014 the Constitutional Court rejected the applicants’ constitutional appeals against the Supreme Court’s decision as premature, given that the Commission was still considering their compensation request. 17.  On 28 December 2015 the Constitutional Court issued another decision dismissing the applicants’ constitutional appeals. The decision stated that the applicants’ constitutional appeals had been filed against the judgments of the Administrative Court and the Supreme Court. In its ruling, the Constitutional Court constantly referred to the “impugned judgments”. There is no information in the case file as to when that decision was served on the applicants. 18.  On 31 March 2016, at a hearing before the Commission, the proceedings were adjourned at the applicants’ request until this Court ruled on their applications.


5.  A list of the applicants is set out in the appendix. 6.  On 23 December 2011 the applicants, political activists, participated in a demonstration organised by the political party “Politics Can Be Different’” (Lehet Más a Politika). The demonstrators blocked the entrance of a car park adjacent to the Parliament building by chaining themselves to each other and to concrete columns situated next to the entrance. 7.  Following the incident the Budapest main police department opened criminal investigations against twenty-nine persons, including the applicants, on charges of violation of personal liberty under Article 175(1) of Act no. IV on the [old] Criminal Code. 8.  On 9 March 2012 Parliament enacted Act no. XII of 2012 (“the Amnesty Act”) (see paragraph 12 below), which entered into force on 10 March 2012. 9.  On 29 March 2012 the Budapest main police department discontinued the criminal investigation against the twenty-nine suspects, pursuant to Article 190 §§ 1 (e) and 2 of the Code on Criminal Procedure on the grounds that they had been granted amnesty. The applicants did not appeal against that decision. 10.  On 6 September 2012 six of the applicants, Ms Bende, Ms Kalocsai, Ms Ámon, Ms Székelyné Rákosi, Mr Moldován and Mr Gajárszki, lodged a constitutional complaint requesting the Constitutional Court to declare sections 1, 2 and 4 of the Amnesty Act unconstitutional as infringing the right to their reputation and the principle of presumption of innocence. 11.  The Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible. It reasoned that the complaint did not raise any constitutional-law issues of “fundamental importance”, since it was based on an erroneous interpretation of the law. The Constitutional Court pointed out that the language employed by the Act could not be interpreted as establishing that the applicants had indeed committed the offence. In any event, the complaint was time-barred since it had been lodged outside the statutory 180 days’ time-limit following the entry into force of the legislation.