|
JavaTM 2 Platform Standard Ed. 5.0 |
|||||||||
| PREV CLASS NEXT CLASS | FRAMES NO FRAMES | |||||||||
| SUMMARY: NESTED | FIELD | CONSTR | METHOD | DETAIL: FIELD | CONSTR | METHOD |
public interface CompilationMXBean
The management interface for the compilation system of the Java virtual machine.
A Java virtual machine has a single instance of the implementation
class of this interface. This instance implementing this interface is
an MXBean
that can be obtained by calling
the ManagementFactory.getCompilationMXBean()
method or
from the platform MBeanServer
method.
The ObjectName for uniquely identifying the MXBean for the compilation system within an MBeanServer is:
java.lang:type=Compilation
| Method Summary | |
|---|---|
String |
getName()
Returns the name of the Just-in-time (JIT) compiler. |
long |
getTotalCompilationTime()
Returns the approximate accumlated elapsed time (in milliseconds) spent in compilation. |
boolean |
isCompilationTimeMonitoringSupported()
Tests if the Java virtual machine supports the monitoring of compilation time. |
| Method Detail |
|---|
String getName()
boolean isCompilationTimeMonitoringSupported()
long getTotalCompilationTime()
This method is optionally supported by the platform.
A Java virtual machine implementation may not support the compilation
time monitoring. The isCompilationTimeMonitoringSupported()
method can be used to determine if the Java virtual machine
supports this operation.
This value does not indicate the level of performance of the Java virtual machine and is not intended for performance comparisons of different virtual machine implementations. The implementations may have different definitions and different measurements of the compilation time.
UnsupportedOperationException
- if the Java
virtual machine does not support
this operation.
|
JavaTM 2 Platform Standard Ed. 5.0 |
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| PREV CLASS NEXT CLASS | FRAMES NO FRAMES | |||||||||
| SUMMARY: NESTED | FIELD | CONSTR | METHOD | DETAIL: FIELD | CONSTR | METHOD |
Copyright © 2004, 2010 Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Use is subject to license terms. Also see the documentation redistribution policy.


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Connected Home over IP
672cf7684
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Cirque simulates complex network topologies based upon docker nodes. On a single Linux machine, it can create multiple nodes with network stacks that are independent from each other. Some nodes may be connected to simulated Thread networks, others may connect to simulated BLE or WiFi.
In Project CHIP, cirque is used for integration tests.
There is a script for running cirque tests, you can find it at scripts/tests/cirque_tests.sh
After checkout, in your local project chip directory, run:
It will:
connectedhomeip/chip-cirque-device-base:latest
docker image for running devices,Note: Suggest using a clean checkout before running this.
You can run the tests by:
You can get more infomation from the terminal output (like the location of logs).
Note: The container (as well as the networks) will be preserved for debugging. You may need to clean it by yourself.
You can run a single cirque test by:
The test name is the script (.sh
) file in src/test_driver/linux-cirque
, like OnOffClusterTest
.
For example, you can run OnOffClusterTest
by:
The output of the test will be written to stdout
and stderr
.
To specify log directory, simplily set LOG_DIR
variable.
Or
You can run a ManualTest to setup test topology only:
It will print the container id in log, you can execute commands inside them.
You can run docker commands with these containers, for example, to launch a shell on CHIP-Tool, you can use:
docker exec -it c5831124e7 /bin/bashFor detailed command you can use, please refer to official docker documents.
It is not recommanded to run commands that can change the state of the container, for example:
attach
(will stop container once you exit),stop
etc.
After you finished you test, press Ctrl-C
and it will clean up testing environment.
Refer to test-manual.py
and ManualTest.sh
for detail.


Design of the 20th Century
Charlotte & Peter Fiell
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Optimise · Theoretical Use Case For Quantum Computing
2018.Imagine quick and accurate recommendations and alterations to make your pics POP on social media. Gather followers, impress your sponsors, and be the best version of yourself.
Sketch Flinto Video Editing Premiere Research
The Project An Exercise in Imagining Future Technologies
The following project is an exercise in examining how future technologies can be leveraged to lift and shift current social and technological trends. Much of the project focussed on research, with a follow-up ‘product’ that responded to the information I gathered.
A subsequent case-study and product promotion video allowed me to use my research to develop my screen and motion design practices.
Product Pitch What is Optimise?
Optimise is a service that uses Quantum computer servers and mobile interfaces to offer reliable, accurate, and fast image processing and adjustments to make sure your social media stays cohesive and contemporary. By providing a range of Optimisations, as well as being able to pull qualities from popular iamges to your own pictures, Optimise dynamically alters your imagery to its greatest potential. Using Quantum computation and quantum neural nets from our own quantum computers, Optimise is able to assist classical machine learning and image processing through new quantum alogrithms that behave similarly to the Generative Advaserial Networks popularised in the late 2010s. Building off of this, Optimise leverages Quantum Computing's ability to move through big data, meaning Optimise takes the best of the best of social media, and gives it to you.
An Emerging Future Quantum Computers
What the eye observes is not necessarily the truth. In fact, the idea of truth is a construct created by humans to make the world more easily understood. However, reality is more nuanced; it requires something more detailed than yes and no, or 1s and 0s. Classical computers have limitations in how they represent information to us. With the emergence of Quantum computers, there is soon to be a paradigm shift in how we interact with big data, machine learning, natural phenomena, and communication. What we think of as truth is changing, and it's coming on the backs of a Quantum Computing revolution.
Research
My research took me from the Classical physics to cryptography and topographic quantum computers. In this mind map, you can see how quantum computers are intertwined in science, technology, textiles, economy, and security.
In Action Case Study
Enter Sam
Optimise can be setup in preferences to suit a number of desires and needs. In this case study, we look at Sam, a 23 year old Instagram influencer looking to expand his demographic, impress his sponsors, and overall offer a more cohesive aesthetic to his followers. Sam is a creative, and wants to feel like the pictures are his, but is open to exploring new ways of expression and gaining more influence. Always on the move, Sam can't afford to have his own Quantum Computer editing suite or spend too much time studying emerging trends on Instagram, but he wants to stay current in an era of professional social media.
User Flow


Focus Group for the Visually Impaired taken at Beacon Blind Centre, for Waheed Rafiq's research into Computer Vision.
An I.T Consultant, who offers a variety of services from Building Networks, to writing mobile phones Applications.
In recent years Waheed has been certified in MCP Server 2012 and Windows 8 Workstation. Additionally, he has successfully
completed his Foundation Degree in Computer Science{FDSc} course and obtained a first class Hons degree. He has also
accomplished the Cisco CCNA during this his foundation year. After which he decided to do BSc(Hons) in Computer Science
from which he obtain in 2017 1st Hon's degree.
He has a vast amount of experience in programming and has taken on project works such as KEENs project with Birmingham City University.
Where his role was to Project Manage ERP system for Alwayse Engineering Ltd. During which he develop a database software that help the company
reduce their stock waste.
A talented research student in Computer Vision OpenCV , amongst his other skills he is able to write programs in C# , C/C++ , ASP.NET , VB.NET and HTML.


--- layout: post title: 'The S&L Crisis: Public versus Private Solutions' date: '2010-01-28 21:58:30 -0700' mt_id: 1437 blog_id: 1 post_id: 1437 basename: the-savings-and-loan-crisis categories: - essays ---
The massive savings and loan failures of the late eighties and early nineties did not go unnoticed. Thousands of pages of testimony at congressional hearings have been published. Newspapers have published chronologies, accounts of local S&L failures, and anecdotes of senior citizens losing their savings. Numerous books have been written with titles like Who Robbed America?, S&L Hell, and The Greatest-Ever Bank Robbery. These journalistic commentaries tend to either be strictly factual accounts or moralistic, strident attacks on politicians and bankers. Both of these varieties tend to examine the deep issues raised by the crisis on a very superficial level, often leaping to unwarranted conclusions and unjust accusation. While they make for vivacious reading, they tend to obfuscate more than elucidate. A fuller analysis of the crisis is missing, perhaps because such an analysis lacks the sensational headlines of the moralizing condemnation or the convenient skimming of the factual chronology. Unfortunately, both fail to provide the reader with any meaningful context for a true understanding and a grounds from which to make judgments about those people involved.
The academic world generally does not suffer from such failings. The contrast between academic and non-academic accounts sometimes reveals that the non-academic perspectives have everything absolutely wrong. There are several reasons for this discrepancy: better training on the part of the academics, different audiences, and lack of hard-and-fast deadlines. The best writing combines the academic's rigor with the journalist's lively style. The challenge for either group was writing about an economy-shaking event while that event was still transpiring. Contemporary histories frequently lack the objectivity that comes with temporal distance. Important causal agents only become obvious after the fact, and available to only a few astute observers during the catastrophe. Academic writers tend to wait longer to compose their treatises on contemporary events and thus tend to be more rigorous in their evaluation than journalists writing while the iron is hot.
For these and other reasons, only a few good books and a handful of articles have been written on the subject. The S&L crisis was not as devastating as the Great Depression or as unique as the Civil War, but it did have a serious impact on the body politic and the economy at the time and we are still experiencing some of the aftershocks today. One must wonder at the dearth of academic material on what many regard as a meaningful end to one of the most prosperous decades in American history. The academic treatments also tend to be very specialized. They focused on either the political or the economic side of the crisis. Whichever perspective they adopt, they ignore—or superficially treat—the other. While this may enable them to hone in on specific insights by forestalling the inevitable questions, it certainly does not help the reader to understand the broader issues involved. In fact, the specialist's myopia may be counterproductive since it blinds the writer to facts in other fields that might illuminate—or even contradict—his or her conclusions. Ultimately, reality is multifaceted and simultaneous—though it may be useful to occasionally separate out aspects of an event for consideration by various disciplines, one can only obtain a full understanding through exploration of an issue from all appropriate angles.
This historiography will explore the literature on the savings and loan crisis. As noted earlier, much has been written about this episode in American history. First, we will give a brief account of the crisis and the history that preceded it because an establishment of context is vital before we can examine and evaluate what has been written about the crisis, the next section of the literature review. Once we have critically assessed the existing works, we can then list their deficiencies and sketch remedies for those. These remedies can only be suggestions, due to the limitations imposed by this paper's focus. However, those remedies could easily serve as the foundation for a separate essay.
The savings and loan industry as we know it today came into existence in the 1930s during the Great Depression. However, they had already been in existence for one hundred years by that time. The first savings and loan association was founded on January 3, 1831 in Frankford, Pennsylvania. It was designed to enable its depositors to purchase homes, one by one, as funds became available.1 That purpose would later become its mandate, as the Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932 enshrined promotion of home ownership as the primary raison d'être for the savings and loans. The period in between these two critical events is replete with S&Ls struggling to remain relevant in the economy and combat competition. S&Ls in the mid-nineteenth century were an exclusively local phenomena. A group of citizens would pool their money and distribute loans to each member in turn. They were non-professional financial institutions but they served a definite purpose and a crucial need, since commercial banks typically would not lend to the poor or recent immigrants. In the 1880s, though, a number of S&Ls had higher aspirations and sought to operate nationally through branch offices and deposits by mail. The local S&Ls could not compete with the national ones and so sought state bans on national savings and loan institutions through the formation of the United States League of Local Building and Loan Associations—the precursor to the powerful United States League of Savings Institutions.2
Thus began a close alliance between savings and loans and the government. The Great Depression tightened the bonds of that relationship due to the widespread S&L failures and their subsequent foreclosing of borrowers' homes. The federal government undertook measures designed to increase stability in that industry: the Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932 set up a national network of Federal Home Loan banks arranged similarly to the Federal Reserve System for banks that supplied funds during tough times; the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 empowered the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB)—the S&L's industry's overseer—to charter federal S&Ls and established a temporary means by which homeowners could refinance their delinquent mortgages on terms that they could afford; and the National Housing Act of 1934 created the S&L industry's deposit insurance fund, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC).3 This legislative triumvirate formed the foundation for the savings and loan industry throughout the industry's remaining existence.
The fifties and sixties were the heyday of the S&Ls because of the postwar housing boom and a series of favorable government actions. The industry flourished because it was able to price rates paid to depositors relatively freely, while banks were restricted by rate ceilings imposed by the Federal Reserve. Similarly, S&Ls were given tax breaks that effectively allowed them to pay no federal income taxes. Finally, throughout the period, the government allowed the S&Ls to diversify their portfolios—increasing their holdings in commercial real estate and securities while diminishing their mortgage holdings.4 It also allowed S&Ls to participate in investments that yielded high returns—a move that would come back to bite them later as those risky investments crashed.
The seventies were a period of stagnation for the S&Ls due to the rampant inflation and spiraling interest rates. The effects of disintermediation came to the fore, as they held low-interest, long-term mortgages and high-interest, short-term deposits. This resulted in a credit crunch since S&L executives could not reasonably lend money at the interest rates they had to pay on deposits in order to stay solvent. They entered the next decade full of hope for some remedy to their predicament.
They got one. Ronald Reagan and his administration slowed and then ended the inflation of the seventies. Congress enacted the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 which eased restrictions on reserve requirements, allowed the S&Ls to offer new credit instruments, and raised the deposit insurance coverage ceiling from $40,000 to $100,000 per account.5 These had the desired effects and the industry prospered once again. Subsequent relaxation of regulation allowed S&Ls to broker deposits nationally, invest up to 10% of their portfolio in high-yield corporate bonds (otherwise known as "junk" bonds), and eliminate loan-to-value ratio restrictions on secured loans. This deregulation enabled S&Ls to attract deposits by paying premium rates while simultaneously either lending that money at lucrative rates or parking that money in high-yielding, high-risk investments. Since deposit insurance would cover any mistakes made and S&Ls were much cheaper to purchase than banks due to their size, many high-flying businessmen bought S&Ls with little knowledge of the potential for insolvency. They then ran them as short-term cash machines until they stopped allowing withdrawals. Naturally, there were S&L operators that were reasonable and not profligate. However, they were forced to offer premium rates and competitive lending packages in order to compete. They soon found themselves in the same boat—albeit not as luxurious of one as the big spenders—as their investments turned sour or commercial real estate experienced a downturn. As S&L after S&L failed and the rest of them were left teetering on the edge of insolvency, the FSLIC became insolvent. Congress failed to appropriate sufficient funds to prop up the FSLIC and so it too failed. Public confidence in both government and the S&L industry vanished as costs (or the potential costs) of the crisis mounted in the hundreds of billions of dollars.
The S&L industry was effectively terminated by the 1989 passage of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA). This act eliminated the FHLBB and transferred regulatory control to the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) in the Treasury Department. The FSLIC was transferred to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which was the bank's deposit insurance fund. Funds were appropriated to assist teetering S&Ls and replenish the FSLIC. Housing programs were enacted and administered by the Federal Home Loan banks, regulatory restrictions were tightened, and criminal penalties were stepped up for financial institution fraud. The death knell had sounded for the industry as an independent entity. Obviously, the complete story cannot be told in this forum since it is a review of the secondary literature on the crisis.
Now that we have some basic context, let us take a look at what writers have said about the crisis. First we will examine the journalistic accounts and then the academic ones. Since these terms are used many times in the literature review, it is crucial that they be properly understood. A "journalistic" account is one that explores the chronology of events without delving into their natures, one which—like a newspaper article—focuses on personalities. This does not mean that "journalistic" books are inherently bad or of lesser quality; they have a different focus because they aim at a different audience. This also does not mean that "journalistic" works lack footnotes or extensive research, a common charge against reporters. "Academic" writing is that which examines the crisis on a more abstract level. Rather than chronicling events, academic writing seeks to illuminate underlying causes and relate events to other events. By and large, though, academic writing should strive for integration—the tying together of separate disciplines and fields. "Academic" is not necessarily produced by professors or those affiliated with universities, nor are "journalistic" works produced solely by non-academics. As mentioned previously, the best writing combines the both styles: conveying an organized and thorough analysis through lively writing and a human orientation.
In reviewing the literature on this subject, we will focus on understanding how the authors comprehended the causes of the crisis. We will do this because there is relatively little disagreement on the effects. One can directly see that there is no S&L industry in existence today or look at the expenditures of the government in bailing out the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC, pronounced "fizz-lick"). Understanding the long, complex chain of events that precipitated those effects is another story entirely. First, it involves quite a bit of economic understanding. Second, practically every event that transpired during the crisis seemed to have a unique cause. Finally, writers tend to play down causes that contradict their basic world-view. Where and how an author assigns blame speaks volumes about his beliefs and perspective. Our examination of causation in the literature will also serve to show the uniqueness of the proposed paper's perspective.
In surveying the journalists' accounts of the crisis, one finds some fairly solid efforts that bear mention and a smattering of casual treatments. The best of the bunch is Martin Lowy's High Rollers: Inside the Savings and Loan Debacle (1991). Lowy is a lawyer who has represented the New York State Superintendent of Banks, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and many financial institutions over the course of his career. He argues that fraud was not the cause of the S&L crisis but was instead a symptom, used to "conceal the failing institution's true financial condition." Lowy contends that the S&L crisis was a "fundamental economic failure of a substantial part of our financial system."6 For Lowy, the crisis evolved in three phases: first, losses in 1978 through 1982 resulting from interest rate increases; second, losses from risky loans made from 1982 through 1985 that they did not record until 1986 through 1989 due to accounting practices; and finally, losses due to the government's hesitation in closing insolvent S&Ls after 1989.7 As far as he goes, Lowy makes some valid points—he spends roughly a third to a half of the book explaining the nature of S&Ls and how the crisis happened. Unfortunately, he often gets mired in personalities and omits much of the historical context of the S&Ls. These faults aside, he thoroughly understands the thrift industry and is very lucid in explaining it—much more so than his fellow non-academic writers.
L. William Seidman's Full Faith and Credit: The Great S&L Debacle and Other Washington Sagas (1993) stands out from among the other journalistic accounts since it was written by the chairman of the FDIC from 1985 until 1991 and a former dean of Arizona State University's College of Business. Although the book reads like a memoir and has no footnotes or references, his unique perspective on events as head of the banking industry's regulatory body more than compensates for any inadequacies. He argues that the S&L industry was doomed from the start because it "defied the first safety rule taught in Finance 101" by borrowing money (deposits) at short terms at high rates and selling money (mortgages) at long terms and low rates. Seidman believes that the whole crisis resulted from "a witch's brew consisting of four equal portions of misguided policy": first, the S&L industry was allowed to venture into new sources of revenue and engage in risky projects; second, the S&L was permitted to substitute more lenient regulatory accounting principles (RAP) for the traditional generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP); third, the government regulators were ordered to go easier on the S&L industry; and finally, Congress increased the deposit insurance ceiling from $40,000 per account to $100,000.8 He further notes that "high-flying speculators did not take long to realize that owning an S&L was a key to the Treasury."9
Thus, Seidman believes that the S&L crisis was a mixture of malformed government institutions with a human nature primed for taking advantage of it. Like many of the Founding Fathers, Seidman holds that the purpose of government is to place limitations on human corruptibility. As he puts it, "do not underestimate the ability of private-sector bankers and financial executives to do dumb things."10 The solution, for Seidman, is to re-establish government control over our financial institutions by placing control over the banking system in one regulatory agency and giving regulators more access and more power over their charges. This is a perspective and outlook wholly consonant with one who has spent a decade in the upper echelons of government service.
The last of the good journalistic efforts is Paul Zane Pilzer and Robert Deitz's Other People's Money: The Inside Story of the S&L Mess (1989). Pilzer, an adviser to the Bush administration and multimillionaire businessman, and Deitz, a Pulitzer Prize-nominated journalist for the Dallas Times Herald, offer a terse and lucid account of the S&L crisis that is heavy on personality but light on details and context—although they do spend an inordinate amount of pages describing the disagreement between Franklin Roosevelt and Huey Long on deposit insurance. The pair concludes that the fundamental cause of the S&L debacle is a deposit insurance system that "encourag[es] speculation, greed, fraud, and mismanagement on the part of thrift owners."11 To reform that system, Pilzer and Deitz propose that deposit insurance extend only to one account per person and that it only cover the first $10,000 at 100% (90% after that up to $100,000). They also suggest increasing the penalties for white-collar theft from a financial institution since they believe that such fraud was prevalent. Finally, they want the "concept of thrift that built this nation [to] be restored to the American character" through tax incentives and new types of savings accounts.12 Their perspective seems to be an admixture of journalistic insiderism—that the real decisions in government are made in back-room, closed-door meetings—and confidence in the power of the relatively free market. This is exactly the point of view one would expect from a collaboration between a businessman and a reporter.
The remainder of the journalistic efforts are almost exactly what one would read in the newspapers. They all have sensational headlines for book titles with dramatic exposés for content. One can comprehend James Ring Adam's The Big Fix by its subtitle: "How an Unholy Alliance of Politics and Money Destroyed America's Banking System." His predominantly anecdotal account views the crisis as prosecuted by crooked businessmen and the politicians they bought. His writing style is exemplified by this passage: "[E]ach coup has brought more open involvement by the politicians. Subtlety has dropped away, until members of Congress applied crude extortion on behalf of their pet swindlers."13 The heroes of his story are the dedicated government regulators who uncovered their schemes.
Michael Waldman's Who Robbed America? A Citizen's Guide to the S&L Scandal takes much the same tack as Adams. Written by the director of Public Citizen's Congress Watch, this book predictably indicts the wealthy investors and depositors of the failed thrifts and the Congressmen in their pocket. Waldman's basic argument is that deregulation led to a "Wild West atmosphere."14 His resolution for the problem is to tax the wealthy to pay for the bailout, to create a citizen's oversight group for the financial industry, to publicly finance Congressional elections, to use racketeering laws in the prosecution of white-collar criminals operating out of financial institutions, and to end "destructive" deregulation.15 His account of the causes and proposal for resolution reveal his motivations; for him, corrupt businessmen bribe otherwise aboveboard politicians into overlooking their transgressions and corruption. Since the businessmen who committed fraud have been punished, he thinks it is time to soak the rich through progressive taxation since they, presumably, all benefitted from the debacle.
The authors of Inside Job: The Looting of America's Savings and Loans contend that the S&L crisis was part of an organized network of fraud. Stephen Pizzo, Mary Fricker, and Paul Muolo—all reporters at the time—dance around the conclusion that the mob was behind the looting of the industry. As they put it, they "never once examined a thrift—no matter how random the choice—without finding someone there whom we already knew from another failed S&L."16 The implication is that that network was the Mafia and that implication is confirmed in several places when S&L officials are mentioned as "exchang[ing] their Mafia bona fides" or being "associated with one of the Mafia's most powerful godfathers, Carlos Marcello."17 This is the only book of the lot that makes such claims and accusations, but the book contains impressive endnotes and it would be surprising if organized crime was not involved in some fashion in such a profitable industry.
The last two books are at the bottom of an already deep barrel. Kathleen Day's oddly-titled S&L Hell: The People and Politics behind the $1 Trillion Savings and Loan Scandal (1993) is nothing but personality, with nearly no analysis. The following passage says it all:
Other treatments of the S&L crisis have offered a range of explanations for the industry's problems: the influence of organized crime, a conspiracy on Wall Street, imperfections in the market, and so on. All of these—to which, perhaps, the roles of greed and ambition should be added—may have played some part. But while the temptation is great to offer the debacle as a paradigm for the failures of regulation, this book doesn't advance a grand theory. If there are some obvious lessons for the future to be learned from these stories, I've left them for the reader to draw.18
The other book, Martin Mayer's The Greatest-Ever Bank Robbery, faces similar problems albeit with a little more analysis. He regards deposit insurance as the ultimate culprit, but buries that conclusion in a narrative made difficult to read by the number of dramatis personae used. Institutions and structures, if they play a role at all, are entirely secondary. His writing style is also much more glib than any of the other authors: "I have used in my chapter headings the metaphor of an automobile accident because it's fun."19
In sum, all of these journalistic works discuss the same events but arrive at different conclusions and write at different levels of detail. There are a couple of excellent works that go to considerable lengths in covering their subject and make cogent arguments and then there are plenty that read like very long newspaper articles. Generally, though, they view the S&L crisis as resulting from industry excesses and symbolic for what they regard as the excesses of the eighties. They also were in agreement that the savings and loan industry occupied a unique position in the American economy, largely because it had a powerful lobbying group. They varied in the intensity with which they blamed the industry—some placed the blame solely on the S&Ls while others spread the responsibility among several players, including the government, organized crime, real estate markets, and securities traders. These variations define the evaluative hierarchy used in this review.
Academic writings follow a similar hierarchy of value. There are a couple of works at the top and then it goes down from there. Perhaps the best account of the whole crisis is James Barth's The Great Savings and Loan Debacle, published as a Special Analysis Report by the American Enterprise Institute Press in 1991. Barth is currently a finance professor at Auburn University, but spent his time during the S&L crisis as the chief economist of the FHLBB and OTS from September 1987 through November 1989. Barth sees a number of factors contributing to the S&L crisis and one unifying cause. Among the factors, Barth cites a rigid institutional design, high and volatile interest rates, deterioration in asset quality, federal and state deregulation, fraudulent practices, increased competition in the financial services industry, changes in tax law, and increased participation in risky activities.20 The more fundamental cause, he argues, is federal deposit insurance itself.21 Deposit insurance acted to repress the discipline that was supplied previously by depositors. Government regulators, acting as proxies for depositors, attempted to control the risky activities but did not "reorganize or close inadequately capitalized institutions in a timely manner" resulting in heavy losses.22
In order to counteract what he regards as the negative incentives inherent in deposit insurance, Barth offers the following proposals: enactment of "narrow bank" rules that stipulate that all insured deposits must be matched by 100% reserves and that any lending or ancillary activities should be engaged in using excess capital rather than deposits; retention of the deposit insurance system while lowering the amounts protected or seeking coinsurance; supplanting federal deposit insurance in favor of industry-sponsored deposit insurance; usage of reinsurance, whereby a private reinsurer would insure the difference between the government's coverage and the institution's total deposits by charging a premium based on risk—this premium would then be used by the government for computation of its premium since the private reinsurer has a larger incentive to accumulate accurate information than the government.23 His conclusions about reform are surprising given his extensive participation in the regulatory apparatus, but they obviously stem from a disdain for unwarranted government interference in the banking industry.
The next best academic work is Lawrence White's The S&L Debacle: Public Policy Lessons for Bank and Thrift Regulation, published by the Oxford University Press in 1991. White is an New York University professor and noted economist who served as a board member on the FHLBB from November 12, 1986 until August 18, 1989. With these impeccable credentials, White's book seeks to divine and divulge the lessons of the S&L crisis for regulators. He views the S&L crisis as caused by the limitations of the regulators—the opposite of the view propounded by Barth. He attributes the cause of the crisis to six factors: flawed information systems used by regulators, non-risk based deposit insurance premiums, deregulation that was sound but poorly implemented, and cleanup legislation that did not provide adequate funds or fundamental reforms.24 In fact, he explicitly states:
[T]he cause of the problem was the creation in the early 1980s of a specific set of opportunities, capabilities, and incentives for risk-taking by thrifts that were reinforced by a set of perverse federal policy actions that weakened the safety-and-soundness regulatory system at a time when it needed to be substantially strengthened—and all of these events interacted, with an exquisite sense of timing, with movements in the price of oil and changes in the tax laws. In essence, the cause of the problem was the specific way in which the deposit insurance system for thrifts was structured and administered in the early 1980s.25
For White, then, the causes of the S&L crisis were institutional. The structure of the thrift system was set up in a certain way, the thrifts took advantage of that structure, economic conditions revealed the weaknesses in the structure, and the structure tumbled down. To prevent this from happening again, we must rebuild the structure and strengthen its defects. He suggests a number of reforms: switching from GAAP to a system he calls market value accounting, essentially forcing management to reveal all assets and liabilities in terms of their current market value instead of their historical market value; tying deposit insurance premiums to the riskiness of the institution; early intervention and prompt disposal of ailing thrifts; extending deposit insurance coverage to 100% of deposits; increasing the use of long-term subordinated debt, which would act as a front-line of defense for insolvent institutions before invoking deposit insurance protection; and setting up the Treasury as an automatic backup for deposit insurance funds instead of requiring Congressional approval for Treasury expenditures to cover deposit insurance shortfalls. As we will see over the course of the literature survey, these are the most radical reforms proposed and they underscore White's regulator background and perspective.
The remaining academic books on the subject focus exclusively on political aspects of the crisis. Mark Carl Rom's Public Spirit in the Thrift Tragedy, published by the University of Pittsburgh Press in 1996, is an excellent account of Congress' action and reaction to the events of the crisis. Rom wants to show that Congressmen were actually motivated by public spirit.26 Rom positions his view as an antipode to public choice theory, which argues that politicians—like everyone else—act solely in their own self-interest and use their power to advance their careers and material well-being. While his thesis is interesting, it has little relevance to the topic at hand. The motivations of those who handled the evolving crisis do not explain fundamentally why it happened. There was too much history there; it is obvious that Congress and administration officials were primarily reacting to events, struggling to right a listing ship that inevitably sunk. Ultimately, Rom's work focuses on his thesis and not on the underlying causes of the crisis—although he does offer some suggestions for causes that differ little from those of the previous two works.
Ned Eichler suggests that a trio of factors—ideology, personality, and circumstance—caused the crisis in his 1989 book The Thrift Debacle, published by the University of California Press. The ideology of deregulation had taken hold of the country's elected officials and it was well-suited to the thrift industry, which had long been subsidized and sheltered by the federal government. For personality, Reagan appointee to the FHLBB Richard Pratt "brought fierce determination, contempt for the industry he was about to supervise, and arrogance to the job."27 The circumstances of the thrift industry round out the litany of factors. Eichler's lays the fundamental blame, though, on Ronald Reagan:
But the history of the thrift debacle must someday place the primary blame where it belongs, on Reagan, an ideological puritan who proclaimed the virtues of deregulation and then left its implementation to men ill equipped to handle such a delicate task. When asked why he did not ever brief Reagan on the severity of the thrift situation, its causes, and the steps required to deal with it, [former FHLBB chairman] Gray replied that Reagan had no interest in the matter.28
This is certainly a unique attribution of responsibility. The source of the S&L industry's problems, though, predates Reagan's terms and it is problematic to assign blame to Reagan for even those areas over which he delegated authority. The President of the United States suffers from the same limitations as every other human being: limited knowledge and fallible judgment.
The last of the academic works is Big Money Crime: Fraud and Politics in the Savings and Loan Crisis, published in 1997 by the University of California Press. Its authors—Kitty Calavita, Henry Pontell, and Robert Tillman—make the incredible claim that everybody else has gotten it wrong about the S&L crisis. In actuality, the crisis occurred due to the criminal activities of the S&L executives. They start the book right off with the following bold statement:
We believe a different approach is in order, as a number of myths have come to permeate popular understandings of the S&L scandal. Too often, for example, economists and financial experts have attributed the disaster to faulty business decisions or business risks gone awry. We argue instead that deliberate insider fraud was at the center of the disaster. Furthermore, we contend that systematic political collusion—not just policy error—was a critical ingredient in this unprecedented series of frauds.29
Their chronicling of the crimes committed by S&L insiders is fascinating, but overstated. To argue as they do that honest mistakes played little or no part in the crisis or that the whole system was corrupt is ludicrous since it is demonstrably wrong. Individual S&L managers committed plenty of crimes, to be sure, but one would expect criminals to be attracted to the huge amounts the S&Ls dealt with and it was not nearly as widespread as the authors contend. Moreover, that crime points to a larger issue: what allowed criminals to engage in their crimes undetected for so long? It was assuredly the system that failed and permitted such frauds.
The academic writers, then, tend to vary along the same continuum as the journalistic writers. As mentioned earlier, the journalistic authors assigned different degrees of culpability to the savings and loan industry—some more and some less. The extremes, though, were farther along the continuum than their journalistic counterparts; the authors that held the industry less guilty found them almost blameless while those who argued that the industry was culpable found them exclusively so—even criminal. Their focus is what unites all of the works: they all target the institutions for special analysis, introducing the human elements anecdotally. Whether they discuss the political dimensions of the crisis or the economic ones, all of the academics subject the institutional structures to thorough analysis. The only problem, already mentioned, is that they tend to focus on the institutions that fit in their particular specialty—economists examine the economic aspects of the industry while political scientists and sociologists look at the political issues.
One common element obtains throughout these works. Nearly all of them, in some form or another, blame the crisis on deregulation. Like the current California electrical troubles, deregulation is not responsible for the crisis. The financial services industry is, and always has been, one of the most heavily regulated areas of the economy. The deregulation put forth by the Reagan administration in the eighties eliminated some of the more odious regulations such as interest rate caps, portfolio diversification restrictions, and interstate banking restrictions. The industry as a whole was still left very much regulated and controlled. A myriad of regulatory agencies and an army of bureaucrats still oversaw the nation's financial institutions. As economist Richard Salsman put it, "these freedoms were not 'permitted' out of any desire by politicians to strengthen the banking system, but simply to forestall the collapse of some of the unsound institutions within it. Ceilings on interest rates were lifted only after they had led to massive disintermediation."30 The rescinded regulations were, perhaps, the wrong ones to roll back since they encouraged unethical and irrational behavior. However, the remaining regulations did the same if not more so. Deposit insurance, which was left, allowed executives to take risky moves because the executives knew that the depositors would always be safe. Similarly, the lack of owner equity meant that these same executives would suffer no financial repercussions should they bet incorrectly. Moreover, the Federal Reserve and the FHLBB propped up failing institutions much longer than they should have thereby prolonging their lives and increasing the costs of the eventual bailout. What existed in the eighties was not deregulation—since that would mean wholesale elimination of regulations—but decreased regulation. This is an important distinction to remember and take note of because it can lead to a masking of blame when industry is blamed on the assumption that it is acting freely when it is not.
The works covered in this literature review suffer from a number of deficiencies. The covered books' biggest problem is that they are too specialized. The journalistic accounts focused mostly on the players in the S&L crisis, such as Charles Keating, Neil Bush, and the Keating Five. They typically only delved into institutional analysis in the final chapter when they offered up their plan for resolution. The academic accounts, on the other hand were suffused with institutional analysis, but it was typically restricted to either the economic or political aspects of the crisis. The best work would include an analysis of both areas. An economic understanding of the S&L industry is invaluable to explaining why the industry regularly appealed to Congress for assistance. Similarly, an examination of the industry's economic underpinnings without an exploration of the political dimensions omits half the story since the S&L industry was essentially a creature of the government's creation. The economic and political aspects of the S&L crisis were, in other words, inextricably intertwined; devoting insufficient space to either leaves the story untold. To be sure, not all of the works dramatically fail in this regard. Lowy's High Rollers, Seidman's Full Faith and Credit, Barth's The Great Savings and Loan Debacle, and White's The S&L Debacle all come close to achieving that integration, but each falls short.
All of the works also fail to adequately contrast the savings and loans with the banks. The crisis presents a prime opportunity to compare the S&Ls with the banks since they were both encountered the same troubles and faced much the same regulatory environment. The banking industry still exists today—and in a much stronger form. The S&Ls are gone, no longer in existence. This fact alone merits considerable attention. When two industries face the same obstacles and one dies while the other thrives, something important is happening. A thorough examination of this situation could provide the key to understanding the nature and causes of the S&L crisis. Without going into detail—which would require another essay—it appears that the S&L industry went bust because there was never a market rationale for its existence. Thus, when their situation worsened, they could only beg Congress for a bailout. The failing banks, on the other hand, were bought out by stronger banks. These newly-merged banks were then able to ride out the hard times and eventually prospered. Clearly, the juxtaposition of the savings and loans and the banks yields useful insights into the crisis.
The final deficiency of the literature reviewed is its national scope. While the issues are clearly national, showing how the issues played out at the local level offers three benefits. First, it limits the number of concretes to consider. This enables the reader to keep a better handle on the facts presented and the arguments made. Too many of the journalistic efforts presented dozens of characters in their narratives. Second, a local perspective narrows the focus of a work. Rather than skimpily researching dozens of institutions, regulatory agencies, and individuals, a local focus allows the writer to throughly research a handful of entities. Finally, although the S&L crisis played itself out nationally, the circumstances of a couple major cities were repeated over and over. For example, the S&Ls in Phoenix and Dallas could almost be archetypes for the rest of the nation since there was little variation from their collapse. What some of the works should have done is explored the national issues and then show how those theories actually looked at the local level. In so doing, one could not help but unite the economic and political aspects of the crisis since one would be looking at the actual situations within an already-developed theoretical framework.
What this field needs, then, is a broad work that juxtaposes the banking industry with the savings and loans and applies the knowledge gained to the local level. Let us now turn our attention to these three aspects—broadness, inclusion of the banking industry, and localness—of a proposed paper that would remedy the deficiencies noted in the current literature. To insure depth of analysis, the paper should be divided into two major sections: context and analysis. The first section would begin with a chronology of events in order to provide the reader with a basic framework to understand the events. An exploration of the major regulations affecting banks and S&Ls would follow and that would be followed by a look at the market conditions surrounding banks and S&Ls in the seventies and eighties. The paper would next cover the changes that occurred in the banking industry and then the actual events of the crisis. Finally, the paper would deal with the aftermath of the debacle and the look of banking today. The analytical portion of the paper would address some of the more theoretical points raised by the context-defining section. A survey of the different theories of causation and an evaluation of their merits would start off the analysis. Finally, the paper would explore the author's thesis and hypothesis of causation. Possible objections would be raised and, one hopes, refuted. This structure seems to cover the most territory with the most efficiency. Moreover, the ordering of the sections exemplifies the need for conclusions to await the explication of the relevant facts of reality. Within each section, parts are ordered in logical progression—each building on the one prior. By the end, the whole structure should stand or fall based on the foundations laid in the first section and the construction methods used in the second.
The work should focus on three subjects: the savings and loan industry, the banking industry, and the federal government. These are the three key players, so to speak, in the S&L debacle. There are other minor players that can be brought in for bit parts including junk bonds, commercial real estate, and criminal executives. These were not monolithic entities: the banking industry, for example, is composed of huge multinational banks, community banks, and banking associations. However, they all faced a similar, basic set of problems that united their interests. This allows us to treat them as a single unit instead of discussing them separately due to inconsequential differences—inconsequential insofar as they did not represent fundamental distinctions. We will study these three principals by first examining the historical contexts with which they came to the events of the late eighties. For the S&L industry, we will look at its founding in the nineteenth century, its troubles in the latter half of that century, its enshrinement in the American firmament by the New Deal, its growth in the fifties, retrenchment in the sixties and seventies, its peak in the early eighties, its collapse in the late eighties, and its elimination in the early nineties. For the banking industry, we will start a little later with the rise of the national banks in the late nineteenth century then move on to the creation of the Federal Reserve System in 1913, the bank runs of the Great Depression, the establishment of deposit insurance in the New Deal legislation of the thirties, the technological changes of the sixties and seventies, the changes to banking law of the eighties, the rise of the national bank in the late eighties and nineties, and the banking climate of today. In our study of the federal government's interaction with these two industries, we will examine the creation of the Federal Reserve System, the issuance of a myriad of regulations governing every aspect of the two industries, the changes made to those regulations over the period, and the changes in the political environment over time. In covering all of these areas, we can fully establish the context necessary for understanding the course of the S&L debacle.
The concentration on local events would permit the writer to show how the industries affected and were affected by the communities they served. Since banks and S&Ls at the time were strictly local (and perhaps regional) enterprises, adopting a national perspective is not particularly useful. The paper should center around a major city that changed and was changed by the S&Ls. Phoenix, Arizona is a particularly poignant example of such a city. Its real estate market attracted national investment from both banks and savings and loans. Moreover, it had both a thriving banking community and a thriving thrift community. Because of its phenomenal growth during the fifties, sixties, and seventies, Phoenix's real estate market practically ached for all the capital financial institutions could muster. When that market collapsed in the mid-eighties, it took these same financial institutions with it. The holdings of these failed institutions were either bought by stronger banks or sold off at substantial discounts. There is plenty of research to conduct along such lines and the documentation produced by the industry and its regulators is voluminous. Newspaper accounts of the time would probably have innumerable stories about the local impact of the S&L crisis.
To review, this paper's proposed thesis is that the thrift industry faced a similar set of problems as the commercial banking industry during the 1980s—disintermediation, increased competition, disincentives introduced by deposit insurance, deregulation, fraud, and mismanagement—but was hamstrung by government edict while the banks were considerably freer. When events took a turn for the worse, the failing savings and loans required government assistance whereas the failing banks were bought by larger banks. The lesson of the S&L debacle, then, is not that Congress should make regulations more stringent or that we should reform deposit insurance; instead, we should eliminate government intervention in the banking system. The S&L industry substantially duplicated the role and function of the banks and was dwindling in impact until 1933 when the Roosevelt administration resurrected it and gave it special advantages. There is no reason why the government should be in the business of propping up one industry in preference to another. The preceding will constitute the thesis and theme of the paper.
This proposed paper would add to the scholarship available on this crisis. Its perspective is unique in that it compares and contrasts the banking industry, which survived, with the thrift industry, which did not. In seeking to answer why the discrepancy exists, the paper would yield valuable insights into why some businesses fail and the why public solutions often produce undesired and undesirable results. In addition, it would provide comment on an area where little exists currently: the state of banking during the savings and loan crisis. Finally, it would address theoretical concerns about centralized banking and offer potential substitutes for its shortcomings.
1 Barth, James R. The Great Savings and Loan Debacle. (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1991), 9.
2 Ibid., 12-3.
3 Ibid., 15-6.
4 Although it was nothing spectacular (something like 15% of assets in non-mortgages and later 40%), this diversification enabled S&Ls to spread the effects of disintermediation across their entire portfolio thereby reducing its effects.
5 Ibid., 123-4.
6 Lowy, Martin. High Rollers: Inside the Savings and Loan Debacle. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991), 4.
7 Ibid., 3.
8 Seidman, L. William. Full Faith and Credit: The S&L Debacle and Other Washington Sagas. (New York City: Times Books, 1993), 177-8.
9 Ibid., 179.
10 Ibid., 273.
11 Pilzer, Paul Zane and Robert Deitz. Other People's Money: An Inside Story of the S&L Mess. (New York City: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 237.
12 Ibid., 237-48.
13 Adams, James Ring. The Big Fix: Inside the S&L Scandal. (New York City: Wiley and Sons, 1990), ix.
14 Waldman, Michael. Who Robbed America? A Citizen's Guide to the S&L Scandal. (New York City: Random House, 1990), 7.
15 Ibid., 146-80.
16 Pizzo, Stephen, Mary Fricker, and Paul Muolo. Inside Job: The Looting of America's Savings and Loans. (New York City: McGraw-Hill, 1989), 7.
17 Ibid., 124, 231.
18 Day, Kathleen. S&L Hell: The People and Politics behind the $1 Trillion Savings and Loan Scandal. (New York City: Norton and Co., 1993), 10.
19 Mayer, Martin. The Greatest-Ever Bank Robbery: The Collapse of the Savings and Loan Industry. (New York City: Scribner's, 1990), 305.
20 Barth, 37-47.
21 Ibid., 48.
22 Ibid., 100.
23 Ibid., 108-11.
24 White, Lawrence. The S&L Debacle: Public Policy Lessons for Bank and Thrift Regulation. (New York City: Oxford University Press, 1991), 3-5.
25 Ibid., 223. Emphasis in original.
26 Rom uses Kelman's definition: "Public spirit is an inclination to make an honest effort to achieve good public policy." Rom, Mark Carl. Public Spirit in the Thrift Tragedy. (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996), 14.
27 Eichler, Ned. The Thrift Debacle. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989), 129-30.
28 Ibid., 136.
29 Calavita, Kitty, Henry Pontell, and Robert Tillman. Big Money Crime: Fraud and Politics in the Savings and Loan Crisis. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997), 1.
30 Salsman, Richard M. Breaking the Banks: Central Banking Problems and Free Banking Solutions. (Great Barrington, MA: American Institute for Economic Research, 1990), 114.


EAC leaders’ summit in Tanzania postponed over lack of quorum
In Summary
- Kenya and Tanzania, who are the best performers in remittances, have lately slowed down their payments to express their displeasure with the conduct of other members.
The summit of heads of state of the six-member East African Community (EAC) scheduled for 30th November in Arusha, Tanzania has been postponed to a later date over the lack of quorum, APA can report on Tuesday.
According to an official correspondence from the Rwandan minister of State in charge of East African Community (EAC) Affairs, Olivier Nduhungirehe, a new date in January or February will be communicated later after consultations between EAC Heads of State.
President Paul Kagame of Rwanda who is assuming the current chairmanship of the summit, announced the postponement for later next year after the absence of the representatives from one member country.
Meanwhile, other reports said Burundi is reported to have requested for the postponement of the summit due to its domestic issues, including matters pertaining to preparation for the 2020 elections.
The postponement comes at a time that the EAC Secretariat has expressed concerns about low budget support by member states, which has been blamed for the stalling of several programmes.
Estimates show that South Sudan and Burundi have been the main defaulters of contributions to the bloc.
Advertisement
Kenya and Tanzania, who are the best performers in remittances, have lately slowed down their payments to express their displeasure with the conduct of other members.
According to budget documents, the EAC is about $100 million in arrears for the 2018/19 fiscal year, blamed on the outstanding debt of member states


@import common.LinkTo @( verifiedReturnUrl: String, idRequest: services.IdentityRequest, idUrlBuilder: services.IdentityUrlBuilder )(implicit request: RequestHeader, messages: play.api.i18n.Messages, context: model.ApplicationContext) @forceSubmitFallback = { Try again } @spinnerError(id: String, text: Html, cta: Option[Html] = None, async: Boolean = false) = {
@if(async) { } } @spinnerError( "identityConsentsLoadingError", Html("Loading seems to be taking a while. If you are in a hurry you can skip this and edit your consents later from your email preferences."), Some(forceSubmitFallback), true )


Test client messages
North
Join (North)
Status (North)
▶
Send pulse (North)
South
Join (South)
Status (South)
▶
Send pulse (South)


Font Size
- src
- utilities
- font-size.scss
Class list
- .huge-1
- .huge-2
- .h1
- .h2
- .h3
- .h4
- .h5
- .h6
- .huge-1-(breakpoint)
- .huge-2-(breakpoint)
- .h1-(breakpoint)
- .h2-(breakpoint)
- .h3-(breakpoint)
- .h4-(breakpoint)
- .h5-(breakpoint)
- .h6-(breakpoint)
Description
The font-size utility classes follow the naming convention used for headings, where the smaller the number, the larger the size.
| Class Name | Font Size |
|---|---|
| .huge-1 | 6.7rem |
| .huge-2 | 5.1rem |
| .h1 | 3.8rem |
| .h2 | 2.8rem |
| .h3 | 2.1rem |
| .h4 | 1.6rem |
| .h5 | 1.2rem |
| .h6 | 0.9rem |
Responsive
Plug in the desired breakpoint suffix (sm, md, lg) into (breakpoint) to have that font-size applied during that breakpoint. Reduce the width of your browser to see the example.
Responsive font size

Responsive font size


Copyright © 2005 W3C® (MIT, ERCIM, Keio), All Rights Reserved. W3C liability, trademark, document use rules apply.
Selectors are patterns that match against elements in a tree. Selectors have been optimized for use with HTML and XML, and are designed to be usable in performance-critical code.
CSS (Cascading Style Sheets) is a language for describing the rendering of HTML and XML documents on screen, on paper, in speech, etc. CSS uses Selectors for binding style properties to elements in the document. This document describes extensions to the selectors defined in CSS level 2. These extended selectors will be used by CSS level 3.
Selectors define the following function:
expression ∗ element → boolean
That is, given an element and a selector, this specification defines whether that element matches the selector.
These expressions can also be used, for instance, to select a set of elements, or a single element from a set of elements, by evaluating the expression across all the elements in a subtree. STTS (Simple Tree Transformation Sheets), a language for transforming XML trees, uses this mechanism. [STTS]
This section describes the status of this document at the time of its publication. Other documents may supersede this document. A list of current W3C publications and the latest revision of this technical report can be found in the W3C technical reports index at http://www.w3.org/TR/.
This document describes the selectors that already exist in CSS1 and CSS2, and also proposes new selectors for CSS3 and other languages that may need them.
The CSS Working Group doesn't expect that all implementations of CSS3 will have to implement all selectors. Instead, there will probably be a small number of variants of CSS3, called profiles. For example, it may be that only a profile for interactive user agents will include all of the selectors.
This specification is a last call working draft for the the CSS Working Group (Style Activity). This document is a revision of the Candidate Recommendation dated 2001 November 13, and has incorporated implementation feedback received in the past few years. It is expected that this last call will proceed straight to Proposed Recommendation stage since it is believed that interoperability will be demonstrable.
All persons are encouraged to review and implement this specification and return comments to the (archived) public mailing list www-style (see instructions). W3C Members can also send comments directly to the CSS Working Group. The deadline for comments is 14 January 2006.
This is still a draft document and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to cite a W3C Working Draft as other than "work in progress".
This document may be available in translation. The English version of this specification is the only normative version.


It’s been a long time coming and it was well worth the effort. We hope that you all will find here a new and interesting source for design and development processes, insights, and tools.
The new site is built on a technology platform based on Ruby called Jekyll. It is a system which runs either locally or on a server (we use Heroku) and can be run for free on Github Pages as long as you don’t mind running without any of the fancy plugins available.
We are using a plugin to generate the portfolio page and manage the projects inside, so Heroku was our best bet.
I’ve used Wordpress to develop every site that I’ve created over the past six or seven years. It is a brilliant CMS and there is good reason for the fact that it powers 22% of the world’s website. That’s huge!
The simple fact of the matter is that Wordpress is a brilliant CMS, but that it is also a monster to run and a hassle to keep up to date. Many security breaches are due to a host’s inability to secure their server, security flaws in the setup, or in Wordpress or its plugins.
Jekyll is a beautiful alternative which offers most of the templating flexibility of a complex CMS, with none of the drawbacks of a dynamic site. Static files are relatively secure and are blazing fast – and this is really the core brilliance of Jekyll. You get all the advantages of a full templating system such as includes, metadata, and auto-generated pages – with none of the overhead of running a database or setting up Wordpress.
Putting together a site like this was done with the help of two really great projects and a bit of hackery on our end.
First, we used Jonas Forsberg’s Jekyll+Heroku+Unicorn setup as a base. I tried a few other projects which either did not run on heroku or did not fit the needs of my company’s site. It let me quickly get a base setup going which we could hack away on.
Secondly, we used the awesome grid system Skeleton for building the site’s look and feel. Skeleton has a few really nice advantages over a full-on theme like Boostrap. It generally gets out of your way when it should, something which designers appreciate, and that it is minimalistic so that you add functionality you want instead of ripping out functionality you don’t need. Designers tend to be finicky about how they work and it is nice to find a system which plays nice.
Like all things, working with Jekyll has its limitations. Since it outputs static files, there is no ability for dynamic content like comments and email forms to be submitted to a server and processed. This means things like a simple contact form need to use alternate solutions. Ours was to use Wufoo to process forms using local javascript files. It works well and we recommend it. For comments, Disqus is always an option.
Sitemaps are also not built in. There are a few solutions out there for generating a sitemap.xml file. In the end we decided it wasn’t a critical feature, but it is something which we believe we will add in the future to our set up.
We are very happy with how the site works, how easy it is to update – just a git push, no messy FTP transfers and you always have a commit history! The learning curve wasn’t too daunting and we get to use our favorite development language, Ruby, to do our in-house website.
If you haven’t considered Jekyll for your company’s website needs, you should. The advantages of stability, speed, and easy updates far outweigh the disadvantages I outline above.


TFrameBrowser Demo
Indy Version 9
http://www.pbear.com/
or
www.pbear.com/
file:///
followed by the filename.
res:///page0.htm
.
The HTML Component set consists of the THtmlViewer, TFrameViewer, and TFrameBrowser components. All three are HTML document display components:
| THtmlViewer | The basic component. THtmlViewer displays single (non-frame)
documents. It forms the basis for the other two components. |
|
|---|---|---|
| TFrameViewer | Displays both Frame and single HTML documents. TFrameViewer is
oriented more for local disk file use. |
|
| TFrameBrowser | Also displays Frame and single HTML documents. However, TFrameBrower is
oriented toward Internet style protocols and URL usage. Additional
code and/or components are generally required to use TFrameBrowser. |
The FrameBrowserId demo program illustrates how the TFrameBrowser component might be used in a complete application. For Internet access, the demo program uses the Internet Direct (Indy) components which come with Delphi 7. Indy versions for Delphi 4, 5 and 5 are also available at no charge at http://www.nevrona.com/Indy/.
The demo program supports the following protocols:
| http | Internet online protocol |
https | Internet online SSL protocol (optional) |
|---|---|---|
| file | Internet local file protocol |
|
| res | Specail protocol to read HTML documents from an application's resources |
When initially loading an HTML document, the full URL including the protocol should be used. From that point on, TFrameBrowser is capable of adding the protocol and path to partial URLs found in the document.
The http, https, and file protocols supported by the demo program are standard. URLs using these protocols are in the form:
http://www.pbear.com/index.html
file:///c|/thtml4/framedem.htm
The res protocol may be used to access HTML documents and their images stored in a program's resources. URLs with the res protocol have the form:
res:///helpinfo.html
The res protocol supports document extensions of HTM, HTML, GIF, JPG, JPEG,
PNG, BMP, CSS,
and TXT
. See Adding HTML Documents
to an Application's Resources for
information on how to add HTML resources to an application.
Additional special protocols may be easily added by the programmer. Protocols might be defined for reading encrypted files or reading HTML from a database, for instance. See Adding Your Own Protocols.


Value Type:
Initial Value:
true.
Description:
If it is true, the #. reader macro has its normal effect. Otherwise, that reader macro signals an error of type reader-error.
Examples: None.
Affected By: None.
See Also:
Notes:
If *read-eval* is false and *print-readably* is true, any method for print-object that would output a reference to the #. reader macro either outputs something different or signals an error of type print-not-readable.


Be sure to run this demo in a browser that supports Transforms
RADIO TELESCOPE
Astronomers Vanquish the Impossible
Intelligent beings permanence of the stars decipherment hearts of the stars as a patch of light finite but unbounded dispassionate extraterrestrial observer with pretty stories for which there's little good evidence bits of moving fluff rogue stirred by starlight. White dwarf laws of physics how far away Jean-François Champollion two ghostly white figures in coveralls and helmets are soflty dancing cosmos, Sea of Tranquility vanquish the impossible prime number Cambrian explosion white dwarf?
Not a sunrise but a galaxyrise birth
Astonishment, radio telescope. Ship of the imagination. Tingling of the spine cosmos colonies concept of the number one, the only home we've ever known another world the carbon in our apple pies not a sunrise but a galaxyrise shores of the cosmic ocean realm of the galaxies inconspicuous motes of rock and gas star stuff harvesting star light network of wormholes. White dwarf. The carbon in our apple pies paroxysm of global death extraplanetary dispassionate extraterrestrial observer.
Hydrogen atoms Cambrian explosion, cosmic fugue? Paroxysm of global death shores of the cosmic ocean the ash of stellar alchemy prime number encyclopaedia galactica laws of physics paroxysm of global death radio telescope Tunguska event tingling of the spine, at the edge of forever.


Data Binding
{{ "Hello" }}
{{ value }}
Property Binding
The color of this text is {{ color }}.
Event Binding
Pipes
{{value | uppercase }}
{{number | percent }}
{{number | currency: 'EUR' }}
{{number | number: '0.3'}}
Own Pipe: {{"Test" | yell: "???" | uppercase}}
Components And Directives
Structural Directives
ngIf
I'm visible
ngFor
ngFor with todo component
RxJS, Observables, Two Way Binding
Other


Put some type description files (*.d.ts).
Importing
TypeScript
Scala.js
Get the results.
Get the results.


| Methods Summary | ||
|---|---|---|
public
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public
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public
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public
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public
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public
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public
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public
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public
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| Properties Summary | ||
|---|---|---|
protected
Koren\ErplyBooks\Client
|
$client
Resolve Client
|
#
NULL
|
protected
string
|
$endpoint
Endpoint
|
#
NULL
|


A comprehensive distributed ledger cloud platform to provision blockchain networks, join other organizations, and deploy & run smart contracts to update and query the ledger. Reliably share data and conduct trusted transactions with suppliers, banks, and other trade partners...


Robot toys are certainly among the best educational toys you can find. Many toys do not interact with their environment, but robots do.


Chapter 2. History: A Tale of Two Cultures
Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.
The Life of Reason (1905)
óGeorge Santayana
The past informs practice. Unix has a long and colorful history, much of which is still live as folklore, assumptions, and (too often) battle scars in the collective memory of Unix programmers. In this chapter we'll survey the history of Unix, with an eye to explaining why, in 2003, today's Unix culture looks the way it does.
|


compare(obj1, obj2)
If obj1
is less than obj2
, return -1. If obj1
is greater than obj2
, returns 1.
If obj1
is equal to obj2
, returns 0.
For sequence objects like strings and lists, a lexicographical comparison is done.
First the first two items are compared, and if they differ this determines the outcome of the comparison; if they are equal,
the next two items are compared, and so on, until either sequence is exhausted. For strings, character comparison
is used, for lists and arrays compare
is called recursively for each element and for numeric arrays number comparison
operators are used.
Compare
is a generic function by default and can be overridden for custom data types without
an explicit declare generic
.
let s1 = "abcd"
let s2 = "xyz"
compare(s1, s2)
// -1
compare(s1, string_upcase(s2))
// 1
compare([1, 2, 3], [3, 2, 1])
// -1
compare([1, 2, 3], reverse([3, 2, 1]))
// 0
// implementing the comparison operators for a custom type:
record point(x, y)
let p1 = point(x = 10, y = 20)
let p2 = point(x = 20, y = 30)
p1 < p2
//> error: compare_not_supported
function pointc(p1)
^(msg)
| 'compare -> ^(p2) compare(point_x(p1), point_x(p2))
let pc1 = pointc(p1)
pc1 < p2
// true
pc1 > p2
// false


BREAKDOWN A film review by Michael Redman Copyright 1997 Michael Redman
*** (out of ****)
My favorite scene in this film comes near the end. A huge vehicle crashes through a bridge, falling to the rocks below. And it doesn't explode into a fireball! That episode is so satisfying that it more than makes up for an earlier conflagration.
Bostonian Yups Jeff (Kurt Russell) and Amy Taylor (Kathleen Quinlan) are heading to new jobs in San Diego. Driving across America in their new Jeep Grand Cherokee loaded down with all their worldly possessions, they stand out like the city dwellers that they are in the Arizona wastelands. The contrast between the clean cuts with their cell phone (which doesn't work in the isolated wilderness) and the rugged rednecks in their dirty beat-up pick-ups is one of the less than subtle aspects of the movie.
When their car breaks down on a deserted highway under the blazing sun, the Taylors are overjoyed to see good Samaritan trucker Red Barr (the ominous J.T. Walsh) who offers Amy a ride to the nearest diner. Soon after she leaves, Jeff reconnects two loose wires and solves the problem. Everything seems to be working out well until he walks into the cowboy bar where his wife supposedly awaits him only to discover that she's not there and probably never has been.
Panicking, he roars down the road and conveniently for the film, finds Red. Mysteriously the trucker claims not to have ever seen the couple. Later, back at the bar, everyone seems to be a part of the conspiracy: the cops, the uncaring cafe country boys, the surly owner and even the simple-minded kid washing a car in the parking lot.
About half way through, the movie changes it's approach and moves from mystery to action as Jeff takes on the bad guys. Both portions of the story work well and fit together fairly seemlessly. The first pulls you in and the second gives you a chance to cheer for the hero.
Russell has played two very different roles in recent years. Sometimes he's Snake Plissken ("Escape From This City Or That One"), but here, as in "Executive Decision", he's Everyman. Jeff becomes something other than who he has been as he bulls and blunders his way into becoming a warrior. There are a few unbelievable bits, but even they are relatively acceptable. After all, we bought Harrison Ford's stunts in the Indiana Jones movies.
Ordinary people forced into heroics by extraordinary situations is a tried but true theme. It's much easier for the audience to relate to their next door neighbor than to Rambo. That it could happen to you makes the film even more suspenseful.
The film "borrows" from a number of others. The story comes from "The Vanishing", the class conflict from "Deliverance", the mood from Hitchcock and the truck menace in the beautiful but bleak southwest from the very early Spielberg "Duel". But, as has been noted often before, there's not much new under the sun and "Breakdown" does well with the recycled ideas.
More disturbing is the apparent underlying theme of "us versus them" where us are the wealthy well educated and them are the blue collar ne'er do wells. Nearly everyone except our friends from Massachusetts is evil, scowling, suspicious or a combination of all the above. Even the one heroic Arizona hick is decidedly unfriendly. This geocentric view of society seems like a cheap shot.
[This appeared in the 5/12/97 "Bloomington Voice", Bloomington, Indiana. Michael Redman can be reached at<EMAIL_ADDRESS>]
The review above was posted to the
rec.arts.movies.reviews newsgroup (de.rec.film.kritiken for German reviews).
The Internet Movie Database accepts no responsibility for the contents of the
review and has no editorial control. Unless stated otherwise, the copyright
belongs to the author.
Please direct comments/criticisms of the review to relevant newsgroups.
Broken URLs inthe reviews are the responsibility of the author.
The formatting of the review is likely to differ from the original due
to ASCII to HTML conversion.
Related links: index of all rec.arts.movies.reviews reviews


{% include 'templates/head.html' %}
{% include 'templates/nav.html' %}
Quizzes
-
Quizzes will be given at the beginning of class and
you will have 10 minutes to answer the questions.
-
Quizzes will happen every Thursday lecture. The quiz
will cover material from the Tuesday lecture of that
week and the previous week's Thursday lecture.
-
All of the quizzes will be short (up to 5 questions),
any you can use pseudocode for any programming
problems.
-
I will give eight quizzes this quarter.
{% include 'templates/footer.html' %}


Master Raien:
This Human King, though young, is said to be an excellent diplomat and strategist. If that is true, then he will no doubt quickly try to establish strong ties to the other races. Elmore is not the only enemy we face...
Ah, but that is a story for another day!
Learn skills.
Ask about Skill Enchanting.
Quest


| DOSE: |
6 hits |
smoked |
Cannabis |
(plant material) |
A few weeks ago my best friend and I decided to meet up with two guys we had met a few weeks before. When we met up with them they asked if we wanted to smoke. Me, someone who has smoked on a regular basis for over 4 years now, couldn't decline. But at the same time, I said I'd never smoke with people I really didn't know, in fear of coming across laced weed, again. But I smoked anyways...
They rolled a blunt in the backseat of my best friends car while we drove to a back road. As soon as we came to the back road we lit the blunt. After two or three hits I was already feeling the effects. I only smoked through one more rotation and I stopped smoking. And so did my friend. We took a total of maybe 6 hits from the blunt each. The two guys continued smoking.
After about 15 or 20 minutes my whole body was numb and tingly. My vision was blurry and I felt like I was looking through a straw. If I focused on one thing, I could see it. But, everything around it was blurry and white. My heart was beating so fast my chest felt like it was on fire. My fingers and legs were locked and I couldn't move them. I felt paranoid and scared because I didn't know what was happening. My legs were wobbly and walking was hard. But, then I remember what a close friend once told me 'Don't fight it.' So I didn't.
In all my years of smoking I never experienced something like this before. And I've smoked many types of weed, too. The effects peaked and after that I calmed down a little and felt awesome. I felt peaceful. Not just high, something better than high. And this high lasted for about 5-6 hours. Where as with regular weed, the full effects are gone after about an hour or so. To this day, I still don't know what it was I smoked, but it was an experience I'll always remember.
Experience Reports are the writings and opinions of the individual authors who submit them.
Some of the activities described are dangerous and/or illegal and none are recommended by Erowid.


{% extends '_main.html' %} {% load static core_tags humanize waffle_tags %} {% block page_title %}Filter chart data - {{ block.super }}{% endblock %} {% block go_back %} Back {% endblock %} {% block content %}
Use this data grid to filter and sort data before creating your chart. You can:
To speed up the loading of your chart we recommend that you:


| handle=the variable you gave the handle to when you loaded the image |
|
Instead of loading a graphic twice in two different handles, you can load the image ONCE then use the CopyImage command to make as many copies in memory as you want.
Why would you want to do this? So you still have a copy of the original image in case you want to alter a copy later for another purpose. |
|
; CopyImage Example
; Load an image and give its handle to gfxOld variable gfxOld=LoadImage("mypicture.bmp") ; Duplicate the gfxOld image to a new handle variable gfxNew=CopyImage(gfxOld) |


SMTP server response on access map violation
access_map_reject_code
This parameter specifies the SMTP server response code when a mail violates the
access map restriction that is:
Access denied: access_map violation (on SMTP client or HELO hostname, sender or recipient email address)
Note that the postfix default value used for access_map_reject_code is
code 554, and this code in 'standard RFC 822' should means
'Requested mail action rejected: access denied'.
So with Postfix, a access map rule violation does not reflect exactly
the RFC822 explanation of reported code.
To avoid confusion, you can change this to 570 for example (another reason is that code 554
is also the postfix default value for other kind of errors), otherwise, do not change
this unless you have a complete understanding of RFC 822.


Sorting Visualizer
new array
no of bars
speed
Bubble sort
Selection sort
Insertion sort
Quick sort
Merge sort


Next: floating-point-overflow, Previous: floating-point-invalid-operation, Up: Numbers Dictionary
floating-point-inexact, arithmetic-error, error, serious-condition, condition, t
The type floating-point-inexact consists of error conditions that occur because of certain floating point traps.
It is implementation-dependent whether floating point traps occur, and whether or how they may be enabled or disabled. Therefore, conforming code may establish handlers for this condition, but must not depend on its being signaled.


wav_args_ebthr.Rd
The main goal of this function is to generate a tibble
with combinations of some possible arguments that can be passed to
get wavelet-based signal estimation from the function
EbayesThresh::ebayesthresh.wavelet
.
wav_args_ebthr(xform, wtlist, ebthrlist)
| xform | A named list of wavelet transform methods. Types can be |
|---|---|
| wtlist | A named list of arguments to use in the wavelet
decomposition, excluding the input vector |
| ebthrlist | A named list of arguments that can be passed to the function |
S3 objetc of class args_ebthr. This object is a list of the following elements:
A tibble with arguments to get wavevel-based
signal estimation from
EbayesThresh::ebayesthresh.wavelet
A integer vector of length two. The first
element is the number of arguments to pass to the function
waveslim::dwt
or waveslim::modwt
. The
second element is the number of arguments to the EbayesThresh::ebayesthresh.wavelet
# Wavelet transform ebthr_xform <- list(wt = c("dwt", "modwt")) # Wavelet filter (package waveslim) ebthr_wt <- list( wf = c("haar", "d4", "d6", "la8"), n.levels = 1:4, boundary = c("periodic", "reflection") ) # Some arguments that can be passed to EbayesThresh::ebayesthresh.wavelet ebthr_ebwav <- list( vscale = c("level", "independet"), a = 0.5, prior = c("laplace", "cauchy"), threshrule = c("median", "mean", "soft", "hard") ) ebthr_args <- wav_args_ebthr(ebthr_xform, ebthr_wt, ebthr_ebwav)


EventwParam()
语法
Result = EventwParam()
This function is not supported anymore and shouldn't used in new project. Use a callback to get full control over Windows message with SetWindowCallback().
已支持操作系统
Windows


This Flash program visualizes the details of the AES encryption algorithm with a fixed data set. In the opposite, you can arbitrarily choose the data with the Rijndael Inspector.
AES is the current standard for modern symmetric encryption algorithms.
AES is a standardized special case of the Rijndael encryption algorithm, which can handle variable block length for the data input (especially 128 bit) and with variable length for the key (128, 192 and 256 bit).
The visualization of Enrique Zabala demonstrates the AES method using the animation software Flash. Here fixed preset data is used. Both the cleartext message (called "state" in the specification) and the used main key have a length of each 128 bit ( = 16 byte).
The animation then shows step-by-step the procedure of both the actual encryption process applied to the input data block and the process of generating the partial keys from the main key.
Remark 1: Specification
The data of the visualized example are taken directly from the official AES specification of NIST: "Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, November 26, 2001, Announcing the ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES)" (http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf), attachment B.
Another very good description can be found in chapter 11, page 20 at http://www.techheap.com/cryptography/encryption/spec.v36.pdf (A Specification for Rijndael, the AES Algorithm, Dr. Brian Gladman, v3.6, 15th April 2003).
The test data from the spec are:
Input = 32 43 f6 a8 88 5a 30 8d 31 31 98 a2 e0 37 07 34
Cipher key = 2b 7e 15 16 28 ae d2 a6 ab f7 15 88 09 cf 4f 3c
a) Input = State = cleartext block of 16 byte:
3243f6a8885a308d313198a2e0370734
The provided hex file "state2.hex" contains this input too.
Initially the input is written column-wise (!) into the matrix:
32 88 31 e0
43 5a 31 37
f6 30 98 07
a8 8d a2 34
b) Cipher key (main key):
2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c
The key is also written column-wise (!) into a 4-row matrix:
2b 28 ab 09
7e ae f7 cf
15 d2 15 4f
16 a6 88 3c
c) Output = ciphertext block:
As output you get again 16 byte, displayed in a matrix:
39 02 dc 19
25 dc 11 6a
84 09 85 0b
1d fb 97 32
Written in a file in hex format this is:
39 25 84 1d 02 dc 09 fb dc 11 85 97 19 6a 0b 32
Remark 2: Column-wise Input
Both the given input data and the main key are column-wise read into a 4*4 byte matrix according to the standard specification (16 byte = 128 bit).
If you look at the Flash animation and you want to reproduce the result of the shown process with the implemented AES functionality under the menu entry Rijndael (AES), then you must read out the data within the matrices of the visualization column-by-column and write it into a line (so you get the original sample data of the specification as described in remark 1).
Remark 3: OpenSSL
For comparison: The following OpenSSL instruction writes the ciphertext into the file "state2-enc.hex":
openssl enc -aes-128-ecb -in state2.hex -out state2-enc.hex -iv 0 -K 2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c
Remark 4: Padding
If you use the 16 byte long exemplary input from the specification (see remark 1) in CrypTool or OpenSSL you get an output of double length (32 instead of 16 byte). This is due to the fact that any input in these implementations is always padded with another 128 bit.
The first 16 byte (the first output block = the actual ciphertext block) are identical with OpenSSL and CrypTool, and also are the same at the animation (and the spec).
The second block, the encrypted padding, is different: The reason is hat CrypTool and OpenSSL are using a different padding string. The padding is not specified in the standard. In the animation no padding is performed.
Sample output of CrypTool:
39 25 84 1d 02 dc 09 fb dc 11 85 97 19 6a 0b 32
fa c6 b4 e4 f2 d2 33 cd 74 c0 35 d7 84 67 af b7
Sample output of OpenSSL:
39 25 84 1d 02 dc 09 fb dc 11 85 97 19 6a 0b 32
a2 54 be 88 e0 37 dd d9 d7 9f b6 41 1c 3f 9d f8
OpenSSL creates with a fixed key (2b7e151628aed2a6abf7158809cf4f3c) with any given plaintext always the same second line (a2 54 be 88 e0 37 dd d9 d7 9f b6 41 1c 3f 9d f8).
CrypTool pads the cleartext with another string (binary<PHONE_NUMBER>0000...) and therefore CrypTool has a different second line.
Remark 5: Sample Files
The two files "state2.hex" (cleartext) and "state2-enc.hex" (ciphertext) are included in the CrypTool package.
Remark 6: Another AES Animation from the Internet
The master thesis of Thomas Hunger "Der Rijndael (AES) Algorithmus: Eine Visualisierung" can be found at http://home.datacomm.ch/th.aes/Daten/Html/frame.html. The details of the algorithm are visualized in single applets, where any value in hexadecimal form can be entered actually dynamically. This visualization is implemented with a fixed key length and data block length of each 128 bit. This page exists only in German (and would be worth to be translated into English).


What type of food would you like to eat?
Authentic Chinese food or westernised Chinese food... we have it all!


ASP.Net Core
- Downloads
- Documentation (mostly docs.microsoft.com):
| Asp.Net 5/MVC6 (pre-release) | Pre 2016 | The command line tools were k (hence "Kestrel") and then dnx, before becoming "dotnet". |
| .Net Core 1.0 | released June 2016 | originally in Visual Studio 2015. Support ended in 2019. |
| .Net Core 1.1 | released November 2016 | Support ended in 2019. |
| .Net Core 2.0 | released August 2017 | Implemented .NetStandard 2.0 and lots more APIs. Project files changed from project.json/ .xproj to an updated .csproj xml formt. Support has ended (in October 2018) |
| .Net Core 2.1 | released May 2018 | Added Span<T> |
| .Net Core 3.0/3.1 | released 2019 | Supports more APIs including winforms. Support ends December 2022 |
| net 5 | released 2020 | Drops "core" from name; there was no v4. C# 9 (record types, init setters). Supports ends 2022 |
| net 6 | released 2021 | C# 10 (global usings, file-scoped namespace), minimal apis. breaking changes |
Source code
- DotNet Core Repo includes
dotnet tooling/SDK
The 2016/VS2015 tooling was preview; it is only RTM with VS2017.
- View the current runtime version with "dotnet --version"; SDK tooling version can be seen in "dotnet"
- there can be multiple runtimes and sdks installed- see %PROGRAMFILES%\dotnet\
- dotnet --list-runtimes runtimes: %PROGRAMFILES%\dotnet\shared\Microsoft.NETCore.App\
- dotnet --list-sdks tooling: %PROGRAMFILES%\dotnet\sdk
- Downloads - LongTermSupport + "Current" (latest)
- .NET Core Runtime and SDK download archive
- Notes on the obsolete VS2015 project.json format
Project-specific tooling: global.json
- The tooling/sdk version can be specified in the solution file global.json (as from VS2017, the "projects" is obsolete).
- The runtime is specified in the csproj (TargetFramework)
- If you don't set this, the latest installed version of the sdk is used. This may break older projects (eg VS2015 projects after you installed VS2017)
- Since net 3 you can use allowPrerelease (true/false), rollForward: (latestMajor, latestMinor ...) to allow later versions
- docs
- Older version (pre 3) had a projects section, which no longer exists
"sdk": {
"version": "3.1.102",
"rollForward": "latestMinor"
}
}
Project types
Projects have a <TargetFramework> (in full framework we had <TargetFrameworkVersion>v4.5</TargetFrameworkVersion>).
NB: for multi-targeting, it's plural <TargetFrameworks> with a semicolon delimiter.
- Executables (consoles and web, with a static void Main) need a runtime - <TargetFramework>netcoreapp1.0</TargetFramework>
- NB: ASP.net Core web projects have a Program.cs
- Class libraries only need an API - <TargetFramework>netstandard1.4</TargetFramework>
- VS2017 Add new project has ".NET Core"/"Class Library (.NET Core)" (netcoreapp1.0)
AND ".NET Standard"/"Class Library (.NET Standard)" (netstandard1.4) - VS2019/VS2022 Add new project has "class library that targets Net Standard or Net Core"; in the wizard after naming the project, select the target from the dropdown as NetStandard, Core 3.1 or net5/net6
- VS2017 Add new project has ".NET Core"/"Class Library (.NET Core)" (netcoreapp1.0)
Netstandard class libraries can be called by "classic" framework .net as well as Core.
<PropertyGroup>
<TargetFramework>netstandard2.1</TargetFramework>
</PropertyGroup>
</Project>
Core class libraries can only be called from Core projects, not full framework.
<PropertyGroup>
<TargetFramework>netcoreapp3.1</TargetFramework>
</PropertyGroup>
</Project>
For Asp.net Core websites the sdk for web is Microsoft.NET.Sdk.Web; otherwise it's Microsoft.NET.Sdk
.net core 2 could run on framework (TargetFramework net461 with RuntimeIdentifier of win7-x86) but since core 3 this is no longer possible.
<PropertyGroup>
<TargetFramework>netcoreapp3.1</TargetFramework>
</PropertyGroup>
</Project>
A console app just has an OutputType of "Exe"
<PropertyGroup>
<OutputType>Exe</OutputType>
<TargetFramework>netcoreapp1.0</TargetFramework>
</PropertyGroup>
</Project>
Multi-targeting
Frameworks run .net code, and there can be several in the same project (multi-targeting). Note TargetFrameworks is plural!
<PropertyGroup>
<TargetFrameworks>netcoreapp1.0;net451</TargetFrameworks>
</PropertyGroup>
</Project>
For references/packages add them with msbuild conditionals.
<PackageReference Include="System.Data.Common" Version="4.1.0" />
<PackageReference Include="System.Xml.XmlSerializer" Version="4.0.11" />
</ItemGroup>
<ItemGroup Condition=" '$(TargetFramework)' == 'net45' ">
<Reference Include="System.Data" />
<Reference Include="System.Xml" />
<Reference Include="System.Xml.Linq" />
<Reference Include="System.Data.DataSetExtensions" />
<Reference Include="System" />
<Reference Include="Microsoft.CSharp" />
</ItemGroup>
The framework moniker (.net 4.6 is "net46") is the same label used in Nuget packages. It's also available (uppercased to NET46) as a conditional compilation symbol when you build.
| Framework | Versions | Framework (TFM) | Dependency (MetaPackage) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Full framework | 4.8 | net48 | N/A (installation) |
| NetStandard (API) | 1.6 | netstandard1.6 | NETStandard.Library 1.6.0 |
| .Net Core (June 2016) | 1.0 | netcoreapp1.0 | Microsoft.NETCore.App 1.0.0 |
| .Net Core (Nov 2016) | 1.1 | netcoreapp1.1 | Microsoft.NETCore.App 1.1.0 |
| .Net Core (Aug 2017) | 2.0-3.1 | netcoreapp2.0 netcoreapp3.1 |
No longer required |
.Net Standard
.Net Core (1-2) can run on .Net full framework, or by itself. .Net Standard is a common API (in programming terms, an interface). Netstandard class libraries are binary compatible across the framework, core, Xamarin, UWP etc.
Each netstandard is a superset of the previous. Core 1.0 supports all netstandards from netstandard1.0 (net45) to netstandard1.6 (net461).
With .Net Core 3.0, there is no longer any support for the full framework.
Netstandard 2.1 is the highest (final) version; net5 and net6 are newer versions which are not compatible with .net framework (although netstandard can still be referenced).
| .Net Standard | .Net Framework | .Net Core |
|---|---|---|
| netstandard1.6 | net 4.6.1 (net461) | Core 1.0 (netcoreapp1.0) |
| netstandard2.0 | net 4.6.1 (net461) | Core 2.0 (netcoreapp2.0) |
| netstandard2.1 | - (Not supported!) | Core 3.0 |


{% extends "layout.html" %} {% block page_title %} Example - Forms {% endblock %} {% block content %}
Many government services for British citizens abroad are offered directly by the relevant Government department and are not available through Embassies.
More topics
Before your enquiry is submitted we will suggest some articles from GOV.UK that may answer your question faster. You can submit your enquiry on the next page.
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To begin playing, first select the server you would like to connect to:
Then enter a user name and click Log in.
Note: You can expand the Server Console below if you would like to see server messages.
A dystopian, cyberpunk themed game featuring human factions, war machines and interplanetary conflict.
Magical and Mythical Creatures clash while Gods, Goddesses and Heroes of Legend fight for human worship.


Coffee makes you feel happier.
Coffee can make you a better athlete.
Coffee could reduce your risk of developing Type 2 diabetes.
Drinking coffee could help keep your brain healthier for longer.
Coffee may make you more intelligent.