Daily Papers

Adversarial poisoning attacks pose huge threats to various machine learning applications. Especially, the recent accumulative poisoning attacks show that it is possible to achieve irreparable harm on models via a sequence of imperceptible attacks followed by a trigger batch. Due to the limited data-level discrepancy in real-time data streaming, current defensive methods are indiscriminate in handling the poison and clean samples. In this paper, we dive into the perspective of model dynamics and propose a novel information measure, namely, Memorization Discrepancy, to explore the defense via the model-level information. By implicitly transferring the changes in the data manipulation to that in the model outputs, Memorization Discrepancy can discover the imperceptible poison samples based on their distinct dynamics from the clean samples. We thoroughly explore its properties and propose Discrepancy-aware Sample Correction (DSC) to defend against accumulative poisoning attacks. Extensive experiments comprehensively characterized Memorization Discrepancy and verified its effectiveness. The code is publicly available at: https://github.com/tmlr-group/Memorization-Discrepancy.

LIBERO has emerged as a widely adopted benchmark for evaluating Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models; however, its current training and evaluation settings are problematic, often leading to inflated performance estimates and preventing fair model comparison. To address these issues, we introduce LIBERO-PRO, an extended LIBERO benchmark that systematically evaluates model performance under reasonable perturbations across four dimensions: manipulated objects, initial states, task instructions, and environments. Experimental results reveal that, although existing models achieve over 90% accuracy under the standard LIBERO evaluation, their performance collapses to 0.0% under our generalized setting. Crucially, this discrepancy exposes the models' reliance on rote memorization of action sequences and environment layouts from the training set, rather than genuine task understanding or environmental perception. For instance, models persist in executing grasping actions when the target object is replaced with irrelevant items, and their outputs remain unchanged even when given corrupted instructions or even messy tokens. These findings expose the severe flaws in current evaluation practices, and we call on the community to abandon misleading methodologies in favor of robust assessments of model generalization and comprehension. Our code is available at: https://github.com/Zxy-MLlab/LIBERO-PRO.

Text-to-image diffusion models have achieved tremendous success in the field of controllable image generation, while also coming along with issues of privacy leakage and data copyrights. Membership inference arises in these contexts as a potential auditing method for detecting unauthorized data usage. While some efforts have been made on diffusion models, they are not applicable to text-to-image diffusion models due to the high computation overhead and enhanced generalization capabilities. In this paper, we first identify a conditional overfitting phenomenon in text-to-image diffusion models, indicating that these models tend to overfit the conditional distribution of images given the corresponding text rather than the marginal distribution of images only. Based on this observation, we derive an analytical indicator, namely Conditional Likelihood Discrepancy (CLiD), to perform membership inference, which reduces the stochasticity in estimating memorization of individual samples. Experimental results demonstrate that our method significantly outperforms previous methods across various data distributions and dataset scales. Additionally, our method shows superior resistance to overfitting mitigation strategies, such as early stopping and data augmentation.

Existing analyses of the expressive capacity of Transformer models have required excessively deep layers for data memorization, leading to a discrepancy with the Transformers actually used in practice. This is primarily due to the interpretation of the softmax function as an approximation of the hardmax function. By clarifying the connection between the softmax function and the Boltzmann operator, we prove that a single layer of self-attention with low-rank weight matrices possesses the capability to perfectly capture the context of an entire input sequence. As a consequence, we show that one-layer and single-head Transformers have a memorization capacity for finite samples, and that Transformers consisting of one self-attention layer with two feed-forward neural networks are universal approximators for continuous permutation equivariant functions on a compact domain.

Memorization in language models is typically treated as a homogenous phenomenon, neglecting the specifics of the memorized data. We instead model memorization as the effect of a set of complex factors that describe each sample and relate it to the model and corpus. To build intuition around these factors, we break memorization down into a taxonomy: recitation of highly duplicated sequences, reconstruction of inherently predictable sequences, and recollection of sequences that are neither. We demonstrate the usefulness of our taxonomy by using it to construct a predictive model for memorization. By analyzing dependencies and inspecting the weights of the predictive model, we find that different factors influence the likelihood of memorization differently depending on the taxonomic category.

Probing the memorization of large language models holds significant importance. Previous works have established metrics for quantifying memorization, explored various influencing factors, such as data duplication, model size, and prompt length, and evaluated memorization by comparing model outputs with training corpora. However, the training corpora are of enormous scale and its pre-processing is time-consuming. To explore memorization without accessing training data, we propose a novel approach, named ROME, wherein memorization is explored by comparing disparities across memorized and non-memorized. Specifically, models firstly categorize the selected samples into memorized and non-memorized groups, and then comparing the demonstrations in the two groups from the insights of text, probability, and hidden state. Experimental findings show the disparities in factors including word length, part-of-speech, word frequency, mean and variance, just to name a few.

Neural networks often learn simple explanations that fit the majority of the data while memorizing exceptions that deviate from these explanations.This behavior leads to poor generalization when the learned explanations rely on spurious correlations. In this work, we formalize the interplay between memorization and generalization, showing that spurious correlations would particularly lead to poor generalization when are combined with memorization. Memorization can reduce training loss to zero, leaving no incentive to learn robust, generalizable patterns. To address this, we propose memorization-aware training (MAT), which uses held-out predictions as a signal of memorization to shift a model's logits. MAT encourages learning robust patterns invariant across distributions, improving generalization under distribution shifts.

Large language models (LLMs) achieve good performance on challenging reasoning benchmarks, yet could also make basic reasoning mistakes. This contrasting behavior is puzzling when it comes to understanding the mechanisms behind LLMs' reasoning capabilities. One hypothesis is that the increasingly high and nearly saturated performance on common reasoning benchmarks could be due to the memorization of similar problems. In this paper, we systematically investigate this hypothesis with a quantitative measurement of memorization in reasoning tasks, using a dynamically generated logical reasoning benchmark based on Knights and Knaves (K&K) puzzles. We found that LLMs could interpolate the training puzzles (achieving near-perfect accuracy) after fine-tuning, yet fail when those puzzles are slightly perturbed, suggesting that the models heavily rely on memorization to solve those training puzzles. On the other hand, we show that while fine-tuning leads to heavy memorization, it also consistently improves generalization performance. In-depth analyses with perturbation tests, cross difficulty-level transferability, probing model internals, and fine-tuning with wrong answers suggest that the LLMs learn to reason on K&K puzzles despite training data memorization. This phenomenon indicates that LLMs exhibit a complex interplay between memorization and genuine reasoning abilities. Finally, our analysis with per-sample memorization score sheds light on how LLMs switch between reasoning and memorization in solving logical puzzles. Our code and data are available at https://memkklogic.github.io.

We propose a new method for estimating how much a model ``knows'' about a datapoint and use it to measure the capacity of modern language models. Prior studies of language model memorization have struggled to disentangle memorization from generalization. We formally separate memorization into two components: unintended memorization, the information a model contains about a specific dataset, and generalization, the information a model contains about the true data-generation process. When we completely eliminate generalization, we can compute the total memorization, which provides an estimate of model capacity: our measurements estimate that GPT-style models have a capacity of approximately 3.6 bits per parameter. We train language models on datasets of increasing size and observe that models memorize until their capacity fills, at which point ``grokking'' begins, and unintended memorization decreases as models begin to generalize. We train hundreds of transformer language models ranging from 500K to 1.5B parameters and produce a series of scaling laws relating model capacity and data size to membership inference.

Large language models (LMs) have been shown to memorize parts of their training data, and when prompted appropriately, they will emit the memorized training data verbatim. This is undesirable because memorization violates privacy (exposing user data), degrades utility (repeated easy-to-memorize text is often low quality), and hurts fairness (some texts are memorized over others). We describe three log-linear relationships that quantify the degree to which LMs emit memorized training data. Memorization significantly grows as we increase (1) the capacity of a model, (2) the number of times an example has been duplicated, and (3) the number of tokens of context used to prompt the model. Surprisingly, we find the situation becomes more complicated when generalizing these results across model families. On the whole, we find that memorization in LMs is more prevalent than previously believed and will likely get worse as models continues to scale, at least without active mitigations.

Understanding memorisation in language models has practical and societal implications, e.g., studying models' training dynamics or preventing copyright infringements. Prior work defines memorisation as the causal effect of training with an instance on the model's ability to predict that instance. This definition relies on a counterfactual: the ability to observe what would have happened had the model not seen that instance. Existing methods struggle to provide computationally efficient and accurate estimates of this counterfactual. Further, they often estimate memorisation for a model architecture rather than for a specific model instance. This paper fills an important gap in the literature, proposing a new, principled, and efficient method to estimate memorisation based on the difference-in-differences design from econometrics. Using this method, we characterise a model's memorisation profile--its memorisation trends across training--by only observing its behaviour on a small set of instances throughout training. In experiments with the Pythia model suite, we find that memorisation (i) is stronger and more persistent in larger models, (ii) is determined by data order and learning rate, and (iii) has stable trends across model sizes, thus making memorisation in larger models predictable from smaller ones.

The training of modern large language models (LLMs) takes place in a regime where most training examples are seen only a few times by the model during the course of training. What does a model remember about such examples seen only a few times during training and how long does that memory persist in the face of continuous training with new examples? Here, we investigate these questions through simple recognition, recall, and retention experiments with LLMs. In recognition experiments, we ask if the model can distinguish the seen example from a novel example; in recall experiments, we ask if the model can correctly recall the seen example when cued by a part of it; and in retention experiments, we periodically probe the model's memory for the original examples as the model is trained continuously with new examples. We find that a single exposure is generally sufficient for a model to achieve near perfect accuracy even in very challenging recognition experiments. We estimate that the recognition performance of even small language models easily exceeds human recognition performance reported in similar experiments with humans (Shepard, 1967). Achieving near perfect recall takes more exposures, but most models can do it in just 3 exposures. The flip side of this remarkable capacity for fast learning is that precise memories are quickly overwritten: recall performance for the original examples drops steeply over the first 10 training updates with new examples, followed by a more gradual decline. Even after 100K updates, however, some of the original examples are still recalled near perfectly. A qualitatively similar retention pattern has been observed in human long-term memory retention studies before (Bahrick, 1984). Finally, recognition is much more robust to interference than recall and memory for natural language sentences is generally superior to memory for stimuli without structure.

A recent study by Feldman (2020) proposed a long-tail theory to explain the memorization behavior of deep learning models. However, memorization has not been empirically verified in the context of NLP, a gap addressed by this work. In this paper, we use three different NLP tasks to check if the long-tail theory holds. Our experiments demonstrate that top-ranked memorized training instances are likely atypical, and removing the top-memorized training instances leads to a more serious drop in test accuracy compared with removing training instances randomly. Furthermore, we develop an attribution method to better understand why a training instance is memorized. We empirically show that our memorization attribution method is faithful, and share our interesting finding that the top-memorized parts of a training instance tend to be features negatively correlated with the class label.

We present an empirical evaluation of various outputs generated by nine of the most widely-available large language models (LLMs). Our analysis is done with off-the-shelf, readily-available tools. We find a correlation between percentage of memorized text, percentage of unique text, and overall output quality, when measured with respect to output pathologies such as counterfactual and logically-flawed statements, and general failures like not staying on topic. Overall, 80.0% of the outputs evaluated contained memorized data, but outputs containing the most memorized content were also more likely to be considered of high quality. We discuss and evaluate mitigation strategies, showing that, in the models evaluated, the rate of memorized text being output is reduced. We conclude with a discussion on potential implications around what it means to learn, to memorize, and to evaluate quality text.

Despite the recent observation that large language models (LLMs) can store substantial factual knowledge, there is a limited understanding of the mechanisms of how they acquire factual knowledge through pretraining. This work addresses this gap by studying how LLMs acquire factual knowledge during pretraining. The findings reveal several important insights into the dynamics of factual knowledge acquisition during pretraining. First, counterintuitively, we observe that pretraining on more data shows no significant improvement in the model's capability to acquire and maintain factual knowledge. Next, there is a power-law relationship between training steps and forgetting of memorization and generalization of factual knowledge, and LLMs trained with duplicated training data exhibit faster forgetting. Third, training LLMs with larger batch sizes can enhance the models' robustness to forgetting. Overall, our observations suggest that factual knowledge acquisition in LLM pretraining occurs by progressively increasing the probability of factual knowledge presented in the pretraining data at each step. However, this increase is diluted by subsequent forgetting. Based on this interpretation, we demonstrate that we can provide plausible explanations for recently observed behaviors of LLMs, such as the poor performance of LLMs on long-tail knowledge and the benefits of deduplicating the pretraining corpus.

Large language models have demonstrated impressive performance on challenging mathematical reasoning tasks, which has triggered the discussion of whether the performance is achieved by true reasoning capability or memorization. To investigate this question, prior work has constructed mathematical benchmarks when questions undergo simple perturbations -- modifications that still preserve the underlying reasoning patterns of the solutions. However, no work has explored hard perturbations, which fundamentally change the nature of the problem so that the original solution steps do not apply. To bridge the gap, we construct MATH-P-Simple and MATH-P-Hard via simple perturbation and hard perturbation, respectively. Each consists of 279 perturbed math problems derived from level-5 (hardest) problems in the MATH dataset (Hendrycksmath et. al., 2021). We observe significant performance drops on MATH-P-Hard across various models, including o1-mini (-16.49%) and gemini-2.0-flash-thinking (-12.9%). We also raise concerns about a novel form of memorization where models blindly apply learned problem-solving skills without assessing their applicability to modified contexts. This issue is amplified when using original problems for in-context learning. We call for research efforts to address this challenge, which is critical for developing more robust and reliable reasoning models.

Memorization, or the tendency of large language models (LLMs) to output entire sequences from their training data verbatim, is a key concern for safely deploying language models. In particular, it is vital to minimize a model's memorization of sensitive datapoints such as those containing personal identifiable information (PII). The prevalence of such undesirable memorization can pose issues for model trainers, and may even require discarding an otherwise functional model. We therefore seek to predict which sequences will be memorized before a large model's full train-time by extrapolating the memorization behavior of lower-compute trial runs. We measure memorization of the Pythia model suite and plot scaling laws for forecasting memorization, allowing us to provide equi-compute recommendations to maximize the reliability (recall) of such predictions. We additionally provide further novel discoveries on the distribution of memorization scores across models and data. We release all code and data necessary to reproduce the results in this paper at https://github.com/EleutherAI/pythia

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) reveal a perplexing phenomenon in continual learning: despite extensive training, models experience significant performance declines, raising questions about task alignment and underlying knowledge retention. This study first explores the concept of "spurious forgetting", proposing that such performance drops often reflect a decline in task alignment rather than true knowledge loss. Through controlled experiments with a synthesized dataset, we investigate the dynamics of model performance during the initial training phases of new tasks, discovering that early optimization steps can disrupt previously established task alignments. Our theoretical analysis connects these shifts to orthogonal updates in model weights, providing a robust framework for understanding this behavior. Ultimately, we introduce a Freezing strategy that fix the bottom layers of the model, leading to substantial improvements in four continual learning scenarios. Our findings underscore the critical distinction between task alignment and knowledge retention, paving the way for more effective strategies in continual learning.

Large language models frequently rely on both contextual input and parametric knowledge to perform tasks. However, these sources can come into conflict, especially when retrieved documents contradict the model's parametric knowledge. We propose a diagnostic framework to systematically evaluate LLM behavior under context-memory conflict, where the contextual information diverges from their parametric beliefs. We construct diagnostic data that elicit these conflicts and analyze model performance across multiple task types. Our findings reveal that (1) knowledge conflict has minimal impact on tasks that do not require knowledge utilization, (2) model performance is consistently higher when contextual and parametric knowledge are aligned, (3) models are unable to fully suppress their internal knowledge even when instructed, and (4) providing rationales that explain the conflict increases reliance on contexts. These insights raise concerns about the validity of model-based evaluation and underscore the need to account for knowledge conflict in the deployment of LLMs.

Recent large language models have been trained on vast datasets, but also often on repeated data, either intentionally for the purpose of upweighting higher quality data, or unintentionally because data deduplication is not perfect and the model is exposed to repeated data at the sentence, paragraph, or document level. Some works have reported substantial negative performance effects of this repeated data. In this paper we attempt to study repeated data systematically and to understand its effects mechanistically. To do this, we train a family of models where most of the data is unique but a small fraction of it is repeated many times. We find a strong double descent phenomenon, in which repeated data can lead test loss to increase midway through training. A predictable range of repetition frequency leads to surprisingly severe degradation in performance. For instance, performance of an 800M parameter model can be degraded to that of a 2x smaller model (400M params) by repeating 0.1% of the data 100 times, despite the other 90% of the training tokens remaining unique. We suspect there is a range in the middle where the data can be memorized and doing so consumes a large fraction of the model's capacity, and this may be where the peak of degradation occurs. Finally, we connect these observations to recent mechanistic interpretability work - attempting to reverse engineer the detailed computations performed by the model - by showing that data repetition disproportionately damages copying and internal structures associated with generalization, such as induction heads, providing a possible mechanism for the shift from generalization to memorization. Taken together, these results provide a hypothesis for why repeating a relatively small fraction of data in large language models could lead to disproportionately large harms to performance.

Current LLM benchmarks focus on evaluating models' memory of facts and semantic relations, primarily assessing semantic aspects of long-term memory. However, in humans, long-term memory also includes episodic memory, which links memories to their contexts, such as the time and place they occurred. The ability to contextualize memories is crucial for many cognitive tasks and everyday functions. This form of memory has not been evaluated in LLMs with existing benchmarks. To address the gap in evaluating memory in LLMs, we introduce Sequence Order Recall Tasks (SORT), which we adapt from tasks used to study episodic memory in cognitive psychology. SORT requires LLMs to recall the correct order of text segments, and provides a general framework that is both easily extendable and does not require any additional annotations. We present an initial evaluation dataset, Book-SORT, comprising 36k pairs of segments extracted from 9 books recently added to the public domain. Based on a human experiment with 155 participants, we show that humans can recall sequence order based on long-term memory of a book. We find that models can perform the task with high accuracy when relevant text is given in-context during the SORT evaluation. However, when presented with the book text only during training, LLMs' performance on SORT falls short. By allowing to evaluate more aspects of memory, we believe that SORT will aid in the emerging development of memory-augmented models.

Studying data memorization in neural language models helps us understand the risks (e.g., to privacy or copyright) associated with models regurgitating training data and aids in the development of countermeasures. Many prior works -- and some recently deployed defenses -- focus on "verbatim memorization", defined as a model generation that exactly matches a substring from the training set. We argue that verbatim memorization definitions are too restrictive and fail to capture more subtle forms of memorization. Specifically, we design and implement an efficient defense that perfectly prevents all verbatim memorization. And yet, we demonstrate that this "perfect" filter does not prevent the leakage of training data. Indeed, it is easily circumvented by plausible and minimally modified "style-transfer" prompts -- and in some cases even the non-modified original prompts -- to extract memorized information. We conclude by discussing potential alternative definitions and why defining memorization is a difficult yet crucial open question for neural language models.

Retrieval augmented generation (RAG) is often used to fix hallucinations and provide up-to-date knowledge for large language models (LLMs). However, in cases when the LLM alone incorrectly answers a question, does providing the correct retrieved content always fix the error? Conversely, in cases where the retrieved content is incorrect, does the LLM know to ignore the wrong information, or does it recapitulate the error? To answer these questions, we systematically analyze the tug-of-war between a LLM's internal knowledge (i.e. its prior) and the retrieved information in settings when they disagree. We test GPT-4 and other LLMs on question-answering abilities across datasets with and without reference documents. As expected, providing the correct retrieved information fixes most model mistakes (94% accuracy). However, when the reference document is perturbed with increasing levels of wrong values, the LLM is more likely to recite the incorrect, modified information when its internal prior is weaker but is more resistant when its prior is stronger. Similarly, we also find that the more the modified information deviates from the model's prior, the less likely the model is to prefer it. These results highlight an underlying tension between a model's prior knowledge and the information presented in reference documents.

Can we localize the weights and mechanisms used by a language model to memorize and recite entire paragraphs of its training data? In this paper, we show that while memorization is spread across multiple layers and model components, gradients of memorized paragraphs have a distinguishable spatial pattern, being larger in lower model layers than gradients of non-memorized examples. Moreover, the memorized examples can be unlearned by fine-tuning only the high-gradient weights. We localize a low-layer attention head that appears to be especially involved in paragraph memorization. This head is predominantly focusing its attention on distinctive, rare tokens that are least frequent in a corpus-level unigram distribution. Next, we study how localized memorization is across the tokens in the prefix by perturbing tokens and measuring the caused change in the decoding. A few distinctive tokens early in a prefix can often corrupt the entire continuation. Overall, memorized continuations are not only harder to unlearn, but also to corrupt than non-memorized ones.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across a wide range of tasks, yet they also exhibit memorization of their training data. This phenomenon raises critical questions about model behavior, privacy risks, and the boundary between learning and memorization. Addressing these concerns, this paper synthesizes recent studies and investigates the landscape of memorization, the factors influencing it, and methods for its detection and mitigation. We explore key drivers, including training data duplication, training dynamics, and fine-tuning procedures that influence data memorization. In addition, we examine methodologies such as prefix-based extraction, membership inference, and adversarial prompting, assessing their effectiveness in detecting and measuring memorized content. Beyond technical analysis, we also explore the broader implications of memorization, including the legal and ethical implications. Finally, we discuss mitigation strategies, including data cleaning, differential privacy, and post-training unlearning, while highlighting open challenges in balancing the minimization of harmful memorization with utility. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the current state of research on LLM memorization across technical, privacy, and performance dimensions, identifying critical directions for future work.

Despite significant achievements in improving the instruction-following capabilities of large language models (LLMs), the ability to process multiple potentially entangled or conflicting instructions remains a considerable challenge. Real-world scenarios often require consistency across multiple instructions over time, such as secret privacy, personal preferences, and prioritization, which demand sophisticated abilities to integrate multiple turns and carefully balance competing objectives when instructions intersect or conflict. This work presents a systematic investigation of LLMs' capabilities in handling multiple turns of instructions, covering three levels of difficulty: (1) retrieving information from instructions, (2) tracking and reasoning across turns, and (3) resolving conflicts among instructions. We construct MultiTurnInstruct with around 1.1K high-quality multi-turn conversations through the human-in-the-loop approach and result in nine capability categories, including statics and dynamics, reasoning, and multitasking. Our finding reveals an intriguing trade-off between different capabilities. While GPT models demonstrate superior memorization, they show reduced effectiveness in privacy-protection tasks requiring selective information withholding. Larger models exhibit stronger reasoning capabilities but still struggle with resolving conflicting instructions. Importantly, these performance gaps cannot be attributed solely to information loss, as models demonstrate strong BLEU scores on memorization tasks but their attention mechanisms fail to integrate multiple related instructions effectively. These findings highlight critical areas for improvement in complex real-world tasks involving multi-turn instructions.

Knowledge-intensive language understanding tasks require Language Models (LMs) to integrate relevant context, mitigating their inherent weaknesses, such as incomplete or outdated knowledge. Nevertheless, studies indicate that LMs often ignore the provided context as it can conflict with the pre-existing LM's memory learned during pre-training. Moreover, conflicting knowledge can already be present in the LM's parameters, termed intra-memory conflict. Existing works have studied the two types of knowledge conflicts only in isolation. We conjecture that the (degree of) intra-memory conflicts can in turn affect LM's handling of context-memory conflicts. To study this, we introduce the DYNAMICQA dataset, which includes facts with a temporal dynamic nature where a fact can change with a varying time frequency and disputable dynamic facts, which can change depending on the viewpoint. DYNAMICQA is the first to include real-world knowledge conflicts and provide context to study the link between the different types of knowledge conflicts. With the proposed dataset, we assess the use of uncertainty for measuring the intra-memory conflict and introduce a novel Coherent Persuasion (CP) score to evaluate the context's ability to sway LM's semantic output. Our extensive experiments reveal that static facts, which are unlikely to change, are more easily updated with additional context, relative to temporal and disputable facts.

Ranking passages by prompting a large language model (LLM) can achieve promising performance in modern information retrieval (IR) systems. A common approach is to sort the ranking list by prompting LLMs for pairwise comparison. However, sorting-based methods require consistent comparisons to correctly sort the passages, which we show that LLMs often violate. We identify two kinds of intrinsic inconsistency in LLM-based pairwise comparisons: order inconsistency which leads to conflicting results when switching the passage order, and transitive inconsistency which leads to non-transitive triads among all preference pairs. In this paper, we propose LLM-RankFusion, an LLM-based ranking framework that mitigates these inconsistencies and produces a robust ranking list. LLM-RankFusion mitigates order inconsistency using in-context learning (ICL) to demonstrate order-agnostic comparisons and calibration to estimate the underlying preference probability between two passages. We then address transitive inconsistency by aggregating the ranking results from multiple rankers. In our experiments, we empirically show that LLM-RankFusion can significantly reduce inconsistent pairwise comparison results, and improve the ranking quality by making the final ranking list more robust.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are nondeterministic, the same input can generate different outputs, some of which may be incorrect or hallucinated. If run again, the LLM may correct itself and produce the correct answer. Unfortunately, most LLM-powered systems resort to single results which, correct or not, users accept. Having the LLM produce multiple outputs may help identify disagreements or alternatives. However, it is not obvious how the user will interpret conflicts or inconsistencies. To this end, we investigate how users perceive the AI model and comprehend the generated information when they receive multiple, potentially inconsistent, outputs. Through a preliminary study, we identified five types of output inconsistencies. Based on these categories, we conducted a study (N=252) in which participants were given one or more LLM-generated passages to an information-seeking question. We found that inconsistency within multiple LLM-generated outputs lowered the participants' perceived AI capacity, while also increasing their comprehension of the given information. Specifically, we observed that this positive effect of inconsistencies was most significant for participants who read two passages, compared to those who read three. Based on these findings, we present design implications that, instead of regarding LLM output inconsistencies as a drawback, we can reveal the potential inconsistencies to transparently indicate the limitations of these models and promote critical LLM usage.

State-of-the-art results on image recognition tasks are achieved using over-parameterized learning algorithms that (nearly) perfectly fit the training set and are known to fit well even random labels. This tendency to memorize the labels of the training data is not explained by existing theoretical analyses. Memorization of the training data also presents significant privacy risks when the training data contains sensitive personal information and thus it is important to understand whether such memorization is necessary for accurate learning. We provide the first conceptual explanation and a theoretical model for this phenomenon. Specifically, we demonstrate that for natural data distributions memorization of labels is necessary for achieving close-to-optimal generalization error. Crucially, even labels of outliers and noisy labels need to be memorized. The model is motivated and supported by the results of several recent empirical works. In our model, data is sampled from a mixture of subpopulations and our results show that memorization is necessary whenever the distribution of subpopulation frequencies is long-tailed. Image and text data is known to be long-tailed and therefore our results establish a formal link between these empirical phenomena. Our results allow to quantify the cost of limiting memorization in learning and explain the disparate effects that privacy and model compression have on different subgroups.

Rote learning is a memorization technique based on repetition. It is commonly believed to hinder generalization by encouraging verbatim memorization rather than deeper understanding. This insight holds for even learning factual knowledge that inevitably requires a certain degree of memorization. In this work, we demonstrate that LLMs can be trained to generalize from rote memorized data. We introduce a two-phase memorize-then-generalize framework, where the model first rote memorizes factual subject-object associations using a semantically meaningless token and then learns to generalize by fine-tuning on a small set of semantically meaningful prompts. Extensive experiments over 8 LLMs show that the models can reinterpret rote memorized data through the semantically meaningful prompts, as evidenced by the emergence of structured, semantically aligned latent representations between the two. This surprising finding opens the door to both effective and efficient knowledge injection and possible risks of repurposing the memorized data for malicious usage.

Recent studies have put into question the belief that emergent abilities in language models are exclusive to large models. This skepticism arises from two observations: 1) smaller models can also exhibit high performance on emergent abilities and 2) there is doubt on the discontinuous metrics used to measure these abilities. In this paper, we propose to study emergent abilities in the lens of pre-training loss, instead of model size or training compute. We demonstrate that the models with the same pre-training loss, but different model and data sizes, generate the same performance on various downstream tasks. We also discover that a model exhibits emergent abilities on certain tasks -- regardless of the continuity of metrics -- when its pre-training loss falls below a specific threshold. Before reaching this threshold, its performance remains at the level of random guessing. This inspires us to redefine emergent abilities as those that manifest in models with lower pre-training losses, highlighting that these abilities cannot be predicted by merely extrapolating the performance trends of models with higher pre-training losses.

Despite significant advancements, there is a limited understanding of how large language models (LLMs) utilize knowledge for reasoning. To address this, we propose a method that deconstructs complex real-world questions into a graph, representing each question as a node with parent nodes of background knowledge needed to solve the question. We develop the DepthQA dataset, deconstructing questions into three depths: (i) recalling conceptual knowledge, (ii) applying procedural knowledge, and (iii) analyzing strategic knowledge. Based on a hierarchical graph, we quantify forward discrepancy, discrepancies in LLMs' performance on simpler sub-problems versus complex questions. We also measure backward discrepancy, where LLMs answer complex questions but struggle with simpler ones. Our analysis shows that smaller models have more discrepancies than larger models. Additionally, guiding models from simpler to complex questions through multi-turn interactions improves performance across model sizes, highlighting the importance of structured intermediate steps in knowledge reasoning. This work enhances our understanding of LLM reasoning and suggests ways to improve their problem-solving abilities.

We characterize how memorization is represented in transformer models and show that it can be disentangled in the weights of both language models (LMs) and vision transformers (ViTs) using a decomposition based on the loss landscape curvature. This insight is based on prior theoretical and empirical work showing that the curvature for memorized training points is much sharper than non memorized, meaning ordering weight components from high to low curvature can reveal a distinction without explicit labels. This motivates a weight editing procedure that suppresses far more recitation of untargeted memorized data more effectively than a recent unlearning method (BalancedSubnet), while maintaining lower perplexity. Since the basis of curvature has a natural interpretation for shared structure in model weights, we analyze the editing procedure extensively on its effect on downstream tasks in LMs, and find that fact retrieval and arithmetic are specifically and consistently negatively affected, even though open book fact retrieval and general logical reasoning is conserved. We posit these tasks rely heavily on specialized directions in weight space rather than general purpose mechanisms, regardless of whether those individual datapoints are memorized. We support this by showing a correspondence between task data's activation strength with low curvature components that we edit out, and the drop in task performance after the edit. Our work enhances the understanding of memorization in neural networks with practical applications towards removing it, and provides evidence for idiosyncratic, narrowly-used structures involved in solving tasks like math and fact retrieval.

Recent work has shown that state space models such as Mamba are significantly worse than Transformers on recall-based tasks due to the fact that their state size is constant with respect to their input sequence length. But in practice, state space models have fairly large state sizes, and we conjecture that they should be able to perform much better at these tasks than previously reported. We investigate whether their poor copying and recall performance could be due in part to training difficulties rather than fundamental capacity constraints. Based on observations of their "attention" maps, we propose a structured initialization technique that allows state space layers to more readily mimic attention. Across a variety of architecture settings, our initialization makes it substantially easier for Mamba to learn to copy and do associative recall from scratch.

Large language models (LLMs) trained on web-scale datasets raise substantial concerns regarding permissible data usage. One major question is whether these models "memorize" all their training data or they integrate many data sources in some way more akin to how a human would learn and synthesize information. The answer hinges, to a large degree, on how we define memorization. In this work, we propose the Adversarial Compression Ratio (ACR) as a metric for assessing memorization in LLMs -- a given string from the training data is considered memorized if it can be elicited by a prompt shorter than the string itself. In other words, these strings can be "compressed" with the model by computing adversarial prompts of fewer tokens. We outline the limitations of existing notions of memorization and show how the ACR overcomes these challenges by (i) offering an adversarial view to measuring memorization, especially for monitoring unlearning and compliance; and (ii) allowing for the flexibility to measure memorization for arbitrary strings at a reasonably low compute. Our definition serves as a valuable and practical tool for determining when model owners may be violating terms around data usage, providing a potential legal tool and a critical lens through which to address such scenarios. Project page: https://locuslab.github.io/acr-memorization.

Recent research developing neural network architectures with external memory have often used the benchmark bAbI question and answering dataset which provides a challenging number of tasks requiring reasoning. Here we employed a classic associative inference task from the memory-based reasoning neuroscience literature in order to more carefully probe the reasoning capacity of existing memory-augmented architectures. This task is thought to capture the essence of reasoning -- the appreciation of distant relationships among elements distributed across multiple facts or memories. Surprisingly, we found that current architectures struggle to reason over long distance associations. Similar results were obtained on a more complex task involving finding the shortest path between nodes in a path. We therefore developed MEMO, an architecture endowed with the capacity to reason over longer distances. This was accomplished with the addition of two novel components. First, it introduces a separation between memories (facts) stored in external memory and the items that comprise these facts in external memory. Second, it makes use of an adaptive retrieval mechanism, allowing a variable number of "memory hops" before the answer is produced. MEMO is capable of solving our novel reasoning tasks, as well as match state of the art results in bAbI.

The reflection capacity of Large Language Model (LLM) has garnered extensive attention. A post-hoc prompting strategy, e.g., reflexion and self-refine, refines LLM's response based on self-evaluated or external feedback. However, recent research indicates without external feedback, LLM's intrinsic reflection is unstable. Our investigation unveils that the key bottleneck is the quality of the self-evaluated feedback. We find LLMs often exhibit overconfidence or high randomness when self-evaluate, offering stubborn or inconsistent feedback, which causes poor reflection. To remedy this, we advocate Self-Contrast: It adaptively explores diverse solving perspectives tailored to the request, contrasts the differences, and summarizes these discrepancies into a checklist which could be used to re-examine and eliminate discrepancies. Our method endows LLM with diverse perspectives to alleviate stubborn biases. Moreover, their discrepancies indicate potential errors or inherent uncertainties that LLM often overlooks. Reflecting upon these can catalyze more accurate and stable reflection. Experiments conducted on a series of reasoning and translation tasks with different LLMs serve to underscore the effectiveness and generality of our strategy.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are claimed to be capable of Natural Language Inference (NLI), necessary for applied tasks like question answering and summarization. We present a series of behavioral studies on several LLM families (LLaMA, GPT-3.5, and PaLM) which probe their behavior using controlled experiments. We establish two biases originating from pretraining which predict much of their behavior, and show that these are major sources of hallucination in generative LLMs. First, memorization at the level of sentences: we show that, regardless of the premise, models falsely label NLI test samples as entailing when the hypothesis is attested in training data, and that entities are used as ``indices'' to access the memorized data. Second, statistical patterns of usage learned at the level of corpora: we further show a similar effect when the premise predicate is less frequent than that of the hypothesis in the training data, a bias following from previous studies. We demonstrate that LLMs perform significantly worse on NLI test samples which do not conform to these biases than those which do, and we offer these as valuable controls for future LLM evaluation.

Many recent developments on generative models for natural images have relied on heuristically-motivated metrics that can be easily gamed by memorizing a small sample from the true distribution or training a model directly to improve the metric. In this work, we critically evaluate the gameability of these metrics by designing and deploying a generative modeling competition. Our competition received over 11000 submitted models. The competitiveness between participants allowed us to investigate both intentional and unintentional memorization in generative modeling. To detect intentional memorization, we propose the ``Memorization-Informed Fr\'echet Inception Distance'' (MiFID) as a new memorization-aware metric and design benchmark procedures to ensure that winning submissions made genuine improvements in perceptual quality. Furthermore, we manually inspect the code for the 1000 top-performing models to understand and label different forms of memorization. Our analysis reveals that unintentional memorization is a serious and common issue in popular generative models. The generated images and our memorization labels of those models as well as code to compute MiFID are released to facilitate future studies on benchmarking generative models.

LLMs are typically trained in high-resource languages, and tasks in lower-resourced languages tend to underperform the higher-resource language counterparts for in-context learning. Despite the large body of work on prompting settings, it is still unclear how LLMs should be adapted cross-lingually specifically for in-context learning in the low-resource target languages. We perform a comprehensive study spanning five diverse target languages, three base LLMs, and seven downstream tasks spanning over 4,100 GPU training hours (9,900+ TFLOPs) across various adaptation techniques: few-shot prompting, translate-test, fine-tuning, embedding re-initialization, and instruction fine-tuning. Our results show that the few-shot prompting and translate-test settings tend to heavily outperform the gradient-based adaptation methods. To better understand this discrepancy, we design a novel metric, Valid Output Recall (VOR), and analyze model outputs to empirically attribute the degradation of these trained models to catastrophic forgetting. To the extent of our knowledge, this is the largest study done on in-context learning for low-resource languages with respect to train compute and number of adaptation techniques considered. We make all our datasets and trained models available for public use.

By providing external information to large language models (LLMs), tool augmentation (including retrieval augmentation) has emerged as a promising solution for addressing the limitations of LLMs' static parametric memory. However, how receptive are LLMs to such external evidence, especially when the evidence conflicts with their parametric memory? We present the first comprehensive and controlled investigation into the behavior of LLMs when encountering knowledge conflicts. We propose a systematic framework to elicit high-quality parametric memory from LLMs and construct the corresponding counter-memory, which enables us to conduct a series of controlled experiments. Our investigation reveals seemingly contradicting behaviors of LLMs. On the one hand, different from prior wisdom, we find that LLMs can be highly receptive to external evidence even when that conflicts with their parametric memory, given that the external evidence is coherent and convincing. On the other hand, LLMs also demonstrate a strong confirmation bias when the external evidence contains some information that is consistent with their parametric memory, despite being presented with conflicting evidence at the same time. These results pose important implications that are worth careful consideration for the further development and deployment of tool- and retrieval-augmented LLMs.

Training data memorization in NLP can both be beneficial (e.g., closed-book QA) and undesirable (personal data extraction). In any case, successful model training requires a non-trivial amount of memorization to store word spellings, various linguistic idiosyncrasies and common knowledge. However, little is known about what affects the memorization behavior of NLP models, as the field tends to focus on the equally important question of generalization. In this work, we demonstrate that the size of the subword vocabulary learned by Byte-Pair Encoding (BPE) greatly affects both ability and tendency of standard Transformer models to memorize training data, even when we control for the number of learned parameters. We find that with a large subword vocabulary size, Transformer models fit random mappings more easily and are more vulnerable to membership inference attacks. Similarly, given a prompt, Transformer-based language models with large subword vocabularies reproduce the training data more often. We conjecture this effect is caused by reduction in the sequences' length that happens as the BPE vocabulary grows. Our findings can allow a more informed choice of hyper-parameters, that is better tailored for a particular use-case.

Retrieval Augmented Generation enhances LLM accuracy by adding passages retrieved from an external corpus to the LLM prompt. This paper investigates how positional bias - the tendency of LLMs to weight information differently based on its position in the prompt - affects not only the LLM's capability to capitalize on relevant passages, but also its susceptibility to distracting passages. Through extensive experiments on three benchmarks, we show how state-of-the-art retrieval pipelines, while attempting to retrieve relevant passages, systematically bring highly distracting ones to the top ranks, with over 60% of queries containing at least one highly distracting passage among the top-10 retrieved passages. As a result, the impact of the LLM positional bias, which in controlled settings is often reported as very prominent by related works, is actually marginal in real scenarios since both relevant and distracting passages are, in turn, penalized. Indeed, our findings reveal that sophisticated strategies that attempt to rearrange the passages based on LLM positional preferences do not perform better than random shuffling.

How can we teach large multimodal models (LMMs) new skills without erasing prior abilities? We study sequential fine-tuning on five target skills while monitoring general ability on eight held-out benchmarks across three model families. We observe that apparent "forgetting" on held-out tasks after narrow fine-tuning can partly recover at later stages. We trace this behavior to a measurable shift in the output token distribution, manifested through a simple counting-bias probe that co-varies with forgetting. Guided by this picture, we identify two simple, robust tuning recipes that learn strongly while limiting drift: (i) updating only the self-attention projection layers, and (ii) updating only the MLP Gate&Up while freezing the Down projection. Across models and tasks, these choices deliver strong target gains while largely preserving held-out performance. Code is available at https://github.com/jessemelpolio/LMM_CL

Transformers, central to the successes in modern Natural Language Processing, often falter on arithmetic tasks despite their vast capabilities --which paradoxically include remarkable coding abilities. We observe that a crucial challenge is their naive reliance on positional information to solve arithmetic problems with a small number of digits, leading to poor performance on larger numbers. Herein, we delve deeper into the role of positional encoding, and propose several ways to fix the issue, either by modifying the positional encoding directly, or by modifying the representation of the arithmetic task to leverage standard positional encoding differently. We investigate the value of these modifications for three tasks: (i) classical multiplication, (ii) length extrapolation in addition, and (iii) addition in natural language context. For (i) we train a small model on a small dataset (100M parameters and 300k samples) with remarkable aptitude in (direct, no scratchpad) 15 digits multiplication and essentially perfect up to 12 digits, while usual training in this context would give a model failing at 4 digits multiplication. In the experiments on addition, we use a mere 120k samples to demonstrate: for (ii) extrapolation from 10 digits to testing on 12 digits numbers while usual training would have no extrapolation, and for (iii) almost perfect accuracy up to 5 digits while usual training would be correct only up to 3 digits (which is essentially memorization with a training set of 120k samples).

Inspired by the phenomenon of catastrophic forgetting, we investigate the learning dynamics of neural networks as they train on single classification tasks. Our goal is to understand whether a related phenomenon occurs when data does not undergo a clear distributional shift. We define a `forgetting event' to have occurred when an individual training example transitions from being classified correctly to incorrectly over the course of learning. Across several benchmark data sets, we find that: (i) certain examples are forgotten with high frequency, and some not at all; (ii) a data set's (un)forgettable examples generalize across neural architectures; and (iii) based on forgetting dynamics, a significant fraction of examples can be omitted from the training data set while still maintaining state-of-the-art generalization performance.

The ability (and inability) of large language models (LLMs) to perform arithmetic tasks has been the subject of much theoretical and practical debate. We show that LLMs are frequently able to correctly and confidently predict the first digit of n-digit by m-digit multiplication tasks without using chain of thought reasoning, despite these tasks require compounding operations to solve. Simultaneously, LLMs in practice often fail to correctly or confidently predict the last digit of an n-digit by m-digit multiplication, a task equivalent to 1-digit by 1-digit multiplication which can be easily learned or memorized. We show that the latter task can be solved more robustly when the LLM is conditioned on all of the correct higher-order digits, which on average increases the confidence of the correct last digit on 5-digit by 5-digit multiplication tasks using Llama 2-13B by over 230% (0.13 to 0.43) and Mistral-7B by 150% (0.22 to 0.55).

Grokking is the intriguing phenomenon where a model learns to generalize long after it has fit the training data. We show both analytically and numerically that grokking can surprisingly occur in linear networks performing linear tasks in a simple teacher-student setup with Gaussian inputs. In this setting, the full training dynamics is derived in terms of the training and generalization data covariance matrix. We present exact predictions on how the grokking time depends on input and output dimensionality, train sample size, regularization, and network initialization. We demonstrate that the sharp increase in generalization accuracy may not imply a transition from "memorization" to "understanding", but can simply be an artifact of the accuracy measure. We provide empirical verification for our calculations, along with preliminary results indicating that some predictions also hold for deeper networks, with non-linear activations.

Recent work suggests that large language models (LLMs) encode factuality signals in their internal representations, such as hidden states, attention weights, or token probabilities, implying that LLMs may "know what they don't know". However, LLMs can also produce factual errors by relying on shortcuts or spurious associations. These error are driven by the same training objective that encourage correct predictions, raising the question of whether internal computations can reliably distinguish between factual and hallucinated outputs. In this work, we conduct a mechanistic analysis of how LLMs internally process factual queries by comparing two types of hallucinations based on their reliance on subject information. We find that when hallucinations are associated with subject knowledge, LLMs employ the same internal recall process as for correct responses, leading to overlapping and indistinguishable hidden-state geometries. In contrast, hallucinations detached from subject knowledge produce distinct, clustered representations that make them detectable. These findings reveal a fundamental limitation: LLMs do not encode truthfulness in their internal states but only patterns of knowledge recall, demonstrating that "LLMs don't really know what they don't know".

A well-known issue with Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) is that retrieved passages that are irrelevant to the query sometimes distract the answer-generating LLM, causing it to provide an incorrect response. In this paper, we shed light on this core issue and formulate the distracting effect of a passage w.r.t. a query (and an LLM). We provide a quantifiable measure of the distracting effect of a passage and demonstrate its robustness across LLMs. Our research introduces novel methods for identifying and using hard distracting passages to improve RAG systems. By fine-tuning LLMs with these carefully selected distracting passages, we achieve up to a 7.5% increase in answering accuracy compared to counterparts fine-tuned on conventional RAG datasets. Our contribution is two-fold: first, we move beyond the simple binary classification of irrelevant passages as either completely unrelated vs. distracting, and second, we develop and analyze multiple methods for finding hard distracting passages. To our knowledge, no other research has provided such a comprehensive framework for identifying and utilizing hard distracting passages.

Pre-trained language models demonstrate general intelligence and common sense, but long inputs quickly become a bottleneck for memorizing information at inference time. We resurface a simple method, Memorizing Transformers (Wu et al., 2022), that gives the model access to a bank of pre-computed memories. We show that it is possible to fix many of the shortcomings of the original method, such as the need for fine-tuning, by critically assessing how positional encodings should be updated for the keys and values retrieved. This intuitive method uses the model's own key/query system to select and attend to the most relevant memories at each generation step, rather than using external embeddings. We demonstrate the importance of external information being retrieved in a majority of decoder layers, contrary to previous work. We open source a new counterfactual long-range retrieval benchmark, and show that Extended Mind Transformers outperform today's state of the art by 6% on average.

Large language models (LLMs) are regularly evaluated using benchmark datasets. But what justifies making inferences about an LLM's capabilities based on its answers to a curated set of questions? This paper first introduces a formal framework to address this question. The key is to note that the benchmarks used to test LLMs -- such as AP exams -- are also those used to test people. However, this raises an implication: these benchmarks are only valid tests if LLMs misunderstand concepts in ways that mirror human misunderstandings. Otherwise, success on benchmarks only demonstrates potemkin understanding: the illusion of understanding driven by answers irreconcilable with how any human would interpret a concept. We present two procedures for quantifying the existence of potemkins: one using a specially designed benchmark in three domains, the other using a general procedure that provides a lower-bound on their prevalence. We find that potemkins are ubiquitous across models, tasks, and domains. We also find that these failures reflect not just incorrect understanding, but deeper internal incoherence in concept representations.

We systematically study a wide variety of image-based generative models spanning semantically-diverse datasets to understand and improve the feature extractors and metrics used to evaluate them. Using best practices in psychophysics, we measure human perception of image realism for generated samples by conducting the largest experiment evaluating generative models to date, and find that no existing metric strongly correlates with human evaluations. Comparing to 16 modern metrics for evaluating the overall performance, fidelity, diversity, and memorization of generative models, we find that the state-of-the-art perceptual realism of diffusion models as judged by humans is not reflected in commonly reported metrics such as FID. This discrepancy is not explained by diversity in generated samples, though one cause is over-reliance on Inception-V3. We address these flaws through a study of alternative self-supervised feature extractors, find that the semantic information encoded by individual networks strongly depends on their training procedure, and show that DINOv2-ViT-L/14 allows for much richer evaluation of generative models. Next, we investigate data memorization, and find that generative models do memorize training examples on simple, smaller datasets like CIFAR10, but not necessarily on more complex datasets like ImageNet. However, our experiments show that current metrics do not properly detect memorization; none in the literature is able to separate memorization from other phenomena such as underfitting or mode shrinkage. To facilitate further development of generative models and their evaluation we release all generated image datasets, human evaluation data, and a modular library to compute 16 common metrics for 8 different encoders at https://github.com/layer6ai-labs/dgm-eval.

The proliferation of Large Language Models (LLMs) highlights the critical importance of conducting thorough evaluations to discern their comparative advantages, limitations, and optimal use cases. Particularly important is assessing their capacity to accurately retrieve information included in a given prompt. A model's ability to do this significantly influences how effectively it can utilize contextual details, thus impacting its practical efficacy and dependability in real-world applications. Our research analyzes the in-context recall performance of various LLMs using the needle-in-a-haystack method. In this approach, a factoid (the "needle") is embedded within a block of filler text (the "haystack"), which the model is asked to retrieve. We assess the recall performance of each model across various haystack lengths and with varying needle placements to identify performance patterns. This study demonstrates that an LLM's recall capability is not only contingent upon the prompt's content but also may be compromised by biases in its training data. Conversely, adjustments to model architecture, training strategy, or fine-tuning can improve performance. Our analysis provides insight into LLM behavior, offering direction for the development of more effective applications of LLMs.

We investigate in-context temporal biases in attention heads and transformer outputs. Using cognitive science methodologies, we analyze attention scores and outputs of the GPT-2 models of varying sizes. Across attention heads, we observe effects characteristic of human episodic memory, including temporal contiguity, primacy and recency. Transformer outputs demonstrate a tendency toward in-context serial recall. Importantly, this effect is eliminated after the ablation of the induction heads, which are the driving force behind the contiguity effect. Our findings offer insights into how transformers organize information temporally during in-context learning, shedding light on their similarities and differences with human memory and learning.

Large-scale text-to-image diffusion models excel in generating high-quality images from textual inputs, yet concerns arise as research indicates their tendency to memorize and replicate training data, raising We also addressed the issue of memorization in diffusion models, where models tend to replicate exact training samples raising copyright infringement and privacy issues. Efforts within the text-to-image community to address memorization explore causes such as data duplication, replicated captions, or trigger tokens, proposing per-prompt inference-time or training-time mitigation strategies. In this paper, we focus on the feed-forward layers and begin by contrasting neuron activations of a set of memorized and non-memorized prompts. Experiments reveal a surprising finding: many different sets of memorized prompts significantly activate a common subspace in the model, demonstrating, for the first time, that memorization in the diffusion models lies in a special subspace. Subsequently, we introduce a novel post-hoc method for editing pre-trained models, whereby memorization is mitigated through the straightforward pruning of weights in specialized subspaces, avoiding the need to disrupt the training or inference process as seen in prior research. Finally, we demonstrate the robustness of the pruned model against training data extraction attacks, thereby unveiling new avenues for a practical and one-for-all solution to memorization.

When language models (LMs) are trained to forget (or "unlearn'') a skill, how precisely does their behavior change? We study the behavior of transformer LMs in which tasks have been forgotten via fine-tuning on randomized labels. Such LMs learn to generate near-random predictions for individual examples in the "training'' set used for forgetting. Across tasks, however, LMs exhibit extreme variability in whether LM predictions change on examples outside the training set. In some tasks (like entailment classification), forgetting generalizes robustly, and causes models to produce uninformative predictions on new task instances; in other tasks (like physical commonsense reasoning and scientific question answering) forgetting affects only the training examples, and models continue to perform the "forgotten'' task accurately even for examples very similar to those that appeared in the training set. Dataset difficulty is not predictive of whether a behavior can be forgotten; instead, generalization in forgetting is (weakly) predicted by the confidence of LMs' initial task predictions and the variability of LM representations of training data, with low confidence and low variability both associated with greater generalization. Perhaps most surprisingly, random-label forgetting appears to be somewhat insensitive to the contents of the training set: for example, models trained on science questions with random labels continue to answer other science questions accurately, but begin to produce random labels on entailment classification tasks. Finally, we show that even generalizable forgetting is shallow: linear probes trained on LMs' representations can still perform tasks reliably after forgetting. Our results highlight the difficulty and unpredictability of performing targeted skill removal from models via fine-tuning.

Rebuses are puzzles requiring constrained multi-step reasoning to identify a hidden phrase from a set of images and letters. In this work, we introduce a large collection of verbalized rebuses for the Italian language and use it to assess the rebus-solving capabilities of state-of-the-art large language models. While general-purpose systems such as LLaMA-3 and GPT-4o perform poorly on this task, ad-hoc fine-tuning seems to improve models' performance. However, we find that performance gains from training are largely motivated by memorization. Our results suggest that rebus solving remains a challenging test bed to evaluate large language models' linguistic proficiency and sequential instruction-following skills.

With the development in cognitive science and Large Language Models (LLMs), increasing connections have come to light between these two distinct fields. Building upon these connections, we propose a conjecture suggesting the existence of a duality between LLMs and Tulving's theory of memory. We identify a potential correspondence between Tulving's synergistic ecphory model (SEM) of retrieval and the emergent abilities observed in LLMs, serving as supporting evidence for our conjecture. Furthermore, we speculate that consciousness may be considered a form of emergent ability based on this duality. We also discuss how other theories of consciousness intersect with our research.

Information retrieval in Large Language Models (LLMs) is increasingly recognized as intertwined with generation capabilities rather than mere lookup. While longer contexts are often assumed to improve retrieval, the effects of intra-context interference remain understudied. To address this, we adapt the proactive interference (PI) paradigm from cognitive science, where earlier information disrupts recall of newer updates. In humans, susceptibility to such interference is inversely linked to working memory capacity. We introduce PI-LLM, an evaluation that sequentially streams semantically related key-value updates and queries only the final values. Although these final values are clearly positioned just before the query, LLM retrieval accuracy declines log-linearly toward zero as interference accumulates; errors arise from retrieving previously overwritten values. Attempts to mitigate interference via prompt engineering (e.g., instructing models to ignore earlier input) yield limited success. These findings reveal a fundamental constraint on LLMs' ability to disentangle interference and flexibly manipulate information, suggesting a working memory bottleneck beyond mere context access. This calls for approaches that strengthen models' ability to suppress irrelevant content during retrieval.

Multiple-choice question answering (MCQA) is often used to evaluate large language models (LLMs). To see if MCQA assesses LLMs as intended, we probe if LLMs can perform MCQA with choices-only prompts, where models must select the correct answer only from the choices. In three MCQA datasets and four LLMs, this prompt bests a majority baseline in 11/12 cases, with up to 0.33 accuracy gain. To help explain this behavior, we conduct an in-depth, black-box analysis on memorization, choice dynamics, and question inference. Our key findings are threefold. First, we find no evidence that the choices-only accuracy stems from memorization alone. Second, priors over individual choices do not fully explain choices-only accuracy, hinting that LLMs use the group dynamics of choices. Third, LLMs have some ability to infer a relevant question from choices, and surprisingly can sometimes even match the original question. We hope to motivate the use of stronger baselines in MCQA benchmarks, the design of robust MCQA datasets, and further efforts to explain LLM decision-making.

We study the depth of grade-school math (GSM) problem-solving capabilities of LLMs. To this end, we evaluate their performance on pairs of existing math word problems together so that the answer to the second problem depends on correctly answering the first problem. Our findings reveal a significant reasoning gap in most LLMs, that is performance difference between solving the compositional pairs and solving each question independently. This gap is more pronounced in smaller, more cost-efficient, and math-specialized models. Moreover, instruction-tuning recipes and code generation have varying effects across LLM sizes, while finetuning on GSM can lead to task overfitting. Our analysis indicates that large reasoning gaps are not because of test-set leakage, but due to distraction from additional context and poor second-hop reasoning. Overall, LLMs exhibit systematic differences in their reasoning abilities, despite what their performance on standard benchmarks indicates.

Advancement in Large Language Models (LLMs) reasoning capabilities enables them to solve scientific problems with enhanced efficacy. Thereby, a high-quality benchmark for comprehensive and appropriate assessment holds significance, while existing ones either confront the risk of data contamination or lack involved disciplines. To be specific, due to the data source overlap of LLMs training and static benchmark, the keys or number pattern of answers inadvertently memorized (i.e. data contamination), leading to systematic overestimation of their reasoning capabilities, especially numerical reasoning. We propose SciDA, a multidisciplinary benchmark that consists exclusively of over 1k Olympic-level numerical computation problems, allowing randomized numerical initializations for each inference round to avoid reliance on fixed numerical patterns. We conduct a series of experiments with both closed-source and open-source top-performing LLMs, and it is observed that the performance of LLMs drop significantly under random numerical initialization. Thus, we provide truthful and unbiased assessments of the numerical reasoning capabilities of LLMs. The data is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/m-a-p/SciDA

Reinforcement learning with human feedback (RLHF) has become the dominant method to align large models to user preferences. Unlike fine-tuning, for which there are many studies regarding training data memorization, it is not clear how memorization is affected by or introduced in the RLHF alignment process. Understanding this relationship is important as real user data may be collected and used to align large models; if user data is memorized during RLHF and later regurgitated, this could raise privacy concerns. In this work, we analyze how training data memorization can surface and propagate through each phase of RLHF. We focus our study on code completion models, as code completion is one of the most popular use cases for large language models. We find that RLHF significantly decreases the chance that data used for reward modeling and reinforcement learning is memorized, in comparison to aligning via directly fine-tuning on this data, but that examples already memorized during the fine-tuning stage of RLHF, will, in the majority of cases, remain memorized after RLHF.

Neural networks often suffer from catastrophic interference (CI): performance on previously learned tasks drops off significantly when learning a new task. This contrasts strongly with humans, who can sequentially learn new tasks without appreciably forgetting previous tasks. Prior work has explored various techniques for mitigating CI such as regularization, rehearsal, generative replay, and distillation methods. The current work takes a different approach, one guided by cognitive science research showing that in naturalistic environments, the probability of encountering a task decreases as a power-law of the time since it was last performed. We argue that a realistic evaluation of techniques for the mitigation of CI should be performed in simulated naturalistic learning environments. Thus, we evaluate the extent of mitigation of CI when training simple rehearsal-based methods in power-law environments similar to the ones humans face. Our work explores this novel rehearsal-based approach for a domain-incremental task: learning permutations in the MNIST task. We compare our rehearsal environment with other baselines to show its efficacy in promoting continual learning. Additionally, we investigate whether this environment shows forward facilitation, i.e., faster learning of later tasks. Next, we explore the robustness of our learning environment to the number of tasks, model size, and amount of data rehearsed after each task. Notably, our results show that the performance is comparable or superior to that of models trained using popular regularization methods and also to rehearsals in non-power-law environments. The benefits of this training paradigm include simplicity and the lack of a need for extra neural circuitry. In addition, because our method is orthogonal to other methods, future research can combine training in power-law environments with other continual learning mechanisms.

Large language models (LLMs) excel on a variety of reasoning benchmarks, but previous studies suggest they sometimes struggle to generalize to unseen questions, potentially due to over-reliance on memorized training examples. However, the precise conditions under which LLMs switch between reasoning and memorization during text generation remain unclear. In this work, we provide a mechanistic understanding of LLMs' reasoning-memorization dynamics by identifying a set of linear features in the model's residual stream that govern the balance between genuine reasoning and memory recall. These features not only distinguish reasoning tasks from memory-intensive ones but can also be manipulated to causally influence model performance on reasoning tasks. Additionally, we show that intervening in these reasoning features helps the model more accurately activate the most relevant problem-solving capabilities during answer generation. Our findings offer new insights into the underlying mechanisms of reasoning and memory in LLMs and pave the way for the development of more robust and interpretable generative AI systems.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) achieve strong reasoning performance by emitting long chains of thought. Yet, these verbose traces slow down inference and often drift into unnecessary detail, known as the overthinking phenomenon. To better understand LRMs' behavior, we systematically analyze the token-level misalignment between reasoning and non-reasoning models. While it is expected that their primary difference lies in the stylistic "thinking cues", LRMs uniquely exhibit two pivotal, previously under-explored phenomena: a Global Misalignment Rebound, where their divergence from non-reasoning models persists or even grows as response length increases, and more critically, a Local Misalignment Diminish, where the misalignment concentrates at the "thinking cues" each sentence starts with but rapidly declines in the remaining of the sentence. Motivated by the Local Misalignment Diminish, we propose FoReaL-Decoding, a collaborative fast-slow thinking decoding method for cost-quality trade-off. In FoReaL-Decoding, a Leading model leads the first few tokens for each sentence, and then a weaker draft model completes the following tokens to the end of each sentence. FoReaL-Decoding adopts a stochastic gate to smoothly interpolate between the small and the large model. On four popular math-reasoning benchmarks (AIME24, GPQA-Diamond, MATH500, AMC23), FoReaL-Decoding reduces theoretical FLOPs by 30 to 50% and trims CoT length by up to 40%, while preserving 86 to 100% of model performance. These results establish FoReaL-Decoding as a simple, plug-and-play route to controllable cost-quality trade-offs in reasoning-centric tasks.

While fine-tuned language models perform well on many tasks, they were also shown to rely on superficial surface features such as lexical overlap. Excessive utilization of such heuristics can lead to failure on challenging inputs. We analyze the use of lexical overlap heuristics in natural language inference, paraphrase detection, and reading comprehension (using a novel contrastive dataset), and find that larger models are much less susceptible to adopting lexical overlap heuristics. We also find that longer training leads models to abandon lexical overlap heuristics. Finally, we provide evidence that the disparity between models size has its source in the pre-trained model

We prove theoretically that generalization improves not only through data scaling but also by compressing internal representations. To operationalize this insight, we introduce the Information Bottleneck Language Modeling (IBLM) objective, which reframes language modeling as a constrained optimization problem: minimizing representation entropy subject to optimal prediction performance. Empirically, we observe an emergent memorization-compression cycle during LLM pretraining, evidenced by oscillation positive/negative gradient alignment between cross-entropy and Matrix-Based Entropy (MBE), a measure of representation entropy. This pattern closely mirrors the predictive-compressive trade-off prescribed by IBLM and also parallels the biological alternation between awake learning and sleep consolidation. Motivated by this observation, we propose Gated Phase Transition (GAPT), a training algorithm that adaptively switches between memorization and compression phases. When applied to GPT-2 pretraining on FineWeb dataset, GAPT reduces MBE by 50% and improves cross-entropy by 4.8%. GAPT improves OOD generalizatino by 35% in a pretraining task on arithmetic multiplication. In a setting designed to simulate catastrophic forgetting, GAPT reduces interference by compressing and separating representations, achieving a 97% improvement in separation - paralleling the functional role of sleep consolidation.

Active learning is a paradigm that significantly enhances the performance of machine learning models when acquiring labeled data is expensive. While several benchmarks exist for evaluating active learning strategies, their findings exhibit some misalignment. This discrepancy motivates us to develop a transparent and reproducible benchmark for the community. Our efforts result in an open-sourced implementation (https://github.com/ariapoy/active-learning-benchmark) that is reliable and extensible for future research. By conducting thorough re-benchmarking experiments, we have not only rectified misconfigurations in existing benchmark but also shed light on the under-explored issue of model compatibility, which directly causes the observed discrepancy. Resolving the discrepancy reassures that the uncertainty sampling strategy of active learning remains an effective and preferred choice for most datasets. Our experience highlights the importance of dedicating research efforts towards re-benchmarking existing benchmarks to produce more credible results and gain deeper insights.

We aim to understand grokking, a phenomenon where models generalize long after overfitting their training set. We present both a microscopic analysis anchored by an effective theory and a macroscopic analysis of phase diagrams describing learning performance across hyperparameters. We find that generalization originates from structured representations whose training dynamics and dependence on training set size can be predicted by our effective theory in a toy setting. We observe empirically the presence of four learning phases: comprehension, grokking, memorization, and confusion. We find representation learning to occur only in a "Goldilocks zone" (including comprehension and grokking) between memorization and confusion. We find on transformers the grokking phase stays closer to the memorization phase (compared to the comprehension phase), leading to delayed generalization. The Goldilocks phase is reminiscent of "intelligence from starvation" in Darwinian evolution, where resource limitations drive discovery of more efficient solutions. This study not only provides intuitive explanations of the origin of grokking, but also highlights the usefulness of physics-inspired tools, e.g., effective theories and phase diagrams, for understanding deep learning.

When do machine learning systems fail to generalize, and what mechanisms could improve their generalization? Here, we draw inspiration from cognitive science to argue that one weakness of machine learning systems is their failure to exhibit latent learning -- learning information that is not relevant to the task at hand, but that might be useful in a future task. We show how this perspective links failures ranging from the reversal curse in language modeling to new findings on agent-based navigation. We then highlight how cognitive science points to episodic memory as a potential part of the solution to these issues. Correspondingly, we show that a system with an oracle retrieval mechanism can use learning experiences more flexibly to generalize better across many of these challenges. We also identify some of the essential components for effectively using retrieval, including the importance of within-example in-context learning for acquiring the ability to use information across retrieved examples. In summary, our results illustrate one possible contributor to the relative data inefficiency of current machine learning systems compared to natural intelligence, and help to understand how retrieval methods can complement parametric learning to improve generalization.

Mechanistic interpretability aims to understand model behaviors in terms of specific, interpretable features, often hypothesized to manifest as low-dimensional subspaces of activations. Specifically, recent studies have explored subspace interventions (such as activation patching) as a way to simultaneously manipulate model behavior and attribute the features behind it to given subspaces. In this work, we demonstrate that these two aims diverge, potentially leading to an illusory sense of interpretability. Counterintuitively, even if a subspace intervention makes the model's output behave as if the value of a feature was changed, this effect may be achieved by activating a dormant parallel pathway leveraging another subspace that is causally disconnected from model outputs. We demonstrate this phenomenon in a distilled mathematical example, in two real-world domains (the indirect object identification task and factual recall), and present evidence for its prevalence in practice. In the context of factual recall, we further show a link to rank-1 fact editing, providing a mechanistic explanation for previous work observing an inconsistency between fact editing performance and fact localization. However, this does not imply that activation patching of subspaces is intrinsically unfit for interpretability. To contextualize our findings, we also show what a success case looks like in a task (indirect object identification) where prior manual circuit analysis informs an understanding of the location of a feature. We explore the additional evidence needed to argue that a patched subspace is faithful.

Large Language Models (LLMs) vary in their abilities on a range of tasks. Initiatives such as the Open LLM Leaderboard aim to quantify these differences with several large benchmarks (sets of test items to which an LLM can respond either correctly or incorrectly). However, high correlations within and between benchmark scores suggest that (1) there exists a small set of common underlying abilities that these benchmarks measure, and (2) items tap into redundant information and the benchmarks may thus be considerably compressed. We use data from n > 5000 LLMs to identify the most informative items of six benchmarks, ARC, GSM8K, HellaSwag, MMLU, TruthfulQA and WinoGrande (with d=28,632 items in total). From them we distill a sparse benchmark, metabench, that has less than 3% of the original size of all six benchmarks combined. This new sparse benchmark goes beyond point scores by yielding estimators of the underlying benchmark-specific abilities. We show that these estimators (1) can be used to reconstruct each original individual benchmark score with, on average, 1.5% root mean square error (RMSE), (2) reconstruct the original total score with 0.8% RMSE, and (3) have a single underlying common factor whose Spearman correlation with the total score is r = 0.93.

In continual learning, catastrophic forgetting is affected by multiple aspects of the tasks. Previous works have analyzed separately how forgetting is affected by either task similarity or overparameterization. In contrast, our paper examines how task similarity and overparameterization jointly affect forgetting in an analyzable model. Specifically, we focus on two-task continual linear regression, where the second task is a random orthogonal transformation of an arbitrary first task (an abstraction of random permutation tasks). We derive an exact analytical expression for the expected forgetting - and uncover a nuanced pattern. In highly overparameterized models, intermediate task similarity causes the most forgetting. However, near the interpolation threshold, forgetting decreases monotonically with the expected task similarity. We validate our findings with linear regression on synthetic data, and with neural networks on established permutation task benchmarks.

This paper investigates the fragility of Large Language Models (LLMs) in generalizing to novel inputs, specifically focusing on minor perturbations in well-established benchmarks (e.g., slight changes in question format or distractor length). Despite high benchmark scores, LLMs exhibit significant accuracy drops and unexpected biases (e.g., preference for longer distractors) when faced with these minor but content-preserving modifications. For example, Qwen 2.5 1.5B's MMLU score rises from 60 to 89 and drops from 89 to 36 when option lengths are changed without altering the question. Even GPT-4 experiences a 25-point accuracy loss when question types are changed, with a 6-point drop across all three modification categories. These analyses suggest that LLMs rely heavily on superficial cues rather than forming robust, abstract representations that generalize across formats, lexical variations, and irrelevant content shifts. This work aligns with the ACL 2025 theme track on the Generalization of NLP models, proposing a "Generalization Stress Test" to assess performance shifts under controlled perturbations. The study calls for reevaluating benchmarks and developing more reliable evaluation methodologies to capture LLM generalization abilities better.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have become essential in many Natural Language Processing (NLP) tasks, leveraging extensive pre-training and fine-tuning to achieve high accuracy. However, like humans, LLMs exhibit biases, particularly positional biases such as primacy and recency effects, which can influence the accuracy of the answers. The primacy effect-where items presented first are more likely to be remembered or selected-plays a key role in Multiple Choice Question Answering (MCQA), where the order of answer options can affect prediction outcomes. This study focuses on primacy bias in fine-tuned LLMs: We first show that fine-tuning amplifies this bias, probably due to exposure to human-like patterns. Hence, we strategically leverage this effect by reordering response options based on semantic similarity to the query, without requiring knowledge of the correct answer. Our experimental results show that this approach significantly improves performance in MCQA. More generally, our findings underscore the dual nature of biases as both challenges and opportunities, offering insights for bias-aware model design and NLP applications.

Diffusion models have achieved remarkable success across a wide range of generative tasks. A key challenge is understanding the mechanisms that prevent their memorization of training data and allow generalization. In this work, we investigate the role of the training dynamics in the transition from generalization to memorization. Through extensive experiments and theoretical analysis, we identify two distinct timescales: an early time τ_gen at which models begin to generate high-quality samples, and a later time τ_mem beyond which memorization emerges. Crucially, we find that τ_mem increases linearly with the training set size n, while τ_gen remains constant. This creates a growing window of training times with n where models generalize effectively, despite showing strong memorization if training continues beyond it. It is only when n becomes larger than a model-dependent threshold that overfitting disappears at infinite training times. These findings reveal a form of implicit dynamical regularization in the training dynamics, which allow to avoid memorization even in highly overparameterized settings. Our results are supported by numerical experiments with standard U-Net architectures on realistic and synthetic datasets, and by a theoretical analysis using a tractable random features model studied in the high-dimensional limit.

Questions of fair use of copyright-protected content to train Large Language Models (LLMs) are being very actively debated. Document-level inference has been proposed as a new task: inferring from black-box access to the trained model whether a piece of content has been seen during training. SOTA methods however rely on naturally occurring memorization of (part of) the content. While very effective against models that memorize a lot, we hypothesize--and later confirm--that they will not work against models that do not naturally memorize, e.g. medium-size 1B models. We here propose to use copyright traps, the inclusion of fictitious entries in original content, to detect the use of copyrighted materials in LLMs with a focus on models where memorization does not naturally occur. We carefully design an experimental setup, randomly inserting traps into original content (books) and train a 1.3B LLM. We first validate that the use of content in our target model would be undetectable using existing methods. We then show, contrary to intuition, that even medium-length trap sentences repeated a significant number of times (100) are not detectable using existing methods. However, we show that longer sequences repeated a large number of times can be reliably detected (AUC=0.75) and used as copyright traps. We further improve these results by studying how the number of times a sequence is seen improves detectability, how sequences with higher perplexity tend to be memorized more, and how taking context into account further improves detectability.

Classical models of memory in psychology and neuroscience rely on similarity-based retrieval of stored patterns, where similarity is a function of retrieval cues and the stored patterns. While parsimonious, these models do not allow distinct representations for storage and retrieval, despite their distinct computational demands. Key-value memory systems, in contrast, distinguish representations used for storage (values) and those used for retrieval (keys). This allows key-value memory systems to optimize simultaneously for fidelity in storage and discriminability in retrieval. We review the computational foundations of key-value memory, its role in modern machine learning systems, related ideas from psychology and neuroscience, applications to a number of empirical puzzles, and possible biological implementations.

Large Language Models (LLMs) do not differentially represent numbers, which are pervasive in text. In contrast, neuroscience research has identified distinct neural representations for numbers and words. In this work, we investigate how well popular LLMs capture the magnitudes of numbers (e.g., that 4 < 5) from a behavioral lens. Prior research on the representational capabilities of LLMs evaluates whether they show human-level performance, for instance, high overall accuracy on standard benchmarks. Here, we ask a different question, one inspired by cognitive science: How closely do the number representations of LLMscorrespond to those of human language users, who typically demonstrate the distance, size, and ratio effects? We depend on a linking hypothesis to map the similarities among the model embeddings of number words and digits to human response times. The results reveal surprisingly human-like representations across language models of different architectures, despite the absence of the neural circuitry that directly supports these representations in the human brain. This research shows the utility of understanding LLMs using behavioral benchmarks and points the way to future work on the number representations of LLMs and their cognitive plausibility.

Learning from mistakes is a fundamental feature of human intelligence. Previous work has shown that Large Language Models (LLMs) can also learn from incorrect answers when provided with a comprehensive rationale detailing why an answer is wrong or how to correct it. In this work, we examine whether LLMs can learn from mistakes in mathematical reasoning tasks when these explanations are not provided. We investigate if LLMs are able to implicitly infer such rationales simply from observing both incorrect and correct answers. Surprisingly, we find that LLMs perform better, on average, when rationales are eliminated from the context and incorrect answers are simply shown alongside correct ones. This approach also substantially outperforms chain-of-thought prompting in our evaluations. We show that these results are consistent across LLMs of different sizes and varying reasoning abilities. Further, we carry out an in-depth analysis, and show that prompting with both wrong and correct answers leads to greater performance and better generalisation than introducing additional, more diverse question-answer pairs into the context. Finally, we show that new rationales generated by models that have only observed incorrect and correct answers are scored equally as highly by humans as those produced with the aid of exemplar rationales. Our results demonstrate that LLMs are indeed capable of in-context implicit learning.

Memory is one of the most essential cognitive functions serving as a repository of world knowledge and episodes of activities. In recent years, large-scale pre-trained language models have shown remarkable memorizing ability. On the contrary, vanilla neural networks without pre-training have been long observed suffering from the catastrophic forgetting problem. To investigate such a retentive-forgetful contradiction and understand the memory mechanism of language models, we conduct thorough experiments by controlling the target knowledge types, the learning strategies and the learning schedules. We find that: 1) Vanilla language models are forgetful; 2) Pre-training leads to retentive language models; 3) Knowledge relevance and diversification significantly influence the memory formation. These conclusions are useful for understanding the abilities of pre-trained language models and shed light on designing and evaluating new learning and inference algorithms of language models.

A new generation of AI models generates step-by-step reasoning text before producing an answer. This text appears to offer a human-readable window into their computation process, and is increasingly relied upon for transparency and interpretability. However, it is unclear whether human understanding of this text matches the model's actual computational process. In this paper, we investigate a necessary condition for correspondence: the ability of humans to identify which steps in a reasoning text causally influence later steps. We evaluated humans on this ability by composing questions based on counterfactual measurements and found a significant discrepancy: participant accuracy was only 29.3%, barely above chance (25%), and remained low (42%) even when evaluating the majority vote on questions with high agreement. Our results reveal a fundamental gap between how humans interpret reasoning texts and how models use it, challenging its utility as a simple interpretability tool. We argue that reasoning texts should be treated as an artifact to be investigated, not taken at face value, and that understanding the non-human ways these models use language is a critical research direction.

Suppose Alice trains an open-weight language model and Bob uses a blackbox derivative of Alice's model to produce text. Can Alice prove that Bob is using her model, either by querying Bob's derivative model (query setting) or from the text alone (observational setting)? We formulate this question as an independence testing problem--in which the null hypothesis is that Bob's model or text is independent of Alice's randomized training run--and investigate it through the lens of palimpsestic memorization in language models: models are more likely to memorize data seen later in training, so we can test whether Bob is using Alice's model using test statistics that capture correlation between Bob's model or text and the ordering of training examples in Alice's training run. If Alice has randomly shuffled her training data, then any significant correlation amounts to exactly quantifiable statistical evidence against the null hypothesis, regardless of the composition of Alice's training data. In the query setting, we directly estimate (via prompting) the likelihood Bob's model gives to Alice's training examples and order; we correlate the likelihoods of over 40 fine-tunes of various Pythia and OLMo base models ranging from 1B to 12B parameters with the base model's training data order, achieving a p-value on the order of at most 1e-8 in all but six cases. In the observational setting, we try two approaches based on estimating 1) the likelihood of Bob's text overlapping with spans of Alice's training examples and 2) the likelihood of Bob's text with respect to different versions of Alice's model we obtain by repeating the last phase (e.g., 1%) of her training run on reshuffled data. The second approach can reliably distinguish Bob's text from as little as a few hundred tokens; the first does not involve any retraining but requires many more tokens (several hundred thousand) to achieve high power.

Empirical scaling laws have driven the evolution of large language models (LLMs), yet their coefficients shift whenever the model architecture or data pipeline changes. Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) models, now standard in state-of-the-art systems, introduce a new sparsity dimension that current dense-model frontiers overlook. We investigate how MoE sparsity influences two distinct capability regimes: memorization and reasoning. We train families of MoE Transformers that systematically vary total parameters, active parameters, and top-k routing while holding the compute budget fixed. For every model we record pre-training loss, downstream task loss, and task accuracy, allowing us to separate the train-test generalization gap from the loss-accuracy gap. Memorization benchmarks improve monotonically with total parameters, mirroring training loss. By contrast, reasoning performance saturates and can even regress despite continued gains in both total parameters and training loss. Altering top-k alone has little effect when active parameters are constant, and classic hyperparameters such as learning rate and initialization modulate the generalization gap in the same direction as sparsity. Neither post-training reinforcement learning (GRPO) nor extra test-time compute rescues the reasoning deficit of overly sparse models. Our model checkpoints, code and logs are open-source at https://github.com/rioyokotalab/optimal-sparsity.

Large language models (LLMs) often produce errors, including factual inaccuracies, biases, and reasoning failures, collectively referred to as "hallucinations". Recent studies have demonstrated that LLMs' internal states encode information regarding the truthfulness of their outputs, and that this information can be utilized to detect errors. In this work, we show that the internal representations of LLMs encode much more information about truthfulness than previously recognized. We first discover that the truthfulness information is concentrated in specific tokens, and leveraging this property significantly enhances error detection performance. Yet, we show that such error detectors fail to generalize across datasets, implying that -- contrary to prior claims -- truthfulness encoding is not universal but rather multifaceted. Next, we show that internal representations can also be used for predicting the types of errors the model is likely to make, facilitating the development of tailored mitigation strategies. Lastly, we reveal a discrepancy between LLMs' internal encoding and external behavior: they may encode the correct answer, yet consistently generate an incorrect one. Taken together, these insights deepen our understanding of LLM errors from the model's internal perspective, which can guide future research on enhancing error analysis and mitigation.

The deployment of pre-trained perception models in novel environments often leads to performance degradation due to distributional shifts. Although recent artificial intelligence approaches for metacognition use logical rules to characterize and filter model errors, improving precision often comes at the cost of reduced recall. This paper addresses the hypothesis that leveraging multiple pre-trained models can mitigate this recall reduction. We formulate the challenge of identifying and managing conflicting predictions from various models as a consistency-based abduction problem. The input predictions and the learned error detection rules derived from each model are encoded in a logic program. We then seek an abductive explanation--a subset of model predictions--that maximizes prediction coverage while ensuring the rate of logical inconsistencies (derived from domain constraints) remains below a specified threshold. We propose two algorithms for this knowledge representation task: an exact method based on Integer Programming (IP) and an efficient Heuristic Search (HS). Through extensive experiments on a simulated aerial imagery dataset featuring controlled, complex distributional shifts, we demonstrate that our abduction-based framework outperforms individual models and standard ensemble baselines, achieving, for instance, average relative improvements of approximately 13.6% in F1-score and 16.6% in accuracy across 15 diverse test datasets when compared to the best individual model. Our results validate the use of consistency-based abduction as an effective mechanism to robustly integrate knowledge from multiple imperfect reasoners in challenging, novel scenarios.

There has been some recent interest in detecting and addressing memorization of training data by deep neural networks. A formal framework for memorization in generative models, called "data-copying," was proposed by Meehan et. al. (2020). We build upon their work to show that their framework may fail to detect certain kinds of blatant memorization. Motivated by this and the theory of non-parametric methods, we provide an alternative definition of data-copying that applies more locally. We provide a method to detect data-copying, and provably show that it works with high probability when enough data is available. We also provide lower bounds that characterize the sample requirement for reliable detection.

Unlearning methods have the potential to improve the privacy and safety of large language models (LLMs) by removing sensitive or harmful information post hoc. The LLM unlearning research community has increasingly turned toward empirical benchmarks to assess the effectiveness of such methods. In this paper, we find that existing benchmarks provide an overly optimistic and potentially misleading view on the effectiveness of candidate unlearning methods. By introducing simple, benign modifications to a number of popular benchmarks, we expose instances where supposedly unlearned information remains accessible, or where the unlearning process has degraded the model's performance on retained information to a much greater extent than indicated by the original benchmark. We identify that existing benchmarks are particularly vulnerable to modifications that introduce even loose dependencies between the forget and retain information. Further, we show that ambiguity in unlearning targets in existing benchmarks can easily lead to the design of methods that overfit to the given test queries. Based on our findings, we urge the community to be cautious when interpreting benchmark results as reliable measures of progress, and we provide several recommendations to guide future LLM unlearning research.

Large Language Models (LLMs) store and retrieve vast amounts of factual knowledge acquired during pre-training. Prior research has localized and identified mechanisms behind knowledge recall; however, it has primarily focused on English monolingual models. The question of how these processes generalize to other languages and multilingual LLMs remains unexplored. In this paper, we address this gap by conducting a comprehensive analysis of two highly multilingual LLMs. We assess the extent to which previously identified components and mechanisms of factual recall in English apply to a multilingual context. Then, we examine when language plays a role in the recall process, uncovering evidence of language-independent and language-dependent mechanisms.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly optimized for long reasoning, under the assumption that more reasoning leads to better performance. However, emerging evidence suggests that longer responses can sometimes degrade accuracy rather than improve it. In this paper, we conduct a systematic empirical study of the relationship between reasoning length and answer correctness. We find that LLMs tend to overthink simple problems, generating unnecessarily long outputs, and underthink harder ones, failing to extend their reasoning when it is most needed. This indicates that models might misjudge problem difficulty and fail to calibrate their response length appropriately. Furthermore, we investigate the effects of length reduction with a preference optimization algorithm when simply preferring the shorter responses regardless of answer correctness. Experiments show that the generation length can be significantly reduced while maintaining acceptable accuracy. Our findings highlight generation length as a meaningful signal for reasoning behavior and motivate further exploration into LLMs' self-awareness in reasoning length adaptation.

Comparison of fine-tuning models with reinforcement learning (RL) and supervised fine-tuning (SFT) reveals that, despite similar performance at a new task, RL preserves prior knowledge and capabilities significantly better. We find that the degree of forgetting is determined by the distributional shift, measured as the KL-divergence between the fine-tuned and base policy evaluated on the new task. Our analysis reveals that on-policy RL is implicitly biased towards KL-minimal solutions among the many that solve the new task, whereas SFT can converge to distributions arbitrarily far from the base model. We validate these findings through experiments with large language models and robotic foundation models and further provide theoretical justification for why on-policy RL updates lead to a smaller KL change. We term this principle RL's Razor: among all ways to solve a new task, RL prefers those closest in KL to the original model.

Continual learning refers to a dynamical framework in which a model receives a stream of non-stationary data over time and must adapt to new data while preserving previously acquired knowledge. Unluckily, neural networks fail to meet these two desiderata, incurring the so-called catastrophic forgetting phenomenon. Whereas a vast array of strategies have been proposed to attenuate forgetting in the computer vision domain, for speech-related tasks, on the other hand, there is a dearth of works. In this paper, we consider the joint use of rehearsal and knowledge distillation (KD) approaches for spoken language understanding under a class-incremental learning scenario. We report on multiple KD combinations at different levels in the network, showing that combining feature-level and predictions-level KDs leads to the best results. Finally, we provide an ablation study on the effect of the size of the rehearsal memory that corroborates the efficacy of our approach for low-resource devices.

This paper evaluates whether large language models (LLMs) exhibit cognitive fan effects, similar to those discovered by Anderson in humans, after being pre-trained on human textual data. We conduct two sets of in-context recall experiments designed to elicit fan effects. Consistent with human results, we find that LLM recall uncertainty, measured via token probability, is influenced by the fan effect. Our results show that removing uncertainty disrupts the observed effect. The experiments suggest the fan effect is consistent whether the fan value is induced in-context or in the pre-training data. Finally, these findings provide in-silico evidence that fan effects and typicality are expressions of the same phenomena.

Precision and Recall are two prominent metrics of generative performance, which were proposed to separately measure the fidelity and diversity of generative models. Given their central role in comparing and improving generative models, understanding their limitations are crucially important. To that end, in this work, we identify a critical flaw in the common approximation of these metrics using k-nearest-neighbors, namely, that the very interpretations of fidelity and diversity that are assigned to Precision and Recall can fail in high dimensions, resulting in very misleading conclusions. Specifically, we empirically and theoretically show that as the number of dimensions grows, two model distributions with supports at equal point-wise distance from the support of the real distribution, can have vastly different Precision and Recall regardless of their respective distributions, hence an emergent asymmetry in high dimensions. Based on our theoretical insights, we then provide simple yet effective modifications to these metrics to construct symmetric metrics regardless of the number of dimensions. Finally, we provide experiments on real-world datasets to illustrate that the identified flaw is not merely a pathological case, and that our proposed metrics are effective in alleviating its impact.

In this paper, we investigate whether Large Language Models (LLMs) actively recall or retrieve their internal repositories of factual knowledge when faced with reasoning tasks. Through an analysis of LLMs' internal factual recall at each reasoning step via Knowledge Neurons, we reveal that LLMs fail to harness the critical factual associations under certain circumstances. Instead, they tend to opt for alternative, shortcut-like pathways to answer reasoning questions. By manually manipulating the recall process of parametric knowledge in LLMs, we demonstrate that enhancing this recall process directly improves reasoning performance whereas suppressing it leads to notable degradation. Furthermore, we assess the effect of Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, a powerful technique for addressing complex reasoning tasks. Our findings indicate that CoT can intensify the recall of factual knowledge by encouraging LLMs to engage in orderly and reliable reasoning. Furthermore, we explored how contextual conflicts affect the retrieval of facts during the reasoning process to gain a comprehensive understanding of the factual recall behaviors of LLMs. Code and data will be available soon.

Grokking, i.e., test performance keeps improving long after training loss converged, has been recently witnessed in neural network training, making the mechanism of generalization and other emerging capabilities such as reasoning mysterious. While prior studies usually train small models on a few toy or highly-specific tasks for thousands of epochs, we conduct the first study of grokking on checkpoints during one-pass pretraining of a 7B large language model (LLM), i.e., OLMoE. We compute the training loss and evaluate generalization on diverse benchmark tasks, including math reasoning, code generation, and commonsense/domain-specific knowledge retrieval tasks. Our study, for the first time, verifies that grokking still happens in the pretraining of large-scale foundation models, though different data may enter grokking stages asynchronously. We further demystify grokking's "emergence of generalization" by investigating LLM internal dynamics. Specifically, we find that training samples' pathways (i.e., expert choices across layers) evolve from random, instance-specific to more structured and shareable between samples during grokking. Also, the complexity of a sample's pathway reduces despite the converged loss. These indicate a memorization-to-generalization conversion, providing a mechanistic explanation of delayed generalization. In the study, we develop two novel metrics to quantify pathway distance and the complexity of a single pathway. We show their ability to predict the generalization improvement on diverse downstream tasks. They are efficient, simple to compute and solely dependent on training data. Hence, they have practical value for pretraining, enabling us to monitor the generalization performance without finetuning and test. Theoretically, we show that more structured pathways reduce model complexity and improve the generalization bound.

Does vision-and-language (VL) training change the linguistic representations of language models in meaningful ways? Most results in the literature have shown inconsistent or marginal differences, both behaviorally and representationally. In this work, we start from the hypothesis that the domain in which VL training could have a significant effect is lexical-conceptual knowledge, in particular its taxonomic organization. Through comparing minimal pairs of text-only LMs and their VL-trained counterparts, we first show that the VL models often outperform their text-only counterparts on a text-only question-answering task that requires taxonomic understanding of concepts mentioned in the questions. Using an array of targeted behavioral and representational analyses, we show that the LMs and VLMs do not differ significantly in terms of their taxonomic knowledge itself, but they differ in how they represent questions that contain concepts in a taxonomic relation vs. a non-taxonomic relation. This implies that the taxonomic knowledge itself does not change substantially through additional VL training, but VL training does improve the deployment of this knowledge in the context of a specific task, even when the presentation of the task is purely linguistic.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) mitigates hallucinations in Large Language Models (LLMs) by integrating external knowledge. However, conflicts between parametric knowledge and retrieved context pose challenges, particularly when retrieved information is unreliable or the model's internal knowledge is outdated. In such cases, LLMs struggle to determine whether to rely more on their own parameters or the conflicted context. To address this, we propose **CK-PLUG**, a plug-and-play method for controlling LLMs' reliance on parametric and contextual knowledge. We introduce a novel knowledge consistency metric, Confidence Gain, which detects knowledge conflicts by measuring entropy shifts in token probability distributions after context insertion. CK-PLUG then enables fine-grained control over knowledge preference by adjusting the probability distribution of tokens with negative confidence gain through a single tuning parameter. Experiments demonstrate CK-PLUG's ability to significantly regulate knowledge reliance in counterfactual RAG scenarios while maintaining generation fluency and knowledge accuracy. For instance, on Llama3-8B, memory recall (MR) of RAG response can be adjusted within a broad range (9.9%-71.9%), compared to the baseline of 42.1%. Moreover, CK-PLUG supports adaptive control based on the model's confidence in both internal and external knowledge, achieving consistent performance improvements across various general RAG tasks. Our code is available at: https://github.com/byronBBL/CK-PLUG{this https URL}.

We present a large-scale dataset, ReCoRD, for machine reading comprehension requiring commonsense reasoning. Experiments on this dataset demonstrate that the performance of state-of-the-art MRC systems fall far behind human performance. ReCoRD represents a challenge for future research to bridge the gap between human and machine commonsense reading comprehension. ReCoRD is available at http://nlp.jhu.edu/record.

Despite high benchmark scores, Large Language Models (LLMs) often fail simple problem, raising a critical question: Do LLMs learn mathematical principles or merely memorize patterns? Rather than designing increasingly complex benchmarks like recent works, we investigate this using elementary two-integer addition (0 to 2^{64}), probing two core properties: commutativity (A+B=B+A) and compositional generalization (via isomorphic symbolic mappings, e.g., 7 rightarrow y). While state-of-the-art LLMs achieve 73.8-99.8\% accuracy on numerical addition, performance collapses to leq7.5\% under symbolic mapping, indicating failure to generalize learned rules. Non-monotonic performance scaling with digit count and frequent commutativity violations (over 1,700 cases of A+B neq B+A) further support this. Explicitly providing addition rules degrades performance by 81.2\% on average, while self-explanation maintains baseline accuracy, suggesting LLM arithmetic processing is misaligned with human-defined principles. Our findings indicate current LLMs rely on memory pattern over genuine rule learning, highlighting architectural limitations and the need for new approaches to achieve true mathematical reasoning.

Misunderstandings arise not only in interpersonal communication but also between humans and Large Language Models (LLMs). Such discrepancies can make LLMs interpret seemingly unambiguous questions in unexpected ways, yielding incorrect responses. While it is widely acknowledged that the quality of a prompt, such as a question, significantly impacts the quality of the response provided by LLMs, a systematic method for crafting questions that LLMs can better comprehend is still underdeveloped. In this paper, we present a method named `Rephrase and Respond' (RaR), which allows LLMs to rephrase and expand questions posed by humans and provide responses in a single prompt. This approach serves as a simple yet effective prompting method for improving performance. We also introduce a two-step variant of RaR, where a rephrasing LLM first rephrases the question and then passes the original and rephrased questions together to a different responding LLM. This facilitates the effective utilization of rephrased questions generated by one LLM with another. Our experiments demonstrate that our methods significantly improve the performance of different models across a wide range to tasks. We further provide a comprehensive comparison between RaR and the popular Chain-of-Thought (CoT) methods, both theoretically and empirically. We show that RaR is complementary to CoT and can be combined with CoT to achieve even better performance. Our work not only contributes to enhancing LLM performance efficiently and effectively but also sheds light on a fair evaluation of LLM capabilities. Data and codes are available at https://github.com/uclaml/Rephrase-and-Respond.

We study the probabilistic modeling performed by Autoregressive Large Language Models (LLMs) through the angle of time directionality, addressing a question first raised in (Shannon, 1951). For large enough models, we empirically find a time asymmetry in their ability to learn natural language: a difference in the average log-perplexity when trying to predict the next token versus when trying to predict the previous one. This difference is at the same time subtle and very consistent across various modalities (language, model size, training time, ...). Theoretically, this is surprising: from an information-theoretic point of view, there should be no such difference. We provide a theoretical framework to explain how such an asymmetry can appear from sparsity and computational complexity considerations, and outline a number of perspectives opened by our results.

Large language models (LLMs) cannot be trusted for economic forecasts during periods covered by their training data. We provide the first systematic evaluation of LLMs' memorization of economic and financial data, including major economic indicators, news headlines, stock returns, and conference calls. Our findings show that LLMs can perfectly recall the exact numerical values of key economic variables from before their knowledge cutoff dates. This recall appears to be randomly distributed across different dates and data types. This selective perfect memory creates a fundamental issue -- when testing forecasting capabilities before their knowledge cutoff dates, we cannot distinguish whether LLMs are forecasting or simply accessing memorized data. Explicit instructions to respect historical data boundaries fail to prevent LLMs from achieving recall-level accuracy in forecasting tasks. Further, LLMs seem exceptional at reconstructing masked entities from minimal contextual clues, suggesting that masking provides inadequate protection against motivated reasoning. Our findings raise concerns about using LLMs to forecast historical data or backtest trading strategies, as their apparent predictive success may merely reflect memorization rather than genuine economic insight. Any application where future knowledge would change LLMs' outputs can be affected by memorization. In contrast, consistent with the absence of data contamination, LLMs cannot recall data after their knowledge cutoff date.

Editing knowledge in large language models is an attractive capability to have which allows us to correct incorrectly learnt facts during pre-training, as well as update the model with an ever-growing list of new facts. While existing model editing techniques have shown promise, they are usually evaluated using metrics for reliability, specificity and generalization over one or few edits. We argue that for model editing to have practical utility, we must be able to make multiple edits to the same model. With this in mind, we evaluate the current model editing methods at scale, focusing on two state of the art methods: ROME and MEMIT. We find that as the model is edited sequentially with multiple facts, it continually forgets previously edited facts and the ability to perform downstream tasks. This forgetting happens in two phases -- an initial gradual but progressive forgetting phase followed by abrupt or catastrophic forgetting phase. Both gradual and catastrophic forgetting limit the usefulness of model editing methods at scale -- the former making model editing less effective as multiple edits are made to the model while the latter caps the scalability of such model editing methods. Our analysis also highlights other key limitations of ROME and MEMIT at scale. With our work, we push for the development and evaluation of model editing methods keeping scalability in mind.

Recent psycholinguistic studies have drawn conflicting conclusions about the relationship between the quality of a language model and the ability of its surprisal estimates to predict human reading times, which has been speculated to be due to the large gap in both the amount of training data and model capacity across studies. The current work aims to consolidate these findings by evaluating surprisal estimates from Transformer-based language model variants that vary systematically in the amount of training data and model capacity on their ability to predict human reading times. The results show that surprisal estimates from most variants with contemporary model capacities provide the best fit after seeing about two billion training tokens, after which they begin to diverge from humanlike expectations. Additionally, newly-trained smaller model variants reveal a 'tipping point' at convergence, after which the decrease in language model perplexity begins to result in poorer fits to human reading times. These results suggest that the massive amount of training data is mainly responsible for the poorer fit achieved by surprisal from larger pre-trained language models, and that a certain degree of model capacity is necessary for Transformer-based language models to capture humanlike expectations.

The leakage of benchmark data into the training data has emerged as a significant challenge for evaluating the capabilities of large language models (LLMs). In this work, we challenge the common assumption that small-scale contamination renders benchmark evaluations invalid. First, we experimentally quantify the magnitude of benchmark overfitting based on scaling along three dimensions: The number of model parameters (up to 1.6B), the number of times an example is seen (up to 144), and the number of training tokens (up to 40B). If model and data follow the Chinchilla scaling laws, minor contamination indeed leads to overfitting. At the same time, even 144 times of contamination can be forgotten if the training data is scaled beyond five times Chinchilla, a regime characteristic of many modern LLMs. Continual pre-training of OLMo-7B corroborates these results. Next, we study the impact of the weight decay parameter on example forgetting, showing that empirical forgetting occurs faster than the cumulative weight decay. This allows us to gauge the degree of example forgetting in large-scale training runs, indicating that many LLMs, including Lllama 3 405B, have forgotten the data seen at the beginning of training.

When large language models are aligned via supervised fine-tuning, they may encounter new factual information that was not acquired through pre-training. It is often conjectured that this can teach the model the behavior of hallucinating factually incorrect responses, as the model is trained to generate facts that are not grounded in its pre-existing knowledge. In this work, we study the impact of such exposure to new knowledge on the capability of the fine-tuned model to utilize its pre-existing knowledge. To this end, we design a controlled setup, focused on closed-book QA, where we vary the proportion of the fine-tuning examples that introduce new knowledge. We demonstrate that large language models struggle to acquire new factual knowledge through fine-tuning, as fine-tuning examples that introduce new knowledge are learned significantly slower than those consistent with the model's knowledge. However, we also find that as the examples with new knowledge are eventually learned, they linearly increase the model's tendency to hallucinate. Taken together, our results highlight the risk in introducing new factual knowledge through fine-tuning, and support the view that large language models mostly acquire factual knowledge through pre-training, whereas fine-tuning teaches them to use it more efficiently.

Accurate estimation of item (question or task) difficulty is critical for educational assessment but suffers from the cold start problem. While Large Language Models demonstrate superhuman problem-solving capabilities, it remains an open question whether they can perceive the cognitive struggles of human learners. In this work, we present a large-scale empirical analysis of Human-AI Difficulty Alignment for over 20 models across diverse domains such as medical knowledge and mathematical reasoning. Our findings reveal a systematic misalignment where scaling up model size is not reliably helpful; instead of aligning with humans, models converge toward a shared machine consensus. We observe that high performance often impedes accurate difficulty estimation, as models struggle to simulate the capability limitations of students even when being explicitly prompted to adopt specific proficiency levels. Furthermore, we identify a critical lack of introspection, as models fail to predict their own limitations. These results suggest that general problem-solving capability does not imply an understanding of human cognitive struggles, highlighting the challenge of using current models for automated difficulty prediction.

We present Hubble, a suite of fully open-source large language models (LLMs) for the scientific study of LLM memorization. Hubble models come in standard and perturbed variants: standard models are pretrained on a large English corpus, and perturbed models are trained in the same way but with controlled insertion of text (e.g., book passages, biographies, and test sets) designed to emulate key memorization risks. Our core release includes 8 models -- standard and perturbed models with 1B or 8B parameters, pretrained on 100B or 500B tokens -- establishing that memorization risks are determined by the frequency of sensitive data relative to size of the training corpus (i.e., a password appearing once in a smaller corpus is memorized better than the same password in a larger corpus). Our release also includes 6 perturbed models with text inserted at different pretraining phases, showing that sensitive data without continued exposure can be forgotten. These findings suggest two best practices for addressing memorization risks: to dilute sensitive data by increasing the size of the training corpus, and to order sensitive data to appear earlier in training. Beyond these general empirical findings, Hubble enables a broad range of memorization research; for example, analyzing the biographies reveals how readily different types of private information are memorized. We also demonstrate that the randomized insertions in Hubble make it an ideal testbed for membership inference and machine unlearning, and invite the community to further explore, benchmark, and build upon our work.

Recently, retrieval augmentation and tool augmentation have demonstrated a remarkable capability to expand the internal memory boundaries of language models (LMs) by providing external context. However, internal memory and external context inevitably clash, leading to knowledge conflicts within LMs. In this paper, we aim to interpret the mechanism of knowledge conflicts through the lens of information flow, and then mitigate conflicts by precise interventions at the pivotal point. We find there are some attention heads with opposite effects in the later layers, where memory heads can recall knowledge from internal memory, and context heads can retrieve knowledge from external context. Moreover, we reveal that the pivotal point at which knowledge conflicts emerge in LMs is the integration of inconsistent information flows by memory heads and context heads. Inspired by the insights, we propose a novel method called Pruning Head via PatH PatcHing (PH3), which can efficiently mitigate knowledge conflicts by pruning conflicting attention heads without updating model parameters. PH3 can flexibly control eight LMs to use internal memory (uparrow 44.0%) or external context (uparrow 38.5%). Moreover, PH3 can also improve the performance of LMs on open-domain QA tasks. We also conduct extensive experiments to demonstrate the cross-model, cross-relation, and cross-format generalization of our method.

We conduct a systematic audit of three widely used reasoning benchmarks, SocialIQa, FauxPas-EAI, and ToMi, and uncover pervasive flaws in both benchmark items and evaluation methodology. Using five LLMs (GPT-{3, 3.5, 4, o1}, and LLaMA 3.1) as diagnostic tools, we identify structural, semantic, and pragmatic issues in benchmark design (e.g., duplicated items, ambiguous wording, and implausible answers), as well as scoring procedures that prioritize output form over reasoning process. Through systematic human annotation and re-evaluation on cleaned benchmark subsets, we find that model scores often improve not due to due to erratic surface wording variations and not to improved reasoning. Infact, further analyses show that model performance is highly sensitive to minor input variations such as context availability and phrasing, revealing that high scores may reflect alignment with format-specific cues rather than consistent inference based on the input. These findings challenge the validity of current benchmark-based claims about reasoning in LLMs, and highlight the need for evaluation protocols that assess reasoning as a process of drawing inference from available information, rather than as static output selection. We release audited data and evaluation tools to support more interpretable and diagnostic assessments of model reasoning.

Knowledge distillation is a popular technique for training a small student network to emulate a larger teacher model, such as an ensemble of networks. We show that while knowledge distillation can improve student generalization, it does not typically work as it is commonly understood: there often remains a surprisingly large discrepancy between the predictive distributions of the teacher and the student, even in cases when the student has the capacity to perfectly match the teacher. We identify difficulties in optimization as a key reason for why the student is unable to match the teacher. We also show how the details of the dataset used for distillation play a role in how closely the student matches the teacher -- and that more closely matching the teacher paradoxically does not always lead to better student generalization.

The impressive performance of recent language models across a wide range of tasks suggests that they possess a degree of abstract reasoning skills. Are these skills general and transferable, or specialized to specific tasks seen during pretraining? To disentangle these effects, we propose an evaluation framework based on "counterfactual" task variants that deviate from the default assumptions underlying standard tasks. Across a suite of 11 tasks, we observe nontrivial performance on the counterfactual variants, but nevertheless find that performance substantially and consistently degrades compared to the default conditions. This suggests that while current LMs may possess abstract task-solving skills to a degree, they often also rely on narrow, non-transferable procedures for task-solving. These results motivate a more careful interpretation of language model performance that teases apart these aspects of behavior.

Recent works have shown the benefits to LLMs from fine-tuning golden-standard Chain-of-Thought (CoT) rationales or using them as correct examples in few-shot prompting. While humans can indeed imitate correct examples, learning from our mistakes is another vital aspect of human cognition. Hence, a question naturally arises: can LLMs learn and benefit from their mistakes, especially for their reasoning? This study investigates this problem from both the prompting and model-tuning perspectives. We begin by introducing CoTErrorSet, a new benchmark with 609,432 questions, each designed with both correct and error references, and demonstrating the types and reasons for making such mistakes. To explore the effectiveness of those mistakes, we design two methods: (1) Self-rethinking prompting guides LLMs to rethink whether they have made similar previous mistakes; and (2) Mistake tuning involves finetuning models in both correct and incorrect reasoning domains, rather than only tuning models to learn ground truth in traditional methodology. We conduct a series of experiments to prove LLMs can obtain benefits from mistakes in both directions. Our two methods offer potentially cost-effective strategies by leveraging errors to enhance reasoning capabilities, which costs significantly less than creating meticulously hand-crafted golden references. We ultimately make a thorough analysis of the reasons behind LLMs' errors, which provides directions that future research needs to overcome. CoTErrorSet will be published soon on \url{https://github.com/YookiTong/Learn-from-Mistakes-CotErrorSet}.

Language Models (LMs) often must integrate facts they memorized in pretraining with new information that appears in a given context. These two sources can disagree, causing competition within the model, and it is unclear how an LM will resolve the conflict. On a dataset that queries for knowledge of world capitals, we investigate both distributional and mechanistic determinants of LM behavior in such situations. Specifically, we measure the proportion of the time an LM will use a counterfactual prefix (e.g., "The capital of Poland is London") to overwrite what it learned in pretraining ("Warsaw"). On Pythia and GPT2, the training frequency of both the query country ("Poland") and the in-context city ("London") highly affect the models' likelihood of using the counterfactual. We then use head attribution to identify individual attention heads that either promote the memorized answer or the in-context answer in the logits. By scaling up or down the value vector of these heads, we can control the likelihood of using the in-context answer on new data. This method can increase the rate of generating the in-context answer to 88\% of the time simply by scaling a single head at runtime. Our work contributes to a body of evidence showing that we can often localize model behaviors to specific components and provides a proof of concept for how future methods might control model behavior dynamically at runtime.

In a systematic way, we investigate a widely asked question: Do LLMs really understand what they say?, which relates to the more familiar term Stochastic Parrot. To this end, we propose a summative assessment over a carefully designed physical concept understanding task, PhysiCo. Our task alleviates the memorization issue via the usage of grid-format inputs that abstractly describe physical phenomena. The grids represents varying levels of understanding, from the core phenomenon, application examples to analogies to other abstract patterns in the grid world. A comprehensive study on our task demonstrates: (1) state-of-the-art LLMs, including GPT-4o, o1 and Gemini 2.0 flash thinking, lag behind humans by ~40%; (2) the stochastic parrot phenomenon is present in LLMs, as they fail on our grid task but can describe and recognize the same concepts well in natural language; (3) our task challenges the LLMs due to intrinsic difficulties rather than the unfamiliar grid format, as in-context learning and fine-tuning on same formatted data added little to their performance.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown tremendous success in following user instructions and generating helpful responses. Nevertheless, their robustness is still far from optimal, as they may generate significantly inconsistent responses due to minor changes in the verbalized instructions. Recent literature has explored this inconsistency issue, highlighting the importance of continued improvement in the robustness of response generation. However, systematic analysis and solutions are still lacking. In this paper, we quantitatively define the inconsistency problem and propose a two-stage training framework consisting of instruction-augmented supervised fine-tuning and consistency alignment training. The first stage helps a model generalize on following instructions via similar instruction augmentations. In the second stage, we improve the diversity and help the model understand which responses are more aligned with human expectations by differentiating subtle differences in similar responses. The training process is accomplished by self-rewards inferred from the trained model at the first stage without referring to external human preference resources. We conduct extensive experiments on recent publicly available LLMs on instruction-following tasks and demonstrate the effectiveness of our training framework.