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CHAPTER Six China’s Foreign Policy Actions
China has developed and deployed numerous effective policies to
shape its external environment in pursuit of its top international
objectives, as defined in Chapter Four. This is evident in the activism
and the diversity of its statecraft: China has systematically
expanded the scope and improved the quality of its bilateral relationships;
it has demonstrated a pronounced embrace of multilateral
organizations, in numerous regions and on several functional issues;
its economic diplomacy is robust and multifaceted; and Beijing has
better incorporated military diplomacy into its foreign policy quiver.
This chapter examines the content and character of these policy actions
as they are reflected in its diplomacy all over the world.
Policy Framework for Foreign Relations
China has expanded the depth, scope, and quality of its bilateral relationships
in the last decade. This is part and parcel of China’s ongoing
effort both to leverage existing influence and to generate new influence.
This has been a distinct trend in Chinese diplomacy and will likely
remain so given China’s long-standing preference for bilateral interactions,
even in the context of a greater use of multilateralism.
China’s bilateral relationships are guided by a principle that
informs how Chinese leaders rank and value them. Chinese officials
and scholars cite the following principle: “Major power relations are
critical (or key); relations with neighboring countries are primary (or the
priority); and relations with developing countries are the foundation (or base)” (da guo shi guanjian, zhoubian shi shouyao, fazhanzhong guojia shi
jichu 大国是关键, 周边是首要, 发展中国家是基础). In recent years,
a fourth element has been added to this principle: “Multilateral is the
stage” (duobian shi wutai 多边是舞台). As an indication of the relevance
of these ideas, Hu Jintao even referred to them in his report to
the CCP’s 17th Party Congress in October 2007.1 Chinese officials and
scholars refer to the entire four-part phrase as the “four big pillars” (si
da zhizhu 四大支柱) of Chinese foreign policy.
The application of this principle to China’s actual foreign policy
behavior is not fixed, and Chinese scholars debate how much it should,
can, and does guide actual policymaking.2 Specifically, the implied relative
prioritization between “major powers” and China’s “neighbors”
(zhoubian guojia 周边国家) vacillates over time and among leaders.
Many Chinese analysts argue that China should focus most of its energies
on neighboring nations to ensure a stable and secure regional security
environment and that China should not become too preoccupied
with major power relations and the perceived status associated with
those relations. In fact, as of 2009, this view seems to dominate Chinese
policymaking.3 Others in China argue that such policies cannot
come at the expense of China’s relations with the United States, Russia,
Japan, and Europe, which are central to ensuring a stable regional environment
and to facilitating global stability and prosperity. In this sense, stable and amicable relations with major powers are necessary, but not
sufficient, for the success of China’s rise, as unspecified as that goal
remains among Chinese policymakers.4
The tension between these two priorities (e.g., major powers versus
regional powers) involves a constant balancing act for China, and its
handling of this tension will provide insights into the foreign policy preferences
of its current and future leaders.5 Some in China maintain that
Jiang Zemin placed the priority on improving major power relations
because of his personal preference for (and presumed status associated
with) interacting with foreign leaders from major powers. By contrast,
Chinese analysts argue that Hu Jintao appears to have taken a more balanced
and pragmatic approach toward major power relations: He emphasized
them when necessary while putting greater energy into regional
diplomacy in Asia to stabilize China’s periphery (which has seen numerous
crises) and growing China’s influence with developing nations.6 China’s
relations with each of these three categories of states—major power,
peripheral states, and developing nations—are analyzed below.
Relations with Major Powers7
Since the early 1990s, Chinese leaders have articulated three principles
to guide China’s relations with major powers: “non-alliance, nonconfrontation,
and not directed against any third party” (bu jiemeng, bu
duikang, bu zhendui di san fang 不结盟, 不对抗, 不针对第三方).8
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At a basic level, these principles indicate the leaders’ general approach
to managing relations with major powers. These principles are used
within the Chinese bureaucracy to communicate leaders’ goals, so they
have value and relevance by dint of that function. It would be a mistake
to dismiss these principles as entirely propagandistic. They are broadly
consistent with China’s interactions with other major powers, but they
do not capture the complexity and subtleties in China’s relations with
the United States, Russia, and others.
Economic linkages play a strong and persistent role in China’s
relations with major powers, specifically with the United States, Japan,
and the EU. For China, there is a consistent economic logic to these
relationships, which is key to understanding China’s policies toward
these states. China has developed and grown ties with them to ensure
access to their markets, investment, and technologies. The United
States, EU, and Japan have been for the past 30 years and continue to
be among China’s top trading partners and sources of investment.
However, China’s rhetoric about and actions toward major
powers have only partially adhered to the three principles noted above.
Although China has not formed any alliances, its efforts to constrain
U.S. influence globally and to limit U.S. and Japanese perceived efforts
to constrain China in Asia have become distinct, albeit not primary,
features of its international behavior. China has not made overt rivalry
with the United States or Japan a feature of its diplomacy but, as argued
above, competition exists (with varying degrees of intensity).
United States
China’s relations with the United States have a distinctly different
dynamic from its relations with other great powers. Since normalization,
China has, on balance, given U.S.-China relations pride of
place in much of its foreign policy. Chinese policymakers have historically
treated U.S.-China relations as Beijing’s most important
relationship—first, because the United States is seen as a critical source
of trade, investment, and technology and, second, because it believes
that if this relationship deteriorates, China’s “period of strategic opportunity”
to reach the next stage of national development would be
disrupted.
The U.S.-China relationship is also unique for China among its
ties with major powers because it is currently characterized by a great
deal of cooperation and competition—on both economic and security
issues. At specific times, both the cooperative and competitive elements
of the relationship have been quite intense; Washington’s and
Beijing’s mutual efforts to restrain North Korea’s nuclear program have
overlapped with growing disagreements about how to respond to Iran’s
nuclear program and how to resolve festering disagreements in bilateral
economic relations.
The dueling cooperative and competitive dimensions of bilateral
ties are structural features of U.S.-China relations. On the one
hand, stable bilateral relations are important to both nations’ economic
and security interests; outright conflict would be costly for both. On
the other hand, Beijing feels threatened by U.S. global predominance
and some aspects of U.S. Asia policy (as discussed above); Washington
is equally concerned about China’s growing economic and military
power, and U.S. leaders remain deeply uncertain about China’s
future intentions. The possibility of armed conflict over Taiwan is driving
military planners and military modernization programs in both
countries; this possibility, and the insecurity it generates, looms darkly
as a major structural constraint on more cooperative bilateral relations.
The latter force risks a militarization of the competitive dimensions
of U.S.-China relations. As a reflection of these complexities, Chinese
policymakers commonly use the principle of “seeking common ground
while reserving differences” to characterize U.S.-China relations and
to capture its complexities, albeit subtly.9 No leaders on either side currently
refer to bilateral relations as a “strategic partnership,” largely at
U.S. insistence; rather, U.S. and Chinese policymakers have referred to
their relations using a bevy of adjectives, such as positive, constructive,
cooperative, candid, and comprehensive.10
How does this situation influence Chinese policies toward the
United States? It manifests in Chinese policies that seek to expand
opportunities for cooperation (to prevent outright rivalry from developing)
and to constrain the United States where possible. These two
goals are partly reflected in the CCP’s guiding principle for U.S.-China
relations of “increase trust, reduce problems, strengthen cooperation,
and avoid confrontation” (zengjia xinren, jianshao mafan, jiaqiang
hezuo, bu gao duikang 增加信任, 减少麻烦, 加强合作, 不搞对抗).
This strategic guideline was initially articulated by Deng in the early
1990s, reiterated frequently by Jiang Zemin, and persists today, albeit
commonly in the form of official references to “developing cooperation
and avoiding confrontation” (fazhan hezuo, bu gao duikang 发展合作,
不搞对抗). China’s continued use of this and other official phrases will
serve as a bellwether for the direction of its policies toward the United
States.11
Chinese policymaking toward the United States in the 2000s
reflects this dual approach. China used the events of 9/11 and the
grand shift in U.S. national security priorities as an opportunity to
put relations on a more solid foundation. Chinese policymakers signaled
to the United States that China wants to avoid becoming a strategic
competitor of the United States. Since then, China has sought to
expand bilateral cooperation on several fronts. Regardless of the scope
and content of Chinese cooperation on these and other security issues,
which varies from thin to robust, Chinese policymakers and analysts
regularly stress the high quality of U.S.-China cooperation on combating
global terrorism and WMD proliferation, highlighting it as a new
basis of stability in bilateral relations.12
As China’s regional and global interests have diversified, practical
cooperation with the United States on nontraditional security issues
has grown. U.S. and Chinese agendas on WMD proliferation have
generally converged in the last decade, and new areas of real cooperation have also opened on such issues as combating infectious diseases,
narcotics and human trafficking, and organized crime. According to
U.S. government assessments, China has been helpful on several global
security issues, including North Korea’s and Iran’s nuclear programs;
political and economic reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan; UNSC
deliberations on Lebanon, Burma, and Sudan; and in generating international
support for global health and energy security initiatives. Nevertheless,
there is much more the United States seeks from China.13
There is a competitive dimension to China’s U.S. policy as well:
countering perceived U.S. efforts to limit China’s capabilities and
influence, in Asia and globally.14 Beijing seeks to create the conditions
under which U.S. policy cannot frustrate or hinder China’s top foreign
policy objectives in the near term and the ultimate goal of national
rejuvenation as a great power. China also wants to be involved in all
major decisions affecting its economic and security interests. On the
one hand, this involves probing (mainly in Asia) for ways to reduce
perceived U.S. containment and to constrain U.S. freedom of action
in the region, especially with regard to U.S. efforts to secure regional
assistance in prosecuting a military conflict over Taiwan. China seeks
to create a regional environment that is highly sensitive to Chinese
preferences and interests. On the other hand, China seeks to accomplish
the above goal in ways that do not openly and brazenly appear to
compete with U.S. goals or otherwise confront the United States. As
an expression of China’s effort to balance these competing goals, some Chinese strategists now argue that China can live with a hegemonic
power but they oppose hegemonic behavior. This distinction allows
Chinese policymakers and analysts to balance the need for stable U.S.-
China relations against their concerns about U.S. predominance and
Washington’s perceived unilateral use of its power, which many Chinese
fear could be directed at China in the future.15
These dueling Chinese goals have manifested in various efforts,
at the regional and global levels, to reduce the U.S. ability to pressure
China and to create greater space and leverage for China. In the
late 1990s, Chinese diplomats approached various East Asian nations
about pulling away from their alliances and security partnerships with
the United States in an effort to remold regional security affairs. This
effort was partly reflected in China’s promulgation of its “new security
concept,” which, in its initial incarnation in 1997, offered an alternative
vision to the U.S. alliance-based “hub-and-spoke” security system in
Asia.16 This attempt faltered because few U.S. allies and security partners
accepted China’s proposals, preferring the reliability of U.S. security
commitments. More recent Chinese actions to secure its periphery
are addressed in the section below on China’s diplomacy in Asia;
most of China’s actions in East Asia are focused on reassuring regional
nations, expanding the role of regional organizations and securing
support for China’s position on Taiwan. These efforts seek to create a
regional security environment in which other states do not seek to balance
China and pay more heed to its views.
Beyond Asia, China’s efforts to constrain U.S. power are expressed
in Chinese calls for more “democracy in international relations,” which
is a code phrase for opposition to perceived U.S. predominance. Since
the mid-1990s, China has sought to expand its relationship with Russia as a nascent counterbalance to U.S. power and to constrain the United
States in such global forums as the U.N. Security Council. This effort
was motivated in part by China’s opposition to NATO expansion,
broadening of the U.S.-Japan alliance, NATO military operations in
Kosovo, and U.S. ballistic missile defense policies.
Last, China appears to be gradually reducing its dependence on
the United States, economically and politically. This is a long-term
trend and one that may be happening as much by default as by design.
As China expands its global activities and its involvement in multilateral
institutions, its sources of prosperity, security, and status are growing.
Reducing political and economic reliance on the United States
is reflected in China’s embrace of the EU and Russia over the past
decade; Beijing’s growing relationships in Africa, Latin America, and
the Middle East; and its activism within the U.N.17 A consequence
is that this trend will minimize the extent to which China believes
it needs constantly stable bilateral relations with the United States to
pursue its foreign policy objectives. Thus, China may be more willing
to challenge the United States and resist U.S. pressure to change its
behavior on controversial issues.
Russia
Beginning with Gorbachev’s normalization of Sino-Soviet relations in
1989, China-Russia relations have since undergone a sea change. Beijing
has made gradual and consistent efforts to upgrade relations, driven
largely, but not exclusively, by mutual concerns about U.S. power and
the U.S. democracy-promotion agenda. Both nations seek to constrain
U.S. diplomatic and military power, to the extent possible. In 1994,
China and Russia formed a “cooperative partnership,” followed by a
“strategic cooperative partnership” in 1996, and the signing of a full
treaty on “Good Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation” in
2001. These agreements led to a series of sustained high-level interactions, which remain the “thickest” part of this bilateral relationship.
Since 1996, Chinese and Russian leaders have held annual summit
meetings. Hu Jintao’s first trip abroad as China’s head of state in 2003
was to Russia. China and Russia jointly created and then expanded
the organization that became the SCO in 2001 (even though it has
also become a venue for competition). In 2004, the border dispute was
finally and completely resolved. In 2005, they conducted, for the first
time, a large and sophisticated joint amphibious landing exercise in
China’s Shandong Province on its eastern coastline, and a second joint
exercise (this time involving only land forces) was held in Russia in
2007. (A third is planned for late summer 2009.) Chinese strategists
see these agreements, treaties, and related events as indicating a very
institutionalized relationship to which Russia is committed.18
There are other important layers to this relationship as well. Russia
has materially contributed to several of China’s modernization needs.
Beginning at the end of the Cold War, Russia served as China’s principal
supplier of sophisticated and much needed weapon systems (e.g.,
modern air defense systems, advanced fighters, multipurpose destroyers,
submarines, and supersonic antiship cruise missiles), which filled
critical gaps in the PLA’s capabilities during a key stage in China’s military
modernization program. In 2007, Russia was China’s fourth-largest
supplier of crude oil imports, at 9 percent. Energy trade has become
a new aspect of bilateral relations as China’s need for imported oil has
grown and Beijing has sought to diversify sources of supply, especially
to non-seaborne delivery routes.
China’s desire for coordination on common global and regional
security challenges is the strongest and most enduring Chinese motivation
for ties with Russia (even though energy cooperation has been expanding).19 Chinese analysts consistently view ties with Russia from
the perspective of China’s relative position among the major powers in
the international system. For China, cooperation with Russia helps to
promote greater multipolarity and multilateralism, lessening U.S. influence.
Russian leaders share Chinese elites’ discomfort with U.S. power
and relative predominance, in particular with the U.S. perceived penchant
for military alliances, regime change, democracy promotion, and
unilateral diplomatic and military actions. According to an authoritative
Chinese study:
There is increasing consensus between the two countries on international
issues. Both China and Russia oppose any form of hegemony
and power politics, calling for maintaining world peace,
and promoting development around the globe. Both countries
are against a single-power world, with the belief that a multipower
world represents the trend of history. Both sides are of the
view that holding onto Cold War mentality and making efforts to
meddle with other nations’ domestic politics constitute the cause
at the root to instability around the world.20
Given these concerns, Chinese analysts and officials see relations
with Russia as a way to reduce the U.S. ability to pressure China and
Russia, constrain U.S. influence in general, and generate leverage for
both in their interactions with Washington. A Chinese assessment put
it this way:
It is the wish of both sides to limit U.S. influence in some regions,
to maintain stability in Central Asia, the Korean Peninsula and
Japan adopting a policy of peace and non-armament. . . .
China-Russia strategic collaborative partnership will play an
important role in bringing stability to the volatile global situation
and the formation of a multi-power pattern.
The pressures that both countries are under have a considerable
bearing on the development of China-Russia relations, e.g., the
U.S. strategic bullying has served as a catalyst in the development
of China-Russia relations.
The situation that China and Russia find themselves in has convinced
both sides to increase cooperation and support each other
with the goal of consolidating their respective major power position
on international stage.
The more the U.S. is worried about the Sino-Russia relations, the
more China and Russia should fortify their relations. By doing
so, they can effectively stand up to the unilateral behavior and
hegemony of the U.S.21
As a further reflection of this logic, the timing of major enhancements
in China-Russia relations (i.e., forming a strategic partnership in late
1996 and signing a treaty in early 2001) coincided with periods of
tensions in U.S.-China relations. Similarly, Chinese and Russian positions
during key UNSC debates have become increasingly aligned
in the latter part of the 2000s, as both seek to restrain U.S. initiatives.
On North Korea nuclear issues at the U.N., China takes the
lead, with Russia’s support; and on Iran nuclear issues, Russia takes
the lead with support from China. In 2006 and 2007, there was a near
100 percent similarity in Chinese and Russian votes in the UNSC,
including vetoes.22 As a reflection of their common concern about U.S.
power, many Chinese also hope that Russia would be willing to support
China in a conflict with the United States over Taiwan; Chinese analysts point to the 2005 joint amphibious exercise as an indication
of growing military cooperation, which could be leveraged during a
cross-Strait crisis.23
In Central Asia, Russia and China share the common goal of
reducing U.S. military presence and democracy-promotion efforts.
Both fear that the U.S. military will remain in Central Asia for years.
One of their acute concerns relates to the “color revolutions” as an
America-led effort to spread democracy. As a consequence, both countries
supported the SCO’s 2005 summit statement calling for a time
line for U.S. withdrawal from Central Asia, with Russia and Uzbekistan
leading that effort.
However, there is a competitive dimension to China-Russia relations
in Central Asia as well. Russia fears that China’s expanding trade
and energy interactions in the region could, over time, allow China to
become a dominant regional actor. Russia remains wary of the SCO as
a Chinese vehicle to promote Beijing’s security agenda and economic
interests in the region, and China has similar concerns about Russian
efforts to constrain Chinese behavior, in particular its access to energy
resources. Within the SCO, China and Russia jockey for influence to
prevent the other from dominating the organization; at the same time,
most Central Asian states play China and Russia off one another to
maximize the benefits to themselves. During the 2008 summit, none
of the SCO states were willing to endorse Russia’s position on the independence
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which indicates the limits of
Russian influence within the organization.24
There is a thinness to, and latent tensions in, Sino-Russian interactions.
Unlike China’s relationship with countries such as the United
States, there is a low level of social and cultural contacts between Russians
and Chinese, which has fed negative stereotypes on both sides
(especially Russian fears of Chinese domination of Eastern Siberia).
High-level diplomatic and military interactions are far more institutionalized
than are people-to-people contacts. A glaring example of this is marginalization of the study of the Russian language in China.
In 2007, about 40,000 Chinese college students and 80,000 middle
school students were learning Russian. More than 200 million Chinese
students are learning English.25 Chinese analysts are aware of these limitations,
and they are frank about this in their assessments: “Because of
the differences of the two social systems, and differences on the ways
of thinking and background of the reforms, China and Russia also run
into some frictions and clashes.”26 These will hinder the development
of closer, quasi-alliance policy coordination.
There are some important constraints on the relationship. Unlike
China’s relations with the other major powers, economic relations with
Russia are limited, albeit growing. Russia has never been one of China’s
major trading partners or a major investor in the Chinese economy.
In 2007, bilateral trade was at an all-time high of just $48 billion;
this compares to $356 billion for the EU, $302 billion for the United
States, and $236 billion for Japan in the same year.27 Also, China’s
share of Russian global trade is consistently much larger than Russia’s
share of China’s global trade. Economic relations, in terms of its dollar
value, have been dominated by the arms trade for over a decade, but
this is changing. China has started importing more crude oil and other
resources from Russia and exporting more manufactured goods to it.
This pattern of bilateral trade is also a source of tension; Russia
wants to export more value-added capital goods to China (e.g., equipment
and machinery) and fears having its market flooded by imports
of cheap Chinese consumer goods. As the global price of oil dropped in
late 2008, bilateral trade numbers stopped rising as fast as in previous
years. Also, China’s purchase of major weapons platforms from Russia may be reaching its limit as the arms trade relationship fundamentally
changes. In 2008, the estimated value of Russian arms sales to the PLA
was about $1.4 billion, less than a third of the amount purchased in
2006; Russian sources suggest that it may stay at this lower level in the
coming years (Figure 6.1). This change is occurring because China has
filled the most critical gaps in its force structure. China increasingly
wants military co-production and technology-sharing agreements with
Russia (vice complete weapons platforms), so that it can further develop
its already improving defense industry. It is unclear whether Russian
firms will be willing to share their design and production technologies
with China. Chinese copying of Russian defense equipment and
technologies has been an acute concern among Russian defense enterprises,
further constraining future cooperation. During the delayed
meeting of the Joint Intergovernmental Commission on Military- Technical Cooperation in December 2008, China and Russia signed
an intellectual property protection agreement, but no new arms contracts
were agreed upon. Future trends in Sino-Russian arms tradeinteractions
will be a useful measure of the health of the broader political
relationship.28
Figure 6.1 Russian Arms Exports to China, 1999–2008
For China, a long-standing tension in bilateral relations is Russia’s
reliability. This has and will limit the depth of cooperation between
Moscow and Beijing, especially as new disagreements creep into this
relationship. In China’s eyes, the history of its relations with the Soviet
Union and Russia is replete with examples of the abandonment of
China. In 2001, following 9/11, Putin turned toward the United States
and in China’s eyes “placed relations with China in the secondary
position.”29 This occurred only a few months after the China-Russia
treaty was signed. As part of Russia’s shift, Putin dropped the Sino-
Russian joint opposition to U.S. missile defense policies and, specifically,
U.S. withdrawal from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, leaving
China in the highly uncomfortable position as the leading and highly
vocal opponent. Russian realignment with Chinese interests occurred a
few years later on such key issues as North Korea and Iran, as Moscow
and Beijing sought to constrain what they perceived as U.S. preference
for unilateral actions and disregard for international institutions.
Chinese concerns about Russian reliability and Russia’s competitive
impulses remain, however. China has faced numerous difficulties
in getting Russia to develop an oil pipeline from Siberia to northeastern
China. Following an initial bilateral agreement in 1995 about building
a pipeline from Angarsk to Daqing, Russia began to waver in 2003
because of a bid from Japan for Russia to build an alternative pipeline
from Siberia to Nakhodka. The so-called “An-Da pipeline” plan was
shelved when its main advocate, Yukos CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky,
was imprisoned on corruption charges that were widely viewed as a
move by political opponents in the Kremlin. As a result, the former
project was replaced with the East Siberia-Pacific Ocean pipeline with a spur to China. The first phase of this project is complete (and runs
from Irkutsk to Skovoridino, near the Chinese border) but the Russians
have not started working on the spur from Skovoridino to China.
Beijing’s February 2009 $25 billion loan to Russia will likely accelerate
work on this project; the loan is meant to help Russian state firms
build the spur and develop reserves in Eastern Siberia, with completion
of the spur to China expected in 2010 or 2011.30
In addition, Chinese officials and analysts are well aware of the
“China-threat theory” within Russia, which Beijing believes reflects
not only public and media views but those of some government officials
as well. Russian concerns are based on China’s growing economic and
military power and Chinese migration into Russia’s Far East. Although
Chinese policymakers and analysts reject these arguments, they know
that they reflect Russian elites’ ambivalence toward China and Russian
concerns that it is fostering the development of a future strategic rival.
This, in turn, fuels Chinese anxieties about Russia’s commitment to
the treaty-enshrined Sino-Russian strategic partnership. The fact that
Russia is willing to sell its most advanced weapon systems to India,
but not to China, is not lost on Chinese leaders. Frictions and delays
in the arms trade relationship in the latter part of this decade indicate
both nations’ growing concerns. As noted above, there is a competitive
dimension to Chinese and Russian interactions in Central Asia and
within the SCO; this may grow as China forges more energy deals with
Central Asian states.31
Last, China’s wariness about Russia’s reliability is also the result of
what the Chinese claim are differences in “diplomatic culture”: Russia
seeks to be a global superpower again and is willing to confront the
United States, whereas China claims not to have such aspirations currently
and prefers more subtle means of constraining the United States.
Such Russian aspirations are closely watched by Chinese analysts and are a key variable in their calculations of prospects for further cooperation
on international security issues.32
Japan
Among China’s relationships with major powers, that with Japan is
undergoing, perhaps, the most profound adjustment. For China, Sino-
Japanese relations have shifted from ties defined by stability, relative
amity, and growing economic cooperation in the 1980s and 1990s to
a relationship defined by even greater economic interaction, increasing
levels of enmity, general instability, and competition for regional
leadership. Chinese policy toward Japan, since the middle part of this
decade, however, has begun to focus on creating a more stable bilateral
relationship, as has Japan’s policy toward China. In China, this policy
evolution has been driven by concerns about the rapid deterioration in
Sino-Japanese ties, fears of runaway anti-Japanese sentiment among the
Chinese public, and corresponding concerns about anti-Chinese sentiments
in Japan.
Historically, there has been a widely accepted economic logic to
China’s Japan policy, and this logic largely defined Sino-Japanese relations
for decades. During the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, Japan never cut
off all trade with China even though the two countries lacked formal
diplomatic relations, which were established in 1972. As China entered
its reform period, Japan became a critical source of trade, direct investment,
and, perhaps most important, overseas development assistance
in the form of annual grants and subsidized loans. Japanese firms
were also important sources of manufacturing equipment, expertise,
and technology in sectors China viewed as central to its own industrial
modernization, such as automobiles, shipbuilding, and consumer
electronics.
In the 1980s and 1990s, China’s resentment of Japan’s imperial
history and anti-Japanese nationalism did not function as a major
constraint on bilateral relations, and when these sentiments flared up, Chinese leaders managed them.33 Although Chinese elites and the
public expressed deep mistrust of Japanese intentions and acute fears
of Japanese remilitarization, there was little security competition in
bilateral relations. In the first two decades of China’s reform period,
both China and Japan had limited international goals and both were
focused largely on fostering regional stability and economic development.
Lingering territorial disputes and historical problems were managed
within the framework of limited state ambitions and mutually
beneficial economic cooperation.
In the late 1990s, Sino-Japanese relations started to become more
tense, competitive, and volatile. Both nations began to define their
external interests more broadly and both their militaries were modernizing,
which altered threat perceptions in Beijing and Tokyo. Chinese
leaders began talking about the rise of China in Asia, and China
became far more active in regional security affairs. Also, Chinese foreign
policy elites began to question the restraint value of the U.S.-Japan
alliance as the Japanese military began to participate in U.S.-led global
military operations and to develop missile defense capabilities jointly
with the United States. Japanese leaders also sought to play a greater
role in regional and global security affairs, facilitated by U.S. efforts to
encourage Japan’s military to assume broader responsibilities. As China’s
economy and trade grew, it sought a regional leadership role on
economic affairs—a role long coveted and carefully fostered by Japan.
These parallel trends have fostered a de facto competition for regional
leadership between China and Japan. As a result, China’s Japan policy
and its broader regional diplomacy are now concerned about maintaining
a position of strength in East Asia relative to Japan.34
Domestic political dynamics in China and Japan accentuated
this emerging competition and contributed to its volatility. Internal
changes in the politics of both nations created space and opportunity
for anti-Chinese voices in Japan and anti-Japanese voices in China to
assert themselves. Unlike before, public opinion began to play a greater
role in both countries’ policymaking toward the other. In China, there
have been several debates about the direction of its Japan policy, which
revolved around the relative importance of “the history issue” in Sino-
Japanese relations. As the domestic context changed, territorial disputes
and lingering historical problems came to the fore, which in turn
further accentuated the sense of an emerging race for regional preeminence.
In some cases, these domestic dynamics constrained the ability
of political leaders to stabilize relations.35
Ironically, during this process, trade and investment continued
to grow rapidly. Between 1996 and 2006, Japanese trade with China
(including Hong Kong) grew by an explosive 239 percent, whereas
Japan’s overall global trade grew by only 45 percent (excluding trade
with China). Japan-U.S. trade grew by only 12 percent in this period.
In 2006, Japan’s trade with China constituted 17 percent of Japan’s
global trade, including 14 percent of its exports and 21 percent of its
imports. As distinct from much of Japan’s trade with the United States,
its trade with China is relatively balanced and highly complementary.
This growth in exports contributed to the momentary recovery of the
Japanese economy from its decade-long recession in the 2005–2008
period, an outcome not unnoticed in Beijing.36
What do these seemingly contradictory trends portend for China’s
approach to Japan and Sino-Japanese relations? China is moving
from a position of unconditionally maintaining a positive relationship
with Japan (to accrue economic gains) to one in which Beijing continues
to seek continued trade and investment but is also far more willing to assert itself on key disagreements on historical and territorial issues.
China is less economically dependent on Japan, more confident in its
economic strength and regional influence, and more wary of Japan’s
intentions. China publicly campaigned against Japan’s bid to join the
U.N. Security Council. It has deployed naval vessels to the East China
Sea to police its disputed claims to hydrocarbon resources there (e.g.,
the Chunxiao gas field) and has moved ahead with oil drilling in these
contested areas. In bilateral relations, China is more willing to assert
itself and to push for a Japanese accommodation of Chinese interests.
Yet there are multiple indications that China’s approach to relations
with Japan is changing, gradually but with important consequences.
Chinese leaders recognized that the downward spiral that
occurred during the 2001–2005 period generated domestic political
risks and imposed acute diplomatic and economic costs. As a result,
since 2006 Chinese leaders have made a major effort to stabilize bilateral
relations; both Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao have visited Japan and
hosted return visits by prime ministers Fukuda, Abe, and Aso. Wen
Jiabao delivered an address to the Japanese parliament in May 2007,
which was broadcast simultaneously in both countries and in which
he acknowledged Japan’s political and economic achievements since
World War II. This speech signaled Beijing’s desire to move past historical
issues. More concretely, despite having completed gas platforms
near contested areas of the East China Sea, China has refrained from
initiating full-scale production and has instead negotiated a tentative
framework for managing the dispute. Chinese leaders may be more
constrained by anti-Japanese nationalism than before as well.
It is not a foregone conclusion that the two countries’ relationship
will become even more competitive and drift into an outright
rivalry. Expanding bilateral economic relations and fostering greater
economic integration in East Asia are substantial common interests for
Beijing and Tokyo and provide reason and momentum for maintaining
stable Sino-Japanese relations. Significantly, Beijing has moved to
restrict the activities of potentially troublesome anti-Japanese agitators
(e.g., groups asserting sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands). Beijing was
quick to arrest unofficial strike leaders in Japanese factories during the
April 2005 anti-Japanese disturbances. And China has moved ahead with a trilateral investment agreement with Japan and South Korea
designed to improve the investment climate and protections for those
countries’ businesses in China. China also agreed in 2007 to support
the initiation of a trilateral diplomatic dialogue among the United
States, China, and Japan.
As of mid-2009, leaders in both nations are trying to forge a
framework for bilateral political ties that would facilitate stability amid
growing competition and anxieties in each country. Both sides still
face real challenges in forging such a framework: enmity at the popular
level in both nations remains strong, none of the complex territorial
issues are close to resolution and are intimately tied to the general
sense of regional competition, and the domestic political dynamics that
fed a deterioration in relations in the late 1990s and early 2000s could
reemerge under new leadership in either nation. Thus, whether Beijing
and Tokyo succeed in reconstructing stable ties able to endure in
the longer term depends on whether leaders on both sides continue
to make that effort a priority and are willing to expend the necessary
political capital when confronted with a flare-up in tensions.
Europe37
China’s approach to relations with the EU and its member states has
evolved substantially since the mid-1990s. The EU is a large market for
China’s exports and a key source of investment and advanced manufacturing
equipment and technology (including potentially for military
modernization). The EU, after adding several members, became
China’s top trading partner in 2004.38 European countries continue to
be important sources of development aid for China. Many European leaders support, at least rhetorically, China’s vision of a more “multipolar”
international order, but interpretations of this goal differ. These
features have led China to seek more from this relationship over the
past decade, albeit with mixed results for Beijing.
China-EU relations have become more complex and contentious
as they have developed, especially as mutual expectations have
grown. Economic interactions, which were historically the foundation
of a friendly and stable relationship, are now plagued by a proliferating
variety of disputes over market access, large and growing trade deficits,
and China’s exchange rate policy. Growing economic pressure on and
from European labor forces have made these issues more politically
salient for EU leaders. China’s various human rights–related policies
(e.g., Tibet) have resurfaced in public debates as well as certain diplomatic
practices (e.g., aid in Africa). Spurred by domestic politics, EU
leaders are now more willing to confront China over these and other
disputes. For both China and the EU, their relations with the United
States loom largely over EU-China ties, often frustrating China’s effort
to shape EU policymaking.39
A Three-Phase Evolution. Beginning with the establishment of
China’s relations with the then–European Community (EC) in 1975,
China’s ties with Europe have evolved in three phases.40 Each one
reveals Chinese objectives and policies and their relative effectiveness.
During the first phase, from 1975 to 1995, relations were neither
well developed nor a priority for either. Europe was a secondary, if not an occasionally tertiary, concern for China.41 Common interests
expanded amid few policy differences, led mainly by merchandise
trade, which blossomed in the 1980s. China’s approach focused
on the European provision of development assistance, business investment,
and technology transfers. Many European policymakers sought
to foster China’s economic development in the search for new markets,
and some were motivated by the belief that development would lead to
political reform—a belief China was happy to benefit from. For China,
EU nations were an important source of investment, associated equipment,
the technology needed to build or renovate key industrial sectors,
such as automobiles (e.g., from Volkswagen), and light and heavy
manufacturing (e.g., from Siemens). EU nations had a commercially
driven approach to China focused on expanding trade and investment
opportunities and encouraging China to join the WTO. The EU issued
its first strategy paper on China in 1995, 20 years after formal relations
had been established. (Several major EC/EU member states had diplomatic
ties with China dating to the 1950s.)
A second phase can be identified from 1995 to 2005, which
involved a sustained and qualitative expansion in EU-China relations.
In this ten-year period, goods trade grew rapidly, especially following
China’s WTO accession 2001. The European Commission issued
four “communications” on overall EU relations with China (in 1995,
1998, 2001, and 2006) and two “country strategy papers” (in 2002 and
2007). The commission’s development aid joined with the aid given
by the EU member states amounted to billions of euros in assistance
to China. The political portfolio of the European Council (the highest
political organization within the EU) became infused with issues
involving China, such as nonproliferation, human rights, energy policy,
and climate change. The portfolio of the commission increased to over 27 “sectoral dialogues” and, as a result, the commission’s interactions
with its Chinese government counterparts proliferated accordingly.42
China made a dedicated effort in the early 2000s to expand
ties with the EU; China saw an opportunity as a result of trans-
Atlantic tensions (especially after the Iraq War) and sought to capitalize
on this apparent opening. In 2003, several unique events occurred.
China issued its first policy paper on relations with the EU; it designated
a minister in charge of EU relations; the annual China-EU
summit was attended, for the first time, by President Hu Jintao; at the
summit, China and the EU formed a “comprehensive strategic partnership”;
and China also began pushing the EU to lift its 1989 embargo
on arms trade with China.
The third, sobering phase in relations began in 2005 and continues
to the present. It is characterized by the end of the previous
honeymoon phase in relations and the arrival of several disputes about
unresolved economic and diplomatic issues.43 In 2005, the Multi-Fiber
Agreement expired and the EU reintroduced import quotas on Chinese
textile imports to prevent a flood of them coming into EU ports.
Resolution of this tense dispute required successive and confrontational
trade negotiations, some of the first for the EU and China. Also by
2005, China’s effort to prod the EU into lifting its arms embargo had
become intense but ultimately failed. Relying on support from France
and Germany, China ran into strong opposition from the United
States, a variety of Scandanavian and East European countries, and
eventually the UK.
These tensions set the stage for a series of subsequent economic
policy disputes about market access, China’s undervalued currency, the
growing trade deficit, and China’s poor standards for food and product
safety. British Labour Party politician Peter Mandelson became European Commissioner for Trade in 2005 and played a central role in
taking a more assertive approach toward China in negotiations. During
the November 2007 EU-China summit, for example, Mandelson and
other commissioners used tough language and publicly confronted
the Chinese about the myriad problems in EU-China economic relations.
The 2007 summit communiqué criticized China on these issues
as well as on Tibet; the communiqué was not issued until four days
after the summit, as further indication of the difficulties surrounding
these negotiations. In late 2008, China used the then–EU President
Nicholas Sarkozy’s bilateral meeting with the Dalai Lama to cancel
the annual EU-China summit. These successive events led policymakers
in Beijing and Brussels to recognize the limits to this relationship
and the danger of false expectations, in particular China’s expectations
that the EU could be used to counterbalance U.S. power. As a result,
China altered its strategy toward Europe, beginning to focus more on
managing its bilateral relations with individual countries than with the
EU; this approach allows China to return to “divide and rule,” using
differences among individual countries to advance Beijing’s agenda and
interests.
Explaining China’s Motives. Several considerations explain this
evolution in China’s approach to Europe and EU-China relations.
The economic drivers of this relationship have long provided it with
momentum and direction; they will likely continue to do so, even amid
growing disputes. As with the United States, Europe has long been
an important and growing market for China’s exports. The EU-27 is
China’s largest trading partner.44 In 2007, China’s most important EU
trading partners were (in order) Germany, the Netherlands, the UK,
France, and Italy. As a block, EU countries also provide China with a
larger amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) than does the United
States. China’s top sources of European FDI were (in order) Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, France, and Italy.45 EU nations remain an
important source of technology transfers. Germany is China’s largest
supplier of machine tools, for example, followed by Japan. But there are
also limits to this economic cooperation. For example, China has tried,
unsuccessfully, to push Europe into granting China “market economy
status” under WTO rules. China seeks this status because it could
give Chinese goods easier access into European markets by making
anti-dumping and countervailing duty cases more difficult to pursue.
Whether and how the EU decides to grant such status to China (before
the deadline specified in China’s WTO accession agreement) will be a
key bellwether of relations.
A consistent component of EU-China economic interactions has
been European assistance to help China manage its developmental challenges.
The EU and its member countries provide a significant amount
of technical assistance and financial aid to the Chinese government
and Chinese nongovernmental organizations. For many years, EU aid
programs were focused on improving China’s infrastructure and rural
development. Beginning in 2002, EU aid programs shifted focus to
social and economic reform, the environment and sustainable development,
and good governance and the rule of law. In its prior China
Country Strategy Paper for 2002–2006, the European Commission
allocated 250 million euros in aid; and in the most recent China Country
Strategy Paper for 2007–2013, it allocated 225 million euros in aid
for the plan’s seven-year period.46
Chinese perceptions of European countries’ place in global politics
have evolved significantly from the 1980s, and this has changed
China’s expectations about diplomatic cooperation with the EU. Once
frequent Chinese references to Britain, France, and Germany’s imperial
and colonial past seem to have virtually disappeared from Chinese
media and scholarly analyses. Although Chinese suspicions of NATO
(and particularly of NATO expansion) remain, these are couched in terms of the U.S. “leadership” of NATO, which places Chinese suspicions
of NATO in the same context as its dissatisfaction with U.S.
unipolar or “hegemonic” tendencies.47
As a consequence, for China, EU countries have a unique appeal
because they do not exhibit the same degree of distrust and fear of
China’s intentions as do many in the United States. Whereas Chinese
analysts believe that the United States wants to contain China’s rise,
they view European policymakers as seeking to engage China and promote
its stable development. In China’s eyes, EU countries also do not
espouse an aggressive democracy-promotion agenda or possess extensive
security interests in Asia, both of which are sources of deep distrust
in U.S.-China relations. Some EU members feel strongly about
China’s human rights situation and the Tibet issue, but these have
been only occasional irritants and not permanent barriers to improving
relations.
For these reasons, many in China believe that Sino-European
relations are less competitive, in a strategic sense, than U.S.-China relations.
China sees its relations with European countries as providing
Beijing with a relatively benign Western alternative, of sorts, to the
United States. For Beijing, developing closer EU-China relations has
been part of its effort to diversify its sources of economic growth, security,
and international legitimacy.
The quantity and quality of China-EU diplomatic interactions
have expanded accordingly since the late 1990s, reflecting a clear Chinese
priority. According to a U.S. study of Chinese diplomacy, Europe
was the most highly visited region for China’s president and premier
from 2000 to 2005. In 2002 and 2004, China’s foreign minister spent
more time visiting Europe than any other region.48 Chinese President
Hu Jintao made one of his first overseas trips to the UK after becoming
China’s president in 2003; his first visit to the United States as
president was not until 2006. China and the European Union hold
an annual summit meeting where they engage in a structured political dialogue on a range of economic and developmental issues—security
and military topics are seldom addressed in detail. China and European
nations also interact within the larger Europe-Asia Summit meetings
among heads of states, held biannually.
China’s unsuccessful effort to persuade the EU to lift its 1989
arms embargo on China reveals much about Beijing’s (mis)perceptions
of EU states’ interests; it also taught Beijing some important lessons
about the boundaries of its ties with the EU. Beginning around 2003,
senior Chinese officials began to press their EU counterparts to consider
lifting this prohibition on trade with China in defense-specific
and dual-use goods and technologies. China was clearly trying to leverage
the tensions in trans-Atlantic relations following the U.S. invasion
of Iraq to push this specific goal. Relying on French and German leaders
(specifically, Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schroeder), Chinese policymakers
argued that the embargo is a “symbolic barrier” to improving
China-EU relations, with Beijing appealing to the goals outlined
in the 2003 EU-China “comprehensive strategic partnership.” China
was using the latter to leverage progress on the former goal, as is often
the purpose of China’s strategic partnerships. Strong U.S. opposition
to lifting the embargo combined with disagreement among member
countries ultimately derailed China’s effort in the latter half of 2005.
Following China’s spring 2005 passage of an Anti-Secession Law (which
sought to “legalize” China’s use of force against Taiwan, among other
objectives), EU opposition to eliminating the embargo grew substantially
and remains so today. Although EU policymakers still refer to
removing the embargo as an eventual goal, opposition remains strong
among numerous EU member states—both old and new.49
For Beijing, the failure of its effort to remove the embargo underscored
several lessons: trans-Atlantic ties are deep and strong, even
during periods of ardent disagreement; there are real limits to China’s
ability to influence the EU, in particular on issues affecting trans-
Atlantic relations; it is no longer sufficient to have Germany and France
on board in an EU composed of 27 member states; the EU and its member states are wary of being drawn into Chinese-initiated efforts,
implicit or explicit, to restrain the United States; and the United States
continues to have much influence over European policymakers on
China-related issues.50
Distinct from China’s interactions with the European Commission
and Council, Beijing has made consistent efforts to expand its
relations with major EU member states. It has reached bilateral “strategic
partnerships” with several major EU countries including France,
Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the UK (Table 5.4). China also
convenes “strategic dialogues” and security-related discussions with the
UK, France, Italy, Germany, and Poland. These discussions generally
focus on such issues as arms control and nonproliferation, assessments
of the international security environment, human rights, and the rule
of law. China in 2007 established high-level economic dialogues with
the UK and the EU, modeled on a similar Chinese dialogue with the
United States. Since 2005, China’s bilateral diplomacy with EU countries
has become a prominent feature of its Europe strategy, and this
remains so today. China became frustrated with its failed interactions
with the EU in Brussels and realized that it gained more leverage by
working bilaterally, including by playing European capitals off one
another.
On balance, Beijing does not treat the EU or individual countries
as important actors on global or Asian security issues, aside from the
UK and France by dint of their status as permanent members of the
U.N. Security Council. Beijing would prefer to keep European countries
out of the Taiwan issue. China has chafed at EU involvement in
Taiwan, such as during the contentious negotiation of the final communiqué
from the 2007 EU-China summit. As a consequence, China’s
security and defense dialogues with European countries are rather thin
in content, even though they have grown in number. Beijing views
such interactions as a way to shape EU perceptions of China and as
providing a limited window into U.S. thinking and policies; Chinese
policymakers continue to debate how much practical cooperation can
result from them. On issues for which Beijing deems European nations to be international leaders, such as aid to Africa and nonproliferation,
Chinese policymakers appear to be giving European views greater
attention and weight.
Even when China has shared diplomatic goals with major EU
countries, substantive policy coordination was limited. Under the
Chirac government, Beijing’s closest diplomatic relationship in the EU
may have been France. Beijing and Paris shared displeasure with the
George W. Bush administration’s perceived efforts to circumvent international
institutions in favor of unilateral actions. Even in this situation,
substantive cooperation was thin. France was far more willing
to confront the United States than was Beijing, such as over U.S. Iraq
policy in 2002 and 2003. French President Nicholas Sarkozy distanced
his government from Chirac’s intense affinity for and cooperation with
China; then a series of bilateral controversies over Sarkozy’s attendance
at the 2008 Beijing Olympics’ opening ceremony and France’s Tibet
policy accelerated this divergence in 2008.51
Several European countries, especially the Scandinavian countries,
remain critical of China’s human rights record; yet for many years,
European countries were unwilling to support U.S. efforts to criticize
China’s human rights practices in the U.N. Many European countries
conduct bilateral human rights dialogues with China (as does the commission),
but few states are willing to confront China over policy differences.
This may be changing, however. In 2008, the leaders of Germany
and the UK were willing to confront China on its Tibet policy
by having these nations’ top leaders meet with the Dalai Lama, albeit
in uncoordinated actions. Notably, German Chancellor Angela Merkel
was the subject of intense criticism from Beijing and a temporary one
year downgrading of relations occurred after Merkel’s September 2007
meeting with the Dalai Lama. In spring 2008, several EU leaders—
most notably Sarkozy of France—openly debated conditionalizing
their attendance at the 2008 Olympics opening ceremony on changes in Chinese policies on the treatment of Tibetans. And, as noted above,
China canceled the EU-China summit in December 2008 following
Sarkozy’s meeting with the Dalai Lama.
China’s historically strong ties with East European countries (e.g.,
the Czech Republic, Albania, Romania, and Hungary) have weakened
significantly as many of them have drawn closer to the United States,
joined NATO, and supported the United States on such controversial
security questions as the arms embargo on China and U.S. missile
defense policies. Most notably, in 2006, Albania, a longtime friend
of China during the Cold War, accepted several Chinese Muslim
Uighurs who were released from the Guantanamo Bay terrorist detention
center. Beijing unsuccessfully pressed Washington for Uighurs to
be returned to China for prosecution. Most East European countries
also have comparatively minor economic and trade relationships with
China, although China’s exports of consumer goods to their markets
have been growing rapidly.
China’s military-to-military diplomacy with European countries
has expanded, in quality and quantity, since 2000. This behavior
is driven, in part, by the acceleration of PLA modernization and the
growing needs of the PLA. Interactions with European militaries are
of special value to the PLA because they hold the prospect of learning
about the doctrine, training, tactics, and procedures of advanced European
militaries and possibly also about NATO operations. These interactions
include high-level policy discussions and professional military
training and education exchanges. Some EU nations, such as France
and the UK, have conducted very basic and scripted military exercises
with the PLA, largely focused on maritime security (e.g., searchand-
rescue operations). As China’s defense industry modernizes and
the PLA’s need for advanced weapon systems grows, Europe’s defense
industry will continue to have appeal. No longer seeking to purchase
complete weapon systems, the PLA and Chinese defense enterprises see
European firms as potential sources of advanced weapon subsystems and technologies useful in building next-generation Chinese-designed
weapon systems.52
Regional Diplomacy in Asia
China’s interactions with its Asian neighbors constitute the policy area
of greatest activity and innovation in its international behavior. China’s
ties with those on its periphery are critical to all five of its foreign policy
objectives, especially the core national priority of economic development.
The origin of China’s current “regional diplomacy” (zhoubian
waijiao 周边外交) dates back to the early 1990s, just after Tiananmen,
when China sought to reestablish its international legitimacy.53
Since then, China has substantially expanded the scope and content
of its regional diplomacy and, thus, has improved its relations with
most nations in East, South, and Central Asia. The depth of China’s
links with its Asian neighbors can hardly be overstated. To be sure,
this is not meant to imply that China has been uniformly successful
in improving ties with every country in Asia or that it has unrivaled
political influence. Doubts about China’s growing economic and military
power and its future aspirations linger below the surface for many
countries on China’s periphery, fostering a tentative quality to these
nations’ engagement with Beijing.54
East Asia
Throughout all of Asia, China’s expansion of its relationships with East
Asian nations has been the most extensive. This effort has been driven by several objectives: to expand China’s access to markets and investment,
to reassure regional nations that China’s rise does not threaten
them economically or militarily, to broaden access to natural resources
and technologies for further development, and to undermine any and
all efforts, U.S.-led and otherwise, to constrain China’s economic, diplomatic,
and military influence. In this sense, China’s regional diplomacy
in East Asia has arguably received pride of place in Beijing’s overall
international strategy in the last decade.
Beginning in the early 1990s following the Tiananmen incident,
China developed an initial set of strategies and policies to engage
East Asian nations more fully—an effort that gradually expanded
throughout the 1990s and into this decade. It first adopted a policy of
“good and friendly neighbor diplomacy” (mulin youhao waijiao 睦邻友
好外交) to generate support for China at a time when it was experiencing
relative international isolation.55 To implement this policy, China,
in the early 1990s, established formal diplomatic relations with several
East Asian nations (especially in Southeast Asia) to begin the process of
breaking out of its relative isolation; it also began to join some regional
organizations, such as APEC. Since 2000, this regional diplomacy has
received new and invigorated emphasis, which came to be called China’s
“great peripheral diplomacy” (da zhoubian waijiao 大周边外交).
China’s calculated embrace of East Asia in the 2000s has a particularly
extensive policy basis and, uniquely, has been discussed
and approved at the highest levels of China’s leadership.56 The 2002
report of the 16th Party Congress articulated a key, eight-character
“guideline” (fangzhen 方针) for China’s regional diplomacy: “building
good-neighborly relationships and partnerships with our neighbors” (yulin weishan, yilin weiban 与邻为善, 以邻为伴). According to Ambassador
Wang Yi, one of the foreign ministry’s top Asia experts, this was
the first time that the theme of regional cooperation was mentioned
in a high-level CCP report. To implement this guideline, according to
Ambassador Wang Yi, China’s leaders then adopted the more specific
policy of “amicable neighbor, secure neighbor, and prosperous neighbor”
(mulin, anlin, fulin 睦邻, 安邻, 富邻) to foster enhanced “cooperation
and coordination” (hezuo yu xietiao 合作与协调) among China
and its Asian neighbors. The specific manifestations of these important
policies are enumerated below; whether and how these guidelines and
policies might change will indicate the future direction of China’s
diplomacy in East Asia.
China’s economic interactions with East Asian nations have taken
off in the last ten years and have been the leading edge of its engagement
with the region. In 2008, before the global financial crisis and the
rapid drop in global trade flows, half of China’s total trade volume was
intraregional (driven by a regional network of processing trade), and
the proportion had been growing annually. China-ASEAN merchandise
trade grew from $6 billion in 1991 to $202.5 billion in 2007. China’s
trade with Southeast Asian nations had also been growing faster
than U.S. trade with the region. Many projected that China would
become ASEAN’s top trading partner.57 In 2004, China became both
Japan’s and South Korea’s top trading partner, and in 2007 it became
Australia’s top trading partner, overtaking Japan. Both China’s exports
to East Asian nations and its imports from them had been growing,
which is a far less controversial and more sustainable pattern than China’s
unbalanced trade with the United States and the EU.58
One of China’s most extensive trade initiatives was the 2002
launching of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, which is
expected to come into force in 2010 and by 2015 to remove all relevant tariffs among members.59 It may eventually encompass an area of more
than 1.7 billion people, with a combined GDP of $2 trillion. The process
of tariff liberalization within the FTA member countries began in
late 2004 with the adoption of “Early Harvest” measures that called for
the lowering of tariffs on select agricultural goods. The China-ASEAN
trade volume is projected to expand to $1.2 trillion under the FTA; this
would be the world’s third-largest market after the North American
Free Trade Agreement and the EU.
Beyond trade, China’s outward direct investment in Southeast
Asia has grown substantially, which is consistent with the global
growth in Chinese outward investment. According to Chinese data,
annual investment flow increased from $150 million in 2005 to $970
million in 2007, and China’s total investment stock in ASEAN states
grew from $1.2 billion in 2005 to $3.9 billion in 2007.60 This is impressive,
given the paucity of China’s global outward FDI ten years ago: In
1996, China’s global ODI flow for the year was about $300 million.
However, these amounts pale in comparison to the investment stock
of the United States, Japan, and EU member states. In 2006, China’s
investment in ASEAN (according to ASEAN data) accounted for
only 1.8 percent of regional investment stock, whereas U.S. investment
accounted for about 7.4 percent, Japan accounted for 20.6 percent, and
EU nations accounted for 25.5 percent.61
China has also been expanding its subregional cooperation with
mainland Southeast Asia. China is an active member in the Greater
Mekong Subregion (GMS) development project that is forging a variety
of new water rights accords and transportation agreements among
nations within the GMS. The issue of water rights has also emerged as
a source of tension, as southern Chinese provinces consider building
dams on rivers that feed into mainland Southeast Asia.62 China’s private
trade and migration into Laos and northern Burma are extensive,
and China’s investment in transportation infrastructure in these countries
is particularly notable. Such transportation links provide China
with improved access to Southeast Asian markets as well as to its sea
ports, which possess economic as well as strategic value for China.63
On security and foreign policy issues, Beijing has taken a series
of calculated steps to fully engage East Asian nations at a consistent
pace and in novel ways, an approach popularly called China’s “charm
offensive.”64 China has done so with two main objectives in mind: reassurance
and countercontainment. In both bilateral and multilateral
settings, China has promoted conceptions of national security that go
beyond classic military security to include questions of economic stability
and national development. These broader conceptions resonate strongly with Southeast Asian nations and provide China with a way to
reassure them that China shares their views of national security challenges.
These ideas also allow China to draw a contrast with U.S. foreign
policy goals which, under the Bush administration, have focused
on counterterrorism missions and the military dimensions of national
security.65
China’s embrace of multilateral security institutions in East Asia
represents one of the most significant and enduring elements of its East
Asia policy and a change from past practice. In the early 1990s, China
was wary of such forums, viewing them as venues that others would
use to criticize and gang up on China; Beijing now views participation
as a way to shape international rules, improve relations with neighboring
countries, manage concerns about expanding Chinese capabilities,
and limit what it perceives as U.S. efforts to constrain Chinese influence.
China has joined all the key regional organizations in East Asia including
the ASEAN Regional Forum, the APEC forum, ASEAN+1 (China),
ASEAN+3 (China, South Korea, and Japan), and the EAS (Table 5.2).
In the case of the EAS, China agreed—after much deliberation—to
let the ASEAN states take the reins of this new multilateral gathering,
despite China’s initial aspirations to play a leading, if not the leading,
role. In 2006, China co-hosted in Southern China a major China-
ASEAN summit to commemorate 15 years of relations, as partial testament
to the success of Chinese diplomacy. At the meeting, Prime
Minister Wen Jiabao heralded that China and ASEAN have “together
gone through the experience of eliminating suspicions and developing
dialogue as well as promoting mutual trust,” leading to his conclusion
that relations were now at their “historic best.”66
China’s efforts at reassurance have also focused on managing past
tensions with ASEAN states. China has resolved numerous border disputes
and has also deferred resolution of other territorial conflicts, both land and maritime ones.67 China agreed, in November 2002, to sign
ASEAN’s Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China
Sea aimed at preventing escalation of ongoing maritime territorial disputes
over the Spratly Islands. (The agreement notably does not cover
the Paracel Islands, over which China and Vietnam have competing
claims.) Beijing in 2003 also signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation,
signaling its nominal acceptance of ASEAN’s security norm of
peaceful settlement of disputes. China was the first non-ASEAN state
to take this step; India followed. Also in 2003, China and ASEAN
signed a “Joint Declaration on a Strategic Partnership,” to signal China’s
commitment to long-term cooperation on regional security issues.
These commitments, to some degree, have been reflected in China’s
actual behavior. In addressing maritime territorial disputes, China
agreed in 2004 to conduct joint seismic investigations of underwater
resources with the Philippines in the South China Sea, and Vietnam
joined this three-year research investigation in 2005. Beijing also
agreed to conduct joint patrols of sea areas that have been agreed on
and demarcated, such as with Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin.68
China’s ultimate aims with these efforts remain unclear. It may
be drawing the Philippines and Vietnam into bilateral management
of these disputes as a way to lessen the influence of ASEAN’s goal to
ensure that maritime territorial conflicts are managed multilaterally,
such that these smaller states collectively have more sway over Beijing.
China’s other offshore territorial disputes, such as with Japan regarding
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and natural gas deposits in the East
China Sea, are far from resolution and have even flared up in recent
years. These remain potential flash points for armed conflict.
China has been a key supporter of a nascent effort to create an
organization for managing Northeast Asian security issues, potentially
modeled on the Six Party process to denuclearize North Korea. A
working group on establishing such a regional security mechanism for
Northeast Asia was established within the Six Party process in February 2007.69 China has been active on other issues regarding regional
architecture. It was initially a strong supporter of convening an East
Asia Summit as a first step toward building an East Asian Community.
China’s initial enthusiasm for this meeting (which was based on
Beijing’s stated support for expanding pan-Asia regionalism) waned as
various ASEAN states asserted themselves in summit planning, reducing
China’s relative influence in shaping this new institution. Southeast
Asian nations in concert with Japan chose the venue, set the agenda,
and expanded the participants list to include India, Australia, and
New Zealand. The initial summit was convened in December 2005
in Kuala Lumpur and occurred at the same time at the ASEAN+1 and
ASEAN+3 ministerial meetings.70
Moreover, China has made a concerted effort to forge “strategic
partnerships” as part of its effort to improve the quality of its bilateral
relationships in the region. Although such actions are part diplomatic
window-dressing, they are the basis of China’s effort to raise the level
of its diplomatic and security dialogue in ways that appeal to regional
actors, and, ultimately, to reassure them. The substance of such strategic
partnerships now includes annual high-level exchanges (or “strategic
dialogues” in some instances) on traditional and nontraditional
security topics among top diplomats and senior political leaders.
China’s emphasis on nontraditional security challenges has been a
central part of its effort to reassure its Asian neighbors about “the China
threat,” to draw a contrast with U.S. foreign policy, and to enhance the
areas of security cooperation in these relationships. The collective aim
of these efforts is to augment China’s appeal, to expand its influence,
and to further inject China into all regional security discussions.71
Corresponding with China’s effort to improve the quality of its
regional relationships, the PLA has stepped up its military-to-military
interactions with China’s East Asian neighbors.72 This is part and parcel
of China’s effort to manage regional perceptions and to reassure Asian
militaries that PLA modernization does not threaten their security. For
example, beginning in 2008, Chinese military leaders have begun to
sensitize its neighbors about its plans to deploy an aircraft carrier. The
PLA also likely uses these dialogues to gather information on these
nations’ interactions with the U.S. military, especially for U.S. allies in
Asia, for which training and arms transfers with the United States are
quite extensive.
China’s military-to-military diplomacy with the region is increasingly
diverse and robust. It now has high-level exchanges with most
countries in Northeast and Southeast Asia; it has allowed military officials
from neighboring countries to watch Chinese military exercises;
it has invited a few to participate in joint exercises, a first for the PLA;
PLA Navy ships’ visits to the region are more common; academic and
functional exchanges between China and Asian militaries are growing
in number; and China has offered favorable arms sales packages
to Cambodia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, among others in the
region.
Central Asia73
China’s relations with Central Asia have undergone a gradual but
important evolution in the last decade; this subregion has become
more significant to China’s domestic economic and security interests.
As a result, China has been investing greater diplomatic and financial
resources to improve its access to natural resources, to limit U.S. (and
to some extent Russian) influence, to combat terrorism, and to generally
reduce regional instability.
Beginning in the early 1990s following China’s establishment
of relations with these former Soviet nations, China’s ties with them
were a relatively low priority. Beijing’s policy was principally focused
on improving regional stability, border security, and gaining access to
energy resources. China in the early 1990s negotiated border agreements
with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan that resolved outstanding
territorial conflicts by demarcating their respective borders; in
some cases, China reached agreements in which it received 50 percent
or less of the disputed territory.74 As China became a net oil importer in
1993, it began to seek more foreign sources of crude oil and natural gas.
China pitched its engagement as creating mutually beneficial economic
opportunities for these transition economies. Counterterrorism did not
emerge as a policy driver until the late 1990s when China sought the
cooperation of Central Asian nations in cracking down on Muslim
Uighur separatists who trained and lived in the region.
In contrast to China’s relations with East Asia, trade between
China and Central Asian nations has always been quite modest and
remains so today. Economic ties are gradually expanding, led by
resource trade. China’s total trade with the five Central Asian nations
has increased from very low levels before the fall of the Soviet Union
to more than $30 billion in 2008. Between 2004 and 2008 alone, the
value of trade between China and Central Asia increased more than
four times, albeit from a small baseline. Even with current increases,
China’s trade with Central Asia currently constitutes only about 1.3 percent
of its total foreign trade. China’s top trading partner in the region
is Kazakhstan, which accounts for 90 percent of its total imports from
the region (more than 50 percent of which is crude oil). China’s exports
to the region, mainly consumer goods, are almost four times greater
than its imports.75 Although non-energy trade with Central Asia may not be that important for China, it is very valuable to Central Asian
economies. China is a top export market for all of them, and it is the
only viable non-Russian export route to the rest of the world via Chinese
roads, railways, and ports. This reduces their reliance on Russia.
Infrastructure development in the transport, communications,
and energy sectors has been and remains the focus of China’s investment
in Central Asia. China has contributed to building oil and gas
pipelines in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, railways in Kazakhstan
and Kyrgyzstan, and various road, bridge, and hydroelectric projects in
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. China has used such infrastructure investments
to gain access to resources and to lubricate various commercial
interactions with the region. Beijing also seeks to revitalize Eurasian
trade routes to diversify its trade partners and thereby better integrate
western China, especially Xinjiang Province, into its economy.
For Central Asian nations, Chinese investment is especially appealing
because it invests in government-backed projects as a means of generating
good will, regardless of these projects’ actual contributions to
economic development. Western investors are far less willing to do so,
further enhancing China’s relative appeal.76
Since 2001, Chinese diplomacy has given greater attention to
Central Asia. Beijing now emphasizes, on the one hand, improving
trade and investment links and, on the other hand, enhancing China’s
regional involvement to reduce U.S. and Russian influence. China
remains concerned about Muslim terrorists training and operating in
Central Asia. China has modestly expanded its security and military
cooperation with the Central Asian states to prevent regional unrest
from overflowing into Xinjiang.77
Energy security and countering U.S. influence became top priorities
in China’s Central Asia diplomacy after two key events: U.S. military
deployments to the region after 9/11 and the U.S.-led intervention
in Iraq in 2003. China sought to diversify its reliance on imported
oil and gas from Middle Eastern suppliers; this made Central Asia far
more appealing because of its relative proximity to China and the availability
of land routes to transport energy to the mainland. In addition,
Chinese analysts began to argue that U.S. military presence in
Central Asia “creates an unfavorable strategic environment” for China
and that China should ensure that the region does not fall under U.S.
domination or that of any single great power (e.g., Russia).78 For many
Chinese, the U.S. military presence in Central Asia facilitates both
coalition operations in Afghanistan as well the U.S. pursuit of regional
hegemony. Chinese military commentators regularly raise the prospect
that U.S. military presence in the region will endure so that the United
States can further contain China. PLA officials specifically raised this
possibility with then–Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld during
his first visit to China as defense secretary in fall 2005. Among the
PLA, there is a general sense that greater U.S. military involvement in
Central Asia could be used to put pressure on China, especially during
a crisis. However, how the United States could do this or why is seldom
articulated.
Following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and political instability
in Central Asia in 2004, Chinese analysts began expressing particular
concern about the U.S. presence. The “color revolutions” in
Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan heightened this anxiety because
many believed that these events were facilitated, if not sponsored, by
the United States. Many Chinese feared such revolutions could spread
throughout Central Asia. Some in China argued that the presence of
U.S. government and nongovernmental organizations in Central Asia
could be used to export such movements to China.79
China has used and continues to use a mix of bilateral and multilateral
initiatives to broaden its presence and expand its influence. It
has begun to upgrade its bilateral political relationships in Central Asia
after neglecting them since the early 1990s. A high-profile manifestation
of China’s efforts was the state visit of Uzbekistan’s President Karimov
to Beijing in May 2005, less than two weeks after Uzbek government
security forces opened fire on anti-regime protestors in the town
of Andijon. During this visit, the Andijon incident was not mentioned,
and China and Uzbekistan signed a treaty (vice the more common joint
statement) outlining their “friendly cooperative partnership,” which
was the first treaty the two had signed since normalization of relations
in 1992.80 During this trip, China and Uzbekistan also signed a $600
million agreement for China to help develop oil fields in Uzbekistan.81
In taking these steps, China presented Uzbekistan’s leaders with political
and economic opportunities at a time when that country was under
international pressure over the Andijon incident. For regional policymakers,
China’s treatment of Uzbek leaders represented a particularly
stark contrast with U.S. criticism of their management of the Andijon
incident and its generally poor human rights record.
China has made a major effort to improve political and economic
relations with Kazakhstan and with much success. China’s bilateral
activities have focused on leveraging improved political relations to
secure access to Kazakh energy resources. Several of China’s top leaders
met numerous times with their counterparts from Kazakhstan in
2004 and 2005; in particular, Hu Jintao has met with Kazakhstan’s
president at least three times since 2004. During Hu’s July 2005 trip
to Kazakhstan, the leaders upgraded bilateral relations to a “strategic
partnership” (the first for a Central Asian nation), and they reached
commercial agreements on building a joint oil pipeline and expanding
trade relations. China in 2005 succeeded in purchasing a stake in a
large natural gas field in Kazakhstan, after being outbid in past years.
The China National Petroleum Corporation agreed to buy PetroKazakhstan,
a regional business competitor, for $4.18 billion. This is one
of China’s biggest cross-border investments.82 In May 2006, a Chinesefinanced
970-km pipeline from central Kazakhstan began delivering
crude oil to western China, with plans to triple its size to deliver oil
from the Caspian Sea. The pipeline is designed to eventually carry 20
million tons of oil, which was almost 10 percent of Chinese crude oil
imports in 2007.83
Leadership diplomacy has been a key Chinese mechanism for
developing bilateral relations with Central Asian states. In addition
to the visits noted above, Wen Jiabao visited Russia, Uzbekistan, and
Turkmenistan in 2007 and concluded major economic deals during
those trips. Hu Jintao made state visits to Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan
in 2007 and to Tajikistan and Turkmenistan in 2008; both visits
were linked to his annual participation in the summit of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization. It is significant that the Chinese president
attends the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit each year,
providing an occasion to conduct state visits to key countries in the
region.
Beyond bilateral diplomacy, China developed and expanded the
SCO to advance its regional interests. The SCO has functioned as one
of China’s main vehicles for entry into Central Asia’s economic and
security politics. It has sought to use the SCO to restrict U.S. advances
and to limit Russian influence. This has manifested in China’s consistent
material support for the SCO and activism within the organization.
In 2003, China provided financial support for the SCO secretariat
to be established in Beijing; this was the first such support
offered since the SCO was founded in 2001.84 During the June 2004 SCO summit, Hu Jintao pledged $900 million in preferential export
buyer credits to SCO members and noted that China would establish
a special fund for the training, in China, of 1,500 students from other
SCO member countries. Hu also called on the SCO to move beyond
the institutional development stage; he advocated that the organization
“shift its focus” to establish “specific objectives” and adopt “effective
measures.” These words and actions strongly indicated that China
seeks to build the SCO into a strong regional organization with a role
in managing all regional economic and security questions.85 In 2005,
China took several steps to improve further the international standing
of the SCO. India, Pakistan, and Iran were given observer status; the
SCO was made an observer at the U.N. General Assembly; and the
SCO signed a memorandum of understanding with ASEAN.
China has had to balance multiple objectives as it operates in the
SCO. Most controversially, the joint communiqué from the 2005 SCO
summit called for a timetable for the U.S. military to withdraw from
its bases in Central Asia when “active” counterterrorism operations end
in Afghanistan. As an indication of SCO members’ concerns, the SCO
statement was preceded by a Russia-China summit statement on “the
21st Century World Order,” which also strongly criticized U.S. use
of its power and the perceived U.S. disregard for multilateral organizations.
Although Uzbekistan and Russia instigated the call for the
timetable for U.S. withdrawal, China likely supported the request—or
at least made no obvious effort to oppose it. In that same year, China
and Russia conducted a large-scale joint amphibious assault exercise off
China’s coastline, which they rhetorically linked to the SCO’s counterterrorism
mission. As a further indication of China’s balancing act,
the language of the 2006 SCO summit declaration was noticeably less
confrontational than in 2005. But, the 2006 document still referenced
similar themes opposing U.S. human rights policies in the region and
the Bush administration’s democracy-promotion agenda. It stated: “difference
in cultural traditions, political and social systems, values and
model of development . . . should not be taken as pretexts to interfere in other countries’ internal affairs” and then bluntly stated: “models of
social development should not be exported.”86
China has also sought to limit Russian influence in Central Asia,
albeit with mixed success. This effort has been in response to Russia’s
attempts to dominate the SCO and to restrain Chinese prerogatives.
Given the Sino-Russian “strategic partnership,” the countries’
military-technical relationship, and their shared interest in constraining
U.S. unilateralism, limiting Russian influence is a subtle Chinese
goal. China does not want to provoke Russia but does not want it to
dominate Central Asia either. The SCO helps China to balance these
objectives by allowing Beijing to engage Central Asian states in a multilateral
format. Russia, unlike the United States, is much more able to
manage Chinese influence in the region given its long-standing links to
the former Soviet Republics and its willingness to use confrontational
tactics. This situation creates multiple layers of competition and cooperation
between Russia and China in Central Asia.
Two examples capture the complexity of Chinese interests as
they relate to Russia—the push and pull of a subtle competition for
regional influence. Beijing, for years, resisted having the Russian-led
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)—which includes
many SCO member states—be linked formally to the SCO. Russia
had been pushing for this. China and other SCO members opposed
it for fear that it would allow Russia to define the SCO as an anti-
Western security institution, rather than one with both economic and
security agendas. Some reports indicate that Russia seeks to link the
CSTO and SCO to form a Eurasian version of NATO. China resists
because it does not want the SCO to assume such a confrontational
identity and a Russian-led security agenda.87 China’s efforts initially
failed in October 2007 when the CSTO signed an agreement with the
SCO to facilitate cooperation on a range of such regional security questions
as drug trafficking and organized crime. In 2008, SCO members were more successful at resisting Russian pressure. The 2008 joint
statement of the annual SCO summit did not endorse Russia’s position
on the independence of the Georgian enclaves South Ossetia and
Abkhazia; the statement only expressed understanding for Russia’s
position but did not go any further, much to Moscow’s frustration.
Collectively, China’s multilateral and bilateral diplomacy in
Central Asia indicates a growing interest in the region, with a focus
on investing in infrastructure, gaining access to natural resources,
expanding political influence, and supporting counterterrorism activities.
China’s diplomacy is primarily focused on establishing a regional
economic role that affords it choice access to regional markets and
natural resources. Concerns about U.S. military and diplomatic presence
in the region will persist, as will nagging anxieties about Russian
assertiveness. China will continue to build up the status and capabilities
of the SCO to create an environment in which U.S. influence, at a
minimum, is constrained and, at a maximum, will eventually decline.
China also sees the SCO as a way to prevent Russia from monopolizing
regional security agendas and debates. China eventually seeks a security
environment in which it plays a leading role; that is, no major issue
can be resolved without Chinese consent. China will likely stop short
of being an active challenger to U.S. interests, especially given that
other countries have been willing to publicly confront and criticize the
United States. Beijing’s relative tolerance of a U.S. presence may wane
if its concerns persist about U.S. democracy-promotion efforts and the
potential spillover effects on Chinese political stability.
Looking forward, China’s approach to Central Asia will likely
reflect continuity and durability. Its regional interests are long-term
and enduring, most of which directly support the CCP’s top goals of
internal stability and economic development. Also, many of the instabilities
and uncertainties in China’s interests in East Asia, such as the
Taiwan issue or relations with Japan, do not affect China’s Central Asia
policy. And the U.S. presence in Central Asia is far more limited than
in East Asia, lessening the degree to which U.S. policy could undermine
China’s regional interests. Checking Russian influence, while
preventing outright confrontation with Moscow, will remain longterm
objectives as well.
South Asia
The major event in China’s South Asia policy is the historic renovation
and rapprochement taking place in Sino-Indian relations. China has
undertaken a dedicated effort since 2001 to expand its political, military,
and economic relations with India. Moreover, Beijing has done so
while also seeking to manage its increasingly complex and costly, but
traditionally close, ties with Pakistan. There are inherent tensions in
China’s approach.
China’s initiation of such a dramatic policy shift toward India is
motivated by three main goals: to stabilize China’s southern periphery
to prevent the emergence of threats (such as a highly competitive
or even hostile India), to expand opportunities for bilateral trade and
investment, and to minimize India’s alignment with the United States
and the possibility that Washington and Delhi could constrain Chinese
power. Regarding the last motivation, Chinese analysts since early
in this decade have expressed growing concerns about the expansion of
U.S.-Indian security and military relations, which many Chinese see as
a U.S.-led effort to balance Chinese power. China has sought to forestall
or limit such a possibility by expanding diplomatic, military, and
economic relations with India. It is no coincidence that China’s effort to
upgrade relations with India (especially military exchanges) coincided
with the qualitative shifts in U.S.-India relations in the 2001–2002
period, in particular the George W. Bush administration’s expansion of
the U.S.-India defense relationship.88 John Garver nicely explained the
totality of Chinese motivations as they relate to India:
China’s broad strategic objective is to persuade India to look
benevolently on an open-ended and expanding Chinese economic,
political, and military presence in South Asia and the
Indian Ocean; to eliminate suspicion in Sino-Indian relations;
and to transform India into China’s partner. In this way the rise
of China in Asia will not lead to Indian efforts to countervail
China in coalition with the United States. But the conversion of
India to friendship with China is to be done without making concessions to India on the status of Tibet, the Sino-Pakistan strategic
link, or by restricting China’s expanding military, security,
and transportation ties with other South Asian nations.89
In contrast to China’s foreign policy in East Asia, China’s diplomacy
in South Asia has principally been bilateral, partly because of the
lack of a strong multilateral organization in the subcontinent. Chinese
policymakers have conducted numerous high-level and high-profile
exchanges with their Indian counterparts, many of which have resulted
in agreements or targets for expanding economic interactions and security
dialogues.
Three such high-level visits have been particularly important to
this rapprochement. First, in June 2003, China invited Indian Prime
Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to visit China. (This visit followed an
important one in April that year by controversial Defense Minister
George Fernandez, who publicly linked India’s nuclear modernization
to security threats from China.) During Vajpayee’s visit, both sides
agreed to a basic plan to upgrade bilateral relations in a joint statement
called “Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation.” This
was an important step for both countries because their leaders indicated,
at least rhetorically, that neither viewed the other as a threat and,
thus, they opened a new phase in relations. At the summit, Vajpayee
also called the relationship “stable and forward looking” and both sides
agreed to designate “special representatives” to negotiate border issues.
Although most of this meeting’s documents and major statements were
similar to those made during Jiang Zemin’s ice-breaking visit in 1996
and Zhu Rongji’s 2002 trip, Vajpayee’s visit finally normalized Sino-
Indian relations after the political tensions following the May 1998
nuclear tests. This trip was important in that it provided a roadmap
for expanding Sino-India ties, which both sides acted on in subsequent
years.90
Second, the April 2005 visit of Premier Wen Jiabao marked a
watershed in Sino-Indian relations. During Wen’s visit (the first of a
Chinese premier since Zhu Rongji’s 2002 trip), both sides agreed to
upgrade their relationship to a “strategic and cooperative partnership
for peace and prosperity” from the “cooperative and constructive partnership”
initially articulated in 1996 (and reiterated during Vajpayee’s
2003 visit to China). This new and important formulation was a culmination
of the growing diplomatic, economic, and military exchanges
since Vajpayee’s 2003 trip, which included the first ever Sino-Indian
“strategic dialogue” in January 2005. Also, Chinese scholars indicated
that Chinese media seemed to provide greater coverage of Wen’s visit
than of Zhu Rongji’s in 2002—and to the Pakistan leg of Wen’s South
Asia trip as well.91
The economic and security content of Wen’s trip was particularly
significant. Both leaders noted that between 2001 and 2004, bilateral
trade had quadrupled from $3.6 billion to $13.6 billion, which
exceeded earlier goals.92 Both leaders also agreed to begin a feasibility
study on a free trade agreement. Just before Wen’s trip China published
a map acknowledging Indian sovereignty over Sikkim, and the joint
statement from the meeting stated that Sikkim was part of India. This
was China’s first acknowledgment of India’s claim; since 1975, China
had refused to recognize the incorporation into India of Sikkim that
year. Indian and Chinese policymakers also signed an important document
that outlined “guiding principles” for resolution of the border
dispute. Premier Wen noted during his trip that this was the first time
since the resumption of border negotiations in 1981 that such “political
guidance” for negotiations had been mutually agreed on.
As a further sign of China’s commitment to improving bilateral
ties, Hu Jintao conducted his first visit to India in November 2006.
This was the first visit of a Chinese head of state to India in over ten years. (Jiang Zemin visited India in 1996.) During this summit meeting,
Hu outlined a “five point proposal” for further developing Sino-
India relations, perhaps as an effort to resolve such lingering problems
as the relative lack of progress on resolving the border question. Both
sides agreed to launch a joint feasibility study on a bilateral FTA. Interestingly,
Hu’s trip was followed by his visit to Pakistan of equivalent
length.
The changing nature of Sino-India relations is further reflected in
growing bilateral interactions on security and military issues. Through
such activities, Beijing has sought to reassure India of China’s cooperative
intentions, to demystify the PLA, and to reduce New Delhi’s
willingness to work with the United States to balance Chinese power.
India’s defense minister traveled to China in April 2003 and the
Chinese reciprocated in 2004. In late 2004, the Indian Army’s
chief of staff visited China (after a ten-year hiatus), and his trip was
reciprocated in May 2005 when his Chinese counterpart, General Liang
Guanglie, visited India; this was the first such trip for a PLA chief of staff
in seven years. Indian media reports have also indicated that India’s
military intelligence chief visited China in June 2005. Later that year,
in December 2005, China and India conducted their first joint maritime
search-and-rescue exercise. In May 2006, China and India signed
their first memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation,
which referenced a variety of future activities including “frequent
exchanges . . . an annual defense dialogue . . . and joint military exercises.”
During India’s Chief of Staff J. J. Singh’s May 2007 visit to
China, both sides decided to conduct a joint army counterterrorism
drill in October 2007 (in China) and then in December 2008 (in
India).93
Beyond military interactions, diplomatic cooperation on security
issues is broadening. China and India initiated, in early 2005, an
annual “strategic dialogue” at the vice foreign minister level. China
supported having both India and Pakistan join the SCO as observers,
and China gained observer status in SAARC. An important event to note from Wen Jiabao’s 2005 trip was his indication that China
would look favorably on—but did not explicitly endorse—India’s bid
to become a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. Later
in 2005, Beijing also sought to communicate to New Delhi that its
effort to oppose expansion of the UNSC was directed at Japan and not
India.94
China and India face long-standing and new challenges to
their bilateral relationship. India’s unease and suspicion of Chinese
intentions—resulting from the 1962 conflict, the unresolved border
dispute, and the competitive dynamics associated with their positions
as rising powers in Asia—serve as natural brakes on the development
of closer security ties. China’s continued military support for Pakistan,
which India sees as an effort to check Indian power in South Asia, is
a source of enduring tension; although China has taken some steps to
inject greater balance into Indo-Pakistani relations, few Indian strategists
see it that way. (China did not support Pakistan during the Kargil
crisis in 1999, for example.) Furthermore, as the need for imported
energy grows in both nations, tensions are fostered as they compete for
access to foreign oil and gas resources, including in areas close to both,
such as in Burma.95 China’s rapidly expanding trade with India has also
been a source of friction; among Indian trading companies, almost half
of India’s anti-dumping cases have resulted from deals with Chinese
firms. For their part, Chinese software manufacturers are concerned
about competition from Indian software exports. Whether Beijing and
New Delhi agree to pursue FTA talks and can then successfully negotiate an FTA will indicate their ability to manage the increasingly competitive
dimensions of their economic relationship.
Diplomacy Beyond Asia
Africa and Latin America
China’s foreign relations with Africa and, to a lesser extent, Latin America
have a unique historical lineage. Dating back to the days of Mao’s
revolutionary foreign policy and his pro–developing nation orientation,
China provided much material support (such as grants for large
infrastructure projects) to revolutionary movements and pro-China
leaders throughout Africa. China had very little economic and political
ties to Latin America, far less than in Africa. In both regions, China’s
diplomacy was primarily driven by its efforts to undermine support for
U.S. “imperialism” and Soviet “revisionism” (during the Cold War)
and, importantly, to isolate Taiwan. Unlike the Soviet Union, Beijing
was less interested in spreading a specific Chinese communist model of
political and economic development—even with close regional states
such as Tanzania. Although China claimed the moral high ground by
opposing colonialism throughout Africa and Latin America, Beijing’s
goals were always based far more on self-interest than is suggested by its
revolutionary rhetoric.96 China’s extensive material assistance to Africa,
and to a lesser degree Latin America, declined dramatically beginning
in the late 1970s as Deng Xiaoping reduced the most ideological
manifestations of Chinese foreign policy and began to divert national
resources toward domestic development.
China’s current relations with countries in Africa and Latin
America represent an evolution in China’s reform-era foreign policy,
albeit with links to past interests and policies. China’s diplomatic and
economic engagement with Africa and Latin America has been far
more extensive in this decade than throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
Chinese diplomacy has been driven by four motivations: to diversify
China’s access to natural resources, especially oil and minerals (mainly oil); to expand access to markets in Africa and Latin America, which
increasingly purchase Chinese consumer goods, cars, and conventional
weapons; to generate support for China’s effort to promote multilateralism
and to build a multipolar world; and to further isolate Taiwan
diplomatically in Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean, where
majority support for Taiwan still remains.97
China’s Economic Goals. There is a consistent economic logic to
China’s activism in sub-Saharan Africa.98 China’s merchandise trade
with sub-Saharan Africa increased from just $3 billion in 1995 to
$45.4 billion in 2006, with annual increases of about 40 percent since
2004.99 China’s imports from Africa grew from $4.5 billion in 2001
to $26.31 billion in 2006, increasing by 485 percent. Over those five
years, about 90 percent of China’s African imports, in terms of value,
consisted of crude oil, iron ore, raw timber, raw cotton, rough diamonds,
re-imports of previously exported goods, metals, bulk stainless
steel supplies, and raw tobacco. Not only are China’s imports from
Africa mostly raw materials, but they also come from a small group
of countries. Imports from seven countries—Angola, South Africa,
Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea,
Gabon, and Nigeria—constituted about 90 percent of China’s imports
between 2001 and 2006. Most of China’s imports from these countries consisted of crude oil, with the exception of South Africa, from which
most of the imports consisted of metals.100
Furthermore, China’s exports to Africa increased from $4.42 billion
in 2001 to $19.04 billion in 2006, an increase of over 330 percent.
Its major exports were woven cotton fabrics, motorcycles, footwear,
synthetic fabrics, batteries, broadcasting equipment, telephone equipment,
tires, embroidery, and mixed component fabrics.101 Sub-Saharan
African nations, like many nations in other parts of the world, are fast
becoming major export markets for Chinese consumer goods. According
to U.S. government officials, “Small, private Chinese investors have
invested millions of dollars into opening enterprises in Africa that operate
in textiles, light manufacturing, construction and agriculture.”102
The growth in China-Africa trade is impressive but needs to be
evaluated in the context of China’s total world trade and global economic
trends. China’s trade with sub-Saharan Africa remains of limited
importance to China’s overall trade volume. In 2006, its trade
with sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 2.6 percent of China’s total
world trade. According to U.S. government data,
As of 2006, the value of China’s trade with Africa was lower than
China’s trade with the Middle East or Latin America and was a
minute percentage of its trade with the rest of Asia. On the investment
side, China’s investment flow into Africa constituted only
2.9% of China’s global outward direct investment. China’s total
direct investment stock in Africa accounted for only 1% of global
foreign direct investment in Africa.103
China’s trade with African nations possesses several attributes.
First, its imports and exports to Africa have both been growing significantly. Second, the value of China’s imports from Africa, mainly
Angola, is large because of oil imports. (In 2007, oil imports from
Angola accounted for more than 50 percent of the value of all Chinese
imports from sub-Saharan Africa; and four of China’s top five trade
partners in sub-Saharan Africa are oil suppliers.) Third, the growth
in Sino-African trade is characterized by much volatility, largely in
China’s oil imports and resulting from variations in world oil prices.
Fourth, China’s exports to Africa have consistently grown and some
sub-Saharan African nations now run a trade deficit with China. As a
result, China’s exports to Africa have not always fostered a “win-win”
situation, as Chinese commentaries suggest, and have resulted in political
frictions with disenfranchised African nations. For example, China’s
global textile exports have hurt numerous African nations, causing
textile-producing factories to close in Kenya, Lesotho, South Africa,
Swaziland, and Kenya. In some cases, China’s textiles exports are a
“double whammy” for African manufacturers: Chinese exports destroy
both domestic and foreign demand for African textiles.
China’s investment in Africa has grown dramatically as trade has
become a major component of China’s economic interactions with Africa.
According to Chinese government data, annual investment flow to the
entire African continent grew from $74 million in 2003 to $1.5 billion in
2007; the total stock of Chinese investment increased from $491 million
in 2003 to $4.4 billion in 2007.104 But China’s official data seem to miss
some major investments, so it is unclear how comprehensive those data
are. More than 800 Chinese state-owned enterprises have investment
projects in 40 Africa countries. As of late 2008, China’s largest crossborder
investment was its 2007 purchase of a 20 percent stake in Standard
Bank of South Africa, a deal reported to be worth $5.5 billion.105
An important and underexamined component of Chinese investment
in Africa is its infrastructure projects. China’s financial commitments
to African infrastructure projects grew from about $1 billion
a year in 2001–2003 to $4.5 billion in 2007—with a peak of $7 billion
in 2006. About 70 percent of Chinese infrastructure investment
has been in just four countries: Nigeria, Ethiopia, Angola, and Sudan.
The majority of China’s projects cover two sectors: power generation
(principally hydropower) and transport (principally rail). China also
financed and provided equipment for the creation of national telecommunication
backbone systems in Ethiopia, Sudan, and Ghana. China’s
focus on infrastructure investment in Africa has allowed a natural economic
complementarity to flourish: Africa’s infrastructure deficit is one
of its biggest development challenges, and China’s construction sector
is one of the world’s largest and most competitive. This complementarity
suggests that the current pattern of Chinese infrastructure investment
will continue to grow.106
China’s largest investments in Africa, by far, have been in resource
extraction (mainly oil), but the scale, mechanics, and consequence of
these investments are often exaggerated. According to a World Bank
study of Chinese investments in Africa, between 2001 and 2005,
China made about $10 billion in oil sector investment across 15 African
nations, with the largest investments in Angola and Sudan. Yet,
this investment pales in comparison to the $168 billion that other
international oil corporations have already invested in Africa. In 2006,
55 percent of African oil exports went to the United States and the EU,
whereas only 15 percent went to China. China’s non-oil investments in
Africa are estimated at about $2 billion and focused on mineral extraction
(e.g., copper and iron ore) in such countries as the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Guinea, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
Interestingly, a World Bank study argues, contrary to some current
research, that only about 7 percent of Chinese infrastructure investment
is directly linked to resource extraction, where Chinese companies
make a net-negative infrastructure investment to facilitate access
to resources for export to China. A more common pattern of Chinese
investment is known as “the Angola model,” in which natural resources
are used as repayment for the loan used to finance Chinese infrastructure
development. For example, in 2007, China gave the Democratic
Republic of the Congo a $9 billion package of loans and investments,
which will be repaid in cobalt and copper from Congolese mines.107
These deals are commonly done through China’s Export-Import Bank
rather than a Chinese development agency. The World Bank report
also found that government loans to Chinese companies for these and
other infrastructure projects “compare favorably with private sector
lending to Africa [with a grant element of 36 percent] but they are not
as attractive as ODA, which tends to provide a grant element of around
66 percent to Africa.”108
China also provides much classic development aid to African
nations in the form of grants and technical assistance (as opposed to
state-subsidized financing for investment projects). In November 2006,
at the China-Africa Cooperation Forum, China pledged an extensive
package of development aid that included grants, loans, and technical
assistance; it was China’s largest commitment of aid to Africa in
decades. One U.S. analysis explained the appeal of China to African
nations: China offers a “complete package” to African nations: money,
technical assistance, and influence in international organizations to
protect the host from international sanctions.109 The World Bank report
underscored these sentiments by noting the appeal of China’s approach
to development aid: “African leadership has typically welcomed China’s
fresh approach to development assistance, which eschews any interference
in domestic affairs, emphasizes partnership and solidarity among
developing nations, and offers an alternative development model based
on a more central role for the state.”110
China’s trade, aid, and investment in Africa has at least three implications
for China’s foreign policy and Western diplomacy in Africa.
First, China’s varied economic interests and historical relations with
countries in Africa have led it to support regimes with dubious human
rights records, such as Sudan and Zimbabwe. China’s aid and assistance
has helped shield such regimes from Western pressure, including
multilateral sanctions. This has constrained the ability of Western
diplomacy, in recent years, to effect change in these African nations.
However, growing international attention may also be precipitating
a gradual change in China’s diplomacy in Africa. Beijing’s support
for Sudan has not been unqualified, but only in the face of U.N.
and international pressure; for example, Beijing did not obstruct (and
in some cases supported) U.N. efforts to impose limited sanctions
on Sudan, albeit grudgingly. The early 2007 effort by international
nongovernmental organizations to link the 2008 Beijing Olympics
to China’s current support for the Sudanese government by labeling
the 2008 Olympics the “genocidal” or “Darfur Olympics” appears to
have galvanized Chinese leaders to become more involved in resolving
the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. More generally, negative reactions
among African publics to Chinese business practices prompted leaders
in Beijing to sensitize both diplomats and business leaders to the possible
effect on China’s image of Chinese business practices and political
relationships in Africa and other regions.111
A second challenge is that China’s economic assistance has diminished
the ability of Western pressure, such as International Monetary
Fund limitations on aid or investment, to improve the governing practices
of certain African nations. A third challenge is that the Chinese
government’s support for investments in Africa creates unfair competition
for Western businesses that cannot afford to make unprofitable
investments or offer various types of aid and assistance (as the Chinese
do) to successfully bid on contracts. In business competition in Africa,
such instruments of Chinese influence are often not available to Western
businesses.112
China’s expanding involvement in Latin America is primarily (but
not exclusively) driven by economic considerations: gaining access to
markets, investments, and resources. The growth in China’s merchandise
trade and investment in the region offers strong evidence of China’s
economic motives. Trade between China and Latin America and
the Caribbean has rapidly increased over the last several years, and as
a result, this region has become more important to China. From 1999
to 2006, total merchandise trade increased from $8.2 billion to close
to $70 billion, an almost tenfold increase. In 2006, Latin America and
the Caribbean accounted for 4 percent of China’s total world trade,
increasing its share by 1.7 percent since 1999.
Between 1999 and 2006, China’s regional imports increased from
close to $3 billion to nearly $34 billion. In terms of value, Brazil, Chile,
Argentina, Peru, and Venezuela supplied most of China’s imports in
2006. China’s primary regional imports included iron, copper, lead and
other ores, soybeans, crude oil and other mineral fuels, and electrical
machinery. China’s imports from any single country in Latin America
and the Caribbean primarily comprise only one or two commodities.
From 1999 to 2006, China’s exports to Latin America and the Caribbean
increased from $5.3 billion to $35.8 billion, with the primary
markets being Mexico, Brazil, Panama, Chile, and Argentina. During
this period, China primarily exported electrical machinery, appliances,
apparel, footwear, and organic chemicals.113
China’s trade with Latin America is a mixed blessing for the
region. It offers opportunities for nations with rich natural resources,
such as Brazil and Argentina, and presents harsh competition to those
who produce low-end manufactured goods, such as Mexico. Mexico’s
textile and apparel industry, in particular, has been hurt by China’s
emergence as a major global textile and apparel producer, undercutting
Mexico’s competitiveness in other countries’ textile markets.114
China’s investments in Latin America are growing as well. China
currently has projects in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, the Dominican
Republic, Guyana, and Venezuela, among other nations. China’s
investments in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela are mainly
focused on facilitating access to such natural resources as iron ore,
copper, and oil (in the case of Venezuela); as such, its investments have
been in the mining, transportation, manufacturing, and petroleum
sectors. From 2003 to 2007, China’s annual investment flow grew from
$1 billion to $4.9 billion, and its cumulative stock of investment grew
from $4.6 billion to $24.7 billion. However, China’s investment in the
region may not be nearly as high as it appears on paper. In 2007, the
destinations for about 95 percent of Chinese FDI in this region were
the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands—countries known
to be tax havens. As a large amount of FDI in China comes from these
three countries, it is possible that Chinese investors reinvest the money
in China as foreign capital to benefit from provisions for foreign investors
(e.g., round-tripping). As for other parts of the region, in 2007,
China’s nonfinancial FDI was primarily directed at Mexico, Peru,
Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela. China’s nonfinancial investment in
Latin America has been primarily devoted to resource extraction and
production but some has been directed at manufacturing assembly,
telecommunications, and textiles.115
China’s Diplomatic Goals. Beyond trade and investment, China’s
activities in both Latin America and Africa reflect specific diplomatic
objectives as well. First, Chinese diplomacy is heavily oriented toward
reducing support for Taiwan. Of the 23 countries with formal diplomatic
relations with Taiwan, 12 are in Latin America. This number
shrank from 14 in 2004, after Costa Rica (2007), Grenada (2005),
and Dominica (2004) changed diplomatic recognition to Beijing (and
St. Lucia switched back to Taiwan in 2007).116 Four of the 23 nations with diplomatic relations with Taiwan are in Africa; this number has
been gradually shrinking as countries such as Malawi (2008), Chad
(2006), Senegal (2005), and Liberia (2003) established diplomatic ties
with China.117
Chinese diplomacy in Latin America and Africa has sought for
decades to persuade, coerce, and bribe countries to switch their diplomatic
allegiance; China’s efforts have received new intensity in recent
years as its ability to offer aid, investment, and other creative financial
enticements has increased.118 For example, China, in a secret deal that
was revealed in 2008, agreed in June 2007 to purchase $300 million
in Costa Rican government bonds as part of a larger package to entice
Costa Rica to switch its diplomatic recognition to mainland China.
China has been making active efforts to push Paraguay, Guatemala,
and Panama to do the same. As an indication of the new and less publicly
confrontational tone in China’s approach to appeal to the region,
Beijing agreed in 2004 to contribute police forces to a U.N. Peacekeeping
Operation in Haiti, despite Haiti’s diplomatic relations with
Taiwan.
Second, China seeks to build and maintain bilateral relationships
to secure access to markets and natural resources in Africa and Latin
America. China has used extensive high-level diplomacy in the last
three to five years to pursue these goals. In 2004 alone, Hu Jintao and
Wu Bangguo, the Communist party’s two most senior officials, both
visited Latin America. Chinese leaders also regularly meet with their
Latin American counterparts in Beijing.
China’s leadership diplomacy in Africa has been even more
intensive than in Latin America (Table 6.1). The Chinese leadership
has used such visits to manage its increasingly complex economic
and political agenda with African nations and the implications of its Africa policy for its broader international image (e.g., the humanitarian
crisis in Darfur, Sudan). As noted above, since 2003, Hu Jintao has
visited Africa four times and a total of 18 countries, an unprecedented
amount for a Chinese leader in such a short period. This clearly reflects
a top diplomatic priority on this continent.
Table 6.1 Chinese Leaders’ Visits to Africa, 1996–2009
In February 2007, Hu Jintao made a major state visit to eight African
nations, including making controversial stops in Sudan and Zimbabwe.
Notably, during the Sudan visit, Hu made his first public statements
encouraging the Sudanese government to resolve the humanitarian
crisis in Darfur, including a call for Sudan to allow U.N. and African
Union peacekeepers into Darfur. In 2006, Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao
separately visited a total of 11 African nations; in 2005, Wen Jiabao and
another Politburo Standing Committee member visited eight African
nations; and in 2004, Hu Jintao and three other Politburo Standing
Committee members visited 12 African nations. A key goal of these
leaders’ visits is gaining access to African resources: Hu Jintao’s African
tours in 2004 and 2006 both included stops in such oil-rich nations
as Nigeria and Angola. But Hu’s more recent visit, to four nations in
early 2009, was to nonresource-rich countries to signal that China is
committed to Africa’s long-term political and economic development.
A third Chinese diplomatic goal in Africa and Latin America is
promoting the interests of developing nations and forging common
causes with them in international institutions. China regularly touts
itself as the “largest developing nation” and, thus, as a natural protector
of these nations’ rights. China rhetorically promotes a common
vision by advocating such diplomatic principles as equality, sovereignty,
“win-win” cooperation, economic development, and noninterference in
internal affairs. This approach redounds to China’s economic and geopolitical
benefit. China presents a “soft alternative” to U.S. and Western
aid and lending policies, which at times has provided China with
preferential access. China also uses common cause with African and
Latin American nations to execute specific diplomatic goals. Developing
nations can be a powerful voting block in international organizations.
They can help to prevent votes against China, such as in the
former U.N. Human Rights Commission. China’s maneuverings with
developing nations in the U.N. are discussed in more detail below.
China has pursued its political goals through both intensive bilateral
and multilateral diplomacy. In Africa, China has established “strategic
partnerships” with South Africa, Nigeria, and Angola, as well as
with the region as a whole. In 2003 and 2004, China forged strategic
partnerships with Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela (Table
5.4). Beijing may seek to use these partnerships in Latin America to
signal implicitly to the United States that Beijing possesses influence in
a region traditionally dominated by the United States.
Given that China’s pro-development, pro-sovereignty, and promultilateralism
diplomacy resonates with many Latin American and
African capitals, relations with China provide them with some diplomatic
and economic leverage in the face of the occasionally unappealing
diplomacy by the United States and other Western nations.
Hugo Chavez in Venezuela and, to a lesser extent, Luiz Inácio Lula
da Silva in Brazil have used their ties with Beijing to manage their
own relations with the United States. Chavez has successively—but not
successfully—sought to draw China, using appeals of greater access to
crude oil, into a coalition to oppose U.S. power. Although China has
accepted offers of preferential access to crude oil and related investments,
it has rejected Chavez’s efforts to become part of an anti-U.S.
partnership.119
Chinese foreign policy in these regions has a growing multilateral
element as well, in both its goals and its execution. In 2000, China
established the China-Africa Cooperation Forum to jointly discuss
regional economic development initiatives and “to reach a broad consensus
about establishing a fair and just international political and economic order in the 21st century.”120 This forum has allowed China
to bolster its political influence among African leaders; for example,
China often uses the CACF meetings to launch major aid and trade
promotion packages, such as in November 2006.121 China joined the
Organization of American States in May 2004 as an observer and has
used its position to hinder Taiwan’s effort to do likewise. China in
2008 finally reached an agreement to join the Inter-American Development
Bank, which expands its ability to bid on lucrative development
projects in Latin America.122
The Middle East
China’s economic and security interests in the Middle East are expanding
and diversifying. It is no longer a region of tertiary interest and
occasional attention from Chinese policymakers. China’s involvement
in the Middle East has grown accordingly. In the last decade, China
has been upgrading its diplomatic, economic, cultural, and military
relations with several countries in the region. China’s growing demand
for energy is an important driver of this but it is not the only one.
China’s bilateral and multilateral diplomacy in the Middle East is also
motivated by a search for overseas markets and investment opportunities,
by a desire to foster stability in a region increasingly important to
Beijing, and by a wish to generate leverage in its multilateral diplomacy
beyond the Middle East.123