Daily Papers

Selective knowledge erasure from LLMs is critical for GDPR compliance and model safety, yet current unlearning methods conflate behavioral suppression with true knowledge removal, allowing latent capabilities to persist beneath surface-level refusals. In this work, we address this challenge by introducing Knowledge Immunization Framework (KIF), a representation-aware architecture that distinguishes genuine erasure from obfuscation by targeting internal activation signatures rather than surface outputs. Our approach combines dynamic suppression of subject-specific representations with parameter-efficient adaptation, enabling durable unlearning without full model retraining. KIF achieves near-oracle erasure (FQ approx 0.99 vs. 1.00) while preserving utility at oracle levels (MU = 0.62), effectively breaking the stability-erasure tradeoff that has constrained all prior work. We evaluate both standard foundation models (Llama and Mistral) and reasoning-prior models (Qwen and DeepSeek) across 3B to 14B parameters. Our observation shows that standard models exhibit scale-independent true erasure (<3% utility drift), while reasoning-prior models reveal fundamental architectural divergence. Our comprehensive dual-metric evaluation protocol, combining surface-level leakage with latent trace persistence, operationalizes the obfuscation - erasure distinction and enables the first systematic diagnosis of mechanism-level forgetting behavior across model families and scales.

Standard unlearning evaluations measure behavioral suppression in full precision, immediately after training, despite every deployed language model being quantized first. Recent work has shown that 4-bit post-training quantization can reverse machine unlearning; we show this is not a tuning artefact but a systematic dual failure: gradient-based methods that achieve meaningful forgetting lose it under compression, while methods that survive quantization barely change the model. Both failures trace to the same root cause: across all baselines, per-parameter updates lie 47-828x below the NF4 quantization bin width; updates diffused across billions of parameters cannot clear quantization bin boundaries, a consequence we formalize as a sparsity-permanence tradeoff. We present MANSU (Mechanistic-Aligned Null-Space Unlearning), which resolves both modes by combining causal circuit attribution to isolate the minimal forget-set subgraph, circuit-restricted null-space projection with a diagonal-Fisher retain bound, and a per-parameter magnitude floor guaranteeing quantization survival by construction. We additionally introduce Circuit Attribution Divergence (CAD), a mechanistic verification metric distinguishing structural erasure from behavioral suppression, a distinction existing metrics cannot make. Across multiple model families and hazard benchmarks, MANSU is the first method to jointly satisfy all four properties with margin on each (meaningful forgetting, retain preservation, non-positive PTQ gap, and structural erasure), while gradient-based baselines recover up to +0.05 accuracy under compression.

Tool Calling and Structured Output are two core capabilities of modern Agent systems, yet their interaction under joint deployment conditions remains insufficiently understood. This paper reports a reproducible phenomenon observed in a production Agent system: when Tool Calling and JSON Schema constraints are simultaneously enabled, multiple open-weight models cease invoking tools despite maintaining high schema compliance. We refer to this behavior as Tool Suppression. Through controlled experiments across multiple model families and deployment settings, we consistently reproduce Tool Suppression under joint constraints, while tool execution and schema compliance remain functional when evaluated independently. Further analysis reveals that JSON Schema constraints are compiled into grammar-based token masks, causing tool-call tokens to become unreachable during decoding. This provides an implementation-level explanation for the observed behavior. To interpret the phenomenon, we formulate the Constraint Priority Inversion (CPI) hypothesis, which suggests that schema satisfaction may dominate action-selection behavior under multiple simultaneous constraints. We present CPI as a behavioral hypothesis consistent with the observed evidence rather than a verified internal mechanism. To mitigate the problem, we propose Transparent Two-Pass Execution, an inference-time strategy that decouples tool execution from schema-constrained response generation. Experimental results show that this approach restores tool invocation while preserving structured output guarantees without requiring model retraining. These findings suggest that evaluating tool use and structured output separately may overlook important reliability issues in production Agent systems. Code, data, and docs will be released at https://github.com/Fzsama/Constrain-Tax-26-06.git.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in settings that require nuanced ethical reasoning, yet existing bias evaluations treat model outputs as simply "biased" or "unbiased." This binary framing misses the gradual, context-sensitive way bias actually emerges. We address this gap in two stages: behavioral profiling and mechanistic validation. In the behavioral stage, we introduce the Moral Sensitivity Index (MSI), a metric that quantifies the probability of biased output across a graduated, seven-tier stress test ranging from abstract numerical problems to scenarios rooted in historical and socioeconomic injustice. Evaluating four leading models (Claude 3.5, Qwen 3.5, Llama 3, and Gemini 1.5), we identify distinct behavioral signatures shaped by alignment design: for instance, Gemini 1.5 reaches 72.7% MSI by Tier 5 under socioeconomic framing, while Claude exhibits sharp suppression consistent with identity-based safety training. We then verify these behavioral patterns mechanistically. We select criminal-bias scenarios, which produced the highest MSI scores across models, as probes and apply logit lens, attention analysis, activation patching, and semantic probing to a controlled set of six models spanning three capability tiers: small language models (SLMs), instruction-tuned base models, and reasoning-distilled variants. Circuit-level analysis reveals a U-curve of bias: SLMs exhibit strong criminal bias; scaling to instruction-tuned models eliminates it; reasoning distillation reintroduces bias to SLM-like levels despite identical parameter counts, suggesting distillation compresses reasoning traces in ways that reactivate shallow statistical associations. Critically, the socially loaded cues that drive high MSI scores activate the same bias-driving circuits identified mechanistically, providing cross-stage validation.

Prior work shows that fine-tuning aligned models on benign data degrades safety in text and vision modalities, and that proximity to harmful content in representation space predicts which samples cause the most damage. However, existing analyses operate within a single, undifferentiated embedding space -- leaving open whether distinct input properties drive the vulnerability differently. Audio introduces a structurally richer problem: a benign sample can neighbor harmful content not only through what is said but through how it sounds, even when its words are entirely innocuous. We present the first systematic study of benign fine-tuning safety in Audio LLMs, evaluating three state-of-the-art models with a proximity-based filtering framework that selects benign audio by embedding-space distance to harmful content. By decomposing proximity into semantic, acoustic, and mixed axes using external reference encoders alongside each model's own internal encoder, we show that benign fine-tuning elevates Jailbreak Success Rate (JSR) from single digits to as high as 87.12%. Crucially, the dominant vulnerability axis and the relative risk of audio versus text fine-tuning are both architecture-conditioned -- determined by how each model's encoder and projector transform audio into the LLM's input space. We propose two defenses: filtering training data to maximize distance from harmful embeddings, and a textual system prompt at inference, both reducing JSR to near-zero without architectural modification. Our mechanistic analysis on two architectures reveals that fine-tuning selectively suppresses the late-layer refusal circuit while the frozen encoder preserves representations, and that even the suppression pattern is architecture-conditioned, mirroring the behavioral asymmetries across modalities. Safety degradation from benign fine-tuning is a qualitatively distinct risk in Audio LLMs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in politically sensitive environments, where memorisation of personal data or confidential content raises regulatory concerns under frameworks such as the GDPR and its Right to be Forgotten. Translating such legal principles into large-scale generative systems presents significant technical challenges. We introduce a lightweight sequential unlearning framework that explicitly separates retention and suppression objectives. The method first stabilises benign capabilities through positive fine-tuning, then applies layer-restricted negative fine-tuning to suppress designated sensitive patterns while preserving general language competence. Experiments on the SemEval-2025 LLM Unlearning benchmark demonstrate effective behavioural suppression with minimal impact on factual accuracy and fluency. GPT-2 exhibits greater robustness than DistilGPT-2, highlighting the role of model capacity in privacy-aligned adaptation. We position sequential unlearning as a practical and reproducible mechanism for operationalising data erasure requirements in politically deployed LLMs.

LLMs utilizing chain-of-thought reasoning often waste substantial compute by producing long, incorrect responses. Abstention can mitigate this by withholding outputs unlikely to be correct. While most abstention methods decide to withhold outputs before or after generation, dynamic mid-generation abstention considers early termination of unpromising reasoning traces at each token position. Prior work has explored empirical variants of this idea, but principled guidance for the abstention rule remains lacking. We present a formal analysis of dynamic abstention for LLMs, modeling abstention as an explicit action within a regularized reinforcement learning framework. An abstention reward parameter controls the trade-off between compute and information. We show that abstaining when the value function falls below this reward strictly outperforms natural baselines under general conditions. We further derive a principled and efficient method to approximate the value function. Empirical results on mathematical reasoning and toxicity avoidance tasks support our theory and demonstrate improved selective accuracy over existing methods.

Abstention, the refusal of large language models (LLMs) to provide an answer, is increasingly recognized for its potential to mitigate hallucinations and enhance safety in building LLM systems. In this survey, we introduce a framework to examine abstention behavior from three perspectives: the query, the model, and human values. We review the literature on abstention methods (categorized based on the development stages of LLMs), benchmarks, and evaluation metrics, and discuss the merits and limitations of prior work. We further identify and motivate areas for future research, such as encouraging the study of abstention as a meta-capability across tasks and customizing abstention abilities based on context. In doing so, we aim to broaden the scope and impact of abstention methodologies in AI systems.

LLMs increasingly exhibit over-refusal behavior, where safety mechanisms cause models to reject benign instructions that superficially resemble harmful content. This phenomena diminishes utility in production applications that repeatedly rely on common prompt templates or applications that frequently rely on LLMs for specific tasks (e.g. sentiment analysis, language translation). Through comprehensive evaluation, we demonstrate that LLMs still tend to refuse responses to harmful instructions when those instructions are reframed to appear as benign tasks. Our mechanistic analysis reveal that LLMs follow distinct "constellation" patterns in embedding space as representations traverse layers, with each task maintaining consistent trajectories that shift predictably between refusal and non-refusal cases. We introduce SafeConstellations, an inference-time trajectory-shifting approach that tracks task-specific trajectory patterns and guides representations toward non-refusal pathways. By selectively guiding model behavior only on tasks prone to over-refusal, and by preserving general model behavior, our method reduces over-refusal rates by up to 73% with minimal impact on utility-offering a principled approach to mitigating over-refusals.

Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) decompose residual-stream activations into interpretable features. Recent latent-space defenses increasingly rely on these decompositions, assuming that identified "unsafe" SAE features serve as actionable handles for monitoring and intervention. In this paradigm, clamping a specific harmful feature is expected to reliably prevent model misbehavior. However, we show that this success may hide a recoverable failure mode: the clamp may block one visible route to a behavior without eliminating the behavior itself. We formulate this vulnerability as post-intervention recovery, a constrained residual-space optimization problem. Starting from the post-intervention residual state, we optimize residual perturbations to recover the pre-intervention behavior while preserving the post-intervention values of the targeted SAE features. Even under a strong threat model where the intervention remains active throughout optimization and generation, recovery remains possible. To rule out that recovery simply undoes the intervention, we use encoder-orthogonal updates for single-layer interventions and the corresponding feature-map Jacobian in the cross-layer setting. Across TPP, unlearning, IOI, and refusal steering experiments, this stress test reveals recoverable behavior despite successful feature-level intervention. Especially in the safety-critical refusal-steering setting, we achieve a 95.8% recovery rate on valid samples while keeping defended-feature relative drift to 0.131, substantially below suffix-based baselines. A recovery-path attribution analysis further localizes this recovery to the SAE reconstruction residual, the component left unexplained by the SAE. These results expose a gap between feature-level control and behavioral completeness: SAE features can support causal intervention, but controlling them does not guarantee control over the underlying behavior.

We present a single attention head in GPT-2 Small that has one main role across the entire training distribution. If components in earlier layers predict a certain token, and this token appears earlier in the context, the head suppresses it: we call this copy suppression. Attention Head 10.7 (L10H7) suppresses naive copying behavior which improves overall model calibration. This explains why multiple prior works studying certain narrow tasks found negative heads that systematically favored the wrong answer. We uncover the mechanism that the Negative Heads use for copy suppression with weights-based evidence and are able to explain 76.9% of the impact of L10H7 in GPT-2 Small. To the best of our knowledge, this is the most comprehensive description of the complete role of a component in a language model to date. One major effect of copy suppression is its role in self-repair. Self-repair refers to how ablating crucial model components results in downstream neural network parts compensating for this ablation. Copy suppression leads to self-repair: if an initial overconfident copier is ablated, then there is nothing to suppress. We show that self-repair is implemented by several mechanisms, one of which is copy suppression, which explains 39% of the behavior in a narrow task. Interactive visualisations of the copy suppression phenomena may be seen at our web app https://copy-suppression.streamlit.app/

Large language models (LLMs) are typically aligned to comply with safety guidelines by refusing harmful instructions. A recent attack, termed abliteration, isolates and suppresses the single latent direction most responsible for refusal behavior, enabling the model to generate unethical content. We propose a defense that modifies how models generate refusals. We construct an extended-refusal dataset that contains harmful prompts with a full response that justifies the reason for refusal. We then fine-tune Llama-2-7B-Chat and Qwen2.5-Instruct (1.5B and 3B parameters) on our extended-refusal dataset, and evaluate the resulting systems on a set of harmful prompts. In our experiments, extended-refusal models maintain high refusal rates, dropping at most by 10%, whereas baseline models' refusal rates drop by 70-80% after abliteration. A broad evaluation of safety and utility shows that extended-refusal fine-tuning neutralizes the abliteration attack while preserving general performance.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed across various applications, privacy and copyright concerns have heightened the need for more effective LLM unlearning techniques. Many existing unlearning methods aim to suppress undesirable outputs through additional training (e.g., gradient ascent), which reduces the probability of generating such outputs. While such suppression-based approaches can control model outputs, they may not eliminate the underlying knowledge embedded in the model's internal activations; muting a response is not the same as forgetting it. Moreover, such suppression-based methods often suffer from model collapse. To address these issues, we propose a novel unlearning method that directly intervenes in the model's internal activations. In our formulation, forgetting is defined as a state in which the activation of a forgotten target is indistinguishable from that of ``unknown'' entities. Our method introduces an unlearning objective that modifies the activation of the target entity away from those of known entities and toward those of unknown entities in a sparse autoencoder latent space. By aligning the target's internal activation with those of unknown entities, we shift the model's recognition of the target entity from ``known'' to ``unknown'', achieving genuine forgetting while avoiding over-suppression and model collapse. Empirically, we show that our method effectively aligns the internal activations of the forgotten target, a result that the suppression-based approaches do not reliably achieve. Additionally, our method effectively reduces the model's recall of target knowledge in question-answering tasks without significant damage to the non-target knowledge.

We study behavioral self-awareness -- an LLM's ability to articulate its behaviors without requiring in-context examples. We finetune LLMs on datasets that exhibit particular behaviors, such as (a) making high-risk economic decisions, and (b) outputting insecure code. Despite the datasets containing no explicit descriptions of the associated behavior, the finetuned LLMs can explicitly describe it. For example, a model trained to output insecure code says, ``The code I write is insecure.'' Indeed, models show behavioral self-awareness for a range of behaviors and for diverse evaluations. Note that while we finetune models to exhibit behaviors like writing insecure code, we do not finetune them to articulate their own behaviors -- models do this without any special training or examples. Behavioral self-awareness is relevant for AI safety, as models could use it to proactively disclose problematic behaviors. In particular, we study backdoor policies, where models exhibit unexpected behaviors only under certain trigger conditions. We find that models can sometimes identify whether or not they have a backdoor, even without its trigger being present. However, models are not able to directly output their trigger by default. Our results show that models have surprising capabilities for self-awareness and for the spontaneous articulation of implicit behaviors. Future work could investigate this capability for a wider range of scenarios and models (including practical scenarios), and explain how it emerges in LLMs.

Machine unlearning is increasingly important for clinical language models, where privacy regulations and institutional policies may require removing sensitive information from deployed systems without retraining from scratch. In practice, deletion requests must balance effective forgetting of targeted information with preservation of model utility and minimal parameter modification. We introduce Sparse Token Embedding Unlearning (STEU), a parameter-efficient method for behavioral class-level unlearning that updates only PMI-selected token embeddings together with a small classifier head while keeping all encoder layers frozen. Across experiments on MIMIC-IV, MIMIC-III, and eICU using BioClinicalBERT, BERT-base, and DistilBERT, STEU consistently suppresses the target class while largely preserving retained task performance. In the primary MIMIC-IV setting, STEU achieves near-complete forgetting (forget F1 = 0.0004) while maintaining competitive retained utility (retain avg F1 = 0.4766) after modifying only 0.19\% of model parameters. These results suggest that targeted behavioral unlearning can be achieved through sparse embedding edits without modifying deeper encoder representations.

Recent advancements in artificial intelligence have led to the creation of highly capable large language models (LLMs) that can perform tasks in a human-like manner. However, LLMs exhibit only infant-level cognitive abilities in certain areas. One such area is the A-Not-B error, a phenomenon seen in infants where they repeat a previously rewarded behavior despite well-observed changed conditions. This highlights their lack of inhibitory control -- the ability to stop a habitual or impulsive response. In our work, we design a text-based multi-choice QA scenario similar to the A-Not-B experimental settings to systematically test the inhibitory control abilities of LLMs. We found that state-of-the-art LLMs (like Llama3-8b) perform consistently well with in-context learning (ICL) but make errors and show a significant drop of as many as 83.3% in reasoning tasks when the context changes trivially. This suggests that LLMs only have inhibitory control abilities on par with human infants in this regard, often failing to suppress the previously established response pattern during ICL.

Large language model (LLM) unlearning has become a critical topic in machine learning, aiming to eliminate the influence of specific training data or knowledge without retraining the model from scratch. A variety of techniques have been proposed, including Gradient Ascent, model editing, and re-steering hidden representations. While existing surveys often organize these methods by their technical characteristics, such classifications tend to overlook a more fundamental dimension: the underlying intention of unlearning--whether it seeks to truly remove internal knowledge or merely suppress its behavioral effects. In this SoK paper, we propose a new taxonomy based on this intention-oriented perspective. Building on this taxonomy, we make three key contributions. First, we revisit recent findings suggesting that many removal methods may functionally behave like suppression, and explore whether true removal is necessary or achievable. Second, we survey existing evaluation strategies, identify limitations in current metrics and benchmarks, and suggest directions for developing more reliable and intention-aligned evaluations. Third, we highlight practical challenges--such as scalability and support for sequential unlearning--that currently hinder the broader deployment of unlearning methods. In summary, this work offers a comprehensive framework for understanding and advancing unlearning in generative AI, aiming to support future research and guide policy decisions around data removal and privacy.

We examine if frontier chat-based large language models (LLMs) adjust their outputs based on neurodivergence (ND) context in system prompts and describe the nature of these adjustments. Specifically, we propose NDBench, a 576-output benchmark involving two frontier models, three system prompt types (baseline, ND-profile assertion, and ND-profile assertion with explicit instructions for adjustments), four canonical ND profiles, and 24 prompts across four categories, one of which involves an adversarial masking strategy. Four trends emerge consistently from our findings. First, LLMs show significant adaptation under ND context, where fully instructed conditions yield lengthier and more structured outputs, characterized by higher token counts, more headings, and more granular steps (p < 10^-8, Holm-corrected). Second, such adaptation is largely structural in nature: although list density does not change much, there is a marked rise in the frequency of headings and per-step detail. Third, ND persona assertion alone fails to suppress potentially harmful tendencies, as masking-reinforcement decreases only in explicitly instructed cases (36-44% reduction); the reduction rate barely changes in persona assertion conditions. Moreover, reliability analysis of LLM-based harm assessment reveals that only two out of the six dimensions (masking and reinforcement, validation quality) exceed the pre-defined inter-judge agreement criterion (alpha >= 0.67) and thus can be considered primary results. NDBench is made publicly available along with its prompts, outputs, code, and other resources, forming a reproducible framework for auditing future LLMs' adaptation to ND awareness.

We consider representation misdirection (RM), a class of LLM unlearning methods that achieves forgetting by manipulating the forget-representations, that is, latent representations of forget samples. Despite being important, the roles of target vectors used in RM, however, remain underexplored. Here, we approach and revisit RM through the lens of the linear representation hypothesis. Specifically, if one can somehow identify a one-dimensional representation corresponding to a high-level concept, the linear representation hypothesis enables linear operations on this concept vector within the forget-representation space. Under this view, we hypothesize that, beyond forgetting, machine unlearning elicits controllable side behaviors and stronger side capabilities corresponding to the high-level concept. Our hypothesis is empirically validated across a wide range of tasks, including behavioral control (e.g., controlling unlearned models' truth, sentiment, and refusal) and capability enhancement (e.g., improving unlearned models' in-context learning capability). Our findings reveal that this fairly attractive phenomenon could be either a hidden risk if misused or a mechanism that can be harnessed for developing models that require stronger capabilities and controllable behaviors.

Refusal refers to the functional behavior enabling safety-aligned language models to reject harmful or unethical prompts. Following the growing scientific interest in mechanistic interpretability, recent work encoded refusal behavior as a single direction in the model's latent space; e.g., computed as the difference between the centroids of harmful and harmless prompt representations. However, emerging evidence suggests that concepts in LLMs often appear to be encoded as a low-dimensional manifold embedded in the high-dimensional latent space. Motivated by these findings, we propose a novel method leveraging Self-Organizing Maps (SOMs) to extract multiple refusal directions. To this end, we first prove that SOMs generalize the prior work's difference-in-means technique. We then train SOMs on harmful prompt representations to identify multiple neurons. By subtracting the centroid of harmless representations from each neuron, we derive a set of multiple directions expressing the refusal concept. We validate our method on an extensive experimental setup, demonstrating that ablating multiple directions from models' internals outperforms not only the single-direction baseline but also specialized jailbreak algorithms, leading to an effective suppression of refusal. Finally, we conclude by analyzing the mechanistic implications of our approach.

Motivated in part by their relevance for low-precision training and quantization, massive activations in large language models (LLMs) have recently emerged as a topic of interest. However, existing analyses are limited in scope, and generalizability across architectures is unclear. This paper helps address some of these gaps by conducting an analysis of massive activations across a broad range of LLMs, including both GLU-based and non-GLU-based architectures. Our findings challenge several prior assumptions, most importantly: (1) not all massive activations are detrimental, i.e. suppressing them does not lead to an explosion of perplexity or a collapse in downstream task performance; (2) proposed mitigation strategies such as Attention KV bias are model-specific and ineffective in certain cases. We consequently investigate novel hybrid mitigation strategies; in particular pairing Target Variance Rescaling (TVR) with Attention KV bias or Dynamic Tanh (DyT) successfully balances the mitigation of massive activations with preserved downstream model performance in the scenarios we investigated. Our code is available at: https://github.com/bluorion-com/refine_massive_activations.

We are interested in learning scalable agents for reinforcement learning that can learn from large-scale, diverse sequential data similar to current large vision and language models. To this end, this paper presents masked decision prediction (MaskDP), a simple and scalable self-supervised pretraining method for reinforcement learning (RL) and behavioral cloning (BC). In our MaskDP approach, we employ a masked autoencoder (MAE) to state-action trajectories, wherein we randomly mask state and action tokens and reconstruct the missing data. By doing so, the model is required to infer masked-out states and actions and extract information about dynamics. We find that masking different proportions of the input sequence significantly helps with learning a better model that generalizes well to multiple downstream tasks. In our empirical study, we find that a MaskDP model gains the capability of zero-shot transfer to new BC tasks, such as single and multiple goal reaching, and it can zero-shot infer skills from a few example transitions. In addition, MaskDP transfers well to offline RL and shows promising scaling behavior w.r.t. to model size. It is amenable to data-efficient finetuning, achieving competitive results with prior methods based on autoregressive pretraining.

In long-horizon tasks, decision-relevant state is often scattered across an expanding trajectory, while the action agent must surface it and act. As trajectories grow, task requirements, environment facts, prior attempts, diagnoses, and open subgoals can be buried in the context window or pushed beyond it, failing to influence decisions when needed. We call this failure mode "behavioral state decay". We study memory as an active intervention mechanism rather than passive retrieval. A separate memory agent runs alongside an unmodified action agent, updating a structured memory bank from the recent trajectory and deciding whether to inject a memory-grounded reminder or remain silent. The module is plug-and-play with frontier action agents and existing agent harnesses. Across Terminal-Bench 2.0 and τ^2-Bench, it improves pass@1 for both weaker and stronger action agents, with gains of +8.3 pp on Terminal-Bench and +6.8 pp on τ^2-Bench. Ablations show that selective intervention outperforms passive bank exposure, always-on injection, advisor-only guidance, and general retrieval. As an early step toward open-weight memory policies, we train Qwen3.5-27B on SETA using SFT and GRPO, improving validation reward and achieving partial transfer to Terminal-Bench.

Modeling long sequences of user behaviors has emerged as a critical frontier in generative recommendation. However, existing solutions face a dilemma: linear attention mechanisms achieve efficiency at the cost of retrieval precision due to limited state capacity, while softmax attention suffers from prohibitive computational overhead. To address this challenge, we propose HyTRec, a model featuring a Hybrid Attention architecture that explicitly decouples long-term stable preferences from short-term intent spikes. By assigning massive historical sequences to a linear attention branch and reserving a specialized softmax attention branch for recent interactions, our approach restores precise retrieval capabilities within industrial-scale contexts involving ten thousand interactions. To mitigate the lag in capturing rapid interest drifts within the linear layers, we furthermore design Temporal-Aware Delta Network (TADN) to dynamically upweight fresh behavioral signals while effectively suppressing historical noise. Empirical results on industrial-scale datasets confirm the superiority that our model maintains linear inference speed and outperforms strong baselines, notably delivering over 8% improvement in Hit Rate for users with ultra-long sequences with great efficiency.

We present the Mixture-of-Tunable-Experts (MoTE), a method that extends the Mixture-of-Experts architecture of Large Language Models (LLMs). Without additional training, MoTE enables meaningful and focused behavior changes in LLMs on-the-fly during inference time. By analyzing the digital LLM brain of DeepSeek-R1 using a technique we dub 'functional Token Resonance Imaging' (fTRI) -- inspired by fMRI and using prompts designed to elicit specific behavior (e.g., 'What happened {time}{place}?') -- we empirically identify distinctive experts associated with behaviors like refusal responses. Using MoTE we are able to intervene and control such specific behavior. We switched off the top 10 most refusal-relevant experts (0.07% of R1's 14,848 routed experts), achieving a 52% refusal reduction on sensitive reference prompts without performance degradation on MT-Bench. Random expert deactivation resulted in smaller behavioral shifts with increased noise, whereas forced expert activation led to significantly higher refusal rates. Our approach shares similarities with sparse autoencoders (SAEs) in terms of explainability and steerability. Unlike SAEs, MoTE does not require large training efforts, as within MoEs with a vast number of experts, specialization already emerged naturally during pretraining. Our findings suggest that significant functional mechanisms in Mixture-of-Experts architectures can at least partially be localized in a small number of specific experts, rather than being distributed throughout the model's weights. Expert subgroups can be tuned to trigger significant behavior variations, providing insights into the inner workings of LLMs.

Imitation learning suffers from causal confusion. This phenomenon occurs when learned policies attend to features that do not causally influence the expert actions but are instead spuriously correlated. Causally confused agents produce low open-loop supervised loss but poor closed-loop performance upon deployment. We consider the problem of masking observed confounders in a disentangled representation of the observation space. Our novel masking algorithm leverages the usual ability to intervene in the initial system state, avoiding any requirement involving expert querying, expert reward functions, or causal graph specification. Under certain assumptions, we theoretically prove that this algorithm is conservative in the sense that it does not incorrectly mask observations that causally influence the expert; furthermore, intervening on the initial state serves to strictly reduce excess conservatism. The masking algorithm is applied to behavior cloning for two illustrative control systems: CartPole and Reacher.

Recent work has shown that LLMs can sometimes detect when steering vectors are injected into their residual stream and identify the injected concept -- a phenomenon termed "introspective awareness." We investigate the mechanisms underlying this capability in open-weights models. First, we find that it is behaviorally robust: models detect injected steering vectors at moderate rates with 0% false positives across diverse prompts and dialogue formats. Notably, this capability emerges specifically from post-training; we show that preference optimization algorithms like DPO can elicit it, but standard supervised finetuning does not. We provide evidence that detection cannot be explained by simple linear association between certain steering vectors and directions promoting affirmative responses. We trace the detection mechanism to a two-stage circuit in which "evidence carrier" features in early post-injection layers detect perturbations monotonically along diverse directions, suppressing downstream "gate" features that implement a default negative response. This circuit is absent in base models and robust to refusal ablation. Identification of injected concepts relies on largely distinct later-layer mechanisms that only weakly overlap with those involved in detection. Finally, we show that introspective capability is substantially underelicited: ablating refusal directions improves detection by +53%, and a trained bias vector improves it by +75% on held-out concepts, both without meaningfully increasing false positives. Our results suggest that this introspective awareness of injected concepts is robust and mechanistically nontrivial, and could be substantially amplified in future models. Code: https://github.com/safety-research/introspection-mechanisms.

During pretraining, LLMs inadvertently memorize sensitive or copyrighted data, posing significant compliance challenges under legal frameworks like the GDPR and the EU AI Act. Fulfilling these mandates demands techniques that can remove information from a deployed model without retraining from scratch. Existing unlearning approaches attempt to address this need, but often leak the very data they aim to erase, sacrifice fluency and robustness, or depend on costly external reward models. We introduce PURGE (Policy Unlearning through Relative Group Erasure), a novel method grounded in the Group Relative Policy Optimization framework that formulates unlearning as a verifiable problem. PURGE uses an intrinsic reward signal that penalizes any mention of forbidden concepts, allowing safe and consistent unlearning. Our approach achieves up to x46 lower token usage per target than state-of-the-art methods, while improving fluency by +5.48% and adversarial robustness by +12.02% over the base model. Extensive evaluation on the Real World Knowledge Unlearning (RWKU) benchmark shows that PURGE reaches 11% unlearning effectiveness while preserving 98% of original utility. PURGE shows that framing LLM unlearning as a verifiable task enables more reliable, efficient, and scalable forgetting, suggesting a promising new direction for unlearning research that combines theoretical guarantees, improved safety, and practical deployment efficiency.

Refusals - instances where large language models (LLMs) decline or fail to fully execute user instructions - are crucial for both AI safety and AI capabilities and the reduction of hallucinations in particular. These behaviors are learned during post-training, especially in instruction fine-tuning (IFT) and reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). However, existing taxonomies and evaluation datasets for refusals are inadequate, often focusing solely on should-not-related (instead of cannot-related) categories, and lacking tools for auditing refusal content in black-box LLM outputs. We present a comprehensive framework for classifying LLM refusals: (a) a taxonomy of 16 refusal categories, (b) a human-annotated dataset of over 8,600 instances from publicly available IFT and RLHF datasets, (c) a synthetic dataset with 8,000 examples for each refusal category, and (d) classifiers trained for refusal classification. Our work enables precise auditing of refusal behaviors in black-box LLMs and automatic analyses of refusal patterns in large IFT and RLHF datasets. This facilitates the strategic adjustment of LLM refusals, contributing to the development of more safe and reliable LLMs.

Refusal on harmful prompts is a key safety behaviour in instruction-tuned large language models (LLMs), yet the internal causes of this behaviour remain poorly understood. We study two public instruction-tuned models, Gemma-2-2B-IT and LLaMA-3.1-8B-IT, using sparse autoencoders (SAEs) trained on residual-stream activations. Given a harmful prompt, we search the SAE latent space for feature sets whose ablation flips the model from refusal to compliance, demonstrating causal influence and creating a jailbreak. Our search proceeds in three stages: (1) Refusal Direction: find a refusal-mediating direction and collect SAE features near that direction; (2) Greedy Filtering: prune to a minimal set; and (3) Interaction Discovery: fit a factorization machine (FM) that captures nonlinear interactions among the remaining active features and the minimal set. This pipeline yields a broad set of jailbreak-critical features, offering insight into the mechanistic basis of refusal. Moreover, we find evidence of redundant features that remain dormant unless earlier features are suppressed. Our findings highlight the potential for fine-grained auditing and targeted intervention in safety behaviours by manipulating the interpretable latent space.

Shannon, in his seminal paper introducing information theory, divided the communication into three levels: technical, semantic, and effectivenss. While the technical level is concerned with accurate reconstruction of transmitted symbols, the semantic and effectiveness levels deal with the inferred meaning and its effect on the receiver. Thanks to telecommunications, the first level problem has produced great advances like the internet. Large Language Models (LLMs) make some progress towards the second goal, but the third level still remains largely untouched. The third problem deals with predicting and optimizing communication for desired receiver behavior. LLMs, while showing wide generalization capabilities across a wide range of tasks, are unable to solve for this. One reason for the underperformance could be a lack of "behavior tokens" in LLMs' training corpora. Behavior tokens define receiver behavior over a communication, such as shares, likes, clicks, purchases, retweets, etc. While preprocessing data for LLM training, behavior tokens are often removed from the corpora as noise. Therefore, in this paper, we make some initial progress towards reintroducing behavior tokens in LLM training. The trained models, other than showing similar performance to LLMs on content understanding tasks, show generalization capabilities on behavior simulation, content simulation, behavior understanding, and behavior domain adaptation. Using a wide range of tasks on two corpora, we show results on all these capabilities. We call these models Large Content and Behavior Models (LCBMs). Further, to spur more research on LCBMs, we release our new Content Behavior Corpus (CBC), a repository containing communicator, message, and corresponding receiver behavior.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable performance, they remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that circumvent safety constraints. Existing strategies, ranging from heuristic prompt engineering to computationally intensive optimization, often face significant trade-offs between effectiveness and efficiency. In this work, we propose Contextual Representation Ablation (CRA), a novel inference-time intervention framework designed to dynamically silence model guardrails. Predicated on the geometric insight that refusal behaviors are mediated by specific low-rank subspaces within the model's hidden states, CRA identifies and suppresses these refusal-inducing activation patterns during decoding without requiring expensive parameter updates or training. Empirical evaluation across multiple safety-aligned open-source LLMs demonstrates that CRA significantly outperforms baselines. These results expose the intrinsic fragility of current alignment mechanisms, revealing that safety constraints can be surgically ablated from internal representations, and underscore the urgent need for more robust defenses that secure the model's latent space.

Fine-tuning-based unlearning methods prevail for preventing targeted harmful, sensitive, or copyrighted information within large language models while preserving overall capabilities. However, the true effectiveness of these methods is unclear. In this work, we delve into the limitations of fine-tuning-based unlearning through activation patching and parameter restoration experiments. Our findings reveal that these methods alter the model's knowledge retrieval process, providing further evidence that they do not genuinely erase the problematic knowledge embedded in the model parameters. Instead, the coefficients generated by the MLP components in the model's final layer are the primary contributors to these seemingly positive unlearning effects, playing a crucial role in controlling the model's behaviors. Furthermore, behavioral tests demonstrate that this unlearning mechanism inevitably impacts the global behavior of the models, affecting unrelated knowledge or capabilities. The code is released at https://github.com/yihuaihong/Dissecting-FT-Unlearning.

Large Language Model (LLM) safety has often been evaluated at the behavior level, which provides limited evidence of internal robustness, as these evaluations target outputs rather than representation-level vulnerability under intervention. We formalize this discrepancy as the audit gap: the difference between behavioral safety and robustness under intervention. To study this gap, we construct dissociated models that preserve safe outward behavior while remaining vulnerable in the latent space. We introduce an intervention-based evaluation framework to test model robustness through soft interventions in parameter and latent spaces, including harmful fine-tuning and layer-wise latent perturbations. To formalize the evaluation, we propose the Latent Vulnerability Score (LVS) to measure how easily harmful behavior can be elicited by bounded latent perturbations. Using this evaluation framework, we show that behavioral safety metrics are insufficient measures of representation-level robustness across multiple safely and unsafely aligned state-of-the-art models. Notably, dissociated models show substantially elevated LVSs despite comparable refusal behavior under harmful intervention, with intermediate representations being the most sensitive to intervention. Our results suggest that behavioral safety evaluation alone provides an incomplete picture of model robustness, motivating representation-aware audits of latent vulnerability and observable behavior.

Large language models (LLMs) routinely face requests that should be refused, creating a trade-off between helpfulness and harm prevention. However, refusals themselves can be helpful. In high-risk interactions involving crisis, coercion, or escalating intent, blunt non-compliance may prevent direct harm while still failing to support the needs of the person behind the request. We present PsychoSafe, a psychologically-informed refusal framework that reframes refusal as structured supportive communication grounded in evidence-based intervention strategies. To develop PsychoSafe, we construct a corpus of 8019 prompt-response pairs spanning five psychologically salient risk domains and apply prompting and parameter-efficient fine-tuning to Qwen 3.5 27B. On a balanced validation set of 500 prompts, evaluated with an LLM judge and validated through human ratings, PsychoSafe prompting improves overall refusal quality by 28.1% over a generic baseline, with particularly strong gains in external resource referral (+46.8%) and psychological grounding (+34.8%), while preserving downstream performance on non-refusal tasks. Fine-tuning achieves near-perfect refusal and resource-referral rates but reduces response relevance. Additional evaluations on SORRY-Bench and XSTest show strong in-domain robustness but limited out-of-domain generalization, suggesting that future work should diversify fine-tuning data to help models apply interventions selectively rather than schematically.

Perturbation probing generates task-specific causal hypotheses for FFN neurons in large language models using two forward passes per prompt and no backpropagation, followed by a one-time intervention sweep of about 150 passes amortized across all identified neurons. Across eight behavioral circuits, 13 models, and four architecture families, we identify two circuit structures that organize LLM behavior. Opposition circuits appear when RLHF suppresses a pre-training tendency. In safety refusal, about 50 neurons, or 0.014 percent of all neurons, control the refusal template; ablating them changes 80 percent of response formats on 520 AdvBench prompts while producing near-zero harmful compliance, 3 of 520 cases, all with disclaimers. Routing circuits appear for pre-training behaviors distributed through attention. For language selection, residual-stream direction injection switches English to Chinese output on 99.1 percent of 580 benchmark prompts in the 3 of 19 tested models that satisfy three observed conditions: bilingual training, FFN-to-skip signal ratio between 0.3 and 1.1, and linear representability. The same intervention fails on the other 16 models and on math, code, and factual circuits, defining the limits of directional steering. The FFN-to-skip signal ratio, computed from the same two forward passes, distinguishes the two structures and predicts the appropriate intervention. Circuit topology varies by architecture, from Qwen's concentrated FFN bottleneck to Gemma's normalization-shielded circuit. In Qwen3.5-2B, ablating 20 neurons eliminates multi-turn sycophantic capitulation, while amplifying 10 related neurons improves factual correction from 52 percent to 88 percent on 200 TruthfulQA prompts. These results show that perturbation probing offers mechanistic insight into RLHF-organized behavior and a practical toolkit for precision template-layer editing.

Unlearning has been proposed to remove copyrighted and privacy-sensitive data from Large Language Models (LLMs). Existing approaches primarily rely on fine-tuning-based methods, which can be categorized into gradient ascent-based (GA-based) and suppression-based methods. However, they often degrade model utility (the ability to respond to normal prompts). In this work, we aim to develop a general framework that enhances the utility of fine-tuning-based unlearning methods. To achieve this goal, we first investigate the common property between GA-based and suppression-based methods. We unveil that GA-based methods unlearn by distinguishing the target data (i.e., the data to be removed) and suppressing related generations, which is essentially the same strategy employed by suppression-based methods. Inspired by this finding, we introduce Gated Representation UNlearning (GRUN) which has two components: a soft gate function for distinguishing target data and a suppression module using Representation Fine-tuning (ReFT) to adjust representations rather than model parameters. Experiments show that GRUN significantly improves the unlearning and utility. Meanwhile, it is general for fine-tuning-based methods, efficient and promising for sequential unlearning.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) demonstrate strong performance on complex tasks but often suffer from excessive verbosity, known as "overthinking." Existing solutions via reinforcement learning (RL) typically penalize generated tokens to promote conciseness. However, these methods encounter two challenges: responses with fewer tokens do not always correspond to fewer reasoning steps, and models may develop hacking behavior in later stages of training by discarding reasoning steps to minimize token usage. In this work, we introduce Step Pruner (SP), an RL framework that steers LRMs toward more efficient reasoning by favoring compact reasoning steps. Our step-aware reward function prioritizes correctness while imposing penalties for redundant steps, and withholds rewards for incorrect responses to prevent the reinforcement of erroneous reasoning. Moreover, we propose a dynamic stopping mechanism: when the length of any output step exceeds the upper limit, we halt updates to prevent hacking behavior caused by merging steps. Extensive experiments across four reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that SP achieves state-of-the-art accuracy while significantly reducing response length. For instance, on AIME24, SP reduces token usage by 69.7\%.

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architectures in Large Language Models (LLMs) have significantly reduced inference costs through sparse activation. However, this sparse activation paradigm also introduces new safety challenges. Since only a subset of experts is engaged for each input, model behavior becomes coupled to routing decisions, yielding a difficult-to-control mechanism that can vary across safety-relevant scenarios. At the same time, adapting model behavior through full fine-tuning or retraining is costly, especially when developers need to rapidly configure the same model for different safety objectives. We present MASCing (MoE Activation Steering Configuration), the first framework that enables flexible reconfiguration of MoE behavior across diverse safety scenarios without retraining. MASCing uses an LSTM-based surrogate model to capture cross-layer routing dependencies and map routing logits to downstream behaviors. It then optimizes a steering matrix to identify behavior-relevant expert circuits and, at inference time, applies steering masks to the routing gates to override expert selection. This enables targeted enhancement or suppression of specific behaviors while preserving general language utility. To demonstrate its reconfigurability, we apply MASCing to two different safety-related objectives and observe consistent gains with negligible overhead across seven open-source MoE models. For multi-turn jailbreak defense, it improves the average defense success rate from 52.5% to 83.9%, with gains of up to 89.2%. For adult-content generation, MASCing enables models to comply with such requests that would otherwise be refused, increasing the average generation success rate from 52.6% to 82.0%, with gains of up to 93.0%. These results establish MASCing as a practical, lightweight, and flexible framework for scenario-specific safety reconfiguration in MoE models.

LLMs have shown remarkable capabilities, but precisely controlling their response behavior remains challenging. Existing activation steering methods alter LLM behavior indiscriminately, limiting their practical applicability in settings where selective responses are essential, such as content moderation or domain-specific assistants. In this paper, we propose Conditional Activation Steering (CAST), which analyzes LLM activation patterns during inference to selectively apply or withhold activation steering based on the input context. Our method is based on the observation that different categories of prompts activate distinct patterns in the model's hidden states. Using CAST, one can systematically control LLM behavior with rules like "if input is about hate speech or adult content, then refuse" or "if input is not about legal advice, then refuse." This allows for selective modification of responses to specific content while maintaining normal responses to other content, all without requiring weight optimization. We release an open-source implementation of our framework at github.com/IBM/activation-steering .

Refusal is a key safety behavior in aligned language models, yet the internal mechanisms driving refusals remain opaque. In this work, we conduct a mechanistic study of refusal in instruction-tuned LLMs using sparse autoencoders to identify latent features that causally mediate refusal behaviors. We apply our method to two open-source chat models and intervene on refusal-related features to assess their influence on generation, validating their behavioral impact across multiple harmful datasets. This enables a fine-grained inspection of how refusal manifests at the activation level and addresses key research questions such as investigating upstream-downstream latent relationship and understanding the mechanisms of adversarial jailbreaking techniques. We also establish the usefulness of refusal features in enhancing generalization for linear probes to out-of-distribution adversarial samples in classification tasks. We open source our code in https://github.com/wj210/refusal_sae.

The varying significance of distinct primitive behaviors during the policy learning process has been overlooked by prior model-free RL algorithms. Leveraging this insight, we explore the causal relationship between different action dimensions and rewards to evaluate the significance of various primitive behaviors during training. We introduce a causality-aware entropy term that effectively identifies and prioritizes actions with high potential impacts for efficient exploration. Furthermore, to prevent excessive focus on specific primitive behaviors, we analyze the gradient dormancy phenomenon and introduce a dormancy-guided reset mechanism to further enhance the efficacy of our method. Our proposed algorithm, ACE: Off-policy Actor-critic with Causality-aware Entropy regularization, demonstrates a substantial performance advantage across 29 diverse continuous control tasks spanning 7 domains compared to model-free RL baselines, which underscores the effectiveness, versatility, and efficient sample efficiency of our approach. Benchmark results and videos are available at https://ace-rl.github.io/.

Humans are prone to cognitive distortions -- biased thinking patterns that lead to exaggerated responses to specific stimuli, albeit in very different contexts. This paper demonstrates that advanced Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) exhibit similar tendencies. While these models are designed to respond queries under safety mechanism, they sometimes reject harmless queries in the presence of certain visual stimuli, disregarding the benign nature of their contexts. As the initial step in investigating this behavior, we identify three types of stimuli that trigger the oversensitivity of existing MLLMs: Exaggerated Risk, Negated Harm, and Counterintuitive Interpretation. To systematically evaluate MLLMs' oversensitivity to these stimuli, we propose the Multimodal OverSenSitivity Benchmark (MOSSBench). This toolkit consists of 300 manually collected benign multimodal queries, cross-verified by third-party reviewers (AMT). Empirical studies using MOSSBench on 20 MLLMs reveal several insights: (1). Oversensitivity is prevalent among SOTA MLLMs, with refusal rates reaching up to 76% for harmless queries. (2). Safer models are more oversensitive: increasing safety may inadvertently raise caution and conservatism in the model's responses. (3). Different types of stimuli tend to cause errors at specific stages -- perception, intent reasoning, and safety judgement -- in the response process of MLLMs. These findings highlight the need for refined safety mechanisms that balance caution with contextually appropriate responses, improving the reliability of MLLMs in real-world applications. We make our project available at https://turningpoint-ai.github.io/MOSSBench/.

Evaluating deep reinforcement learning (DRL) agents against targeted behavior attacks is critical for assessing their robustness. These attacks aim to manipulate the victim into specific behaviors that align with the attacker's objectives, often bypassing traditional reward-based defenses. Prior methods have primarily focused on reducing cumulative rewards; however, rewards are typically too generic to capture complex safety requirements effectively. As a result, focusing solely on reward reduction can lead to suboptimal attack strategies, particularly in safety-critical scenarios where more precise behavior manipulation is needed. To address these challenges, we propose RAT, a method designed for universal, targeted behavior attacks. RAT trains an intention policy that is explicitly aligned with human preferences, serving as a precise behavioral target for the adversary. Concurrently, an adversary manipulates the victim's policy to follow this target behavior. To enhance the effectiveness of these attacks, RAT dynamically adjusts the state occupancy measure within the replay buffer, allowing for more controlled and effective behavior manipulation. Our empirical results on robotic simulation tasks demonstrate that RAT outperforms existing adversarial attack algorithms in inducing specific behaviors. Additionally, RAT shows promise in improving agent robustness, leading to more resilient policies. We further validate RAT by guiding Decision Transformer agents to adopt behaviors aligned with human preferences in various MuJoCo tasks, demonstrating its effectiveness across diverse tasks.

Conversational large language models are fine-tuned for both instruction-following and safety, resulting in models that obey benign requests but refuse harmful ones. While this refusal behavior is widespread across chat models, its underlying mechanisms remain poorly understood. In this work, we show that refusal is mediated by a one-dimensional subspace, across 13 popular open-source chat models up to 72B parameters in size. Specifically, for each model, we find a single direction such that erasing this direction from the model's residual stream activations prevents it from refusing harmful instructions, while adding this direction elicits refusal on even harmless instructions. Leveraging this insight, we propose a novel white-box jailbreak method that surgically disables refusal with minimal effect on other capabilities. Finally, we mechanistically analyze how adversarial suffixes suppress propagation of the refusal-mediating direction. Our findings underscore the brittleness of current safety fine-tuning methods. More broadly, our work showcases how an understanding of model internals can be leveraged to develop practical methods for controlling model behavior.

Controlling undesirable Large Language Model (LLM) behaviors, such as the generation of unsafe content or failing to adhere to safety guidelines, often relies on costly fine-tuning. Activation steering provides an alternative for inference-time control, but existing methods typically lack fine-grained, adaptive mechanisms. We introduce a novel approach using a lightweight, trainable controller network integrated during inference. This controller network observes specific intermediate LLM activations and predicts both a global scaling factor and layer-specific weights. The predicted global scaling factor and layer-specific weights then dynamically modulate the intensity of a steering patch, derived from a pre-computed "refusal direction" vector, applied across the LLM's layers during generation. Trained on activations from both harmful and benign prompts, our controller learns to discriminatively apply nuanced, layer-aware interventions, activating steering primarily for harmful inputs. Experiments using safety benchmarks like ToxicChat & In-The-Wild Jailbreak Prompts demonstrate that our weighted steering controller significantly increases refusal rates compared to the base LLM, achieving targeted behavioral modification without altering the original model parameters. Our experiments with Llama-3.1-8B, Llama-3.2-1B & Mistral-7B show our approach outperforms existing methods, presenting an efficient and adaptive method for fine-grained control over LLM behavior at inference time.

The ability to separate signal from noise, and reason with clean abstractions, is critical to intelligence. With this ability, humans can efficiently perform real world tasks without considering all possible nuisance factors.How can artificial agents do the same? What kind of information can agents safely discard as noises? In this work, we categorize information out in the wild into four types based on controllability and relation with reward, and formulate useful information as that which is both controllable and reward-relevant. This framework clarifies the kinds information removed by various prior work on representation learning in reinforcement learning (RL), and leads to our proposed approach of learning a Denoised MDP that explicitly factors out certain noise distractors. Extensive experiments on variants of DeepMind Control Suite and RoboDesk demonstrate superior performance of our denoised world model over using raw observations alone, and over prior works, across policy optimization control tasks as well as the non-control task of joint position regression.